[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5117-5135]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                IMPROVING AMERICA'S SECURITY ACT OF 2007

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of S. 4, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 4) to make the United States more secure by 
     implementing unfinished recommendations of the 9/11 
     Commission to

[[Page 5118]]

     fight the war on terror more effectively, to improve homeland 
     security, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Reid amendment No. 275, in the nature of a substitute;
       Collins amendment No. 277 (to amendment No. 275), to extend 
     the deadline by which State identification documents shall 
     comply with certain minimum standards; and
       Bingaman-Domenici amendment No. 281 (to amendment No. 275), 
     to provide financial aid to local law enforcement officials 
     along the Nation's borders.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, this is the second day of our 
consideration of this important legislation that came out with a 
bipartisan vote of 16 to 0, with one abstention, from our Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. As its title makes clear, 
this bill is aimed at finishing the job, completing the mission the 9/
11 Commission gave us to secure the American people while at home from 
potential terrorist attack post-9/11.
  We had some good discussion in the opening day yesterday. We adopted 
by voice an amendment offered by the Senator from California, Senator 
Feinstein, which improved the security elements of the so-called visa 
waiver program, and we adopted in rollcall votes two amendments by 
Senator DeMint and another by Senator Inouye which would codify the 
existing regulatory framework that creates the Transportation Worker 
Identification Card, TWIC. This is the system by which, again post-9/
11, we are doing things we never thought we would have to do. Then 
again, we never thought we would be attacked by terrorists at home, 
striking against civilians using elements of our own commercial 
society, in that case planes, to try to destroy us.
  So here we are with these two amendments now that would codify the 
screening process by which we aim to assure that those working at our 
docks, and this will be extended more broadly over time to 
transportation sectors--there is a card now that exists for aviation-
related facilities--to make sure that we have done some screening to 
see that the people who are now working behind the scenes or even in 
front of these transportation nodes, which have now in this age become 
potential targets of terrorists, will be people whom we have reason to 
trust with that now very sensitive responsibility.
  We return to the bill this morning, and we are moving ahead. There 
are several amendments that I know are being discussed. We have an 
amendment my ranking member, Senator Collins of Maine, filed regarding 
the so-called REAL ID Act that is pending. There are other amendments 
that are being discussed.
  I would advise my colleagues and their staffs, if they are hearing 
this at this moment, that the floor is open. We gather that Senator 
Schumer and Senator Menendez may be coming over with an amendment early 
this afternoon dealing with port security, but there is nothing before 
us now. If you have an amendment, this would be a good time to bring it 
over.
  Mr. President, I note the presence of my friend and colleague from 
New Hampshire, Senator Sununu, on the floor, and I yield the floor to 
him at this time.
  Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. President, I rise to speak about an issue that was 
raised by the amendment offered by Senator Collins to this homeland 
security bill dealing with the REAL ID Program, a program that is 
ostensibly designed to improve standards for security and eligibility 
for a driver's license. One of the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission, was that America needs to find a way to improve the 
issuance of driver's licenses, a process which takes place daily in 
States all across the country and produces a form of identification 
used for various purposes, in order to ensure that this system is as 
secure and consistent as it can possibly be.
  I very much support those recommendations. In fact, in 2004, Congress 
sent to the President an intelligence reform bill that included a new, 
strong, well-defined process for improving those standards for security 
and eligibility, a negotiated rulemaking process, that brought the 
interested parties together.
  Who are the interested parties? States that issue the driver's 
licenses, the motor vehicle departments we have all visited from time 
to time, the privacy advocates, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and other groups. All those entities that have a shared interest in 
improving the way driver's licenses are issued, improving the standards 
for eligibility, improving standards for security and verification so 
that fraudulent activity is more easily identified and prevented.
  It was a good process, a sound process, but, unfortunately, as 
Senator Collins and others have pointed out in this debate, back in 
2005, during a debate on an appropriation bill, there was a provision 
included that struck down this negotiated process, that cut the States 
out of the process, that superceded all those efforts and simply said 
to the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Government, you 
decide the standards, you decide the criteria, and then simply require 
the States to comply.
  In Washington ``speak,'' that is called a big unfunded mandate, a 
mandate from the Federal Government for the States to do something 
without any support of funds to actually implement the decision. It is 
never a good idea to impose such a stark unfunded mandate. Equally 
important, that kind of federalized process takes away an important 
responsibility that the States have historically had and I believe they 
should maintain.
  We shouldn't be taking away the responsibility of the States to issue 
driver's licenses. We shouldn't be taking away the responsibility for 
managing this information. We want to make this a better process, we 
want to improve those standards, but we should not be cutting the 
States out and moving toward a national identity card system, which I 
think is fundamentally unnecessary.
  Senator Collins, recognizing these flaws in the REAL ID Program, came 
forward with an amendment that at least moves us back toward a 
rulemaking that listens to the States, that listens to local 
stakeholders, that listens to the departments of motor vehicles across 
the country. I think at the end of the day that kind of an inclusive 
process will result in better standards that are less costly, that are 
more easily implemented, and that ultimately can be carried though more 
quickly than any unfunded Federal mandate ever could.
  Senator Akaka and I have introduced legislation to fully repeal the 
REAL ID Act and bring us back to the negotiated rulemaking that we had 
in 2004. I think that would be the best solution because the applicable 
provisions of that 2004 intelligence reform bill were well crafted, 
well thought out, supported by both the States and the Federal 
Government, and made great progress. But what Senator Collins has 
proposed, in delaying the implementation of these rules and bringing 
back State participants, privacy advocates, and other stakeholders, is 
certainly a step in the right direction. I very much hope the 
administration is committed and sincere in the statements they have 
made that they understand that States need to be a part of this 
process.
  I support very much what Senator Collins is trying to do. I hope as 
our colleagues listen to this debate they recognize that improving 
security and eligibility standards for driver's licenses does not mean 
that we have to take rights and responsibilities away from the States. 
It does not mean that we have to create a national ID card. It does not 
mean that we have to have a national database on every driver in 
America. We can do these things in a way that respects the rights of 
States, that makes us all more secure, and that is consistent with the 
9/11 Commission report.
  I thank both the chairman and the ranking member for allowing me the 
time to speak. I certainly hope that we continue to proceed to adopt 
the Collins amendment or provisions similar to the Collins amendment, 
and I will certainly continue to speak out on this issue with my 
colleagues, such as Senator Akaka and Senator Alexander

[[Page 5119]]

and others, who recognized, not this year or last year but back in 2005 
when this program was forced upon us, that REAL ID simply does not take 
America in the right direction.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The Senator from Maine is 
recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me begin my comments this morning by 
commending the Senator from New Hampshire for his hard work and 
vigorous advocacy on this issue. He has been a very early voice, 
pointing out the unfairness of this unfunded mandate on the States, 
unfunded mandates that the National Governors Association estimates may 
cost $11 billion over the next 5 years. He has also raised very 
important concerns about the privacy implications of some of the 
provisions of the REAL ID Act.
  He was a strong supporter of the approach that we took in 2004 as 
part of the Intelligence Reform Act when we set up a negotiated 
rulemaking process which would bring all of the stakeholders to the 
table--State governments, Federal agencies, privacy advocates, 
technological experts--and clearly that would have been a far better 
way to proceed. The Senator from New Hampshire is one of the Senate's 
foremost advocates for privacy. He has brought that issue up, and his 
concerns about privacy and civil liberties, on other legislation such 
as the PATRIOT Act that has been before the Senate. I thank him for his 
leadership on this important issue.
  I do have some good news to report to my colleagues about the pending 
regulations for the REAL ID Act. As many of my colleagues are aware, 
one of the problems that the States have had is the Department of 
Homeland Security had yet to issue the regulations giving States the 
detailed guidance on how to comply with the REAL ID Act. This is a 
major problem for the States because of the looming deadline of May of 
next year by which time they are supposed to be in full compliance with 
the law, despite the fact that the regulations had not been issued. It 
was that concern, the long delay by the Department, the cost and the 
complexity of the task, and the privacy and civil liberty implications 
that led several of us to come together and offer an amendment that 
would have a 2-year delay in compliance with the REAL ID Act.
  I am pleased to inform my colleagues that as the result of some 
rather spirited negotiations with the Department of Homeland Security 
that the Department will announce later today regulations that would 
give any State that asks an automatic, virtually, 2 years--it could be 
more than 2 years in some cases--but a 2-year delay in the requirement 
to comply with the REAL ID Act. This is significant progress. The 
Department has finally recognized that it simply was unfair to impose 
this burden on the States, to set such an unrealistic compliance date 
when the Department had failed to issue the regulations. So the 
Department will be announcing today that any State that seeks an 
additional 2 years to comply with the regulations will be granted that 
extension. This is major progress.
  In addition, the Department will announce that it will reconvene the 
members of the negotiated rulemaking committee that was established by 
the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act and subsequently repealed by the REAL 
ID Act to come together and to comment on the Department's regulations. 
Again, this reflects a major principle in the Collins amendment: that 
we should have a 2-year delay to allow for additional compliance time 
but that we should also reconvene the negotiated rulemaking committee, 
the committee that is comprised of State officials--in fact, Maine's 
own secretary of state was one of the officials on the committee--and 
privacy experts, technological experts, all the stakeholders would be 
reconvened to formally review the proposed regulations and provide the 
Department with the benefit of this committee's insight.
  That is what should have happened in the first place but, certainly, 
given where we are now, this is another very positive step that the 
Department is taking. It reflects the principles in the amendment that 
I and others offered yesterday. It is obvious that the pending 
amendment provided a great deal of impetus for the Department to 
undertake these revisions in the proposed regulations.
  These two major concessions by the Department--the extension for 
compliance and the reconvening of the negotiated rulemaking committee--
are major steps forward, but they do not solve all of the issues and 
all of the problems with the REAL ID Act, the biggest of which is the 
huge cost of compliance. Along with Senator Alexander and others--
Senator Sununu, Senator Carper, Senator Akaka, and others who had been 
active on this issue--I am pledging today to continue to work very 
closely with our State leaders and with the Department of Homeland 
Security to calculate what the actual costs of compliance are going to 
be--that is going to be easier to do now that the regulations are 
finally being issued--and to work to try to find some funding to assist 
States with the cost of compliance.
  To date, Congress has only appropriated about $40 million to help the 
States comply with the REAL ID Act, and the Department, I am told, has 
only allocated about $6 million of that $40 million. So there is some 
additional money in the pipeline, but if in fact the cost is as high as 
the National Governors Association and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures estimate, that $40 million is a drop in the bucket. The 5-
year cost estimated by the NGA is $11 billion. Clearly, if the costs do 
prove to be in that neighborhood, if they are that high, we have an 
obligation to come forward and assist the States in the cost of 
compliance. It can be a shared responsibility, but surely, since we 
imposed the mandate, we should be providing some of the funding that is 
needed.
  I am very happy the amendment that I and several of our colleagues 
have offered has prompted the Department to take a second look at its 
regulations, to realize that it was simply unreasonable to expect the 
States to comply by May of next year when the Department has been so 
tardy in issuing the regulations. And I am pleased that the Department 
has changed its mind. I thank Secretary Chertoff for working closely 
with me and for listening to all of us who were raising these 
concerns--that it was simply unreasonable to expect States to be in 
full compliance by May of next year when they did not have the detailed 
guidance from the Department.
  I am also very pleased the Department is going to reconvene the 
negotiated rulemaking committee members. That will give the Department 
further input and insights and improve the quality of the final 
regulations.
  There is still much work to be done, particularly in the funding 
area, but this is certainly great progress, a welcome development, and 
a major step forward by the Department. I again thank Secretary 
Chertoff for working so closely with me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I congratulate Senator Collins for her 
leadership and for having created a context in which the administration 
now has come forward, finally, with the regulations pursuant to the so-
called REAL ID Act, which does create some flexibility for States to 
comply with the requirement but also doesn't eliminate it because it is 
an important one. This is in the nature of this glorious governmental 
system of ours, the wisdom of the Founders more than two centuries ago 
to create the checks and balances. The legislature acts, Congress acts, 
the executive branch begins to work on implementation, States--this 
could actually be a textbook. Incidentally, I said to my friend I 
cannot say enough that it was my honor, too many years ago, in teaching 
a course at Yale to have the current occupant of the chair, the Senator 
from Ohio, Mr. Brown, as my student. He learned very well. He taught me 
a lot, actually, as time went on. This sounds like we are back in the 
classroom talking about the relationships in government.
  It was, I believe, the advocacy of Senator Collins that produced a 
reasonable result without the need for a specific legislative action. I 
do want to go

