[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 3]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 4572-4574]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   FORGETTING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE

                               of hawaii

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, February 16, 2007

  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Madam Speaker, the following 1984 speech by former 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger provides an important 
perspective on the use of military force in Iraq.

                      The Uses of Military Power''

                       (By Caspar W. Weinberger)

       Thank you for inviting me to be here today with the members 
     of the National Press Club, a group most important to our 
     national security. I say that because a major point I intend 
     to make in my remarks today is that the single most critical 
     element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of 
     support and agreement for our basic purposes. Policies formed 
     without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve will 
     never work. And you help to build that understanding among 
     our citizens.
       Of all the many policies our citizens deserve and need to 
     understand, none is so important as those related to our 
     topic today the uses of military power. Deterrence will work 
     only if the Soviets understand our firm commitment to keeping 
     the peace, . . . and only from a well-informed public can we 
     expect to have that national will and commitment.
       So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps the most 
     important question concerning keeping the peace. Under what 
     circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such 
     as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military 
     force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out 
     our national policy?
       National power has many components, some tangible, like 
     economic wealth, technical pre-eminence. Other components are 
     intangible such as moral force, or strong national will. 
     Military forces, when they are strong and ready and modern, 
     are a credible and tangible addition to a nation's power. 
     When both the intangible national will and those forces are 
     forged into one instrument, national power becomes effective.
       In today's world, the line between peace and war is less 
     clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George 
     Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new 
     democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then lay 2-
     3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States was 
     protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear 
     age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.
       Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of 
     the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid 
     conflict, while maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has 
     always been to work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war 
     comes. Yet, so blurred have the lines become between open 
     conflict and half-hidden hostile acts that we cannot 
     confidently predict where, or when, or how, or from what 
     direction aggression may arrive. We must be prepared, at any 
     moment, to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated 
     terrorist acts, to guerrilla action, to full-scale military 
     confrontation.
       Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, said 
     that it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and 
     variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent 
     and variety of the means, which may be

[[Page 4573]]

