[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 4862-4920]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                IMPROVING AMERICA'S SECURITY ACT OF 2007

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to the consideration of S. 4, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 4) to make the United States more secure by 
     implementing unfinished recommendations of the 9/11 
     Commission to fight the war on terror more effectively, to 
     improve homeland security, and for other purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported 
from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, with 
an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
thereof the following:

                                  S. 4

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     [SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       [This Act may be cited as the ``Improving America's 
     Security by Implementing Unfinished Recommendations of the 9/
     11 Commission Act of 2007''.

[[Page 4863]]



     [SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       [It is the sense of Congress that Congress should enact, 
     and the President should sign, legislation to make the United 
     States more secure by implementing unfinished recommendations 
     of the 9/11 Commission to fight the war on terror more 
     effectively and to improve homeland security.]

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Improving America's Security 
     Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the 
     Department of Homeland Security.
       (2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 3. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Table of contents.

  TITLE I--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE 
    FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

     Subtitle A--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement

Sec. 111. Homeland Security Advisory System and information sharing.
Sec. 112. Information sharing.
Sec. 113. Intelligence training development for State and local 
              government officials.
Sec. 114. Information sharing incentives.

     Subtitle B--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships

Sec. 121. State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative.
Sec. 122. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.

    Subtitle C--Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group

Sec. 131. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.

                   TITLE II--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Homeland Security Grant Program.
Sec. 203. Technical and conforming amendments.

       TITLE III--COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY

Sec. 301. Dedicated funding to achieve emergency communications 
              operability and interoperable communications.
Sec. 302. Border Interoperability Demonstration Project.

          TITLE IV--ENHANCING SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

Sec. 401. Modernization of the visa waiver program.
Sec. 402. Strengthening the capabilities of the Human Smuggling and 
              Trafficking Center.
Sec. 403. Enhancements to the Terrorist Travel Program.
Sec. 404. Enhanced driver's license.
Sec. 405. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.

              TITLE V--PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES MATTERS

Sec. 501. Modification of authorities relating to Privacy and Civil 
              Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 502. Privacy and civil liberties officers.
Sec. 503. Department Privacy Officer.
Sec. 504. Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007.

    TITLE VI--ENHANCED DEFENSES AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Sec. 601. National Biosurveillance Integration Center.
Sec. 602. Biosurveillance efforts.
Sec. 603. Interagency coordination to enhance defenses against nuclear 
              and radiological weapons of mass destruction.

                 TITLE VII--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS

Sec. 701. Definitions.
Sec. 702. Responsibilities of the private sector office of the 
              Department.
Sec. 703. Voluntary national preparedness standards compliance; 
              accreditation and certification program for the private 
              sector.
Sec. 704. Sense of Congress regarding promoting an international 
              standard for private sector preparedness.
Sec. 705. Report to Congress.
Sec. 706. Rule of construction.

  TITLE VIII--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

Sec. 801. Transportation security strategic planning.
Sec. 802. Transportation security information sharing.
Sec. 803. Transportation Security Administration personnel management.

                   TITLE IX--INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

Sec. 901. Preidentifying and evaluating multijurisdictional facilities 
              to strengthen incident command; private sector 
              preparedness.
Sec. 902. Credentialing and typing to strengthen incident command.

              TITLE X--CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Sec. 1001. Critical infrastructure protection.
Sec. 1002. Risk assessment and report.
Sec. 1003. Use of existing capabilities.

           TITLE XI--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

Sec. 1101. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding 
              information.
Sec. 1102. Response of intelligence community to requests from 
              Congress.
Sec. 1103. Public Interest Declassification Board.

   TITLE XII--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ANTITERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES

Sec. 1201. Promoting antiterrorism capabilities through international 
              cooperation.
Sec. 1202. Transparency of funds.

                  TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 1301. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Secretary for Management.
Sec. 1302. Sense of the Senate regarding combating domestic 
              radicalization.
Sec. 1303. Sense of the Senate regarding oversight of homeland 
              security.
Sec. 1304. Report regarding border security.

  TITLE I--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE 
    FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

     Subtitle A--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement

     SEC. 111. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM AND INFORMATION 
                   SHARING.

       (a) Advisory System and Information Sharing.--
       (1) In general.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 203. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

       ``(a) Requirement.--The Secretary shall administer the 
     Homeland Security Advisory System in accordance with this 
     section to provide warnings regarding the risk of terrorist 
     attacks on the homeland to Federal, State, local, and tribal 
     government authorities and to the people of the United 
     States, as appropriate. The Secretary shall exercise primary 
     responsibility for providing such warnings.
       ``(b) Required Elements.--In administering the Homeland 
     Security Advisory System, the Secretary shall--
       ``(1) establish criteria for the issuance and revocation of 
     such warnings;
       ``(2) develop a methodology, relying on the criteria 
     established under paragraph (1), for the issuance and 
     revocation of such warnings;
       ``(3) provide, in each such warning, specific information 
     and advice regarding appropriate protective measures and 
     countermeasures that may be taken in response to that risk, 
     at the maximum level of detail practicable to enable 
     individuals, government entities, emergency response 
     providers, and the private sector to act appropriately; and
       ``(4) whenever possible, limit the scope of each such 
     warning to a specific region, locality, or economic sector 
     believed to be at risk.

     ``SEC. 204. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

       ``(a) Information Sharing.--Consistent with section 1016 of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (6 U.S.C. 485), the Secretary shall integrate and standardize 
     the information of the intelligence components of the 
     Department, except for any internal protocols of such 
     intelligence components, to be administered by the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer.
       ``(b) Information Sharing and Knowledge Management 
     Officers.--For each intelligence component of the Department, 
     the Secretary shall designate an information sharing and 
     knowledge management officer who shall report to the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer regarding coordinating the different 
     systems used in the Department to gather and disseminate 
     homeland security information.
       ``(c) State, Local, and Private-Sector Sources of 
     Information.--
       ``(1) Establishment of business processes.--The Chief 
     Intelligence Officer shall--
       ``(A) establish Department-wide procedures for the review 
     and analysis of information gathered from sources in State, 
     local, and tribal government and the private sector;
       ``(B) as appropriate, integrate such information into the 
     information gathered by the Department and other departments 
     and agencies of the Federal Government; and
       ``(C) make available such information, as appropriate, 
     within the Department and to other departments and agencies 
     of the Federal Government.
       ``(2) Feedback.--The Secretary shall develop mechanisms to 
     provide feedback regarding the analysis and utility of 
     information provided by any entity of State, local, or tribal 
     government or the private sector that gathers information and 
     provides such information to the Department.
       ``(d) Training and Evaluation of Employees.--
       ``(1) Training.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall 
     provide to employees of the Department opportunities for 
     training and education to develop an understanding of--
       ``(A) the definition of homeland security information; and
       ``(B) how information available to such employees as part 
     of their duties--
       ``(i) might qualify as homeland security information; and
       ``(ii) might be relevant to the intelligence components of 
     the Department.
       ``(2) Evaluations.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall--

[[Page 4864]]

       ``(A) on an ongoing basis, evaluate how employees of the 
     Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence 
     components of the Department are utilizing homeland security 
     information, sharing information within the Department, as 
     described in this subtitle, and participating in the 
     information sharing environment established under section 
     1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
       ``(B) provide a report regarding any evaluation under 
     subparagraph (A) to the appropriate component heads.

     ``SEC. 205. COORDINATION WITH INFORMATION SHARING 
                   ENVIRONMENT.

       ``All activities to comply with sections 203 and 204 shall 
     be--
       ``(1) implemented in coordination with the program manager 
     for the information sharing environment established under 
     section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
       ``(2) consistent with and support the establishment of that 
     environment, and any policies, guidelines, procedures, 
     instructions, or standards established by the President or, 
     as appropriate, the program manager for the implementation 
     and management of that environment.''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendments.--
       (A) In general.--Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) is amended--
       (i) by striking paragraph (7); and
       (ii) by redesignating paragraphs (8) through (19) as 
     paragraphs (7) through (18), respectively.
       (B) Table of contents.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et 
     seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 202 the following:

``Sec. 203. Homeland Security Advisory System.
``Sec. 204. Homeland Security Information Sharing.
``Sec. 205. Coordination with information sharing environment.''.

       (b) Intelligence Component Defined.--
       (1) In general.--Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (16) as 
     paragraphs (10) through (17), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following:
       ``(9) The term `intelligence component of the Department' 
     means any directorate, agency, or other element or entity of 
     the Department that gathers, receives, analyzes, produces, or 
     disseminates homeland security information.''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendments.--
       (A) Homeland security act of 2002.--Section 501(11) of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 311(11)) is amended 
     by striking ``section 2(10)(B)'' and inserting ``section 
     2(11)(B)''.
       (B) Other law.--Section 712(a) of title 14, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``section 2(15) of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(15))'' and inserting 
     ``section 2(16) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 101(16))''.
       (c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--Section 201(d) of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, in support of the 
     mission responsibilities of the Department and consistent 
     with the functions of the National Counterterrorism Center 
     established under section 119 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 50 U.S.C. 404o),'' after ``and to integrate 
     such information''; and
       (2) by striking paragraph (7), as redesignated by 
     subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(7) To review, analyze, and make recommendations for 
     improvements in the policies and procedures governing the 
     sharing of intelligence information, intelligence-related 
     information, and other information relating to homeland 
     security within the Federal Government and among the Federal 
     Government and State, local, and tribal government agencies 
     and authorities, consistent with the information sharing 
     environment established under section 1016 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
     U.S.C. 485) and any policies, guidelines, procedures, 
     instructions or standards established by the President or, as 
     appropriate, the program manager for the implementation and 
     management of that environment.''.

     SEC. 112. INFORMATION SHARING.

       Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (4) as 
     paragraphs (2) through (5), respectively;
       (B) by inserting before paragraph (2), as so redesignated, 
     the following:
       ``(1) Homeland security information.--The term `homeland 
     security information' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     482).'';
       (C) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated--
       (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (D) as 
     clauses (i) through (iv), respectively, and adjusting the 
     margin accordingly;
       (ii) by striking `` `terrorism information' means'' and 
     inserting the following: `` `terrorism information'--
       ``(A) means'';
       (iii) in subparagraph (A)(iv), as so redesignated, by 
     striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
       (iv) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) includes homeland security information and weapons of 
     mass destruction information.''; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) Weapons of mass destruction information.--The term 
     `weapons of mass destruction information' means information 
     that could reasonably be expected to assist in the 
     development, proliferation, or use of a weapon of mass 
     destruction (including chemical, biological, radiological, 
     and nuclear weapons) that could be used by a terrorist or a 
     terrorist organization against the United States, including 
     information about the location of any stockpile of nuclear 
     materials that could be exploited for use in such a weapon 
     that could be used by a terrorist or a terrorist organization 
     against the United States.'';
       (2) in subsection (b)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (I), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(J) integrates the information within the scope of the 
     information sharing environment, including any such 
     information in legacy technologies;
       ``(K) integrates technologies, including all legacy 
     technologies, through Internet-based services;
       ``(L) allows the full range of analytic and operational 
     activities without the need to centralize information within 
     the scope of the information sharing environment;
       ``(M) permits analysts to collaborate both independently 
     and in a group (commonly known as `collective and 
     noncollective collaboration'), and across multiple levels of 
     national security information and controlled unclassified 
     information;
       ``(N) provides a resolution process that enables changes by 
     authorized officials regarding rules and policies for the 
     access, use, and retention of information within the scope of 
     the information sharing environment; and
       ``(O) incorporates continuous, real-time, and immutable 
     audit capabilities, to the maximum extent practicable.'';
       (3) in subsection (f)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``during the two-year period beginning on 
     the date of designation under this paragraph unless sooner'' 
     and inserting ``until''; and
       (ii) by striking ``The program manager shall have and 
     exercise governmentwide authority.'' and inserting ``Except 
     as otherwise expressly provided by law, the program manager, 
     in consultation with the head of any affected department or 
     agency, shall have and exercise governmentwide authority over 
     the sharing of information within the scope of the 
     information sharing environment by all Federal departments, 
     agencies, and components, irrespective of the Federal 
     department, agency, or component in which the program manager 
     may be administratively located.''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2)(A)--
       (i) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (v); and
       (ii) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
       ``(ii) assist in the development of policies, as 
     appropriate, to foster the development and proper operation 
     of the ISE;
       ``(iii) issue governmentwide procedures, guidelines, 
     instructions, and functional standards, as appropriate, for 
     the management, development, and proper operation of the ISE;
       ``(iv) identify and resolve information sharing disputes 
     between Federal departments, agencies, and components; and'';
       (4) in subsection (g)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``during the two-year 
     period beginning on the date of the initial designation of 
     the program manager by the President under subsection (f)(1), 
     unless sooner'' and inserting ``until'';
       (B) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (ii) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (I); 
     and
       (iii) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following:
       ``(G) assist the program manager in identifying and 
     resolving information sharing disputes between Federal 
     departments, agencies, and components;
       ``(H) identify appropriate personnel for assignment to the 
     program manager to support staffing needs identified by the 
     program manager; and'';
       (C) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``(including any 
     subsidiary group of the Information Sharing Council)'' before 
     ``shall not be subject''; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) Detailees.--Upon a request by the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the departments and agencies 
     represented on the Information Sharing Council shall detail 
     to the program manager, on a reimbursable basis, appropriate 
     personnel identified under paragraph (2)(H).'';
       (5) in subsection (h)(1), by striking ``and annually 
     thereafter'' and inserting ``and not later than June 30 of 
     each year thereafter''; and
       (6) by striking subsection (j) and inserting the following:
       ``(j) Report on the Information Sharing Environment.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     the President shall report to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the

[[Page 4865]]

     House of Representatives, and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives on the 
     feasibility of--
       ``(A) eliminating the use of any marking or process 
     (including `Originator Control') intended to, or having the 
     effect of, restricting the sharing of information within the 
     scope of the information sharing environment between and 
     among participants in the information sharing environment, 
     unless the President has--
       ``(i) specifically exempted categories of information from 
     such elimination; and
       ``(ii) reported that exemption to the committees of 
     Congress described in the matter preceding this subparagraph; 
     and
       ``(B) continuing to use Federal agency standards in effect 
     on such date of enactment for the collection, sharing, and 
     access to information within the scope of the information 
     sharing environment relating to citizens and lawful permanent 
     residents;
       ``(C) replacing the standards described in subparagraph (B) 
     with a standard that would allow mission-based or threat-
     based permission to access or share information within the 
     scope of the information sharing environment for a particular 
     purpose that the Federal Government, through an appropriate 
     process, has determined to be lawfully permissible for a 
     particular agency, component, or employee (commonly known as 
     an `authorized use' standard); and
       ``(D) the use of anonymized data by Federal departments, 
     agencies, or components collecting, possessing, 
     disseminating, or handling information within the scope of 
     the information sharing environment, in any cases in which--
       ``(i) the use of such information is reasonably expected to 
     produce results materially equivalent to the use of 
     information that is transferred or stored in a non-anonymized 
     form; and
       ``(ii) such use is consistent with any mission of that 
     department, agency, or component (including any mission under 
     a Federal statute or directive of the President) that 
     involves the storage, retention, sharing, or exchange of 
     personally identifiable information.
       ``(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term `anonymized 
     data' means data in which the individual to whom the data 
     pertains is not identifiable with reasonable efforts, 
     including information that has been encrypted or hidden 
     through the use of other technology.
       ``(k) Additional Positions.--The program manager is 
     authorized to hire not more than 40 full-time employees to 
     assist the program manager in--
       ``(1) identifying and resolving information sharing 
     disputes between Federal departments, agencies, and 
     components under subsection (f)(2)(A)(iv); and
       ``(2) other activities associated with the implementation 
     of the information sharing environment, including--
       ``(A) implementing the requirements under subsection 
     (b)(2); and
       ``(B) any additional implementation initiatives to enhance 
     and expedite the creation of the information sharing 
     environment.
       ``(l) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to carry out this section $30,000,000 for 
     each of fiscal years 2008 and 2009.''.

     SEC. 113. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT FOR STATE AND 
                   LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

       (a) Curriculum.--The Secretary, acting through the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer, shall develop curriculum for the 
     training of State, local, and tribal government officials 
     relating to the handling, review, and development of 
     intelligence material.
       (b) Training.--To the extent possible, the Federal Law 
     Enforcement Training Center and other existing Federal 
     entities with the capacity and expertise to train State, 
     local, and tribal government officials based on the 
     curriculum developed under subsection (a) shall be used to 
     carry out the training programs created under this section. 
     If such entities do not have the capacity, resources, or 
     capabilities to conduct such training, the Secretary may 
     approve another entity to conduct the training.
       (c) Consultation.--In carrying out the duties described in 
     subsection (a), the Chief Intelligence Officer shall consult 
     with the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
     Center, the Attorney General, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
     Management Agency, and other appropriate parties, such as 
     private industry, institutions of higher education, nonprofit 
     institutions, and other intelligence agencies of the Federal 
     Government.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out 
     this section.

     SEC. 114. INFORMATION SHARING INCENTIVES.

       (a) Awards.--In making cash awards under chapter 45 of 
     title 5, United States Code, the President or the head of an 
     agency, in consultation with the program manager designated 
     under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), may consider the 
     success of an employee in sharing information within the 
     scope of the information sharing environment established 
     under that section in a manner consistent with any policies, 
     guidelines, procedures, instructions, or standards 
     established by the President or, as appropriate, the program 
     manager of that environment for the implementation and 
     management of that environment.
       (b) Other Incentives.--The head of each department or 
     agency described in section 1016(i) of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 
     485(i)), in consultation with the program manager designated 
     under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), shall adopt best 
     practices regarding effective ways to educate and motivate 
     officers and employees of the Federal Government to engage in 
     the information sharing environment, including--
       (1) promotions and other nonmonetary awards; and
       (2) publicizing information sharing accomplishments by 
     individual employees and, where appropriate, the tangible end 
     benefits that resulted.

     Subtitle B--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships

     SEC. 121. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER 
                   INITIATIVE.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), as amended by 
     this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 206. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER 
                   INITIATIVE.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `Chief Intelligence Officer' means the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer of the Department;
       ``(2) the term `fusion center' means a collaborative effort 
     of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal government 
     agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information 
     with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to 
     detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to 
     criminal or terrorist activity;
       ``(3) the term `information sharing environment' means the 
     information sharing environment established under section 
     1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485);
       ``(4) the term `intelligence analyst' means an individual 
     who regularly advises, administers, supervises, or performs 
     work in the collection, analysis, evaluation, reporting, 
     production, or dissemination of information on political, 
     economic, social, cultural, physical, geographical, 
     scientific, or military conditions, trends, or forces in 
     foreign or domestic areas that directly or indirectly affect 
     national security;
       ``(5) the term `intelligence-led policing' means the 
     collection and analysis of information to produce an 
     intelligence end product designed to inform law enforcement 
     decision making at the tactical and strategic levels; and
       ``(6) the term `terrorism information' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).
       ``(b) Establishment.--The Secretary, in consultation with 
     the program manager of the information sharing environment 
     established under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the Attorney 
     General, the Privacy Officer of the Department, the Officer 
     for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department, and 
     the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established 
     under section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note), shall establish a 
     State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative to 
     establish partnerships with State, local, and regional fusion 
     centers.
       ``(c) Department Support and Coordination.--Through the 
     State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, the 
     Secretary shall--
       ``(1) coordinate with the principal officer of each State, 
     local, or regional fusion center and the officer designated 
     as the Homeland Security Advisor of the State;
       ``(2) provide operational and intelligence advice and 
     assistance to State, local, and regional fusion centers;
       ``(3) support efforts to include State, local, and regional 
     fusion centers into efforts to establish an information 
     sharing environment;
       ``(4) conduct exercises, including live training exercises, 
     to regularly assess the capability of individual and regional 
     networks of State, local, and regional fusion centers to 
     integrate the efforts of such networks with the efforts of 
     the Department;
       ``(5) coordinate with other relevant Federal entities 
     engaged in homeland security-related activities;
       ``(6) provide analytic and reporting advice and assistance 
     to State, local, and regional fusion centers;
       ``(7) review homeland security information gathered by 
     State, local, and regional fusion centers and incorporate 
     relevant information with homeland security information of 
     the Department;
       ``(8) provide management assistance to State, local, and 
     regional fusion centers;
       ``(9) serve as a point of contact to ensure the 
     dissemination of relevant homeland security information;
       ``(10) facilitate close communication and coordination 
     between State, local, and regional fusion centers and the 
     Department;
       ``(11) provide State, local, and regional fusion centers 
     with expertise on Department resources and operations;
       ``(12) provide training to State, local, and regional 
     fusion centers and encourage such fusion centers to 
     participate in terrorist threat-related exercises conducted 
     by the Department; and
       ``(13) carry out such other duties as the Secretary 
     determines are appropriate.
       ``(d) Personnel Assignment.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Chief Intelligence Officer may, to 
     the maximum extent practicable, assign officers and 
     intelligence analysts from components of the Department to 
     State, local, and regional fusion centers.

[[Page 4866]]

       ``(2) Personnel sources.--Officers and intelligence 
     analysts assigned to fusion centers under this subsection may 
     be assigned from the following Department components, in 
     consultation with the respective component head:
       ``(A) Office of Intelligence and Analysis, or its 
     successor.
       ``(B) Office of Infrastructure Protection.
       ``(C) Transportation Security Administration.
       ``(D) United States Customs and Border Protection.
       ``(E) United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
       ``(F) United States Coast Guard.
       ``(G) Other intelligence components of the Department, as 
     determined by the Secretary.
       ``(3) Participation.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary may develop qualifying 
     criteria for a fusion center to participate in the assigning 
     of Department officers or intelligence analysts under this 
     section.
       ``(B) Criteria.--Any criteria developed under subparagraph 
     (A) may include--
       ``(i) whether the fusion center, through its mission and 
     governance structure, focuses on a broad counterterrorism 
     approach, and whether that broad approach is pervasive 
     through all levels of the organization;
       ``(ii) whether the fusion center has sufficient numbers of 
     adequately trained personnel to support a broad 
     counterterrorism mission;
       ``(iii) whether the fusion center has--

       ``(I) access to relevant law enforcement, emergency 
     response, private sector, open source, and national security 
     data; and
       ``(II) the ability to share and analytically exploit that 
     data for authorized purposes;

       ``(iv) whether the fusion center is adequately funded by 
     the State, local, or regional government to support its 
     counterterrorism mission; and
       ``(v) the relevancy of the mission of the fusion center to 
     the particular source component of Department officers or 
     intelligence analysts.
       ``(4) Prerequisite.--
       ``(A) Intelligence analysis, privacy, and civil liberties 
     training.--Before being assigned to a fusion center under 
     this section, an officer or intelligence analyst shall 
     undergo--
       ``(i) appropriate intelligence analysis or information 
     sharing training using an intelligence-led policing 
     curriculum that is consistent with--

       ``(I) standard training and education programs offered to 
     Department law enforcement and intelligence personnel; and
       ``(II) the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies 
     under part 23 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any corresponding similar regulation or ruling);

       ``(ii) appropriate privacy and civil liberties training 
     that is developed, supported, or sponsored by the Privacy 
     Officer appointed under section 222 and the Officer for Civil 
     Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department, in partnership 
     with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
     established under section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note); and
       ``(iii) such other training prescribed by the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer.
       ``(B) Prior work experience in area.--In determining the 
     eligibility of an officer or intelligence analyst to be 
     assigned to a fusion center under this section, the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer shall consider the familiarity of the 
     officer or intelligence analyst with the State, locality, or 
     region, as determined by such factors as whether the officer 
     or intelligence analyst--
       ``(i) has been previously assigned in the geographic area; 
     or
       ``(ii) has previously worked with intelligence officials or 
     emergency response providers from that State, locality, or 
     region.
       ``(5) Expedited security clearance processing.--The Chief 
     Intelligence Officer--
       ``(A) shall ensure that each officer or intelligence 
     analyst assigned to a fusion center under this section has 
     the appropriate clearance to contribute effectively to the 
     mission of the fusion center; and
       ``(B) may request that security clearance processing be 
     expedited for each such officer or intelligence analyst.
       ``(6) Further qualifications.--Each officer or intelligence 
     analyst assigned to a fusion center under this section shall 
     satisfy any other qualifications the Chief Intelligence 
     Officer may prescribe.
       ``(e) Responsibilities.--An officer or intelligence analyst 
     assigned to a fusion center under this section shall--
       ``(1) assist law enforcement agencies and other emergency 
     response providers of State, local, and tribal governments 
     and fusion center personnel in using Federal homeland 
     security information to develop a comprehensive and accurate 
     threat picture;
       ``(2) review homeland security-relevant information from 
     law enforcement agencies and other emergency response 
     providers of State, local, and tribal government;
       ``(3) create intelligence and other information products 
     derived from such information and other homeland security-
     relevant information provided by the Department;
       ``(4) assist in the dissemination of such products, under 
     the coordination of the Chief Intelligence Officer, to law 
     enforcement agencies and other emergency response providers 
     of State, local, and tribal government; and
       ``(5) assist in the dissemination of such products to the 
     Chief Intelligence Officer for collection and dissemination 
     to other fusion centers.
       ``(f) Database Access.--In order to fulfill the objectives 
     described under subsection (e), each officer or intelligence 
     analyst assigned to a fusion center under this section shall 
     have direct access to all relevant Federal databases and 
     information systems, consistent with any policies, 
     guidelines, procedures, instructions, or standards 
     established by the President or, as appropriate, the program 
     manager of the information sharing environment for the 
     implementation and management of that environment.
       ``(g) Consumer Feedback.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall create a mechanism 
     for any State, local, or tribal emergency response provider 
     who is a consumer of the intelligence or other information 
     products described under subsection (e) to voluntarily 
     provide feedback to the Department on the quality and utility 
     of such intelligence products.
       ``(2) Results.--The results of the voluntary feedback under 
     paragraph (1) shall be provided electronically to Congress 
     and appropriate personnel of the Department.
       ``(h) Rule of Construction.--
       ``(1) In general.--The authorities granted under this 
     section shall supplement the authorities granted under 
     section 201(d) and nothing in this section shall be construed 
     to abrogate the authorities granted under section 201(d).
       ``(2) Participation.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to require a State, local, or regional government 
     or entity to accept the assignment of officers or 
     intelligence analysts of the Department into the fusion 
     center of that State, locality, or region.
       ``(i) Guidelines.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General of the United States, shall establish 
     guidelines for fusion centers operated by State and local 
     governments, to include standards that any such fusion center 
     shall--
       ``(1) collaboratively develop a mission statement, identify 
     expectations and goals, measure performance, and determine 
     effectiveness for that fusion center;
       ``(2) create a representative governance structure that 
     includes emergency response providers and, as appropriate, 
     the private sector;
       ``(3) create a collaborative environment for the sharing of 
     information within the scope of the information sharing 
     environment established under section 1016 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
     U.S.C. 485) among Federal, State, tribal, and local emergency 
     response providers, the private sector, and the public, 
     consistent with any policies, guidelines, procedures, 
     instructions, or standards established by the President or, 
     as appropriate, the program manager of the information 
     sharing environment;
       ``(4) leverage the databases, systems, and networks 
     available from public and private sector entities to maximize 
     information sharing;
       ``(5) develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil 
     liberties policy consistent with Federal, State, and local 
     law;
       ``(6) ensure appropriate security measures are in place for 
     the facility, data, and personnel;
       ``(7) select and train personnel based on the needs, 
     mission, goals, and functions of that fusion center; and
       ``(8) offer a variety of intelligence services and products 
     to recipients of fusion center intelligence and information.
       ``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--Except for 
     subsection (i), there are authorized to be appropriated 
     $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012, to 
     carry out this section, including for hiring officers and 
     intelligence analysts to replace officers and intelligence 
     analysts who are assigned to fusion centers under this 
     section.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 205, as added by this Act, the following:

``Sec. 206. State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center 
              Initiative.''.

       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of enactment of this Act and before the State, 
     Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative under section 
     206 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by 
     subsection (a), (in this section referred to as the 
     ``program'') has been implemented, the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Privacy Officer of the Department, the 
     Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the 
     Department, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board established under section 1061 of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 
     note), shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report 
     that contains a concept of operations for the program, which 
     shall--
       (A) include a clear articulation of the purposes, goals, 
     and specific objectives for which the program is being 
     developed;
       (B) identify stakeholders in the program and provide an 
     assessment of their needs;
       (C) contain a developed set of quantitative metrics to 
     measure, to the extent possible, program output;
       (D) contain a developed set of qualitative instruments 
     (including surveys and expert interviews) to assess the 
     extent to which stakeholders believe their needs are being 
     met; and
       (E) include a privacy and civil liberties impact 
     assessment.
       (2) Privacy and civil liberties.--Not later than 1 year 
     after the date on which the program is implemented, the 
     Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under 
     section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note), in consultation 
     with the Privacy Officer of the Department

[[Page 4867]]

     and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the 
     Department, shall submit to Congress, the Secretary, and the 
     Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department a report on the 
     privacy and civil liberties impact of the program.

     SEC. 122. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment of Program.--Subtitle A of title II of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), as 
     amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 207. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS 
                   PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, acting through the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer, and in consultation with the Chief 
     Human Capital Officer, shall establish a fellowship program 
     in accordance with this section for the purpose of--
       ``(A) detailing State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     officers and intelligence analysts to the Department in 
     accordance with subchapter VI of chapter 33 of title 5, 
     United States Code, to participate in the work of the Office 
     of Intelligence and Analysis in order to become familiar 
     with--
       ``(i) the relevant missions and capabilities of the 
     Department and other Federal agencies; and
       ``(ii) the role, programs, products, and personnel of the 
     Office of Intelligence and Analysis; and
       ``(B) promoting information sharing between the Department 
     and State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and 
     intelligence analysts by assigning such officers and analysts 
     to--
       ``(i) serve as a point of contact in the Department to 
     assist in the representation of State, local, and tribal 
     homeland security information needs;
       ``(ii) identify homeland security information of interest 
     to State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers, 
     emergency response providers, and intelligence analysts; and
       ``(iii) assist Department analysts in preparing and 
     disseminating terrorism-related products that are tailored to 
     State, local, and tribal emergency response providers, law 
     enforcement officers, and intelligence analysts and designed 
     to prepare for and thwart terrorist attacks.
       ``(2) Program name.--The program under this section shall 
     be known as the `Homeland Security Information Sharing 
     Fellows Program'.
       ``(b) Eligibility.--
       ``(1) In general.--In order to be eligible for selection as 
     an Information Sharing Fellow under the program under this 
     section, an individual shall--
       ``(A) have homeland security-related responsibilities;
       ``(B) be eligible for an appropriate national security 
     clearance;
       ``(C) possess a valid need for access to classified 
     information, as determined by the Chief Intelligence Officer;
       ``(D) be an employee of an eligible entity; and
       ``(E) have undergone appropriate privacy and civil 
     liberties training that is developed, supported, or sponsored 
     by the Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and 
     Civil Liberties, in partnership with the Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board established under section 1061 of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 
     (5 U.S.C. 601 note).
       ``(2) Eligible entities.--In this subsection, the term 
     `eligible entity' means--
       ``(A) a State, local, or regional fusion center;
       ``(B) a State or local law enforcement or other government 
     entity that serves a major metropolitan area, suburban area, 
     or rural area, as determined by the Secretary;
       ``(C) a State or local law enforcement or other government 
     entity with port, border, or agricultural responsibilities, 
     as determined by the Secretary;
       ``(D) a tribal law enforcement or other authority; or
       ``(E) such other entity as the Secretary determines is 
     appropriate.
       ``(c) Optional Participation.--No State, local, or tribal 
     law enforcement or other government entity shall be required 
     to participate in the Homeland Security Information Sharing 
     Fellows Program.
       ``(d) Procedures for Nomination and Selection.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall 
     establish procedures to provide for the nomination and 
     selection of individuals to participate in the Homeland 
     Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.
       ``(2) Limitations.--The Chief Intelligence Officer shall--
       ``(A) select law enforcement officers and intelligence 
     analysts representing a broad cross-section of State, local, 
     and tribal agencies; and
       ``(B) ensure that the number of Information Sharing Fellows 
     selected does not impede the activities of the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis.
       ``(e) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `Chief Intelligence Officer' means the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer of the Department; and
       ``(2) the term `Office of Intelligence and Analysis' means 
     the office of the Chief Intelligence Officer.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 206, as added by this Act, the following:

``Sec. 207. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.''.

       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of enactment of this Act, and before the 
     implementation of the Homeland Security Information Sharing 
     Fellows Program under section 207 of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002, as added by subsection (a), (in this section 
     referred to as the ``Program'') the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Privacy Officer of the Department, the 
     Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the 
     Department, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board established under section 1061 of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 
     note), shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report 
     that contains a concept of operations for the Program, which 
     shall include a privacy and civil liberties impact 
     assessment.
       (2) Review of privacy impact.--Not later than 1 year after 
     the date on which the Program is implemented, the Privacy and 
     Civil Liberties Oversight Board established under section 
     1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note), in consultation with the Privacy 
     Officer of the Department and the Officer for Civil Rights 
     and Civil Liberties of the Department, shall submit to 
     Congress, the Secretary, and the Chief Intelligence Officer 
     of the Department a report on the privacy and civil liberties 
     impact of the Program.

    Subtitle C--Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group

     SEC. 131. INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION 
                   GROUP.

       (a) In General.--As part of efforts to establish the 
     information sharing environment established under section 
     1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the program manager shall oversee and 
     coordinate the creation and ongoing operation of an 
     Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (in this 
     section referred to as the ``ITACG'').
       (b) Responsibilities.--The ITACG shall facilitate the 
     production of federally coordinated products derived from 
     information within the scope of the information sharing 
     environment established under section 1016 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
     U.S.C. 485) and intended for distribution to State, local, 
     and tribal government officials and the private sector.
       (c) Operations.--
       (1) In general.--The ITACG shall be located at the 
     facilities of the National Counterterrorism Center of the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) Management.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary shall assign a senior level 
     officer to manage and direct the administration of the ITACG.
       (B) Distribution.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General and the heads of other agencies, as 
     appropriate, shall determine how specific products shall be 
     distributed to State, local, and tribal officials and private 
     sector partners under this section.
       (C) Standards for admission.--The Secretary, acting through 
     the Chief Intelligence Officer and in consultation with the 
     Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and 
     the program manager of the information sharing environment 
     established under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), shall 
     establish standards for the admission of law enforcement and 
     intelligence officials from a State, local, or tribal 
     government into the ITACG.
       (d) Membership.--
       (1) In general.--The ITACG shall include representatives 
     of--
       (A) the Department;
       (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (C) the Department of Defense;
       (D) the Department of Energy;
       (E) law enforcement and intelligence officials from State, 
     local, and tribal governments, as appropriate; and
       (F) other Federal entities as appropriate.
       (2) Criteria.--The program manager for the information 
     sharing environment, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall develop qualifying criteria and establish 
     procedures for selecting personnel assigned to the ITACG and 
     for the proper handling and safeguarding of information 
     related to terrorism.
       (e) Inapplicability of the Federal Advisory Committee 
     Act.--The ITACG and any subsidiary groups thereof shall not 
     be subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory 
     Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

                   TITLE II--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Grant 
     Enhancement Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 202. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

       The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

                  ``TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

     ``SEC. 2001. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this title, the following definitions shall apply:
       ``(1) Administrator.--The term `Administrator' means the 
     Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
       ``(2) Combined statistical area.--The term `combined 
     statistical area' means a combined

[[Page 4868]]

     statistical area, as defined by the Office of Management and 
     Budget.
       ``(3) Directly eligible tribe.--The term `directly eligible 
     tribe' means--
       ``(A) any Indian tribe that--
       ``(i) is located in the continental United States;
       ``(ii) operates a law enforcement or emergency response 
     agency with the capacity to respond to calls for law 
     enforcement or emergency services;
       ``(iii) is located--

       ``(I) on, or within 50 miles of, an international border or 
     a coastline bordering an ocean or international waters;
       ``(II) within 10 miles of critical infrastructure or has 
     critical infrastructure within its territory; or
       ``(III) within or contiguous to 1 of the 50 largest 
     metropolitan statistical areas in the United States; and

       ``(iv) certifies to the Secretary that a State is not 
     making funds distributed under this title available to the 
     Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes for the purpose 
     for which the Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes is 
     seeking grant funds; and
       ``(B) a consortium of Indian tribes, if each tribe 
     satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (A).
       ``(4) Eligible metropolitan area.--The term `eligible 
     metropolitan area' means the following:
       ``(A) In general.--A combination of 2 or more incorporated 
     municipalities, counties, parishes, or Indian tribes that--
       ``(i) is within--

       ``(I) any of the 100 largest metropolitan statistical areas 
     in the United States; or
       ``(II) any combined statistical area, of which any 
     metropolitan statistical area described in subparagraph (A) 
     is a part; and

       ``(ii) includes the city with the largest population in 
     that metropolitan statistical area.
       ``(B) Other combinations.--Any other combination of 
     contiguous local or tribal governments that are formally 
     certified by the Administrator as an eligible metropolitan 
     area for purposes of this title with the consent of the State 
     or States in which such local or tribal governments are 
     located.
       ``(C) Inclusion of additional local governments.--An 
     eligible metropolitan area may include additional local or 
     tribal governments outside the relevant metropolitan 
     statistical area or combined statistical area that are likely 
     to be affected by, or be called upon to respond to, a 
     terrorist attack within the metropolitan statistical area.
       ``(5) Indian tribe.--The term `Indian tribe' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 4(e) of the Indian Self-
     Determination Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(e)).
       ``(6) Metropolitan statistical area.--The term 
     `metropolitan statistical area' means a metropolitan 
     statistical area, as defined by the Office of Management and 
     Budget.
       ``(7) National special security event.--The term `National 
     Special Security Event' means a designated event that, by 
     virtue of its political, economic, social, or religious 
     significance, may be the target of terrorism or other 
     criminal activity.
       ``(8) Population.--The term `population' means population 
     according to the most recent United States census population 
     estimates available at the start of the relevant fiscal year.
       ``(9) Population density.--The term `population density' 
     means population divided by land area in square miles.
       ``(10) Target capabilities.--The term `target capabilities' 
     means the target capabilities for Federal, State, local, and 
     tribal government preparedness for which guidelines are 
     required to be established under section 646(a) of the Post-
     Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 
     746(a)).
       ``(11) Tribal government.--The term `tribal government' 
     means the government of an Indian tribe.

     ``SEC. 2002. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is established a Homeland 
     Security Grant Program, which shall consist of--
       ``(1) the Urban Area Security Initiative established under 
     section 2003, or any successor thereto;
       ``(2) the State Homeland Security Grant Program established 
     under section 2004, or any successor thereto;
       ``(3) the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program 
     established under section 2005 or any successor thereto; and
       ``(4) the Emergency Communications and Interoperability 
     Grants Program established under section 1809, or any 
     successor thereto.
       ``(b) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary, through the 
     Administrator, may award grants to State, local, and tribal 
     governments under the Homeland Security Grant Program for the 
     purposes of this title.
       ``(c) Programs Not Affected.--This title shall not be 
     construed to affect any authority to award grants under any 
     of the following Federal programs:
       ``(1) The firefighter assistance programs authorized under 
     section 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control 
     Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229 and 2229a).
       ``(2) Except as provided in subsection (d), all grant 
     programs authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
     Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), 
     including the Urban Search and Rescue Grant Program.
       ``(3) Grants to protect critical infrastructure, including 
     port security grants authorized under section 70107 of title 
     46, United States Code.
       ``(4) The Metropolitan Medical Response System authorized 
     under section 635 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
     Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 723).
       ``(5) Grant programs other than those administered by the 
     Department.
       ``(d) Relationship to Other Laws.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Homeland Security Grant Program 
     shall supercede--
       ``(A) all grant programs authorized under section 1014 of 
     the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 3714); and
       ``(B) the Emergency Management Performance Grant authorized 
     under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and section 662 of 
     the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 
     U.S.C. 762).
       ``(2) Program integrity.--Each grant program described 
     under paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a) shall 
     include, consistent with the Improper Payments Information 
     Act of 2002 (31 U.S.C. 3321 note), policies and procedures 
     for--
       ``(A) identifying activities funded under the Homeland 
     Security Grant Program that are susceptible to significant 
     improper payments; and
       ``(B) reporting the incidence of improper payments to the 
     Department.
       ``(3) Allocation.--Except as provided under paragraph (2) 
     of this subsection, the allocation of grants authorized under 
     this title shall be governed by the terms of this title and 
     not by any other provision of law.
       ``(e) Minimum Performance Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall--
       ``(A) establish minimum performance requirements for 
     entities that receive homeland security grants;
       ``(B) conduct, in coordination with State, regional, local, 
     and tribal governments receiving grants under the Homeland 
     Security Grant Program, simulations and exercises to test the 
     minimum performance requirements established under 
     subparagraph (A) for--
       ``(i) emergencies (as that term is defined in section 102 
     of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)) and major disasters not less 
     than twice each year; and
       ``(ii) catastrophic incidents (as that term is defined in 
     section 501) not less than once each year; and
       ``(C) ensure that entities that the Administrator 
     determines are failing to demonstrate minimum performance 
     requirements established under subparagraph (A) shall remedy 
     the areas of failure, not later than the end of the second 
     full fiscal year after the date of such determination by--
       ``(i) establishing a plan for the achievement of the 
     minimum performance requirements under subparagraph (A), 
     including--

       ``(I) developing intermediate indicators for the 2 fiscal 
     years following the date of such determination; and
       ``(II) conducting additional simulations and exercises; and

       ``(ii) revising an entity's homeland security plan, if 
     necessary, to achieve the minimum performance requirements 
     under subparagraph (A).
       ``(2) Waiver.--At the discretion of the Administrator, the 
     occurrence of an actual emergency, major disaster, or 
     catastrophic incident in an area may be deemed as a 
     simulation under paragraph (1)(B).
       ``(3) Report to congress.--Not later than the end of the 
     first full fiscal year after the date of enactment of the 
     Improving America's Security Act of 2007, and each fiscal 
     year thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate and to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report describing--
       ``(A) the performance of grantees under paragraph (1)(A);
       ``(B) lessons learned through the simulations and exercises 
     under paragraph (1)(B); and
       ``(C) efforts being made to remedy failed performance under 
     paragraph (1)(C).

     ``SEC. 2003. URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is established an Urban Area 
     Security Initiative to provide grants to assist high-risk 
     metropolitan areas in preventing, preparing for, protecting 
     against, responding to, and recovering from acts of 
     terrorism.
       ``(b) Application.--
       ``(1) In general.--An eligible metropolitan area may apply 
     for grants under this section.
       ``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under 
     this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for 
     grants distributed under the program.
       ``(3) Information.--In an application for a grant under 
     this section, an eligible metropolitan area shall submit--
       ``(A) a plan describing the proposed division of 
     responsibilities and distribution of funding among the local 
     and tribal governments in the eligible metropolitan area;
       ``(B) the name of an individual to serve as a metropolitan 
     area liaison with the Department and among the various 
     jurisdictions in the metropolitan area; and
       ``(C) such information in support of the application as the 
     Administrator may reasonably require.
       ``(c) State Review and Transmission.--
       ``(1) In general.--To ensure consistency with State 
     homeland security plans, an eligible metropolitan area 
     applying for a grant under this section shall submit its 
     application to each State within which any part of the 
     eligible metropolitan area is located for review before 
     submission of such application to the Department.

[[Page 4869]]

       ``(2) Deadline.--Not later than 30 days after receiving an 
     application from an eligible metropolitan area under 
     paragraph (1), each such State shall transmit the application 
     to the Department.
       ``(3) State disagreement.--If the Governor of any such 
     State determines that an application of an eligible 
     metropolitan area is inconsistent with the State homeland 
     security plan of that State, or otherwise does not support 
     the application, the Governor shall--
       ``(A) notify the Administrator, in writing, of that fact; 
     and
       ``(B) provide an explanation of the reason for not 
     supporting the application at the time of transmission of the 
     application.
       ``(d) Prioritization.--In allocating funds among 
     metropolitan areas applying for grants under this section, 
     the Administrator shall consider--
       ``(1) the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences 
     faced by the eligible metropolitan area from a terrorist 
     attack, including consideration of--
       ``(A) the population of the eligible metropolitan area, 
     including appropriate consideration of military, tourist, and 
     commuter populations;
       ``(B) the population density of the eligible metropolitan 
     area;
       ``(C) the history of threats faced by the eligible 
     metropolitan area, including--
       ``(i) whether there has been a prior terrorist attack in 
     the eligible metropolitan area; and
       ``(ii) whether any part of the eligible metropolitan area, 
     or any critical infrastructure or key resource within the 
     eligible metropolitan area, has ever experienced a higher 
     threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than 
     other parts of the United States;
       ``(D) the degree of threat, vulnerability, and consequences 
     to the eligible metropolitan area related to critical 
     infrastructure or key resources identified by the Secretary 
     or the State homeland security plan, including threats, 
     vulnerabilities, and consequences from critical 
     infrastructure in nearby jurisdictions;
       ``(E) whether the eligible metropolitan area is located at 
     or near an international border;
       ``(F) whether the eligible metropolitan area has a 
     coastline bordering ocean or international waters;
       ``(G) threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences faced by 
     the eligible metropolitan area related to at-risk sites or 
     activities in nearby jurisdictions, including the need to 
     respond to terrorist attacks arising in those jurisdictions;
       ``(H) the most current threat assessments available to the 
     Department;
       ``(I) the extent to which the eligible metropolitan area 
     has unmet target capabilities;
       ``(J) the extent to which the eligible metropolitan area 
     includes--
       ``(i) all incorporated municipalities, counties, parishes, 
     and Indian tribes within the relevant metropolitan 
     statistical area or combined statistical area; and
       ``(ii) other local governments and tribes that are likely 
     to be called upon to respond to a terrorist attack within the 
     eligible metropolitan area; and
       ``(K) such other factors as are specified in writing by the 
     Administrator; and
       ``(2) the anticipated effectiveness of the proposed 
     spending plan for the eligible metropolitan area in 
     increasing the ability of that eligible metropolitan area to 
     prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to, and 
     recover from terrorism, to meet its target capabilities, and 
     to otherwise reduce the overall risk to the metropolitan 
     area, the State, and the Nation.
       ``(e) Opportunity To Amend.--In considering applications 
     for grants under this section, the Administrator shall 
     provide applicants with a reasonable opportunity to correct 
     defects in the application, if any, before making final 
     awards.
       ``(f) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section 
     may be used to achieve target capabilities, consistent with a 
     State homeland security plan and relevant local and regional 
     homeland security plans, through--
       ``(1) developing and enhancing State, local, or regional 
     plans, risk assessments, or mutual aid agreements;
       ``(2) purchasing, upgrading, storing, or maintaining 
     equipment;
       ``(3) designing, conducting, and evaluating training and 
     exercises, including exercises of mass evacuation plans under 
     section 512 and including the payment of overtime and 
     backfill costs in support of such activities;
       ``(4) responding to an increase in the threat level under 
     the Homeland Security Advisory System, or to the needs 
     resulting from a National Special Security Event, including 
     payment of overtime and backfill costs;
       ``(5) establishing, enhancing, and staffing with 
     appropriately qualified personnel State and local fusion 
     centers that comply with the guidelines established under 
     section 206(i);
       ``(6) protecting critical infrastructure and key resources 
     identified in the Critical Infrastructure List established 
     under section 1001 of the Improving America's Security Act of 
     2007, including the payment of appropriate personnel costs;
       ``(7) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007 
     Program Guidance of the Department for the Urban Area 
     Security Initiative or the Law Enforcement Terrorism 
     Prevention Grant Program, including activities permitted 
     under the full-time counterterrorism staffing pilot; and
       ``(8) any other activity relating to achieving target 
     capabilities approved by the Administrator.
       ``(g) Distribution of Awards to Metropolitan Areas.--
       ``(1) In general.--If the Administrator approves the 
     application of an eligible metropolitan area for a grant 
     under this section, the Administrator shall distribute the 
     grant funds to the State or States in which the eligible 
     metropolitan area is located.
       ``(2) State distribution of funds.--Each State shall 
     provide the eligible metropolitan area not less than 80 
     percent of the grant funds. Any funds retained by a State 
     shall be expended on items or services approved by the 
     Administrator that benefit the eligible metropolitan area.
       ``(3) Multistate regions.--If parts of an eligible 
     metropolitan area awarded a grant are located in 2 or more 
     States, the Secretary shall distribute to each such State--
       ``(A) a portion of the grant funds in accordance with the 
     proposed distribution set forth in the application; or
       ``(B) if no agreement on distribution has been reached, a 
     portion of the grant funds in proportion to each State's 
     share of the population of the eligible metropolitan area.