[[Page 5120]]

back and set this in context because the overall purpose is a 
critically important one to the quest for homeland security. The 9/11 
committee found that all but one of the 9/11 hijackers, the terrorists 
who attacked us that day, obtained American identification documents, 
some--I hate to use the word, but--legally, which is to say they 
complied with the requirements for that identification, and then some 
others by fraud. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the Federal 
Government set standards for the issuance of driver's licenses and 
identification cards.
  Driver's licenses are the most commonly used form of personal 
identification by people in this country. For a long time, what was 
identification about? It was simply that--maybe for credit purposes, 
maybe to get into a facility. Now identification is loaded with 
tremendous implications for security and abuse that go beyond financial 
fraud, which is what we were primarily concerned about before.
  The 9/11 Commission made this recommendation for national standards 
for driver's licenses and other forms of ID cards. They saw it as 
important to protecting the Nation against terrorism post-9/11 because 
often--it is very important to think about this--ID cards are the last 
line of defense against terrorists entering controlled areas such as 
airplanes or secure buildings. Obviously, it is important that we know 
exactly who those people are, that they are what the card says they 
are, and that they haven't obtained that card through fraud.
  In 2004, as part of the legislative effort successfully completed to 
adopt the proposals of the 9/11 Commission and put them into law, 
Senator Collins, Senator McCain, and I drafted provisions to implement 
this recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. I am pleased to say that we 
did so with input from both sides of the political aisle and all 
interested constituencies to increase security for issuing driver's 
licenses. Our language was endorsed by State and local governments, by 
the administration, and by a range of immigration, privacy, and civil 
liberties advocacy groups. In fact, our provisions to create national 
standards for State issuance of driver's licenses were enacted into law 
as part of the 2004 intelligence reform legislation.
  In 2005, beginning in the other body, so to speak, the House of 
Representatives, the REAL ID Act was included in a supplemental 
appropriations bill providing emergency funding for our troops. The 
REAL ID Act repealed the provisions I have spoken of that Senator 
Collins, Senator McCain, and I and others had put into the 9/11 
legislation the previous year. In place of what I still believe was our 
workable and balanced program, which would have achieved the aims the 
9/11 Commission gave us, the REAL ID Act imposed very difficult and, in 
some cases, unrealistic and, of course, unfunded requirements on States 
to verify identification documents by plugging into a series of 
databases that require technological changes that are expensive and, as 
is happening right now, delaying the actual implementation of a 
national set of standards which would have guaranteed us that driver's 
licenses and other ID cards are more secure.
  The fact is, REAL ID obviously, if it did not have this escape valve 
opened up as a result of Senator Collins' work, would slow down the 
issuance of driver's licenses to everyone and, I fear, might even 
increase the risk of identity theft. Notwithstanding that, if I had my 
druthers, as they used to say, I would go back to the provision we had 
in the original 9/11 legislation, but we are not there. The REAL ID Act 
is law, and it is beginning to be implemented.
  The most important thing we can do is not pull away from the goal 
which remains critically important to our national security in the war 
against the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 and want to do it again; 
that is, to make sure our driver's licenses and other forms of identity 
are tamper-proof and real.
  We have now struck a balance, with the initiative of Senator Collins 
and others and the response of the Department of Homeland Security this 
morning. We still have the goal, and we are going to implement it in a 
more balanced and reasonable fashion. But it is critically important 
not to move away from the goal. The goal is fundamental to the security 
of each and every American. Yes, it is going to be a little harder to 
get the driver's license but not a lot harder. What it is going to mean 
to everybody is that we can feel more secure when we get on a plane, 
when we go into a secure building, when we just move about enjoying the 
freedom and way of life we are blessed to enjoy as Americans.
  I thank Senator Collins for her leadership and the good result. I 
remind colleagues that the floor is open for business. We welcome 
amendments.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


       Amendments Nos. 291 and 292 to Amendment No. 275, En Bloc

  Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. President, I have two amendments at the desk. I ask 
unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and that the 
two amendments I have at the desk be considered en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Sununu] proposes 
     amendments numbered 291 and 292 en bloc to amendment No. 275.

  Mr. SUNUNU. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendments be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 291

       (Purpose: To ensure that the emergency communications and 
interoperability communications grant program does not exclude Internet 
                Protocol-based interoperable solutions)

       On page 121, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
       ``(k) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed or interpreted to preclude the use of funds 
     under this section by a State for interim or long-term 
     Internet Protocol-based interoperable solutions, 
     notwithstanding compliance with the Project 25 standard.''.


                           amendment no. 292

     (Purpose: To expand the reporting requirement on cross border 
   interoperability, and to prevent lengthy delays in the accessing 
  frequencies and channels for public safety communication users and 
                                others)

       On page 361, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:
       (c) International Negotiations to Remedy Situation.--Not 
     later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     the Secretary of the Department of State shall report to 
     Congress on--
       (1) the current process for considering applications by 
     Canada for frequencies and channels by United States 
     communities above Line A;
       (2) the status of current negotiations to reform and revise 
     such process;
       (3) the estimated date of conclusion for such negotiations;
       (4) whether the current process allows for automatic 
     denials or dismissals of initial applications by the 
     Government of Canada, and whether such denials or dismissals 
     are currently occurring; and
       (5) communications between the Department of State and the 
     Federal Communications Commission pursuant to subsection 
     (a)(3).

  Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. President, I offer this morning two amendments that 
expand on the work we did in the Commerce Committee dealing with the 
implementation of September 11 recommendations; in particular, in the 
area of interoperability, meaning, quite simply, the continued effort 
of State, local, and Federal law enforcement to put in place 
communications systems that work reliably, effectively, robustly, and 
that work effectively with one another.
  The first amendment deals with the grant programs which have been 
established in law already and which are expanded under the legislation 
before us. Those grant programs support the purchase of equipment to 
expand and improve our interoperability for homeland security purposes. 
It is essential

[[Page 5121]]

that we make sure that to the greatest extent possible, we look at all 
available technologies for meeting these goals--in particular, we make 
sure we don't preclude any funding from going to the Internet-based or 
IP-enabled services and software and communications systems that are 
more and more a part of our daily lives. Members of the Senate are 
often seen roaming the hallways of the Capitol with their Blackberrys, 
for example. More and more, these devices operate like a Palm or a 
Treo, using IP-enabled systems. These systems are improving. They are 
getting more robust. They are becoming ever more reliable.
  The language I offer today simply states that those IP-enabled 
technologies which can help improve interoperability should not be 
precluded from receiving funds under any of the grant programs in this 
legislation. We have such language already that applies to the NTIA 
which is under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Committee, but I want 
to make sure that language is included throughout the bill. I don't 
think we should be picking technological winners and losers, but we 
want to make sure some of the most promising technologies out there at 
least are put on a level playing field with older alternatives.
  The second amendment I offer deals with the issue of cross-border 
interoperability, which simply means communications in areas of the 
country where we border a foreign country. The northern part of the 
country--New Hampshire, Maine, Vermont, New England States--shares a 
border with our neighbor Canada, and there are certainly issues in the 
southern part of the country with our neighbor Mexico. But there are 
always questions about awarding or distributing spectrum channels for 
communication that would be used by State or local homeland security or 
law enforcement issues in those border areas because we don't want to 
engage in policies that unnecessarily interfere with the efforts of the 
communication of our foreign neighbors. Unfortunately, there have been 
a lot of delays in making spectrum available in those cross-border 
areas.
  We have language again in part of the bill that I included in the 
Commerce Committee that applies to the FCC to look at the issues 
associated with awarding spectrum for cross-border interoperability, to 
find out why there have been delays, find out what can be done to 
accelerate this process, so in those parts of the country that are 
affected by cross-border interoperability, we can serve law enforcement 
effectively. We have some reporting requirements to look at this issue 
within the FCC.
  My second amendment would extend that language to ask the State 
Department, which has obvious responsibility in maintaining and 
improving our relations with foreign countries, to also look at these 
questions.
  So these are the two amendments. They expand on work that was 
accepted in a broad, bipartisan consensus in the Commerce Committee. I 
hope my colleagues will have an opportunity today to look at these 
amendments. I sincerely ask for their support.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from New Hampshire. 
These sound like two very constructive, sensible amendments. We will 
take a look at them and be in touch with him. But I am optimistic we 
will want to support these amendments. They improve the basic 
architecture of the bill, and particularly in the critical area of 
establishing programs of Federal support for the first time that will 
enable States and localities, consistent with a plan--not just willy-
nilly but consistent with a plan--to finally make communications 
interoperable so our first responders can talk to one another in times 
of crisis.
  I thank my friend from New Hampshire for his initiative.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I want to let the Senator from New 
Hampshire know we are reviewing his two amendments. Based on what he 
told me, I, too, am inclined to agree to them, and I will be working 
with the Senator from New Hampshire and the Senator from Connecticut to 
try to get the two amendments cleared.
  I certainly appreciate, coming from a border State, the concerns the 
Senator from New Hampshire has about U.S.-Canadian issues that might 
affect interoperability of communications equipment. That has been an 
issue for us in Maine as well.
  I look forward to working with him.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 277

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, shortly, I am going to ask unanimous 
consent to withdraw the Collins amendment No. 277, which is cosponsored 
by Senators Alexander, Cantwell, Carper, Chambliss, Mikulski, 
Murkowski, and Snowe. It also has received support from Senator Sununu 
this morning, who was very eloquent in his comments about the 
implementation of the REAL ID Act.
  I ask to withdraw my amendment in light of the tremendous progress we 
have been able to make with the Department of Homeland Security over 
the last 24 hours in convincing the Department to modify the 
regulations which it is releasing today to allow about 2 years of 
additional time for compliance with the REAL ID mandates and also to 
reconvene the negotiated rulemaking committee to take a look at those 
regulations and provide their insights and input to the Department so 
the Department can take them into account in issuing the final 
regulations.
  Now, I consider this to be tremendous progress. It is a very welcomed 
development. The Department's actions reflect the two primary 
objectives I outlined yesterday for my amendment: first, to give the 
Federal Government and States the time and flexibility needed to come 
up with an effective system to provide secure driver's licenses without 
unduly burdening the States and, second, to involve experts from the 
States, from the technology industry, as well as privacy and civil 
liberty advocates--to bring them back to the table and give them a 
chance to work on these regulations and to improve them.
  I am very pleased to say over the course of the past week our 
amendment has received a great deal of support from a number of 
sources. The National Governors Association praised our amendment for 
providing States:

     a more workable time frame to comply with federal standards, 
     ensure necessary systems are operational and enhance the 
     input states and other stakeholders have in the 
     implementation process.

  The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, in 
a letter to all Senators that was sent on February 27, said:

       We strongly urge you to support an amendment offered by 
     Senator Collins that would delay implementation of 
     requirements under the REAL ID Act. . . .

  The letter goes on to outline the organization's concerns about the 
costs to States, the capacity for States to meet the REAL ID 
requirements, and privacy issues and concludes:

       The Collins amendment provides the opportunity to address 
     these matters.

  Similarly, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the NCSL, 
with which we have worked very closely, in a statement on February 20, 
said this legislation would help ``address state concerns over the Real 
ID Act. . . .''
  To this support has been added the voices of Senator Alexander, 
Senator Chambliss, Senator Sununu, and cosponsors on both sides of the 
aisle. One of the very first cosponsors is a former Governor who 
understands very well the implications for States of complying with the 
REAL ID Act. That individual is Senator Carper of Delaware.
  So we have been able to build a broad bipartisan coalition, and that 
gave us

[[Page 5122]]

the strength to prompt the Department of Homeland Security to make the 
changes as a result of recent, extended discussions with the 
Department. As a result, we can now say the primary concerns we have 
addressed with our amendment have been addressed in the Department's 
proposed regulations.
  In the regulations being announced this morning, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security will commit to granting a waiver to any State that 
asks for it through December 31 of 2009. States will not be required to 
make a complicated case for the waiver. The Secretary has recognized 
the delay in the Department's promulgation of the draft regulations is 
reason enough to give States an additional 2 years before they need to 
begin producing REAL ID- compliant driver's licenses. I am pleased the 
Department has taken this step.
  In addition, the Department has agreed, as I have mentioned, to 
invite the members of the negotiated rulemaking committee--which was 
created by the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, and subsequently repealed 
by the REAL ID Act, just when they were making great progress--to come 
to the Department and discuss, in person, their specific concerns about 
the regulations. The provisions announced today are in line with the 
need for more time and the inclusion of all interested parties that 
were the two primary goals of our amendment. These provisions, of 
course, are part of a much larger regulation that will take us time to 
review, to consult with the States on, and to comment on. I am going to 
follow closely the whole notice and comment period. I am sure I will be 
suggesting changes to the regulations, and I will be working closely 
with the negotiated rulemaking committee to make sure the regulations 
are modified further down the line.
  I am under no illusions that there are not further issues which need 
to be addressed about the REAL ID Act. We must look closely at the 
concerns that privacy advocates have raised about potentially having 
interlocking databases among the States so that information is shared. 
There are a lot of questions, such as who would have access to that 
information, how secure it would be, and how correct it would be. There 
is a lot of work to be done.
  Most of all, we need to get an accurate estimate of how much this 
program is going to cost the States and how we can help them bear those 
costs. This does remain a huge unfunded Federal mandate on our States. 
The NGA, as I have said several times, has estimated the cost at $11 
billion over the next 5 years. That is an enormous burden for States to 
bear.
  We also have to determine if the technological demands that will be 
imposed on States by these regulations are, in fact, feasible. But I am 
very pleased to note that our efforts with the Department have achieved 
the goals that we set out in offering our amendment. There is further 
work to be done on the REAL ID Act, but we certainly have made 
tremendous progress over the past 24 hours.
  I thank all of the cosponsors of the bill: Senators Alexander, 
Carper, Cantwell, Chambliss, Snowe, Mikulski, and Murkowski for their 
strong, bipartisan support, and I thank all of the outside 
organizations, including the Governors and the State legislatures, who 
have worked so closely with us. I hope we will continue our partnership 
as we make real progress in improving the REAL ID Act.


