[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 3]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 4570-4571]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




             INTRODUCING THE IRAQ CONTINGENCY PLANNING ACT

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                            HON. MARK UDALL

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, February 16, 2007

  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Madam Speaker, this week the House has 
considered a resolution focused on the President's plan to escalate the 
war in Iraq by committing more troops. That certainly deserves the 
debate it has received.
  I voted for the resolution disapproving of the escalation plan 
because I think that plan is misguided and will not be effective in the 
context of the civil war that has emerged in Iraq.
  Of course, I'm not under any illusion that the president will listen 
to the resolution's message. He has made clear his intention to move 
forward, and many troops are already in place or heading to their new 
positions.

[[Page 4571]]

  I think that is a tragic error, one that I will work to correct. But 
at the same time we--both the Administration and the Congress--must 
consider what may come next.
  That is why I am today introducing legislation to require that 
Congress be informed about the extent to which the Administration is 
doing the planning that is needed if we are to be prepared to respond 
to what our intelligence agencies tell us may be further catastrophic 
developments in Iraq and the region.
  You'd think it wouldn't be necessary for Congress to legislate to 
make sure the Pentagon plans for contingencies. And when, at a recent 
Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked Secretary Gates whether they 
were doing that, his answer, while vague, was reassuring.
  But vague reassurances aren't enough, and I am following up with this 
bill because I don't want a repeat of the performance that led the 
Administration to launch a war in Iraq without a plan for what would 
come after initial military success.
  The Bush Administration was warned--by the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the Pentagon's Joint Staff, the State Department's Bureau of 
intelligence and Research, and the CIA's National Intelligence Council, 
among others--that U.S. troops could face significant postwar 
resistance.
  And in February, 2003 an Army War College report warned that without 
an ``overwhelming'' effort to prepare for the U.S. occupation of Iraq, 
``The United States may find itself in a radically different world over 
the next few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems 
like a pale shadow of new problems of America's own making.''
  But despite these warnings, the Bush Administration rushed ahead 
without a comprehensive plan in place to secure and rebuild the country 
once our military had achieved its initial objectives.
  We all know where that has led us--to the point where, according to 
the just-released National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq, we're 
faced with a deteriorating situation in Iraq in which ``Iraqi society's 
growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces 
and the state in general, and all sides' ready recourse to violence are 
collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and 
political extremist.''
  And now we are being warned that things well may get even worse.
  Specifically, the NIE states that as Iraq's security environment 
worsens, three prospective security paths could emerge--chaos leading 
to partition, the emergency of a Shia strongman, or anarchic 
fragementation of power.
  Madam Speaker, the NIE is the Administration's own document, and the 
most authoritiative written judgment of the Director of National 
Intelligence with respect to Iraq. I think it must be taken seriously, 
and I think we in Congress must demand to be told--specifically and in 
detail--just how the Administration is preparing to respond should any 
one of those contingencies occur.
  That is what my legislation calls for. It would require that by June 
30th of this year the Administration inform the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees just how the Department of Defense and other 
agencies would respond to each of the three scenarios identified by the 
NIE, with an explanation of the proposed role of U.S. troops under each 
scenario, including a comprehensive analysis identifying and justifying 
the number of U.S. troops needed in each case.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I want assurances that 
this Administration is thinking about and planning for troubling 
possibilities they themselves have depicted. No one wants chaos or 
increased violence in Iraq, but it would be irresponsible not to plan 
for those possibilities. While looking at Iraq through rose-colored 
glasses may make us feel better, we will only do right by our men and 
women in uniform if we plan for likely contingencies, however 
unpalatable.
  Of course, this legislation isn't intended to solve the larger 
problem of Iraq. To do that, we need a policy aimed at escalating 
diplomatic and political efforts and lightening the U.S. footprint in 
Iraq. But so far the President instead is continuing to embrace the 
idea that the solution is more troop.
  Defense Secretary Gates has said that we'll know within months 
whether or not that escalation has been successful. So it isn't too 
soon to begin planning now for what may come next. And it is high time 
for Congress to insist that the Administration is responding to that 
essential.

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