     necessary to satisfy them. If it was true then, how much more 
     true it is today, when we must remain ready to consider the 
     means to meet such serious indirect challenges to the peace 
     as proxy wars and individual terrorist action. And how much 
     more important is it now, considering the consequences of 
     failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible. While 
     the use of military force to defend territory has never been 
     questioned when a democracy has been attacked and its very 
     survival threatened, most democracies have rejected the 
     unilateral aggressive use of force to invade, conquer or 
     subjugate other nations. The extent to which the use of force 
     is acceptable remains unresolved for the host of other 
     situations which fall between these extremes of defensive and 
     aggressive use of force.
       We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern 
     paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace--the gray 
     area conflicts--are precisely the most difficult challenges 
     to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and 
     nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our response must 
     be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force 
     is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to 
     apply the resources needed.
       Because we face a spectrum of threats from covert 
     aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation, 
     to use of brute force, choosing the appropriate level of our 
     response is difficult. Flexible response does not mean just 
     any response is appropriate. But once a decision to employ 
     some degree of force has been made, and the purpose 
     clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to 
     carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the 
     purpose has been achieved. That, too, has been difficult to 
     accomplish.
       The issue of which branch of government has authority to 
     define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now 
     being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s Congress 
     demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in the making 
     of foreign policy and in the decision-making process for the 
     employment of military forces abroad than had been thought 
     appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality 
     of decision-making authority in the Executive branch has been 
     compromised by the Legislative branch to an extent that 
     actively interferes with that process. At the same time, 
     there has not been a corresponding acceptance of 
     responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions 
     concerning the employment of military forces.
       Yet the outcome of decisions on whether and when and to 
     what degree to use combat forces abroad has never been more 
     important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or 
     settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as 
     a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of 
     such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to 
     ignore. So we must be prepared to deal with a range of 
     possibilities, a spectrum of crises, from local insurgency to 
     global conflict. We prefer, of course, to limit any conflict 
     in its early stages, to contain and control it but to do that 
     our military forces must be deployed in a timely manner, and 
     be fully supported and prepared before they are engaged, 
     because many of those difficult decisions must be made 
     extremely quickly.
       Some on the national scene think they can always avoid 
     making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question of 
     whether any force can ever be used abroad. They want to avoid 
     grappling with a complex issue because, despite clever 
     rhetoric disguising their purpose, these people are in fact 
     advocating a return to post-World War I isolationism. While 
     they may maintain in principle that military force has a role 
     in foreign policy, they are never willing to name the 
     circumstance or the place where it would apply.
       On the other side, some theorists argue that military force 
     can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these 
     proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in 
     limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are 
     American forces of any size present they will somehow solve 
     the problem.
       Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or 
     satisfactory solutions. The first undue reserve would lead us 
     ultimately to withdraw from international events that require 
     free nations to defend their interests from the aggressive 
     use of force. We would be abdicating our responsibilities as 
     the leader of the free world responsibilities more or less 
     thrust upon us in the aftermath of World War II war 
     incidentally that isolationism did nothing to deter. These 
     are responsibilities we must fulfill unless we desire the 
     Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked 
     throughout the world. In an international system based on 
     mutual interdependence among nations, and alliances between 
     friends, stark isolationism quickly would lead to a far more 
     dangerous situation for the United States: we would be 
     without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent 
     nations.
       The second alternative employing our forces almost 
     indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our 
     diplomatic efforts would surely plunge us headlong into the 
     sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam 
     war, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed 
     our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric 
     of our society, endangering the single most critical element 
     of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and 
     agreement for our basic purposes.
       Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we 
     hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops, 
     who would have an understandable opposition to being used in 
     every sense of the word casually and without intent to 
     support them fully. Ultimately this course would reduce their 
     morale and their effectiveness for engagements we must win. 
     And if the military were to distrust its civilian leadership, 
     recruitment would fall off and I fear an end to the all-
     volunteer system would be upon us, requiring a return to a 
     draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent that so 
     wracked the country in the '60s.
       We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform 
     throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is working 
     spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit what we have 
     fought so hard to regain?
       In maintaining our progress in strengthening America's 
     military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For we have 
     entered an era where the dividing lines between peace and war 
     are less clearly drawn, the identity of the foe is much less 
     clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our 
     enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of why the 
     principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.
       Since these two wars threatened our very survival as a free 
     nation and the survival of our allies, they were total wars, 
     involving every aspect of our society. All our means of 
     production, all our resources were devoted to winning. Our 
     policies had the unqualified support of the great majority of 
     our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II ended with the 
     unconditional surrender of our enemies. . . . The only 
     acceptable ending when the alternative was the loss of our 
     freedom.
       But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we 
     encountered a more subtle form of warfare warfare in which, 
     more often than not, the face of the enemy was masked. 
     Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by 
     proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from 
     afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of ``national 
     liberation,'' but far more frequently ideology or religion 
     provided the spark to the tinder.
       Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open 
     society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use 
     alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt 
     our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow 
     such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to exploit 
     ours by conducting simultaneous military and propaganda 
     campaigns to achieve their ends.
       They realize that if they can divide our national will at 
     home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces abroad. 
     So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they aim to 
     intimidate western leaders and citizens, encouraging us to 
     adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. Meanwhile 
     they remain sheltered from the force of public opinion in 
     their countries, because public opinion there is simply 
     prohibited and does not exist.
       Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity. 
     It is true that until democratic nations have the support of 
     the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage in a 
     conflict. But when they do have that support they cannot be 
     defeated. For democracies have the power to send a compelling 
     message to friend and foe alike by the vote of their 
     citizens. And the American people have sent such a signal by 
     re-electing a strong Chief Executive. They know that 
     President Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for 
     his actions and is able to lead us through these complex 
     times by insisting that we regain both our military and our 
     economic strength.
       In today's world where minutes count, such decisive 
     leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless of 
     whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill defined, we 
     must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and 
     conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of 
     the United States and our allies. . . . And then responding 
     appropriately.
       Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack on 
     our territory, and our response may not necessarily require 
     the immediate or direct defense of our homeland. But when our 
     vital national interests and those of our allies are at 
     stake, we cannot ignore our safety, or forsake our allies.
       At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot 
     assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have 
     learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and 
     blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our 
     responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and 
     should offer substantial amounts of economic and military 
     assistance to our allies in their time of need, and help them 
     maintain forces to deter attacks against them usually we 
     cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.
       We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a 
     matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume 
     for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend 
     their territory without their strong invitation when our 
     freedom is not threatened.