                      Amendment No. 277 Withdrawn

  Mr. President, at this time, recognizing the tremendous progress we 
have made, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 277 be withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, again, I congratulate Senator Collins 
for having achieved the purpose of her amendment without having to put 
it formally on the bill, and I look forward to seeing the Department 
move ahead in a more cooperative way with the States to achieve the 
purposes that the 9/11 Commission set out, which is to make the ID 
cards more secure to protect the rest of us Americans from those who 
would abuse those identity cards. It is a great accomplishment for my 
friend from Maine.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise to voice my strong opposition 
to section 803 of S. 4 and urge my colleagues to join me in advocating 
its removal from this important piece of legislation.
  What is section 803? This provision would permit TSA's transport 
security officers, our Nation's airport security screeners, to engage 
in collective bargaining, a change that was not among the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Let me repeat that: it was not 
among the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
  At first, some may look at it and say: Why not? The professionals at 
TSA are Federal employees. As such, they cannot strike. They can 
already join a union, so why not permit collective bargaining?
  As a former union member and one who believes in collective 
bargaining as a general rule, I can see why many believe that such a 
request is reasonable. Unfortunately, as much in life is, the devil is 
in the details.
  The fact remains that we as a nation are at war. Through the hard 
work and dedication of our Armed Forces and civil servants such as 
those at TSA, our Nation has, so far, been spared further tragedies 
such as those that occurred on September 11, 2001. However, our past 
success must not lull us into a false sense of security. Those who wish 
to undermine and even destroy Western civilization have been beaten 
back but still remain a potent adversary. Al-Qaida is a sophisticated 
enemy which searches for our weaknesses and attempts to devise ways to 
exploit our vulnerabilities. The surest way to play into their hands is 
to act in a ``business as usual'' manner. In order to defeat this 
enemy, we must be nimble, we must constantly change our tactics and 
strategies, and we must be flexible and unpredictable.
  That is why the American people demanded that we create the TSA. The 
people saw that our Nation required a professional Government agency 
whose primary purpose is to keep the traveling public safe, an agency 
that consists of experts who can identify terrorists and their plots 
before they board an aircraft or other mode of transport.
  So what has this to do with the ability of TSA employees to engage in 
collective bargaining? If one looks at the details, it has everything 
to do with TSA's ability to keep several steps ahead of the terrorists. 
We all know one of the central aspects of any collective bargaining 
agreement is setting the conditions by which an employee works. When a 
person works, where they work, and how they work are matters which are 
open to negotiation. Obviously, efficiency and productivity, for better 
or worse, can be dramatically affected by a collective bargaining 
agreement.
  So how would this affect TSA's operations? One must remember the 
events of this past summer. In August, the security services of the 
United Kingdom discovered a well-organized conspiracy that reportedly 
sought to blow up commercial aircraft in flight using liquid explosives 
disguised as items commonly found in carry-on luggage. Within 6 hours, 
due to their professionalism and the current flexibility of their work 
structure, TSA's Transportation Security Officers were able to make 
quick use of this highly classified information and train and execute 
new security protocols designed to mitigate this threat. In six hours 
that is impressive.
  In contrast to this history of success and impressive performance, 
the possibility of collective bargaining only raises questions and 
uncertainties. For

[[Page 5123]]

example, should the Government have to bargain in advance of what 
actions it can or cannot take when dealing with an emergency situation? 
If so, how would we know what to bargain for? Remember, before the 
events of September 11, what rational person would have thought of 
using a commercial aircraft as a suicide bomb? What other heinous act 
might occur that we have not contemplated? Remember, this is an enemy 
that uses surprise.
  Other questions come to mind. If timely intelligence is gathered that 
requires an immediate change in TSA's operation, does the Government 
have to inform a private entity such as the union? Do we not wish to 
preserve the maximum level of flexibility not only to catch terrorists 
but to provide a secure situation where the business of the Nation can 
continue unmolested?
  Another example of the flexibility of the current system can be found 
during this winter's snow storms in Denver. Local TSA officials were 
overwhelmed by the influx of stranded and newly arriving passengers. 
The agency responded by deploying 55 officers from the mountain State 
region, including, I am proud to say, my own home State of Utah, so 
that security screening operations were able to continue around the 
clock until the situation was resolved. Under collective bargaining, 
redeployments such as this could be hindered by red-tape and cumbersome 
procedures, greatly reducing the ability of TSA to respond efficiently 
and effectively to these eventualities.
  It also raises the question, under a collective bargaining agreement, 
whether redeployment decisions might be subject to seniority rules 
rather than sending individuals with the proper skills. Is deployment 
subject to binding arbitration? If so, what effect will that have 
during emergencies?
  Bureaucratic hurdles preventing the TSA from operating efficiently 
and effectively during a time of war are not the only problems created 
by section 803. The provision also would create an unacceptable drain 
of resources away from the TSA's primary mission, which is protecting 
the traveling public. Resources would be diminished because of the cost 
to implement and execute a collective bargaining agreement.
  TSA estimates if this section were enacted, it could cost, in the 
first year alone, $175 million. Why? The agency would be forced to 
train its employees on union issues and employ labor relations 
specialists, negotiators, and union stewards. One must also remember 
that these funds will have to come out of the Department of Homeland 
Security's budget, a budget which is consistently criticized as being 
too small by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
  So what do the taxpayers lose for that $175 million? Such a reduction 
in funding is the same as a loss of 3,815 transportation security 
officers, or 11.5 percent of the total workforce. It also equates to 
closing 273 of the 2,054 active screening lanes, which would be 12 
percent of the current lanes. In terms that most of the frequent flyers 
in this body would understand, the loss of capacity to screen 330,000 
passengers every day. Imagine that line
  This is not to say that TSA employees should bear an unfair burden. 
Far from it. TSA employees, and especially transportation security 
officers, should be afforded just compensation and the safest possible 
working conditions. Some who advocate collective bargaining say 
transportation security officers have not been given a raise in four 
years. That is not accurate. TSA's pay scheme is based upon technical 
competence, readiness for duty, and operational performance. 
Accordingly, in 2006, TSA paid out over $42 million in pay raises and 
bonuses based upon job performance.
  If a transportation security officer has a complaint, a grievance, or 
does not believe he or she has been paid properly, these are addressed 
through the agency's Model Workplace Program, where employees and 
managers form councils to address those concerns.
  This does not mean that employees' due process protections for the 
resolution of employment issues have been sacrificed. Transportation 
Security Officers can seek relief from the TSA's Ombudsman Office and 
Disciplinary Review Board or from outside Government agencies such as 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
  Another misconception is that transportation security officers do not 
have whistleblower protections. As a result of a formal memorandum of 
understanding between TSA and the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, all 
Transportation Security Officers now have this protection.
  Others in favor of collective bargaining point to the Transportation 
Security Officers' attrition rate. Initially, this was a problem. 
However, the agency has addressed and is continuing to address this 
issue. I am pleased to report that the Transportation Security 
Officers' voluntary attrition rate of 16.5 percent is lower than 
comparable positions in the private sector, which are estimated at 26.4 
percent.
  Injury rates are decreasing.
  The agency has worked hard to reduce lost time claims by 44 percent. 
Just in 2006, injury claims resulting in lost workdays have been 
reduced by 32 percent. This is not luck but part of a comprehensive 
strategy to look after the well-being and safety of transportation 
security officers. These safety initiatives include providing a nurse 
case manager at each airport, utilizing optimization and safety teams 
to create ergonomic work areas to reduce lifting and carrying heavy 
bags, and an automated injury claims filing process.
  Another question some ask is, Since Customs and Border Protection 
Agents are permitted to engage in collective bargaining, why not 
Transportation Security Officers? However, when Congress created the 
TSA, the goal was to create a new organization that would meet the 
unique needs of our War on Terrorism--a modern organization that would 
have the maximum flexibility to protect the national security of the 
United States. This, of course, is the same charter as the FBI, CIA, 
and Secret Service. These agencies do not permit collective bargaining 
for this and other reasons.
  Should we hold the TSA to a different standard despite the fact that 
securing our transportation systems is one of the most vital roles our 
Government can play? Is TSA perfect? No, of course not. But look at 
what has been achieved. Five years ago, TSA did not exist, and now we 
can all take pride in the agency and more importantly in its personnel 
who have done such a remarkable job in keeping our Nation safe. They 
deserve our respect, our thanks, and they deserve fair compensation. 
But in doing so, we must not undermine one of their greatest weapons in 
this war--their flexibility to change tactics and strategies at a 
moment's notice. Such a course of action could have a calamitous effect 
on our Nation.
  Mr. President, as I previously mentioned, in general, I am a 
supporter of collective bargaining. However, in these times, we must 
not change a policy that could inadvertently jeopardize the lives of 
Americans.
  I urge my colleagues to remove this section from the bill.
  I see the distinguished Senator from Alaska is here, and I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues, Senators Lieberman 
and Collins, for working with the Commerce Committee to include 
important security measures in this bill. I am grateful to my great 
friend, Senator Inouye, for his willingness to work in our committee on 
a bipartisan basis to develop and report these measures.
  In the 5\1/2\ years since the horrific events of September 11, we 
have made many good improvements in the security of our Nation's 
transportation infrastructure and ensuring communications 
interoperability. Our job, however, is far from over, for there are 
still more improvements to be made and gaps to close. In matters of 
security, we cannot become complacent; as our enemies adapt, so must 
we.
  The Commerce Committee's aviation and surface transportation 
legislation, which has been included in S. 4, will significantly 
enhance the ability of the

[[Page 5124]]

Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security 
Administration to fulfill their missions. These provisions were 
developed by the Commerce Committee while mindful of the delicate 
balance between implementing tough security measures and the effects 
such regulations may have on the Nation's economy and the movement of 
goods.
  The aviation provisions incorporated in S. 4 were reported by our 
Commerce Committee on February 13 as S. 509, the Aviation Security 
Improvement Act of 2007. The provisions incorporate aviation-related 9/
11 Commission recommendations and provide TSA with additional tools to 
carry out its layered approach to security. To do this, the aviation 
security provisions dedicate continued funding for the installation of 
in-line explosive detection systems utilized for the enhanced screening 
of checked baggage at our Nation's airports.
  We all recognize the importance of screening 100 percent of cargo 
transported to and within the United States. Last year, in the Safe 
Port Act, Congress acted to ensure that all cargo arriving in the 
United States by sea is screened. In S. 4, we ensure that 100 percent 
of air cargo also is screened. The U.S. air cargo supply chain handles 
over 50,000 tons of cargo each day, of which 26 percent is designated 
for domestic passenger carriers.
  Screening is of particular importance in Alaska. Anchorage, my home, 
is the No. 1 airport in the United States for landed weight cargo, and 
it is No. 3 in the world for cargo throughput. Our provision would 
require TSA to develop and implement a system to provide for screening 
of all cargo being carried by passenger aircraft.
  To address ongoing concerns about passenger prescreening procedures, 
the legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to create 
an Office of Appeals and Redress to establish a timely and fair process 
for airline passengers who believe they have been misidentified against 
the ``no-fly'' or ``selectee'' watchlists.
  TSA's layered approach to security relies not only upon equipment and 
technological advances but also upon improved security screening 
techniques employed by TSA screeners as well as the use of very 
effective canines. This legislation calls for TSA's National Explosives 
Detection Canine Team to deploy more of these valuable resources across 
the Nation's transportation network.
  The bill we are considering also contains the provisions of S. 184, 
the Surface Transportation and Rail Security Act of 2007, which was 
also developed and reported on a bipartisan basis by our Commerce 
Committee. While the aviation industry has received most of the 
attention and funding for security, the rail and transit attacks in 
Britain, Spain, and India all point to a common strategy utilized by 
terrorists. The openness of our transportation system, our surface 
transportation network, presents unique security challenges. The 
vastness of these systems requires targeted allocation of our resources 
based upon risk.
  Most of the surface transportation security provisions in the bill 
before the Senate today have been included previously as part of other 
transportation security bills introduced by Senator Inouye, Senator 
McCain, and myself. Many of the provisions in the substitute amendment 
passed the Senate unanimously last year as well as in the 108th 
Congress. Each time, however, the House of Representatives did not 
agree to the need to address rail, pipeline, motor carrier, hazardous 
materials, and other over-the-road bus security. The time has come to 
send these provisions to the President's desk. We are hopeful that the 
House will agree this time.
  The substitute also contains provisions of the Commerce Committee's 
reported measure, S. 385, the Interoperable Emergency Communications 
Act. Since 2001, we have heard the cries of public safety officials 
that the police, firefighters, and emergency medical response personnel 
throughout the country need help in achieving interoperability. With 
this $1 billion program which helps every State, public safety will be 
able to move forward with real solutions and begin addressing the 
problems that have plagued our Nation's first responders for too long. 
The legislation addresses all of the public safety issues which have 
been brought to the attention of the committee. It also includes $100 
million to establish both Federal and State strategic technology 
reserves to help restore communications quickly in disasters equal in 
scale to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
  We should not politicize national security. The Commerce Committee's 
initiatives included in this bill are very important, and I urge their 
adoption.
  Again, I appreciate very much the cooperation of the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. We achieved the reported 
bills I mentioned from the Commerce Committee because of the 
bipartisanship in our committee. I hope this debate on this important 
bill before the Senate will continue in that same spirit. The American 
people really expect and deserve nothing less.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SCHUMER. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Amendment No. 298 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
pending amendment be set aside, that I be allowed to offer and speak on 
my amendment, and that Senator Menendez be permitted to speak after I 
do. I send the amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, reserving the right to object, I ask 
that the Senator amend his unanimous consent request so we can go back 
and forth on his amendment. I suggest that after he speaks, I be 
recognized, then Senator Menendez, then Senator Coleman, and that we go 
back and forth on the amendment.
  Mr. SCHUMER. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator so modify his request?
  Mr. SCHUMER. I do.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New York [Mr. Schumer], for himself and 
     Mr. Menendez, proposes an amendment numbered 298 to amendment 
     No. 275.

  Mr. SCHUMER. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       (Purpose: To strengthen the security of cargo containers)

       On page 377 insert after line 22, and renumber accordingly:

        TITLE XV--STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF CARGO CONTAINERS

     SEC. ___. DEADLINE FOR SCANNING ALL CARGO CONTAINERS.

       (a) In General.--The SAFE Port Act (Public Law 109-347) is 
     amended by inserting after section 232 the following:

     ``SEC. 232A. SCANNING ALL CARGO CONTAINERS.