     ``SEC. 2004. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is established a State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program to assist State, local, and tribal 
     governments in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, 
     responding to, and recovering from acts of terrorism.
       ``(b) Application.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each State may apply for a grant under 
     this section, and shall submit such information in support of 
     the application as the Administrator may reasonably require.
       ``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under 
     this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for 
     grants distributed under the program.
       ``(c) Prioritization.--In allocating funds among States 
     applying for grants under this section, the Administrator 
     shall consider--
       ``(1) the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences 
     faced by a State from a terrorist attack, including 
     consideration of--
       ``(A) the size of the population of the State, including 
     appropriate consideration of military, tourist, and commuter 
     populations;
       ``(B) the population density of the State;
       ``(C) the history of threats faced by the State, 
     including--
       ``(i) whether there has been a prior terrorist attack in an 
     urban area that is wholly or partly in the State, or in the 
     State itself; and
       ``(ii) whether any part of the State, or any critical 
     infrastructure or key resource within the State, has ever 
     experienced a higher threat level under the Homeland Security 
     Advisory System than other parts of the United States;
       ``(D) the degree of threat, vulnerability, and consequences 
     related to critical infrastructure or key resources 
     identified by the Secretary or the State homeland security 
     plan;
       ``(E) whether the State has an international border;
       ``(F) whether the State has a coastline bordering ocean or 
     international waters;
       ``(G) threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences faced by a 
     State related to at-risk sites or activities in adjacent 
     States, including the State's need to respond to terrorist 
     attacks arising in adjacent States;
       ``(H) the most current threat assessments available to the 
     Department;
       ``(I) the extent to which the State has unmet target 
     capabilities; and
       ``(J) such other factors as are specified in writing by the 
     Administrator;
       ``(2) the anticipated effectiveness of the proposed 
     spending plan of the State in increasing the ability of the 
     State to--
       ``(A) prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
     and recover from terrorism;
       ``(B) meet the target capabilities of the State; and
       ``(C) otherwise reduce the overall risk to the State and 
     the Nation; and
       ``(3) the need to balance the goal of ensuring the target 
     capabilities of the highest risk areas are achieved quickly 
     and the goal of ensuring that basic levels of preparedness, 
     as measured by the attainment of target capabilities, are 
     achieved nationwide.
       ``(d) Minimum Allocation.--In allocating funds under 
     subsection (c), the Administrator shall ensure that, for each 
     fiscal year--
       ``(1) except as provided for in paragraph (2), no State 
     receives less than an amount equal to 0.45 percent of the 
     total funds appropriated for the State Homeland Security 
     Grant Program; and
       ``(2) American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
     Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each receive 
     not less than 0.08 percent of the amounts appropriated for 
     the State Homeland Security Grant Program.
       ``(e) Multistate Partnerships.--
       ``(1) In general.--Instead of, or in addition to, any 
     application for funds under subsection (b), 2 or more States 
     may submit an application under this paragraph for multistate 
     efforts to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
     or recover from acts of terrorism.
       ``(2) Grantees.--Multistate grants may be awarded to 
     either--
       ``(A) an individual State acting on behalf of a consortium 
     or partnership of States with the consent of all member 
     States; or
       ``(B) a group of States applying as a consortium or 
     partnership.
       ``(3) Administration of grant.--If a group of States apply 
     as a consortium or partnership such States shall submit to 
     the Secretary at the time of application a plan describing--
       ``(A) the division of responsibilities for administering 
     the grant; and

[[Page 4870]]

       ``(B) the distribution of funding among the various States 
     and entities that are party to the application.
       ``(f) Funding for Local and Tribal Governments.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall require that, 
     not later than 60 days after receiving grant funding, any 
     State receiving a grant under this section shall make 
     available to local and tribal governments and emergency 
     response providers, consistent with the applicable State 
     homeland security plan--
       ``(A) not less than 80 percent of the grant funds;
       ``(B) with the consent of local and tribal governments, the 
     resources purchased with such grant funds having a value 
     equal to not less than 80 percent of the amount of the grant; 
     or
       ``(C) grant funds combined with resources purchased with 
     the grant funds having a value equal to not less than 80 
     percent of the amount of the grant.
       ``(2) Extension of period.--The Governor of a State may 
     request in writing that the Administrator extend the period 
     under paragraph (1) for an additional period of time. The 
     Administrator may approve such a request, and may extend such 
     period for an additional period, if the Administrator 
     determines that the resulting delay in providing grant 
     funding to the local and tribal governments and emergency 
     response providers is necessary to promote effective 
     investments to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond 
     to, and recover from terrorism, or to meet the target 
     capabilities of the State.
       ``(3) Indian tribes.--States shall be responsible for 
     allocating grant funds received under this section to tribal 
     governments in order to help those tribal communities achieve 
     target capabilities. Indian tribes shall be eligible for 
     funding directly from the States, and shall not be required 
     to seek funding from any local government.
       ``(4) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the 
     District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
     American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
     Islands, Guam, or the Virgin Islands.
       ``(g) Grants to Directly Eligible Tribes.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (b), the 
     Secretary may award grants to directly eligible tribes under 
     this section.
       ``(2) Tribal applications.--A directly eligible tribe may 
     apply for a grant under this section by submitting an 
     application to the Administrator that includes the 
     information required for an application by a State under 
     subsection (b).
       ``(3) State review.--
       ``(A) In general.--To ensure consistency with State 
     homeland security plans, a directly eligible tribe applying 
     for a grant under this section shall submit its application 
     to each State within which any part of the tribe is located 
     for review before submission of such application to the 
     Department.
       ``(B) Deadline.--Not later than 30 days after receiving an 
     application from a directly eligible tribe under subparagraph 
     (A), each such State shall transmit the application to the 
     Department.
       ``(C) State disagreement.--If the Governor of any such 
     State determines that the application of a directly eligible 
     tribe is inconsistent with the State homeland security plan 
     of that State, or otherwise does not support the application, 
     the Governor shall--
       ``(i) notify the Administrator, in writing, of that fact; 
     and
       ``(ii) provide an explanation of the reason for not 
     supporting the application at the time of transmission of the 
     application.
       ``(4) Distribution of awards to directly eligible tribes.--
     If the Administrator awards funds to a directly eligible 
     tribe under this section, the Administrator shall distribute 
     the grant funds directly to the directly eligible tribe. The 
     funds shall not be distributed to the State or States in 
     which the directly eligible tribe is located.
       ``(5) Tribal liaison.--A directly eligible tribe applying 
     for a grant under this section shall designate a specific 
     individual to serve as the tribal liaison who shall--
       ``(A) coordinate with Federal, State, local, regional, and 
     private officials concerning terrorism preparedness;
       ``(B) develop a process for receiving input from Federal, 
     State, local, regional, and private officials to assist in 
     the development of the application of such tribe and to 
     improve the access of such tribe to grants; and
       ``(C) administer, in consultation with State, local, 
     regional, and private officials, grants awarded to such 
     tribe.
       ``(6) Tribes receiving direct grants.--A directly eligible 
     tribe that receives a grant directly under this section is 
     eligible to receive funds for other purposes under a grant 
     from the State or States within the boundaries of which any 
     part of such tribe is located, consistent with the homeland 
     security plan of the State.
       ``(7) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to affect the authority of an Indian tribe that 
     receives funds under this section.
       ``(h) Opportunity To Amend.--In considering applications 
     for grants under this section, the Administrator shall 
     provide applicants with a reasonable opportunity to correct 
     defects in the application, if any, before making final 
     awards.
       ``(i) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section 
     may be used to achieve target capabilities, consistent with a 
     State homeland security plan, through--
       ``(1) developing and enhancing State, local, tribal, or 
     regional plans, risk assessments, or mutual aid agreements;
       ``(2) purchasing, upgrading, storing, or maintaining 
     equipment;
       ``(3) designing, conducting, and evaluating training and 
     exercises, including exercises of mass evacuation plans under 
     section 512 and including the payment of overtime and 
     backfill costs in support of such activities;
       ``(4) responding to an increase in the threat level under 
     the Homeland Security Advisory System, including payment of 
     overtime and backfill costs;
       ``(5) establishing, enhancing, and staffing with 
     appropriately qualified personnel State and local fusion 
     centers, that comply with the guidelines established under 
     section 206(i);
       ``(6) protecting critical infrastructure and key resources 
     identified in the Critical Infrastructure List established 
     under section 1001 of the Improving America's Security Act of 
     2007, including the payment of appropriate personnel costs;
       ``(7) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007 
     Program Guidance of the Department for the State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program or the Law Enforcement Terrorism 
     Prevention Grant Program, including activities permitted 
     under the full-time counterterrorism staffing pilot; and
       ``(8) any other activity relating to achieving target 
     capabilities approved by the Administrator.

     ``SEC. 2005. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is established an Emergency 
     Management Performance Grants Program to make grants to 
     States to assist State, local, and tribal governments in 
     preventing, preparing for, protecting against, responding to, 
     recovering from, and mitigating against all hazards, 
     including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other 
     man-made disasters.
       ``(b) Application.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each State may apply for a grant under 
     this section, and shall submit such information in support of 
     an application as the Administrator may reasonably require.
       ``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under 
     this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for 
     grants distributed under the program.
       ``(c) Allocation.--Funds available under the Emergency 
     Management Performance Grants Program shall be allocated as 
     follows:
       ``(1) Baseline amount.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     each State shall receive an amount equal to 0.75 percent of 
     the total funds appropriated for grants under this section.
       ``(B) Territories.--American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the 
     Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each 
     shall receive an amount equal to 0.25 percent of the amounts 
     appropriated for grants under this section.
       ``(2) Per capita allocation.--The funds remaining for 
     grants under this section after allocation of the baseline 
     amounts under paragraph (1) shall be allocated to each State 
     in proportion to its population.
       ``(d) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section 
     may be used to achieve target capabilities, consistent with a 
     State homeland security plan or a catastrophic incident annex 
     developed under section 613 of the Robert T. Stafford 
     Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
     5196b) through--
       ``(1) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007 
     Program Guidance of the Department for Emergency Management 
     Performance Grants; and
       ``(2) any other activity approved by the Administrator that 
     will improve the capability of a State, local, or tribal 
     government in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, 
     responding to, recovering from, or mitigating against all 
     hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and 
     other man-made disasters.
       ``(e) Cost Sharing.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Federal share of the costs of an 
     activity carried out with a grant under this section shall 
     not exceed 75 percent.
       ``(2) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a grant under 
     this section may meet the matching requirement under 
     paragraph (1) by making in-kind contributions of goods or 
     services that are directly linked with the purpose for which 
     the grant is made.
       ``(f) Local and Tribal Governments.--
       ``(1) In general.--In allocating grant funds received under 
     this section, a State shall take into account the needs of 
     local and tribal governments.
       ``(2) Indian tribes.--States shall be responsible for 
     allocating grant funds received under this section to tribal 
     governments in order to help those tribal communities improve 
     their capabilities in preventing, preparing for, protecting 
     against, responding to, recovering from, or mitigating 
     against all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of 
     terrorism, and other man-made disasters. Indian tribes shall 
     be eligible for funding directly from the States, and shall 
     not be required to seek funding from any local government.

     ``SEC. 2006. TERRORISM PREVENTION.

       ``(a) Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall designate not 
     less than 25 percent of the combined amount appropriated for 
     grants under sections 2003 and 2004 to be used for law 
     enforcement terrorism prevention activities.
       ``(2) Use of funds.--Grants awarded under this subsection 
     may be used for--
       ``(A) information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks;

[[Page 4871]]

       ``(B) target hardening to reduce the vulnerability of 
     selected high value targets;
       ``(C) threat recognition to recognize the potential or 
     development of a threat;
       ``(D) intervention activities to interdict terrorists 
     before they can execute a threat;
       ``(E) overtime expenses related to a State homeland 
     security plan, including overtime costs associated with 
     providing enhanced law enforcement operations in support of 
     Federal agencies for increased border security and border 
     crossing enforcement;
       ``(F) establishing, enhancing, and staffing with 
     appropriately qualified personnel State and local fusion 
     centers that comply with the guidelines established under 
     section 206(i);
       ``(G) any other activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 
     2007 Program Guidance of the Department for the Law 
     Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program; and
       ``(H) any other terrorism prevention activity authorized by 
     the Administrator.
       ``(b) Office for the Prevention of Terrorism.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the 
     Department an Office for the Prevention of Terrorism, which 
     shall be headed by a Director.
       ``(2) Director.--
       ``(A) Reporting.--The Director of the Office for the 
     Prevention of Terrorism shall report directly to the 
     Secretary.
       ``(B) Qualifications.--The Director of the Office for the 
     Prevention of Terrorism shall have an appropriate background 
     with experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or other 
     antiterrorist functions.
       ``(3) Assignment of personnel.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall assign to the Office 
     for the Prevention of Terrorism permanent staff and other 
     appropriate personnel detailed from other components of the 
     Department to carry out the responsibilities under this 
     section.
       ``(B) Liaisons.--The Secretary shall designate senior 
     employees from each component of the Department that has 
     significant antiterrorism responsibilities to act as liaisons 
     between that component and the Office for the Prevention of 
     Terrorism.
       ``(4) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Office for the 
     Prevention of Terrorism shall--
       ``(A) coordinate policy and operations between the 
     Department and State, local, and tribal government agencies 
     relating to preventing acts of terrorism within the United 
     States;
       ``(B) serve as a liaison between State, local, and tribal 
     law enforcement agencies and the Department;
       ``(C) in coordination with the Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis, develop better methods for the sharing of 
     intelligence with State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     agencies;
       ``(D) work with the Administrator to ensure that homeland 
     security grants to State, local, and tribal government 
     agencies, including grants under this title, the Commercial 
     Equipment Direct Assistance Program, and grants to support 
     fusion centers and other law enforcement-oriented programs 
     are adequately focused on terrorism prevention activities; 
     and
       ``(E) coordinate with the Federal Emergency Management 
     Agency, the Department of Justice, the National Institute of 
     Justice, law enforcement organizations, and other appropriate 
     entities to support the development, promulgation, and 
     updating, as necessary, of national voluntary consensus 
     standards for training and personal protective equipment to 
     be used in a tactical environment by law enforcement 
     officers.
       ``(5) Pilot project.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Director of the Office for the 
     Prevention of Terrorism, in coordination with the 
     Administrator, shall establish a pilot project to determine 
     the efficacy and feasibility of establishing law enforcement 
     deployment teams.
       ``(B) Function.--The law enforcement deployment teams 
     participating in the pilot program under this paragraph shall 
     form the basis of a national network of standardized law 
     enforcement resources to assist State, local, and tribal 
     governments in responding to natural disasters, acts of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(6) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be 
     construed to affect the roles or responsibilities of the 
     Department of Justice.

     ``SEC. 2007. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF FUNDS.

       ``(a) Limitations on Use.--
       ``(1) Construction.--
       ``(A) In general.--Grants awarded under this title may not 
     be used to acquire land or to construct buildings or other 
     physical facilities.
       ``(B) Exceptions.--
       ``(i) In general.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), 
     nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the use of grants 
     awarded under this title to achieve target capabilities 
     through--

       ``(I) the construction of facilities described in section 
     611 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196); or
       ``(II) the alteration or remodeling of existing buildings 
     for the purpose of making such buildings secure against 
     terrorist attacks or able to withstand or protect against 
     chemical, radiological, or biological attacks.

       ``(ii) Requirements for exception.--No grant awards may be 
     used for the purposes under clause (i) unless--

       ``(I) specifically approved by the Administrator;
       ``(II) the construction occurs under terms and conditions 
     consistent with the requirements under section 611(j)(8) of 
     the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196(j)(8)); and
       ``(III) the amount allocated for purposes under clause (i) 
     does not exceed 20 percent of the grant award.

       ``(2) Personnel.--
       ``(A) In general.--For any grant awarded under section 2003 
     or 2004--
       ``(i) not more than 25 percent of the amount awarded to a 
     grant recipient may be used to pay overtime and backfill 
     costs; and
       ``(ii) not more than 25 percent of the amount awarded to 
     the grant recipient may be used to pay personnel costs not 
     described in clause (i).
       ``(B) Waiver.--At the request of the recipient of a grant 
     under section 2003 or section 2004, the Administrator may 
     grant a waiver of any limitation under subparagraph (A).
       ``(3) Recreation.--Grants awarded under this title may not 
     be used for recreational or social purposes.
       ``(b) Multiple-Purpose Funds.--Nothing in this title shall 
     be construed to prohibit State, local, or tribal governments 
     from using grant funds under sections 2003 and 2004 in a 
     manner that enhances preparedness for disasters unrelated to 
     acts of terrorism, if such use assists such governments in 
     achieving capabilities for terrorism preparedness established 
     by the Administrator.
       ``(c) Equipment Standards.--If an applicant for a grant 
     under this title proposes to upgrade or purchase, with 
     assistance provided under that grant, new equipment or 
     systems that do not meet or exceed any applicable national 
     voluntary consensus standards developed under section 647 of 
     the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 
     U.S.C. 747), the applicant shall include in its application 
     an explanation of why such equipment or systems will serve 
     the needs of the applicant better than equipment or systems 
     that meet or exceed such standards.
       ``(d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Amounts appropriated for 
     grants under this title shall be used to supplement and not 
     supplant other State, local, and tribal government public 
     funds obligated for the purposes provided under this title.

     ``SEC. 2008. ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION.

       ``(a) Administrator.--The Administrator shall, in 
     consultation with other appropriate offices within the 
     Department, have responsibility for administering all 
     homeland security grant programs administered by the 
     Department and for ensuring coordination among those programs 
     and consistency in the guidance issued to recipients across 
     those programs.
       ``(b) National Advisory Council.--To ensure input from and 
     coordination with State, local, and tribal governments and 
     emergency response providers, the Administrator shall 
     regularly consult and work with the National Advisory Council 
     established under section 508 on the administration and 
     assessment of grant programs administered by the Department, 
     including with respect to the development of program guidance 
     and the development and evaluation of risk-assessment 
     methodologies.
       ``(c) Regional Coordination.--The Administrator shall 
     ensure that--
       ``(1) all recipients of homeland security grants 
     administered by the Department, as a condition of receiving 
     those grants, coordinate their prevention, preparedness, and 
     protection efforts with neighboring State, local, and tribal 
     governments, as appropriate; and
       ``(2) all metropolitan areas and other recipients of 
     homeland security grants administered by the Department that 
     include or substantially affect parts or all of more than 1 
     State, coordinate across State boundaries, including, where 
     appropriate, through the use of regional working groups and 
     requirements for regional plans, as a condition of receiving 
     Departmentally administered homeland security grants.
       ``(d) Planning Committees.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any State or metropolitan area receiving 
     grants under this title shall establish a planning committee 
     to assist in preparation and revision of the State, regional, 
     or local homeland security plan and to assist in determining 
     effective funding priorities.
       ``(2) Composition.--
       ``(A) In general.--The planning committee shall include 
     representatives of significant stakeholders, including--
       ``(i) local and tribal government officials; and
       ``(ii) emergency response providers, which shall include 
     representatives of the fire service, law enforcement, 
     emergency medical response, and emergency managers.
       ``(B) Geographic representation.--The members of the 
     planning committee shall be a representative group of 
     individuals from the counties, cities, towns, and Indian 
     tribes within the State or metropolitan areas, including, as 
     appropriate, representatives of rural, high-population, and 
     high-threat jurisdictions.
       ``(e) Interagency Coordination.--The Secretary, through the 
     Administrator, in coordination with the Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other agencies 
     providing assistance to State, local, and tribal governments 
     for preventing, preparing for, protecting against, responding 
     to, and recovering from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, 
     and other man-made disasters, and not later than 12 months 
     after the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007, shall--
       ``(1) compile a comprehensive list of Federal programs that 
     provide assistance to State, local, and tribal governments 
     for preventing, preparing for, and responding to, natural 
     disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters;
       ``(2) develop a proposal to coordinate, to the greatest 
     extent practicable, the planning, reporting, application, and 
     other requirements and

[[Page 4872]]

     guidance for homeland security assistance programs to--
       ``(A) eliminate redundant and duplicative requirements, 
     including onerous application and ongoing reporting 
     requirements;
       ``(B) ensure accountability of the programs to the intended 
     purposes of such programs;
       ``(C) coordinate allocation of grant funds to avoid 
     duplicative or inconsistent purchases by the recipients; and
       ``(D) make the programs more accessible and user friendly 
     to applicants; and
       ``(3) submit the information and proposals under paragraphs 
     (1) and (2) to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

     ``SEC. 2009. ACCOUNTABILITY.

       ``(a) Reports to Congress.--
       ``(1) Funding efficacy.--The Administrator shall submit to 
     Congress, as a component of the annual Federal Preparedness 
     Report required under section 652 of the Post-Katrina 
     Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 752), an 
     evaluation of the extent to which grants Administered by the 
     Department, including the grants established by this title--
       ``(A) have contributed to the progress of State, local, and 
     tribal governments in achieving target capabilities; and
       ``(B) have led to the reduction of risk nationally and in 
     State, local, and tribal jurisdictions.
       ``(2) Risk assessment.--
       ``(A) In general.--For each fiscal year, the Administrator 
     shall provide to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a detailed 
     and comprehensive explanation of the methodology used to 
     calculate risk and compute the allocation of funds under 
     sections 2003 and 2004 of this title, including--
       ``(i) all variables included in the risk assessment and the 
     weights assigned to each;
       ``(ii) an explanation of how each such variable, as 
     weighted, correlates to risk, and the basis for concluding 
     there is such a correlation; and
       ``(iii) any change in the methodology from the previous 
     fiscal year, including changes in variables considered, 
     weighting of those variables, and computational methods.
       ``(B) Classified annex.--The information required under 
     subparagraph (A) shall be provided in unclassified form to 
     the greatest extent possible, and may include a classified 
     annex if necessary.
       ``(C) Deadline.--For each fiscal year, the information 
     required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided on the 
     earlier of--
       ``(i) October 31; or
       ``(ii) 30 days before the issuance of any program guidance 
     for grants under sections 2003 and 2004.
       ``(b) Reviews and Audits.--
       ``(1) Department review.--The Administrator shall conduct 
     periodic reviews of grants made under this title to ensure 
     that recipients allocate funds consistent with the guidelines 
     established by the Department.
       ``(2) Government accountability office.--
       ``(A) Access to information.--Each recipient of a grant 
     under this title and the Department shall provide the 
     Government Accountability Office with full access to 
     information regarding the activities carried out under this 
     title.
       ``(B) Audits and reports.--
       ``(i) Audit.--Not later than 12 months after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     and periodically thereafter, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall conduct an audit of the Homeland Security 
     Grant Program.
       ``(ii) Report.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall submit a report to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives on--

       ``(I) the results of any audit conducted under clause (i), 
     including an analysis of the purposes for which the grant 
     funds authorized under this title are being spent; and
       ``(II) whether the grant recipients have allocated funding 
     consistent with the State homeland security plan and the 
     guidelines established by the Department.

       ``(3) Audit requirement.--Grant recipients that expend 
     $500,000 or more in grant funds received under this title 
     during any fiscal year shall submit to the Administrator an 
     organization-wide financial and compliance audit report in 
     conformance with the requirements of chapter 75 of title 31, 
     United States Code.
       ``(4) Recovery audits.--The Secretary shall conduct a 
     recovery audit (as that term is defined by the Director of 
     the Office of Management and Budget under section 3561 of 
     title 31, United States Code) for any grant administered by 
     the Department with a total value of $1,000,000 or greater.
       ``(c) Remedies for Noncompliance.--
       ``(1) In general.--If the Administrator finds, after 
     reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that a 
     recipient of a grant under this title has failed to 
     substantially comply with any provision of this title, or 
     with any regulations or guidelines of the Department 
     regarding eligible expenditures, the Administrator shall--
       ``(A) terminate any payment of grant funds to be made to 
     the recipient under this title;
       ``(B) reduce the amount of payment of grant funds to the 
     recipient by an amount equal to the amount of grants funds 
     that were not expended by the recipient in accordance with 
     this title; or
       ``(C) limit the use of grant funds received under this 
     title to programs, projects, or activities not affected by 
     the failure to comply.
       ``(2) Duration of penalty.--The Administrator shall apply 
     an appropriate penalty under paragraph (1) until such time as 
     the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full 
     compliance with this title or with applicable guidelines or 
     regulations of the Department.
       ``(3) Direct funding.--If a State fails to substantially 
     comply with any provision of this title or with applicable 
     guidelines or regulations of the Department, including 
     failing to provide local or tribal governments with grant 
     funds or resources purchased with grant funds in a timely 
     fashion, a local or tribal government entitled to receive 
     such grant funds or resources may petition the Administrator, 
     at such time and in such manner as determined by the 
     Administrator, to request that grant funds or resources be 
     provided directly to the local or tribal government.

     ``SEC. 2010. AUDITING.

       ``(a) Audit of Grants Under This Title.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than the date described in 
     paragraph (2), and every 2 years thereafter, the Inspector 
     General of the Department shall conduct an audit of each 
     entity that receives a grant under the Urban Area Security 
     Initiative, the State Homeland Security Grant Program, or the 
     Emergency Management Performance Grant Program to evaluate 
     the use of funds under such grant program by such entity.
       ``(2) Timing.--The date described in this paragraph is the 
     later of 2 years after--
       ``(A) the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007; and
       ``(B) the date that an entity first receives a grant under 
     the Urban Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program, or the Emergency Management 
     Performance Grant Program, as the case may be.
       ``(3) Contents.--Each audit under this subsection shall 
     evaluate--
       ``(A) the use of funds under the relevant grant program by 
     an entity during the 2 full fiscal years before the date of 
     that audit;
       ``(B) whether funds under that grant program were used by 
     that entity as required by law; and
       ``(C)(i) for each grant under the Urban Area Security 
     Initiative or the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the 
     extent to which funds under that grant were used to prepare 
     for, protect against, respond to, or recover from acts of 
     terrorism; and
       ``(ii) for each grant under the Emergency Management 
     Performance Grant Program, the extent to which funds under 
     that grant were used to prevent, prepare for, protect 
     against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against all 
     hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and 
     other man-made disasters.
       ``(4) Public availability on website.--The Inspector 
     General of the Department shall make each audit under this 
     subsection available on the website of the Inspector General.
       ``(5) Reporting.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 2 years and 60 days after 
     the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act 
     of 2007, and annually thereafter, the Inspector General of 
     the Department shall submit to Congress a consolidated report 
     regarding the audits conducted under this subsection.
       ``(B) Contents.--Each report submitted under this paragraph 
     shall describe--
       ``(i)(I) for the first such report, the audits conducted 
     under this subsection during the 2-year period beginning on 
     the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act 
     of 2007; and
       ``(II) for each subsequent such report, the audits 
     conducted under this subsection during the fiscal year before 
     the date of the submission of that report;
       ``(ii) whether funds under each grant audited during the 
     period described in clause (i) that is applicable to such 
     report were used as required by law; and
       ``(iii)(I) for grants under the Urban Area Security 
     Initiative or the State Homeland Security Grant Program 
     audited, the extent to which, during the period described in 
     clause (i) that is applicable to such report, funds under 
     such grants were used to prepare for, protect against, 
     respond to, or recover from acts of terrorism; and
       ``(II) for grants under the Emergency Management 
     Performance Grant Program audited, the extent to which funds 
     under such grants were used during the period described in 
     clause (i) applicable to such report to prevent, prepare for, 
     protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate 
     against all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of 
     terrorism, and other man-made disasters.
       ``(b) Audit of Other Preparedness Grants.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than the date described in 
     paragraph (2), the Inspector General of the Department shall 
     conduct an audit of each entity that receives a grant under 
     the Urban Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program, or the Emergency Management 
     Performance Grant Program to evaluate the use by that entity 
     of any grant for preparedness administered by the Department 
     that was awarded before the date of enactment of the 
     Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
       ``(2) Timing.--The date described in this paragraph is the 
     later of 2 years after--
       ``(A) the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007; and
       ``(B) the date that an entity first receives a grant under 
     the Urban Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program, or the Emergency Management 
     Performance Grant Program, as the case may be.

[[Page 4873]]

       ``(3) Contents.--Each audit under this subsection shall 
     evaluate--
       ``(A) the use of funds by an entity under any grant for 
     preparedness administered by the Department that was awarded 
     before the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007;
       ``(B) whether funds under each such grant program were used 
     by that entity as required by law; and
       ``(C) the extent to which such funds were used to enhance 
     preparedness.
       ``(4) Public availability on website.--The Inspector 
     General of the Department shall make each audit under this 
     subsection available on the website of the Inspector General.
       ``(5) Reporting.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 2 years and 60 days after 
     the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act 
     of 2007, and annually thereafter, the Inspector General of 
     the Department shall submit to Congress a consolidated report 
     regarding the audits conducted under this subsection.
       ``(B) Contents.--Each report submitted under this paragraph 
     shall describe--
       ``(i)(I) for the first such report, the audits conducted 
     under this subsection during the 2-year period beginning on 
     the date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act 
     of 2007; and
       ``(II) for each subsequent such report, the audits 
     conducted under this subsection during the fiscal year before 
     the date of the submission of that report;
       ``(ii) whether funds under each grant audited were used as 
     required by law; and
       ``(iii) the extent to which funds under each grant audited 
     were used to enhance preparedness.
       ``(c) Funding for Audits.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall withhold 1 
     percent of the total amount of each grant under the Urban 
     Area Security Initiative, the State Homeland Security Grant 
     Program, and the Emergency Management Performance Grant 
     Program for audits under this section.
       ``(2) Availability of funds.--The Administrator shall make 
     amounts withheld under this subsection available as follows:
       ``(A) Amounts withheld from grants under the Urban Area 
     Security Initiative shall be made available for audits under 
     this section of entities receiving grants under the Urban 
     Area Security Initiative.
       ``(B) Amounts withheld from grants under the State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program shall be made available for audits 
     under this section of entities receiving grants under the 
     State Homeland Security Grant Program.
       ``(C) Amounts withheld from grants under the Emergency 
     Management Performance Grant Program shall be made available 
     for audits under this section of entities receiving grants 
     under the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program.

     ``SEC. 2011. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       ``(a) Grants.--
       ``(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     for the Homeland Security Grant Program established under 
     section 2002 of this title for each of fiscal years 2008, 
     2009, and 2010, $3,105,000,000, to be allocated as follows:
       ``(A) For grants under the Urban Area Security Initiative 
     under section 2003, $1,278,639,000.
       ``(B) For grants under the State Homeland Security Grant 
     Program established under section 2004, $913,180,500.
       ``(C) For grants under the Emergency Management Performance 
     Grant Program established under section 2005, $913,180,500.
       ``(2) Subsequent years.--There is authorized to be 
     appropriated for the Homeland Security Grant Program 
     established under section 2002 of this title such sums as are 
     necessary for fiscal year 2011 and each fiscal year 
     thereafter.
       ``(b) Proportionate Allocation.--Regardless of the amount 
     appropriated for the Homeland Security Grant Program in any 
     fiscal year, the appropriated amount shall, in each fiscal 
     year, be allocated among the grant programs under sections 
     2003, 2004, and 2005 in direct proportion to the amounts 
     allocated under paragraph (a)(1) of this section.''.

     SEC. 203. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating title XVIII, as added by the SAFE Port 
     Act (Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), as title XIX;
       (2) by redesignating sections 1801 through 1806, as added 
     by the SAFE Port Act (Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), as 
     sections 1901 through 1906, respectively;
       (3) in section 1904(a), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``section 1802'' and inserting ``section 1902''; and
       (4) in section 1906, as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``section 1802(a)'' each place that term appears and 
     inserting ``section 1902(a)''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 note) 
     is amended by striking the items relating to title XVIII and 
     sections 1801 through 1806, as added by the SAFE Port Act 
     (Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), and inserting the 
     following:

             ``TITLE XIX--DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

``Sec. 1901. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
``Sec. 1902. Mission of Office.
``Sec. 1903. Hiring authority.
``Sec. 1904. Testing authority.
``Sec. 1905. Relationship to other Department entities and Federal 
              agencies.
``Sec. 1906. Contracting and grant making authorities.

                  ``TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

``Sec. 2001. Definitions.
``Sec. 2002. Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2003. Urban Area Security Initiative.
``Sec. 2004. State Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2005. Emergency Management Performance Grants Program.
``Sec. 2006. Terrorism prevention.
``Sec. 2007. Restrictions on use of funds.
``Sec. 2008. Administration and coordination.
``Sec. 2009. Accountability.
``Sec. 2010. Auditing.
``Sec. 2011. Authorization of appropriations.''.

       TITLE III--COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY

     SEC. 301. DEDICATED FUNDING TO ACHIEVE EMERGENCY 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABLE 
                   COMMUNICATIONS.

       (a) Emergency Communications Operability and Interoperable 
     Communications.--
       (1) In general.--Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act 
     of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 571 et seq.) (relating to emergency 
     communications) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 1809. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND 
                   INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS GRANTS.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Administrator.--The term `Administrator' means the 
     Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
       ``(2) Emergency communications operability.--The term 
     `emergency communications operability' means the ability to 
     provide and maintain, throughout an emergency response 
     operation, a continuous flow of information among emergency 
     response providers, agencies, and government officers from 
     multiple disciplines and jurisdictions and at all levels of 
     government, in the event of a natural disaster, act of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disaster, including where there 
     has been significant damage to, or destruction of, critical 
     infrastructure, including substantial loss of ordinary 
     telecommunications infrastructure and sustained loss of 
     electricity.
       ``(b) In General.--The Administrator shall make grants to 
     States for initiatives necessary to achieve, maintain, or 
     enhance Statewide, regional, national and, as appropriate, 
     international emergency communications operability and 
     interoperable communications.
       ``(c) Statewide Interoperable Communications Plans.--
       ``(1) Submission of plans.--The Administrator shall require 
     any State applying for a grant under this section to submit a 
     Statewide Interoperable Communications Plan as described 
     under section 7303(f) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 194(f)).
       ``(2) Coordination and consultation.--The Statewide plan 
     submitted under paragraph (1) shall be developed--
       ``(A) in coordination with local and tribal governments, 
     emergency response providers, and other relevant State 
     officers; and
       ``(B) in consultation with and subject to appropriate 
     comment by the applicable Regional Emergency Communications 
     Coordination Working Group as described under section 1805.
       ``(3) Approval.--The Administrator may not award a grant to 
     a State unless the Administrator, in consultation with the 
     Director for Emergency Communications, has approved the 
     applicable Statewide plan.
       ``(4) Revisions.--A State may revise the applicable 
     Statewide plan approved by the Administrator under this 
     subsection, subject to approval of the revision by the 
     Administrator.
       ``(d) Consistency.--The Administrator shall ensure that 
     each grant is used to supplement and support, in a consistent 
     and coordinated manner, any applicable State, regional, or 
     urban area homeland security plan.
       ``(e) Use of Grant Funds.--Grants awarded under subsection 
     (b) may be used for initiatives to achieve, maintain, or 
     enhance emergency communications operability and 
     interoperable communications, including--
       ``(1) Statewide or regional communications planning, 
     including governance related activities;
       ``(2) system design and engineering;
       ``(3) system procurement and installation;
       ``(4) exercises;
       ``(5) modeling and simulation exercises for operational 
     command and control functions;
       ``(6) technical assistance;
       ``(7) training; and
       ``(8) other appropriate activities determined by the 
     Administrator to be integral to achieve, maintain, or enhance 
     emergency communications operability and interoperable 
     communications.
       ``(f) Application.--
       ``(1) In general.--A State desiring a grant under this 
     section shall submit an application at such time, in such 
     manner, and accompanied by such information as the 
     Administrator may reasonably require.
       ``(2) Minimum contents.--At a minimum, each application 
     submitted under paragraph (1) shall--
       ``(A) identify the critical aspects of the communications 
     life cycle, including planning, system design and 
     engineering, procurement and installation, and training for 
     which funding is requested;

[[Page 4874]]

       ``(B) describe how--
       ``(i) the proposed use of funds--

       ``(I) would be consistent with and address the goals in any 
     applicable State, regional, or urban homeland security plan; 
     and
       ``(II) unless the Administrator determines otherwise, are--

       ``(aa) consistent with the National Emergency 
     Communications Plan under section 1802; and
       ``(bb) compatible with the national infrastructure and 
     national voluntary consensus standards;
       ``(ii) the applicant intends to spend funds under the 
     grant, to administer such funds, and to allocate such funds 
     among participating local and tribal governments and 
     emergency response providers;
       ``(iii) the State plans to allocate the grant funds on the 
     basis of risk and effectiveness to regions, local and tribal 
     governments to promote meaningful investments for achieving, 
     maintaining, or enhancing emergency communications 
     operability and interoperable communications;
       ``(iv) the State intends to address the emergency 
     communications operability and interoperable communications 
     needs at the city, county, regional, State, and interstate 
     level; and
       ``(v) the State plans to emphasize regional planning and 
     cooperation, both within the jurisdictional borders of that 
     State and with neighboring States;
       ``(C) be consistent with the Statewide Interoperable 
     Communications Plan required under section 7303(f) of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
     U.S.C. 194(f)); and
       ``(D) include a capital budget and timeline showing how the 
     State intends to allocate and expend the grant funds.
       ``(g) Award of Grants.--
       ``(1) Considerations.--In approving applications and 
     awarding grants under this section, the Administrator shall 
     consider--
       ``(A) the nature of the threat to the State from a natural 
     disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster;
       ``(B) the location, risk, or vulnerability of critical 
     infrastructure and key national assets, including the 
     consequences from damage to critical infrastructure in nearby 
     jurisdictions as a result of natural disasters, acts of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disasters;
       ``(C) the size of the population of the State, including 
     appropriate consideration of military, tourist, and commuter 
     populations;
       ``(D) the population density of the State;
       ``(E) the extent to which grants will be utilized to 
     implement emergency communications operability and 
     interoperable communications solutions--
       ``(i) consistent with the National Emergency Communications 
     Plan under section 1802 and compatible with the national 
     infrastructure and national voluntary consensus standards; 
     and
       ``(ii) more efficient and cost effective than current 
     approaches;
       ``(F) the extent to which a grant would expedite the 
     achievement, maintenance, or enhancement of emergency 
     communications operability and interoperable communications 
     in the State with Federal, State, local, and tribal 
     governments;
       ``(G) the extent to which a State, given its financial 
     capability, demonstrates its commitment to achieve, maintain, 
     or enhance emergency communications operability and 
     interoperable communications by supplementing Federal funds 
     with non-Federal funds;
       ``(H) whether the State is on or near an international 
     border;
       ``(I) whether the State encompasses an economically 
     significant border crossing;
       ``(J) whether the State has a coastline bordering an ocean, 
     a major waterway used for interstate commerce, or 
     international waters;
       ``(K) the extent to which geographic barriers pose unusual 
     obstacles to achieving, maintaining, or enhancing emergency 
     communications operability or interoperable communications;
       ``(L) the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences faced 
     by the State related to at-risk sites or activities in nearby 
     jurisdictions, including the need to respond to natural 
     disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters 
     arising in those jurisdictions;
       ``(M) the need to achieve, maintain, or enhance nationwide 
     emergency communications operability and interoperable 
     communications, consistent with the National Emergency 
     Communications Plan under section 1802;
       ``(N) whether the activity for which a grant is requested 
     is being funded under another Federal or State emergency 
     communications grant program; and
       ``(O) such other factors as are specified by the 
     Administrator in writing.
       ``(2) Review panel.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a review 
     panel under section 871(a) to assist in reviewing grant 
     applications under this section.
       ``(B) Recommendations.--The review panel established under 
     subparagraph (A) shall make recommendations to the 
     Administrator regarding applications for grants under this 
     section.
       ``(C) Membership.--The review panel established under 
     subparagraph (A) shall include--
       ``(i) individuals with technical expertise in emergency 
     communications operability and interoperable communications;
       ``(ii) emergency response providers; and
       ``(iii) other relevant State and local officers.
       ``(3) Minimum grant amounts.--The Administrator shall 
     ensure that for each fiscal year--
       ``(A) no State receives less than an amount equal to 0.75 
     percent of the total funds appropriated for grants under this 
     section; and
       ``(B) American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
     Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each receive no 
     less than 0.25 percent of the amounts appropriated for grants 
     under this section.
       ``(4) Availability of funds.--Any grant funds awarded that 
     may be used to support emergency communications operability 
     or interoperable communications shall, as the Administrator 
     may determine, remain available for up to 3 years, consistent 
     with section 7303(e) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 194(e)).
       ``(h) State Responsibilities.--
       ``(1) Pass-through of funds to local and tribal 
     governments.--The Administrator shall determine a date by 
     which a State that receives a grant shall obligate or 
     otherwise make available to local and tribal governments and 
     emergency response providers--
       ``(A) not less than 80 percent of the funds of the amount 
     of the grant;
       ``(B) resources purchased with the grant funds having a 
     value equal to not less than 80 percent of the total amount 
     of the grant; or
       ``(C) grant funds combined with resources purchased with 
     the grant funds having a value equal to not less than 80 
     percent of the total amount of the grant.
       ``(2) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds 
     to local and tribal governments.--Any State that receives a 
     grant shall certify to the Administrator, by not later than 
     30 days after the date described under paragraph (1) with 
     respect to the grant, that the State has made available for 
     expenditure by local or tribal governments and emergency 
     response providers the required amount of grant funds under 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Report on grant spending.--
       ``(A) In general.--Any State that receives a grant shall 
     submit a spending report to the Administrator at such time, 
     in such manner, and accompanied by such information as the 
     Administrator may reasonably require.
       ``(B) Minimum contents.--At a minimum, each report under 
     this paragraph shall include--
       ``(i) the amount, ultimate recipients, and dates of receipt 
     of all funds received under the grant;
       ``(ii) the amount and the dates of disbursements of all 
     such funds expended in compliance with paragraph (1) or under 
     mutual aid agreements or other intrastate and interstate 
     sharing arrangements, as applicable;
       ``(iii) how the funds were used by each ultimate recipient 
     or beneficiary;
       ``(iv) the extent to which emergency communications 
     operability and interoperable communications identified in 
     the applicable Statewide plan and application have been 
     achieved, maintained, or enhanced as the result of the 
     expenditure of grant funds; and
       ``(v) the extent to which emergency communications 
     operability and interoperable communications identified in 
     the applicable Statewide plan and application remain unmet.
       ``(C) Public availability on website.--The Administrator 
     shall make each report submitted under subparagraph (A) 
     publicly available on the website of the Federal Emergency 
     Management Agency. The Administrator may redact such 
     information from the reports as the Administrator determines 
     necessary to protect national security.
       ``(4) Penalties for reporting delay.--If a State fails to 
     provide the information required by the Administrator under 
     paragraph (3), the Administrator may--
       ``(A) reduce grant payments to the State from the portion 
     of grant funds that are not required to be passed through 
     under paragraph (1);
       ``(B) terminate payment of funds under the grant to the 
     State, and transfer the appropriate portion of those funds 
     directly to local and tribal governments and emergency 
     response providers that were intended to receive funding 
     under that grant; or
       ``(C) impose additional restrictions or burdens on the use 
     of funds by the State under the grant, which may include--
       ``(i) prohibiting use of such funds to pay the grant-
     related expenses of the State; or
       ``(ii) requiring the State to distribute to local and 
     tribal government and emergency response providers all or a 
     portion of grant funds that are not required to be passed 
     through under paragraph (1).
       ``(i) Prohibited Uses.--Grants awarded under this section 
     may not be used for recreational or social purposes.
       ``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
       ``(1) $400,000,000 for fiscal year 2008;
       ``(2) $500,000,000 for fiscal year 2009;
       ``(3) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2010;
       ``(4) $800,000,000 for fiscal year 2011;
       ``(5) $1,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2012; and
       ``(6) such sums as necessary for each fiscal year 
     thereafter.''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of 
     contents under section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1808 the following:

``Sec. 1809. Emergency communications operability and interoperable 
              communications grants.''.

       (b) Interoperable Communications Plans.--Section 7303 of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 
     (6 U.S.C. 194) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (f)--
       (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;

[[Page 4875]]

       (B) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) include information on the governance structure used 
     to develop the plan, such as all agencies and organizations 
     that participated in developing the plan and the scope and 
     timeframe of the plan; and
       ``(7) describe the method by which multi-jurisdictional, 
     multi-disciplinary input was provided from all regions of the 
     jurisdiction and the process for continuing to incorporate 
     such input.''; and
       (2) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``or video'' and 
     inserting ``and video''.
       (c) National Emergency Communications Plan.--Section 
     1802(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     652(c)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(10) set a date, including interim benchmarks, as 
     appropriate, by which State, local, and tribal governments, 
     Federal departments and agencies, emergency response 
     providers, and the private sector will achieve interoperable 
     communications as that term is defined under section 
     7303(g)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 194(g)(1).''.

     SEC. 302. BORDER INTEROPERABILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department 
     an International Border Community Interoperable 
     Communications Demonstration Project (referred to in this 
     section as ``demonstration project'').
       (2) Minimum number of communities.--The Secretary shall 
     select no fewer than 6 communities to participate in a 
     demonstration project.
       (3) Location of communities.--No fewer than 3 of the 
     communities selected under paragraph (2) shall be located on 
     the northern border of the United States and no fewer than 3 
     of the communities selected under paragraph (2) shall be 
     located on the southern border of the United States.
       (b) Program Requirements.--The demonstration projects 
     shall--
       (1) address the interoperable communications needs of 
     emergency response providers and the National Guard;
       (2) foster interoperable emergency communications systems--
       (A) among Federal, State, local, and tribal government 
     agencies in the United States involved in preventing or 
     responding to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other 
     man-made disaster; and
       (B) with similar agencies in Canada or Mexico;
       (3) identify common international cross-border frequencies 
     for communications equipment, including radio or computer 
     messaging equipment;
       (4) foster the standardization of interoperable emergency 
     communications equipment;
       (5) identify solutions that will facilitate interoperable 
     communications across national borders expeditiously;
       (6) ensure that emergency response providers can 
     communicate with each other and the public at disaster sites;
       (7) provide training and equipment to enable emergency 
     response providers to deal with threats and contingencies in 
     a variety of environments; and
       (8) identify and secure appropriate joint-use equipment to 
     ensure communications access.
       (c) Distribution of Funds.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall distribute funds under 
     this section to each community participating in a 
     demonstration project through the State, or States, in which 
     each community is located.
       (2) Other participants.--Not later than 60 days after 
     receiving funds under paragraph (1), a State shall make the 
     funds available to the local and tribal governments and 
     emergency response providers selected by the Secretary to 
     participate in a demonstration project.
       (d) Reporting.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than December 31, 2007, and each 
     year thereafter in which funds are appropriated for a 
     demonstration project, the Secretary shall submit to the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report on the demonstration 
     projects.
       (2) Contents.--Each report under this subsection shall 
     contain the following:
       (A) The name and location of all communities involved in 
     the demonstration project.
       (B) The amount of funding provided to each State for the 
     demonstration project.
       (C) An evaluation of the usefulness of the demonstration 
     project towards developing an effective interoperable 
     communications system at the borders.
       (D) The factors that were used in determining how to 
     distribute the funds in a risk-based manner.
       (E) The specific risks inherent to a border community that 
     make interoperable communications more difficult than in non-
     border communities.
       (F) The optimal ways to prioritize funding for 
     interoperable communication systems based upon risk.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as are necessary in each of 
     fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009 to carry out this section.

