[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3792-3793]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                 NOMINATION OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I voted last Thursday in opposition to 
the nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., to be the 36th Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Army.
  This decision did not come easily, but after watching the slow 
failure of our Iraq strategy since the invasion in March 2003, it was 
time for some accountability.
  This is not to say General Casey, alone, should take the blame for 
the multitude of mistakes in Iraq. In fact, there is no doubt that the 
buck stops at the President's desk and this is his war.
  It is President Bush more than any other individual who is 
responsible for the dire situation we face in Iraq today.
  It was he who ordered the invasion and he who has stubbornly stuck to 
a strategy that has put success in Iraq increasingly out of reach.
  In addition to President Bush, Vice President Cheney and former 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were some of the strongest public 
backers of the campaign to invade Iraq that failed to plan for the 
chaotic aftermath that we are now mired in today. And it should not be 
forgotten that it was George Tenet, then the Director of the CIA, who 
presided over the flawed intelligence analysis that suggested that Iraq 
had weapons of mass destruction and was in the process of developing a 
nuclear capability. It was Tenet who told us that this intelligence was 
a ``slam dunk.''
  Yet, that said, our military strategy over the past several years 
should not be free from criticism.
  General Casey has served as the commander of Multi-national Force--
Iraq since July 2004. Over these past 2\1/2\ years, I can see little to 
applaud regarding our military strategy on the ground.
  Too many times, in my view, General Casey, and those around him, 
failed to provide the Congress with accurate assessments of what has 
been happening in Iraq. For example, it was General Casey who suggested 
that the situation in Iraq would improve enough following the December 
2005 elections that troop reductions could take place in early 2006. He 
even went so far as to provide specific projections of troop 
withdrawals, saying in August 2005 that the level of U.S. troops in 
Iraq could be drawn down to about 100,000 by the spring of 2006.
  Earlier, in June 2005, he said, and I quote:

       I'm confident that we'll be able to continue to take 
     reductions over the course of this year based on the security 
     situation and the progress of the Iraqi security forces.

  Time and time again General Casey came before us in Congress and 
painted an overly optimistic view of the situation on the ground in 
Iraq. Just last week, at his confirmation hearing in front of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, General Casey suggested that, rather 
than a ``slow failure,'' he sees ``slow progress'' in Iraq.
  Since General Casey took over as commander of all coalition forces in 
Iraq, we have seen the following:
  Car bombings have grown from 30 a month when General Casey took 
command to about 80 today.
  Daily insurgent attacks have skyrocketed from 50 to some 200 today.
  The training of Iraqi forces, which General Casey touted as the means 
for an exit of U.S. troops from Iraq, has been slow and inconsistent.
  In fact, though General Casey called 2006 the ``Year of the Police'' 
in Iraq, we have seen increased infiltration of Iraqi police forces by 
Shiite militias and growing Iranian influence.
  While 320,000 Iraqi troops have been ``trained and equipped'' 
according to the Pentagon, our troop level today, 140,000, is just a 
few thousand less than when General Casey took command in July 2004.
  Iraqi security forces have 91 brigades that are taking the ``lead'' 
in counterinsurgency operations throughout the

[[Page 3793]]

country, yet these forces are now responsible for the security of only 
2 of Iraq's 18 provinces.
  I have no doubt that General Casey is a good man with an impeccable 
character. Many of the mistakes regarding our Iraq strategy are not the 
result of his leadership.
  But it is time that the Senate insists upon accountability.
  It is past time for the Senate to provide oversight by showing that 
we will not accept anything but unvarnished, forthright candor from our 
military leaders.
  We expect independent views from our military leaders,
  and this has simply been too often lacking over these past few years.
  General Casey deserves credit for his long, dedicated service to this 
country. But I did not believe he should to be promoted to Chief of 
Staff of the Army. Therefore, I regretfully cast my vote against his 
nomination.

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