       ``(a) Requirements Relating to Entry of Containers.--
       ``(1) In general.--A container may enter the United States, 
     either directly or via a foreign port, only if--
       ``(A) the container is scanned with equipment that meets 
     the standards established pursuant to sec. 121(f) and a copy 
     of the scan is provided to the Secretary; and
       ``(B) the container is secured with a seal that meets the 
     standards established pursuant to sec. 204, before the 
     container is loaded on a vessel for shipment to the United 
     States.
       ``(2) Standards for scanning equipment and seals.--
       ``(A) Scanning equipment.--The Secretary shall establish 
     standards for scanning equipment required to be used under 
     paragraph (1)(A) to ensure that such equipment uses the best-
     available technology, including technology to scan a 
     container for radiation and density and, if appropriate, for 
     atomic elements.
       ``(B) Seals.--The Secretary shall establish standards for 
     seals required to be used under paragraph (1)(B) to ensure 
     that such seals use the best-available technology, including

[[Page 5125]]

     technology to detect any breach into a container and identify 
     the time of such breach.
       ``(C) Review and revision.--The Secretary shall--
       ``(i) review and, if necessary, revise the standards 
     established pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) not less 
     than once every 2 years; and
       ``(ii) ensure that any such revised standards require the 
     use of technology, as soon as such technology becomes 
     available--

       ``(I) to identify the place of a breach into a container;
       ``(II) to notify the Secretary of such breach before the 
     container enters the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United 
     States; and
       ``(III) to track the time and location of the container 
     during transit to the United States, including by truck, 
     rail, or vessel.

       ``(D) Definition.--In subparagraph (C), the term `Exclusive 
     Economic Zone of the United States' has the meaning provided 
     such term in section 107 of title 46, United States Code.
       ``(b) Regulations; Application.--
       ``(1) Regulations.--
       ``(A) Interim final rule.--Consistent with the results of 
     and lessons derived from the pilot system implemented under 
     section 231, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue 
     an interim final rule as a temporary regulation to implement 
     subsection (a) of this section, not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the submission of the report under section 231, 
     without regard to the provisions of chapter 5 of title 5, 
     United States Code.
       ``(B) Final rule.--The Secretary shall issue a final rule 
     as a permanent regulation to implement subsection (a) not 
     later than 1 year after the date of the submission of the 
     report under section 231, in accordance with the provisions 
     of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code. The final rule 
     issued pursuant to that rulemaking may supersede the interim 
     final rule issued pursuant to subparagraph (A).
       ``(2) Phased-in application.--
       ``(A) In general.--The requirements of subsection (a) apply 
     with respect to any container entering the United States, 
     either directly or via a foreign port, beginning on--
       ``(i) the end of the 3-year period beginning on the date of 
     the enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 
     2007, in the case of a container loaded on a vessel destined 
     for the United States in a country in which more than 75,000 
     twenty-foot equivalent units of containers were loaded on 
     vessels for shipping to the United States in 2005; and
       ``(ii) the end of the 5-year period beginning on the date 
     of the enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 
     2007, in the case of a container loaded on a vessel destined 
     for the United States in any other country.
       ``(B) Extension.--The Secretary may extend by up to 1 year 
     the period under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) for 
     containers loaded in a port, if the Secretary--
       ``(i) finds that the scanning equipment required under 
     subsection (a) is not available for purchase and installation 
     in the port; and
       ``(ii) at least 60 days prior to issuing such extension, 
     transmits such finding to the appropriate congressional 
     committees.
       ``(c) International Cargo Security Standards.--The 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is 
     encouraged to promote and establish international standards 
     for the security of containers moving through the 
     international supply chain with foreign governments and 
     international organizations, including the International 
     Maritime Organization and the World Customs Organization.
       ``(d) International Trade and Other Obligations.--In 
     carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary shall consult with 
     appropriate Federal departments and agencies and private 
     sector stakeholders to ensure that actions under such section 
     do not violate international trade obligations or other 
     international obligations of the United States.
       ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section, such 
     sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2008 
     through 2013.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     SAFE Port Act (Public Law 109-347) is amended by inserting 
     after the item related to section 232 the following:

``Sec. 232A. Deadline for scanning all cargo containers.''.

  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, at the request of my colleague from 
Maine, who wishes to wait until Senator Lieberman can come to the 
floor, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, if we could withhold the request for a 
quorum, I thank the Senator from New York for his cooperation in this 
matter. I know the Senator from Connecticut is on his way.
  Mr. SCHUMER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I rise today to speak on an amendment 
offered by myself and my colleague from New Jersey to deal with 100 
percent scanning of containers that enter our ports.
  First, I wish to salute my colleague from New Jersey. He has been a 
stalwart leader on this issue while in the House and now in the Senate. 
It has been a pleasure to work with him side by side on something 
people on both sides of the Hudson River care so dearly about.
  I rise today to call upon my colleagues to take action against one of 
the greatest risks that confront the United States. It is one of the 
very greatest, if not the greatest risk, and that is a nuclear weapon 
reaching our shores in a shipping container.
  More than 11 million cargo containers come into our country's ports 
each year, but only 5 percent of these containers are thoroughly 
inspected by Customs agents. That means right now if, God forbid, a 
nuclear weapon were put in one of these containers, it could have a 1-
in-20 chance of being detected. No American, certainly no New Yorker, 
likes those odds.
  It means a terrorist could almost use any cargo container as a 
``Trojan horse'' to hide a nuclear weapon or radiological material and 
bring it to the United States. We know terrorists have tried to 
purchase nuclear weapons and radiological materials on the black 
market. We also know the United States is a top target.
  Let me be clear: a nuclear weapon does not have to enter the United 
States or leave our ports to cause death and destruction. Our major 
ports are also our major cities because so many of our cities, similar 
to New York, were founded and thrive on maritime trading. A terrorist 
group could simply detonate a nuclear weapon at the port terminal for 
the ship docks or even as the ship approaches the harbor. The 
devastation of a terrorist nuclear attack is literally unimaginable. A 
nuclear explosion in one of our major ports or one of our major inland 
cities--if such a weapon were smuggled into one of our ports and driven 
by truck to it, an Omaha or a Chicago or a Saint Louis--would cause 
enormous loss of life, both immediately and over time. It would inflict 
huge economic and physical damage, would render parts of the attacked 
cities unusable and unapproachable for decades, and would dramatically 
change life in this country forever.
  We are also at risk of an attack with a ``dirty bomb'' that combines 
conventional explosives with radiological material. The consequences, 
while not as severe as a nuclear weapon, would also be horrific.
  A nuclear or radiological attack by terrorists in our ports is a 
scenario that keeps me up at night. I worry about my children, my 
family, my friends, and then 19 million New Yorkers, and 30 million 
Americans. But the people running things at the Department of Homeland 
Security do not seem to be losing a wink of sleep over this. DHS gives 
us the usual delay and nay-saying that we have seen so often.
  I have been talking about this issue for 5 years in this Congress. I 
have offered amendment after amendment, and every time people come back 
and say: Forbear. We will get it done. Well, it is now 2007. It is 5\1/
2\ years after 9/11, and we are not close to doing what we should be 
doing--not even close.
  I am tired of all the excuses and delay and, frankly, lack of focus--
proportionate focus. I am tired of the lack of proportionate focus the 
Department of Homeland Security gives to this issue. If we all agree 
this is one of the greatest tragedies that could befall us, then how in 
God's Name do we pay so little attention, put in so few resources to 
getting this done?
  Congress--this new Congress--owes it to the country and to our 
children and to our families to do better. This amendment will do much 
better.
  The Schumer-Menendez amendment contains the same firm deadlines the 
House passed in January for DHS to require all containers coming into 
the

[[Page 5126]]

United States from foreign ports to be scanned for nuclear and 
radiological weapons and then sealed with a tamperproof lock.
  Within 3 years, 100 percent of containers coming from the largest 
foreign ports would be scanned and sealed before arriving in the United 
States.
  Within 5 years, 100 percent of all containers from all ports 
worldwide would be scanned and sealed.
  Imagine, on that date, only 5 years from now, Americans could breathe 
a huge sigh of relief knowing we are safe from the nightmare I 
described earlier.
  Now, I know what the critics say. The critics say 100 percent 
scanning cannot be done. But the truth is, technology for scanning does 
exist, and it can be expected to improve steadily, as technology 
usually does. The experts are divided. There are some who say it cannot 
be done, some who say it can be done. I know the shipping industry 
would rather we not do this, that we slow-walk it. I understand their 
interest. But our interest is much greater.
  We already have advanced scanning equipment that can check for 
radiation as a moving cargo container passes through a port. That is 
without dispute. As a part of the same process, we have equipment that 
can create a detailed image showing the density of the contents of the 
container, in order to see radioactive material that might be shielded.
  In fact, this scanning equipment is already being set up at foreign 
ports and brought online through DHS's Secure Freight Initiative, which 
is a pilot project required under last year's SAFE Port Act.
  Now, the Secure Freight Initiative is a good start, but it is only a 
small start. It will only scan between 5 and 10 percent of our incoming 
cargo for nuclear weapons. We cannot, we must not, and do not have to 
accept 5 percent security.
  The only real barrier to 100 percent scanning is lack of will--lack 
of will in the administration, which we have seen for 5\1/2\ years; 
lack of will in DHS, which we have seen from its inception; and, 
frankly, lack of will in this Congress. If we show we are serious about 
100 percent scanning, then we will see an end to the administration's 
and DHS's foot-dragging and a beginning of real security.
  Adapting to 100 percent scanning may have some small effect on 
commerce. It is true, it will affect commerce. But that is far 
outweighed by the complete shutdown of trade that a successful attack 
would cause. A nuclear attack in the shipping chain would grind 
commerce to a halt.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that my colleague from New 
York, Senator Clinton, be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Our amendment is sensible, it is feasible, and it is 
absolutely necessary.
  The Congressional Budget Office says the House bill--which is very 
similar to this amendment--will cost the Government $160 million in 
2008 through 2012. That may sound like a lot of money, but it is such a 
small price to pay for an enormous improvement in security. When we 
compare it to the other large sums we spend on other things, it is not 
even close.
  If we asked Americans to rank the cost of this program with the 
benefit, it would be at the very top of the list. America sees it. 
Certainly, New York sees it. New Jersey sees it. Why doesn't this body? 
I hope we will.
  The amendment does not obligate the Government to buy scanning 
equipment or seals. Scanning equipment will simply become a cost of 
doing international business, similar to so many other necessary costs 
that are imposed for very good reasons.
  The DHS rules for 100 percent scanning will not be developed in a 
vacuum but will use the results of the Secure Freight Initiative and 
other demonstrations of scanning technology.
  Under my amendment, DHS will only issue a final 100 percent scanning 
regulation after the Secure Freight Initiative pilot project is 
complete and DHS reports to Congress. DHS will use the lessons learned 
from the pilot project to write regulations that are workable.
  Our amendment also has some flexibility because it is obvious you 
cannot do scanning without equipment. The Secretary of Homeland 
Security can extend the deadline for 100 percent scanning by a year if 
the scanning equipment is not available for purchase and installation 
in a port.
  This amendment also will not lock us into using today's technology 
when tomorrow arrives. Under this amendment, DHS will have to develop 
standards for the best available scanning technology and also for 
container seals and to update these standards regularly as technology 
improves.
  This amendment accommodates our international agreements with our 
trading partners. It authorizes DHS to develop international standards 
for container security, and it directs DHS to ensure that 100 percent 
scanning is implemented in a way that is consistent with our 
international trade obligations.
  I cannot overstate how much it disturbs me that Congress has, so far, 
lacked the resolve to impose firm deadlines for 100 percent scanning. 
Now the House has acted decisively and so should the Senate.
  The amendment is desperately needed to keep the scanning effort 
moving forward and to create a real incentive for DHS to require 
container scanning all over the world.
  I truly believe, unless we have a firm deadline, DHS will continue to 
drag its feet and our people in America, in our ports and on land, will 
be susceptible to this kind of horror for far too many years than they 
should have to be. Again, there will be arguments that it is not 
feasible. A deadline will make it feasible. A deadline will concentrate 
the minds of those in DHS and in the shipping industry to get it done, 
and if after 3 or 4 years they have shown effort and they say they need 
an extension, they can come back to the Congress to do it. But I would 
argue that is the way to go, not to set no deadline and let them 
proceed at the all-too-slow pace we have seen thus far.
  This amendment is desperately needed to keep the scanning effort 
moving forward and to create a real incentive for DHS to require 
container scanning all over the world; otherwise, we will probably see 
the same misplaced priorities from DHS we usually do.
  At any given moment, our seaports are full of container ships and 
more are steaming to and from our shores. Each one of these ships, 
unfortunately, is an opportunity for terrorists to strike at our 
industry, our infrastructure, and our lives. We know our enemies will 
wait patiently and plan carefully in order to create maximum panic, 
damage, death. A nuclear weapon in a shipping container would be a 
dream come true for them, those few crazy fanatics who unfortunately 
live in the same world as we do, but it would be an endless nightmare 
for us.
  We have lived with the threat of a nuclear weapon in a shipping 
container for so long that some people seem prepared to accept this 
insecurity as a fact of life. But talk to intelligence experts or read 
the New York Times Magazine from last Sunday. Al-Qaida and others are 
focusing, and they would prefer this method of terrorism, worst of all. 
I am not prepared, my colleague from New Jersey, my colleague from New 
York, and hopefully a majority of this body is not prepared to let this 
insecurity continue. When it comes to shipping container security, the 
danger is obvious, the stakes are high, and the solution is available. 
We simply cannot afford any more delay.
  One of the greatest risks facing our security is that a terrorist 
could easily smuggle a nuclear weapon from a foreign country into our 
ports. It would inflict countless deaths, tremendous destruction, and 
bring trade to a standstill. The bottom line is program screening for 
nuclear materials is delayed, funding for research and development 
squandered, and international security mismanaged.
  If this administration isn't going to put some muscle behind security 
under the current laws, then Congress ought to do it, and we ought to 
do it now. We have waited long enough.
  I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join with me and 
Senator Menendez in making our ports, our

[[Page 5127]]