          TITLE IV--ENHANCING SECURITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

     SEC. 401. MODERNIZATION OF THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Secure 
     Travel and Counterterrorism Partnership Act''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States should modernize the visa waiver 
     program by simultaneously--
       (A) enhancing program security requirements; and
       (B) extending visa-free travel privileges to nationals of 
     foreign countries that are allies in the war on terrorism; 
     and
       (2) the expansion described in paragraph (1) will--
       (A) enhance bilateral cooperation on critical 
     counterterrorism and information sharing initiatives;
       (B) support and expand tourism and business opportunities 
     to enhance long-term economic competitiveness; and
       (C) strengthen bilateral relationships.
       (c) Discretionary Visa Waiver Program Expansion.--Section 
     217(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1187(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(8) Nonimmigrant visa refusal rate flexibility.--
       ``(A) Certification.--On the date on which an air exit 
     system is in place that can verify the departure of not less 
     than 97 percent of foreign nationals that exit through 
     airports of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall certify to Congress that such air exit system 
     is in place.
       ``(B) Waiver.--After certification by the Secretary under 
     subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the 
     application of paragraph (2)(A) for a country if--
       ``(i) the country meets all security requirements of this 
     section;
       ``(ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that 
     the totality of the country's security risk mitigation 
     measures provide assurance that the country's participation 
     in the program would not compromise the law enforcement, 
     security interests, or enforcement of the immigration laws of 
     the United States;
       ``(iii) there has been a sustained reduction in visa 
     refusal rates for aliens from the country and conditions 
     exist to continue such reduction; and
       ``(iv) the country cooperated with the Government of the 
     United States on counterterrorism initiatives and information 
     sharing before the date of its designation as a program 
     country, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
     Secretary of State expect such cooperation will continue.
       ``(9) Discretionary security-related considerations.--
       ``(A) In general.--In determining whether to waive the 
     application of paragraph (2)(A) for a country, pursuant to 
     paragraph (8), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take into 
     consideration other factors affecting the security of the 
     United States, including--
       ``(i) airport security standards in the country;
       ``(ii) whether the country assists in the operation of an 
     effective air marshal program;
       ``(iii) the standards of passports and travel documents 
     issued by the country; and
       ``(iv) other security-related factors.
       ``(B) Overstay rates.--In determining whether to permit a 
     country to participate in the program, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall consider the estimated rate at which 
     nationals of the country violate the terms of their visas by 
     remaining in the United States after the expiration of such 
     visas.''.
       (d) Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program.--
       (1) In general.--Section 217 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) by striking ``Operators of aircraft'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(10) Electronic transmission of identification 
     information.--Operators of aircraft''; and
       (ii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(11) Eligibility determination under the electronic 
     travel authorization system.--Beginning on the date on which 
     the electronic travel authorization system developed under 
     subsection (h)(3) is fully operational, each alien traveling 
     under the program shall, before applying for admission, 
     electronically provide basic biographical information to the 
     system. Upon review of such biographical information, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall determine whether the 
     alien is eligible to travel to the United States under the 
     program.'';
       (B) in subsection (c), as amended by subsection (c) of this 
     section--
       (i) in paragraph (2)--

       (I) by amending subparagraph (D) to read as follows:

       ``(D) Reporting lost and stolen passports.--The government 
     of the country enters into an agreement with the United 
     States to report, or make available through Interpol, to the 
     United States Government information about the theft or loss 
     of passports within a strict time limit and in a manner 
     specified in the agreement.''; and

       (II) by adding at the end the following:

       ``(E) Repatriation of aliens.--The government of a country 
     accepts for repatriation any citizen, former citizen, or 
     national against whom a final executable order of removal is

[[Page 4876]]

     issued not later than 3 weeks after the issuance of the final 
     order of removal. Nothing in this subparagraph creates any 
     duty for the United States or any right for any alien with 
     respect to removal or release. Nothing in this subparagraph 
     gives rise to any cause of action or claim under this 
     paragraph or any other law against any official of the United 
     States or of any State to compel the release, removal, or 
     consideration for release or removal of any alien.
       ``(F) Passenger information exchange.--The government of 
     the country enters into an agreement with the United States 
     to share information regarding whether nationals of that 
     country traveling to the United States represent a threat to 
     the security or welfare of the United States or its 
     citizens.'';.
       (ii) in paragraph (5)--

       (I) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place it appears 
     and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
       (II) in subparagraph (A)(i)--

       (aa) in subclause (II), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (bb) in subclause (III), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (cc) by adding at the end the following:

       ``(IV) shall submit to Congress a report regarding the 
     implementation of the electronic travel authorization system 
     under subsection (h)(3) and the participation of new 
     countries in the program through a waiver under paragraph 
     (8).''; and

       (iii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(10) Technical assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
     provide technical assistance to program countries to assist 
     those countries in meeting the requirements under this 
     section.'';
       (C) in subsection (f)(5), by striking ``of blank'' and 
     inserting ``or loss of''; and
       (D) in subsection (h), by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) Electronic travel authorization system.--
       ``(A) System.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized to 
     develop and implement a fully automated electronic travel 
     authorization system (referred to in this paragraph as the 
     `System') to collect such basic biographical information as 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security determines to be necessary 
     to determine, in advance of travel, the eligibility of an 
     alien to travel to the United States under the program.
       ``(B) Fees.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may charge 
     a fee for the use of the System, which shall be--
       ``(i) set at a level that will ensure recovery of the full 
     costs of providing and administering the System; and
       ``(ii) available to pay the costs incurred to administer 
     the System.
       ``(C) Validity.--
       ``(i) Period.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State shall prescribe 
     regulations that provide for a period, not to exceed 3 years, 
     during which a determination of eligibility to travel under 
     the program will be valid. Notwithstanding any other 
     provision under this section, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security may revoke any such determination at any time and 
     for any reason.
       ``(ii) Limitation.--A determination that an alien is 
     eligible to travel to the United States under the program is 
     not a determination that the alien is admissible to the 
     United States.
       ``(iii) Judicial review.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review 
     an eligibility determination under the System.
       ``(D) Report.--Not later than 60 days before publishing 
     notice regarding the implementation of the System in the 
     Federal Register, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     submit a report regarding the implementation of the System 
     to--
       ``(i) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate;
       ``(ii) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
       ``(iii) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       ``(iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       ``(v) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives;
       ``(vi) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives;
       ``(vii) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives; and
       ``(viii) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.''.
       (2) Effective date.--Section 217(a)(11) of the Immigration 
     and Nationality Act, as added by paragraph (1)(A)(ii) shall 
     take effect on the date which is 60 days after the date on 
     which the Secretary of Homeland Security publishes notice in 
     the Federal Register of the requirement under such paragraph.
       (e) Exit System.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall establish an exit system that records the departure on 
     a flight leaving the United States of every alien 
     participating in the visa waiver program established under 
     section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1187).
       (2) System requirements.--The system established under 
     paragraph (1) shall--
       (A) match biometric information of the alien against 
     relevant watch lists and immigration information; and
       (B) compare such biometric information against manifest 
     information collected by air carriers on passengers departing 
     the United States to confirm such individuals have departed 
     the United States.
       (3) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
     Congress that describes--
       (A) the progress made in developing and deploying the exit 
     system established under this subsection; and
       (B) the procedures by which the Secretary will improve the 
     manner of calculating the rates of nonimmigrants who violate 
     the terms of their visas by remaining in the United States 
     after the expiration of such visas.
       (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section and the amendments made by this section.

     SEC. 402. STRENGTHENING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE HUMAN 
                   SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER.

       (a) In General.--Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1777) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ``address'' and 
     inserting ``integrate and disseminate intelligence and 
     information related to'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections 
     (g) and (h), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsections:
       ``(d) Director.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     nominate an official of the Government of the United States 
     to serve as the Director of the Center, in accordance with 
     the requirements of the memorandum of understanding entitled 
     the `Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) Charter'.
       ``(e) Staffing of the Center.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     cooperation with heads of other relevant agencies and 
     departments, shall ensure that the Center is staffed with not 
     fewer than 40 full-time equivalent positions, including, as 
     appropriate, detailees from the following:
       ``(A) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
       ``(B) The Transportation Security Administration.
       ``(C) The United States Citizenship and Immigration 
     Services.
       ``(D) The United States Customs and Border Protection.
       ``(E) The United States Coast Guard.
       ``(F) The United States Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement.
       ``(G) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       ``(H) The Department of Defense.
       ``(I) The Department of the Treasury.
       ``(J) The National Counterterrorism Center.
       ``(K) The National Security Agency.
       ``(L) The Department of Justice.
       ``(M) The Department of State.
       ``(N) Any other relevant agency or department.
       ``(2) Expertise of detailees.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in cooperation with the head of each agency, 
     department, or other entity set out under paragraph (1), 
     shall ensure that the detailees provided to the Center under 
     paragraph (1) include an adequate number of personnel with 
     experience in the area of--
       ``(A) consular affairs;
       ``(B) counterterrorism;
       ``(C) criminal law enforcement;
       ``(D) intelligence analysis;
       ``(E) prevention and detection of document fraud;
       ``(F) border inspection; or
       ``(G) immigration enforcement.
       ``(3) Reimbursement for detailees.--To the extent that 
     funds are available for such purpose, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall provide reimbursement to each agency 
     or department that provides a detailee to the Center, in such 
     amount or proportion as is appropriate for costs associated 
     with the provision of such detailee, including costs for 
     travel by, and benefits provided to, such detailee.
       ``(f) Administrative Support and Funding.--The Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall provide to the Center the 
     administrative support and funding required for its 
     maintenance, including funding for personnel, leasing of 
     office space, supplies, equipment, technology, training, and 
     travel expenses necessary for the Center to carry out its 
     functions.''.
       (b) Report.--Subsection (g) of section 7202 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 
     U.S.C. 1777), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2), is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``Report'' and inserting 
     ``Initial report'';
       (2) by redesignating such subsection (g) as paragraph (1);
       (3) by indenting such paragraph, as so designated, four ems 
     from the left margin;
       (4) by inserting before such paragraph, as so designated, 
     the following:
       ``(g) Report.--''; and
       (5) by inserting after such paragraph, as so designated, 
     the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Follow-up report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 
     2007, the President shall transmit to Congress a report 
     regarding the operation of the Center and the activities 
     carried out by the Center, including a description of--
       ``(A) the roles and responsibilities of each agency or 
     department that is participating in the Center;
       ``(B) the mechanisms used to share information among each 
     such agency or department;
       ``(C) the staff provided to the Center by each such agency 
     or department;

[[Page 4877]]

       ``(D) the type of information and reports being 
     disseminated by the Center; and
       ``(E) any efforts by the Center to create a centralized 
     Federal Government database to store information related to 
     illicit travel of foreign nationals, including a description 
     of any such database and of the manner in which information 
     utilized in such a database would be collected, stored, and 
     shared.''.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out section 7202 
     of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004 (8 U.S.C. 1777), as amended by this section, $20,000,000 
     for fiscal year 2008.

     SEC. 403. ENHANCEMENTS TO THE TERRORIST TRAVEL PROGRAM.

       Section 7215 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 123) is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``SEC. 7215. TERRORIST TRAVEL PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Requirement To Establish.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Director of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center and consistent with the strategy 
     developed under section 7201, shall establish a program to 
     oversee the implementation of the Secretary's 
     responsibilities with respect to terrorist travel.
       ``(b) Head of the Program.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall designate an official of the Department of 
     Homeland Security to be responsible for carrying out the 
     program. Such official shall be--
       ``(1) the Assistant Secretary for Policy of the Department 
     of Homeland Security; or
       ``(2) an official appointed by the Secretary who reports 
     directly to the Secretary.
       ``(c) Duties.--The official designated under subsection (b) 
     shall assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in improving 
     the Department's ability to prevent terrorists from entering 
     the United States or remaining in the United States 
     undetected by--
       ``(1) developing relevant strategies and policies;
       ``(2) reviewing the effectiveness of existing programs and 
     recommending improvements, if necessary;
       ``(3) making recommendations on budget requests and on the 
     allocation of funding and personnel;
       ``(4) ensuring effective coordination, with respect to 
     policies, programs, planning, operations, and dissemination 
     of intelligence and information related to terrorist travel--
       ``(A) among appropriate subdivisions of the Department of 
     Homeland Security, as determined by the Secretary and 
     including--
       ``(i) the United States Customs and Border Protection;
       ``(ii) the United States Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement;
       ``(iii) the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
     Services;
       ``(iv) the Transportation Security Administration; and
       ``(v) the United States Coast Guard; and
       ``(B) between the Department of Homeland Security and other 
     appropriate Federal agencies; and
       ``(5) serving as the Secretary's primary point of contact 
     with the National Counterterrorism Center for implementing 
     initiatives related to terrorist travel and ensuring that the 
     recommendations of the Center related to terrorist travel are 
     carried out by the Department.
       ``(d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report on the implementation of 
     this section.''.

     SEC. 404. ENHANCED DRIVER'S LICENSE.

       Section 7209(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1185 note) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B)--
       (A) in clause (vi), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in clause (vii), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(viii) the signing of a memorandum of agreement to 
     initiate a pilot program with not less than 1 State to 
     determine if an enhanced driver's license, which is machine-
     readable and tamper proof, not valid for certification of 
     citizenship for any purpose other than admission into the 
     United States from Canada, and issued by such State to an 
     individual, may permit the individual to use the driver's 
     license to meet the documentation requirements under 
     subparagraph (A) for entry into the United States from Canada 
     at the land and sea ports of entry.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the initiation 
     of the pilot program described in subparagraph (B)(viii), the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of State shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, 
     which includes--
       ``(i) an analysis of the impact of the pilot program on 
     national security;
       ``(ii) recommendations on how to expand the pilot program 
     to other States;
       ``(iii) any appropriate statutory changes to facilitate the 
     expansion of the pilot program to additional States and to 
     citizens of Canada;
       ``(iv) a plan to scan individuals participating in the 
     pilot program against United States terrorist watch lists; 
     and
       ``(v) a recommendation for the type of machine-readable 
     technology that should be used in enhanced driver's licenses, 
     based on individual privacy considerations and the costs and 
     feasibility of incorporating any new technology into existing 
     driver's licenses.''.

     SEC. 405. WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE.

       Before publishing a final rule in the Federal Register, the 
     Secretary shall conduct--
       (1) a complete cost-benefit analysis of the Western 
     Hemisphere Travel Initiative, authorized under section 7209 
     of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004 (Public Law 108-458; 8 U.S.C. 1185 note); and
       (2) a study of the mechanisms by which the execution fee 
     for a PASS Card could be reduced, considering the potential 
     increase in the number of applications.

              TITLE V--PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES MATTERS

     SEC. 501. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO PRIVACY AND 
                   CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       (a) Modification of Authorities.--Section 1061 of the 
     National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of 
     Public Law 108-458; 5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       ``(a) In General.--There is established within the 
     Executive Office of the President a Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this section as the 
     `Board').
       ``(b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
     Congress makes the following findings:
       ``(1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government 
     may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of 
     its existing powers.
       ``(2) This shift of power and authority to the Government 
     calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to 
     protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of 
     life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for 
     the purposes for which the powers were given.
       ``(c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
       ``(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes 
     to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need 
     for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy 
     and civil liberties; and
       ``(2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately 
     considered in the development and implementation of laws, 
     regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the 
     Nation against terrorism.
       ``(d) Functions.--
       ``(1) Advice and counsel on policy development and 
     implementation.--The Board shall--
       ``(A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and 
     policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from 
     terrorism, including the development and adoption of 
     information sharing guidelines under subsections (d) and (f) 
     of section 1016;
       ``(B) review the implementation of new and existing 
     legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to 
     protect the Nation from terrorism, including the 
     implementation of information sharing guidelines under 
     subsections (d) and (f) of section 1016;
       ``(C) advise the President and the departments, agencies, 
     and elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy 
     and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the 
     development and implementation of such legislation, 
     regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
       ``(D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance 
     a particular governmental power, consider whether the 
     department, agency, or element of the executive branch has 
     established--
       ``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need 
     to protect privacy and civil liberties;
       ``(ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by the 
     executive branch of the power to ensure protection of privacy 
     and civil liberties; and
       ``(iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to 
     properly confine its use.
       ``(2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
       ``(A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the 
     implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures, 
     of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive 
     branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are 
     protected;
       ``(B) the information sharing practices of the departments, 
     agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine 
     whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil 
     liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines 
     issued or developed under subsections (d) and (f) of section 
     1016 and to other governing laws, regulations, and policies 
     regarding privacy and civil liberties; and
       ``(C) other actions by the executive branch related to 
     efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine 
     whether such actions--
       ``(i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; 
     and
       ``(ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and 
     policies regarding privacy and civil liberties.
       ``(3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties 
     officers.--The Board shall--
       ``(A) review and assess reports and other information from 
     privacy officers and civil liberties officers under section 
     1062;

[[Page 4878]]

       ``(B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such 
     privacy officers and civil liberties officers regarding their 
     activities; and
       ``(C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of such 
     privacy officers and civil liberties officers on relevant 
     interagency matters.
       ``(4) Testimony.--The members of the Board shall appear and 
     testify before Congress upon request.
       ``(e) Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Board shall--
       ``(A) receive and review reports from privacy officers and 
     civil liberties officers under section 1062; and
       ``(B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, 
     reports--
       ``(i)(I) to the appropriate committees of Congress, 
     including the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate, the Committee on Oversight and Government 
     Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       ``(II) to the President; and
       ``(ii) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
       ``(2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each 
     year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
       ``(A) a description of the major activities of the Board 
     during the preceding period;
       ``(B) information on the findings, conclusions, and 
     recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and 
     oversight functions under subsection (d);
       ``(C) the minority views on any findings, conclusions, and 
     recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and 
     oversight functions under subsection (d);
       ``(D) each proposal reviewed by the Board under subsection 
     (d)(1) that--
       ``(i) the Board advised against implementation; and
       ``(ii) notwithstanding such advice, actions were taken to 
     implement; and
       ``(E) for the preceding period, any requests submitted 
     under subsection (g)(1)(D) for the issuance of subpoenas that 
     were modified or denied by the Attorney General.
       ``(f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall--
       ``(1) make its reports, including its reports to Congress, 
     available to the public to the greatest extent that is 
     consistent with the protection of classified information and 
     applicable law; and
       ``(2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public 
     of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent 
     with the protection of classified information and applicable 
     law.
       ``(g) Access to Information.--
       ``(1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be 
     necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this 
     section, the Board is authorized to--
       ``(A) have access from any department, agency, or element 
     of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee, 
     to all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, 
     papers, recommendations, or other relevant material, 
     including classified information consistent with applicable 
     law;
       ``(B) interview, take statements from, or take public 
     testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or 
     element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or 
     employee;
       ``(C) request information or assistance from any State, 
     tribal, or local government; and
       ``(D) at the direction of a majority of the members of the 
     Board, submit a written request to the Attorney General of 
     the United States that the Attorney General require, by 
     subpoena, persons (other than departments, agencies, and 
     elements of the executive branch) to produce any relevant 
     information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, 
     papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence.
       ``(2) Review of subpoena request.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     receipt of a request by the Board under paragraph (1)(D), the 
     Attorney General shall--
       ``(i) issue the subpoena as requested; or
       ``(ii) provide the Board, in writing, with an explanation 
     of the grounds on which the subpoena request has been 
     modified or denied.
       ``(B) Notification.--If a subpoena request is modified or 
     denied under subparagraph (A)(ii), the Attorney General 
     shall, not later than 30 days after the date of that 
     modification or denial, notify the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives.
       ``(3) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or 
     failure to obey a subpoena issued pursuant to paragraph 
     (1)(D), the United States district court for the judicial 
     district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, 
     or may be found may issue an order requiring such person to 
     produce the evidence required by such subpoena.
       ``(4) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or 
     assistance requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
     paragraph (1) is, in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably 
     refused or not provided, the Board shall report the 
     circumstances to the head of the department, agency, or 
     element concerned without delay. The head of the department, 
     agency, or element concerned shall ensure that the Board is 
     given access to the information, assistance, material, or 
     personnel the Board determines to be necessary to carry out 
     its functions.
       ``(h) Membership.--
       ``(1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time 
     chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by 
     the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
     Senate.
       ``(2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be 
     selected solely on the basis of their professional 
     qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in 
     civil liberties and privacy, and relevant experience, and 
     without regard to political affiliation, but in no event 
     shall more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same 
     political party.
       ``(3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the 
     Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected 
     official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government, 
     other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.
       ``(4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of 
     6 years, except that--
       ``(A) a member appointed to a term of office after the 
     commencement of such term may serve under such appointment 
     only for the remainder of such term;
       ``(B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a 
     member, the member shall continue to serve until the member's 
     successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no 
     member may serve under this subparagraph--
       ``(i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session 
     unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been 
     submitted to the Senate; or
       ``(ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the 
     Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and
       ``(C) the members first appointed under this subsection 
     after the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007 shall serve terms of two, three, four, 
     five, and six years, respectively, with the term of each such 
     member to be designated by the President.
       ``(5) Quorum and meetings.--After its initial meeting, the 
     Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority 
     of its members. Three members of the Board shall constitute a 
     quorum.
       ``(i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
       ``(1) Compensation.--
       ``(A) Chairman.--The chairman of the Board shall be 
     compensated at the rate of pay payable for a position at 
     level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       ``(B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be 
     compensated at a rate of pay payable for a position at level 
     IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, for each day during which that member is 
     engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Board.
       ``(2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be 
     allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
     subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed 
     intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or 
     regular places of business in the performance of services for 
     the Board.
       ``(j) Staff.--
       ``(1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairman of the 
     Board, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, 
     shall appoint and fix the compensation of a full-time 
     executive director and such other personnel as may be 
     necessary to enable the Board to carry out its functions, 
     without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States 
     Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and 
     without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter 
     III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification 
     and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay 
     fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that 
     payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule 
     under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to 
     the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such 
     detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of 
     the detailee's regular employment without interruption.
       ``(3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the 
     temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants 
     in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States 
     Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a 
     person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive 
     Schedule under section 5315 of such title.
       ``(k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments, 
     agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall 
     cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board 
     members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the 
     extent possible under existing procedures and requirements.
       ``(l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The 
     Board--
       ``(1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 
     5, United States Code); and
       ``(2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 
     3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)).
       ``(m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 
     amounts as follows:
       ``(1) For fiscal year 2008, $5,000,000.
       ``(2) For fiscal year 2009, $6,650,000.
       ``(3) For fiscal year 2010, $8,300,000.
       ``(4) For fiscal year 2011, $10,000,000.
       ``(5) For fiscal year 2012, and each fiscal year 
     thereafter, such sums as may be necessary.''.
       (b) Continuation of Service of Current Members of Privacy 
     and Civil Liberties Board.--The members of the Privacy and 
     Civil Liberties Oversight Board as of the date of enactment 
     of this Act may continue to serve as

[[Page 4879]]

     members of that Board after that date, and to carry out the 
     functions and exercise the powers of that Board as specified 
     in section 1061 of the National Security Intelligence Reform 
     Act of 2004 (as amended by subsection (a)), until--
       (1) in the case of any individual serving as a member of 
     the Board under an appointment by the President, by and with 
     the advice and consent of the Senate, the expiration of a 
     term designated by the President under section 1061(h)(4)(C) 
     of such Act (as so amended);
       (2) in the case of any individual serving as a member of 
     the Board other than under an appointment by the President, 
     by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the 
     confirmation or rejection by the Senate of that member's 
     nomination to the Board under such section 1061 (as so 
     amended), except that no such individual may serve as a 
     member under this paragraph--
       (A) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session 
     unless a nomination of that individual to be a member of the 
     Board has been submitted to the Senate; or
       (B) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the 
     Senate in which such nomination is submitted; or
       (3) the appointment of members of the Board under such 
     section 1061 (as so amended), except that no member may serve 
     under this paragraph--
       (A) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session 
     unless a nomination to fill the position on the Board shall 
     have been submitted to the Senate; or
       (B) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the 
     Senate in which such nomination is submitted.

     SEC. 502. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

       (a) In General.--Section 1062 of the National Security 
     Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-
     458; 118 Stat. 3688) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 1062. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

       ``(a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, and the head of any other department, agency, or 
     element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy and 
     Civil Liberties Oversight Board under section 1061 to be 
     appropriate for coverage under this section shall designate 
     not less than 1 senior officer to--
       ``(1) assist the head of such department, agency, or 
     element and other officials of such department, agency, or 
     element in appropriately considering privacy and civil 
     liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, 
     developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, 
     procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the 
     Nation against terrorism;
       ``(2) periodically investigate and review department, 
     agency, or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, 
     and related laws and their implementation to ensure that such 
     department, agency, or element is adequately considering 
     privacy and civil liberties in its actions;
       ``(3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has 
     adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and 
     redress complaints from individuals who allege such 
     department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or 
     civil liberties; and
       ``(4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance 
     a particular governmental power the officer shall consider 
     whether such department, agency, or element has established--
       ``(A) that the need for the power is balanced with the need 
     to protect privacy and civil liberties;
       ``(B) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such 
     department, agency, or element of the power to ensure 
     protection of privacy and civil liberties; and
       ``(C) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to 
     properly confine its use.
       ``(b) Exception to Designation Authority.--
       ``(1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or 
     element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the 
     Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which has a 
     statutorily created privacy officer, such officer shall 
     perform the functions specified in subsection (a) with 
     respect to privacy.
       ``(2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency, 
     or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the 
     Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties 
     officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified 
     in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties.
       ``(c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer 
     or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b) 
     shall--
       ``(1) report directly to the head of the department, 
     agency, or element concerned; and
       ``(2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector 
     General of such department, agency, or element to avoid 
     duplication of effort.
       ``(d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department, 
     agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and 
     civil liberties officer--
       ``(1) has the information, material, and resources 
     necessary to fulfill the functions of such officer;
       ``(2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
       ``(3) is consulted by decision makers; and
       ``(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer 
     determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such 
     officer.
       ``(e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action 
     constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a 
     complaint or for disclosing information to a privacy officer 
     or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or 
     (b), or to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 
     that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or 
     civil liberties in the administration of the programs and 
     operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to 
     protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any 
     Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless 
     the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with 
     the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for 
     its truth or falsity.
       ``(f) Periodic Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties 
     officers of each department, agency, or element referred to 
     or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but 
     not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of 
     such officers--
       ``(A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress, 
     including the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate, the Committee on Oversight and Government 
     Reform of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
       ``(ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element; 
     and
       ``(iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; 
     and
       ``(B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
       ``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include information on the discharge of each of the 
     functions of the officer concerned, including--
       ``(A) information on the number and types of reviews 
     undertaken;
       ``(B) the type of advice provided and the response given to 
     such advice;
       ``(C) the number and nature of the complaints received by 
     the department, agency, or element concerned for alleged 
     violations; and
       ``(D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the 
     reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the 
     activities of such officer.
       ``(g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil 
     liberties officer shall--
       ``(1) make the reports of such officer, including reports 
     to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent 
     that is consistent with the protection of classified 
     information and applicable law; and
       ``(2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such 
     officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the 
     protection of classified information and applicable law.
       ``(h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other 
     authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy 
     officers or civil liberties officers.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (Public Law 108-458) is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 1062 and inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 1062. Privacy and civil liberties officers.''.

     SEC. 503. DEPARTMENT PRIVACY OFFICER.

       Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     142) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a) Appointment and Responsibilities.--
     '' before ``The Secretary''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Authority To Investigate.--
       ``(1) In general.--The senior official appointed under 
     subsection (a) may--
       ``(A) have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, 
     documents, papers, recommendations, and other materials 
     available to the Department that relate to programs and 
     operations with respect to the responsibilities of the senior 
     official under this section;
       ``(B) make such investigations and reports relating to the 
     administration of the programs and operations of the 
     Department that are necessary or desirable as determined by 
     that senior official;
       ``(C) subject to the approval of the Secretary, require by 
     subpoena the production, by any person other than a Federal 
     agency, of all information, documents, reports, answers, 
     records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary 
     evidence necessary to performance of the responsibilities of 
     the senior official under this section; and
       ``(D) administer to or take from any person an oath, 
     affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary to performance 
     of the responsibilities of the senior official under this 
     section.
       ``(2) Enforcement of subpoenas.--Any subpoena issued under 
     paragraph (1)(C) shall, in the case of contumacy or refusal 
     to obey, be enforceable by order of any appropriate United 
     States district court.
       ``(3) Effect of oaths.--Any oath, affirmation, or affidavit 
     administered or taken under paragraph (1)(D) by or before an 
     employee of the Privacy Office designated for that purpose by 
     the senior official appointed under subsection (a) shall have 
     the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or 
     before an officer having a seal of office.
       ``(c) Supervision and Coordination.--
       ``(1) In general.--The senior official appointed under 
     subsection (a) shall--
       ``(A) report to, and be under the general supervision of, 
     the Secretary; and

[[Page 4880]]

       ``(B) coordinate activities with the Inspector General of 
     the Department in order to avoid duplication of effort.
       ``(2) Notification to congress on removal.--If the 
     Secretary removes the senior official appointed under 
     subsection (a) or transfers that senior official to another 
     position or location within the Department, the Secretary 
     shall--
       ``(A) promptly submit a written notification of the removal 
     or transfer to Houses of Congress; and
       ``(B) include in any such notification the reasons for the 
     removal or transfer.
       ``(d) Reports by Senior Official to Congress.--The senior 
     official appointed under subsection (a) shall--
       ``(1) submit reports directly to the Congress regarding 
     performance of the responsibilities of the senior official 
     under this section, without any prior comment or amendment by 
     the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other officer or 
     employee of the Department or the Office of Management and 
     Budget; and
       ``(2) inform the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives not later 
     than--
       ``(A) 30 days after the Secretary disapproves the senior 
     official's request for a subpoena under subsection (b)(1)(C) 
     or the Secretary substantively modifies the requested 
     subpoena; or
       ``(B) 45 days after the senior official's request for a 
     subpoena under subsection (b)(1)(C), if that subpoena has not 
     either been approved or disapproved by the Secretary.''.

     SEC. 504. FEDERAL AGENCY DATA MINING REPORTING ACT OF 2007.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007''.
       (b) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Data mining.--The term ``data mining'' means a query, 
     search, or other analysis of 1 or more electronic databases, 
     where--
       (A) a department or agency of the Federal Government, or a 
     non-Federal entity acting on behalf of the Federal 
     Government, is conducting the query, search, or other 
     analysis to discover or locate a predictive pattern or 
     anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on the 
     part of any individual or individuals; and
       (B) the query, search, or other analysis does not use 
     personal identifiers of a specific individual, or inputs 
     associated with a specific individual or group of 
     individuals, to retrieve information from the database or 
     databases.
       (2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include 
     telephone directories, news reporting, information publicly 
     available to any member of the public without payment of a 
     fee, or databases of judicial and administrative opinions.
       (c) Reports on Data Mining Activities by Federal 
     Agencies.--
       (1) Requirement for report.--The head of each department or 
     agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any 
     activity to use or develop data mining shall submit a report 
     to Congress on all such activities of the department or 
     agency under the jurisdiction of that official. The report 
     shall be made available to the public, except for a 
     classified annex described paragraph (2)(H).
       (2) Content of report.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) shall include, for each activity to use or 
     develop data mining, the following information:
       (A) A thorough description of the data mining activity, its 
     goals, and, where appropriate, the target dates for the 
     deployment of the data mining activity.
       (B) A thorough description of the data mining technology 
     that is being used or will be used, including the basis for 
     determining whether a particular pattern or anomaly is 
     indicative of terrorist or criminal activity.
       (C) A thorough description of the data sources that are 
     being or will be used.
       (D) An assessment of the efficacy or likely efficacy of the 
     data mining activity in providing accurate information 
     consistent with and valuable to the stated goals and plans 
     for the use or development of the data mining activity.
       (E) An assessment of the impact or likely impact of the 
     implementation of the data mining activity on the privacy and 
     civil liberties of individuals, including a thorough 
     description of the actions that are being taken or will be 
     taken with regard to the property, privacy, or other rights 
     or privileges of any individual or individuals as a result of 
     the implementation of the data mining activity.
       (F) A list and analysis of the laws and regulations that 
     govern the information being or to be collected, reviewed, 
     gathered, analyzed, or used with the data mining activity.
       (G) A thorough discussion of the policies, procedures, and 
     guidelines that are in place or that are to be developed and 
     applied in the use of such technology for data mining in 
     order to--
       (i) protect the privacy and due process rights of 
     individuals, such as redress procedures; and
       (ii) ensure that only accurate information is collected, 
     reviewed, gathered, analyzed, or used.
       (H) Any necessary classified information in an annex that 
     shall be available, as appropriate, to the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 
     the Judiciary, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee 
     on Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Time for report.--Each report required under paragraph 
     (1) shall be--
       (A) submitted not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act; and
       (B) updated not less frequently than annually thereafter, 
     to include any activity to use or develop data mining engaged 
     in after the date of the prior report submitted under 
     paragraph (1).

    TITLE VI--ENHANCED DEFENSES AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

     SEC. 601. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

       (a) In General.--Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 316. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `biological event of national significance' 
     means--
       ``(A) an act of terrorism that uses a biological agent, 
     toxin, or other product derived from a biological agent; or
       ``(B) a naturally-occurring outbreak of an infectious 
     disease that may result in a national epidemic;
       ``(2) the term `Member Agencies' means the departments and 
     agencies described in subsection (d)(1);
       ``(3) the term `NBIC' means the National Biosurveillance 
     Integration Center established under subsection (b);
       ``(4) the term `NBIS' means the National Biosurveillance 
     Integration System established under subsection (b); and
       ``(5) the term `Privacy Officer' means the Privacy Officer 
     appointed under section 222.
       ``(b) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish, 
     operate, and maintain a National Biosurveillance Integration 
     Center, headed by a Directing Officer, under an existing 
     office or directorate of the Department, subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, to oversee development and 
     operation of the National Biosurveillance Integration System.
       ``(c) Primary Mission.--The primary mission of the NBIC is 
     to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to--
       ``(1) rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a 
     biological event of national significance by integrating and 
     analyzing data from human health, animal, plant, food, and 
     environmental monitoring systems (both national and 
     international); and
       ``(2) disseminate alerts and other information regarding 
     such data analysis to Member Agencies and, in consultation 
     with relevant member agencies, to agencies of State, local, 
     and tribal governments, as appropriate, to enhance the 
     ability of such agencies to respond to a biological event of 
     national significance.
       ``(d) Requirements.--The NBIC shall design the NBIS to 
     detect, as early as possible, a biological event of national 
     significance that presents a risk to the United States or the 
     infrastructure or key assets of the United States, 
     including--
       ``(1) if a Federal department or agency, at the discretion 
     of the head of that department or agency, has entered a 
     memorandum of understanding regarding participation in the 
     NBIC, consolidating data from all relevant surveillance 
     systems maintained by that department or agency to detect 
     biological events of national significance across human, 
     animal, and plant species;
       ``(2) seeking private sources of surveillance, both foreign 
     and domestic, when such sources would enhance coverage of 
     critical surveillance gaps;
       ``(3) using an information technology system that uses the 
     best available statistical and other analytical tools to 
     identify and characterize biological events of national 
     significance in as close to real-time as is practicable;
       ``(4) providing the infrastructure for such integration, 
     including information technology systems and space, and 
     support for personnel from Member Agencies with sufficient 
     expertise to enable analysis and interpretation of data;
       ``(5) working with Member Agencies to create information 
     technology systems that use the minimum amount of patient 
     data necessary and consider patient confidentiality and 
     privacy issues at all stages of development and apprise the 
     Privacy Officer of such efforts; and
       ``(6) alerting relevant Member Agencies and, in 
     consultation with relevant Member Agencies, public health 
     agencies of State, local, and tribal governments regarding 
     any incident that could develop into a biological event of 
     national significance.
       ``(e) Responsibilities of the Secretary.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall--
       ``(A) ensure that the NBIC is fully operational not later 
     than September 30, 2008;
       ``(B) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment 
     of this section and on the date that the NBIC is fully 
     operational, submit a report to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives on the progress of making the NBIC 
     operational addressing the efforts of the NBIC to integrate 
     surveillance efforts of Federal, State, local, and tribal 
     governments.
       ``(f) Responsibilities of the Directing Officer of the 
     NBIC.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
     shall--
       ``(A) establish an entity to perform all operations and 
     assessments related to the NBIS;
       ``(B) on an ongoing basis, monitor the availability and 
     appropriateness of contributing surveillance systems and 
     solicit new surveillance systems that would enhance 
     biological situational awareness or overall performance of 
     the NBIS;

[[Page 4881]]

       ``(C) on an ongoing basis, review and seek to improve the 
     statistical and other analytical methods utilized by the 
     NBIS;
       ``(D) receive and consider other relevant homeland security 
     information, as appropriate; and
       ``(E) provide technical assistance, as appropriate, to all 
     Federal, regional, State, local, and tribal government 
     entities and private sector entities that contribute data 
     relevant to the operation of the NBIS.
       ``(2) Assessments.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
     shall--
       ``(A) on an ongoing basis, evaluate available data for 
     evidence of a biological event of national significance; and
       ``(B) integrate homeland security information with NBIS 
     data to provide overall situational awareness and determine 
     whether a biological event of national significance has 
     occurred.
       ``(3) Information sharing.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
     shall--
       ``(i) establish a method of real-time communication with 
     the National Operations Center, to be known as the Biological 
     Common Operating Picture;
       ``(ii) in the event that a biological event of national 
     significance is detected, notify the Secretary and 
     disseminate results of NBIS assessments related to that 
     biological event of national significance to appropriate 
     Federal response entities and, in consultation with relevant 
     member agencies, regional, State, local, and tribal 
     governmental response entities in a timely manner;
       ``(iii) provide any report on NBIS assessments to Member 
     Agencies and, in consultation with relevant member agencies, 
     any affected regional, State, local, or tribal government, 
     and any private sector entity considered appropriate that may 
     enhance the mission of such Member Agencies, governments, or 
     entities or the ability of the Nation to respond to 
     biological events of national significance; and
       ``(iv) share NBIS incident or situational awareness 
     reports, and other relevant information, consistent with the 
     information sharing environment established under section 
     1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) and any policies, guidelines, 
     procedures, instructions, or standards established by the 
     President or the program manager for the implementation and 
     management of that environment.
       ``(B) Coordination.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
     shall implement the activities described in subparagraph (A) 
     in coordination with the program manager for the information 
     sharing environment of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis, and other offices or agencies of the Federal 
     Government, as appropriate.
       ``(g) Responsibilities of the NBIC Member Agencies.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each Member Agency shall--
       ``(A) use its best efforts to integrate biosurveillance 
     information into the NBIS, with the goal of promoting 
     information sharing between Federal, State, local, and tribal 
     governments to detect biological events of national 
     significance;
       ``(B) participate in the formation and maintenance of the 
     Biological Common Operating Picture to facilitate timely and 
     accurate detection and reporting;
       ``(C) connect the biosurveillance data systems of that 
     Member Agency to the NBIC data system under mutually-agreed 
     protocols that maintain patient confidentiality and privacy;
       ``(D) participate in the formation of strategy and policy 
     for the operation of the NBIC and its information sharing; 
     and
       ``(E) provide personnel to the NBIC under an interagency 
     personnel agreement and consider the qualifications of such 
     personnel necessary to provide human, animal, and 
     environmental data analysis and interpretation support to the 
     NBIC.
       ``(h) Administrative Authorities.--
       ``(1) Hiring of experts.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
     shall hire individuals with the necessary expertise to 
     develop and operate the NBIS.
       ``(2) Detail of personnel.--Upon the request of the 
     Directing Officer of the NBIC, the head of any Federal 
     department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable basis, any 
     of the personnel of that department or agency to the 
     Department to assist the NBIC in carrying out this section.
       ``(i) Joint Biosurveillance Leadership Council.--The 
     Directing Officer of the NBIC shall--
       ``(1) establish an interagency coordination council to 
     facilitate interagency cooperation and to advise the 
     Directing Officer of the NBIC regarding recommendations to 
     enhance the biosurveillance capabilities of the Department; 
     and
       ``(2) invite Member Agencies to serve on such council.
       ``(j) Relationship to Other Departments and Agencies.--The 
     authority of the Directing Officer of the NBIC under this 
     section shall not affect any authority or responsibility of 
     any other department or agency of the Federal Government with 
     respect to biosurveillance activities under any program 
     administered by that department or agency.
       ``(k) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to 
     carry out this section.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et 
     seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 315 the following:

``Sec. 316. National Biosurveillance Integration Center.''.

     SEC. 602. BIOSURVEILLANCE EFFORTS.

       The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a 
     report to Congress describing--
       (1) the state of Federal, State, local, and tribal 
     government biosurveillance efforts as of the date of such 
     report;
       (2) any duplication of effort at the Federal, State, local, 
     or tribal government level to create biosurveillance systems; 
     and
       (3) the integration of biosurveillance systems to allow the 
     maximizing of biosurveillance resources and the expertise of 
     Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to benefit 
     public health.

     SEC. 603. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION TO ENHANCE DEFENSES 
                   AGAINST NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF 
                   MASS DESTRUCTION.

       (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is 
     amended by adding after section 1906, as redesignated by 
     section 203 of this Act, the following:

     ``SEC. 1907. JOINT ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION 
                   ARCHITECTURE.

       ``(a) Annual Review.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, the Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
     of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     jointly ensure interagency coordination on the development 
     and implementation of the global nuclear detection 
     architecture by ensuring that, not less frequently than once 
     each year--
       ``(A) each relevant agency, office, or entity--
       ``(i) assesses its involvement, support, and participation 
     in the development, revision, and implementation of the 
     global nuclear detection architecture;
       ``(ii) examines and evaluates components of the global 
     nuclear detection architecture (including associated 
     strategies and acquisition plans) that are related to the 
     operations of that agency, office, or entity, to determine 
     whether such components incorporate and address current 
     threat assessments, scenarios, or intelligence analyses 
     developed by the Director of National Intelligence or other 
     agencies regarding threats related to nuclear or radiological 
     weapons of mass destruction; and
       ``(B) each agency, office, or entity deploying or operating 
     any technology acquired by the Office--
       ``(i) evaluates the deployment and operation of that 
     technology by that agency, office, or entity;
       ``(ii) identifies detection performance deficiencies and 
     operational or technical deficiencies in that technology; and
       ``(iii) assesses the capacity of that agency, office, or 
     entity to implement the responsibilities of that agency, 
     office, or entity under the global nuclear detection 
     architecture.
       ``(2) Technology.--Not less frequently than once each year, 
     the Secretary shall examine and evaluate the development, 
     assessment, and acquisition of technology by the Office.
       ``(b) Annual Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than March 31 of each year, 
     the Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
     of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
     submit a report regarding the compliance of such officials 
     with this section and the results of the reviews required 
     under subsection (a) to--
       ``(A) the President;
       ``(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
       ``(C) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form to the maximum extent 
     practicable, but may include a classified annex.
       ``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `global 
     nuclear detection architecture' means the global nuclear 
     detection architecture developed under section 1902.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 101 note) is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1906, as added by section 203 of this 
     Act, the following:

``Sec. 1907. Joint annual review of global nuclear detection 
              architecture.''.

                 TITLE VII--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS

     SEC. 701. DEFINITIONS.

       (a) In General.--In this title, the term ``voluntary 
     national preparedness standards'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 101), as amended by this Act.
       (b) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 2 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(17) The term `voluntary national preparedness standards' 
     means a common set of criteria for preparedness, disaster 
     management, emergency management, and business continuity 
     programs, such as the American National Standards Institute's 
     National Fire Protection Association Standard on Disaster/
     Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/
     NFPA 1600).''.

[[Page 4882]]



     SEC. 702. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR OFFICE OF 
                   THE DEPARTMENT.

       (a) In General.--Section 102(f) of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 112(f)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (8) through (10) as 
     paragraphs (9) through (11), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
       ``(8) providing information to the private sector regarding 
     voluntary national preparedness standards and the business 
     justification for preparedness and promoting to the private 
     sector the adoption of voluntary national preparedness 
     standards;''.
       (b) Private Sector Advisory Councils.--Section 102(f)(4) of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 112(f)(4)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``and'' at the end; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) advise the Secretary on private sector preparedness 
     issues, including effective methods for--
       ``(i) promoting voluntary national preparedness standards 
     to the private sector;
       ``(ii) assisting the private sector in adopting voluntary 
     national preparedness standards; and
       ``(iii) developing and implementing the accreditation and 
     certification program under section 522;''.

     SEC. 703. VOLUNTARY NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS STANDARDS 
                   COMPLIANCE; ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION 
                   PROGRAM FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``SEC. 522. VOLUNTARY NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS STANDARDS 
                   COMPLIANCE; ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION 
                   PROGRAM FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

       ``(a) Accreditation and Certification Program.--Not later 
     than 120 days after the date of enactment of this section, 
     the Secretary, in consultation with representatives of the 
     organizations that coordinate or facilitate the development 
     of and use of voluntary consensus standards, appropriate 
     voluntary consensus standards development organizations, and 
     each private sector advisory council created under section 
     102(f)(4), shall--
       ``(1) support the development, promulgating, and updating, 
     as necessary, of voluntary national preparedness standards; 
     and
       ``(2) develop, implement, and promote a program to certify 
     the preparedness of private sector entities.
       ``(b) Program Elements.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Program.--The program developed and implemented under 
     this section shall assess whether a private sector entity 
     complies with voluntary national preparedness standards.
       ``(B) Guidelines.--In developing the program under this 
     section, the Secretary shall develop guidelines for the 
     accreditation and certification processes established under 
     this section.
       ``(2) Standards.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     American National Standards Institute and representatives of 
     appropriate voluntary consensus standards development 
     organizations and each private sector advisory council 
     created under section 102(f)(4)--
       ``(A) shall adopt appropriate voluntary national 
     preparedness standards that promote preparedness, which shall 
     be used in the accreditation and certification program under 
     this section; and
       ``(B) after the adoption of standards under subparagraph 
     (A), may adopt additional voluntary national preparedness 
     standards or modify or discontinue the use of voluntary 
     national preparedness standards for the accreditation and 
     certification program, as necessary and appropriate to 
     promote preparedness.
       ``(3) Tiering.--The certification program developed under 
     this section may use a multiple-tiered system to rate the 
     preparedness of a private sector entity.
       ``(4) Small business concerns.--The Secretary and any 
     selected entity shall establish separate classifications and 
     methods of certification for small business concerns (as that 
     term is defined in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 
     U.S.C. 632)) for the program under this section.
       ``(5) Considerations.--In developing and implementing the 
     program under this section, the Secretary shall--
       ``(A) consider the needs of the insurance industry, the 
     credit-ratings industry, and other industries that may 
     consider preparedness of private sector entities, to assess 
     the preparedness of private sector entities; and
       ``(B) ensure the program accommodates those needs where 
     appropriate and feasible.
       ``(c) Accreditation and Certification Processes.--
       ``(1) Agreement.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall enter into 
     1 or more agreements with the American National Standards 
     Institute or other similarly qualified nongovernmental or 
     other private sector entities to carry out accreditations and 
     oversee the certification process under this section.
       ``(B) Contents.--Any selected entity shall manage the 
     accreditation process and oversee the certification process 
     in accordance with the program established under this section 
     and accredit qualified third parties to carry out the 
     certification program established under this section.
       ``(2) Procedures and requirements for accreditation and 
     certification.--
       ``(A) In general.--The selected entities shall collaborate 
     to develop procedures and requirements for the accreditation 
     and certification processes under this section, in accordance 
     with the program established under this section and 
     guidelines developed under subsection (b)(1)(B).
       ``(B) Contents and use.--The procedures and requirements 
     developed under subparagraph (A) shall--
       ``(i) ensure reasonable uniformity in the accreditation and 
     certification processes if there is more than 1 selected 
     entity; and
       ``(ii) be used by any selected entity in conducting 
     accreditations and overseeing the certification process under 
     this section.
       ``(C) Disagreement.--Any disagreement among selected 
     entities in developing procedures under subparagraph (A) 
     shall be resolved by the Secretary.
       ``(3) Designation.--A selected entity may accredit any 
     qualified third party to carry out the certification process 
     under this section.
       ``(4) Third parties.--To be accredited under paragraph (3), 
     a third party shall--
       ``(A) demonstrate that the third party has the ability to 
     certify private sector entities in accordance with the 
     procedures and requirements developed under paragraph (2);
       ``(B) agree to perform certifications in accordance with 
     such procedures and requirements;
       ``(C) agree not to have any beneficial interest in or any 
     direct or indirect control over--
       ``(i) a private sector entity for which that third party 
     conducts a certification under this section; or
       ``(ii) any organization that provides preparedness 
     consulting services to private sector entities;
       ``(D) agree not to have any other conflict of interest with 
     respect to any private sector entity for which that third 
     party conducts a certification under this section;
       ``(E) maintain liability insurance coverage at policy 
     limits in accordance with the requirements developed under 
     paragraph (2); and
       ``(F) enter into an agreement with the selected entity 
     accrediting that third party to protect any proprietary 
     information of a private sector entity obtained under this 
     section.
       ``(5) Monitoring.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary and any selected entity 
     shall regularly monitor and inspect the operations of any 
     third party conducting certifications under this section to 
     ensure that third party is complying with the procedures and 
     requirements established under paragraph (2) and all other 
     applicable requirements.
       ``(B) Revocation.--If the Secretary or any selected entity 
     determines that a third party is not meeting the procedures 
     or requirements established under paragraph (2), the 
     appropriate selected entity shall--
       ``(i) revoke the accreditation of that third party to 
     conduct certifications under this section; and
       ``(ii) review any certification conducted by that third 
     party, as necessary and appropriate.
       ``(d) Annual Review.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with 
     representatives of the organizations that coordinate or 
     facilitate the development of and use of voluntary consensus 
     standards, appropriate voluntary consensus standards 
     development organizations, and each private sector advisory 
     council created under section 102(f)(4), shall annually 
     review the voluntary accreditation and certification program 
     established under this section to ensure the effectiveness of 
     such program and make improvements and adjustments to the 
     program as necessary and appropriate.
       ``(2) Review of standards.--Each review under paragraph (1) 
     shall include an assessment of the voluntary national 
     preparedness standards used in the program under this 
     section.
       ``(e) Voluntary Participation.--Certification under this 
     section shall be voluntary for any private sector entity.
       ``(f) Public Listing.--The Secretary shall maintain and 
     make public a listing of any private sector entity certified 
     as being in compliance with the program established under 
     this section, if that private sector entity consents to such 
     listing.
       ``(g) Definition.--In this section, the term `selected 
     entity' means any entity entering an agreement with the 
     Secretary under subsection (c)(1)(A).''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 521 the following:

``Sec. 522. Voluntary national preparedness standards compliance; 
              accreditation and certification program for the private 
              sector.''.