[[Page 4574]]

       On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the 
     United States has seen the need to join forces with other 
     nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with 
     negotiations, and by separating warring parties, and thus 
     enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities 
     safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict 
     for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years both 
     to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a peacekeeping 
     mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for 
     combat they were armed only for their self-defense. Their 
     mission required them to be and to be recognized as 
     peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions deteriorated so they 
     were in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring 
     nations, their peacekeeping mission could not be realized, 
     then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to the 
     number and arms of our troops in short to equip them for 
     combat, . . . or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when we 
     faced just such a choice, because the warring nations did not 
     enter into withdrawal or peace agreements, the President 
     properly withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping.
       In those cases where our national interests require us to 
     commit combat force we must never let there be doubt of our 
     resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be 
     committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient 
     numbers and we must support them, as effectively and 
     resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops 
     to combat we must do so with the sole object of winning.
       Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital 
     interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national 
     resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win 
     the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just 
     that.
       Just as clearly, there are other situations where United 
     States combat forces should not be used. I believe the 
     postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I 
     have developed six major tests to be applied when we are 
     weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me now 
     share them with you:
       First, the United States should not commit forces to combat 
     overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is 
     deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. 
     That emphatically does not mean that we should declare 
     beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular 
     area is outside our strategic perimeter.
       Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops 
     into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and 
     with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to 
     commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our 
     objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if 
     the particular situation requires only limited force to win 
     our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces 
     sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and 
     remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then could 
     perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II.
       Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, 
     we should have clearly defined political and military 
     objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can 
     accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should 
     have and send the forces needed to do just that. As 
     Clausewitz wrote, ``no one starts a war or rather, no one in 
     his senses ought to do so without first being clear in his 
     mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he 
     intends to conduct it.''
       War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but 
     the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent 
     strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat 
     mission has become necessary for our vital national 
     interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job and 
     not assign a combat mission to a force configured for 
     peacekeeping.
       Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the 
     forces we have committed their size, composition and 
     disposition must be continually reassessed and adjusted if 
     necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during 
     the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must 
     our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a 
     beacon light before us the basic questions: ``Is this 
     conflict in our national interest?'' ``Does our national 
     interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?'' If the 
     answers are ``yes,'' then we must win. If the answers are 
     ``no,'' then we should not be in combat.
       Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there 
     must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of 
     the American people and their elected representatives in 
     Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are 
     candid in making clear the threats we face; the support 
     cannot be sustained without continuing and close 
     consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at 
     home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in 
     the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, 
     but just to be there.
       Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be 
     a last resort.
       I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding 
     whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the 
     months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost 
     in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to 
     combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of 
     our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must 
     have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and 
     understood and supported by the widest possible number of our 
     citizens. And those objectives must be vital to our survival 
     as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our 
     responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted 
     enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to 
     apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that 
     may be required later. We must never forget those 
     isolationists in Europe who shrugged that ``Danzig is not 
     worth a war,'' and ``why should we fight to keep the 
     Rhineland demilitarized?''
       These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased 
     negatively for a purpose they are intended to sound a note of 
     caution that we must observe prior to committing forces to 
     combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to risk 
     their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not 
     only prudent, it is morally required.
       In many situations we may apply these tests and conclude 
     that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should 
     interpret what I am saying here today as an abdication of 
     America's responsibilities either to its own citizens or to 
     its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal 
     that this country, or this Administration, is unwilling to 
     commit forces to combat overseas.
       We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital 
     interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are ready 
     to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those 
     interests. Let no one entertain any illusions if our vital 
     interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are 
     resolved that if we must fight, we must win.
       So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have 
     learned from the past, they also can and should be applied to 
     the future. For example, the problems confronting us in 
     Central America today are difficult. The possibility of more 
     extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this 
     hemisphere in months ahead is something we should recognize. 
     If this happens we will clearly need more economic and 
     military assistance and training to help those who want 
     democracy.
       The President will not allow our military forces to creep 
     or be drawn gradually into a combat role in Central America 
     or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is 
     designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement. 
     This means we will need sustained Congressional support to 
     back and give confidence to our friends in the region.
       I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today can, 
     if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist 
     incremental approach, which almost always means the use of 
     insufficient force. These tests can help us to avoid being 
     drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where it is not 
     vital to our national interest to fight.
       But policies and principles such as these require decisive 
     leadership in both the Executive and Legislative branches of 
     government and they also require strong and sustained public 
     support. Most of all, these policies require national unity 
     of purpose. I believe the United States now possesses the 
     policies and leadership to gain that public support and 
     unity. And I believe that the future will show we have the 
     strength of character to protect peace with freedom.
       In summary, we should all remember these are the policies 
     indeed the only policies that can preserve for ourselves, our 
     friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom.
       I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union and 
     other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs 
     around the world. We can enable our friends in Central 
     America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to 
     nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge posed 
     by the unfolding complexity of the 1980s.
       We will then be poised to begin the last decade of this 
     century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured by 
     firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will 
     enable all of us ourselves at home, and our friends abroad to 
     achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and materially, 
     far higher than man has even dared to dream.

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