Nation, and the international supply chain more secure by enacting firm 
deadlines for 100 percent scanning.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I understand there is a UC that would 
have Senator Collins speak next, then Senator Menendez, and then 
myself. I ask unanimous consent that we alter that so I can speak and 
then Senator Menendez and then Senator Collins. I would simply switch 
places with Senator Collins. That is my understanding of the UC 
agreement.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I would 
ask the Senator how long he intends to speak.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Is there a limitation under the UC?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Salazar). There is no limitation under the 
current unanimous consent agreement.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. I would say to my colleague I have the Governor of our 
State with whom I am supposed to meet right now and that is the only 
reason I am inquiring.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I would ask my colleague from New Jersey 
how long he would intend to speak. Would he like to alter the UC to 
speak first and then I would follow?
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Ten minutes.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I would simply ask unanimous consent that 
the Senator from New Jersey speak for 10 minutes and then I would speak 
and then the Senator from Maine would have an opportunity to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, let me, first, thank my colleague for 
his courtesy. I appreciate it very much. I rise to join my 
distinguished colleague from New York, Senator Schumer, in offering 
this amendment. He has been a champion in this regard, and he 
understands that the cause of the devastation in the city of New York 
was the of acts of terrorism. I, too, reside right across the river and 
having lost 700 residents on that fateful day, I understand the 
consequences of inaction.
  What we are calling for is to move forward to implement 100 percent 
scanning of all the cargo containers entering the United States. This, 
5 years later--5 years later--in understanding the realities of a post-
September 11 world.
  Last year this body took action to secure a long overlooked 
vulnerability in our Nation's security. We passed the SAFE Port Act, 
which made significant progress toward improving security in our ports. 
But the fact remains that until we know what is in every cargo 
container entering our ports, we cannot definitively say we are secure.
  Because of our action in the SAFE Port Act, the Department of 
Homeland Security is now conducting a pilot project to implement 100 
percent scanning of cargo at six ports. That is a crucial first step. 
However, reaching 100 percent scanning should not be a far-off goal but 
something we should be doing as quickly and as urgently as possible. 
When it comes to the security of our ports, we should not be 
comfortable with baby steps.
  The amendment we are offering, the Senator from New York and I, would 
ensure that efforts to implement 100 percent scanning move forward by 
setting clear deadlines for all cargo entering U.S. ports to be 
scanned. Now, deadlines may not be popular, but the fact is they result 
in action. Let's not forget that the requirements set in the SAFE Port 
Act got the Department to act. Within 2 months of the bill being signed 
into law, the Department moved forward with the pilot project now 
underway.
  The 9/11 Commission made a critical observation in how to approach 
securing our most at-risk targets. The Commission said:

       In measuring effectiveness, perfection is unattainable. But 
     terrorists should perceive that potential targets are 
     defended. They may be deterred by a significant chance of 
     failure.

  We recognize we may not be at an ideal place to implement perfect 
technology, but we do have systems that work, and we should be doing 
everything possible to advance and implement them at every port. We 
cannot afford for terrorists to know our ports and our cargo are not 
defended. Frankly, when 95 percent of the cargo entering our ports has 
not been scanned, I think it is clear we have a lack of a significant 
deterrent. We have a 95-percent chance of getting something in. That is 
a pretty good percentage for the terrorists.
  Our ports remain some of the most vulnerable and exploitable 
terrorist targets our Nation has. We cannot afford to wait for years 
and years while we simply cross our fingers that an attack will not hit 
our ports or disrupt our commerce.
  In the years after September 11, our focus was largely and 
understandably on aviation security. But in narrowing in on such a 
singular focus, we did not start out making the strong investments 
needed in other areas of our security. We have spent less than $900 
million in port security improvements since 2001, which is a small 
fraction of what we spend annually on aviation security. Only when 
faced with a very public and highly controversial deal that would have 
put American ports in the hands of a foreign government, did Congress 
act on port security.
  For some of us, however, this is not a new issue, nor was the threat 
unknown. For 13 years, I represented a congressional district in New 
Jersey that is home to the Nation's third largest container port. The 
Port of New York and New Jersey, the majority of which physically 
resides in New Jersey, has a cluster of neighborhoods literally in its 
backyard. Ask any New Jerseyan from that part of the State and they 
will tell you how close to home the threat of port security hits. Every 
day, they drive by the containers stacked in rows within throwing 
distance of major highways. Every day, they see cargo coming off the 
ships, ready to be put on a truck that drives through their 
neighborhood or to sit in a shipyard visible from a 2-mile radius 
around the port, with an international airport and a transnortheastern 
corridor. Until we can assure them we know exactly what is coming into 
our ports and into their neighborhoods, they have a right to question 
their safety.
  Ironically, the people who live in the backyards of the Port of New 
York and New Jersey also live in the shadows of what was the World 
Trade Center. But there are other ports throughout this country with 
similar neighborhoods. So not only are they keenly aware of the 
vulnerability of the ports, many of them have experienced or witnessed 
the destruction that took place on that fateful day.
  Despite the awful lesson I hope we learned on September 11, where we 
saw everyday modes of transportation turned into destructive weapons, 
we still seem slow to understand that everyday modes of commerce could 
as quickly and easily be turned into weapons with catastrophic 
consequences. When it comes to the security of our cargo, precision is 
everything. We have to be on the ball every day. We have to be right 
about what is in every single container entering our ports. The 
terrorists only have to be right once, and they have a 95-percent 
chance to be right once.
  This is not just a question of homeland security; it is also about 
economic security. Every year, more than 2 billion tons of cargo pass 
through U.S. ports. Jobs at U.S. ports generate $44 billion in annual 
personal income and more than $16 billion in Federal, State, and local 
taxes. The Port of New York and New Jersey alone handled more than $130 
billion in goods in 2005. While too much of our country's and our 
Nation's ports are part of an invisible backdrop, they are key to an 
international and domestic economic chain, and if there was a major 
disruption, economies would be crippled and industries halted.
  Many of us in this body have repeatedly warned of the disastrous 
repercussions if there was an attack at one of our ports. Yet, as a 
Nation, we have moved at a snail's pace when it comes to doing what is 
necessary to fully secure our ports. The question is, if we continue to 
delay and there is an attack because we have not implemented

[[Page 5128]]

100 percent scanning, what price then are we willing to pay? How much 
are we willing to sacrifice if the worst-case scenario happens at one 
of our ports?
  I can't look at a constituent of mine or anyone in this country and 
say that algorithms--we presently scan only a small percentage, only 5 
percent, the rest of it we do calculations by algorithms. If I tell an 
American that their protection is based upon algorithms, they would 
tell me I am crazy. But that is what is happening today. That is the 
layered approach. But it is an algorithm that supposedly protects you. 
If Hong Kong can do this, certainly the United States of America can do 
this. We are not talking about immediately, we are talking about 3 
years for major ports, 5 years for all other ports, with the 
opportunity for extension.
  In a post-September 11 world, where we have had to think about the 
unimaginable and prepare for the unthinkable, how can we continue to 
operate as if the threat to our ports is not that great? Can we not 
imagine how a ship with cargo can become a weapon of mass destruction? 
Can we not foresee how a deadly container can get to a truck and be 
driven through some of the most densely populated cities? Will we be 
content in telling the families of those whom we let down that we 
didn't move fast enough? I, for one, am not willing to do that. I 
believe we must do everything possible now so we never have to be in 
that position.
  I hope my colleagues join Senator Schumer and myself in making sure 
we never have to look at a fellow American and tell them we just acted 
too slowly or we let economic interests overcome security interests. I 
think we can do much better. Our amendment does that.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I agree with my colleagues from New York 
and New Jersey about the grave danger, the almost unimaginable horror 
that would occur if a nuclear device was smuggled into one of the 11 
million containers that come into our ports every year. It is an area 
of vulnerability. It is an issue of great concern.
  I am not a casual observer of this. I don't just lose sleep over 
this--which we all should--but for 3 years we worked on this. As 
chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, I participated 
in a 3-year review and then laid out a plan of action, working with the 
Senator from Connecticut and working with my Democratic colleague from 
Washington, Senator Murray. Of course, I also worked with the 
leadership and Senator Collins from Maine, chairman of the Homeland 
Security Committee last year.
  As a result of that 3-year effort, we put forth a bill last year to 
bolster American security. I say to those watching that there was not a 
95-percent chance of somebody smuggling a nuclear device in a 
container. We are not simply looking at 5 percent and ignoring 
everything else. To raise that kind of level--first, that is simply not 
true. We have in place a system we need to do better with, no question 
about it. We passed legislation last year to help us do better. Part of 
that legislation is a provision that would require the Department of 
Homeland Security, through the secure freight initiative, to develop a 
pilot program to figure out can we do 100-percent testing of every 
container. That is what we should be doing. The idea that somehow there 
is a lack of resolve is simply not true. It is a matter of figuring out 
the right thing to do.
  To quote an editorial in the Washington Post on Tuesday, January 9, 
2007:

       Given a limited amount of money and an endless list of 
     programs and procedures that could make Americans safer, it's 
     essential to buy the most homeland security possible with the 
     cash available. And as the little list above demonstrates, 
     that can be a tough job [if you know anything about border 
     crossing and x-ray machines at airports]. That's all the more 
     reason not to waste money on the kind of political shenanigan 
     written into a sprawling Democratic bill--up for a vote in 
     the House this week--that would require the Department of 
     Homeland Security to ensure every maritime cargo container 
     bound for the United States is scanned before it departs for 
     American shores.

  I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Jan. 9, 2007]

                            A Bad Investment

       What's more important, Coast Guard patrols or collecting 
     fingerprints at border crossings? Running checked bags 
     through X-ray machines at airports or installing blast 
     barriers at nuclear plants?
       Given a limited amount of money and an endless list of 
     programs and procedures that could make Americans safer, it's 
     essential to buy the most homeland security possible with the 
     cash available. And as the little list above demonstrates, 
     that can be a tough job. That's all the more reason not to 
     waste money on the kind of political shenanigan written into 
     a sprawling Democratic bill--up for a vote in the House this 
     week--that would require the Department of Homeland Security 
     to ensure that every maritime cargo container bound for the 
     United States is scanned before it departs for American 
     shores.
       Container scanning technology is improving, but it is not 
     able to perform useful, speedy inspections of cargo on the 
     scale House Democrats envision. Congress has already 
     authorized pilot programs to study the feasibility of 
     scanning all maritime cargo. The sensible posture is to await 
     the results of those trials before buying port scanners, 
     training the thousands who would be needed to operate them 
     and gumming up international trade.
       The Democrats don't offer a realistic cost estimate for the 
     mandate they will propose today. But the cost to the 
     government and the economy is sure to be in the tens of 
     billions and quite possibly hundreds of billions annually. 
     The marginal benefit isn't close to being worth the price. 
     Under recently expanded programs, all cargo coming into the 
     country is assessed for risk and, when necessary, inspected, 
     all without the cost of expensive scanning equipment, 
     overseas staff and long waits at foreign ports. Perhaps 
     that's why the Sept. 11 commission didn't recommend 100 
     percent cargo scanning.
       The newly installed House leadership will bring the bill, 
     which contains a range of other homeland security proposals 
     both deserving and undeserving, directly to the floor, 
     bypassing the Homeland Security Committee. Luckily, the 
     Senate will give more thought to its homeland security bill 
     and probably won't approve a 100 percent container inspection 
     plan. House Democrats can figure those odds as well as 
     anyone. But why not score some easy political points in your 
     first 100 hours?

  Mr. COLEMAN. It goes on to say:

       Container scanning technology is improving, but it is not 
     able to perform useful, speedy inspections of cargo on the 
     scale House Democrats envision [or this amendment envisions]. 
     Congress has already authorized pilot programs to study the 
     feasibility of scanning all maritime cargo.

  That is what we have done. I offered that amendment last year. As a 
result, the Department of Homeland Security is putting in place a pilot 
that will scan all U.S.-bound containers at three ports by July of this 
year. They are the Port Qasim in Pakistan, which is ready for testing 
now; Port Cortez in Honduras, which is ready for testing now; and 
Southhampton in the United Kingdom, which will be ready in July.
  So the reality is what we are doing in Congress is acting in a 
rational manner, understanding the needs to go forward as aggressively 
as possible but not fearing demagoguery and telling the public we are 
turning a blind eye to 95 percent of the cargo containers that are 
there. The idea of 100-percent scanning comes from a system we saw in 
Hong Kong, a system I asked the Senator from New York to look at. I 
believe he did. When you see that system, what happens is they have a 
scanning technology where vehicles literally roll through, nonstop, 
with no slowing up of traffic, and as it scans it takes almost a moving 
``CT scan'' to see what is inside. There is a radiation portal device 
in front of it. Then you have that information. That is what he 
observed. That is 100-percent scanning.
  But the reality is that system is in place in 2 of the 40 lanes in 
Hong Kong. Nothing is done with the information that is gathered it. It 
is not sent over to Langley or integrated into a more comprehensive 
review of what we do. Even if there are radiation signals that come 
off, there is not necessarily a mandated or forced review of the cargo.
  So what the Senate did, being the world's most deliberative body, is 
look at the danger of the threat, and I agree with the Senators from 
New Jersey and New York that it is an enormously

[[Page 5129]]

high threat. We said, how do we rationally handle that and not do 
political shenanigans and play to the fear of the public by saying 95 
percent of the cargo containers are coming to this country without 
being dealt with. We said, how do we put in place a system where we see 
whether we can get 100-percent scanning to work and integrate it into 
our other systems. That is part of the point the public should 
understand. We do have systems in place. When the Senator from New 
Jersey talks about algorithms, he is saying that cargo--every single 
container gets rated at a level of risk; based on that, determinations 
are made as to the level of review. We have what would be called a 
delayed approach to security. We don't have the capacity, resources, or 
ability to scan 11 million containers today, so 100-percent scanning 
should be our goal, to be done in a way that we can use the information 
integrated into the system. By the way, it is done in a way that 
doesn't stop the flow of commerce.
  The mayor of New York testified before the Homeland Security 
Committee. I asked him the question about 100-percent scanning. His 
quote was:

       Al-Qaida wins if we close our ports, which is exactly what 
     would happen if you tried to look at every single 1 of the 11 
     million containers that come here.