     SEC. 704. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PROMOTING AN 
                   INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
                   PREPAREDNESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary or any 
     entity designated under section 522(c)(1)(A) of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002, as added by this Act, should promote, 
     where appropriate, efforts to develop a consistent 
     international standard for private sector preparedness.

     SEC. 705. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and

[[Page 4883]]

     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report 
     detailing--
       (1) any action taken to implement this title or an 
     amendment made by this title; and
       (2) the status, as of the date of that report, of the 
     implementation of this title and the amendments made by this 
     title.

     SEC. 706. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title may be construed to supercede any 
     preparedness or business continuity standards or requirements 
     established under any other provision of Federal law.

  TITLE VIII--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

     SEC. 801. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.

       (a) In General.--Section 114(t)(1)(B) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) transportation modal and intermodal security plans 
     addressing risks, threats, and vulnerabilities for aviation, 
     bridge, tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, 
     pipeline, rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other 
     public transportation infrastructure assets.''.
       (b) Contents of the National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security.--Section 114(t)(3) of such title is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, based on risk 
     assessments conducted by the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security,'' after ``risk based priorities'';
       (2) in subparagraph (D)--
       (A) by striking ``and local'' and inserting ``, local, and 
     tribal''; and
       (B) by striking ``private sector cooperation and 
     participation'' and inserting ``cooperation and participation 
     by private sector entities and nonprofit employee labor 
     organizations'';
       (3) in subparagraph (E)--
       (A) by striking ``response'' and inserting ``prevention, 
     response,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and threatened and executed acts of 
     terrorism outside the United States to the extent such acts 
     affect United States transportation systems'' before the 
     period at the end;
       (4) in subparagraph (F), by adding at the end the 
     following: ``Transportation security research and development 
     projects initiated by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall be based on such prioritization.''; and
       (5) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(G) Short- and long-term budget recommendations for 
     Federal transportation security programs, which reflect the 
     priorities of the National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security.
       ``(H) Methods for linking the individual transportation 
     modal security plans and the programs contained therein, and 
     a plan for addressing the security needs of intermodal 
     transportation hubs.
       ``(I) Transportation security modal and intermodal plans, 
     including operational recovery plans to expedite, to the 
     maximum extent practicable, the return of an adversely 
     affected transportation system to its normal performance 
     level preceding a major terrorist attack on that system or 
     another catastrophe. These plans shall be coordinated with 
     the resumption of trade protocols required under section 202 
     of the SAFE Port Act (6 U.S.C. 942).''.
       (c) Periodic Progress Reports.--Section 114(t)(4) of such 
     title is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C)--
       (A) in clause (i), by inserting ``, including the 
     transportation modal security plans'' before the period at 
     the end; and
       (B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
       ``(ii) Content.--Each progress report submitted under this 
     subparagraph shall include the following:

       ``(I) Recommendations for improving and implementing the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security and the 
     transportation modal and intermodal security plans that the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate.
       ``(II) An accounting of all grants for transportation 
     security, including grants for research and development, 
     distributed by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the most 
     recently concluded fiscal year and a description of how such 
     grants accomplished the goals of the National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security.
       ``(III) An accounting of all--

       ``(aa) funds requested in the President's budget submitted 
     pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 for the most recently 
     concluded fiscal year for transportation security, by mode; 
     and
       ``(bb) personnel working on transportation security issues, 
     including the number of contractors.
       ``(iii) Written explanation of transportation security 
     activities not delineated in the national strategy for 
     transportation security.--At the end of each year, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a written explanation of 
     any activity inconsistent with, or not clearly delineated in, 
     the National Strategy for Transportation Security, including 
     the amount of funds to be expended for the activity.''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``Select''.
       (d) Priority Status.--Section 114(t)(5)(B) of such title is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (iii), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
       (3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
       ``(iv) the transportation sector specific plan required 
     under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and''.
       (e) Coordination and Plan Distribution.--Section 114(t) of 
     such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) Coordination.--In carrying out the responsibilities 
     under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall 
     consult with Federal, State, and local agencies, tribal 
     governments, private sector entities (including nonprofit 
     employee labor organizations), institutions of higher 
     learning, and other appropriate entities.
       ``(7) Plan distribution.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall provide an unclassified version of the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security, including its 
     component transportation modal security plans, to Federal, 
     State, regional, local and tribal authorities, transportation 
     system owners or operators, private sector stakeholders 
     (including non-profit employee labor organizations), 
     institutions of higher learning, and other appropriate 
     entities.''.

     SEC. 802. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

       (a) In General.--Section 114 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(u) Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan.--
       ``(1) Establishment of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the program manager of the 
     information sharing environment established under section 
     1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the Secretary of Transportation, and 
     public and private stakeholders, shall establish a 
     Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan.
       ``(2) Purpose of plan.--The Plan shall promote sharing of 
     transportation security information between the Department of 
     Homeland Security and public and private stakeholders.
       ``(3) Content of plan.--The Plan shall include--
       ``(A) a description of how intelligence analysts within the 
     Department of Homeland Security will coordinate their 
     activities within the Department and with other Federal, 
     State, and local agencies, and tribal governments;
       ``(B) an assignment of a single point of contact for and 
     within the Department of Homeland Security for its sharing of 
     transportation security information with public and private 
     stakeholders;
       ``(C) a demonstration of input on the development of the 
     Plan from private and public stakeholders and the program 
     manager of the information sharing environment established 
     under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485);
       ``(D) a reasonable deadline by which the Plan will be 
     implemented; and
       ``(E) a description of resource needs for fulfilling the 
     Plan.
       ``(4) Coordination with the information sharing 
     environment.--The Plan shall be--
       ``(A) implemented in coordination with the program manager 
     for the information sharing environment established under 
     section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
       ``(B) consistent with and support the establishment of that 
     environment, and any policies, guidelines, procedures, 
     instructions, or standards established by the President or 
     the program manager for the implementation and management of 
     that environment.
       ``(5) Reports to congress.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     containing the Plan.
       ``(B) Annual report.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
     of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report 
     on updates to and the implementation of the Plan.
       ``(6) Survey.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct an annual 
     survey of the satisfaction of each of the recipients of 
     transportation intelligence reports disseminated under the 
     Plan, and include the results of the survey as part of the 
     annual report to be submitted under paragraph (5)(B).
       ``(B) Information sought.--The annual survey conducted 
     under subparagraph (A) shall seek information about the 
     quality, speed, regularity, and classification of the 
     transportation security information products disseminated 
     from the Department of Homeland Security to public and 
     private stakeholders.
       ``(7) Security clearances.--The Secretary, to the greatest 
     extent practicable, shall facilitate the security clearances 
     needed for public and private stakeholders to receive and 
     obtain access to classified information as appropriate.
       ``(8) Classification of material.--The Secretary, to the 
     greatest extent practicable, shall provide public and private 
     stakeholders with specific and actionable information in an 
     unclassified format.
       ``(9) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' has the meaning given 
     that term in subsection (t).
       ``(B) Plan.--The term `Plan' means the Transportation 
     Security Information Sharing Plan established under paragraph 
     (1).
       ``(C) Public and private stakeholders.--The term `public 
     and private stakeholders' means Federal, State, and local 
     agencies, tribal

[[Page 4884]]

     governments, and appropriate private entities, including 
     nonprofit employee labor organizations.
       ``(D) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security.
       ``(E) Transportation security information.--The term 
     `transportation security information' means information 
     relating to the threats to and vulnerabilities and 
     consequences of transportation modes, including aviation, 
     bridge and tunnel, mass transit, passenger and freight rail, 
     ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, and over-the-road bus 
     transportation.''.
       (b) Congressional Oversight of Security Assurance for 
     Public and Private Stakeholders.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary shall provide a semiannual report to the Committee 
     on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security and the 
     Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House 
     of Representatives that--
       (A) identifies the job titles and descriptions of the 
     persons with whom such information is to be shared under the 
     transportation security information sharing plan established 
     under section 114(u) of title 49, United States Code, as 
     added by this Act, and explains the reason for sharing the 
     information with such persons;
       (B) describes the measures the Secretary has taken, under 
     section 114(u)(7) of that title, or otherwise, to ensure 
     proper treatment and security for any classified information 
     to be shared with the public and private stakeholders under 
     the plan; and
       (C) explains the reason for the denial of transportation 
     security information to any stakeholder who had previously 
     received such information.
       (2) No report required if no changes in stakeholders.--The 
     Secretary is not required to provide a semiannual report 
     under paragraph (1) if no stakeholders have been added to or 
     removed from the group of persons with whom transportation 
     security information is shared under the plan since the end 
     of the period covered by the last preceding semiannual 
     report.

     SEC. 803. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL 
                   MANAGEMENT.

       (a) TSA Employee Defined.--In this section, the term ``TSA 
     employee'' means an individual who holds--
       (1) any position which was transferred (or the incumbent of 
     which was transferred) from the Transportation Security 
     Administration of the Department of Transportation to the 
     Department by section 403 of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 203); or
       (2) any other position within the Department the duties and 
     responsibilities of which include carrying out 1 or more of 
     the functions that were transferred from the Transportation 
     Security Administration of the Department of Transportation 
     to the Secretary by such section.
       (b) Elimination of Certain Personnel Management 
     Authorities.--Effective 90 days after the date of enactment 
     of this Act--
       (1) section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation 
     Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is repealed and any 
     authority of the Secretary derived from such section 111(d) 
     shall terminate;
       (2) any personnel management system, to the extent 
     established or modified under such section 111(d) (including 
     by the Secretary through the exercise of any authority 
     derived from such section 111(d)) shall terminate; and
       (3) the Secretary shall ensure that all TSA employees are 
     subject to the same personnel management system as described 
     in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (e).
       (c) Establishment of Certain Uniformity Requirements.--
       (1) System under subsection (e)(1).--The Secretary shall, 
     with respect to any personnel management system described in 
     subsection (e)(1), take any measures which may be necessary 
     to provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA employees 
     under such system.
       (2) System under subsection (e)(2).--Section 9701(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA 
     employees (as that term is defined in section 803 of the 
     Improving America's Security Act of 2007).''.
       (3) Effective date.--
       (A) Provisions relating to a system under subsection 
     (e)(1).--Any measures necessary to carry out paragraph (1) 
     shall take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act.
       (B) Provisions relating to a system under subsection 
     (e)(2).--Any measures necessary to carry out the amendments 
     made by paragraph (2) shall take effect on the later of 90 
     days after the date of enactment of this Act and the 
     commencement date of the system involved.
       (d) Report to Congress.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 6 months after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives a report on--
       (A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA 
     employees as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (B) any changes to such system which would be made under 
     any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) a brief description of each pay system described in 
     paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
       (B) a comparison of the relative advantages and 
     disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
       (C) such other matters as the Comptroller General 
     determines appropriate.
       (e) Personnel Management System Described.--A personnel 
     management system described in this subsection is--
       (1) any personnel management system, to the extent that it 
     applies with respect to any TSA employees under section 
     114(n) of title 49, United States Code; and
       (2) any human resources management system, established 
     under chapter 97 of title 5, United States Code.

                   TITLE IX--INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

     SEC. 901. PREIDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
                   FACILITIES TO STRENGTHEN INCIDENT COMMAND; 
                   PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS.

       Section 507(c)(2) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 317(c)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (I) as subparagraph (K); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (H) the following:
       ``(I) coordinating with the private sector to help ensure 
     private sector preparedness for natural disasters, acts of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disasters;
       ``(J) assisting State, local, or tribal governments, where 
     appropriate, to preidentify and evaluate suitable sites where 
     a multijurisdictional incident command system can be quickly 
     established and operated from, if the need for such a system 
     arises; and''.

     SEC. 902. CREDENTIALING AND TYPING TO STRENGTHEN INCIDENT 
                   COMMAND.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 331 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by striking section 510 and inserting the following:

     ``SEC. 510. CREDENTIALING AND TYPING.

       ``(a) Credentialing.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection--
       ``(A) the term `credential' means to provide documentation 
     that can authenticate and verify the qualifications and 
     identity of managers of incidents, emergency response 
     providers, and other appropriate personnel, including by 
     ensuring that such personnel possess a minimum common level 
     of training, experience, physical and medical fitness, and 
     capability appropriate for their position;
       ``(B) the term `credentialing' means evaluating an 
     individual's qualifications for a specific position under 
     guidelines created under this subsection and assigning such 
     individual a qualification under the standards developed 
     under this subsection; and
       ``(C) the term `credentialed' means an individual has been 
     evaluated for a specific position under the guidelines 
     created under this subsection.
       ``(2) Requirements.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Administrator shall enter into a 
     memorandum of understanding with the administrators of the 
     Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and 
     tribal governments, emergency response providers, and the 
     organizations that represent such providers, to collaborate 
     on establishing nationwide standards for credentialing all 
     personnel who are likely to respond to a natural disaster, 
     act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(B) Contents.--The standards developed under subparagraph 
     (A) shall--
       ``(i) include the minimum professional qualifications, 
     certifications, training, and education requirements for 
     specific emergency response functional positions that are 
     applicable to Federal, State, local, and tribal government;
       ``(ii) be compatible with the National Incident Management 
     System; and
       ``(iii) be consistent with standards for advance 
     registration for health professions volunteers under section 
     319I of the Public Health Services Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-7b).
       ``(C) Timeframe.--The Administrator shall develop standards 
     under subparagraph (A) not later than 6 months after the date 
     of enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
       ``(3) Credentialing of department personnel.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     the Secretary and the Administrator shall ensure that all 
     personnel of the Department (including temporary personnel 
     and individuals in the Surge Capacity Force established under 
     section 624 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
     Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 711)) who are likely to respond to a 
     natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made 
     disaster are credentialed.
       ``(B) Strategic human capital plan.--Not later than 90 days 
     after completion of the credentialing under subparagraph (A), 
     the Administrator shall evaluate whether the workforce of the 
     Agency complies with the strategic human capital plan of the 
     Agency developed under section 10102 of title 5, United 
     States

[[Page 4885]]

     Code, and is sufficient to respond to a catastrophic 
     incident.
       ``(4) Integration with national response plan.--
       ``(A) Distribution of standards.--Not later than 6 months 
     after the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007, the Administrator shall provide the 
     standards developed under paragraph (2) to all Federal 
     agencies that have responsibilities under the National 
     Response Plan.
       ``(B) Credentialing of agencies.--Not later than 6 months 
     after the date on which the standards are provided under 
     subparagraph (A), each agency described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall--
       ``(i) ensure that all employees or volunteers of that 
     agency who are likely to respond to a natural disaster, act 
     of terrorism, or other man-made disaster are credentialed; 
     and
       ``(ii) submit to the Secretary the name of each 
     credentialed employee or volunteer of such agency.
       ``(C) Leadership.--The Administrator shall provide 
     leadership, guidance, and technical assistance to an agency 
     described in subparagraph (A) to facilitate the credentialing 
     process of that agency.
       ``(5) Documentation and database system.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     the Administrator shall establish and maintain a 
     documentation and database system of Federal emergency 
     response providers and all other Federal personnel 
     credentialed to respond to a natural disaster, act of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(B) Accessibility.--The documentation and database system 
     established under subparagraph (1) shall be accessible to the 
     Federal coordinating officer and other appropriate officials 
     preparing for or responding to a natural disaster, act of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(C) Considerations.--The Administrator shall consider 
     whether the credentialing system can be used to regulate 
     access to areas affected by a natural disaster, act of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(6) Guidance to state and local governments.--Not later 
     than 6 months after the date of enactment of the Improving 
     America's Security Act of 2007, the Administrator shall--
       ``(A) in collaboration with the administrators of the 
     Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and 
     tribal governments, emergency response providers, and the 
     organizations that represent such providers, provide detailed 
     written guidance, assistance, and expertise to State, local, 
     and tribal governments to facilitate the credentialing of 
     State, local, and tribal emergency response providers 
     commonly or likely to be used in responding to a natural 
     disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster; and
       ``(B) in coordination with the administrators of the 
     Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and 
     tribal governments, emergency response providers (and the 
     organizations that represent such providers), and appropriate 
     national professional organizations, assist State, local, and 
     tribal governments with credentialing the personnel of the 
     State, local, or tribal government under the guidance 
     provided under subparagraph (A).
       ``(7) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report describing the 
     implementation of this subsection, including the number and 
     level of qualification of Federal personnel trained and ready 
     to respond to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other 
     man-made disaster.
       ``(b) Typing of Resources.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection--
       ``(A) the term `typed' means an asset or resource that has 
     been evaluated for a specific function under the guidelines 
     created under this section; and
       ``(B) the term `typing' means to define in detail the 
     minimum capabilities of an asset or resource.
       ``(2) Requirements.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Administrator shall enter into a 
     memorandum of understanding with the administrators of the 
     Emergency Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and 
     tribal governments, emergency response providers, and 
     organizations that represent such providers, to collaborate 
     on establishing nationwide standards for typing of resources 
     commonly or likely to be used in responding to a natural 
     disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(B) Contents.--The standards developed under subparagraph 
     (A) shall--
       ``(i) be applicable to Federal, State, local, and tribal 
     government; and
       ``(ii) be compatible with the National Incident Management 
     System.
       ``(3) Typing of department resources and assets.--Not later 
     than 1 year after the date of enactment of the Improving 
     America's Security Act of 2007, the Secretary shall ensure 
     that all resources and assets of the Department that are 
     commonly or likely to be used to respond to a natural 
     disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster are 
     typed.
       ``(4) Integration with national response plan.--
       ``(A) Distribution of standards.--Not later than 6 months 
     after the date of enactment of the Improving America's 
     Security Act of 2007, the Administrator shall provide the 
     standards developed under paragraph (2) to all Federal 
     agencies that have responsibilities under the National 
     Response Plan.
       ``(B) Typing of agencies, assets, and resources.--Not later 
     than 6 months after the date on which the standards are 
     provided under subparagraph (A), each agency described in 
     subparagraph (A) shall--
       ``(i) ensure that all resources and assets (including 
     teams, equipment, and other assets) of that agency that are 
     commonly or likely to be used to respond to a natural 
     disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster are 
     typed; and
       ``(ii) submit to the Secretary a list of all types 
     resources and assets.
       ``(C) Leadership.--The Administrator shall provide 
     leadership, guidance, and technical assistance to an agency 
     described in subparagraph (A) to facilitate the typing 
     process of that agency.
       ``(5) Documentation and database system.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     the Administrator shall establish and maintain a 
     documentation and database system of Federal resources and 
     assets commonly or likely to be used to respond to a natural 
     disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(B) Accessibility.--The documentation and database system 
     established under subparagraph (A) shall be accessible to the 
     Federal coordinating officer and other appropriate officials 
     preparing for or responding to a natural disaster, act of 
     terrorism, or other man-made disaster.
       ``(6) Guidance to state and local governments.--Not later 
     than 6 months after the date of enactment of the Improving 
     America's Security Act of 2007, the Administrator, in 
     collaboration with the administrators of the Emergency 
     Management Assistance Compact, State, local, and tribal 
     governments, emergency response providers, and the 
     organizations that represent such providers, shall--
       ``(A) provide detailed written guidance, assistance, and 
     expertise to State, local, and tribal governments to 
     facilitate the typing of the resources and assets of State, 
     local, and tribal governments likely to be used in responding 
     to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made 
     disaster; and
       ``(B) assist State, local, and tribal governments with 
     typing resources and assets of State, local, or tribal 
     governments under the guidance provided under subparagraph 
     (A).
       ``(7) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report describing the 
     implementation of this subsection, including the number and 
     type of Federal resources and assets ready to respond to a 
     natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made 
     disaster.
       ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary to carry 
     out this section.''; and
       (2) by adding after section 522, as added by section 703 of 
     this Act, the following:

     ``SEC. 523. PROVIDING SECURE ACCESS TO CRITICAL 
                   INFRASTRUCTURE.

       ``Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of 
     the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, and in 
     coordination with appropriate national professional 
     organizations, Federal, State, local, and tribal government 
     agencies, and private-sector and nongovernmental entities, 
     the Administrator shall create model standards or guidelines 
     that States may adopt in conjunction with critical 
     infrastructure owners and operators and their employees to 
     permit access to restricted areas in the event of a natural 
     disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 101(b)) is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 522, as added by section 703 of this Act, 
     the following:

``Sec. 523. Providing secure access to critical infrastructure.''.

              TITLE X--CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

     SEC. 1001. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

       (a) Critical Infrastructure List.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, and in coordination 
     with other initiatives of the Secretary relating to critical 
     infrastructure or key resource protection and partnerships 
     between the government and private sector, the Secretary 
     shall establish a risk-based prioritized list of critical 
     infrastructure and key resources that--
       (1) includes assets or systems that, if successfully 
     destroyed or disrupted through a terrorist attack or natural 
     catastrophe, would cause catastrophic national or regional 
     impacts, including--
       (A) significant loss of life;
       (B) severe economic harm;
       (C) mass evacuations; or
       (D) loss of a city, region, or sector of the economy as a 
     result of contamination, destruction, or disruption of vital 
     public services; and

[[Page 4886]]

       (2) reflects a cross-sector analysis of critical 
     infrastructure to determine priorities for prevention, 
     protection, recovery, and restoration.
       (b) Sector Lists.--In coordination with other initiatives 
     of the Secretary relating to critical infrastructure or key 
     resource protection and partnerships between the government 
     and private sector, the Secretary may establish additional 
     critical infrastructure and key resources priority lists by 
     sector, including at a minimum the sectors named in Homeland 
     Security Presidential Directive-7 as in effect on January 1, 
     2006.
       (c) Maintenance.--Each list created under this section 
     shall be reviewed and updated on an ongoing basis, but at 
     least annually.
       (d) Annual Report.--
       (1) Generally.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
     shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report 
     summarizing--
       (A) the criteria used to develop each list created under 
     this section;
       (B) the methodology used to solicit and verify submissions 
     for each list;
       (C) the name, location, and sector classification of assets 
     in each list created under this section;
       (D) a description of any additional lists or databases the 
     Department has developed to prioritize critical 
     infrastructure on the basis of risk; and
       (E) how each list developed under this section will be used 
     by the Secretary in program activities, including grant 
     making.
       (2) Classified information.--The Secretary shall submit 
     with each report under this subsection a classified annex 
     containing information required to be submitted under this 
     subsection that cannot be made public.

     SEC. 1002. RISK ASSESSMENT AND REPORT.

       (a) Risk Assessment.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary, pursuant to the 
     responsibilities under section 202 of the Homeland Security 
     Act (6 U.S.C. 122), for each fiscal year beginning with 
     fiscal year 2007, shall prepare a risk assessment of the 
     critical infrastructure and key resources of the Nation which 
     shall--
       (A) be organized by sector, including the critical 
     infrastructure sectors named in Homeland Security 
     Presidential Directive-7, as in effect on January 1, 2006; 
     and
       (B) contain any actions or countermeasures proposed, 
     recommended, or directed by the Secretary to address security 
     concerns covered in the assessment.
       (2) Reliance on other assessments.--In preparing the 
     assessments and reports under this section, the Department 
     may rely on a vulnerability assessment or risk assessment 
     prepared by another Federal agency that the Department 
     determines is prepared in coordination with other initiatives 
     of the Department relating to critical infrastructure or key 
     resource protection and partnerships between the government 
     and private sector, if the Department certifies in the 
     applicable report submitted under subsection (b) that the 
     Department--
       (A) reviewed the methodology and analysis of the assessment 
     upon which the Department relied; and
       (B) determined that assessment is reliable.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the last day 
     of fiscal year 2007 and for each year thereafter, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security 
     and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report 
     containing a summary and review of the risk assessments 
     prepared by the Secretary under this section for that fiscal 
     year, which shall be organized by sector and which shall 
     include recommendations of the Secretary for mitigating risks 
     identified by the assessments.
       (2) Classified annex.--The report under this subsection may 
     contain a classified annex.

     SEC. 1003. USE OF EXISTING CAPABILITIES.

       Where appropriate, the Secretary shall use the National 
     Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center to carry out 
     the actions required under this title.

           TITLE XI--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

     SEC. 1101. AVAILABILITY TO PUBLIC OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE 
                   FUNDING INFORMATION.

       (a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President 
     shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after 
     fiscal year 2007 the aggregate amount of appropriations 
     requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year 
     for the National Intelligence Program.
       (b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.--
     Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year 
     after fiscal year 2007 the aggregate amount of funds 
     authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of 
     funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the 
     National Intelligence Program.
       (c) Study on Disclosure of Additional Information.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall conduct a study to assess the advisability of 
     disclosing to the public amounts as follows:
       (A) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the 
     budget of the President for each fiscal year for each element 
     of the intelligence community.
       (B) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be 
     appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, 
     by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (2) Requirements.--The study required by paragraph (1) 
     shall--
       (A) address whether or not the disclosure to the public of 
     the information referred to in that paragraph would harm the 
     national security of the United States; and
       (B) take into specific account concerns relating to the 
     disclosure of such information for each element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (3) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress 
     a report on the study required by paragraph (1).
       (d) Definitions.--In this section--
       (1) the term ``element of the intelligence community'' 
     means an element of the intelligence community specified in 
     or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)); and
       (2) the term ``National Intelligence Program'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 3(6) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)).

     SEC. 1102. RESPONSE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO REQUESTS 
                   FROM CONGRESS.

       (a) Response of Intelligence Community to Requests From 
     Congress for Intelligence Documents and Information.--Title V 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new section:


  ``RESPONSE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO REQUESTS FROM CONGRESS FOR 
                 INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

       ``Sec. 508.  (a) Requests of Committees.--The Director of 
     the National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a 
     national intelligence center, or the head of any department, 
     agency, or element of the intelligence community shall, not 
     later than 15 days after receiving a request for any 
     intelligence assessment, report, estimate, legal opinion, or 
     other intelligence information from the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives, or any other 
     committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject 
     matter to which information in such assessment, report, 
     estimate, legal opinion, or other information relates, make 
     available to such committee such assessment, report, 
     estimate, legal opinion, or other information, as the case 
     may be.
       ``(b) Requests of Certain Members.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a national 
     intelligence center, or the head of any department, agency, 
     or element of the intelligence community shall respond, in 
     the time specified in subsection (a), to a request described 
     in that subsection from the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the 
     Chairman or Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       ``(2) Upon making a request covered by paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) the Chairman or Vice Chairman, as the case may be, of 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall 
     notify the other of the Chairman or Vice Chairman of such 
     request; and
       ``(B) the Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be, 
     of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives shall notify the other of the 
     Chairman or Ranking Member of such request.
       ``(c) Assertion of Privilege.--In response to a request 
     covered by subsection (a) or (b), the Director of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center, the Director of a national 
     intelligence center, or the head of any department, agency, 
     or element of the intelligence community shall provide the 
     document or information covered by such request unless the 
     President certifies that such document or information is not 
     being provided because the President is asserting a privilege 
     pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.
       ``(d) Independent Testimony of Intelligence Officials.--No 
     officer, department, agency, or element within the Executive 
     branch shall have any authority to require the head of any 
     department, agency, or element of the intelligence community, 
     or any designate of such a head--
       ``(1) to receive permission to testify before Congress; or
       ``(2) to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or 
     comments to any officer or agency of the Executive branch for 
     approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such 
     recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress if such 
     testimony, legislative recommendations, or comments include a 
     statement indicating that the views expressed therein are 
     those of the head of the department, agency, or element of 
     the intelligence community that is making the submission and 
     do not necessarily represent the views of the 
     Administration.''.
       (b) Disclosures of Certain Information to Congress.--Title 
     V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et 
     seq.), as amended by subsection (a), is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new section:


                       ``DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS

       ``Sec. 509.  (a) Authority To Disclose Certain 
     Information.--An employee of a covered agency or an employee 
     of a contractor carrying out activities pursuant to a 
     contract with a covered agency may disclose covered 
     information to an authorized individual without first 
     reporting

[[Page 4887]]

     such information to the appropriate Inspector General.
       ``(b) Authorized Individual.--(1) In this section, the term 
     `authorized individual' means--
       ``(A) a Member of the Senate or the House of 
     Representatives who is authorized to receive information of 
     the type disclosed; or
       ``(B) an employee of the Senate or the House of 
     Representatives who--
       ``(i) has an appropriate security clearance; and
       ``(ii) is authorized to receive information of the type 
     disclosed.
       ``(2) An authorized individual described in paragraph (1) 
     to whom covered information is disclosed under the authority 
     in subsection (a) shall be presumed to have a need to know 
     such covered information.
       ``(c) Covered Agency and Covered Information Defined.--In 
     this section:
       ``(1) The term `covered agency' means--
       ``(A) any department, agency, or element of the 
     intelligence community;
       ``(B) a national intelligence center; and
       ``(C) any other Executive agency, or element or unit 
     thereof, determined by the President under section 
     2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to have as 
     its principal function the conduct of foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities.
       ``(2) The term `covered information'--
       ``(A) means information, including classified information, 
     that an employee referred to in subsection (a) reasonably 
     believes provides direct and specific evidence of a false or 
     inaccurate statement--
       ``(i) made to Congress; or
       ``(ii) contained in any intelligence assessment, report, or 
     estimate; and
       ``(B) does not include information the disclosure of which 
     is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
     Procedure.
       ``(d) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.--
     Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or 
     otherwise affect--
       ``(1) any reporting requirement relating to intelligence 
     activities that arises under this Act or any other provision 
     of law; or
       ``(2) the right of any employee of the United States to 
     disclose information to Congress, in accordance with 
     applicable law, information other than covered 
     information.''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 507 the following new items:

``Sec. 508. Response of intelligence community to requests from 
              Congress for intelligence documents and information.
``Sec. 509. Disclosures to Congress.''.

     SEC. 1103. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

       The Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 
     435 note) is amended--
       (1) in section 704(e)--
       (A) by striking ``If requested'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--If requested''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Authority of board.--Upon receiving a congressional 
     request described in section 703(b)(5), the Board may conduct 
     the review and make the recommendations described in that 
     section, regardless of whether such a review is requested by 
     the President.
       ``(3) Reporting.--Any recommendations submitted to the 
     President by the Board under section 703(b)(5), shall be 
     submitted to the chairman and ranking member of the committee 
     of Congress that made the request relating to such 
     recommendations.''; and
       (2) in section 710(b), by striking ``8 years after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``on December 
     31, 2012''.

   TITLE XII--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON ANTITERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES

     SEC. 1201. PROMOTING ANTITERRORISM CAPABILITIES THROUGH 
                   INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The development and implementation of technology is 
     critical to combating terrorism and other high consequence 
     events and implementing a comprehensive homeland security 
     strategy.
       (2) The United States and its allies in the global war on 
     terrorism share a common interest in facilitating research, 
     development, testing, and evaluation of equipment, 
     capabilities, technologies, and services that will aid in 
     detecting, preventing, responding to, recovering from, and 
     mitigating against acts of terrorism.
       (3) Certain United States allies in the global war on 
     terrorism, including Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
     Australia, and Singapore have extensive experience with, and 
     technological expertise in, homeland security.
       (4) The United States and certain of its allies in the 
     global war on terrorism have a history of successful 
     collaboration in developing mutually beneficial equipment, 
     capabilities, technologies, and services in the areas of 
     defense, agriculture, and telecommunications.
       (5) The United States and its allies in the global war on 
     terrorism will mutually benefit from the sharing of 
     technological expertise to combat domestic and international 
     terrorism.
       (6) The establishment of an office to facilitate and 
     support cooperative endeavors between and among government 
     agencies, for-profit business entities, academic 
     institutions, and nonprofit entities of the United States and 
     its allies will safeguard lives and property worldwide 
     against acts of terrorism and other high consequence events.
       (b) Promoting Antiterrorism Through International 
     Cooperation Act.--
       (1) In general.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is 
     amended by inserting after section 316, as added by section 
     601 of this Act, the following:

     ``SEC. 317. PROMOTING ANTITERRORISM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL 
                   COOPERATION PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director 
     selected under subsection (b)(2).
       ``(2) International cooperative activity.--The term 
     `international cooperative activity' includes--
       ``(A) coordinated research projects, joint research 
     projects, or joint ventures;
       ``(B) joint studies or technical demonstrations;
       ``(C) coordinated field exercises, scientific seminars, 
     conferences, symposia, and workshops;
       ``(D) training of scientists and engineers;
       ``(E) visits and exchanges of scientists, engineers, or 
     other appropriate personnel;
       ``(F) exchanges or sharing of scientific and technological 
     information; and
       ``(G) joint use of laboratory facilities and equipment.
       ``(b) Science and Technology Homeland Security 
     International Cooperative Programs Office.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--The Under Secretary shall establish 
     the Science and Technology Homeland Security International 
     Cooperative Programs Office.
       ``(2) Director.--The Office shall be headed by a Director, 
     who--
       ``(A) shall be selected (in consultation with the Assistant 
     Secretary for International Affairs, Policy Directorate) by 
     and shall report to the Under Secretary; and
       ``(B) may be an officer of the Department serving in 
     another position.
       ``(3) Responsibilities.--
       ``(A) Development of mechanisms.--The Director shall be 
     responsible for developing, in coordination with the 
     Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
     Department of Energy, and other Federal agencies, mechanisms 
     and legal frameworks to allow and to support international 
     cooperative activity in support of homeland security 
     research.
       ``(B) Priorities.--The Director shall be responsible for 
     developing, in coordination with the Directorate of Science 
     and Technology, the other components of the Department 
     (including the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
     International Affairs, Policy Directorate), the Department of 
     State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, 
     and other Federal agencies, strategic priorities for 
     international cooperative activity.
       ``(C) Activities.--The Director shall facilitate the 
     planning, development, and implementation of international 
     cooperative activity to address the strategic priorities 
     developed under subparagraph (B) through mechanisms the Under 
     Secretary considers appropriate, including grants, 
     cooperative agreements, or contracts to or with foreign 
     public or private entities, governmental organizations, 
     businesses, federally funded research and development 
     centers, and universities.
       ``(D) Identification of partners.--The Director shall 
     facilitate the matching of United States entities engaged in 
     homeland security research with non-United States entities 
     engaged in homeland security research so that they may 
     partner in homeland security research activities.
       ``(4) Coordination.--The Director shall ensure that the 
     activities under this subsection are coordinated with the 
     Office of International Affairs and the Department of State, 
     the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and 
     other relevant Federal agencies or interagency bodies. The 
     Director may enter into joint activities with other Federal 
     agencies.
       ``(c) Matching Funding.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Equitability.--The Director shall ensure that funding 
     and resources expended in international cooperative activity 
     will be equitably matched by the foreign partner government 
     or other entity through direct funding, funding of 
     complementary activities, or through the provision of staff, 
     facilities, material, or equipment.
       ``(B) Grant matching and repayment.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Secretary may require a recipient of 
     a grant under this section--

       ``(I) to make a matching contribution of not more than 50 
     percent of the total cost of the proposed project for which 
     the grant is awarded; and
       ``(II) to repay to the Secretary the amount of the grant 
     (or a portion thereof), interest on such amount at an 
     appropriate rate, and such charges for administration of the 
     grant as the Secretary determines appropriate.

       ``(ii) Maximum amount.--The Secretary may not require that 
     repayment under clause (i)(II) be more than 150 percent of 
     the amount of the grant, adjusted for inflation on the basis 
     of the Consumer Price Index.
       ``(2) Foreign partners.--Partners may include Israel, the 
     United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Singapore, and other 
     allies in the global war on terrorism, as determined by the 
     Secretary of State.
       ``(d) Funding.--Funding for all activities under this 
     section shall be paid from discretionary funds appropriated 
     to the Department.
       ``(e) Foreign Reimbursements.--If the Science and 
     Technology Homeland Security International Cooperative 
     Programs Office participates in an international cooperative 
     activity with a foreign partner on a cost-sharing basis,

[[Page 4888]]

     any reimbursements or contributions received from that 
     foreign partner to meet the share of that foreign partner of 
     the project may be credited to appropriate appropriations 
     accounts of the Directorate of Science and Technology.''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of 
     contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by adding after the item 
     relating to section 316, as added by section 601 of this Act, 
     the following:

``Sec. 317. Promoting antiterrorism through international cooperation 
              program.''.

     SEC. 1202. TRANSPARENCY OF FUNDS.

       For each Federal award (as that term is defined in section 
     2 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act 
     of 2006 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note)) under this title or an 
     amendment made by this title, the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget shall ensure full and timely compliance 
     with the requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability 
     and Transparency Act of 2006 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note).

                  TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

     SEC. 1301. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECRETARY FOR 
                   MANAGEMENT.

       (a) Establishment and Succession.--Section 103 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Deputy 
     Secretary'' and inserting ``Deputy Secretaries'';
       (B) by striking paragraph (6);
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as 
     paragraphs (3) through (6), respectively; and
       (D) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
       ``(1) A Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.
       ``(2) A Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Management.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) Vacancies.--
       ``(1) Vacancy in office of secretary.--
       ``(A) Deputy secretary.--In case of a vacancy in the office 
     of the Secretary, or of the absence or disability of the 
     Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security may 
     exercise all the duties of that office, and for the purpose 
     of section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, the Deputy 
     Secretary of Homeland Security is the first assistant to the 
     Secretary.
       ``(B) Deputy secretary for management.--When by reason of 
     absence, disability, or vacancy in office, neither the 
     Secretary nor the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security is 
     available to exercise the duties of the office of the 
     Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Management shall act as Secretary.
       ``(2) Vacancy in office of deputy secretary.--In the case 
     of a vacancy in the office of the Deputy Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, or of the absence or disability of the 
     Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy Secretary 
     of Homeland Security for Management may exercise all the 
     duties of that office.
       ``(3) Further order of succession.--The Secretary may 
     designate such other officers of the Department in further 
     order of succession to act as Secretary.''.
       (b) Responsibilities.--Section 701 of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 341) is amended--
       (1) in the section heading, by striking ``UNDER SECRETARY'' 
     and inserting ``DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY'';
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by inserting ``The Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Management shall serve as the Chief Management 
     Officer and principal advisor to the Secretary on matters 
     related to the management of the Department, including 
     management integration and transformation in support of 
     homeland security operations and programs.'' before ``The 
     Secretary'';
       (B) by striking ``Under Secretary for Management'' and 
     inserting ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Management'';
       (C) by striking paragraph (7) and inserting the following:
       ``(7) Strategic planning and annual performance planning 
     and identification and tracking of performance measures 
     relating to the responsibilities of the Department.''; and
       (D) by striking paragraph (9), and inserting the following:
       ``(9) The integration and transformation process, to ensure 
     an efficient and orderly consolidation of functions and 
     personnel to the Department, including the development of a 
     management integration strategy for the Department.''; and
       (3) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Under Secretary for 
     Management'' and inserting ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Management''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Under Secretary for 
     Management'' and inserting ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Management''.
       (c) Appointment, Evaluation, and Reappointment.--Section 
     701 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 341) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) Appointment, Evaluation, and Reappointment.--The 
     Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management--
       ``(1) shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
     advice and consent of the Senate, from among persons who 
     have--
       ``(A) extensive executive level leadership and management 
     experience in the public or private sector;
       ``(B) strong leadership skills;
       ``(C) a demonstrated ability to manage large and complex 
     organizations; and
       ``(D) a proven record in achieving positive operational 
     results;
       ``(2) shall--
       ``(A) serve for a term of 5 years; and
       ``(B) be subject to removal by the President if the 
     President--
       ``(i) finds that the performance of the Deputy Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Management is unsatisfactory; and
       ``(ii) communicates the reasons for removing the Deputy 
     Secretary of Homeland Security for Management to Congress 
     before such removal;
       ``(3) may be reappointed in accordance with paragraph (1), 
     if the Secretary has made a satisfactory determination under 
     paragraph (5) for the 3 most recent performance years;
       ``(4) shall enter into an annual performance agreement with 
     the Secretary that shall set forth measurable individual and 
     organizational goals; and
       ``(5) shall be subject to an annual performance evaluation 
     by the Secretary, who shall determine as part of each such 
     evaluation whether the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Management has made satisfactory progress toward 
     achieving the goals set out in the performance agreement 
     required under paragraph (4).''.
       (d) Incumbent.--The individual who serves in the position 
     of Under Secretary for Management of the Department of 
     Homeland Security on the date of enactment of this Act--
       (1) may perform all the duties of the Deputy Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Management at the pleasure of the 
     President, until a Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Management is appointed in accordance with subsection (c) of 
     section 701 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     341), as added by this Act; and
       (2) may be appointed Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Management, if such appointment is otherwise in 
     accordance with sections 103 and 701 of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113 and 341), as amended by this Act.
       (e) References.--References in any other Federal law, 
     Executive order, rule, regulation, or delegation of 
     authority, or any document of or relating to the Under 
     Secretary for Management of the Department of Homeland 
     Security shall be deemed to refer to the Deputy Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Management.
       (f) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Other reference.--Section 702(a) of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 342(a)) is amended by striking 
     ``Under Secretary for Management'' and inserting ``Deputy 
     Secretary of Homeland Security for Management''.
       (2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(b)) 
     is amended by striking the item relating to section 701 and 
     inserting the following:

``Sec. 701. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management.''.

       (3) Executive schedule.--Section 5313 of title 5, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating 
     to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security the following:
       ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for Management.''.

     SEC. 1302. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING COMBATING DOMESTIC 
                   RADICALIZATION.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
       (1) The United States is engaged in a struggle against a 
     transnational terrorist movement of radical extremists 
     seeking to exploit the religion of Islam through violent 
     means to achieve ideological ends.
       (2) The radical jihadist movement transcends borders and 
     has been identified as a potential threat within the United 
     States.
       (3) Radicalization has been identified as a precursor to 
     terrorism.
       (4) Countering the threat of violent extremists 
     domestically, as well as internationally, is a critical 
     element of the plan of the United States for success in the 
     war on terror.
       (5) United States law enforcement agencies have identified 
     radicalization as an emerging threat and have in recent years 
     identified cases of ``homegrown'' extremists operating inside 
     the United States with the intent to provide support for, or 
     directly commit, a terrorist attack.
       (6) The alienation of Muslim populations in the Western 
     world has been identified as a factor in the spread of 
     radicalization.
       (7) Radicalization cannot be prevented solely through law 
     enforcement and intelligence measures.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that 
     the Secretary, in consultation with other relevant Federal 
     agencies, should make a priority of countering domestic 
     radicalization and extremism by--
       (1) using intelligence analysts and other experts to better 
     understand the process of radicalization from sympathizer to 
     activist to terrorist;
       (2) recruiting employees with diverse worldviews, skills, 
     languages, and cultural backgrounds and expertise;
       (3) consulting with experts to ensure that the lexicon used 
     within public statements is precise and appropriate and does 
     not aid extremists by offending the American Muslim 
     community;
       (4) developing and implementing, in concert with the 
     Attorney General and State and local

[[Page 4889]]

     corrections officials, a program to address prisoner 
     radicalization and post-sentence reintegration;
       (5) pursuing broader avenues of dialogue with the Muslim 
     community to foster mutual respect, understanding, and trust; 
     and
       (6) working directly with State, local, and community 
     leaders to--
       (A) educate these leaders on the threat of radicalization 
     and the necessity of taking preventative action at the local 
     level; and
       (B) facilitate the sharing of best practices from other 
     countries and communities to encourage outreach to the 
     American Muslim community and develop partnerships between 
     all faiths, including Islam.

     SEC. 1303. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING OVERSIGHT OF 
                   HOMELAND SECURITY.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
       (1) The Senate recognizes the importance and need to 
     implement the recommendations offered by the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (in 
     this section referred to as the ``Commission'').
       (2) Congress considered and passed the National Security 
     Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 
     Stat. 3643) to implement the recommendations of the 
     Commission.
       (3) Representatives of the Department testified at 165 
     Congressional hearings in calendar year 2004, and 166 
     Congressional hearings in calendar year 2005.
       (4) The Department had 268 representatives testify before 
     15 committees and 35 subcommittees of the House of 
     Representatives and 9 committees and 12 subcommittees of the 
     Senate at 206 congressional hearings in calendar year 2006.
       (5) The Senate has been unwilling to reform itself in 
     accordance with the recommendation of the Commission to 
     provide better and more streamlined oversight of the 
     Department.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that 
     the Senate should implement the recommendation of the 
     Commission to ``create a single, principal point of oversight 
     and review for homeland security.''.

     SEC. 1304. REPORT REGARDING BORDER SECURITY.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
     Congress regarding ongoing initiatives of the Department to 
     improve security along the northern border of the United 
     States.
       (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) address the vulnerabilities along the northern border 
     of the United States; and
       (2) provide recommendations to address such 
     vulnerabilities, including required resources needed to 
     protect the northern border of the United States.
       (c) Government Accountability Office.--Not later than 270 
     days after the date of the submission of the report under 
     subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States 
     shall submit a report to Congress that--
       (1) reviews and comments on the report under subsection 
     (a); and
       (2) provides recommendations regarding any additional 
     actions necessary to protect the northern border of the 
     United States.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, with the authority of the Homeland 
Security and the Governmental Affairs Committee--that is, the consent 
of a majority of the Members--I now withdraw the committee-reported 
substitute amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is 
withdrawn.
  The majority leader is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 275

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I send a substitute amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Reid], for himself, Mr. 
     Lieberman, Ms. Collins, Mr. Inouye, and Mr. Dodd, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 275.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the substitute I have just offered 
encompasses the provisions of S. 4, also legislation on surface 
transportation security, aviation security, and rail security from the 
Commerce Committee, as well as transit security legislation from the 
Banking Committee.
  As I said yesterday, I deeply appreciate, as does the distinguished 
Republican leader, the work done by the two committee managers. Senator 
Lieberman and Senator Collins have worked together for a number of 
years, and they work well together. This is an extremely important 
piece of legislation, and so we ask Members if there is something about 
the bill that has just been laid down that they don't like, they should 
come and try to change it and not wait around because they will be 
disappointed. We have to move through this bill.
  We have been told there are a number of amendments people have to 
offer, and we want them to do that. I asked the Democratic manager, 
Chairman Lieberman, if people offer amendments, to have a reasonable 
debate. We are not going to mess around here for a long time. With 
appropriate debate, Senator Lieberman is going to move to table if it 
is something we don't like, and I think it is important that Members 
know that.
  I have been told there are a lot of amendments on both sides. It is 
our goal to finish this legislation as soon as we can next week. That 
is going to be difficult. We could have some late nights, and as I 
indicated this morning, we might have to work into Friday sometime. 
Monday night, I hope we can stack votes so that we have a number of 
votes. As I have indicated, we will not have votes starting before 
5:30, but I hope we can have a number of votes at 5:30 so we can 
dispose of them that night.
  This is what we do. We are legislating now, and I look forward to a 
good piece of legislation when we finish.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, let me echo the remarks of the majority 
leader. We have a number of amendments on this side, and we are 
prepared to offer them in the next few hours. I believe the first 
amendment is going to come from the Democratic side. Senator Collins is 
either here or on her way, and she is certainly going to manage the 
bill on our side, but then we will follow the Democratic amendment with 
an amendment on our side.
  I also want to remind everyone that at 2 p.m. this afternoon the 
Transportation Security Administration will hold an all-Members 
briefing related to the provisions of S. 4, the bill we are now 
discussing, which will be pending today. A notice was sent to all 
offices, and Senators should be made aware that this briefing will be 
held in S407 of the Capitol.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would also say this: We are going to 
alternate back and forth. If there is not a Democrat here, a Republican 
will offer two amendments in a row, and vice versa. In other words, we 
need expedition. There are a number of amendments, and we are not going 
to wait while somebody is coming from their office to offer an 
amendment. If somebody is here ahead of someone, then they will 
proceed.
  Our first amendment, if she is here on time, will be from Senator 
Feinstein; otherwise, Senator Collins, I understand, has an amendment.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, while the two leaders are here, I want 
to thank Senator Reid for designating this urgent legislation which 
would implement the previously unimplemented or inadequately 
implemented recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I also thank 
Senator McConnell, the Republican leader, for his cooperation and 
consent to moving this forward quickly on the Senate floor.
  This bipartisan cooperation, obviously, is justified by the subject 
matter, homeland security, and in that regard I want to thank, again, 
Senator Collins. We switched titles in this session of Congress, but as 
I said to her when that happened, nothing else will change but our 
titles. She has been a wonderful partner and coworker on this measure 
once again, and it is in that spirit that we invite amendments, as 
Senator Reid said, from our colleagues who may think that, as good as 
the bill is, it could be better, and we urge them to come forward 
quickly.
  In our committee, only one amendment was divided on a party-line 
vote. The rest were totally nonpartisan, and I hope that is generally 
the way things will go on the Senate floor as we consider the 
amendments brought forth.
  Yesterday, to expedite matters, Senator Collins and I both made our 
opening statements, so we do not have those opening statements now. 
Therefore, we look forward to the Senator from California coming to the 
floor as soon as she can to offer an amendment, which I note will 
concern visa waiver

[[Page 4890]]

sections of the measure. Senator Collins has another amendment which we 
will go to if Senator Feinstein does not come soon.
  I thank the Chair and, for the moment, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Amendment No. 271 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from 
California, Mrs. Feinstein, I call up amendment No. 271.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman], for Mrs. 
     Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 271 to amendment 
     No. 275.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

  (Purpose: To prohibit a foreign country with a visa refusal rate of 
  more than 10 percent or that exceeds the maximum visa overstay rate 
             from participating in the visa waiver program)

       Strike subsection (c) of section 401 and insert the 
     following:
       (c) Discretionary Visa Waiver Program Expansion.--Section 
     217(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1187(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(8) Nonimmigrant visa refusal rate flexibility.--
       ``(A) Certification.--On the date on which an air exit 
     system is in place that can verify the departure of not less 
     than 97 percent of foreign nationals that exit through 
     airports of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall certify to Congress that such air exit system 
     is in place.
       ``(B) Waiver.--After certification by the Secretary under 
     subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the 
     application of paragraph (2)(A) for a country--
       ``(i) if the country meets all security requirements of 
     this section;
       ``(ii) if the Secretary of Homeland Security determines 
     that the totality of the country's security risk mitigation 
     measures provide assurance that the country's participation 
     in the program would not compromise the law enforcement, 
     security interests, or enforcement of the immigration laws of 
     the United States;
       ``(iii) if there has been a sustained reduction in the rate 
     of refusals for nonimmigrant visitor visas for nationals of 
     the country and conditions exist to continue such reduction;
       ``(iv) the country cooperated with the Government of the 
     United States on counterterrorism initiatives and information 
     sharing before the date of its designation as a program 
     country, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
     Secretary of State expect such cooperation will continue; and
       ``(v)(I) if the rate of refusals for nonimmigrant visitor 
     visas for nationals of the country during the previous full 
     fiscal year was not more than 10 percent; or
       ``(II) if the visa overstay rate for the country for the 
     previous full fiscal year does not exceed the maximum visa 
     overstay rate, once it is established under subparagraph (C).
       ``(C) Maximum visa overstay rate.--
       ``(i) Requirement to establish.--After certification by the 
     Secretary under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security and the Secretary of State jointly shall use 
     information from the air exit system referred to in 
     subparagraph (A) to establish a maximum visa overstay rate 
     for countries participating in the program pursuant to a 
     waiver under subparagraph (B).
       ``(ii) Visa overstay rate defined.--In this paragraph the 
     term `visa overstay rate' means, with respect to a country, 
     the ratio of--

       ``(I) the total number of nationals of that country who 
     were admitted to the United States on the basis of a 
     nonimmigrant visitor visa for which the period of stay 
     authorized by such visa ended during a fiscal year and who 
     remained in the United States unlawfully beyond the such 
     period of stay; to
       ``(II) the total number of nationals of that country who 
     were admitted to the United States on the basis of a 
     nonimmigrant visitor visa for which the period of stay 
     authorized by such visa ended during such fiscal year.

       ``(iii) Report and publication.--Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall submit to Congress and publish in the Federal 
     Register a notice of the maximum visa overstay rate proposed 
     to be established under clause (i). Not less than 60 days 
     after the date such notice is submitted and published, the 
     Secretary shall issue a final maximum visa overstay rate.
       ``(9) Discretionary security-related considerations.--In 
     determining whether to waive the application of paragraph 
     (2)(A) for a country, pursuant to paragraph (8), the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of State, shall take into consideration other 
     factors affecting the security of the United States, 
     including--
       ``(A) airport security standards in the country;
       ``(B) whether the country assists in the operation of an 
     effective air marshal program;
       ``(C) the standards of passports and travel documents 
     issued by the country; and
       ``(D) other security-related factors.''.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my concern about 
the efforts to expand the Visa Waiver Program in the 9/11 commission 
report bill and to offer an amendment that will cap the unlimited 
expansion of this program.
  I believe the bill as offered on the floor will make us less safe, 
not more safe with respect to this huge program called Visa Waiver.
  The bill would allow the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of State to expand the Visa Waiver Program without limits. 
My amendment would limit this discretion based on a 10 percent visa 
refusal rate or on the actual visa overstay rate.
  The Visa Waiver Program provides an extraordinary exception to our 
immigration laws. It allows the citizens of 27 nations to visit this 
country by merely showing up on the day of departure with a passport 
from their home country. In 2004, the State Department reported that 
15.6 million people came to this country as part of this program. I am 
told that in 2005, unofficially, the number was at least 15.5 million 
and in 2006, the number was at least 15.6 million.
  We have no way of knowing how many left because we do not have an 
exit system.
  The bill on the floor today changes the Visa Waiver Program in a 
number of key ways.
  First, it adds some good security measures, such as the expedited 
reporting of lost and stolen travel documents; and the exchange of 
information on terrorist watchlist. It also authorizes the Department 
of Homeland Security to develop an electronic travel authorization 
program so that all persons entering the U.S. will have to apply for 
clearance to enter the U.S. in advance of their trip. And it requires 
the Department of Homeland Security to develop a system to track all 
the foreign visitors who leave the U.S. via our airports--but not our 
seaports or land ports. This has been an unmet goal, however, year 
after year.
  I welcome and support the enhanced security measures included in the 
bill. They are long overdue.
  Second--and here is the problem--the bill allows the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of State to fundamentally change 
the way countries are admitted into the visa waiver program, and thus, 
who can come into the U.S. without getting a visa.
  Under current law, a country is eligible for this program so long as 
the vast majority--at least 97 percent--of its nationals can get a visa 
when they apply for one. The percentage of people who are rejected when 
they apply for a visa is called the ``visa refusal rate'' and that 
percentage must be under 3 percent for a country to participate in the 
program.
  The rationale is that if the overwhelming majority of visitors 
satisfy requirements for a U.S. visa when they apply, we should not 
waste our resources and the time of U.S. consular officers to evaluate 
every single visa application. The 3 percent rate means that 97 percent 
of these applicants will return to their home country for one reason or 
another. They have family and earn a satisfactory living.
  But even with a 3 percent rejection rate, the Visa Waiver Program is 
a security problem.
  Convicted terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui from France and ``shoe-
bomber'' Richard Reid from Great Britain both boarded flights to the 
United

[[Page 4891]]

States with passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries.
  On August 10 of this past year, British police charged 17 suspects 
with a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives carried on board 
several airliners traveling from the United Kingdom to the United 
States. The key suspects were reported to be British-born Muslims, 
eligible to travel to the U.S. with just a passport in hand.
  For that reason, I believe that the current Visa Waiver Program is 
the soft underbelly of our national security.
  But this bill undermines even the scant protection afforded by our 
current laws in that it allows the administration to admit new 
countries into the program with complete disregard for how many people 
were previously rejected when they applied for a U.S. visa. My 
amendment would provide a meaningful limit to that discretion.
  This bill does not affect just a handful of countries. It would 
affect any and every country whose nationals travel to the United 
States.
  As a matter of fact, the ``roadmap'' countries--or countries that the 
administration is currently talking to about inclusion in the Visa 
Waiver Program--total 19. So the Departments of State and Homeland 
Security are actively talking with 19 countries for acceptance into 
this Program.
  A significant number of these 19 countries have visa rejection rates 
that are well above 3 percent. They are marked with an asterisk, and 
total 13 of the 19. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record a chart showing by country the rejection rates.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


        Country Name                        2006 Refusal Rate (Percent)
Argentina*..........................................................6.7
Brazil*............................................................13.2
Bulgaria*..........................................................17.5
Cyprus..............................................................2.2
Czech Republic*.....................................................9.4
Estonia*............................................................7.1
Greece..............................................................2.2
Hungary*...........................................................12.7
Israel..............................................................4.2
Korea, South........................................................3.6
Latvia*............................................................21.6
Lithuania*.........................................................27.7
Malta...............................................................2.8
Poland*............................................................26.2
Romania*...........................................................34.1
Slovakia*..........................................................16.0
Taiwan..............................................................3.1
Turkey*............................................................15.4
Uruguay*...........................................................12.6
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today, 544 million people are eligible 
to travel into the U.S. without a visa as part of the Visa Waiver 
Program. If we add these ``roadmap'' countries to the program, we will 
add 162 million more people who can travel into the United States 
without a visa--a 30 percent increase.
  And if these 19 additional ``roadmap'' countries can come into the 
program, what is to preclude any other country from coming into the 
program? How do we say ``no'' to India, also a good ally, when its 
refusal rate--19.5 percent--is lower than 4 of the roadmap--countries? 
The rejection rate for China--24.5 percent--is lower than those coming 
from Romania. Indonesia, at 35.1 percent just exceeds Romania. So this 
bill will likely set up some real conflicts and create additional 
problems.
  The administration has argued that the expansion of the visa waiver 
countries should be limited to our allies. But what does it mean to be 
an ally? According to this administration, when we invaded Iraq we 
counted Colombia with a 33.3 percent visa rejection rate, and 
Nicaragua, with a 48 percent rejection rate among our allies because 
they had provided some assistance in war.
  Do we, in Congress, really want to give the administration unfettered 
flexibility to allow nationals from any country to travel to the U.S. 
without a visa, simply because their governments have cooperated with 
ours?
  Does that mean that those nationals should be allowed to come to the 
United States with no advance screening?
  We can only assume that we will also significantly increase the 
number of people who will not leave the United States after their visa 
expires. In this manner, this bill, if enacted into law, will likely 
add many thousands, if not millions, to the undocumented or illegal 
population.
  Remember, today, 30 to 40 percent of the illegal population are, in 
fact, visa overstays--people who come with temporary or visitor visas 
and do not return to their countries.
  I believe we should not expand this program without a good hard look 
at how it will compromise our national security, law enforcement, and 
immigration goals and without ensuring that safety measures are in 
place to make the program strong.
  First, whenever the United States adds new countries to the program, 
it increases the demand for, and the availability of, fraudulent travel 
documents.
  The value of lost, stolen or fraudulent Visa Waiver Program documents 
is enormous. A person carrying a visa waiver country passport has 
virtually unlimited access into and out of the United States.
  No doubt, the expansion of the program will increase the use of 
fraudulent border documents which are sold on the black market in the 
tens of thousands: passports, international driver's licenses, and 
other forms of identification from new visa waiver countries will flood 
the market.
  According to the July 2006 GAO report on improving the security of 
the Visa Waiver Program, visa waiver travel documents have been used by 
criminals and terrorists seeking to disguise their true identity.
  In 2004, more than 15 million people from 27 countries traveled in 
and out of the United States with no visa.
  And from January through June 2005--a 6-month period--the Department 
of Homeland Security reported that it confiscated 298 fraudulent or 
altered passports issued by Visa Waiver Program countries that 
travelers were attempting to use to enter the United States. And these 
are just the ones who got caught.
  In fact, Interpol reports that they have records of more than 12 
million stolen and lost travel documents in their database, but that 
there are 30 to 40 million travel documents have been stolen worldwide.
  We can extrapolate that tens of thousands of those documents are from 
visa waiver countries.
  As the 9/11 Commission report demonstrates, individuals with 
fraudulent documents pose a far greater threat to our national security 
than those traveling with no documents at all.
  For that reason, Senator Sessions and I have introduced a bill this 
Congress to crack down on people who traffic in lost and stolen travel 
documents.
  The second problem is that some countries have very weak policies on 
who can become a citizen--and therefore legally obtain travel 
documents. Not every country has the same strict controls on who can 
become a citizen as the U.S. does.
  For example, Romania, one of the ``road map'' countries, extends 
citizenship to many citizens of Ukraine or Moldova as a matter of 
course without prior residency requirements. Ukraine and Moldova are 
not slated to participate in the visa waiver program, and in fact, have 
visa rejection rates of 38.7 percent and 34.2 percent, respectively. 
Adding Romania is like adding Ukraine and Moldova. How would their 
inclusion impact national security?
  Finally, this bill does not go far enough to protect U.S. borders.
  The bill requires the development of an air exit system, but it does 
nothing to track who comes and goes by way of our land and sea ports.
  It also requires the Department of Homeland Security to track how 
many people overstay their visas, but it does not require them to use 
this information to determine who can participate in the program.
  For example, even if we learn that one out of four Lithuanian 
visitors never returns to Lithuania when their visa expires, Lithuania 
could still participate in the Visa Waiver Program.
  Again, experts estimate that between 30 percent and 40 percent of 
those undocumented people living in the U.S. today are here because 
they ignored the time limits on their visa and just never went back 
home.
  At a time when this country is torn about how to handle the 12 
million undocumented people currently living

[[Page 4892]]

here, we must consider who plays by the rules when we talk about who 
participates in the program.
  If a high number of travelers from countries overstay their visas, 
then those countries should not be allowed the benefit of permitting 
their nationals to enter the U.S. without a background check and a 
consular interview.
  The amendment I am proposing today offers a way to limit the 
expansion of the Visa Waiver Program in light of our immigration and 
national security concerns.
  The amendment I am offering would increase the visa rejection rate 
under the current law from 3 percent to 10 percent for countries that 
agree to these enhanced security measures.
  The result is that countries such as South Korea, 3.6 percent, 
Taiwan, 3.1 percent, Estonia, 7.1 percent, and the Czech Republic, 9.4 
percent could be eligible to participate in the program provided they 
pass the security requirements this bill imposes.
  Then, once the U.S. has statistics on which foreign nationals 
regularly overstay their visa, the government should use those 
statistics to decide who can participate in the program.
  My amendment would require the Departments of Homeland Security and 
State, in consultation and with the approval of Congress, to set a 
meaningful overstay rate once they have that data. Then countries with 
a proven track record--those with nationals who go home when they are 
supposed to go home--could be eligible for the program.
  The answer is not to entirely remove the visa rejection rate, 3 
percent, as this bill does with no suitable replacement, but to enact a 
fair system across the board that recognizes that the screening of 
those who wish to come to our country is important, both for the 
security of the country, as well as to ensure that visitors do what 
their ``visa waiver'' provides--and that is to return to their country 
of origin at the end of the 90-day period.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, there are discussions going on between 
the Senator from California and others to answer a question or two 
about the amendment, so for the moment we are going to leave it 
pending, and I yield for my colleague from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have only had a brief time to look at 
the amendment offered by the Senator from California, but it would, in 
my judgment, enhance certain provisions in the underlying bill on the 
visa waiver program. There are discussions going on with key Senators 
on our side of the aisle, such as Senator Kyl of Arizona, who has also 
a great interest in this area.
  We are not prepared on this side to proceed with a full discussion of 
the amendment at this time or to dispose of it at this time, but I 
would inform my colleagues that I am optimistic that the discussions 
will produce a fruitful result. At this time, we cannot proceed to 
disposing of the amendment, however.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, Parliamentary inquiry: Am I correct 
that the Feinstein amendment, No. 271, is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I have been informed the questions one Member was 
raising about the amendment of Senator Feinstein have been resolved. I 
now urge we adopt the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? The Senator from 
Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to clarify for our colleagues, the 
objection or the clarification I mentioned earlier has been resolved on 
this side of the aisle. I know of no objection to adopting the 
amendment of Senator Feinstein. I believe it strengthens the provisions 
in the underlying bill and I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate on the 
amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 271) was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 277

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Ms. Collins], for herself, Mr. 
     Alexander, Mr. Carper, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Cantwell, and Ms. 
     Mikulski, proposes an amendment numbered 277.

  Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

    (Purpose: To extend the deadline by which State identification 
  documents shall comply with certain minimum standards and for other 
                               purposes)

       On page 145, strike line 21 and insert the following:

     SEC. 404. IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS.

       (a) Minimum Document Requirements.--Section 202(a)(1) of 
     the REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note) is amended by 
     striking ``3 years after the date of the enactment of this 
     division'' and inserting ``2 years after the promulgation of 
     final regulations to implement this section''.
       (b) Authority to Extend Compliance Deadlines.--Section 
     205(b) of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Lack of validation systems.--If the Secretary 
     determines that the Federal or State electronic systems 
     required to verify the validity and completeness of documents 
     under section 202(c)(3) are not available to any State on the 
     date described in section 202(a)(1), the requirements under 
     section 202(c)(1) shall not apply to any State until adequate 
     electronic validation systems are available to all States.''.
       (c) Negotiated Rulemaking.--
       (1) Negotiated rulemaking committee.--Not later than 30 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary shall reconvene the committee originally 
     established pursuant to section 7212(b)(4) of the 9/11 
     Commission Implementation Act of 2004 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note), 
     with the addition of any new interested parties, including 
     experts in privacy protection, experts in civil liberties and 
     protection of constitutional rights, and experts in 
     immigration law, to--
       (A) review the regulations proposed by the Secretary to 
     implement section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (49 U.S.C. 
     30301 note);
       (B) review the provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005;
       (C) submit recommendations to the Secretary regarding 
     appropriate modifications to such regulations; and
       (D) submit recommendations to the Secretary and Congress 
     regarding appropriate modifications to the REAL ID Act of 
     2005.
       (2) Criteria.--In conducting the review under paragraph 
     (1)(A), the committee shall consider, in addition to other 
     factors at the discretion of the committee, modifications to 
     the regulations to--
       (A) minimize conflicts between State laws regarding 
     driver's license eligibility;
       (B) include procedures and requirements to protect the 
     Federal and State constitutional rights, civil liberties, and 
     privacy rights of individuals who apply for and hold driver's 
     licenses and personal identification cards;
       (C) protect the security of all personal information 
     maintained in electronic form;
       (D) provide individuals with procedural and substantive due 
     process, including rules and right of appeal, to challenge 
     errors in data records contained within the databases created 
     to implement section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 2005;
       (E) ensure that private entities are not permitted to scan 
     the information contained on the face of a license, or in the 
     machine readable component of the license, and resell, share, 
     or trade such information with third parties;

[[Page 4893]]

       (F) provide a fair system of funding to limit the costs of 
     meeting the requirements of section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 
     2005;
       (G) facilitate the management of vital identity-proving 
     records; and
       (H) improve the effectiveness and security of Federal 
     documents used to validate identification.
       (3) Rulemaking.--To the extent that the final regulations 
     to implement section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 do not 
     reflect the modifications recommended by the committee 
     pursuant to paragraph (1)(C), the Secretary shall include, 
     with such regulations in the Federal Register, the reasons 
     for rejecting such modifications.
       (4) Reports.--Not later than 120 days after reconvening 
     under paragraph (1), the committee shall submit a report to 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives that includes--
       (A) the list of recommended modifications to the 
     regulations that were submitted to the Secretary under 
     paragraph (1)(C); and
       (B) a list of recommended amendments to the Real ID Act of 
     2005 that would address any concerns that could not be 
     resolved by regulation.
       (d) Enhanced Driver's License.--

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce an amendment to 
address the growing concern among States regarding the implementation 
of the REAL ID Act of 2005. This law requires States to meet minimum 
security standards before citizens can use their driver's licenses for 
Federal purposes, such as boarding an airplane. I am very pleased to 
have several cosponsors of this amendment, including Senator Alexander, 
Senator Carper, Senator Cantwell, Senator Snowe, and Senator Mikulski. 
All of them have expressed concerns about the impact on their States. I 
particularly wish to single out Senator Alexander, who has long been a 
leading voice in raising concerns about the costs imposed upon States 
by the REAL ID Act.
  As the deadline for compliance for the REAL ID Act rapidly 
approaches, States are beginning to send a very clear message that they 
are deeply concerned they simply will not be able to meet these 
standards. The amendment I introduce today recognizes those concerns by 
allowing more time to devise a way to make driver's licenses more 
secure without unduly burdening State governments and without 
threatening privacy and civil liberties.
  To begin with, perhaps some background information would be useful. 
The 9/11 Commission's investigation found that all but one of the 9/11 
terrorists had acquired some form of U.S. identification--in most cases 
a State driver's licenses. The Commission recommended that the Federal 
Government should set standards for the issuance of driver's licenses 
to make them more secure, to ensure the person was, in fact, entitled 
to a driver's license, and to make certain the driver's license has 
certain security features to ensure the individual is who he or she 
claims to be.
  To implement that recommendation, which was indeed in response to a 
very real concern identified by the 9/11 Commission, I worked with a 
bipartisan group of Senators, most notably my colleague, Senator 
Lieberman, to craft a provision in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act 
that would accomplish the goal of the Commission. It called for the 
creation of a committee of experts from the Federal Government, from 
State governments, from privacy groups, from technology information 
organizations, to come together in a negotiated rulemaking process and 
to develop a means of providing secure identification, while protecting 
privacy and civil liberty rights, and also respecting the role of the 
States, which have always had the primary responsibility in this area.
  The language we came up with also provided for some grants that would 
help the States bear this cost--not the whole cost but to help them 
out.
  This committee was indeed appointed--indeed, at my recommendation, 
Maine's secretary of state was one of the members--and they began 
diligently working on this task. Unfortunately, before the committee 
could complete its work, the House of Representatives attached the REAL 
ID Act of 2005 to an emergency war supplemental, a bill that was truly 
urgent. There was not a lot of consideration in the Senate nor debate 
over this provision. It was inserted into the emergency war 
appropriations bill.
  The effect of that was to repeal the negotiated rulemaking provisions 
that we had worked so hard to craft and to put into the Intelligence 
Reform Act of 2004. The further effect, therefore, was to halt the very 
productive and worthwhile progress this committee was making in 
devising standards to improve security without imposing unnecessary 
burdens and costs on State governments.
  Unlike our Intelligence Reform Act, the REAL ID Act of 2005 did not 
include States and other interested parties, whether privacy advocates 
or technological experts, in the rulemaking process. Instead, the REAL 
ID Act simply instructed the Department of Homeland Security to write 
its own regulations. It has been almost 2 years since the REAL ID Act 
was passed, and the Department has yet to issue the detailed guidance 
the States need to comply with the law. We expect these regulations are 
just about to be published, that they are about to be issued under the 
formal notice and comment period later this week.
  The problem is, the States are facing this looming May of 2008 
deadline for being in full compliance with the REAL ID Act. That is an 
enormously constricted period for the States to comply, when the 
regulations have not yet been issued.
  As States begin work this year on their 2008 budgets, they still have 
no idea what the final regulations will require of them, but they do 
know that the costs are likely to be substantial based on a study 
released in 2006 by the National Governors Association. The NGA 
estimated that the costs to States to implement the REAL ID Act could 
total more than $11 billion over the next 5 years. This is a 
substantial amount. Perhaps the cost will be less than that, but the 
point is, we don't know because the regulations with the detailed 
guidance have still not been issued, even as we speak.
  The State of Maine reports that the costs of implementation of the 
REAL ID Act could total $158 million. The Secretary of State tells me 
that is more than six times the normal operating budget of the Maine 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
  The result has been an increasing rebellion by States over this 
unfunded, very difficult mandate. Some States, including my home State 
of Maine, have passed resolutions that have sent the message to 
Washington that they cannot and will not implement the REAL ID Act by 
the May 2008 deadline. So what do we do?
  Here is what my amendment proposes. I have had extensive 
consultations with the National Governors Association, the National 
Council of State Legislatures, and other experts on this issue.
  My amendment has two primary objectives. The first is to give the 
Federal Government and States the time and flexibility they need to 
come up with an effective but practical system to provide secure 
driver's licenses.
  Second, my amendment would ensure the involvement of experts from the 
States, from the technology industry, and privacy and civil liberties 
advocates, by bringing them back to the table and giving them a chance 
to review these regulations and make them work.
  There are three major provisions in the amendment we are offering. 
First, the amendment provides that States would not have to be in full 
compliance with the REAL ID Act until 2 years after the final 
regulations are promulgated. That is reasonable. This is a difficult 
task, and it is important that we get it right. It is important for our 
security, but it is also important for the States that have been 
burdened with the task. That means no matter how long it takes for the 
Department of Homeland Security to finish these regulations, States 
will have a full 2 years to implement them. Most likely, the impact of 
that is to delay from May of next year to May of 2010 the compliance 
date. That is the likely timeframe about which we are talking.
  Second, the amendment would give the Secretary of Homeland Security 
more flexibility to waive certain requirements of REAL ID, if an aspect 
of the program proves to be technically

[[Page 4894]]

difficult to implement. I have talked with some technology experts. 
Some of them say it can be done. Some of them say this is an enormous 
task because we are talking about having interlocking databases so that 
States can check with other States on whether an individual is licensed 
there. That is a very complex project because, not surprisingly, each 
State has its own system. So there are questions about the technology 
and the feasibility of all of the requirements of the REAL ID Act. We 
want to give the Secretary some flexibility in that area.
  It is possible that some of the technological links necessary for 
REAL ID may not be fully in place at the time that compliance is 
required. On the other hand, if the technology is there and the systems 
are up and running, it will be easier for the States to proceed. That 
is another advantage of the extension in time. The technology is only 
going to get better and become more effective.
  This also gives us more time to address privacy concerns because 
there are a lot of questions, if you have people throughout the country 
working in motor vehicle bureaus who are now going to have access to 
databases and are going to need training in evaluating the underlying 
documents, whether they are birth certificates or visas, in determining 
their validity. So this is a complicated task.
  Third, the amendment reconstitutes the committee that we created in 
2004, and that was making such good progress in its deliberations 
before these provisions were repealed by the REAL ID Act. This 
committee would be required to look at the regulations published by the 
Department of Homeland Security and to make suggestions for 
modifications to meet the concerns of States, privacy advocates, and 
other interested parties. Within 120 days of convening, the committee 
would report its recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security 
and to Congress. So we are not throwing out the work that has already 
been done by the Department of Homeland Security. It doesn't make sense 
to go back to square one, to go back to scratch, as the 2004 bill had 
proposed. Instead, we create this committee, bringing all the 
stakeholders to the table. They would take a rigorous look at the 
regulations that are issued, and they would make recommendations to the 
Department and to us so that we could exercise our oversight.
  The Department of Homeland Security would then either have to make 
the recommendations recommended by this committee or explain why it 
chose not to. So we would have much more transparency and 
accountability in the process.
  In addition, the committee could recommend to Congress, if they 
believed that statutory changes are needed to mitigate concerns that 
could not be addressed by modifications to the regulations. That is an 
important safeguard as well.
  The amendment we are offering would give us time, the information 
that Congress and the Department of Homeland Security need to better 
implement the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission in order to make our driver's licenses secure so that 
they cannot again be used to facilitate a plot to attack our country.
  There is a real problem. The 9/11 Commission was correct in 
identifying the ease with which the hijackers were able to secure 
driver's licenses. But let's come up with not only an effective 
solution to the problem identified but also a practical one. We don't 
have to choose one versus the other. We can come up with a cost-
effective, efficient, effective way to achieve this goal. This bill 
does so in a way that does not rewind the clock 3 years but instead 
keeps us moving to a more secure America.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle to address REAL ID and to put us back on the right track to 
protect our country, to protect our privacy, to protect our liberty, 
and to do so in a practical way.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Klobuchar). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is the Collins 
amendment.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, it is actually a Collins-Alexander 
amendment, along with several of our colleagues. I am very pleased to 
note the Senator from Tennessee, who has been such a leader and such an 
early voice raising concerns about the implications of the REAL ID Act 
for State governments, is here on the floor. As a former Governor, he 
has a better appreciation than many of us of the burden this act 
imposes on the States. So I am very pleased the Senator is here and I 
yield to him such time as he may need.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee, the coauthor of 
the amendment, is recognized.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Maine and I 
salute the Senator from Maine. She is paying close attention not just 
to the security of our country but the fact that we need strong States 
and cities in our country at the same time. She, obviously, is in tune 
with the people in Maine because they, like people in Tennessee and 
other States, have taken a look at the so-called REAL ID law and 
wondered what we are doing up here.
  She has made a very thoughtful and sensible suggestion, which is that 
we delay for 2 years the implementation of the so-called REAL ID law, 
and let's make sure we know what we are doing.
  Senator Collins, because she is ranking member of the committee that 
deals with homeland security and a former chairman, and because she 
served in State government, is more sensitive to this issue than 
perhaps some of our colleagues. But she understands it is very easy for 
those of us in Washington to stand up here and come up with a big idea 
and think it might be a good idea, and then turn it into a law and hold 
a press conference and take credit for it, and then send the bill to 
the Governor and the legislature and say: You pay for it.
  Senator Collins is more polite about this than I might be. Nothing 
used to make me madder when I was Governor than for legislators and 
Congressmen to do just that: to pass a big bill, take credit for it, 
and send the bill to the State. Then that same Congressman would 
usually be back in Tennessee making a Lincoln Day speech or a Jefferson 
Day speech or a Jackson Day speech about local control and saying how 
we need strong States and strong cities, but they dumped a big unfunded 
mandate on top of us.
  So let me see if I can be in support of Senator Collins, who has made 
a very reasonable, sensible amendment: First, to think about what we 
are doing with REAL ID and to make sure if we want to continue down 
this path, we do it in a way that respects the privacy of Americans. We 
are, after all, for the first time in our history actually creating a 
national identification card with all the ramifications of that. That 
is what the REAL ID law did. Second, to make sure that we don't create 
an unfunded mandate. The Republican Congress in 1994 was ushered in 
claiming no more unfunded mandates. The Congressmen stood on the steps 
over there in the House and said: If we break our promise, throw us 
out. Well, they threw us out this past election, so why would we 
persist with unfunded mandates?
  This is an $11 billion unfunded mandate on State governments over the 
next 5 years. What does that mean? Higher property taxes, higher 
tuition costs, less funding for higher education so we can stay 
competitive with China and India, less money for lower classroom sizes, 
and less money for rewarding outstanding teachers. That is what 
unfunded mandates will mean, so we shouldn't do that.
  Then the third thing that is unfortunate about this REAL ID law that 
passed is we didn't have the opportunity to say anything about it over 
here in the Senate. Now, we are not always the wisest people in 
Washington,

[[Page 4895]]

DC, but we have half the say. The REAL ID Act came up in the House of 
Representatives. It was stuffed into the supplemental appropriations 
bill for Katrina and the troops in Iraq. So of course we had to vote 
for the bill. We had no chance to amend it, no debate, no hearings, and 
no consideration of other alternatives. Yet we impose on every State in 
this country a total of $11 billion worth of unfunded mandates, and we 
create for the first time in the history of a liberty-loving nation a 
national identification card. I would say we wouldn't be doing our job 
if we didn't stop and think about what we have done. Fortunately, we 
have time to stop and think about it, because while the law has been 
passed, it is not implemented yet.
  Here is what Senator Collins has done, and I give her great credit 
for this. For her to introduce this amendment is especially useful 
because of her position as former chairman of the affected committee 
and now its ranking member. She has quickly attracted several 
cosponsors, Republicans and Democrats. She would extend the deadline 
for compliance with REAL ID to 2 years after final regulations are 
issued by the Department of Homeland Security.
  Now, from the point of view of a Governor, that makes sense. If I 
were sitting back in Nashville, I would say: Well, now, Madam 
Congressman or Mr. Congressman, you are not going to expect me to take 
3 or 4 million Tennesseans and run them through the State driver's 
license offices and find out if they are terrorists or if they are 
illegally here, or send them back home to grandma's attic and dig up 
their birth certificates, are you? I mean how many Tennesseans have 
their birth certificates handy? How many want to go back to the 
driver's license office and stand in line? That is a lot of people, 3 
or 4 million people, and that is only Tennessee. There are over 196 
million people with driver's licenses in the United States.
  There is another section or two in Senator Collins' amendment. She 
gives a little more discretion to the Secretary of DHS to waive State 
deadlines. That is a reasonable approach. She reestablishes the 
negotiated rulemaking committee that was created as part of the 
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. That means in plain English 
that States that have the job of implementing this law will have a 
chance to come to the Federal Government and say: Well, in Minnesota, 
we have longer lines during this part of the year because it snows and 
shorter lines during that part of the year because there is ice. And in 
other times of the year people are fishing on their lakes, and so we 
have some local conditions here. This gives more time to take into 
consideration the local conditions.
  Also, it requires figuring out what a fair system of reimbursement 
is. Here are the figures I have seen: Apparently we have appropriated 
$40 million for this. The Senator from Maine is nodding her head. Yet, 
the Governors tell us it is going to cost $11 billion. We have 
appropriated $40 million. They say it is going to cost $11 billion. We 
have a 60-vote point of order against unfunded Federal mandates. We 
couldn't even raise that when this went through like a freight train in 
the middle of a Katrina and troops-in-Iraq bill. There would have to be 
60 votes in order to impose on the States this kind of financial 
burden.
  So that is basically it. This amendment says let's stop and think 
about this since this is the first national identification card we have 
ever had in this country. And since it is a massive unfunded mandate 
that would have the effect, if the Governors are right, of raising 
State taxes, raising tuition, cutting the amount of money available for 
colleges and competitiveness, cutting money for reducing classroom 
size, and cutting money for State health care plans.
  Then the third thing is we had no discussion--I don't believe there 
was a single hearing anywhere in the Senate--about this bill. I am 
delighted to have a chance to be a cosponsor of this legislation that 
Senator Collins has introduced.
  I will say one other thing about this idea of a national 
identification card. I have lived long enough to have changed my mind a 
few times on important issues. When I was Governor of Tennessee, I 
vetoed twice the photo identification card I now carry in my billfold 
because I thought it was an infringement on civil liberties and I 
didn't think it was anybody's business to have my picture on the 
identification card. Well, the retailers wanted it for check cashing, 
and law enforcement people wanted it so they could catch more 
criminals. So the legislature overrode me. Plus, when I tried to get 
into the White House one time as Governor, they wouldn't let me in 
because I didn't have a photo identification card and I said: Well, I 
vetoed it, and they didn't think that was a good reason. The Governor 
of Georgia had to vouch for me, and after that indignity, Tennessee 
finally got a photo identification card.
  We have a right in America to be skeptical of national identification 
cards. We love liberty more than anything in this country, and that 
could infringe on our liberty. We have seen what happened in South 
Africa when people carried around passports and they were classified 
based on race, and their lives, their activities, everything about them 
was regulated that way. We can think back on Nazi Germany and other 
totalitarian countries where so much information was on a single card 
that it gave the Government a good chance to keep up with every single 
person.
  I have changed my mind after 9/11. I believe we need a national 
identification card of some kind, and we, in fact, have one now. It is 
a de facto identification card. We call it the driver's license, but it 
is completely ineffective. It gets stolen. It gets copied. We show it 
when we go through the line at an airport. For a long time, mine said 
on the front that it expired in the year 2000, but if you turn it over, 
it said 2005. Well, at the airport they never turned it over so it is 
not a very effective identification card, and that is the impetus for 
the REAL ID. I understand that.
  The first thought was let's take all of these 196 million driver's 
licenses and turn them into identification cards, but that might not be 
the best thought. There are other options. For example, we might need a 
work card in the United States. A lot of the impetus for this came from 
immigration problems. Since many of the immigration problems are the 
result of people wanting to come here and work, maybe one way to think 
about identity theft is to say: Let's have a Social Security card that 
is biometric and let people apply for that; let people who get new 
cards get that, and let's have a work card. Or maybe we need a travel 
card for people who want to travel on airplanes, and they would have a 
travel card. Maybe we need to expand the number of passports. Twenty-
five percent of us have passports. I am not sure what the right answer 
is. My instinct is that probably a work card would be a good card to 
have. Maybe we ought to have two or three cards that meet certain 
Federal requirements, any of which could be used for other 
identification purposes. That way we would technically avoid having the 
national identification card, but for convenience, people could have a 
work card, a travel card, and a passport. All of those are just ideas. 
But I wouldn't suggest that the Senate wait until midnight and take 
Senator Alexander's ideas, ram them through, and send them to the House 
and tell them to pass them with the next Iraq supplemental bill just 
because we thought of it.
  I think it would be better to let Senator Lieberman and Senator 
Collins and others consider all of these options very carefully. I 
think it might be best when we get to the immigration bill and we talk 
about having an employer identification system, because that is going 
to be an essential part of the comprehensive immigration bill. Well, if 
that is the case, then we are probably going to need some kind of work 
card. If that is the case, we might end up with a secure Social 
Security card. If that is the case, we might not need REAL ID at all.
  So that is an even better reason to adopt the Collins amendment, 
because

[[Page 4896]]

between now and the expiration of 2 years, we should pass a 
comprehensive immigration bill here in Congress. In fact, if we don't, 
we should all be severely criticized, because it is our job to do it. 
So I urge my colleagues respectfully to look at the Collins amendment 
and see it as a reasonable approach. It says: Let's delay 2 years. 
Let's hold some hearings. Let's ask the States to be more involved in 
what the cost is. Let's think about any privacy issues that might 
result from a de facto national identification card, and let's even 
make sure, if we are going to have an identification card, that the 
idea of using driver's licenses is the best way to do it.
  As my last comment, I would underscore the fact that there are a 
number of States already considering taking the action Maine has 
already taken, the Senator's State, in passing a resolution rejecting 
the REAL ID card. Those are Hawaii, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Vermont, and Washington State. If the REAL ID card were to go 
into effect in those States in May, next spring, and they didn't have 
the REAL ID card, according to the law they can't fly on a commercial 
airplane. Well, that is going to create a situation I don't think any 
Member of this Senate wants to see.
  So I am here to salute the Senator from Maine for being diligent in 
protecting our liberty and in protecting the rights of State and local 
governments, and making sure that if we are going to have some kind of 
more secure card, whether it is a driver's license or a work card, a 
travel card, or even a passport, that we do it right after we have 
suitable hearings.
  I am proud to be a cosponsor of the Collins amendment, and I thank 
the Senator for yielding time to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Tennessee for 
his excellent statement. He outlined the issue very well.
  I emphasize two points the Senator made. First is the cost. The 
National Governors Association has estimated that compliance with the 
requirements of the REAL ID card will impose $11 billion of costs on 
State governments over the next 5 years. Yet we have appropriated only 
$40 million to be used toward that cost, and of that amount the 
Department of Homeland Security has only allocated $6 million, so only 
a tiny fraction of the expected cost.
  The second point I emphasize is the Department of Homeland Security 
has yet to issue the regulations detailing how States are to comply 
with the law. So to expect the States to comply by May of next year 
with regulations that have yet to be issued is simply unfair and will 
add another layer of costs because of the short time for compliance. 
This 2 years will allow a more careful review. It will allow more input 
by the States when DHS does issue the regulations, and it will allow us 
to devise a cost-effective way of achieving a goal all of us have, and 
that is to make driver's licenses more secure.
  I am very grateful for the insights of the Senator from Tennessee, 
for his support, and for his very early leadership on this issue.
  Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, the provisions included in the Commerce 
Committee title, title 13 of the substitute amendment, reflect the 
Commerce Committee's relentless efforts to tackle emerging issues and 
building upon existing security transportation legislation. The 
provisions included in the Commerce title improve and enhance our 
security efforts across all modes: rail, truck, motor carrier, 
pipeline, and aviation.
  Senator Stevens and I, and our colleagues on the Commerce Committee 
are no strangers to the issue of transportation security. In fact, the 
Commerce Committee responded and the Congress enacted immediately in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attack landmark aviation and maritime 
security laws.
  Last year, the Congress took its first step in 4 years, to 
significantly improve the Nation's transportation security system by 
enacting the Commerce Committee's SAFE Port Act, which strengthened the 
security of our Nation's ports and maritime vessels.
  While significant in terms of the protections provided to our ports 
and maritime system, the Congress failed during conference to seize the 
opportunity to enact comprehensive transportation security legislation 
that would have addressed many of the gaps in other modes of the 
transportation system.
  Today we begin to correct that shortcoming with the proposed 
legislation before us.
  The Commerce title to the substitute amendment before the Senate 
addresses transportation security for our rail, motor carrier, and 
pipeline industries. The economic importance of these three industries 
can not be overstated.
  While 95 percent of the Nation's cargo comes through our ports, our 
rail system and our motor carriers move these goods from our coasts and 
borders, through the interior of this country, to their final 
destinations. Together, these systems are the backbone that sustains 
our economy.
  In terms of rail security, the Nation's 560-plus freight railroads 
own more than 140,000 miles of track over which nearly 30 million 
carloads are transported annually. This network transports 42 percent 
of all domestic intercity freight, the majority of coal used in 
electricity generation, more than 12 million trailers and containers, 
and two million carloads of chemicals. Meanwhile, U.S. trucking hauled 
9.1 billion tons of freight and employed 5.6 million people in trucking 
related fields in 2003.
  Equally important is the contribution that these modes make in moving 
passengers throughout our Nation. Approximately 24 million passengers 
ride Amtrak annually, and there are nearly 3.4 billion passenger and 
commuter rail trips in this country each year. Similarly, over-the-road 
buses transport approximately 600 million passengers annually and are 
the only viable means of public transportation for many people 
throughout the country.
  The recent attacks on the passenger trains and transit systems in 
Madrid, London, and Mumbai all demonstrate that railroads and surface 
transportation systems are vulnerable targets for terrorists, and are a 
constant reminder of what can happen in our communities.
  We must address the risks facing our essential surface and rail 
transportation systems here at home in a comprehensive and coordinated 
way before we become the next victim of a successful attack.
  Toward this goal, Senator Stevens and I, along with Senators 
Lautenberg, Rockefeller, Kerry, Boxer, Snowe, Pryor, Carper, Dorgan, 
Hutchison, Klobuchar, Cantwell, and others, introduced the Surface 
Transportation and Rail Security Act of 2007, or STARS Act. This bill 
has 22 cosponsors to date.
  The STARS Act incorporates updated versions of provisions within the 
Rail Security Act of 2004, which the Senate passed by unanimous consent 
in the 108th Congress, and the Senate version of the SAFE Port Act 
which we passed in the 109th Congress.
  The Commerce Committee unanimously reported this bill along with S. 
509, the Aviation Security Improvement Act, and S. 385, the 
Interoperable Emergency Communication Act, on February 13, 2007, and 
these provisions are included in the substitute amendment before us 
today as title 13.
  The surface and rail provisions in title 13 require the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration to 
expand existing security initiatives and develop grant programs to 
assist private-sector surface transportation security efforts. The 
title authorizes $1.1 billion over fiscal years 2008 through 2011.
  The rail title of the substitute amendment requires railroad risk 
assessments and plans for improving rail

[[Page 4897]]

security. It also authorizes grants to Amtrak, freight railroads and 
others to upgrade passenger and freight rail security, undertake 
research and development, and improve tunnel security.
  Additionally, the title encourages the deployment of rail car 
tracking equipment for high-hazard material shipments, requires 
railroads to create a railroad worker security-training program, and 
provides whistleblower protection for rail workers who report security 
concerns.
  The surface transportation security provisions in title 13 of the 
substitute amendment promotes tracking technology for truck shipments 
of high-hazard materials and requires new guidance and assessments 
pertaining to hazardous materials truck routing.
  The title also establishes programs for reviewing and enforcing 
hazardous materials and pipeline security plans and requires the TSA to 
develop pipeline incident recovery plans.
  Additionally, the title authorizes the existing grant program for 
improving intercity bus and bus terminal security.
  Finally, the title clarifies, at the TSA's request, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security's legal authority for initiating an administrative 
enforcement proceeding for violations of security regulations relating 
to nonaviation modes of transportation.
  Regarding aviation security, title 13 addresses all the 
recommendations in the 9/11 Commission's report, including cargo and 
baggage screening, explosive detection at airport checkpoints, 
passenger prescreening, airport access controls, and general aviation 
security. The title requires the TSA to provide for the screening of 
all cargo being carried on commercial passenger aircraft within 3 
years. The system must allow for a level of screening ``comparable'' to 
that of checked baggage screening and ensure the security of all cargo 
that is shipped on passenger aircraft.
  The aviation provisions in title 13 advance the deployment of 
electronic Explosive Detection Systems, EDS, at airports across the 
nation by extending the Aviation Security Capital Fund that is used to 
integrate such machines into the baggage conveyor process.
  The title also bolsters the existing grant program through changes in 
funding allocation requirements requiring a prioritized schedule for 
such projects that will increase flexibility for funding options.
  Our legislation recognizes the threat presented by passengers 
transporting explosives through security checkpoints and promotes key 
changes to address this risk.
  Title 13 requires the TSA to produce a strategic plan to deploy 
explosive detection equipment at airport checkpoints and fully 
implement that plan within 1 year of its submission. They must also 
provide specialized training to the screener workforce in the areas of 
behavior observation, and explosives detection. To address ongoing 
problems in developing an advanced passenger prescreening system, the 
aviation provisions in title 13 would ensure a system is in place to 
coordinate passenger redress for those individuals misidentified 
against the ``no-fly'' or ``selectee'' watchlists. The TSA must also 
submit a strategic plan to Congress for the testing and implementation 
of its advanced passenger prescreening system.
  To increase General Aviation, GA, security, the title will require a 
threat assessment program that is standardized and focused on GA 
facilities. It will further require foreign based GA aircraft entering 
U.S. airspace to have their passengers checked against appropriate 
watchlists to determine if there are any potential threats on board.
  Title 13 of the substitute amendment includes a number of additional 
provisions that will take significant steps toward strengthening 
aviation security generally.
  Title 13 will also authorize research and development spending for 
aviation security technology, remove the arbitrary cap of 45,000 full-
time equivalent--FTE--employees currently imposed on the TSA's screener 
workforce, and mandate security rules for foreign aircraft repair 
stations.
  In addition, this title will require the TSA to develop a system by 
which the Administrator will provide blast-resistant cargo containers 
to commercial passenger air carriers for use on a random or risk-
assessed basis, implement a sterile area access system that will grant 
flight deck and cabin crews expedited access to secure areas through 
screening checkpoints, and require a doubling of the DHS's existing dog 
team capacity used for explosive detection across the Nation's 
transportation network.
  In addition to transportation security, title 13 also includes the 
text of S. 385, the Interoperable Emergency Communications Act, which I 
introduced earlier this year with Senators Stevens, Kerry, Smith, and 
Snowe. Under the foresight and leadership of Senator Stevens, during 
the Deficit Reduction Act, the Commerce Committee created a new $1 
billion fund administered by the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration--NTIA--to support state and local first 
responders in their efforts to talk to one another during emergencies.
  The interoperable provisions in title 13 provide congressional 
direction on the implementation of that fund.
  Since its creation, NTIA has served as the principal 
telecommunications policy advisor to the Secretary of Commerce and the 
President, and manages the Federal Government's use of the radio 
spectrum.
  In this capacity, NTIA has historically played an important role in 
assisting public safety personnel in improving communications 
interoperability and recognizing that effective solutions involve 
attention to issues of spectrum and government coordination as well as 
funding.
  Today, our first responders continue to struggle in their efforts to 
improve the interoperability of their systems. The statutory guidance 
provided to NTIA in this legislation will help them in these efforts.
  First, the provision would make clear that proposals to improve 
interoperable communications are not solely limited to systems or 
equipment that utilize new public safety spectrum that will be vacated 
following the digital television transition.
  In a letter to the majority leader earlier this year, Mayor Bloomberg 
of New York City noted the significant efforts of his city to improve 
communications interoperability for first responders utilizing systems 
in other public safety spectrum bands, and urged Congress to eliminate 
the apparent eligibility restriction in current law. As a result, our 
provisions make clear that if the project will improve public safety 
interoperability, it is eligible for funding.
  In addition, the provisions provide the NTIA Administrator to direct 
up to $100 million of these funds for the creation of State and Federal 
strategic technology reserves of communications equipment that can be 
readily deployed in the event that terrestrial networks fail in times 
of disaster.
  Recently, an independent panel created by FCC Chairman Kevin Martin 
to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on communications networks 
noted the impact that limited pre-positioning of communications 
equipment had in slowing the recovery process. As a result, these 
provisions will help to ensure that our focus on interoperability also 
considers the importance of communications redundancy and resiliency.
  Second, the provisions ensure that funding allocations among the 
several States result in a fair distribution by requiring a base amount 
of funding--.75 percent--to be distributed to all States.
  On top of these minimum allocations, the provision would further 
require that prioritization of these funds be based upon an ``all-
hazards'' approach that recognizes the critical need for effective 
emergency communications in response to natural disasters, such as 
tsunami, earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes, in addition to 
terrorist attacks.
  Finally, NTIA's administration of the grant fund will not only help 
to integrate the disparate elements that must be a part of effective 
interoperability solutions, but will also ensure

[[Page 4898]]

greater program transparency and oversight. Given the myriad of 
different grant programs administered by the Department of Homeland 
Security, it is critical that these funds--specifically allocated by 
Congress to speed up our efforts to improve communications 
interoperability for first responders--not get lost in the shuffle of 
other disaster and nondisaster grants.
  As a result, the provisions not only devote NTIA's attention to the 
success of this program, but also require the inspector general of the 
Department of Commerce to annually review the administration of this 
program.
  The terrorists that seek to do us harm are cunning, dynamic, and most 
of all, patient. While they have not successfully struck our homeland 
since September 11, 2001, it does not mean they are not preparing to do 
so.
  They work 24 hours a day, studying every move we make, looking for 
some weakness to exploit. It is imperative that we stay ahead of them.
  We must recruit, train, and deploy a skilled and dedicated security 
force. We must research and implement the most effective and cutting 
edge technologies to enhance the capabilities of that security force. 
And we must provide communications equipment to our first responders 
that is interoperable and accessible in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster.
  Simply put, our entire economy relies on a well-functioning, secure 
transportation system, and we must ensure that the system, and the 
passengers and cargo that use it, are well protected.
  The steps we take in the coming months will impact our safety, 
security, and one of our most essential freedoms--movement--for years 
to come. We must commit ourselves to ensuring that our transportation 
security remains a priority and is as strong and effective as possible.
  The provisions before the Senate this week that were reported out of 
the Commerce Committee make that commitment.
  We have worked over the past several years with our colleagues and 
with the TSA and DHS and with the FCC and NTIA to address concerns, 
improve on initial efforts, and plan for the future. Now, it is time to 
act and to pass these provisions, so we can continue to move forward.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank Senator Inouye for his 
extraordinary leadership in these matters. The committees have 
differing jurisdictions, all aimed at supporting homeland security. The 
Commerce Committee sections we are proud to have put together with the 
parts that came out of the Homeland Security Committee, as well as 
parts that came out of the Banking Committee.
  It is always an honor and pleasure to work with Senator Inouye. I 
thank him for the contributions he and Senator Stevens and their 
committee have made to the overall movement in the Senate to improve 
our homeland security. I thank the Senator very much.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I thank the chairman for his kind words.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I yield to the Senator from South 
Carolina, who has come to the floor to offer an amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.