  We don't want al-Qaida to win or to close our ports. We want 100-
percent scanning, but we want to do it in a way that doesn't raise the 
level of fear and somehow communicate to the public that there is a 
lack of resolve or a lack of will. It is a matter of us trying to 
proceed in a very rational way.
  By the way, there is nothing in our amendment of last year that stops 
the Department of Homeland Security from moving forward quicker. Our 
amendment last year requires the pilot projects to be done within a 
year of passage of the bill last year. It says the Department has to 
come back to us, to Congress, and explain to us what it is going to 
take to move forward. We have in place today a mechanism that will 
accelerate the opportunity for 100-percent screening as fast as is 
possible. There is no lack of resolve, no lack of will, no bureaucratic 
obfuscation. There is simply the reality of trying to figure out a way 
to take the technology that is out there and incorporate it into the 
defense system we have so it is doing something. Again, we do it not 
because we want to tell people we are looking at 11 million containers. 
We certainly should not be telling people we are turning a blind eye 
to--or there is a 95-percent chance of something coming in without 
being considered. That is not reality.
  As the mayor of New York also said when he testified, we cannot give 
a guarantee. No matter what we do, the enemy is going to try to attack 
us. They may succeed. But it would be a terrible tragedy if somehow it 
were conveyed that we are sitting on our hands and this Senate is not 
responding to the real, grave, and terrible threat of a nuclear device 
or a weapon of mass destruction coming here in a cargo container.
  We have in place a pilot project. Let the agency do what the Senate 
and Congress has dictated it do. Let it test the technology, see if it 
can make it work. Let it come back and tell us how quickly they are 
going to get it done. If it is not done quickly enough, I will join 
with the Senators from New York and New Jersey, and other colleagues, 
and say you have to accelerate the pace. Let there not be fear 
mongering about this issue. Let there not be what the Washington Post 
called ``political shenanigans.'' Let us play to our best instincts and 
let the public know we have resolve on this issue. Let's give the pilot 
program a chance to work. I urge my colleagues to reject this 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first, let me thank the Senator from 
Minnesota for his excellent statement. He has spent a great deal of 
time on this issue as the former chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations. He examined our ports very closely. He helped draft 
the port security bill we passed last year. I hope my colleagues will 
listen to his advice on this issue.
  Mr. President, 100 percent screening, that sounds like a great 
slogan. After all, who could be against scanning 11 million containers?
  Let's look at what that would involve. The fact is we need to 
concentrate our resources on containers that pose a real threat, on 
containers and cargo that are at highest risk. It doesn't make sense to 
try to inspect everything, and it has extraordinarily negative 
consequences for our system of international trade.
  I rise to oppose Senator Schumer's amendment that would require 
scanning of all cargo containers entering the United States from large 
foreign ports within 3 years, and containers from all 700 foreign ports 
in 5 years. This approach patently ignores the technological 
limitations on integrated scanning systems that are necessary to scan 
100-percent of containers. It irrationally assumes that integrated 
scanning systems will be practical and cost-effective and work well in 
only 3 years. I hope they will be, and I will talk about the pilot 
programs we have underway to see or to test the feasibility.
  But the costs of being wrong on this assumption are too high for our 
economy, as so much of our international trade relies on cargo 
container traffic. Think of how many companies rely on just-in-time 
inventory. Think of how many businesses all across this country receive 
cargo. We need a system that makes sense.
  The fact is there are substantial technological challenges to 
scanning 100 percent of cargo containers at foreign ports. I traveled 
to Seattle, Long Beach, and Los Angeles to look at the ports and see 
their operations. I think anyone who does that quickly reaches the 
conclusion Senator Murray and I have reached, which is this cannot 
work. If you look at how at-risk cargo is scanned, it takes time to 
unload the container, separate it from the rest of the cargo; it takes 
a few minutes to scan each container as this giant x-ray-like machine 
goes around the container. Then the analysis of the images can take 
several more minutes.
  Think about this. We have 11 million containers headed to the United 
States; that is in a year's time. That is going up each year. When I 
first started working on port security legislation, it was only 8 
million. Now it is 11 million containers. Well, think of the delays 
that would be caused by scanning each and every container. It would 
create a massive backlog of cargo at our ports and it would not make us 
safer.
  There are other problems as well. Current radiation scanning 
technology produces alarm rates of about 1 percent--almost entirely 
from naturally occurring substances in containers. Actually, when I was 
in Seattle with Senator Murray, we were told that, for some reason, 
marble and kitty litter seemed to trigger false alarms. So obtaining 
enough foreign government and DHS personnel to conduct inspections of 
all those false alarms would be expensive. It is far better to 
concentrate on containers that, because of the cargo or because of 
other indicators through the sophisticated system used to identify at-
risk cargo, warrant that kind of inspection. There would also be a 
requirement for extensive negotiations with foreign governments to 
agree on the deployment of scanning technologies, the protocol for 
inspecting containers that set off alarms, and stationing customs and 
border protection inspectors in their ports. Foreign governments would 
probably turn around and say: If you are going to scan all of the 
containers coming into America, we are going to scan all of your 
containers coming into our country. That would multiply the costs and 
the impact.
  Requiring all containers to be scanned and the images reviewed 
without adequate technology in place would make our country less safe, 
not more safe. The approach in this amendment would unwisely waste 
scarce resources on inspecting completely safe cargo instead of 
targeting personnel and equipment on the cargo that presents a threat 
to our country and the greatest risk.
  The Homeland Security Committee spent a great deal of time last year 
on

[[Page 5130]]

port security legislation, and we drafted a bill, brought it 
unanimously to the Senate floor, had extensive debates in September, 
and we debated this very issue at that time. Why we are revisiting it 
just a few months later is beyond me, but here we are.
  This amendment wholly ignores the pilot projects that were 
established by the SAFE Port Act which we passed last year. These pilot 
projects are intended to test the technology to see if there is a way 
to increase scanning. The technology is changing. It is getting better. 
This may be feasible at some point, but it is not today.
  The SAFE Port Act requires the Department of Homeland Security to 
test scanning in three foreign ports, and the Department is proceeding 
very rapidly to follow the instructions. It is going to be implemented 
in ports in Pakistan, Honduras, and the United Kingdom. These pilot 
projects will involve radiation scanning and x-ray or a nonintrusive 
imaging scanning that will then be reviewed by American employees, 
American officials. If these pilots are successful, then we will begin 
to expand the equipment and the personnel. But the fact is that 
extensive research and development remains to be done on 100-percent 
scanning technologies and on infrastructure deployment at seaports.
  Given the significant impact this requirement would have on our 
economy, it simply is not responsible to move to this requirement 
before we have the technology in place to make it feasible and before 
we have the results of these pilot projects. This isn't just my 
opinion. If one talks to port directors around the world and on both 
coasts of the United States, one will find that they believe we cannot 
do this in a practical way and that it would cause massive backlogs and 
delay the delivery of vital commodities. It would cause terrible 
problems for companies that rely on just-in-time inventory. That is why 
many shippers and importers oppose this amendment, as well as the 
Retail Industry Leaders Association, National Retail Federation and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
  So what do we do now? I think it is important for people to 
understand that we do have a good and improving system in place to 
secure our cargo. DHS has adopted a layered approach to cargo security 
that balances security interests against the need for efficient 
movement of millions of cargo containers each year.
  One layer is the screening of all cargo manifests at least 24 hours 
before they are loaded onto ships. This screening is done through DHS's 
automated targeting system which identifies high-risk cargo and 
containers. This is a very important point. The SAFE Port Act, which is 
now in effect, requires 100 percent of all high-risk containers to be 
scanned or searched by Customs and Border Protection--100 percent. We 
found in our investigations that was not always the case, that high-
risk containers that had been identified were, in some cases, loaded 
onto ships and reaching our shores. But the SAFE Port Act changes that. 
It ensures that 100 percent of high-risk containers will be scanned.
  The scanning and inspection of certain high-risk containers is one of 
the first layers of this multilayered approach the Department uses to 
prevent weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous cargo from 
entering the United States.
  A second layer is the Container Security Initiative. This program 
stations Customs and Border Patrol officers--American Customs and 
Border Protection officers--at foreign ports. The concept here is to 
push back our shores. The more we can do these reviews overseas rather 
than waiting for dangerous cargo to come to our shores, the better the 
system. CSI will be operational in 58 foreign ports by the end of this 
year, covering approximately 85 percent of containerized cargo headed 
for the United States by sea. DHS is continuing to expand this program 
by working with foreign governments, but this is an excellent program 
because it ensures that our trained American personnel are stationed in 
foreign ports.
  There is yet another layer, a third layer, and that is the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program. It is called C-TPAT. This 
is another layer that is designed to bolster security along the entire 
supply chain under a voluntary regime. The concept here is that a 
company can sign up to be part of C-TPAT by guaranteeing that its 
entire supply chain is secure from the factory floor to the showroom 
floor, and that is the best kind of security we can have. So when goods 
leave the factory floor, the supply chain, every step of the way--the 
transporting of the cargo in a truck to the truck going to the port--at 
every stage, the company has ensured that the supply chain is secure.
  These layers--the automated targeting system, the work the Coast 
Guard does, which I haven't even touched on--also add to the security. 
The Container Security Initiative and the C-TPAT Program represent a 
risk-based approach to enhancing our homeland security. At the same 
time, they allow the maritime cargo industry in the United States, 
which moves more than 11 million containers each year, to continue to 
function efficiently.
  The SAFE Port Act also requires that at the end of this year, the 
largest 22 U.S. ports must have radiation scanners, which will ensure 
that 98 percent of containers are scanned for radiation. That is 
practical with the current technology. Again, I have seen that in 
operation in Seattle, where the trucks roll through these radiation 
portal monitors and an alarm can sound if radiation is found. 
Sometimes, unfortunately, there are false alarms as well.
  We are also working to install those kinds of radiation monitors 
overseas because, obviously, it is far better if we can do that 
scanning for radiation overseas in foreign ports on cargo before it 
reaches our shores. The Department of Energy, under the Megaports 
Initiative, is currently installing scanning equipment in foreign ports 
and scanning containers for radiological material. So we are making 
good progress.
  Some who are advocating 100 percent screening are pointing to a 
project in Hong Kong, the Integrated Container Inspection System. This 
is a promising concept, but, as my colleague from Minnesota noted, the 
project in Hong Kong actually covers only 2 lanes of traffic of more 
than 40 at the port. In addition, what is happening is images are being 
taken, but no one is reading and analyzing the images. So this is not 
truly a project that tells us whether a true, 100-percent integrated 
scanning system is feasible. But we do have those projects underway, 
and we should wait until they are ready and finished before moving 
ahead.
  Again, I hope my colleagues will once again reject this amendment. I 
think it is a big mistake. It would interrupt our system of container 
traffic, and it could have truly disastrous consequences for our 
economy. All of us want to make sure cargo coming into this country is 
safe. There were definitely vulnerabilities and holes in our system for 
cargo security, but the SAFE Port Act, which we passed at the end of 
last year, took major steps to plugging those gaps, closing those 
holes.
  We should proceed with vigorous implementation of that bill, 
including the requirement that 100 percent of all high-risk cargo be 
scanned, and we should also continue our efforts to build the strongest 
possible layered system to secure the entire supply chain.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I wish to build on some things my 
ranking member, Senator Collins, said about this amendment. I think 
what ought to be acknowledged is that everyone in the Senate, everyone 
in America would like to get to the point where we have 100 percent 
scanning of containers coming into this country--scanning for radiation 
because we are worried about the potential catastrophe of a nuclear 
weapon or a dirty bomb in a container coming into this country.
  We know the number of containers coming in is enormous. Each day, 
more than 30,000 containers offload millions of tons at our maritime 
borders. We

[[Page 5131]]

understand this requires two kinds of screening: First is radiation 
detection equipment to pick up, obviously, radiation emanating from a 
nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb; secondly, so-called nonintrusive 
imaging equipment, which is needed in case terrorists have shielded the 
nuclear weapon or dirty bomb inside some kind of material that will 
stop it from registering on the radiation equipment. So the 
nonintrusive imaging equipment, x-ray equipment, will note there is 
something there that is shielded, which will then lead to a physical 
inspection of the container.
  There is no question in my mind that everybody in the Senate wants to 
get us to a point where we have 100 percent of the containers coming 
into America being scanned in the way I just described as soon as 
possible. What I want to say at this point is that the SAFE Port Act, 
which, as Senator Collins said, came out of our Homeland Security 
Committee last year--during those halcyon days when she was Chairman 
and I worked deferentially as the Ranking Minority Member--was a good, 
strong bill. It came out of committee, was adopted by both Houses, 
enacted, and became law on October 13 of last year. Here is the point. 
The SAFE Port Act, existing law, sets the goal of 100 percent scanning 
by radiation detection equipment and nonintrusive imaging equipment, as 
soon as possible.
  Obviously, if somebody says we should do it in 5 years, you would 
say: Sure, why not do that in 5 years. But I want to suggest now that I 
believe the existing law holds open the possibility of achieving that 
goal of 100 percent cargo scanning, assuming we can get over all the 
technological obstacles that Senator Collins and others have spoken of, 
sooner than the 5 year requirement found in this amendment. That is why 
it seems to me, with all due respect, that this amendment is 
unnecessary and, in fact, is less demanding than existing law.
  Let me go now to section 232 of Public Law 109-347, which is the SAFE 
Port Act. It says that the Secretary, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Energy, and foreign partners as appropriate, shall ensure 
integrated scanning systems are fully deployed--100 percent--to scan, 
using nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment, 
all containers--all containers, 100 percent--before those containers 
arrive in the United States, as soon as possible.
  As soon as possible, I hope, will occur before the 5 years required 
by this amendment. Not only does it set the goal as soon as possible, 
it creates a process that, with all due respect, is not found in this 
amendment, and that process as Senator Collins and Senator Coleman have 
described. A one year pilot project scanning 100 percent of cargo 
containers by these two methods of detection, at three ports around the 
world. That pilot has already begun. Six months after the conclusion of 
the pilot program, the Secretary has to report to Congress on the 
success of the program. The Secretary also has to do something else, 
according to the law. The Secretary has to indicate to the relevant 
committees of Congress how soon the 100 percent scanning goal of the 
SAFE Port Act can be achieved.
  Not only that, but subsection (c) of section 232 of the SAFE Port Act 
says that not later than 6 months after the submission of the initial 
report--and every 6 months thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the 
status of full-scale deployment of 100 percent cargo screening. That is 
not in the House-passed provision or, as I see it, in this amendment 
before us now.
  In other words, 6 months after the year long pilot project, the 
Secretary is going to report on the results and tell us when exactly he 
thinks we can achieve 100 percent screening of all cargo. The Secretary 
will then be required to file a similar report every 6 months 
thereafter until we achieve full-scale deployment of these two types of 
scanning devices to detect nuclear weapons that may be smuggled into 
this country in a container.
  Obviously, if the relevant committees of Congress that receive these 
reports--the first of which by my calculation would be April of next 
year, 2008, and then every 6 months thereafter--believe this 
implementation is not moving rapidly enough, we can come back and set a 
definite deadline date. Right now, however, I submit to my colleagues, 
existing law, the SAFE Port Act, actually sets a goal of 100 percent 
cargo scanning that I think may be more quickly achieved than the 5 
years in this amendment, and sets up a process not found in the 
amendment, which requires reports to Congress every 6 months. This will 
inevitably, by the nature of the congressional process, trigger further 
legislation, perhaps specifically stating a deadline date for 100 
percent scanning if we, in our wisdom, think that the Secretary and the 
industry are not moving rapidly enough.
  The bottom line is this. Existing law, in a technologically very 
difficult area, with significant potential impacts on our economy and 
the world economy, actually holds the potential of achieving more, and 
I believe will achieve more, than the amendment that is being offered. 
For those reasons, I will respectfully oppose the amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
it is so ordered.