                 Amendment No. 279 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. DeMint. Madam President, I ask to set aside the pending 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, I thank the managers of this bill for 
the time and effort they have put into it. It is almost 400 pages long, 
and it contains numerous provisions. I look forward to working with the 
Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, and the Senator from Maine, 
Ms. Collins, in the coming days to make this bill better. I call up 
amendment No. 279.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. DeMint] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 279 to amendment No. 275.

  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To specify the criminal offenses that disqualify an applicant 
          from the receipt of a transportation security card)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PROHIBITION OF ISSUANCE OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
                   CARDS TO CONVICTED FELONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 70105 of title 46, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``decides that the 
     individual poses a security risk under subsection (c)'' and 
     inserting ``determines under subsection (c) that the 
     individual poses a security risk''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (1) to read as 
     follows:
       ``(1) Disqualifications.--
       ``(A) Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as 
     provided under paragraph (2), an individual is permanently 
     disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation 
     security card under subsection (b) if the individual has been 
     convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a 
     civilian or military jurisdiction of any of the following 
     felonies:
       ``(i) Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.
       ``(ii) Sedition or conspiracy to commit sedition.
       ``(iii) Treason or conspiracy to commit treason.
       ``(iv) A Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section 
     2332b(g) of title 18), a comparable State law, or conspiracy 
     to commit such crime.
       ``(v) A crime involving a transportation security incident.
       ``(vi) Improper transportation of a hazardous material 
     under section 5124 of title 49, or a comparable State law.
       ``(vii) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, 
     manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, 
     transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an 
     explosive or explosive device. In this clause, an explosive 
     or explosive device includes--

       ``(I) an explosive (as defined in sections 232(5) and 
     844(j) of title 18);
       ``(II) explosive materials (as defined in subsections (c) 
     through (f) of section 841 of title 18); and
       ``(III) a destructive device (as defined in 921(a)(4) of 
     title 18 and section 5845(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
     1986).

       ``(viii) Murder.
       ``(ix) Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false 
     information knowing the same to be false, concerning the 
     deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or 
     other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a 
     State or other government facility, a public transportation 
     system, or an infrastructure facility.
       ``(x) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
     Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.), or a comparable 
     State law, if 1 of the predicate acts found by a jury or 
     admitted by the defendant consists of 1 of the crimes listed 
     in this subparagraph.
       ``(xi) Attempt to commit any of the crimes listed in 
     clauses (i) through (iv).
       ``(xii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes 
     described in clauses (v) through (x).
       ``(B) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as 
     provided under paragraph (2), an individual is disqualified 
     from being issued a biometric transportation security card 
     under subsection (b) if the individual has been convicted, or 
     found not guilty by reason of insanity, during the 7-year 
     period ending on the date on which the individual applies for 
     such card, or was released from incarceration during the 5-
     year period ending on the date on which the individual 
     applies for such card, of any of the following felonies:
       ``(i) Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture, 
     purchase, distribution, receipt, transfer, shipping, 
     transporting, delivery, import, export of, or dealing in a 
     firearm or other weapon. In this clause, a firearm or other 
     weapon includes--

       ``(I) firearms (as defined in section 921(a)(3) of title 18 
     and section 5845(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); 
     and
       ``(II) items contained on the United States Munitions 
     Import List under section 447.21 of title 27, Code of Federal 
     Regulations.

       ``(ii) Extortion.
       ``(iii) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, including 
     identity fraud and money laundering if the money laundering 
     is related to a crime described in this subparagraph or 
     subparagraph (A). In this clause, welfare fraud and passing 
     bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, fraud, or 
     misrepresentation.
       ``(iv) Bribery.

[[Page 4899]]

       ``(v) Smuggling.
       ``(vi) Immigration violations.
       ``(vii) Distribution of, possession with intent to 
     distribute, or importation of a controlled substance.
       ``(viii) Arson.
       ``(ix) Kidnapping or hostage taking.
       ``(x) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.
       ``(xi) Assault with intent to kill.
       ``(xii) Robbery.
       ``(xiii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes 
     listed in this subparagraph.
       ``(xiv) Fraudulent entry into a seaport under section 1036 
     of title 18, or a comparable State law.
       ``(xv) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
     Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.) or a comparable 
     State law, other than any of the violations listed in 
     subparagraph (A)(x).
       ``(C) Under want warrant, or indictment.--An applicant who 
     is wanted, or under indictment, in any civilian or military 
     jurisdiction for a felony listed in this paragraph, is 
     disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation 
     security card under subsection (b) until the want or warrant 
     is released or the indictment is dismissed.
       ``(D) Determination of arrest status.--
       ``(i) In general.--If a fingerprint-based check discloses 
     an arrest for a disqualifying crime listed in this section 
     without indicating a disposition, the Transportation Security 
     Administration shall notify the applicant of such disclosure 
     and provide the applicant with instructions on how the 
     applicant can clear the disposition, in accordance with 
     clause (ii).
       ``(ii) Burden of proof.--In order to clear a disposition 
     under this subparagraph, an applicant shall submit written 
     proof to the Transportation Security Administration, not 
     later than 60 days after receiving notification under clause 
     (i), that the arrest did not result in conviction for the 
     disqualifying criminal offense.
       ``(iii) Notification of disqualification.--If the 
     Transportation Security Administration does not receive proof 
     in accordance with the Transportation Security 
     Administration's procedures for waiver of criminal offenses 
     and appeals, the Transportation Security Administration shall 
     notify--

       ``(I) the applicant that he or she is disqualified from 
     being issued a biometric transportation security card under 
     subsection (b);
       ``(II) the State that the applicant is disqualified, in the 
     case of a hazardous materials endorsement; and
       ``(III) the Coast Guard that the applicant is disqualified, 
     if the applicant is a mariner.

       ``(E) Other potential disqualifications.--Except as 
     provided under subparagraphs (A) through (C), an individual 
     may not be denied a transportation security card under 
     subsection (b) unless the Secretary determines that 
     individual--
       ``(i) has been convicted within the preceding 7-year period 
     of a felony or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a 
     felony--

       ``(I) that the Secretary believes could cause the 
     individual to be a terrorism security risk to the United 
     States; or
       ``(II) for causing a severe transportation security 
     incident;

       ``(ii) has been released from incarceration within the 
     preceding 5-year period for committing a felony described in 
     clause (i);
       ``(iii) may be denied admission to the United States or 
     removed from the United States under the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); or
       ``(iv) otherwise poses a terrorism security risk to the 
     United States.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 70101 of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as 
     paragraphs (3) through (7); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
       ``(2) The term `economic disruption' does not include a 
     work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to 
     terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute.''.

  Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, the amendment I have offered, No. 279, 
is very simple. It codifies the recent regulations issued by the 
Department of Homeland Security which bans certain criminals from 
gaining security access to our seaports. My amendment is needed to 
protect these regulations from outside groups that may challenge them 
in court, as well as from future administrations that may repeal or 
weaken them.
  My amendment is also bipartisan and should not be controversial. It 
was unanimously adopted by this body last year as part of the SAFE Port 
Act which passed 98 to 0. Unfortunately, it was gutted by the 
conference committee behind closed doors, and that is why I am offering 
it again today.
  As my colleagues know, the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
requires the Transportation Security Agency, TSA, to develop a 
biometric security card for port workers at our seaports that can be 
used to limit access to sensitive areas within a seaport. The security 
card is called a transportation worker identification card or, as we 
sometimes call it, a TWIC.
  The law requires that the Secretary issue this card to any individual 
requesting it unless the Secretary determines that the individual poses 
a terrorism security risk or if the individual has been convicted of 
treason, terrorism, sedition, or espionage. To clarify who poses a 
security risk, the Department of Homeland Security recently issued 
regulations that bar certain serious felons from receiving these TWICs. 
Specifically, the regulations permanently bar from our ports criminals 
convicted of espionage, sedition, treason, terrorism, crimes involving 
transportation security, improper transport of hazardous material, 
unlawful use of an explosive device, bomb threats, murder, violation of 
the RICO Act, where one of the above crimes is a predicate act, and 
conspiracy to commit any of these crimes.
  The Department of Homeland Security regulations also bar recent 
felons--defined as those convicted within the last 7 years or 
incarcerated in the last 5 years--from gaining access to our ports if 
they have been convicted of any of the following felonies: assault with 
intent to murder, kidnapping or hostage-taking, rape or aggravated 
sexual abuse, unlawful use of a firearm, extortion, fraud, bribery, 
smuggling, immigration violations, racketeering, robbery, drug dealing, 
arson, or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes.
  These regulations were developed after an extensive process that 
included consultation with the Department of Justice and Transportation 
to identify individuals who have a propensity to engage in unlawful 
activity, specifically activity that places our ports at risk. These 
regulations governing who can gain access to our seaports are nearly 
identical to the regulations that govern those who can gain access to 
our airports as well as those who can transport hazardous material in 
our country.
  These prohibitions are crucial because individuals who engage in this 
type of unlawful activity have a greater likelihood to engage in these 
acts or in acts that put American ports and American lives at risk. Our 
law enforcement officials understand this risk. They understand the 
threat our ports face when traditional criminals, particularly 
organized criminals, work with terrorists. For example, the FBI 
recently apprehended a member of the Russian mafia attempting to sell 
missiles to an FBI agent who he believed was acting as a middleman for 
terrorists.
  Joseph Billie, Jr., the FBI's top counterterrorism official, recently 
commented that the FBI is continuing to look at a nexus between 
organized crime and terrorists, and they are looking at this very 
aggressively. The threat not only comes from criminals working directly 
with terrorists, it also comes from criminals who may look the other 
way when a suspect container comes from a port. Joseph King, a former 
Customs Service agent and now a professor at the John J. College of 
Criminal Justice, outlined the concern very clearly: ``It is an 
invitation to smuggling of all kinds,'' he said. ``Instead of bringing 
in 50 kilograms of heroin, what would stop them from bringing in 5 
kilograms of plutonium?'' The nightmare scenario here is where a 
criminal at one of our ports who may think he is just helping a friend 
smuggle in drugs inadvertently helps smuggle in a weapon of mass 
destruction. That is a risk we cannot take.
  I offered this amendment last year to address this threat and to 
ensure that serious felons are kept out of our ports. My amendment 
codified in statute the then-proposed TWIC regulations. As I said 
earlier, my amendment was unanimously adopted and was included in the 
Senate-passed version of the SAFE Port Act that passed 98 to 0. 
Unfortunately, my amendment was also completely gutted behind closed 
doors in the conference committee. The provision went from addressing a 
list of 20 serious felons to a list of just 4. These

[[Page 4900]]

4 felonies are so rare that the conference committee made the provision 
almost meaningless.
  I am extremely disappointed by the stealth opposition to this 
measure. I cannot understand who would oppose banning serious felons 
from gaining secure access at our American ports. While no Senator has 
been willing to publicly oppose this measure, the longshoremen's labor 
union was more than happy to take credit for gutting the provision. 
Late last year, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union claimed 
credit for killing the provision in the SAFE Port conference committee. 
They stated in their newsletter:

       We have heard rumors that Senator DeMint is particularly 
     angry with the union's successful lobbying effort to strip 
     his anti-labor provision. He may attempt to amend another 
     piece of legislation, so the union will stay on guard to 
     protect its members' interests.

  Apparently, this union has stayed on guard because it was able to get 
five Senators to object to this vital homeland security measure when I 
tried to pass it the second time late last year.
  I wish I could say that the unions would stop at fighting this 
legislation on the Senate floor, but they are also gearing up to mount 
a legal battle against Department of Homeland Security regulations. In 
response to a Wall Street Journal editorial on the subject, the union 
stated that the TWIC security regulations were `` . . . double jeopardy 
and unconstitutional.'' This is a clear indication that they have a 
legal challenge in mind. It seems clear that once longshoremen start 
applying for TWIC cards and some members are rejected because they are 
convicted felons, the labor unions are going to take the Department of 
Homeland Security to court and try to bog the regulations down in 
lengthy legal battles. The consequence will be that as we continue to 
fight this global war on terror, America's ports will be staffed by 
serious felons who cannot be trusted.
  Some of my colleagues may be tempted to come to the defense of the 
longshoremen. They will say that the individuals in question have paid 
their debt to society and barring them is gutting our port workforce. 
They may also claim that the crimes listed in the Department of 
Homeland Security regulations are somehow not related to homeland 
security. These objections are just plain wrong.
  I don't disagree that convicted felons should be given a second 
chance. I hope they get back on their feet and become productive 
members of their communities. What I disagree with is that we should 
give serious felons a pass, literally and figuratively, to access the 
most secure areas of America's port infrastructure. When they are fresh 
out of prison, we should not trust them with the most vulnerable areas 
of our ports. The stakes here are simply too high.
  As for the concern that barring these individuals will empty the 
ranks of the port workforce, the facts don't agree. When the Department 
of Homeland Security issued nearly 350,000 ID cards for hazmat 
truckdrivers and subjected them to the same background check that is 
required by my amendment, only 3,100 were rejected. That is less than 1 
percent. The fact is, we are talking about an isolated group of serious 
felons here, and the workforce in the United States is dynamic enough 
to supply the few thousand longshoremen who may be needed to replace 
those we let go.
  Finally, some may say these felonies do not represent serious crimes. 
To that, I would ask any of my colleagues to tell me which individual 
he or she wants working at our ports where security is so important: 
Murderers? Extortionists? Drug dealers? Bomb makers? I just want to 
hear the rationale for trusting these criminals with our national 
security.
  The bottom line is this: My amendment applies nearly the same 
protections to seaports that are already applied at our airports. It 
will make us safer by keeping individuals who have shown a willingness 
to break the law outside our ports. This is extremely important. We can 
spend all the money in our Treasury trying to screen cargo, but if we 
don't screen the people who work at our ports, we cannot expect to be 
safe.
  I do wish to thank several people for supporting this important 
policy. First, I thank the Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, who was 
very helpful to me during the debate on the SAFE Port Act last year. I 
also thank the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, for his 
support. I should also say that the Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, 
was also helpful in getting this provision into the bill.
  This is a bipartisan proposal, and it should not be controversial. 
Americans expect us to check and verify the nature of the people who 
work at our seaports, and we have a responsibility to ensure that 
happens even if it upsets a labor union that feels compelled to protect 
the jobs of a small group of serious felons. My amendment codifies in 
statute these important security regulations, and I hope all of my 
colleagues will support it.
  I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important measure, and 
I will be happy to work with the bill managers to arrange a time to 
come back to the floor if further debate is needed.
  I thank the Chair for this time, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Menendez). The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank our friend from South Carolina 
for the amendment he has offered. We worked together when last this 
subject came before the Senate to bring about a result that I believe 
was a good one and in the public interest, which was that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security issued regulations to create an identity card. The 
card has a marvelous acronym, which doesn't sound as serious as it is. 
The acronym is TWIC, transportation worker identification card. This is 
one of the necessities of the post-9/11 age, that we need to move 
toward some filter for people working in areas that now have become 
higher vulnerability areas and are more likely targets for terrorism. 
Unfortunately, that includes our ports and, obviously, includes our 
airports as well, which have a separate ID program on which they are 
working.
  I know there is some hope within the Department of Homeland Security 
that we are moving toward a more common program for a similar 
background check and card for postal workers at a host of different 
transportation-related locations to protect them and us from potential 
terrorist attacks.
  Senator DeMint, I gather from his statement--and I appreciate his 
intentions here--intends by this amendment to codify in law the 
regulations the Department of Homeland Security has established for 
these identification cards for workers at our ports. I want to take a 
look at it. I know Senator Collins does as well. We want to work with 
Senator DeMint.
  Clearly, the intention here is one we all share, which is to do 
everything we can, within reason and respectful of common sense and 
constitutional rights, to secure our critical transportation 
facilities, including our ports. I rise now to simply thank the Senator 
for offering his amendment, to tell him we will consider it with some 
thoughtfulness and look forward to working with him as we move toward a 
vote on this amendment.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The DeMint amendment is the pending business.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I ask unanimous consent that amendment be set aside 
and I be allowed to speak on the Collins amendment, No. 277, please.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 277

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
amendment offered by my colleague from Maine, Senator Collins, relative 
to the issue of REAL ID. I was back in my State last week, as most of 
us were, and I had the opportunity to speak to our legislature and 
visit with members of both

[[Page 4901]]

the State house and the State senate in Atlanta, and I cannot tell you 
the angst and apprehension that I saw among members of my legislature 
over this issue of REAL ID.
  When I got back I did not understand why there would be that much 
concern about the issue. I was not sure how this thing came about. When 
I checked with my staff I found out, as Senator Alexander said this 
morning in his comments, that this was a measure that was stuck into 
the Katrina appropriations bill that did not go through committee, we 
did not have debate on it on the floor of this body, and I don't think 
anybody here understood the real consequences of it.
  When the 19 hijackers came to this country and carried out the 
horrific attack on September 11, they were in possession of 63 driver's 
licenses issued by various States around the country. That should never 
have happened, and we need to make sure it does not happen again. But 
the fact is, I don't think anybody understood the consequences of this 
REAL ID Act as it pertains to that particular issue of driver's 
licenses.
  In 1994, when I was elected to the House of Representatives, we 
talked a lot about unfunded mandates. The Presiding Officer was a 
Member of that body. He remembers well we had a lot of conversations 
about unfunded mandates coming out of Washington to our State and local 
officials and organizations that were required to fund those mandates 
that we passed. There is no bigger unfunded mandate that we have passed 
lately that is more atrocious than this particular mandate.
  I applaud Senator Collins for looking at this issue, for deciding 
that it is a real, practical problem. It is an issue that needs to be 
dealt with. Her amendment makes a lot of sense. It does not repeal the 
law. What it does is to say that the law is not going to be implemented 
until 2 years following the issuance of the regulations. Here we are, 
with this law supposed to be implemented by our State legislatures this 
year, and we don't even have the regulations coming out of the 
Department of Homeland Security yet. They don't know how to carry out 
the provisions of this law.
  I support the Collins amendment, No. 277. I think it makes an awful 
lot of sense. It allows us to go back in and take a more thorough look 
at this particular issue and decide how we can accomplish the results 
that the REAL ID Act wants to accomplish but at the same time not 
burden our States with a mandate that none of us intended to impose 
upon them.
  I do support this amendment. I hope when the time comes it will 
receive not only passage but significant numbers to support the passage 
of this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Georgia for his 
support and his excellent comments. This is a carefully drafted 
amendment. It doesn't rewind the clock in terms of throwing out the 
work that the Department has done, but it recognizes that it is simply 
unreasonable to expect States to comply by May of next year with 
complex and costly regulations that the Department has yet to issue. 
The Department has yet to issue the detailed guidance that the States 
need.
  It also recognizes that the quality of the final regulations will be 
improved by the formation of a committee with State officials, privacy 
advocates, technological experts, and Federal officials sitting down, 
looking at the regulations, and providing input to the Department on 
their proposed regulations and also providing that input to us.
  The third provision of the amendment would increase the waiver 
authority that the Secretary can have if it proves that there are 
technological barriers to complying with certain provisions of the law. 
I think this is a reasonable approach to a real problem.
  Finally, let me say to my colleagues, the estimates for the cost of 
compliance with this law are as high as $11 billion over the next 5 
years. This is a huge unfunded mandate on the States. My hope is 
through our approach we can come up with more practical, cost-effective 
means of achieving a goal that all of us share and that is improving 
the security of driver's licenses that are used for Federal 
identification purposes, such as boarding an airplane. There is a real 
need to have a secure driver's license, but let's do it in a practical, 
collaborative way, and let's make sure there is adequate time to 
comply.
  I thank the Senator from Georgia for his support and for his 
excellent comments.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss, 
be added as a cosponsor of the Collins amendment, No. 277.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for 20 minutes. I don't think I will use all that 
time. If I need more time, I will ask for it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                                 Taxes

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, as everybody who follows Congress on a 
regular basis knows, when you get close to the month of March, we are 
in budget season. The President sent his budget to the Hill, which he 
does regularly, the first week of February, about a month ago. So now 
it is up to the Congress. In the next few days the Senate Budget 
Committee will be marking up our budget resolution.
  For the public at large, don't confuse a budget resolution, which is 
a discipline for Congress on budgeting, with appropriations bills that 
actually give the President the authority to spend money. They come 
along a little bit later in the year.
  At a minimum, the budget resolution will lay out the fiscal 
priorities of the next 5 years. As everyone knows, the American people 
spoke last November and sent a Democratic majority to both Houses of 
Congress. For the first time in 12 years, Democrats will take the 
initiative on the Senate budget. As ranking Republican on the Finance 
Committee, which deals with taxes, trade, Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid, and also as the senior Republican on the Budget 
Committee, which is the committee that sends the budget to the Senate, 
I am eager to see the direction the new Democratic majority wants to 
take on fiscal policy for this year, but the budget also has long-term 
implications of 5 years.
  There are a lot of questions I am waiting to get answered. What will 
be their plan on pay-go, which means pay as you go? With spending at 
higher-than-average levels of our economy, what kind of spending 
discipline will the Democratic majority show? On the revenue side of 
the ledger, will Democrats look to prevent a tax increase on virtually 
every American taxpayer a few years down the road, when the present tax 
policy sunsets, or will the Democratic majority, without a vote, set in 
motion, then, the largest Federal tax increase of all time? This is a 
fact. It will happen. When we have a sunsetting of tax law, it is 
possible to have a tax increase without Congress voting it. In this 
particular instance, this would put in place the biggest Federal tax 
increase ever.
  Over the next few days, I want to talk about the tax issues--I want 
to do it topic by topic--that are going to come up during debate on the 
process of the budget. There are probably many ways to do it, but this 
is how I split the general subject into topics: One, the importance of 
preventing a tax hike on virtually all American taxpaying families and 
individuals. That is what I want to visit about today. Next is the 
negative economic consequences of sunsetting the bipartisan tax relief 
plan that will be the biggest tax increase in the history of the 
country without a vote of the people, if we

[[Page 4902]]

don't do something about it. Then another time, I am going to review 
Democratic tax increase offset proposals with a specific focus on the 
limits and problems associated with those tax increases.
  Next I will focus on one particular ill-defined but often mentioned 
offset; that is, reducing the tax gap. Everybody is for reducing the 
tax gap, and I am working with Senator Baucus to do that. He is 
chairman of our committee. But there has to be realism brought into 
that debate, and I hope to provide that realism. Then fifth and last, 
tax reform and simplification, its necessity and bipartisan 
opportunities to do so.
  These discussions are meant to be about the revenue side of the 
budget. But before we get into the revenue side of the budget, I want 
to issue a challenge to my friends on the other side of the aisle. It 
is a challenge I have made over the last few years. It is in the 
context of intellectually honest budgeting. It is also in the context 
of the bipartisan record of the Finance Committee on tax policy over 
the last few years. That tax policy has been led by this Senator, when 
I was chairman, and by Senator Baucus working with me during that 
period of time, or Senator Baucus, now leading the committee and, 
hopefully, my always working with him as he worked with me.
  That bipartisan record of the Senate Finance Committee shows about 
$200 billion of revenue raisers from antitax shelter measures and 
corporate loophole closures, basically doing something about abuse of 
the Tax Code, unintended by Congress, by people who can hire very 
sophisticated lawyers to find ways around paying taxes. We have closed 
$200 billion of those, and it has been bipartisan. So when I hear from 
self-styled deficit hawks, or from the media, who are sympathetic to 
those points of view that we need higher taxes to reduce the deficit, I 
believe the Finance Committee has anted up in terms of producing 
revenue raisers without raising general levels of taxation on the 
American people.
  Here is my challenge, and I will ask my friends to listen up. Anyone 
on the other side who considers themselves a deficit hawk needs to 
prove it, then, on the spending side. Compared to our committee already 
raising revenue by $200 billion by closing tax loopholes and tax abuse, 
show me, then, a spending restraint proposal for deficit reduction. I 
issued that challenge several years ago and have issued it repeatedly. 
No one from the other side has stepped up. We can look and look and 
look and we won't find such a proposal. All of those liberal think 
tanks that oppose tooth and nail any kind of tax relief are usually 
advocates of spending increases, all of this under the guise of fiscal 
responsibility. We won't find any proposals to restrain spending from 
these liberal think tanks.
  If we look at the media sources that are sympathetic to the views of 
the Democratic leadership or the liberal think tanks, we will find 
hard-line opposition to tax relief and a lot of tax increase proposals 
but, likewise, no proposal reining in spending. They will claim the 
mantle of fiscal responsibility but won't show anything on the spending 
side other than spending increases. For these folks, when it comes to 
deficit reduction, there is only one side of the Federal ledger. That 
is raising taxes.
  We have a Federal Government that is projected to spend $2.7 trillion 
for this fiscal year alone and is projected to spend $33.7 trillion 
over the next 10 years. Yet leadership on the other side of the aisle, 
the liberal think tanks that back them up, and the media that helps 
them get their message out so easily and is sympathetic to their views, 
can't find a dollar of savings on the spending side. To these folks, 
with all due respect, I want to call them out. They won in November. 
The Congress is in their hands. Let's see some credibility on the 
spending side of the ledger. Show the taxpayers the money. Show me a 
proposal to restrain spending and put it to deficit reduction. That is 
a preliminary point.
  Now I will move to talk about preventing tax hikes. The same group's 
position on current law tax relief is radically different than its 
position on spending restraint. Back in 2001 and 2003, Congress 
approved, and the President signed, legislation that provided across-
the-board tax relief to nearly every American taxpayer. The Democratic 
leadership, liberal think tanks, and sympathetic east coast media 
criticized tax relief on a couple of grounds. One charge was that the 
tax relief was a tax cut for the rich. The other charge was that the 
bipartisan tax relief was fiscally irresponsible.
  Nonpartisan Joint Committee on Taxation distribution tables actually 
put a lie to that first charge. The record levels of revenue show that 
the growing economy, the expanding U.S. economy, and economic stimulus 
from tax relief better the Nation's fiscal situation, bringing in more 
tax dollars, not depriving the Federal Treasury of dollars.
  This debate on preventing tax increases is often couched only in 
macroeconomic terms. We will hear what it ``costs'' to extend 
bipartisan tax relief. We will hear very big numbers. For instance, the 
Joint Committee on Taxation projects that the revenue loss from making 
the bipartisan tax relief permanent is $1.9 trillion over the next 10 
years. That is the way the Democratic leadership, liberal think tanks, 
and sympathetic east coast media will define proposals to prevent a tax 
hike. We won't see them talk about the number of families who benefit 
from the extension of the $1,000 child tax credit. You won't see them 
talk about the number of married couples who benefit or the average 
family benefit from marriage penalty relief.
  Today I am going to take a few minutes and shed some light on the 
side of the debate about extending bipartisan tax relief. Lord only 
knows, there is not much light shed on these important facts, because 
everybody is talking about tax relief for the rich. I will acknowledge 
the critics' point on the macro cost of extending tax relief. But keep 
in mind, a liberal's tax relief cost is a conservative's tax hike, when 
we are talking about extending current law. They are the two sides of 
the same taxpayer's coin. I will agree to that number, but call it a 
$1.9 trillion tax increase.
  So I am going to follow the Democratic leadership plan and dismantle 
the bipartisan tax relief package bit by bit. I am also going to 
challenge the Democratic leadership to show us the money by indicating 
whether they want to scrap each piece as I move through the package. 
Which pieces would they scuttle? I will work through the bipartisan tax 
legislation piece by piece.
  Let's start, then, with the basis for the 2001 bipartisan tax relief 
measure. That is the new 10-percent bracket. The revenue loss for this 
part of the package is $299 billion over 10 years, according to the 
Joint Committee on Taxation. The 10-percent bracket is a huge piece of 
tax relief for low-income people. The 10-percent bracket does that. No 
wonder 100 million families and individual taxpayers benefit from the 
10-percent bracket. I do not think anybody wants to dismantle that 
piece. But I want to hear that from the Democratic leadership because 
that is a compromise of their position of whether the 2001 tax 
increases ought to sunset.
  Where do we go next, then? The marginal tax rate cuts, which include 
the 10-percent bracket, lose $852 billion over 10 years, according to 
the Joint Committee on Taxation. That proposal reduces the taxes of 
approximately 100 million families and individuals across America. It 
appears some folks think 35 percent is too low of a top rate. Well, 
guess what. Repealing the marginal rate cuts hits small business--the 
biggest source of new jobs in this great country of ours--and it hits 
small business the hardest.
  The Treasury Department estimates 33 million small business owners 
who are taxed on their business income at individual rates benefit from 
the marginal rate cuts. Repealing these cuts would cause 33 million 
small business owners to pay a 13-percent penalty. Do the Democratic 
leaders want to raise taxes on these small business taxpayers, 
restricting the ability of small business to create jobs?
  Treasury also projects that small business gets over 80 percent of 
the

[[Page 4903]]

benefits of the cuts in the top two rates. Do we want to raise the tax 
rates on these people--small businesses for the most part--by 13 
percent? Does that make any sense? So to the Democratic leadership, 
what do you say?
  How about the death tax relief package? The Joint Committee on 
Taxation scores that package at $499 billion over 10 years. Most of the 
revenue loss is attributable to increasing the exemption amount and 
dropping the rate to 45 percent on already taxed property. Is it 
unreasonable to provide relief from the death tax or should we raise 
the death tax on small businesses and family farms? That is what will 
happen if the bipartisan tax relief package is not extended. So to the 
Democratic leadership, what is your take on that provision?
  Do the opponents want to repeal the proposal to double the child tax 
credit, which the 2001 bill does? Mr. President, 31.6 million families 
benefit from the child tax credit, according to the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. Or how about the refundable piece that helps 16 million kids 
and their families? That proposal loses $135 billion over 10 years. I 
do not think we would have a lot of takers on that one. They are going 
to want to extend that. Democratic leadership, do you agree?
  How about the lower rates on capital gains and dividends? Thirty-
three million Americans--a good number of them low-income seniors--
benefit from the lower tax rates on capital gains and dividends, 
according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. Does the Democratic 
leadership think we should raise taxes on these 33 million Americans 
benefiting from these lower tax rates? That would be families and 
individuals.
  On a side note, in another speech, I will be talking about the 
worrisome Goldman Sachs economic report on the adverse economic effects 
of failing to extend lower rates on capital gains--this line right 
here, as shown on the chart--when it expires.
  There are consequences to what Congress does. When you have a booming 
economy, there could be very detrimental consequences to the country 
when you take away the incentives that have had this economy exploding 
like not any time since the early 1990s.
  Let's take a look at the marriage penalty piece. It is the first 
marriage penalty relief we delivered in over 30 years. The Joint 
Committee on Taxation scores this proposal at $52 billion over 10 
years, and Treasury estimates that in 2004, nearly 33 million married 
couples benefited from this tax relief. Again, I do not think many 
folks would want to raise taxes on people because they decided to be 
married. I hope the Democratic leadership would agree with that 
statement.
  Another proposal is expensing for small businesses; in other words, 
writing everything off in 1 year instead of stretching it out over 10 
years. This is a commonsense, bipartisan proposal and directed 
specifically to small business--the engine that creates new jobs. 
According to IRS Statistics of Income, 6.7 million small businesses 
across the country benefited from this expensing provision in 2004. If 
we do not make it permanent, small businesses face a tax increase of 
$19 billion over 10 years and probably sputtering the engine that 
creates so many jobs in America. Does the Democratic leadership think 
small business expensing is an unwise tax policy?
  Continuing on through the bipartisan tax relief package, let's take a 
look at education tax relief. This package, which will help Americans 
deal with college education costs, scores at $12 billion over 10 years 
by the Joint Committee on Taxation. IRS Statistics of Income show 
nearly 16 million families and students benefited from this tax relief 
in 2004.
  In this era of rising higher education costs, should we gut tax 
benefits for families to send their kids off to college? Does the 
Democratic leadership think that is the way to go, which would be the 
way we would go if Congress does nothing and you let this tax law 
sunset?
  Finally, families where both parents work have to deal with childcare 
expenses. The tax relief package includes enhanced incentives for 
childcare expenses. Mr. President, 5.9 million families across America 
benefit, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. Does the 
Democratic leadership think we ought to take away these childcare 
benefits? That is what would happen if the tax cuts of 2001 were 
sunset. It would happen without a vote of the Congress either.
  Now, I have taken you through about $1.9 trillion of tax relief. It 
sounds like a lot in abstraction, but it provides relief to every 
American who pays income tax. I would ask any of those who want to 
adjust or restructure--and those are words that are used around here 
about this tax relief package passed in 2001--do you want to adjust it 
or restructure it? Where would you cut in this package?
  Would you hit the 10-percent bracket, driving up the taxes of low-
income people? Would you hit small business tax relief and sputter the 
growth machine, the job machine of America; or the now refundable child 
tax credit, and hurt low-income people; or the death tax relief; or the 
marriage penalty relief; dividends and capital gains relief; education 
tax relief; or childcare tax relief? I hope not. Because in a 
recovering economy, with above-average levels of individual income tax, 
as a percentage of GDP, even with the tax relief package in place, 
which areas would you adjust, which areas would you restructure?
  Why, then, undo bipartisan--with emphasis upon ``bipartisan''--tax 
cuts that make the Tax Code actually more progressive? Now get that, 
not regressive; it is more progressive now than before the tax bill of 
2001.
  As folks on both sides of the aisle say, budgets are about 
priorities. As the Democratic leadership draws up its budget, we will 
hear a lot of talk about a big number for extending tax relief. It is a 
big number. It is the biggest tax increase ever. It is going to affect 
nearly every American taxpayer.
  If leadership now in the majority of this body, because of the 
results of the last election, decides to propose the biggest tax 
increase in history in the name of deficit reduction, I will be looking 
for that one, single dollar of spending restraint I never see. Now, 
maybe we will see it, but I will bet we would not. Only time will tell, 
and it will be within the next 2 or 3 weeks.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor. I do not think I see any colleagues 
who wish to speak, so I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to 
speak as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Space Station Safety Report

  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, there was a space station task 
force safety report released yesterday which points out a number of 
hazards as we are now in the process of completing the space station. 
Remember that we have this multibillion-dollar structure about 300 
miles above the Earth, with a crew of three, and eventually it will 
have more of a complement, of five or six, which will have the ongoing, 
full-time responsibility of scientific experiments. Right now it is 
about two football fields long. During the completion, which will occur 
over the next 3 years, it will have all the additional appendages, 
including the international laboratory we need to conduct all of the 
experiments that we want. Yet the task force that released its report 
yesterday says there are certain inherent hazards that we have always 
known about, such as meteorites striking and/or space debris.
  The U.S. Air Force catalogs all of the space debris. Therefore, we 
have the ability, if something really got in the way, to actually 
maneuver the space station out of the way of that debris--if we know 
where that debris is. The same is true with weather and reconnaissance 
satellites. I don't need to say

[[Page 4904]]

anything about weather satellites here. Everybody knows because it is 
obvious what technology we have today to see the approaching storms, 
and if you live on the coast and it is during the summer, it is all the 
more important, because of an inbound hurricane, that everybody is 
prepared.
  Well, what is preparing us? It is not only that airplane that is 
flying into the hurricane, it is those satellites that are constantly 
tracking the position of that hurricane. Those are threatened by this 
space debris, which brings me to share with my colleagues: Isn't it 
interesting that there has almost been a strange silence throughout the 
world for the last 6 weeks after the Chinese tested their antisatellite 
missile, which created a debris field that is 100 times more than any 
debris that has been created, and because of its altitude, some 500 
miles, it is going to be years before all of that debris is pulled back 
to Earth by the gravitational pull of the Earth?
  It is that debris field of thousands of particles, as a result of the 
Chinese rocket destroying a Chinese satellite by hitting it and 
exploding all of the kinetic energy in parts into the vacuum of space, 
that now we have a new threat not only to our space station but also to 
all of our weather satellites and our reconnaissance satellites. So my 
colleagues can imagine the headache now for the U.S. Air Force of 
trying to track all of that Chinese debris, much more so I think just 
from that one explosion, more debris than all the other debris that is 
up there. It is going to take several years before it ever comes down 
because of the altitude where the kinetic energy occurred when the 
vehicle slammed into the target, which was an old Chinese weather 
satellite.
  So as we are looking at the future of NASA and the completion of the 
space station and the saving of the Hubble space telescope, which has 
opened vast vistas of new knowledge to us about the heavens and about 
the origin of the universe, thanks to the Chinese, as we do this we now 
have to worry about something that could be lethal to our astronauts 
and cosmonauts who are onboard the space station.
  Some of the things they are talking about in this report released 
yesterday include some kind of special curtains they put over the 
windows that would give extra protection to the glass of the space 
station windows. Others are talking about protective blankets they 
might put over very sensitive areas of the space station that could be 
hit by debris. This debris could be coming at a velocity of 10,000 
miles per hour because, if it is in a different orbit and suddenly it 
crosses the orbit of the space station and hits it--remember, going 
around the Earth in orbital velocity is 17,500 miles an hour. If that 
debris hits at right angles, you are going to have a velocity of 17,500 
miles an hour. With the space station going at a different orbit, you 
start to see the kind of kinetic energy that could rain from such a 
collision. So it complicates it, and it complicates it not only for the 
American space program but for every space program on planet Earth, and 
that is the problem.
  That is what the Chinese have done for us. Yet there has been a 
suspicious silence of anybody speaking out in the world community about 
what the Chinese have done in space. There was an intellectual 
discussion about China having shown they have the capability of 
targeting an antisatellite to hit a satellite, which is a significant 
feat. But in the process, they ignored the threats now to all of the 
human and nonmanned assets that are up there, not just for our country 
but for every country in the world that depends on a satellite or a 
spacecraft of some kind.
  That is what we are facing. That is what we have to figure a plan 
for. I hope the Chinese who have had singular success--and this Senator 
has invited their Chinese astronaut to come here and visit, and he did. 
This Senator has congratulated them on their space accomplishments. But 
this time China has done something in accomplishing something 
technologically that has endangered the other nations of the world with 
the manned and the unmanned programs.
  That is what is facing us. This is only the first the Chinese have 
heard from this Senator about how they have endangered the interests of 
planet Earth.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Pryor). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two parts of the 
bill that is before us, the Improving America's Security Act, which is 
really the attempt by our committee and the Senate to finish the job 
the 9/11 Commission gave us to protect the security of the American 
people from terrorist attack and also to adopt for the first time a 
national all-hazards defense strategy that would set up a system that 
would not only be aimed at preventing and, if, God forbid, necessary, 
responding to a terrorist attack but also being ready and preparing 
every level of government to be ready to respond to a natural disaster.
  The amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina is pending. 
I wanted, in the interim, hoping others will come to the floor to offer 
other amendments or speak on that pending amendment, to speak about 
these two parts of the bill.
  The first is about what is one of the most significant changes the 
bill would make; that is, to establish for the first time a dedicated 
grant program to assist States and localities in creating interoperable 
communications systems to be used to protect the American people in 
time of emergency. The ability of first responders to communicate with 
one another is fundamental at a time of disaster. Yet time and time 
again over the years, disasters have occurred, and police, 
firefighters, and emergency medical workers are unable to exchange 
critical information with one another, even indications of their 
location. Sometimes, as we saw in Katrina, certainly, not only is this 
a problem of their not being able to communicate with one another, it 
is a problem of their not being able to communicate at all. There is a 
painful and tragic cost to this failure to communicate or to 
interoperate with others in law enforcement, and that is that lives are 
lost.
  This is a problem which was intensely made clear to all of us on 
September 11, 2001 and again during Katrina, but it is not new. In 
1982, the record shows, communications difficulties frustrated the 
recovery efforts in response to the crash of the Air Florida plane 
right here in Washington, DC. In 1995, again the record shows 
communications difficulties complicated the response to the terrorist 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK. 
In 1999, communications difficulties again slowed the response to the 
shootings at Columbine High School near Littleton, CO.
  Then came 9/11. The story of the communication breakdown among New 
York City's first responders is well known. It is well known because it 
cost the lives of some of the bravest Americans, some on duty and some 
off duty, who rushed to the aid of their fellow citizens and fellow 
first responders. But there were other communications breakdowns on 
September 11, 2001, as well--less well known but also breakdowns that 
hampered the response at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, PA.
  After an in-depth look at the three incidents I have described--the 
Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the plane that went down in 
Pennsylvania on 9/11--the 9/11 Commission wrote:

       The occurrence of this problem at three very different 
     sites is strong evidence that compatible and adequate 
     communications among public safety organizations at the 
     local, State, and Federal level remains an important problem.

  That was the 9/11 Report which came out in 2004. We are now at the 
end of February 2007, and that problem remains as real and intense as 
ever.
  The Commission recommended expediting and increasing the assignment 
of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. In 2005, as part of the 
Deficit Reduction Act, Congress set February

[[Page 4905]]

2009 as the deadline for broadcasters to transition to digital signals, 
which will free up much-needed spectrum for first responders. A lot of 
us, including myself, believed that delay to February 2009 was too 
long. The occupant of the chair remembers that well; we stood together 
on that. But so be it, that is what it is.
  Since that time, Hurricane Katrina devastated the gulf coast, 
particularly the great city of New Orleans, and reminded us again how 
much more needs to be done to improve communications operability, to 
sustain the very operation of an emergency communications system, and 
interoperability, the ability of different first responders to 
communicate with one another.
  The communications infrastructure in Louisiana and Mississippi at the 
time of Hurricane Katrina was decimated. Once again, difficulties in 
communicating among officials and first responders significantly 
impeded rescue and relief efforts. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour 
drove the point home when he said the chief of the National Guard in 
Mississippi ``might as well have been a Civil War general for the first 
2 or 3 days'' because in order to get information, he had to use 
runners. His runners had helicopters instead of horses, but the point 
was clear. The lack of operable or interoperable communications 
equipment put first responders in that disaster back about a century 
and a half.
  The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, which is 
proud to claim the Presiding Officer as a member, investigated the 
preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina, a 9-month 
investigation that produced a 700-page report and almost 90 
recommendations. We enacted some of those recommendations last fall as 
part of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. That 
legislation, which I am proud has largely become law, included ways to 
improve planning and coordination, establish a much needed national 
emergency communications plan, and strengthen technical guidance and 
assistance to local first responders. The newly created Office of 
Emergency Communications, which was created therein, will be 
responsible for carrying out many of those responsibilities. Like many 
of the homeland security challenges we face, achieving nationwide 
operability and interoperability of communications will require 
significant resources, a lot of money. One estimate from our Government 
several years ago put the figure at $15 billion. Testimony before the 
Senate Commerce Committee this past month estimated that the cost may 
be as high as $50 billion to create a genuinely interoperable, 
disaster-resistant communications system for our country. We don't know 
the exact price tag, but we do know the costs will be significant. We 
do know they are beyond the ability of State and local government 
themselves to provide. That is why title III of the legislation before 
the Senate, the Improving America's Security Act, establishes a 
dedicated interoperability grant program for first responders which 
will put us on the path to nationwide operability and interoperability, 
capable of surviving and helping America survive a potential terrorist 
attack or a natural disaster.
  This is an important investment, a kind of leverage for the Federal 
Government to create in partnership with the States and local 
governments. Of course, part of the reason there is not only financial 
need but programmatic policy justification for this. The kinds of 
attacks, the kinds of natural disasters we are talking about, as we saw 
most painfully in Katrina, have national consequences. The Federal 
Government needs to be there to make some additional investments on 
which the State and local governments will build.
  The legislation, S. 4, before the Senate today authorizes $3.5 
billion over 5 years, beginning in the coming fiscal year. That is on 
top of the $1 billion interoperability grant program to be administered 
by the Department of Commerce during this fiscal year, the result of 
previous legislation. This is the beginning of moving toward a genuine 
national system, if we can adopt this and fund it, a call to the States 
and localities to match that money, each in their own way, so we can 
build this survivable network of communications.
  Individual States will be able to apply for grants under this new 
program, which will be administered by FEMA, with assistance from the 
Office of Emergency Communications. The committee was very anxious, as 
the Presiding Officer knows, to not only create a fund of money and 
throw it out there for every local official who had some idea about how 
to create interoperable communications--all applications will have to 
be consistent with each State's communications plan and the national 
emergency communication plan which is being developed and expanded by 
the new Office of Emergency Communications. In other words, to get 
money, you have to prove you are going to fit into a statewide and 
national plan for interoperability of communications.
  Incidentally, the national element of this is pretty obvious. In 
Katrina, you had a lot of first responders streaming into the gulf 
coast, and New Orleans particularly, when local first responders were 
overwhelmed. They were all bringing their own communications systems 
with them. A similar response occurred--a really moving patriotic 
response--after 9/11 to New York City, with first responders from all 
over the country coming in.
  What do we want at that point? A Tower of Babel, where people cannot 
communicate with one another, or the ability, easily, as part of a 
national communications plan, to do so? Obviously, the latter is what 
we want.
  States, incidentally, which would be the recipients of this money, 
would be required to pass at least 80 percent of the grant funding to 
local and tribal governments. The money could then be used for a range 
of activities: planning, system design, engineering, training, 
exercises, procurement, and installation.
  We also include a minimum amount of funding for each State because 
interoperability is an all-hazards concern. In other words, we are 
having a well-intentioned, good-faith debate about homeland security 
grants and to what extent--as some would say--should they all be 
distributed based on risk or be distributed with a minimum amount going 
to each State?
  In this case of interoperability of communications, it seems to me 
the argument is compelling there ought to be some element that gives a 
minimum to each State because what we are trying to establish is a 
national emergency communications system that will be ready to respond 
not just to a potential terrorist attack, but to natural disasters 
which, obviously, can occur anywhere in the country. In other words, 
the ability for first responders and other emergency responders to 
communicate with one another, either by voice or through data sharing, 
is necessary regardless of the nature of the emergency.
  In short, we owe it to the memory of the firefighters and police 
officers who gave their lives on 9/11, some of whom lost their lives 
because of the absence of interoperable communications, and to the 
commitment of first responders who struggled under such adverse 
circumstances to do their jobs in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
and to first responders and emergency managers today all across our 
country who are ready to respond in the time of our need to pass this 
legislation, to provide the funding necessary for this critical effort, 
and to move the Nation's first responders toward real 21st century 
operable and interoperable communications in the face of disaster.
  I have one more topic I want to discuss at this time. The one I have 
just talked about--a dedicated fund for interoperable communications--I 
think is one of the most significant parts of the bill. It is the 
beginning of a transformational partnership between the Federal, State, 
local, and tribal governments that I am convinced will have a 
measurable, significant effect on the security of the American people.
  This next topic I want to talk about has to do with a provision in 
the committee bill which extends employee rights and protections to 
airport

[[Page 4906]]

screeners who work for the Transportation Security Administration. 
Frankly, I do not consider this to be a major part of the bill. To me, 
it is correcting an inequity that exists in current law. I honestly do 
not know why anybody would oppose it. I will listen to the arguments, 
but I want to contrast it with the section I just described, because if 
the last 24 hours are any indication, this section may receive more 
attention than any other section of the bill. The White House has 
indicated it will veto the bill if this section is in it. I 
respectfully do not understand that.
  Colleagues, I know, are preparing to come to the floor to try to 
strike this section from the bill. I think this section is an act of 
elemental fairness, granting quite limited employee rights to airport 
screeners who are now denied--I am using this term beyond its judicial 
meaning--equal protection that is enjoyed by most every other Federal 
employee, including most every other Federal employee involved in 
security.
  So I hope, one, we do not spend a disproportionate amount of time on 
this section; and, two, we do not allow it to get in the way of us 
fulfilling our urgent responsibility to finish the job of enacting the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which S. 4, the legislation 
before us, would do.
  I wish to spend a few moments talking about this section of the bill. 
The fact is, since the Transportation Security Administration was 
created in 2001, TSA screeners have been denied the same employment 
rights and protections as almost all of their fellow workers in TSA. In 
fact, they have been denied the same rights and protections that are 
enjoyed by most of their fellow employees at the Department of Homeland 
Security, such as the Border Patrol and Customs and Immigration 
officers.
  TSA screeners--often also known as TSOs, transportation security 
officers--are familiar to most Americans because we see them at every 
airport across our country. Thanks, in part, I believe to their hard 
work and diligence, we have been spared a repeat of September 11, and 
air travel generally is safer than it was before that day.
  They deserve to be treated equally in their employment rights. It is 
long past time to provide the same protections to TSA screeners as are 
enjoyed by their colleagues.
  I wish to take just a moment to review the history of how this 
inequality came to exist. Shortly after the September 11 attacks, 
Congress federalized the work of passenger and baggage screeners at 
U.S. airports. TSA was created within the Department of Transportation. 
It was subject generally to the same personnel rules as the Federal 
Aviation Administration. Responding to the sense of emergency at the 
time, however--remember, this was right after 9/11--Congress gave the 
head of TSA broad authority to set personnel rules at his own 
discretion for airport screeners.
  In 2002, when Congress established the Department of Homeland 
Security to coordinate and strengthen our defenses against manmade and 
natural disasters, TSA was removed from the Department of 
Transportation and put into the Department of Homeland Security.
  At that time, Congress engaged in extensive debate with quite serious 
partisan and political overtones about how to apply civil service law 
to employees at the new Department. This was an amalgam of 22 different 
agencies, almost 180,000 employees, most of whom were coming already 
with their own employee rights--their own rights--most particularly, to 
join a union.
  Ultimately, and contrary to my own position, Congress authorized the 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary to waive certain provisions 
of civil service law which Congress and the President believed were 
necessary for national security purposes.
  Meanwhile, since 2001, TSA has declared itself exempt from laws 
enforcing the most basic employee protections, including the 
Whistleblower Protection Act, the Rehabilitation Act protecting Federal 
employees with disabilities, the Federal Sector Labor-Management 
Relations statute, appeal of adverse personnel actions to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board, and veterans preference laws.
  In each case, the Transportation Security Agency has devised its own 
version of these fundamental employee protections substantially below 
the standard that Congress and the President decided were appropriate 
generally for DHS employees.
  So now you have this anomaly because of this unusual statutory 
history where TSA screeners have a much lower level of employee 
protection than most of the other employees at the Department of 
Homeland Security.
  It is now 5 years after the agency was established, and TSA screeners 
still lack those basic rights that are available to their colleagues at 
DHS and throughout the Federal Government. That is exactly the inequity 
this small provision in this bill, S. 4, aims to overcome.
  For example, TSA screeners have no individual right to appeal to the 
Merit Systems Protection Board when they believe they have been subject 
to unlawful retaliation for protected whistleblowing activity. OK, this 
is exactly what we want employees of the Federal Government to do. They 
are our representatives. We are paying them. If they see something 
wrong going on, we want them to blow the whistle, and we do not want 
them to be punished as a result.
  But under the current state of the law, TSA screeners do not have any 
right to an outside appeal when they believe they have been subject to 
unlawful retaliation because they blew the whistle on something or 
someone else they saw doing something they thought was wrong.
  Second, TSA is not bound and the screeners are not protected by the 
Rehabilitation Act. So TSA is not bound to make reasonable 
accommodations for a disabled screener still able to perform his 
duties. This is the basic mindset we have overcome in recent decades, 
that somebody who may be disabled in one way is--if I can make up a 
word--abled in many other ways and perhaps, therefore, able to carry 
out the responsibilities of a screener at one of the security 
checkpoints we have all gone through. We have all gone through them, so 
we know there are a number of those functions that could be performed 
by somebody who may have a disability. But there is no right to appeal 
if an employee, a screener, thinks they have been discriminated against 
based on that.
  TSOs--that is, screeners--are allowed to join a union, but they 
cannot collectively bargain as other security forces at DHS and 
throughout the Federal Government can do. Nor can TSOs claim an unfair 
labor practice with the independent Federal Labor Relations Authority.
  I want to stress something. Screeners at TSA can join a union. They 
cannot strike. There is nothing in this small provision in S. 4 that 
will give them the right to strike. There is nothing in this provision 
that will give them the right to strike. I fear people hearing about 
this provision may think we want to extend some employee rights to TSA 
screeners and may think, oh, my God, at a time of crisis these people 
will just walk off their jobs and strike. It is illegal. They cannot do 
it. It is the same limitation that is on Federal employees who have 
collective bargaining rights generally. It is just that these screeners 
have much less, many fewer rights than others do. They cannot claim an 
unfair labor practice with the independent Federal Labor Relations 
Authority.
  Finally, unlike the rest of the Federal Government, TSA limits the 
veterans preference in hiring and other personnel decisions to veterans 
who retired from the Armed Services, and denies the preference to those 
who were honorably discharged. Of course, it is the vast majority of 
men and women who have served our country in uniform who are honorably 
discharged as opposed to serving until the time of their retirement. 
But they do not get any veterans preference in hiring and other 
personnel decisions at the TSA. Is that a big deal? It is if you are a 
veteran. One of the things this provision in this bill would say is 
that, the full

[[Page 4907]]

veterans preference should apply for TSA screeners.
  So that is the amendment we adopted, the literal effect of which is 
to instruct the Secretary of Homeland Security to include TSA 
screeners, either under the departmentwide human resources management 
system or under the specialized system that now applies to TSA 
employees other than the screeners, in the most specific way, which 
leaves no ground--no gaps for misunderstanding. Although there are 
people, I fear, who are misunderstanding or misstating it, this 
amendment simply and directly says that TSA screeners have to be 
included under the departmentwide DHS human resources management 
system, or under the specialized system that applies to TSA employees 
other than the screeners.
  I know critics of this provision are arguing right now that TSA needs 
flexibility to manage the screener workforce in a way that provides 
security when, where, and how it is needed, such as when the threat 
level is raised, or when a new threat becomes evident, or when 
unexpected problems arise at a particular location so the Administrator 
of TSA would want to move screeners from one airport to another. This 
argument is not based on fact. The concerns are misplaced. The 
committee bill, in this small section, retains flexibility for the TSA 
Administrator to promptly redeploy employees, change their assignments, 
or otherwise respond to problems as they arise. The bill recognizes 
this is a department which has to have the flexibility, the management 
flexibility, to respond to emergencies. In granting these TSA screeners 
the same employee rights most everybody else within the Department, 
including people involved in border patrol, for instance, and other 
security functions, we retain nonetheless the flexibility of the 
administrator to redeploy his forces at a time of crisis.
  There is another reason to do this, I believe, apart from equity, and 
that goes to the effectiveness of the TSA screeners and the Department 
of Homeland Security employees generally. Personnel management at TSA, 
the record will show, has been troubled since its inception. The record 
will show the agency has experienced unusually high rates of 
attrition--people leaving, unusually high rates of workplace injury, 
high rates of absenteeism, and other indications of low employee 
morale. Anybody in the private sector will tell you if you have high 
attrition, high workplace injury, absenteeism, and low morale, you have 
a problem, and the problem is going to mean the service you are 
intending to provide is not going to be what you want it to be.
  I would say those problems interfere with establishing and 
maintaining the core of experienced and professional screeners we need, 
that the American people need to ensure aviation security. From 
conversations I have had with screeners, simply taking a step to put 
them on an equal plane with everybody else in TSA or DHS in terms of 
their employee rights will go a long way toward creating the kind of 
morale, devotion to work, and avoidance of workplace injury that will 
better serve our Nation. I know the Administrator of TSA, Kip Holley, 
has recently made some efforts to improve personnel management, but I 
believe they haven't gone far enough, and this amendment will take them 
a large step forward.
  I want to say finally that when the Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee marked up the bill, there was apparently a 
Transportation Security Agency screener by the name of A.J. Castilla 
who was there in the public section of the room. Later he wrote a note 
of thanks in which he said:

       We TSOs aren't asking for special treatment, merely to be 
     made whole and equal again in the eyes of the law.

  A.J. Castilla is committed to his job, is as committed as any other 
employee of the Department of Homeland Security or the Transportation 
Security Administration, and it is time to give him and every other TSA 
screener parity with those other Federal employees so that they may 
better do the critical work we ask and need them to do.
  I appreciate the opportunity to speak at some length about these two 
provisions. Both are, I think, important. One is a dedicated grant 
program for interoperable communications that, as I said, I think will 
have a critical effect and I hope we will discuss the positive effect. 
The second, I am afraid, will be discussed more than it deserves. That 
provision is fair. It is simple equity. It treats working people with 
the fairness they deserve, and in fact will improve our security, not 
hamper it, as its critics say. I urge my colleagues to look at both 
carefully, and particularly when an amendment is offered, as I fear it 
will be, to strike the section that would correct the inequity now 
suffered by transportation screeners, when it comes to the floor, that 
my colleagues will come, will listen, and ultimately will vote to 
reject that amendment.
  I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 269

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside 
the pending amendment and call up amendment No. 269.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, for the moment I am going to object on 
behalf of Senator Collins who is co-managing the bill with me because 
no one has looked at the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The Senator from California has the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. President. The amendment I 
am seeking to bring up is a bill that has been reported out of the 
Judiciary Committee, and essentially what it would do is ensure the 
confirmation of all U.S. attorneys by the Senate.
  What happened was that in 2006, an amendment went into the PATRIOT 
Act that allowed the administration to appoint an interim U.S. attorney 
indefinitely without confirmation. In the early part of this year, I 
believe it was on January 6, I learned that six U.S. attorneys had been 
called and summarily told they were to resign effective a specific date 
in January. I was told by the person who gave me the information that 
there was something suspicious about that. I didn't know, so I began to 
look into it.
  Well, I received a new story today about one of those U.S. attorneys, 
and if I might, I will read it to this body. It is an article by Marisa 
Taylor of the McClatchy Newspapers:

       The U.S. Attorney from New Mexico who was recently fired by 
     the Bush administration said Wednesday that he believes he 
     was forced out because he refused to rush an indictment in an 
     ongoing probe of local Democrats a month before November's 
     congressional elections.
       David Iglesias said two Members of Congress separately 
     called in mid October to inquire about the timing of an 
     ongoing probe of a kickback scheme and appeared eager for an 
     indictment to be issued on the eve of the elections in order 
     to benefit the Republicans. He refused to name the Members of 
     Congress because he said he feared retaliation.
       Two months later, on December 7, Iglesias became one of six 
     U.S. Attorneys ordered to step down for what administration 
     officials have termed ``performance-related issues.'' Two 
     other U.S. Attorneys also have been asked to resign.
       Iglesias, who received a positive performance review before 
     he was fired, said he suspected he was forced out because of 
     his refusal to be pressured to hand down an indictment on the 
     ongoing probe:
       I believe that because I didn't play ball, so to speak, I 
     was asked to resign, said Iglesias, who officially stepped 
     down on Wednesday.
       Iglesias acknowledged that he had no proof that the 
     pressure from the congressional members prompted his forced 
     resignation, but he said the contact in and of itself 
     violated one of the most important tenets of a U.S. 
     Attorney's Office: Don't mix politics with prosecutions. The 
     article goes on.

  Now this is only one element of this story. The matter has been the 
subject of a hearing in the Judiciary Committee. Legislation is ready 
to come before the floor. I have introduced it as an amendment. We 
approved it in the

[[Page 4908]]

Judiciary Committee with a bipartisan vote. I think the time has come 
to do two things. One would be for the Judiciary Committee--and I hope 
it will, and I believe the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Oversight and The Courts, Senator Schumer, is interested 
in doing this--to issue subpoenas to have these U.S. attorneys come 
before the Committee to answer questions about how their demanded 
resignations took place.
  Generally, a U.S. attorney is appointed for a term of four years, but 
serves at the pleasure of the President. If he wants to fire them he 
can. However, U.S. attorneys have very complicated and very difficult 
cases and I believe they must have some level of independence. The FBI, 
as we have heard in our oversight hearings, has raised the level of 
public corruption in their investigations.
  So if the FBI investigates a case and comes up with the evidence, a 
U.S. attorney is obviously bound to prosecute that case. How this 
affects David Iglesias, I don't know. But the fact that these people 
all had very good performance reviews causes me a great concern. I wish 
to read from those performance reviews.
  The performance review for John McKay of the Western District of 
Washington says:

       ``McKay is an effective, well-regarded and capable leader 
     of the [U.S. attorney's office] and the District's law 
     enforcement community,'' according to the team of 27 Justice 
     Department officials.

  David Iglesias, about whom I read the news story, of the District of 
New Mexico, got this performance review:

       The [U.S. Attorney] had a highly effective firearms 
     violence initiative and active and effective program to 
     address drug trafficking.

  Daniel Bogden, District of Nevada:

       United States Attorney Bogden was highly regarded by the 
     federal judiciary, the law enforcement and civil client 
     agencies, and the staff of the United States Attorney's 
     Office. He was a capable leader of the [office].

  Bud Cummins, who many of us know, in the Eastern District of 
Arkansas:

       The U.S. Attorney had an active, well managed anti-
     terrorism program . . . The Project Safe Neighborhoods 
     initiatives were being effectively implemented and 
     successfully managed.

  Carol Lam, Southern District of California, including San Diego, whom 
I am very familiar with:

       Carol Lam was an effective manager and respected leader in 
     the District . . . Appropriate management procedures and 
     practices were in place to ensure a quality written work 
     product.

  These are some of the snippets from the reviews. But clearly, the 
performance of these U.S. attorneys was not a reason to fire them.
  I truly believe what the Department of Justice intended to do was 
what they did in the Eastern District of Arkansas--bring in bright, 
young Republican political operatives to assume these roles to give 
them a leg up and fire or require the resignation of these U.S. 
attorneys.
  When I began to inquire into it, I asked whether interviews for 
replacements were taking place within these offices, particularly in 
San Diego. At that time, no one in the office was being interviewed as 
a replacement. Since these hearings have begun, individuals within the 
office have been interviewed. In fact, one has been appointed to fill 
in for former U.S. Attorney Carol Lam.
  I truly believe there was an effort to use this section of the 
PATRIOT Act reauthorization to bring political operatives into these 
offices, and I think it is a matter of urgency for us to pass the 
legislation that was marked up by the Judiciary Committee. Absent that, 
there is no recourse, other than to issue subpoenas, to have these 
former U.S. attorneys come before the committee and be able to ask them 
some hard questions.
  I think when a U.S. attorney who has served, and served well, is 
summarily dismissed for no real reason, it is a problem. We all know 
the U.S. attorney in San Diego brought the prosecution of a Member of 
the House of Representatives who is serving consequential time for 
major felonies and had subpoenas outstanding for other Members of the 
House and was summarily told in December that she should resign--in 
this case--by the end of January. That is not right.
  So the only way I know to right the wrong is to restore the law to 
where it was before the PATRIOT Act reauthorization. That law is this 
amendment and the amendment is very simple. It simply says that the 
Attorney General may appoint an interim U.S. attorney to a vacancy for 
120 days. After 120 days, if a nominee has not been confirmed by the 
Senate, the district court in the district where the vacancy exists can 
make an appointment. This provides the incentive for the administration 
to move a nominee. I should say there are 13 vacancies, of which only 3 
nominees have presently been sent to the Senate. If you combine those 
13 vacancies with the seven new vacancies, then over 20 percent of the 
U.S. attorney positions could be filled without Senate confirmation if 
we assume the intent was not to send a nominee to the Senate. Of 
course, the administration will decry this and say that is not the 
case. Nonetheless, there were 13 vacancies and now seven new vacancies 
with only 3 nominees before the Judiciary Committee for review and for 
approval by the full Senate.
  If the law is left as it is, any Attorney General or President could 
essentially appoint every single U.S. attorney as an interim U.S. 
attorney, not subject to confirmation. If you consider the work of the 
U.S. attorneys--the public corruption, the major narcotics cases, the 
immigration cases, the complicated Federal law they carry out--I think 
every Member of this body would believe that confirmation by the Senate 
for every U.S. attorney should be assured. This amendment will carry 
that forward.
  I was shocked to read about David Iglesias. I don't know whether it 
is accurate. I know it appeared in the news. Based on that, he has said 
he believes he was forced out for a political reason. There is only one 
way to find out, and that is for the Judiciary Committee to issue 
subpoenas, have these U.S. attorneys come before us, and ask a number 
of hard questions.
  I am hopeful this body will see fit to pass this amendment. It is 
simple, short, direct, and it solves the problem.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, knowing the Senator from California as I 
do, I am certain a lot of the issues she has raised are serious ones, 
deserving of scrutiny. They are, however, under the jurisdiction of the 
Judiciary Committee and not the Homeland Security Committee. As such, I 
don't feel that I, at this time, have the expertise or the knowledge to 
evaluate the amendment that has been filed by the Senator from 
California. That is why I am objecting to the amendment. It is not 
because of its merits but because it is not relevant to this debate. I 
have not had a chance to look at it, and it is not in the jurisdiction 
of the Homeland Security Committee.
  I will say to my colleagues that the Senator from Connecticut and I 
have been working very hard in a bipartisan way to try to keep the 
focus of this bill on issues to improve our homeland security. We were 
very pleased that, despite the overwhelming importance of the debate on 
Iraq, there had been an agreement by our leaders to try to keep that 
debate for the next issue to come before the Senate, rather than having 
it tied in with this bill. Similarly, the families of the victims of 9/
11 have made a plea to all of us to focus on this bill and to keep 
extraneous issues off this bill and rather focus on issues the 9/11 
Commission raised. That is what we are attempting to do. I have no 
doubt this is an important issue, an issue that is worthy of debate, an 
issue that is worthy of scrutiny by the Judiciary Committee, based on 
the explanation of the Senator from California, for whom I have a great 
deal of respect. But it is an issue that is completely outside the 
jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Committee.
  For that reason, my hope is the Senator from California will look at 
this as an opportunity to educate us on the issue but will not proceed 
with this amendment because it is not at all relevant to the bill 
before us.

[[Page 4909]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise to follow up on the comments of my 
friend from California, who has legislation I am proud to cosponsor on 
the general issue of the fired U.S. attorneys.
  Mr. President, it is said that ``where there is smoke there is 
fire.'' As we look at the case of the U.S. attorneys, that is more and 
more likely to be true.
  Today, according to the McClatchy Newspapers, one of the fired U.S. 
attorneys from New Mexico said that ``two Members of Congress 
separately called in mid-October to inquire about the timing of an 
ongoing probe of a kickback scheme and appeared eager for an indictment 
to be issued on the eve of the elections in order to benefit the 
Republicans.''
  That is a quote in an article by Marisa Taylor of the McClatchy 
Newspapers. Frankly, it comes as no surprise to me. That is because 
David Iglesias, the U.S. attorney, told my staff the same thing the day 
before. He asked, in fact, that he be brought to Washington--was 
willing, rather, to be brought to Washington, under the power of 
subpoena, to tell his story. We have inquired of the fired U.S. 
attorneys. The overwhelming majority of them want to tell more but feel 
honor-bound not to do it, except if they were brought under the power 
of subpoena to Washington.
  So I join certainly in the request of my colleague from California 
and others. I have already spoken to Senator Leahy, and we are 
examining how that can be accomplished. Senator Leahy is very mindful 
of the fact that the Judiciary Committee doesn't issue subpoenas willy-
nilly. But given the fact that some of the U.S. attorneys expressed a 
desire to testify, and others said they would be willing to testify, 
and now with these new revelations, the fear many of us had that these 
U.S. attorneys were summarily fired not for no reason and not for a 
good reason but for a bad reason is coming closer to reality.
  Mr. President, we must get to the bottom of this issue. The U.S. 
attorney is the lead enforcer of the law in his or her jurisdiction. 
Fortunately, for decades, the U.S. attorneys, almost without exception, 
have been insulated from the political process, even though they are 
chosen in part by the political process. So when six were fired in one 
evening, and when it later became clear in hearings I held that at 
least one, by the admission of the Deputy Attorney General, was fired 
for no reason, and a call from the White House to suggest a replacement 
who was someone with very little legal experience but someone who had 
worked for both Karl Rove and the RNC, I believe it was, you can 
imagine the concern that not only the Senator from California and I had 
but the concern throughout the country in law enforcement--
nonpolitical, simply a desire to protect the integrity of the U.S. 
attorneys. So we must do two things now.
  These new revelations are extremely troubling. They would show 
politics at its worst--the long hand of the Justice Department reaching 
out to fire U.S. attorneys who would not do what was politically asked. 
At least that is a very real suspicion. So we must get to the bottom of 
this. The only way to do that is to call before us the fired U.S. 
attorneys and hear their side of the story.
  I remind my colleagues that we did have a briefing--the Senator from 
California was there, the Senator from Rhode Island was there--and then 
were shown the evaluation reports, the EARS reports, and almost to a 
person the fired U.S. attorneys received very good evaluations from 
their peers and from everybody else. If you read those evaluations, you 
would say: Oh, they will keep that person in office for as long as he 
or she wants to stay. But instead, they were fired.
  In private conversations my staff has had with them, they have grave 
suspicions as to why--some of them more than grave suspicions. Today, 
Mr. Iglesias said publicly what he told my staff privately, that he has 
a very troubling view that he may well have been fired because he 
refused to bend his U.S. attorney's office to politics of the worst 
sort.
  So there are two imperatives here. One, as I said, is to get to the 
bottom of this and get to the bottom of it quickly. The second is to 
pass legislation that restores the appointment of U.S. attorneys away 
or at least removes it somewhat from the political realm because when 
the Senate must confirm or when an independent judge must temporarily 
appoint, there is a check, there is a balance that was removed, 
unbeknownst to almost all of us, in the PATRIOT Act. The minute that 
passed, people were surprised and wondered: Why did it happen? The 
explanation from the administration didn't quite ring true. Then, on 
the evening of December 7, when six U.S. attorneys were called at once 
and fired and not given any reason, suspicions went further. The 
investigations my subcommittee has had, with the help of our chairman, 
the Senator from Vermont, and the Senator from California, who has 
taken a keen interest in this issue and is lead sponsor of the 
legislation, have gotten worse every day.
  As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the expression goes: Where 
there is smoke, there is fire. Every day, not only is there more smoke 
in this investigation of the firing of the U.S. attorneys, but there 
seems to be, unfortunately, a real fire. We will not rest until we get 
to the bottom of this matter, to see what happened, to see if possibly 
any rules, regulations, or even laws were broken. By bringing it to 
light, it will importune this body, the other body, and the White House 
to pass legislation so that it cannot happen again.
  Mr. President, in sum, this is serious stuff. When U.S. attorneys are 
fired for political reasons, fired to stand in the way of justice 
rather than promote justice, it puts a dagger into the heart of the 
faith Americans have in their Government and in their system of 
justice. That faith, fortunately, is long and deep, but if we don't get 
to the bottom of this, if we don't change the law to make sure it 
doesn't happen again, we will be weakening permanently our system of 
justice and the faith the public has in it.
  We will move forward in whatever way we can. Hopefully, we will find 
it is possible to subpoena these attorneys and subpoena them quickly 
and then take the necessary action in these cases and prevent future 
cases from occurring, which justice and the faith the people have in 
the American system demand.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, the remarks the Senator from 
California and the Senator from New York have made today are very well 
taken, and I rise to express my shared concern with them and my support 
for their initiative to get to the bottom of what took place. In May of 
1994 I had the honor to be sworn in as Rhode Island's U.S. attorney. It 
was one of the great honors of my life, equivalent to the great honor 
of being sworn in with you, Mr. President, into this extraordinary 
body. I knew when I took that oath that I would be forced to make very 
hard decisions and that my independence and my integrity would be my 
strongest allies as I discharged the extraordinarily difficult and 
powerful responsibilities of a U.S. attorney.
  Last December, seven U.S. attorneys were fired by the Department of 
Justice, all on the very same day. That is unprecedented. Never, to my 
knowledge, in the history of the Department have so many heads of U.S. 
attorneys rolled all on the same day. These men and women had been 
confirmed in this great Chamber. By all indications, they were well 
qualified and performing well in their jobs. Several of them were 
involved in ongoing public corruption investigations. Yet in this 
unprecedented step, this administration showed them all the door. It 
suggests to us all the question: why might such an extraordinary act 
have taken place; why were they told their services were no longer 
required?
  The Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, told us this:


[[Page 4910]]

       What we do is make an evaluation about the performance of 
     individuals, and I have a responsibility to the people in 
     your district that we have the best possible people in these 
     positions.

  Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty testified that ``turnover in the 
position of U.S. attorney is not uncommon.''
  So the two suggestions that were made were that this was performance 
related, that a performance evaluation had been done of these 
individuals and they had not measured up, and that it was just 
turnover. It is hard to accommodate both of those stories, but when one 
looks into each of them, it makes even less sense.
  The committee, through Senator Schumer and Senator Feinstein, asked 
to see the Evaluation and Review Staff reports, what is called an EARS 
evaluation. When I was a U.S. attorney in Rhode Island, I lived through 
an EARS evaluation. All the local agencies were interviewed by career 
U.S. attorney services staff, detailed to Rhode Island just for the 
purpose of doing these evaluations. They happen in every office every 3 
years. They are a significant part of the oversight and management 
practice of the Department of Justice, and they are extremely thorough.
  We asked to see the reports. When it was clear that we were going to 
ask to see these performance evaluations, the Department began to back 
down. Mr. McNulty told the committee:

       We are ready to stipulate that the removal of the U.S. 
     attorneys may or may not be something supported by an EARS 
     report because it may be something performance related that 
     isn't the subject of what the evaluators saw or when they saw 
     it or how it came up, and so forth.

  There isn't much that an EARS evaluation doesn't look at, and 
contrary views began to emerge from the Department very shortly.
  In an article published February 4, the Washington Post reported 
that:

       [O]ne administration official, who spoke on the condition 
     of anonymity in discussing personnel issues, said the spate 
     of firings was the result of ``pressure from people who make 
     personnel decisions outside of Justice who wanted to make 
     some things happen in those places.''

  Let's look at some of those places. In Arkansas, H.E. Bud Cummins III 
was a 5-year veteran U.S. attorney serving in Arkansas's Eastern 
District. Last June, he was asked to resign. The man chosen to replace 
the well-respected Mr. Cummins was Tim Griffin. Mr. Griffin is 37 years 
old. He served as Special Assistant to Assistant Attorney General 
Michael Chertoff in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, 
where he was sent as a detailee to the Arkansas U.S. Attorney's Office.
  What Mr. Griffin lacked in prosecutorial experience, he more than 
made up for in political experience. Mr. Griffin is a former aide to 
Presidential adviser Karl Rove. He is also a former Republican National 
Committee research director. As those of us who have been through this 
sort of thing know, ``research director'' is not about looking up old 
statutes; it is about prying into personal lives of other candidates in 
order to try to dig up dirt on them.
  A more partisan choice could not have been made to replace Mr. 
Cummins. Remember, Mr. McNulty said:

       The Department is committed to having the best person 
     possible for discharging the responsibilities of that office 
     at all times in every district.

  It is just hard to believe that Mr. Tim Griffin was the best person 
possible, at least not as we ordinarily define those terms. At the end 
of our Judiciary hearing, Mr. McNulty admitted that Mr. Cummins, the 
Government's chief prosecutor in Little Rock, Arkansas, was fired to 
give Mr. Griffin the opportunity to have the appointment.
  In San Diego, U.S. attorney Carol Lam successfully prosecuted Duke 
Cunningham, who pled guilty and resigned in 2005. She subpoenaed the 
House Armed Services, Appropriations, and Intelligence Committees in 
connection with a probe into Defense Department contracts. Her office 
indicted Kyle ``Dusty'' Foggo, the CIA's former Executive Director, and 
Brent Wilkes, a defense contractor and top Republican fundraiser.
  In her district, former Reagan U.S. attorney Peter Nunez--another 
Republican political appointee familiar with the world of U.S. 
attorneys because he served there himself; he served from 1982 to 
1988--said this:

       It's just like nothing I have ever seen before in 35-plus 
     years. To be asked to resign and to be publicly humiliated by 
     leaking this to the press is beyond any bounds of decency and 
     behavior. It shocks me. It is really outrageous.

  San Diego's top-ranking FBI official, Dan Dzwilewski, also commented 
on Lam's firing. Bear in mind, this is the Director of the FBI office 
that is operating as lead agency in these public corruption 
investigations. His quote:

       I guarantee politics is involved . . . It will be a huge 
     loss from my perspective.

  Other U.S. attorneys, such as David Iglesias of New Mexico and John 
McKay of Seattle, said they had no idea why they were being asked to 
step down.
  That changed recently. Today was posted a story from which I will 
quote:

       The U.S. attorney from New Mexico who was recently fired by 
     the Bush administration said Wednesday that he believes he 
     was forced out because he refused to rush an indictment in an 
     ongoing probe of local Democrats a month before November's 
     Congressional elections.
       David Iglesias said two members of Congress separately 
     called in mid October to inquire about the timing of an 
     ongoing probe of a kickback scheme and appeared eager for an 
     indictment to be issued on the eve of the elections in order 
     to benefit the Republicans. He refused to name the members of 
     Congress because he said he feared retaliation. . . .
       ``U.S. Attorney Daniel Bogden, who also stepped down 
     Wednesday after being asked to leave in December'' had it 
     recently reported in the Wall Street Journal that the FBI was 
     investigating in his district allegations ``whether Nevada 
     Governor Jim Gibbons performed any official acts on behalf of 
     a contract in exchange for gifts or payments. Gibbons, a 
     Republican, has denied any wrongdoing.''
       Bogden said he hoped that the ongoing case did not have 
     anything to do with his ouster.

  This is his quote:

       You would like to think that the reason you're put in the 
     position as U.S. attorney is because you are willing to step 
     up to the plate and take on big cases, Bogden said.
       It's not a good thing if you begin to wonder whether you'll 
     lose your job if you pursue them.

  Last month, a Las Vegas newspaper reported:

       a GOP source said . . . the decision to remove U.S. 
     attorneys, primarily in the West, was part of a plan to 
     ``give somebody else that experience'' to build up the back 
     bench of Republicans by giving them high-profile jobs.

  These are extremely troubling facts. The New York Times has recently 
editorialized on this subject and hypothesized three reasons for why 
these well-qualified attorneys were fired. As the New York Times said, 
``all political and all disturbing.'' The first reason: helping 
friends; the second, candidate recruitment; the third, Presidential 
politics.
  The newspaper concluded that the politicization of Government over 
the last 6 years has had tragic consequences in New Orleans, in Iraq, 
and elsewhere, but allowing politics to infect U.S. Attorney's Offices 
takes it to a whole new level. Congress should continue to pursue the 
case of the fired U.S. attorneys vigorously, both to find out what 
really happened and to make sure that it does not happen again.
  I would like to highlight two further concerns that come from my 
experience as a U.S. attorney. One concern is how this alters the 
balance between U.S. Attorney's Offices and what we used to call main 
Justice, and the second concern is the chilling effect on prosecutions 
of public corruption.
  There is constant tension between the U.S. attorneys in the field and 
main Justice. The U.S. attorneys know their districts, they have 
practiced before those judges, they know their office's capabilities 
very well, and they have their own local priorities. Of course, the 
Department of Justice also has its own priorities, its national 
priorities set by the President, and the tension between those two is 
healthy and is constant. In getting its message out to the U.S. 
attorneys, the Department has a wide array of ways to send its signals 
and make its wishes known, but to take six or seven well-performing 
U.S. attorneys and sack them

[[Page 4911]]

all at once ends that dialogue. It brings the blunt instrument of, not 
even persuasion any longer, but brute force, to bear.
  Now, there can very well be policy differences between the Department 
of Justice and local offices, but this would be a first for the 
Department of Justice, to say: You haven't emphasized this enough so we 
are going to have your head. It will squash the healthy tension between 
U.S. attorneys and between the Department, and at least in my 
experience, the greater wisdom of the Department of Justice versus that 
of all the U.S. attorneys in the field was not such that it justifies 
this level of force in emphasis and enforcement and in the demand for 
conformity with its policy positions.
  I submit there is long-term damage to the capabilities of the 
Department of Justice as this tension is disrupted. We live in a 
country of checks and balances, and tensions like these are very often 
the best things for the public we serve when they are allowed to be 
maintained in a healthy fashion.
  The second point I would make is the chilling effect on prosecutions 
of public corruption. This applies particularly with respect to Ms. Lam 
in California. In many respects, she had become the leading edge of the 
Federal Government's sword point on public corruption investigation 
because of the investigations that I mentioned earlier in my remarks. 
Her office was leading the biggest public corruption cases in the 
Nation, with more to come it appears. U.S. Attorney Lam was personally 
at the helm of these investigations, and she was well qualified for 
that role. Her unceremonious expulsion from office will send a 
shockwave through the offices of her fellow U.S. attorneys, and that 
shockwave will carry a very unfortunate message because these cases are 
not easy ones.
  Public corruption cases are resource intensive for the office 
involved. They are extraordinarily challenging. Witnesses are scarce 
and difficult, significant agent expertise is required, internal 
procedures governing the investigation itself are complex and onerous, 
and launching one's office at established political figures is a 
decision with potentially serious consequences not only for the U.S. 
attorney but for the career people in that office. Someone who has come 
through all of that and moved out onto the leading edge of public 
corruption investigation for this country, I believe, merits the active 
support of the Department of Justice not just for the good work done 
but as a message and a signal to U.S. attorneys around the country that 
when they step out into that public corruption arena, we will back them 
up.
  The signal to the contrary is a dangerous one. When a U.S. attorney 
gets fired, and one who was deep into a public corruption investigation 
and is leading it so well that their termination draws a public rebuke 
from the FBI chief, antennae will go up across the country.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks a letter that the Attorney 
General has received from the National Association of Former United 
States Attorneys.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Clinton). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, the sentence in that letter which 
strikes me as the most significant is:

       We are concerned that the role of the United States 
     Attorneys may have been undermined by what may have been 
     political considerations which run counter to the proper 
     administration of justice and the traditions of the 
     Department of Justice.

  This is not a good day. This is not the sort of thing that we need to 
be discussing. This is not the sort of thing that we should be 
discussing. As Senator Schumer earlier said, there is a lot of smoke in 
the air right now, and it looks as if there is actually some fire. It 
is truly incumbent on this body, the body which confirmed these 
individuals to their offices and which has oversight responsibility 
with the Department of Justice, to look into what is happening and to 
reestablish the procedures to prevent this from happening again.
  I yield the floor, and I thank the Chair.

                               Exhibit 1

         The National Association of Former United States 
           Attorneys,
                                                February 14, 2007.
     Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales,
     Attorney General of the United States, United States 
         Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

     Re: Media Reports of Termination of United States Attorneys
       Dear Attorney General Gonzales, We are the President and 
     Executive Director of the National Association of Former 
     United States Attorneys (``NAFUSA''). NAFUSA was founded in 
     March 1979 to promote, defend and further the integrity and 
     the preservation of the litigating authority and independence 
     of the Office of the United States Attorney. Our membership 
     includes United States Attorneys from every administration 
     back to President Kennedy and includes former United States 
     Attorneys from every state in the union. It is with this 
     mission and with our cumulative experience as United States 
     Attorneys that we write.
       We are very troubled with recent press accounts concerning 
     the termination of a sizable number of United States 
     Attorneys. Historically, United States Attorneys have had a 
     certain degree of independence because of the unique and 
     integral role the United States Attorneys play in federal law 
     enforcement Among other things, the United States Attorney 
     establishes and maintains working and trusting relationships 
     with key federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. 
     In many respects, while the United States Attorney is a 
     representative of the Department of Justice in each district, 
     the United States Attorney also brings to bear his or her 
     experience and knowledge of the law enforcement needs of the 
     district in establishing priorities and allocating resources. 
     Most importantly, United States Attorneys have maintained a 
     strong. tradition of insuring that the laws of the United 
     States are faithfully executed, without favor to anyone and 
     without regard to any political consideration. It is for 
     these reasons that the usual practice has been for United 
     States Attorneys to be permitted to serve for the duration of 
     the administration that appointed them.
       We are concerned that the role of the United States 
     Attorneys may have been undermined by what may have been 
     political considerations which run counter to the proper 
     administration of justice and the tradition of the Department 
     of Justice. While we certainly recognize that the United 
     States Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President, we 
     would vigorously oppose any effort by any Attorney General to 
     remove a United States Attorney as a result of political 
     displeasure or for political reward. Any such effort would 
     undermine the confidence of the federal judiciary, federal 
     and local law enforcement agencies, the public, and the 
     thousands of Assistant United States Attorneys working in 
     those offices.
       We do not mean to suggest that we know the reasons for each 
     of the terminations or, for that matter, all of the relevant 
     facts. Indeed, we encourage the Department of Justice and 
     Congress to make as full and as complete a disclosure of the 
     facts surrounding these firings as is permissible. Still, the 
     reported facts are troubling, perhaps unique in the annals of 
     the Department of Justice, and certainly raise questions as 
     to whether political considerations prompted the decision to 
     terminate so many United States Attorneys. It may well be 
     that legislative attention or a written policy of the 
     Department of Justice is necessary to deal with this and 
     similar situations in the future to afford continuity and 
     protection to United States Attorneys. We will be happy to 
     assist the Department or Congress in any such effort.
           Sincerely yours,
     Atlee W. Wampler III,
       President.
     B. Mahlon Brown,
       Executive Director.


                     Amendment No. 279, as Modified

  Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, I ask for regular order in regards to my 
amendment No. 279. I have a modification of that amendment that I would 
like to send to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's amendment is pending. He has the 
right to modify it. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

(Purpose: To specify the criminal offenses that disqualify an applicant 
          from the receipt of a transportation security card)

         At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PROHIBITION OF ISSUANCE OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
                   CARDS TO CONVICTED FELONS.

         (a) In General.--Section 70105 of title 46, United States 
     Code, is amended--
         (1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``decides that the 
     individual poses a security risk under subsection (c)'' and 
     inserting ``determines under subsection (c) that the 
     individual poses a security risk''; and

[[Page 4912]]

         (2) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (1) to read 
     as follows:
         ``(1) Disqualifications.--
         ``(A) Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except 
     as provided under paragraph (2), an individual is permanently 
     disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation 
     security card under subsection (b) if the individual has been 
     convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a 
     civilian or military jurisdiction of any of the following 
     felonies:
         ``(i) Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.
         ``(ii) Sedition or conspiracy to commit sedition.
         ``(iii) Treason or conspiracy to commit treason.
         ``(iv) A Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in 
     section 2332b(g) of title 18), a comparable State law, or 
     conspiracy to commit such crime.
         ``(v) A crime involving a transportation security 
     incident.
         ``(vi) Improper transportation of a hazardous material 
     under section 5124 of title 49, or a comparable State law.
         ``(vii) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, 
     manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, 
     transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an 
     explosive or explosive device. In this clause, an explosive 
     or explosive device includes--

         ``(I) an explosive (as defined in sections 232(5) and 
     844(j) of title 18);
         ``(II) explosive materials (as defined in subsections (c) 
     through (f) of section 841 of title 18); and
         ``(III) a destructive device (as defined in 921(a)(4) of 
     title 18 and section 5845(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
     1986).

         ``(viii) Murder.
         ``(ix) Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false 
     information knowing the same to be false, concerning the 
     deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or 
     other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a 
     State or other government facility, a public transportation 
     system, or an infrastructure facility.
         ``(x) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
     Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.), or a comparable 
     State law, if 1 of the predicate acts found by a jury or 
     admitted by the defendant consists of 1 of the crimes listed 
     in this subparagraph.
         ``(xi) Attempt to commit any of the crimes listed in 
     clauses (i) through (iv).
         ``(xii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes 
     described in clauses (v) through (x).
         ``(B) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as 
     provided under paragraph (2), an individual is disqualified 
     from being issued a biometric transportation security card 
     under subsection (b) if the individual has been convicted, or 
     found not guilty by reason of insanity, during the 7-year 
     period ending on the date on which the individual applies for 
     such card, or was released from incarceration during the 5-
     year period ending on the date on which the individual 
     applies for such card, of any of the following felonies:
         ``(i) Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture, 
     purchase, distribution, receipt, transfer, shipping, 
     transporting, delivery, import, export of, or dealing in a 
     firearm or other weapon. In this clause, a firearm or other 
     weapon includes--

         ``(I) firearms (as defined in section 921(a)(3) of title 
     18 and section 5845(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); 
     and
         ``(II) items contained on the United States Munitions 
     Import List under section 447.21 of title 27, Code of Federal 
     Regulations.

         ``(ii) Extortion.
         ``(iii) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, 
     including identity fraud and money laundering if the money 
     laundering is related to a crime described in this 
     subparagraph or subparagraph (A). In this clause, welfare 
     fraud and passing bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, 
     fraud, or misrepresentation.
         ``(iv) Bribery.
         ``(v) Smuggling.
         ``(vi) Immigration violations.
         ``(vii) Distribution of, possession with intent to 
     distribute, or importation of a controlled substance.
         ``(viii) Arson.
         ``(ix) Kidnapping or hostage taking.
         ``(x) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.
         ``(xi) Assault with intent to kill.
         ``(xii) Robbery.
         ``(xiii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the 
     crimes listed in this subparagraph.
         ``(xiv) Fraudulent entry into a seaport under section 
     1036 of title 18, or a comparable State law.
         ``(xv) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and 
     Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.) or a 
     comparable State law, other than any of the violations listed 
     in subparagraph (A)(x).
         ``(C) Under want warrant, or indictment.--An applicant 
     who is wanted, or under indictment, in any civilian or 
     military jurisdiction for a felony listed in this paragraph, 
     is disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation 
     security card under subsection (b) until the want or warrant 
     is released or the indictment is dismissed.
         ``(D) Determination of arrest status.--
         ``(i) In general.--If a fingerprint-based check discloses 
     an arrest for a disqualifying crime listed in this section 
     without indicating a disposition, the Transportation Security 
     Administration shall notify the applicant of such disclosure 
     and provide the applicant with instructions on how the 
     applicant can clear the disposition, in accordance with 
     clause (ii).
         ``(ii) Burden of proof.--In order to clear a disposition 
     under this subparagraph, an applicant shall submit written 
     proof to the Transportation Security Administration, not 
     later than 60 days after receiving notification under clause 
     (i), that the arrest did not result in conviction for the 
     disqualifying criminal offense.
         ``(iii) Notification of disqualification.--If the 
     Transportation Security Administration does not receive proof 
     in accordance with the Transportation Security 
     Administration's procedures for waiver of criminal offenses 
     and appeals, the Transportation Security Administration shall 
     notify--

         ``(I) the applicant that he or she is disqualified from 
     being issued a biometric transportation security card under 
     subsection (b);
         ``(II) the State that the applicant is disqualified, in 
     the case of a hazardous materials endorsement; and
         ``(III) the Coast Guard that the applicant is 
     disqualified, if the applicant is a mariner.

         ``(E) Other potential disqualifications.--Except as 
     provided under subparagraphs (A) through (C), an individual 
     may not be denied a transportation security card under 
     subsection (b) unless the Secretary determines that 
     individual--
         ``(i) has been convicted within the preceding 7-year 
     period of a felony or found not guilty by reason of insanity 
     of a felony--

         ``(I) that the Secretary believes could cause the 
     individual to be a terrorism security risk to the United 
     States; or
         ``(II) for causing a severe transportation security 
     incident;

         ``(ii) has been released from incarceration within the 
     preceding 5-year period for committing a felony described in 
     clause (i);
         ``(iii) may be denied admission to the United States or 
     removed from the United States under the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); or
         ``(iv) otherwise poses a terrorism security risk to the 
     United States.''.
         ``(F) Modification of listed offenses.--The Secretary 
     may, by rulemaking, add the offenses described in paragraph 
     (1)(A) or (B).''.
         (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 70101 of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended--
         (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as 
     paragraphs (3) through (7); and
         (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
         ``(2) The term `economic disruption' does not include a 
     work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to 
     terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute.''.

  Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, if I can make a couple of comments about 
the modification, many will recall that this amendment is focused on 
our ports and the security of our ports. I think all of us are well 
aware that as a nation we see that our ports of entry, whether they be 
in Seattle, New York, or Charleston, SC, could be our most vulnerable 
points when it comes to smuggling in a weapon of mass destruction. We 
have committed many resources and lots of technology to try to detect 
radiation and other types of weapons that might be smuggled into our 
country that could hurt Americans and destroy American cities, and we 
are making some progress. But there is a lot more to be done.
  All the spending, all the technology, all the equipment in the world 
will make no difference at all if we don't have the right people 
working in the secure areas of our ports. We need to make sure those 
people are the most trusted we have, just as we do in our airports. Our 
responsibility, whether it is homeland security as an administration or 
we as the Congress, is to make sure these people are screened and that 
we have the best and the most trusted individuals working in our secure 
areas. This is very important.
  My amendment focuses on just that subject. It prohibits convicted 
felons from working in the secure areas of our ports. This is common 
sense to most Americans, and I think it is common sense to most in this 
Senate because when this exact same amendment was offered last year, 
when we were dealing with port security specifically, everyone voted 
for this amendment in the Senate. Unfortunately, that amendment was 
stripped out when we had a conference with the House.
  Many of my colleagues have encouraged me to reintroduce this 
amendment, Republicans and Democrats

[[Page 4913]]

alike, and that is exactly what I have done. I understand the Senator 
from Hawaii is considering introducing a modification that would allow 
the Secretary to eliminate some of these felonies that we have listed 
in our amendment. Please keep in mind that the listed felonies are the 
exact same ones that homeland security has listed in the regulation 
that they have put in force at their agency. So this amendment puts in 
law what homeland security has already put into regulation.
  The importance of putting it in law is that we already suspect this 
legislation will be contested; that there will be delays, there will be 
challenges, and we need to make sure that our ports are secure. The 
modification of my amendment would allow the Secretary to add felonies 
in the future which may become important but that are not now listed. 
We think it would be a huge mistake if we put in law something that 
allowed future administrations to eliminate felonies that are 
specifically laid out in regulation and in this amendment I am 
offering.
  If anyone in the Senate would like to eliminate some of the felonies 
that we have listed, I would encourage them to come to the Senate floor 
and let's discuss those that they would like to eliminate. Maybe they 
would like to have some of these folks working in the secure areas of 
our ports, folks who have committed espionage, sedition, treason, 
terrorism, crimes involving transportation security, improper transport 
of hazardous material, unlawful use of an explosive device, bomb 
threats, or murder. These are specifically listed. If there are some of 
these that we think should be eliminated, let's discuss them.
  Homeland Security has evaluated this and has listed these, just like 
we have for our airports, to keep our ports secure.
  I am offering this modification that would allow our Secretary to add 
felonies but prohibit the elimination of these felonies which we think 
are so important to our security.
  I thank the Chair for the opportunity to offer this modification, and 
I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank the Senator from South 
Carolina for his modification. We talked about this briefly. I think he 
is heading in the right direction. We are taking a look at the 
amendment as it is offered, and we look forward to working together. I 
think the purposes are very important.
  I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to add Ms. 
Murkowski, a Senator from Alaska, as a cosponsor to the Collins 
amendment No. 277.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 277

  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, speaking of the Collins amendment on 
REAL ID, cosponsored by Senators Alexander, Mikulski, Carper, Cantwell, 
Snowe, Chambliss, and Murkowski, I bring to my colleagues' attention 
the several groups representing Governors, State legislatures, and 
others who are now speaking in favor of passage of this amendment. In 
addition, as the Presiding Officer so ably represents the State of New 
York, there was a Newsday editorial today also endorsing the amendment 
with its 2-year delay.
  The National Governors Association has also issued a statement that 
says:

       Senator Collins' bipartisan amendment recognizes the need 
     to give state officials and other interested parties the 
     right to review regulations and suggest modifications.

  It goes on to say:

       This proposal would provide states a more workable time 
     frame to comply with federal standards, ensure necessary 
     systems are operational and enhance the input states and 
     other stakeholders have in the implementation process.

  We have also heard from the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees, a union that is affiliated with the AFL-CIO, which 
has written a letter as well. It says:

       It is clear that the states do not have the capacity to 
     comply with the REAL ID Act by the 2008 deadline and that a 
     number of serious concerns related to privacy must be 
     addressed. The Collins amendment provides the opportunity to 
     address these matters.

  Similarly, another group with whom we have worked closely is the 
National Conference of State Legislatures. In fact, it was a high-
ranking official of the NCSL who sat next to me on a plane going to 
Maine some time ago and suggested that what States needed most was a 
delay in the compliance time. I worked very closely with the NCSL in 
drafting our amendment. I am very grateful for their advice.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letters and editorials I have 
mentioned be printed in the Record so we may share them with our 
colleagues.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

        [From the National Governors Association, Feb. 28, 2007]

         NGA Praises Congressional Movement To Correct REAL ID

       Washington.--On behalf of the nation's governors, the 
     National Governors Association (NGA) issued the following 
     statement regarding the introduction of an amendment to delay 
     implementation of Real ID.
       ``Governors praise Senator Susan Collins, ranking member of 
     the Senate Homeland Security Committee, for introducing an 
     amendment to address the issues raised by the Real ID Act of 
     2005. This proposal would provide states a more workable time 
     frame to comply with federal standards, ensure necessary 
     systems are operational and enhance the input states and 
     other stakeholders have in the implementation process.
       ``Improving the security and integrity of their drivers' 
     license systems is vital; however, the substantial costs and 
     looming implementation deadline make Real ID unworkable and 
     unreasonable. NGA has called on the Department of Homeland 
     Security and Congress to fix the law by providing additional 
     time, resources and flexibility for states to enhance their 
     systems.
       ``Senator Collins' bipartisan amendment recognizes the need 
     to give state officials and other interested parties the 
     right to review regulations and suggest modifications. This 
     allows governors and state legislators to help create 
     reasonable standards and ensure the act is implemented in a 
     cost-effective and feasible manner with maximum safety and 
     minimum inconvenience for all Americans.''
                                  ____

         American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
           employees, AFL-CIO,
                                Washington, DC, February 27, 2007.
       Dear Senator: On behalf of the 1.4 million members of the 
     American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
     (AFSCME), I am writing with respect to the Senate debate over 
     S. 4, legislation to implement 9/11 Commission 
     recommendations.
       We understand that an amendment may be offered, possibly by 
     Senator DeMint, to strike or weaken a provision in the bill 
     that gives Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
     screeners collective bargaining and other civil service 
     protections. We strongly urge you to oppose this amendment. 
     In addition, we urge you to support an amendment to be 
     offered by Senator Collins that would delay implementation of 
     requirements under the REAL ID Act and to reopen negotiated 
     rulemaking of the Act.
       With respect to the DeMint amendment, it is important to 
     highlight that civil service protections, backed up by 
     collective bargaining, ensure that federal employment is 
     efficient, fair, open to all, free from political 
     interference and staffed by honest, competent and dedicated 
     employees. Civil service protections and collective 
     bargaining rights ensure that federal employees are able to 
     fulfill their assignments with professional integrity and a 
     commitment to the public interest. The decision to take away 
     civil service protections and collective bargaining rights 
     has resulted in a demoralized workforce, with injury and 
     illness rates that are six times higher than the federal 
     average and an attrition rate that is more than ten times 
     higher than the federal employee average. Clearly, the 
     removal of civil service protections and collective 
     bargaining rights has jeopardized the public, not made it 
     safer.
       With respect to the Collins amendment, we have previously 
     expressed our concern over the costs to the states to 
     implement the requirements under the REAL ID Act. It is clear 
     that states do not have the capacity to comply with the Act 
     by the 2008 deadline and that a number of serious concerns 
     related to privacy must be addressed. The Collins amendment 
     provides the opportunity to address these matters.
           Sincerely,
                                              Charles M. Loveless,
                                          Director of Legislation.

[[Page 4914]]

     
                                  ____
                    [From NCSL News, Feb. 20, 2007]

     State Lawmakers Encouraged by REAL ID Activity in U.S. Senate


 Senator Collins' measure to provide extra time, state input into the 
                           regulatory process

       Washington, DC.--The National Conference of State 
     Legislatures praises Maine Senator Susan Collins for 
     introducing legislation (S. 563) to address state concerns 
     over the Real ID Act, a measure which creates national 
     standards for state-issued drivers licenses and 
     identification cards.
       S. 563 addresses some of the recommendations for change 
     called for by NCSL, governors and motor vehicle 
     administrators in a September 2006 report--The REAL ID: 
     National Impact Analysis. Legislators throughout the country 
     support REAL ID's goal of making drivers licenses more 
     secure, but are frustrated by the rigidity of the law's 
     approach, the high costs it imposes on states and the 
     inordinately long time it has taken the Department of 
     Homeland Security to issue the regulations needed to 
     implement REAL ID.
       NCSL is encouraged that Senator Collins, ranking member of 
     the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     Committee, and other members of Congress are taking steps to 
     correct the problems associated with the law. S. 563 provides 
     a longer time frame to comply with the federal standards and 
     to ensure that necessary systems are operational. Senator 
     Collins' legislation also establishes a committee of state 
     officials and other interested parties to. review the draft 
     DHS regulations and to submit recommendations for regulatory 
     and legislative changes.
       NCSL's official policy statement calls for repeal of Real 
     10 if, by December 31 of this year, Congress fails to adopt 
     the necessary changes as outlined in the September 2006 
     report and if they fail to provide full funding for the law. 
     Senator Collins' legislation, therefore, is especially timely 
     and NCSL looks forward to working with her and her colleagues 
     to fix and fund the law.
       NCSL is the bipartisan organization that serves the 
     legislators and staff of the states, commonwealths and 
     territories. It provides research, technical assistance and 
     opportunities for policymakers to exchange ideas on the most 
     pressing state issues and is an effective and respected 
     advocate for the interests of the states in the American 
     federal system.
                                  ____


                [From Kennebec Journal Morning Sentinel]

                Addressing the Real Problems of REAL ID

       The REAL ID Act was passed by Congress in 2005. Part of a 
     suite of measures to beef up homeland security, the act 
     requires that by mid-2008, Americans must have a federally 
     approved ID card--most likely an enhanced driver's license--
     to travel on airplanes, collect government payments or use 
     government services and open a bank account. The national ID 
     cards would have to be machine-readable.
       As the deadline approaches for compliance with the act, 
     opposition to the mandate has grown. Late last month, the 
     Maine Legislature became the first in the nation to pass a 
     measure against the requirement, unequivocally refusing to 
     implement the act and urging Congress to repeal it. Too 
     expensive, too fast, too much of an invasion of privacy and 
     too burdensome to administer, said a bipartisan coalition of 
     Maine lawmakers. Estimate of the cost of compliance in Maine 
     alone is $185 million.
       The Legislature's rejection made news around the nation. 
     What Maine started threatened to become a tidal wave of state 
     opposition. In an effort to stem the momentum and salvage 
     what she considers good about the requirement, U.S. Sen. 
     Susan Collins Friday announced she's introducing legislation 
     to delay implementation of the act and provide states with a 
     more reasonable time frame for complying with its new 
     standards for drivers' licenses. ``The costs of complying 
     with REAL ID are enormous and overly burdensome to states, 
     including Maine,'' said Collins.
       We agree. Collins' legislation puts the brakes on a mandate 
     that raises significant concerns, as well as the broader 
     question of whether the REAL ID would ultimately be 
     effective.
       Her bill would give the Department of Homeland Security the 
     ability to delay or waive REAL ID requirements if states 
     don't have the technical capability to comply with it, or the 
     money.
       It furthermore calls to the discussion table the right 
     group of people to hammer out an alternative: federal and 
     state officials, privacy advocates and others with a stake in 
     the matter. We're encouraged that this senator, who has made 
     her name as an advocate of effective and real security 
     measures, has focused on finding a solution to the real 
     problems posed by REAL ID.
                                  ____


                      [From the Bangor Daily News]

                            Needed ID Delay

       By introducing a bill to slow the pace of new federal 
     identification rules, Sen. Susan Collins today is expected to 
     offer a way out of a growing confrontation between Washington 
     and the states. The bill would extend the deadline for REAL 
     ID by two years and recognize the cost burden currently 
     imposed on states. Additionally, it reopens the question of 
     how much information the federal government should 
     centralize.
       This pause is needed. Last week, for instance, Georgia 
     looked at REAL ID's expected price tag of between $30 million 
     and $60 million and declined to fund it. That follows Maine's 
     resolution to reject the program and likely precedes work in 
     about a dozen states that have legislation against REAL ID 
     before their legislatures. The Collins bill would reconvene 
     the panel that made recommendations on this issue and review 
     problems raised by the states, the standards for protecting 
     constitutional rights and civil liberties and the security of 
     the electronic information, among other issues.
       Under the current regulations, all Americans would have a 
     federally approved ID card by the end of next year. Usually 
     seen as a machine-readable driver's license, the card would 
     be needed not only for driving but all the standard uses--to 
     board airplanes, do business with the federal government, 
     open a bank account. One estimate put the cost to states for 
     transitioning to these new IDs at $11 billion.
       Besides cost, opponents of the standardized identification 
     program fear that REAL ID will result in a national database, 
     which the federal government may not be equipped to protect. 
     In particular, one provision would require states to verify 
     all documents required for the issuance of a driver's license 
     or identification card. That would require each state to have 
     agreements with all other states or, more likely, have a 
     single national agreement.
       Given the government's track record on securing private 
     information, states are reasonably worried. Not long ago, the 
     House Government Reform Committee looked at 19 agencies going 
     back to 2003 and found 788 separate cases of confidential 
     data being either lost or stolen. Most of the lost data, the 
     report concluded, was due to ``unauthorized use of data by 
     employees.''
       The extended deadline proposed by the Collins legislation 
     would give officials an opportunity to improve security at 
     both federal and state levels. And it should find ways for 
     Washington to help pay for this expensive program.
                                  ____


                    [From the Portland Press Herald]

  Real ID program Is a Real Mess; How Can States Standardize Driver's 
           Licenses by 2008 When Standards Haven't Been Set?

       Maine's ``revolt'' against a federal mandate to create an 
     expensive, high-tech driver's license that meets new 
     standards set by the federal government is catching on.
       Since state legislators overwhelmingly approved a 
     resolution objecting to the Real ID Act of 2005 in late 
     January, lawmakers in Vermont, Georgia, Wyoming, Montana, New 
     Mexico and Washington state have followed suit.
       The Real ID Act was an effort to enhance and standardize 
     the information on state driver's licenses so they could 
     double as a national identification card.
       Such a sensitive federal-state issue ought to have been the 
     subject of negotiations including the states. But the House 
     of Representatives forged ahead with the Real ID Act, which 
     simply ordered the Department of Homeland Security to write 
     its own requirements. The measure passed the Senate attached 
     to a supplemental spending bill.
       A very real set of concerns revolve around the security of 
     the machine-readable personal information that will be 
     included in the high-tech card, as well as the security of 
     the linked national database that will house this 
     information. One recent study found more than 700 instances 
     of confidential data being stolen from the federal government 
     since 2003.
       Also problematic is the notion that state transportation 
     workers will be essentially conscripted to the front line of 
     this federal program.
       Across the country, states will begin working on their 2008 
     budgets this year. A 2006 study by the National Governors 
     Association tabbed the cost of compliance at $11 billion over 
     five years. Secretary of State Matt Dunlap estimates Maine's 
     share will be $185 million.
       Yet despite Real ID's looming May 2008 deadline for 
     compliance, states still haven't seen the law's requirements.
       On Monday, Sen. Susan Collins introduced a bill that would 
     delay the compliance date for two years to 2010 so the 
     federal government can get its act straightened out.
       Her bill would convene a panel of federal and state 
     stakeholders to examine issues raised by the states around 
     cost, privacy and feasibility.
       Rep. Tom Allen intends to offer a bill that would repeal 
     the law entirely.
       If Congress feels homeland security requires that all 
     Americans carry an internal passport, then it ought to 
     administer the program.
       It ought to pay for it as well.
                                  ____


                   [From Newsday (NY), Feb. 28, 2007]

                    Go Slow on New Driver's Licenses


                 u.s. should take time to get it right

       It's a sad sign of the times, but a national identification 
     card, a new gold standard for

[[Page 4915]]

      proof of identity, may be needed in the battle against 
     terrorism. The 9/11 Commission urged tighter security for 
     driver's licenses and Congress has asked the Department of 
     Homeland Security to develop rules for standardizing licenses 
     and other state issued identification into what would be, 
     essentially, a national ID card.
       But establishing a system that will make it appreciably 
     harder for terrorists to operate without exacerbating the 
     problem of identity theft or compromising what's left of 
     privacy in the digital age won't be quick or easy. The 
     current May 2008 implementation date is unrealistic. And 
     there's the question state officials are already asking: Who 
     will pay?
       Washington hasn't gotten off to a very promising start in 
     dealing with these concerns. In 2004, Congress established a 
     committee of state and federal officials and others to craft 
     regulations for making licenses more uniform and secure. It 
     preempted that process in 2005 when it tacked the Real ID Act 
     to a spending bill, giving the rule-making job to the 
     Department of Homeland Security. It's been almost two years 
     and no rules have been announced, although officials say they 
     may come as soon as this week.
       But creating a secure, standardized national ID card 
     involves more than deciding on such things as digital 
     photographs and bar codes. Clerks everywhere would need ready 
     access to nationwide databases to verify vital records such 
     as birth certificates, immigration status and driver's 
     license records in all 50 states. Integrating that data, 
     securing it, controlling access and correcting errors will be 
     no small task.
       Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) wants to give states more time 
     to comply. That's advisable and probably inevitable.

  Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Chair.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Amendment No. 285 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I rise today to offer an amendment that 
incorporates Senator DeMint's amendment No. 279 regarding the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, known as TWIC.
  I am pleased to advise my colleagues of this amendment. It is 
cosponsored by Senator Stevens, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Murray.
  The amendment offered by Senator DeMint codifies in statute the list 
of permanent and interim disqualifying offenses for individuals 
applying for a TWIC that the Department of Homeland Security has 
already codified in final regulations this January.
  While I understand Senator DeMint's desire to ensure we do not allow 
individuals who could pose a terrorism security risk to have access to 
our ports, Senator DeMint's language restricts the authority of the 
Secretary to identify, adopt, and modify criminal offenses that may 
pose a terrorist security threat.
  We are all aware of the fact the war on terrorism continues to evolve 
with emerging threats. We need to ensure the Department has the 
flexibility to adjust their procedures accordingly. I, along with my 
fellow cosponsors, believe such a responsibility is best left to the 
intelligence, terrorist, and law enforcement experts at the Department 
of Homeland Security rather than Members of Congress. Therefore, this 
amendment preserves the authority of the Secretary to modify the 
offenses accordingly.
  I ask my colleagues to support our amendment and help ensure we 
improve the security of our port facilities in a fair and effective 
manner.
  Madam President, I call up my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for himself, Mr. 
     Stevens, Mr. Lieberman, and Mrs. Murray, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 285 to amendment No. 275.

  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To specify the criminal offenses that disqualify an applicant 
          from the receipt of a transportation security card)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PROHIBITION OF ISSUANCE OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
                   CARDS TO CONVICTED FELONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 70105 of title 46, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``decides that the 
     individual poses a security risk under subsection (c)'' and 
     inserting ``determines under subsection (c) that the 
     individual poses a security risk''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (1) to read as 
     follows:
       ``(1) Disqualifications.--
       ``(A) Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as 
     provided under paragraph (2), an individual is permanently 
     disqualified from being issued a biometric transportation 
     security card under subsection (b) if the individual has been 
     convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a 
     civilian or military jurisdiction of any of the following 
     felonies:
       ``(i) Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.
       ``(ii) Sedition or conspiracy to commit sedition.
       ``(iii) Treason or conspiracy to commit treason.
       ``(iv) A Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section 
     2332b(g) of title 18), a comparable State law, or conspiracy 
     to commit such crime.
       ``(v) A crime involving a transportation security incident.
       ``(vi) Improper transportation of a hazardous material 
     under section 5124 of title 49, or a comparable State law.
       ``(vii) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, 
     manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, 
     transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an 
     explosive or explosive device. In this clause, an explosive 
     or explosive device includes--

       ``(I) an explosive (as defined in sections 232(5) and 
     844(j) of title 18);
       ``(II) explosive materials (as defined in subsections (c) 
     through (f) of section 841 of title 18); and
       ``(III) a destructive device (as defined in 921(a)(4) of 
     title 18 and section 5845(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
     1986).

       ``(viii) Murder.
       ``(ix) Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false 
     information knowing the same to be false, concerning the 
     deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or 
     other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a 
     State or other government facility, a public transportation 
     system, or an infrastructure facility.
       ``(x) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
     Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.), or a comparable 
     State law, if 1 of the predicate acts found by a jury or 
     admitted by the defendant consists of 1 of the crimes listed 
     in this subparagraph.
       ``(xi) Attempt to commit any of the crimes listed in 
     clauses (i) through (iv).
       ``(xii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes 
     described in clauses (v) through (x).
       ``(B) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses.--Except as 
     provided under paragraph (2), an individual is disqualified 
     from being issued a biometric transportation security card 
     under subsection (b) if the individual has been convicted, or 
     found not guilty by reason of insanity, during the 7-year 
     period ending on the date on which the individual applies for 
     such card, or was released from incarceration during the 5-
     year period ending on the date on which the individual 
     applies for such card, of any of the following felonies:
       ``(i) Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture, 
     purchase, distribution, receipt, transfer, shipping, 
     transporting, delivery, import, export of, or dealing in a 
     firearm or other weapon. In this clause, a firearm or other 
     weapon includes--

       ``(I) firearms (as defined in section 921(a)(3) of title 18 
     and section 5845(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); 
     and
       ``(II) items contained on the United States Munitions 
     Import List under section 447.21 of title 27, Code of Federal 
     Regulations.

       ``(ii) Extortion.
       ``(iii) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, including 
     identity fraud and money laundering if the money laundering 
     is related to a crime described in this subparagraph or 
     subparagraph (A). In this clause, welfare fraud and passing 
     bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, fraud, or 
     misrepresentation.
       ``(iv) Bribery.
       ``(v) Smuggling.
       ``(vi) Immigration violations.
       ``(vii) Distribution of, possession with intent to 
     distribute, or importation of a controlled substance.
       ``(viii) Arson.
       ``(ix) Kidnapping or hostage taking.
       ``(x) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.
       ``(xi) Assault with intent to kill.
       ``(xii) Robbery.
       ``(xiii) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the crimes 
     listed in this subparagraph.
       ``(xiv) Fraudulent entry into a seaport under section 1036 
     of title 18, or a comparable State law.
       ``(xv) A violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
     Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.) or a comparable 
     State law, other than any of the violations listed in 
     subparagraph (A)(x).
       ``(C) Under want warrant, or indictment.--An applicant who 
     is wanted, or under

[[Page 4916]]

     indictment, in any civilian or military jurisdiction for a 
     felony listed in this paragraph, is disqualified from being 
     issued a biometric transportation security card under 
     subsection (b) until the want or warrant is released or the 
     indictment is dismissed.
       ``(D) Determination of arrest status.--
       ``(i) In general.--If a fingerprint-based check discloses 
     an arrest for a disqualifying crime listed in this section 
     without indicating a disposition, the Transportation Security 
     Administration shall notify the applicant of such disclosure 
     and provide the applicant with instructions on how the 
     applicant can clear the disposition, in accordance with 
     clause (ii).
       ``(ii) Burden of proof.--In order to clear a disposition 
     under this subparagraph, an applicant shall submit written 
     proof to the Transportation Security Administration, not 
     later than 60 days after receiving notification under clause 
     (i), that the arrest did not result in conviction for the 
     disqualifying criminal offense.
       ``(iii) Notification of disqualification.--If the 
     Transportation Security Administration does not receive proof 
     in accordance with the Transportation Security 
     Administration's procedures for waiver of criminal offenses 
     and appeals, the Transportation Security Administration shall 
     notify--

       ``(I) the applicant that he or she is disqualified from 
     being issued a biometric transportation security card under 
     subsection (b);
       ``(II) the State that the applicant is disqualified, in the 
     case of a hazardous materials endorsement; and
       ``(III) the Coast Guard that the applicant is disqualified, 
     if the applicant is a mariner.

       ``(E) Other potential disqualifications.--Except as 
     provided under subparagraphs (A) through (C), an individual 
     may not be denied a transportation security card under 
     subsection (b) unless the Secretary determines that 
     individual--
       ``(i) has been convicted within the preceding 7-year period 
     of a felony or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a 
     felony--

       ``(I) that the Secretary believes could cause the 
     individual to be a terrorism security risk to the United 
     States; or
       ``(II) for causing a severe transportation security 
     incident;

       ``(ii) has been released from incarceration within the 
     preceding 5-year period for committing a felony described in 
     clause (i);
       ``(iii) may be denied admission to the United States or 
     removed from the United States under the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); or
       ``(iv) otherwise poses a terrorism security risk to the 
     United States.
       (F) Modification of listed offenses.--The Secretary may, by 
     rulemaking, add or modify the offenses described in paragraph 
     (1)(A) or (B).``.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 70101 of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as 
     paragraphs (3) through (7); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
       ``(2) The term `economic disruption' does not include a 
     work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to 
     terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute.''.

  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will call the 
roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. OBAMA). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                       U.S. Economic Sovereignty

  Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, we are in the middle of an ongoing 
discussion and debate over our homeland security, and certainly, as all 
of us know, this remains a matter of grave concern. Homeland security 
means many things, and it certainly does mean that we fully and 
appropriately fund our police and our fire. It means we guard our ports 
and our infrastructure such as our tunnels and bridges, all of which 
are going to be the subject of the authorization legislation brought 
forward by the chairman and ranking member. But it also means we have 
to remain strong at home and we have to have the economic resources to 
spend on protecting ourselves.
  Yesterday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted 416 points--the 
largest single drop since the markets reopened after the September 11 
attacks. While our markets were reeling, alarm bells were ringing once 
again over the irresponsible fiscal and economic policies of this 
administration that continue to surrender the economic sovereignty of 
our country to foreign banks, investors, and governments piece by 
piece.
  Yesterday's stock market disruption came on the heels of pessimistic 
economic news on the homefront and ominous comments about recession by 
former Fed Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. So while it can and will be 
debated whether yesterday's market fluctuation was a blip or a larger 
indicator of our economy's vulnerabilities, it is clear that what 
happened underscores the exposure of our economy to a combination of 
economic developments in countries such as China and economic policies 
here at home. A scare in the Chinese stock market, based on rumors 
within that country, sent economic reverberations around the world.
  In terms of our fiscal stability, we are in uncharted waters. 
Markets, to a certain degree, will always be volatile and, to a great 
extent, we are fortunate that our domestic markets are deep enough to 
absorb certain shocks. But there is no precedent in U.S. history for an 
economy as large as ours to be as heavily in debt to its trading 
partners as the United States is to countries such as China, Japan, and 
others.
  When it comes to the fiscal recklessness and economic fatalism of the 
current administration, the writing may not be on the wall, but 
yesterday the writing was on the ``Big Board.'' In the face of this 
challenge, the economic policies of the last 6 years have contributed 
to an erosion of U.S. economic sovereignty and have made us more 
dependent on the economic decisions of other nations. As I have 
proposed, and continue to support, we need to take steps to restore 
fiscal responsibility and sound economic policies based on the facts, 
not ideology.
  I will continue to support legislative steps to require that the Bush 
administration address mounting fiscal and trade imbalances. Today I 
sent letters to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke urging them to address many of our underlying 
economic vulnerabilities resulting from our debt and deficits.
  Our Nation has been running record deficits and digging a massive 
fiscal hole of nearly $8.8 trillion as foreign countries have been 
buying our debt and in essence becoming our bankers. According to the 
most recent Treasury statistics, foreign nations now hold more than 
$2.2 trillion, or 44 percent, of all publicly held U.S. debt. Japan and 
China alone hold nearly $1 trillion. To put it plainly: 16 percent of 
our entire economy is being loaned to us by the Central Banks of other 
nations. I know other Members of this Chamber, such as Senator Conrad, 
the chairman of our Budget Committee, share my concern over the 
implications of this massive foreign debt.
  While the foundations of our fiscal house are eroded by our fiscal 
policies, our failure to pursue smart economic policies has added 
strain on our economy. Every single year since President Bush took 
office we have had a record trade deficit. Last year the deficit was 
$764 billion. One of the ramifications of that trade deficit to foreign 
interests is the control by foreign interests of more and more of our 
assets.
  How can we negotiate fair, pro-American trade agreements and ensure 
foreign countries uphold these agreements when we sit across the 
negotiating table not only from our competitor but from our banker as 
well? While ceding our economic sovereignty, we also sow the seeds of 
economic vulnerability. Precipitous decisions by any country holding 
our debt could create much graver economic problems than what we saw 
yesterday.
  I believe in smart, pro-American trade, and globalization does hold 
incredible promise to continue to improve our standard of living and to 
create economic growth. But for too long, the choices have been painted 
far too starkly and with a broad political brush. In fact, we can 
protect our economic interests while promoting trade. We can secure our 
economic sovereignty while promoting policies that secure our global 
economic position. Trade does not have to be a zero sum game.
  The choice is not between fatalism and protectionism. The choice is 
between policies that work and policies

[[Page 4917]]

that are not working. We have to curb these deficits and ensure foreign 
governments do not own too much of our Government debt. We need a 
firewall that keeps our economic future more in our own hands.
  In years past I have worked with other Members of Congress who share 
my concerns. For example, during the last session of Congress I 
supported legislation by Senator Dorgan and then-Congressman Cardin 
that rings an alarm bell when U.S. foreign-owned debt reaches 25 
percent of GDP or the trade deficit reaches 5 percent of GDP. It would 
require the administration to develop a plan of action to address these 
conditions and report their findings to Congress. At the very least 
this proposal would compel our Government to deal with these economic 
issues while they are problems but before they become crises. I believe 
proposals such as these need to be considered in order to put our 
economic house in order, as we can too easily be held hostage to the 
economic policies that are being made not in Washington and not in the 
markets of New York but in Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo, and elsewhere.
  Yesterday it was the selloff of foreign stocks that had 
reverberations in U.S. markets. But if China or Japan made a decision 
to decrease their massive holdings of U.S. dollars, there could be a 
currency crisis and the United States would have to raise interest 
rates and invite conditions for a recession. Precipitous decisions by 
any country holding our debt could create far graver economic 
consequences than what we witnessed yesterday.
  While it is clear we should take reasonable steps now to ensure that 
the economic problems of today do not become the crises of tomorrow, we 
are awaiting some action by the administration that gives us a clear 
signal that we can begin to restore responsibility. This is a long-term 
problem, but it is one that I think we must respond to. We ignore it at 
our peril. As we saw yesterday, the United States is interconnected 
with globalized markets. They are not going to leave anyone out. We 
will all be impacted by decisions that we have nothing to do with 
making, even if they are rumors or quickly reversed.
  It is my hope what happened yesterday, which gave us headlines across 
the world, will open our eyes to what we need to do to take action to 
put ourselves in a much more competitive position and to begin to move 
away from the loss of economic sovereignty we have seen over the last 
years.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Inouye amendment to S. 4 is pending.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Bunning are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 5:20 
today, the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Inouye amendment 
No. 285, to be followed by a vote in relation to the DeMint amendment 
No. 279, as modified; with the time until then for debate to run 
concurrently on both amendments, with the time equally divided and 
controlled between Senators Inouye and DeMint or their designees; that 
no amendments be in order to either amendment prior to the vote and 
that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided between the votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Hawaii is 
recognized.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I concur with the statement just issued, 
and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 285

  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I wish to comment on the second-degree 
amendment that has been offered by my colleague from Hawaii, Senator 
Inouye.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired under the previous 
agreement.
  Mr. DeMINT. I ask unanimous consent----
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to clarify the unanimous consent request, 
I believe there were 2 minutes between the votes, am I correct, for 
debate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from South 
Carolina may proceed.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator through the 
Chair, how much time does the Senator from South Carolina need?
  Mr. DeMINT. Three or 4 minutes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senator be given 4 minutes to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeMINT. I thank the Senator. I appreciate the Senator fitting me 
in. Again, I am speaking on the second degree to my amendment that is 
related to port security.
  As we talked about here several times on the floor, and actually 
passed last year, it is important that the people who are working at 
our ports are people we can trust to use the equipment and technology 
they are given to keep the people of America safe.
  The amendment I have offered is consistent with--in fact, it is 
identical to--the regulations that the Secretary and the homeland 
defense agency have put together so that we will not have convicted 
felons working in our ports around this country, so that we know the 
people who are operating our most secure areas are people who have not 
proven to be susceptible to crimes.
  Senator Inouye is offering a second degree to my amendment that would 
allow the Secretary to change some of these crimes or felony 
convictions or to modify the rules. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
has not asked for this. In fact, he is supporting the amendment we 
have. I cannot imagine any future Secretary or future administration 
wanting to eliminate some of these felonies. The whole point of having 
this amendment and putting it into law is so that our agencies are not 
subject to lawsuits and constant harassment to change the criteria for 
working in the secure areas of our ports.
  So I appeal to my fellow colleagues, a vote for this second-degree 
amendment is a vote to gut my amendment. It is a vote to allow in the 
future any administration or this administration to eliminate certain 
felonies that would keep convicted criminals from working in our ports. 
I encourage my colleagues not to vote for this second degree. Vote for 
my amendment, which everybody in this body has voted for unanimously in 
the past.
  Again, I thank the Senator from Connecticut and Senator Collins for 
the opportunity to speak.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the amendment I introduced is not a 
second-degree amendment. However, it incorporates Senator DeMint's 
amendment.
  It doesn't in any way minimize the matter of security. It just says 
the Secretary shall have flexibility with changing times. As we all 
concur, times do change.
  Thirdly, in the other areas where security threats are common, such 
as airports, the Department of Transportation has not asked for 
anything like this, with no flexibility.
  Fourth, if rules are to be made to differ from the present rules as 
set forth in the DeMint amendment and the Inouye amendment, it will 
have to go through the rulemaking process. I can assure my colleagues 
that we will not let felons be in charge of our security.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, may I have an additional 60 seconds?

[[Page 4918]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeMINT. I thank the Senator from Hawaii. I need to make an 
important point. The whole point of my amendment is to put a regulation 
in law so it cannot be changed and contested. The amendment offered by 
Senator Inouye basically guts the amendment and eliminates the reason 
for the amendment. It moves from being a law to something that is 
subject to the whims of any future administration or Secretary.
  Our job here is certainly to be fair to workers, but our first 
priority is to protect the American people. Please, let's not allow 
convicted felons to work in our ports. Our job is to protect our ports. 
The second degree completely guts the whole idea of an amendment that 
makes this law.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
285.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), 
the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Johnson), and the Senator from Rhode 
Island (Mr. Reed) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 58, nays 37, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 54 Leg.]

                                YEAS--58

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Smith
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Tester
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--37

     Alexander
     Allard
     Bennett
     Bond
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Coleman
     Collins
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dole
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Sununu
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Biden
     Brownback
     Johnson
     McCain
     Reed
  The amendment (No. 285) was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I 
move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                     Amendment No. 279, as Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under a previous order, there will now be 2 
minutes of debate equally divided on the DeMint amendment No. 279.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the time on 
our side and go right to the vote.
  Mr. BYRD. Let's hear something about the amendment.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The proponent of the amendment is the Senator from 
South Carolina, and he has 1 minute to describe it, if he so chooses.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if the Senator from West Virginia is 
seeking an explanation of the amendment, I believe I can provide that.
  The amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina would give 
authority to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to 
add certain advances to the list of disqualifying crimes that would 
prevent someone from working at our seaports.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield back the remaining time on this 
side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
279, as modified.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to 
be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden) and 
the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Johnson) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 94, nays 2, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 55 Leg.]

                                YEAS--94

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brown
     Bunning
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Tester
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--2

     Smith
     Specter
       

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Biden
     Brownback
     Johnson
     McCain
  The amendment (No. 279), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the 
table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, because of these two votes coming together 
as they did, there was some confusion. That is why this vote took 
longer. Everyone should understand, we will not make a habit of this. 
We have been very strict in enforcing the 20-minute rule, and we will 
continue to do so.
  For the benefit of all Senators, we had a productive day today but, 
in my opinion, not as productive as it should have been. For Senators 
who have amendments, tomorrow is Thursday. We are not having votes 
until 5:30 on Monday night. We are going to have some amendments 
offered or I am going to get the idea there are not any amendments to 
offer, and we will have to either move to third reading or move to 
cloture or something. If Members have amendments, we said this would be 
an open process. This is a very important piece of legislation. I hope 
they are not waiting until the last minute because the last minute may 
arrive more quickly than they think. It is important legislation. In 
our cloakroom, we sent out a hotline today to find out what amendments 
my caucus has. I hope the Republicans will follow up on that so we may 
have a list of amendments so we know whom to call.
  We have had a lot of dead time today. If this bill is open to 
amendment and people have concerns with it, they should offer those 
amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

[[Page 4919]]




                 Amendment No. 281 to Amendment No. 275

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I call up amendment No. 281 and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to setting aside the 
pending amendment?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], for himself and 
     Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 281 to amendment 
     No. 275.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To provide financial aid to local law enforcement officials 
          along the Nation's borders, and for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

              TITLE__.--BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT RELIEF ACT

     SEC. __01. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Border Law Enforcement 
     Relief Act of 2007''.

     SEC. __02. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) It is the obligation of the Federal Government of the 
     United States to adequately secure the Nation's borders and 
     prevent the flow of undocumented persons and illegal drugs 
     into the United States.
       (2) Despite the fact that the United States Border Patrol 
     apprehends over 1,000,000 people each year trying to 
     illegally enter the United States, according to the 
     Congressional Research Service, the net growth in the number 
     of unauthorized aliens has increased by approximately 500,000 
     each year. The Southwest border accounts for approximately 94 
     percent of all migrant apprehensions each year. Currently, 
     there are an estimated 11,000,000 unauthorized aliens in the 
     United States.
       (3) The border region is also a major corridor for the 
     shipment of drugs. According to the El Paso Intelligence 
     Center, 65 percent of the narcotics that are sold in the 
     markets of the United States enter the country through the 
     Southwest Border.
       (4) Border communities continue to incur significant costs 
     due to the lack of adequate border security. A 2001 study by 
     the United States-Mexico Border Counties Coalition found that 
     law enforcement and criminal justice expenses associated with 
     illegal immigration exceed $89,000,000 annually for the 
     Southwest border counties.
       (5) In August 2005, the States of New Mexico and Arizona 
     declared states of emergency in order to provide local law 
     enforcement immediate assistance in addressing criminal 
     activity along the Southwest border.
       (6) While the Federal Government provides States and 
     localities assistance in covering costs related to the 
     detention of certain criminal aliens and the prosecution of 
     Federal drug cases, local law enforcement along the border 
     are provided no assistance in covering such expenses and must 
     use their limited resources to combat drug trafficking, human 
     smuggling, kidnappings, the destruction of private property, 
     and other border-related crimes.
       (7) The United States shares 5,525 miles of border with 
     Canada and 1,989 miles with Mexico. Many of the local law 
     enforcement agencies located along the border are small, 
     rural departments charged with patrolling large areas of 
     land. Counties along the Southwest United States-Mexico 
     border are some of the poorest in the country and lack the 
     financial resources to cover the additional costs associated 
     with illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and other border-
     related crimes.
       (8) Federal assistance is required to help local law 
     enforcement operating along the border address the unique 
     challenges that arise as a result of their proximity to an 
     international border and the lack of overall border security 
     in the region

     SEC. __03. BORDER RELIEF GRANT PROGRAM.

       (a) Grants Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to award 
     grants, subject to the availability of appropriations, to an 
     eligible law enforcement agency to provide assistance to such 
     agency to address--
       (A) criminal activity that occurs in the jurisdiction of 
     such agency by virtue of such agency's proximity to the 
     United States border; and
       (B) the impact of any lack of security along the United 
     States border.
       (2) Duration.--Grants may be awarded under this subsection 
     during fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
       (3) Competitive basis.--The Secretary shall award grants 
     under this subsection on a competitive basis, except that the 
     Secretary shall give priority to applications from any 
     eligible law enforcement agency serving a community--
       (A) with a population of less than 50,000; and
       (B) located no more than 100 miles from a United States 
     border with--
       (i) Canada; or
       (ii) Mexico.
       (b) Use of Funds.--Grants awarded pursuant to subsection 
     (a) may only be used to provide additional resources for an 
     eligible law enforcement agency to address criminal activity 
     occurring along any such border, including--
       (1) to obtain equipment;
       (2) to hire additional personnel;
       (3) to upgrade and maintain law enforcement technology;
       (4) to cover operational costs, including overtime and 
     transportation costs; and
       (5) such other resources as are available to assist that 
     agency.
       (c) Application.--
       (1) In general.--Each eligible law enforcement agency 
     seeking a grant under this section shall submit an 
     application to the Secretary at such time, in such manner, 
     and accompanied by such information as the Secretary may 
     reasonably require.
       (2) Contents.--Each application submitted pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall--
       (A) describe the activities for which assistance under this 
     section is sought; and
       (B) provide such additional assurances as the Secretary 
     determines to be essential to ensure compliance with the 
     requirements of this section.
       (d) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
       (1) Eligible law enforcement agency.--The term ``eligible 
     law enforcement agency'' means a tribal, State, or local law 
     enforcement agency--
       (A) located in a county no more than 100 miles from a 
     United States border with--
       (i) Canada; or
       (ii) Mexico; or
       (B) located in a county more than 100 miles from any such 
     border, but where such county has been certified by the 
     Secretary as a High Impact Area.
       (2) High impact area.--The term ``High Impact Area'' means 
     any county designated by the Secretary as such, taking into 
     consideration--
       (A) whether local law enforcement agencies in that county 
     have the resources to protect the lives, property, safety, or 
     welfare of the residents of that county;
       (B) the relationship between any lack of security along the 
     United States border and the rise, if any, of criminal 
     activity in that county; and
       (C) any other unique challenges that local law enforcement 
     face due to a lack of security along the United States 
     border.
       (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of the Department of Homeland Security.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011 to 
     carry out the provisions of this section.
       (2) Division of authorized funds.--Of the amounts 
     authorized under paragraph (1)--
       (A) \2/3\ shall be set aside for eligible law enforcement 
     agencies located in the 6 States with the largest number of 
     undocumented alien apprehensions; and
       (B) \1/3\ shall be set aside for areas designated as a High 
     Impact Area under subsection (d).
       (f) Supplement Not Supplant.--Amounts appropriated for 
     grants under this section shall be used to supplement and not 
     supplant other State and local public funds obligated for the 
     purposes provided under this title.

     SEC. __04. ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW.

       Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize State 
     or local law enforcement agencies or their officers to 
     exercise Federal immigration law enforcement authority.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, this is an amendment I am offering on 
behalf of myself and Senator Domenici, my colleague. It is to provide 
funds to local law enforcement agencies along our very substantial 
borders with Canada and Mexico to assist them with criminal activity, 
problems of enforcement of the laws, and dealing with criminal activity 
in those border communities. This is an amendment that sets up a $50 
million-a-year grant program. It is an amendment we have passed twice 
in the Senate, but it has not become law as yet.
  It calls upon the Department of Homeland Security to establish a 
competitive grant program to assist local law enforcement located along 
the border or other local law enforcement agencies that are determined 
by the Homeland Security Department to be heavily impacted, high-impact 
areas elsewhere in the country.
  The border with Canada is 5,525 miles long. Our border with Mexico is 
nearly 2,000 miles long. We have had serious problems on the New 
Mexico-Mexico border, as has the State of Arizona. In fact, last year 
the States of Arizona and New Mexico declared states of emergency in 
order to provide local law enforcement with immediate assistance in 
dealing with criminal activity along the border. The Federal Government 
needs to step up and do its

[[Page 4920]]

part in helping these local law enforcement agencies. This amendment 
helps to do that.
  I hope when the time comes for a vote on the amendment, my colleagues 
will agree to support it, and we can pass it with a unanimous vote.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, the Improving America's Security Act 
is not only about unfinished business, it is not only about doing what 
others have failed to do, it is about living up to the responsibilities 
we have as a Congress and a government to protect our Nation and its 
people and to do everything possible to prevent what was once 
unthinkable from happening again.
  As a Senator from New Jersey, I take that responsibility as a solemn 
promise to the 700 New Jerseyans who lost their lives on September 11 
and their families who survived them.
  More than 5 years ago, it became painfully clear that we, as a Nation 
that believed it was the most secure in the world, were unprotected. In 
the glimpse of a few minutes and over the course of a few short 
horrific hours, our Nation and the security we thought we had was 
changed forever. We entered into the stark reality of a post-September 
11 world.
  On that day, glaring gaps in our security were exploited, lax systems 
were taken advantage of, and a trusting nation paid the price. 
Thousands of innocent lives, everyday Americans whom this Nation has 
grieved every day since, were lost. We can never go back to rectify 
past mistakes that could have prevented that day, but we can work to 
better secure our Nation moving forward.
  We have a roadmap of how to get there. The 9/11 Commission laid out a 
plan, provided guidance, and delivered 41 specific and wide-ranging 
recommendations. Yet more than 2 years after the Commission issued 
those recommendations, many of them remain just that--recommendations 
that have not been acted on or fully implemented.
  This legislation already comes before this body far later than it 
should. But the fact that it is on the floor of this Chamber just 2 
short months into a new Congress speaks boldly of our new leadership 
and how important finishing the 9/11 Commission's work is to our 
leadership. I commend both Majority Leader Reid and Chairman Lieberman 
for making this a top priority for this Congress, as well as Chairman 
Inouye and Chairman Dodd for their roles in crafting this legislation.
  Many of us have been pushing for a long time to see all 41 
recommendations fully implemented and to make significant improvements 
to our Nation's security that have been under the radar screen for far 
too long.
  As a former Member of the House of Representatives, I fought to see 
that all 41 recommendations were fully implemented in the 2004 
intelligence reform legislation. I was proud to serve as the lead 
Democratic negotiator in the House on the conference committee that 
created the final intelligence bill. While that legislation made 
essential and urgently needed reforms to our Nation's intelligence, 
unfortunately, it fell far short on implementing all of the 
recommendations.
  I have also since introduced legislation that ensures that all of 
these recommendations will be fully implemented and to hold the 
executive branch accountable for implementing each recommendation. It 
is my hope that with the bill we are working on now before the Senate, 
and with the vigorous oversight under the leadership of Chairman 
Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, we will be able to see all these 
recommendations enacted and implemented.
  It was just over a year ago the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, led by 
former members of the 9/11 Commission, published its disturbing report 
card, giving far more Fs than As on the implementation of those 41 
recommendations.
  There is no excuse left for Congress, the White House, or our Federal 
agencies for not finishing what is so direly needed: improving the 
security of our Nation. Yes, we have made some great steps forward. 
Yes, we have made some significant improvements that have likely saved 
lives and stopped terrorists in their tracks. But no one--no one--
should use the lack of another catastrophic attack on our soil as proof 
that we have succeeded in fully meeting our goals.
  The fact is, so long as we do not heed the advice of the 9/11 
Commissioners who spent months examining how we could improve our 
Nation's security, so long as we do not make dramatic improvements to 
our security--at our Nation's ports, on our trains and buses, around 
our chemical plants, and in how we allocate homeland security funding--
we continue to leave our Nation at risk.
  I cannot imagine talking about the security of our Nation without the 
41 recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The Commission's findings 
and recommendations are integral to understanding our deepest flaws, 
the complexity of our intelligence and security networks, the obstacles 
that lie ahead and, most of all, what needs to be done.
  Yet if some in our Government had had their way, there would have 
been no Commission, there would have been no digging into the secrecy 
and ineffectiveness of our Nation's security, no poring over thousands 
upon thousands of documents, no reviewing of every action Federal 
agencies took or did not take to prevent and respond to the attacks of 
September 11, no asking of some of the toughest questions our Nation 
has had to bear.
  So once we pass this final legislation, have it signed into law and 
implemented, we will come to the day--I hope sooner rather than later--
when our Nation's security funding is based more on risk, when our 
ports are fully secure because of 100 percent scanning, when we are 
making the necessary investments in mass transit security, and when our 
first responders have a strong emergency communications system that 
works in interoperable ways, so that those who are sworn to protect us 
can speak to each other effectively.
  These are only a few of the dimensions in this fight. Unfortunately, 
this is a fight that would not have taken place without the commitment 
and strength of the families of the victims of September 11.
  When the loved ones of those who were lost on September 11 have to 
become full-time advocates, spending every possible hour lobbying 
Congress, when they have to be the constant reminder for our Government 
to do its job, we know we have failed them. Many of them are here and 
have been here today watching this body, waiting to finally see this 
legislation become law, hoping that all their suffering, their work, 
and their tireless advocacy will not be in vain.
  Let us not only fulfill their wishes but the wishes of all Americans 
to have a nation as secure as possible for their families and 
neighbors. Let's work to pass this legislation and make sure it is 
fully enacted. Let's finally accomplish what should have been finished 
several years ago.
  Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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