                              Health Care

  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, yesterday, the Washington Post brought to 
the Nation's attention the story of a young boy, Deamonte Driver, who 
died Sunday, February 25, at the age of 12. Our thoughts are with the 
Driver family. Deamonte's death, the result of a brain infection 
brought on by a tooth abscess, is a national tragedy. It is a tragedy 
because it was preventable. It is a tragedy because it happened right 
here in the United States, in a State which is one of the most affluent 
in the Nation. It happened in a State that is home to the first and one 
of the best dental schools in the Nation, the University of Maryland. 
It happened in Prince George's County, whose border is less than 6 
miles from where we are standing in the United States Capitol.
  By now, most of my colleagues are familiar with Deamonte's story. 
Through a sad confluence of circumstances and events, the disjointed 
parts of our health care system failed this child. The Driver family, 
like many other families across the country, lacked dental insurance. 
At one point his family had Medicaid coverage, but they lost it because 
they had moved to a shelter and the paperwork fell through the cracks. 
Even when a dedicated community social worker tried to help, it took 
more than 20 phone calls to find a dentist who would treat him.
  Deamonte began to complain about headaches just 8 weeks ago, on 
January 11. An evaluation at Children's Hospital led beyond basic 
dental care to emergency brain surgery. He later experienced seizures 
and a second operation. Even though he received further treatment and 
therapy, and he appeared to be recovering, medical intervention had 
come too late. Deamonte passed away on Sunday, February 25.
  At the end, the total cost of Deamonte's treatment exceeded $250,000. 
That is more than 3,000 times as much as the $80 it would have cost to 
have a tooth extraction. It is not enough for the community and the 
State, and even the Senate, to mourn Deamonte's death. We must learn 
from this appalling failure of our broken health care system, and we 
must fix it.
  Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop once said: ``There is no 
health without oral health.'' The sad story of the Driver family has 
brought Dr. Koop's lesson home in a painful way.
  Our medical researchers have discovered the important linkage between 
plaque and heart disease, that chewing stimulates brain cell growth, 
and that gum disease can signal diabetes, liver ailments, and hormone 
imbalances. They have learned the vital connection between oral 
research advanced treatments like gene therapy, which can

[[Page 5132]]

help patients with chronic renal failure. Without real support for 
government insurance programs like SCHIP and Medicaid, however, all 
this textbook knowledge will do nothing to help our children.
  Here are some basic facts: According to the American Academy of 
Pediatric Medicine, dental decay is the most chronic childhood disease 
among children in the United States. It affects one in five children 
aged 2 to 4, half of those aged 6 to 8, and nearly three-fifths of 15-
year-olds.
  Tooth decay is five times more common than asthma among school-aged 
children.
  Children living in poverty suffer twice as much tooth decay as middle 
and upper income children.
  Thirty-nine percent of Black children have untreated tooth decay in 
their permanent teeth.
  Eleven percent of the Nation's rural population has never visited a 
dentist.
  An estimated 25 million people live in areas that lack adequate 
dental care services.
  One year ago, the President signed into law the so-called Deficit 
Reduction Act. I voted against that bill. It included dangerous cuts to 
Medicaid that provide only short-term savings while raising health care 
costs and the number of uninsured in the long term. That law allows 
States to increase copayments by Medicaid beneficiaries for services, 
putting health of America's most vulnerable residents like the Drivers 
at risk.
  The new law also removes Medicaid's Early and Periodic Screening, 
Diagnostic, and Treatment Program guarantee, which provides children 
with vital care, including dental services. This became effective as of 
January 1.
  What does this mean? Before the Deficit Reduction Act, Medicaid law 
required all States to provide a comprehensive set of early and 
periodic screening and diagnostic treatment benefits to all children. 
Now States can offer one of four benchmark packages instead, and none 
of these packages include dental services. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office, as a result of this provision, 1.5 million 
children will receive less benefits by 2015.
  The last few years have also produced budgets that have crippled 
health initiatives in this country. This is the result of an agenda 
that does not give priority to health care, science, and education. 
After doubling NIH's budget in 5 years, at about a 15-percent annual 
growth ending in 2003, we are now looking at increases that don't even 
equal the rate of inflation. With flat funding in the President's NIH 
budget this year, we are not doing more, we are treading water. When it 
comes to research project grants, we are doing less. At the same time, 
overall appropriations for the Health Resources and Services 
Administration are declining.
  The agency's principal responsibility is to ensure that primary care 
health care services and qualified health professionals are available 
to meet the health needs of all Americans, particularly the 
underserved. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget cuts this program 
by $251 million. President Bush, once again, proposes to almost wipe 
out programs that educate non-nurse health professionals. This is 
happening at a time when more than 20 percent of our dentists are 
expected to retire in the next decade.
  The 2008 Bush proposal would also cut more than $135 million from 
health professions training programs. Programs that help prepare 
minority high school and college students for dentistry would be shut 
down, as would grants to help support training of primary care doctors 
and dentists. Scholarships for minority and disadvantaged children 
would be cut significantly.
  Dental reimbursement for programs within the Ryan White CARE Act, 
which help dental schools train doctors to care for HIV patients, is 
not increased sufficiently to meet our communities' needs. We cannot 
let this happen. These training programs provide critically important 
training and health education services to communities throughout the 
country, including those in my own State of Maryland.
  We need to do more to make the public and the administration 
understand that dental care must be part of a comprehensive medical 
approach in this country, and we need to find ways to provide dental 
coverage as part of health insurance plans.
  This comes back to a fundamental question: What should the role of 
the Federal Government be in these matters? We cannot end these vital 
health education resource programs; we must strengthen them. Deamonte's 
death should be a wake-up call to all of us in the 110th Congress. This 
year we will be called upon to make important decisions about Medicaid 
funding and we will be called upon to authorize the SCHIP program. We 
must ensure that the SCHIP reauthorization bill we send to the 
President for his signature includes dental coverage for our children. 
I call upon my colleagues, as we begin this debate in the spring, to 
remember Deamonte. I also ask them to remember his brother, DaShawn, 
who still needs dental care, and the millions of other American 
children who rely on public health care for their dental care needs. 
That is the least we can do.
  I urge my colleagues to give these matters the attention they need.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Missouri is recognized.


                     Accountability at Walter Reed

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, yesterday I had the privilege of 
spending 3 hours at Walter Reed Army Hospital, specifically looking at 
outpatient care. As a result of that visit, I have come to several 
inescapable conclusions about the leadership of the armed services over 
this important area.
  First, we have to start with a foundational premise, and that premise 
is our wounded deserve the best. The men and women who have crossed 
that line and say ``I will go'' and go and get hurt and come home 
deserve the best our military can give them--not Building 18.
  There are so many problems at Walter Reed, and legislation has been 
introduced that I am honored to cosponsor that will address a lot of 
these problems--systemic bureaucratic problems: not sufficient 
counselors, not sufficient training, not taking care of the families of 
the wounded. A lot of necessary issues are covered in that legislation. 
But today I thought it important to spend a few minutes talking about 
the leadership.
  We have to make up our mind around here whether we are going to say 
``support the troops'' and provide oversight and accountability or 
whether we are going to mean it. If you are going to have 
accountability under these circumstances you have to look at the 
culture of leadership. You have to look at the very top of the 
leadership tree over Walter Reed. In this instance the leader, General 
Kiley, was at Walter Reed at or near the time Building 18 opened. It is 
clear that General Kiley, the Surgeon General of the Army, knew about 
the conditions at Building 18. More importantly, he knew about the 
other problems.
  The irony of this situation is General Weightman, who has only been 
there a year, stepped up and said, I take responsibility. I am the 
commander here now. Just minutes ago he was relieved of his command, 
while General Kiley is quoted repeatedly as if there is not a problem--
he is spinning: ``I want to reset the thinking that while we have some 
issues here, this is not a horrific, catastrophic failure at Walter 
Reed. I mean these are not good, but you saw rooms that were perfectly 
acceptable.''
  They are not perfectly acceptable. You have people who are stationed 
at Walter Reed who have better barracks than the wounded. That is 
unacceptable. Our wounded should get the best. The people in better 
barracks can be placed in apartments in town. When the decision was 
made to let these men move into Building 18, they could have moved into 
the better barracks and the people who are stationed there permanently 
could have been stationed elsewhere.
  On Building 18 he said the problems--by the way, he lives within a 
block of

[[Page 5133]]

Building 18, General Kiley--``weren't serious and there weren't a lot 
of them.'' They are serious and there are a lot of them. He said they 
were not ``emblematic of a process of Walter Reed that has abandoned 
soldiers and their families.''''
  Back in December, when the vets organizations met with General Kiley 
and enumerated these problems about the wounded and their families and 
the problems they were facing in outpatient, General Kiley said, ``very 
important testimony.'' That was it.
  I want to make sure there is no misunderstanding. Colonel Callahan, 
who is in charge of the hospital at Walter Reed, was open and honest 
and clearly cared, as did most of the leaders I talked to around the 
table. But I went away with an uneasy sense that all the legislation we 
pass and all the paint we can put on the walls is not going to solve 
this problem if we don't begin to speak out for accountability within 
the leadership of the military.
  When we had the scandal at Abu Ghraib, noncommissioned officers were 
disciplined. Up until the relieving of General Weightman today, no one 
above a captain had been disciplined in this matter. It is time the 
leadership at the top takes responsibility and that is why I have 
called today for the Surgeon General of the Army, LTG Kevin Kiley, to 
be relieved of his command over the medical command of the United 
States Army so the message can go out loudly and clearly: We will not 
tolerate treatment of our wounded in any way that does not reflect the 
respect we have for them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.


                     Amendment No. 290, As Modified

  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify 
amendment No. 290. I send the modification to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is not pending. The Senator may 
modify his amendment.
  Mr. SALAZAR. I send the amendment as modified to the desk. I ask 
unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Salazar], for himself and 
     Mr. Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered 290, as 
     modified.

  The amendment is as follows:

      (Purpose: To require a quadrennial homeland security review)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Establishment.--Not later than the end of fiscal year 
     2008, the Secretary shall establish a national homeland 
     security strategy.
       (2) Review.--Four years after the establishment of the 
     national homeland security strategy, and every 4 years 
     thereafter, the Secretary shall conduct a comprehensive 
     examination of the national homeland security strategy.
       (3) Scope.--In establishing or reviewing the national 
     homeland security strategy under this subsection, the 
     Secretary shall conduct a comprehensive examination of 
     interagency cooperation, preparedness of Federal response 
     assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of 
     the homeland security program and policies of the United 
     States with a view toward determining and expressing the 
     homeland security strategy of the United States and 
     establishing a homeland security program for the 20 years 
     following that examination.
       (4) Reference.--The establishment or review of the national 
     homeland security strategy under this subsection shall be 
     known as the ``quadrennial homeland security review''.
       (5) Consultation.--Each quadrennial homeland security 
     review under this subsection shall be conducted in 
     consultation with the Attorney General of the United States, 
     the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of 
     the Treasury.
       (b) Contents of Review.--Each quadrennial homeland security 
     review shall--
       (1) delineate a national homeland security strategy 
     consistent with the most recent National Response Plan 
     prepared under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 or 
     any directive meant to replace or augment that directive;
       (2) describe the interagency cooperation, preparedness of 
     Federal response assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and 
     other elements of the homeland security program and policies 
     of the United States associated with the national homeland 
     security strategy required to execute successfully the full 
     range of missions called for in the national homeland 
     security strategy delineated under paragraph (1); and
       (3) identify--
       (A) the budget plan required to provide sufficient 
     resources to successfully execute the full range of missions 
     called for in that national homeland security strategy at a 
     low-to-moderate level of risk; and
       (B) any additional resources required to achieve such a 
     level of risk.
       (c) Level of Risk.--The assessment of the level of risk for 
     purposes of subsection (b)(3) shall be conducted by the 
     Director of National Intelligence.
       (d) Reporting.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall submit a report 
     regarding each quadrennial homeland security review to the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives. Each such report shall be submitted 
     not later than September 30 of the year in which the review 
     is conducted.
       (2) Contents of report.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) the results of the quadrennial homeland security 
     review;
       (B) the threats to the assumed or defined national homeland 
     security interests of the United States that were examined 
     for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in 
     the examination of those threats;
       (C) the status of cooperation among Federal agencies in the 
     effort to promote national homeland security;
       (D) the status of cooperation between the Federal 
     Government and State governments in preparing for emergency 
     response to threats to national homeland security; and
       (E) any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.
       (e) Resource Plan.--
       Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary shall provide to the Committee on 
     Appropriations and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Appropriations and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a detailed resource plan specifying 
     the estimated budget and number of staff members that will be 
     required for preparation of the initial quadrennial homeland 
     security review.

  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I come here today first to make some 
comments about the legislation that is before the Chamber. I can think 
of no greater responsibility for this Senate to take on than to make 
sure our homeland is in fact secure and protected. I commend my 
colleagues, the chairman, Senator Joe Lieberman, and Senator Susan 
Collins, the ranking member, for having worked with the committee to 
have brought a very good product here to the floor of the Senate. It is 
legislation I strongly support. It moves our country in the right 
direction in terms of making sure we are moving forward with the 
appropriate level of homeland security.
  When the people of Colorado chose me to represent them here in this 
Chamber, I made a promise to them that protecting our homeland and 
supporting law enforcement would be among my very highest priorities. 
In the 2 years-plus since I took that oath of office, I have had the 
privilege of working hard to fulfill that pledge with my colleagues 
here in the Senate. With the help of colleagues of both parties, I have 
been privileged to help pass the Combat Meth Act, I have been 
privileged to help find bipartisan support on the PATRIOT Act, provide 
resources for law enforcement and emergency responders, and pass, last 
year, a comprehensive immigration reform bill that secured our borders 
and enforced our laws.
  Great challenges remain. Great challenges remain as we move forward 
with the challenge of homeland security, challenges that cannot be 
deferred, challenges we should not defer here in Washington. These are 
challenges that require compromise and a bipartisan approach in dealing 
with homeland security. This week we take up those challenges as we 
implement the unfinished recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
  I begin my remarks by reading a few sentences from the preface of the 
9/11 Commission report. That report said in its preface the following:

       We have come together with a unity of purpose because our 
     Nation demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of 
     unprecedented

[[Page 5134]]

     shock and suffering in the history of the United States. The 
     nation was unprepared. How did this happen and how can we 
     avoid such tragedy again?

  These words convey a simple but a very important message. We have an 
obligation to work together, not as partisans but as policymakers, to 
ensure our Nation is better protected in the future. The bill we are 
debating today takes a number of very important steps in that 
direction.
  First, I am pleased to see the creation of a grant program dedicated 
to improving interoperable communications at the Federal, State, and 
local levels. This grant program will help ensure that communities 
across the country in both urban and rural areas receive the funding 
necessary to improve their communications systems. Money alone will not 
solve the problem of interoperability, but many cash-strapped 
communities need the Federal funds necessary to help purchase the 
necessary radio and tower upgrades.
  It is also important to note that States will be required to pass on 
at least 80 percent of grants under this program to local and tribal 
governments and to demonstrate that those funds will be used in a 
manner consistent with statewide operability plans and the National 
Emergency Communications Plan. While Colorado has been a leader in 
achieving interoperability, many communities in my State simply do not 
have the resources necessary to purchase radio equipment. As Frank 
Cavaliere, the chief of the Lower Valley Colorado Fire District, told 
my office last year, ``We are many light years away from being able to 
purchase enough radio equipment let alone all of the repeater towers 
needed for effective coverage.'' This grant program alone will not 
solve the problem, but it is an important step in the right direction.
  Second, I am pleased to see the proposed legislation would improve 
the sharing of intelligence and information with State and local and 
tribal governments. In particular, I am pleased the bill establishes an 
intelligence training program for State, local, and tribal law 
enforcement officers and emergency responders, and it authorizes the 
Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group, which will coordinate 
the dissemination of intelligence to State and local officials.
  Intelligence and information sharing is an issue of particular 
importance to law enforcement officials and emergency responders 
throughout our Nation. Indeed, when I conducted a survey last year of 
Colorado emergency officials, by a 3-to-1 margin they felt 
antiterrorism information they received from the Federal Government was 
insufficient and ineffective. The chief of police for Estes Park, CO, 
Lowell Richardson, summed this up when he told my office the following. 
He said ``a duplicity in sharing information . . . exists between State 
and Federal agencies. This overwhelms our ability to efficiently sift 
through the information and forward what is relevant to the officers on 
the street.''
  I am hopeful this bill will begin to sort out this program and ensure 
our State and local emergency responders have all the necessary 
information and intelligence.
  Finally, I am pleased the bill would mandate the creation of a 
National Biosurveillance Integration Center which would promote the 
integration of Federal, State, and local data from human health, 
agriculture, and environmental surveillance programs in order to 
enhance the ability to rapidly identify and attack outbreaks following 
a bioterrorist attack or a naturally occurring pandemic. In the survey 
of Colorado emergency responders, by a 4-to-1 margin they felt 
unprepared to handle a weapons of mass destruction attack. It is our 
duty as a Congress to do everything in our power to help State, local, 
and tribal communities prepare for the possibility of a bioterrorist 
attack and this bill takes an important step in that direction.
  I also note two amendments which I offered to strengthen this already 
good bill. These amendments deal with two issues which I understand 
well since serving as attorney general for Colorado, the planning and 
training for law enforcement.
  Now I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set aside. I 
call up amendment No. 290 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
  Mr. SALAZAR. This amendment would require the Department of Homeland 
Security to conduct a ``Quadrennial Homeland Defense Review.'' I am 
proud both Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins are cosponsors of this 
legislation.
  This amendment would provide a comprehensive examination of the 
national homeland security strategy and an assessment of interagency 
cooperation, preparedness of Federal response assets and 
infrastructure, and a budget plan.
  The quadrennial homeland defense review would mirror the quadrennial 
homeland defense review prepared by the Pentagon which helped shape 
defense policy, military strategy, and resource allocation. The 
quadrennial review would not be another bureaucratic document which 
gathers dust on some shelf; instead, this document will require DHS to 
do the hard thinking, preparation, and planning necessary to coordinate 
national homeland security resources.


                 Amendment No. 280 to Amendment No. 275

  The second amendment I wish to discuss is amendment No. 280. I ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the pending amendment 
being set aside?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Salazar], for himself, Mr. 
     Chambliss, Mr. Isakson, and Mr. Pryor, proposes an amendment 
     No. 280 to amendment No. 275.

  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. RURAL POLICING INSTITUTE.

       (a) In General.--There is established a Rural Policing 
     Institute, which shall be administered by the Office of State 
     and Local Training of the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
     Center (based in Glynco, Georgia), to--
       (1) evaluate the needs of law enforcement agencies of units 
     of local government and tribal governments located in rural 
     areas;
       (2) develop expert training programs designed to address 
     the needs of rural law enforcement agencies regarding 
     combating methamphetamine addiction and distribution, 
     domestic violence, law enforcement response related to school 
     shootings, and other topics identified in the evaluation 
     conducted under paragraph (1);
       (3) provide the training programs described in paragraph 
     (2) to law enforcement agencies of units of local government 
     and tribal governments located in rural areas; and
       (4) conduct outreach efforts to ensure that training 
     programs under the Rural Policing Institute reach law 
     enforcement officers of units of local government and tribal 
     governments located in rural areas.
       (b) Curricula.--The training at the Rural Policing 
     Institute established under subsection (a) shall be 
     configured in a manner so as to not duplicate or displace any 
     law enforcement program of the Federal Law Enforcement 
     Training Center in existence on the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``rural'' means 
     area that is not located in a metropolitan statistical area, 
     as defined by the Office of Management and Budget.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to carry out this section (including for 
     contracts, staff, and equipment)--
       (1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; and
       (2) $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2013.

  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, this amendment, which I offer with 
Senators Chambliss, Isakson, and Pryor, would create a Rural Policing 
Institute at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. I have often 
referred to our rural communities as ``the forgotten America.'' Indeed, 
rural America is the backbone of our country. But often those with wide 
stretches of land out in the heartland of America are forgotten and 
don't have the kinds of resources found in larger cities.
  What this amendment would do is create a Rural Policing Institute 
that would be operated out of the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center in Georgia. I am proud my colleagues in Georgia and Arkansas 
have agreed to cosponsor the amendment. The essence of this amendment 
is to evaluate the

[[Page 5135]]

needs of rural and tribal law enforcement agencies. It would develop 
training programs designed to address the needs of rural law 
enforcement agencies. It would export those training programs to those 
agencies, and it would conduct outreach to ensure the programs reach 
rural law enforcement agencies.
  Let me comment briefly on this amendment. When I step back and see 
what we are trying to do on the front of homeland security, we know 
that at some point, someplace, we in the United States will be attacked 
again in the same way we were attacked on 9/11. The question becomes, 
What will we do to prevent those kinds of attacks from occurring?
  If one looks at the men and women who wear our uniform as our peace 
officers around the country, there are some 600,000 of them out there 
in patrol cars. They are the ones who are going to be the first to 
really know whether there is a threat somewhere within a small 
community or a large community. It is important for us to support these 
men and women who are out there as law enforcement officers and make 
them a coordinated partner in helping us deal with issues of homeland 
security. The Rural Policing Institute, which is a top-of-the-line 
institute for Federal law enforcement training, should be made 
available to these rural law enforcement officers because that will 
help them be true partners in enhancing homeland security, which we 
need so much.
  I commend the leadership of Senators Lieberman and Collins on this 
bill.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if the Senator from New Jersey will 
withhold, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess from 
3 p.m. to 4 p.m. for the national security briefing in S. 407; that 
upon reconvening at 4 p.m., the Senate resume the Schumer amendment No. 
298; that prior to a vote in relation to the amendment, there be 45 
minutes of debate equally divided and controlled by Senators Schumer 
and Lieberman or their designees; that no amendment be in order to the 
amendment prior to the vote; and that upon use of the time, the Senate 
proceed to vote in relationship to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from New Jersey.


                           Amendment No. 298

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I will try to conclude my remarks 
before the time we are closing down the Senate.
  The House has taken an important step to implement the 9/11 
Commission recommendations. I am pleased to see us at work to complete 
our deliberations on this bill, but for the moment, I wish to talk 
about amendment No. 298 which Senator Schumer has offered to strengthen 
our port and container security. It builds on a law I helped write last 
year. It was then that I authored language in the SAFE Ports Act to 
require the Bush administration to scan every container entering our 
country, looking for weapons and contraband. My amendment called for a 
dramatic change in our national policy on cargo screening, but the 
administration was not moving fast enough. That is why it is essential 
that we pass today's amendment offered by Senator Schumer, which I 
cosponsored.
  The 2-mile stretch that is between Port Newark and Newark-Liberty 
International Airport is considered the most at-risk area in the 
country for a terrorist attack. This is asserted by the FBI, and it is 
something to which we have to pay serious attention.
  I served as a commissioner of the Port Authority of New Jersey and 
New York. I know how vulnerable a target the port region is. Our ports 
are the doors through which essential goods and commodities enter our 
national economy. They are the doors through which supplies flow to our 
military. Ninety-five percent of all America's imported goods arrive by 
ship. We need a way to ensure that 100 percent of these containers 
coming into our country are WMD free. We need a scanning system in 
place as soon as possible. Since the Bush administration has failed to 
act promptly to put this scanning system in place at our ports, we need 
to pass this amendment to push the administration to complete the task.
  The New Jersey-New York port is the second busiest container port in 
the entire country. In 2005, 13 percent of all vessels arriving in 
America called on our port. Thousands of longshoremen and others work 
at docks where these ships come in, and millions of people live in the 
densely packed communities around the port. Every day we fail to make 
our ports safer is a day we can leave them more vulnerable to a 
terrorist attack.
  Today, we only inspect about 5 percent of the shipping containers 
that enter our country. Who knows what lies within those containers? We 
have seen attempts to smuggle arms into our country through the port. 
Within 95 percent of the containers we don't inspect, terrorists could 
launch an attack even more devastating than 9/11, virtually in the same 
neighborhood. Terrorists could smuggle themselves, traditional weapons, 
chemical or biological weapons, or even nuclear weapons. We know about 
the availability of smaller, more compact, more deadly weapons that are 
being developed.
  We have seen what happened in the past. In April 2005, security 
guards at the Port of Los Angeles found 28 human beings, Chinese 
nationals, who were smuggled into the country in two cargo containers. 
In October 2002, Italian authorities found a suspected Egyptian 
terrorist living in a shipping container en route to Canada. According 
to a news report at the time, he had a laptop computer, two cell 
phones, a Canadian passport, security passes for airports in three 
countries, a certificate identifying him as an airline mechanic, and 
airport maps. We can't let that happen.
  We have screened all airline passengers for weapons, and we do it 
because Congress passed a strong law with clear deadlines. Of course, 
that forced the Bush administration to act. We need to screen all cargo 
containers for weapons. That is why we have to pass a strong law now.
  Some in the industry and the administration say 100 percent screening 
cannot be done without crippling our economy. Let me tell my colleagues 
what would cripple commerce--that would be another terrorist attack. We 
lost 700 New Jerseyans and a total of over 3,000 people on 9/11. I 
don't want my State or anybody in our country to lose any more. This 
amendment will give us the tools and incentives we need to help prevent 
an attack on our ports, and it will help protect our economy and 
American lives.
  I am proud to cosponsor the amendment and urge my colleagues to 
support it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up 
to 6 minutes prior to the recess.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Bingaman pertaining to the introduction of S. 739 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')


                      Amendment No. 281 Withdrawn

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, prior to yielding the floor, I ask 
unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment, No. 281, to the pending 
bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
amendment is withdrawn.

                          ____________________