[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3484-3487]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, I rise today to discuss U.S. military 
operations in Iraq.
  Four years ago, we invaded Iraq to disarm an oppressor's regime and 
restore control of that country to its own people. In the early hours 
of March 20, 2003, the United States, joined by our coalition partners, 
began a military campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Code 
named ``shock and awe,'' the first 24 hours of combat operations filled 
the country with punishing air attacks. As the massive firestorm of 
bombs and missiles targeted Iraqi leadership, ground forces rolled 
towards Iraq's capital.
  Without question, our military operations were swift and decisive. 
Approximately 120,000 U.S. troops, as well as a number of forces from 
our coalition partners, led the invasion into Iraq. Ground forces moved 
into Baghdad, formally occupied the city, and the Hussein government 
collapsed approximately 3 weeks after military operations began. Saddam 
Hussein and his top leadership were captured, killed, or forced into 
hiding by coalition forces.
  With Saddam on the run many Iraqis celebrated the downfall of the 
oppressive regime.
  While some fighting in Iraq continued, the major battles appeared 
over just one month after the start of the military campaign. And 43 
days after announcing the beginning of the war, President Bush declared 
that, ``Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of 
Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.''
  Undoubtedly, the President was wrong. After remarkable success during 
the initial combat operations, it appears that the Bush administration 
did not sufficiently prepare for the consequences of their military 
victory. The Bush administration could not have known everything about 
what it would find in Iraq.
  But it could have, and should have, done far more than it did.
  As George Washington once said, ``There is nothing so likely to 
produce peace as to be well prepared to meet the enemy.'' In the 
aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime, 
the U.S. proved it was ill-equipped for the post combat environment it 
would face. As a result, the Bush administration made grave and glaring 
political, military, and intelligence miscalculations.
  As it turned out, the defeat of the Iraqi army was just the beginning 
of the war. Prewar plans drastically underestimated the number of 
troops necessary in a post-Saddam Iraq.
  The troop level of the invasion force proved inadequate to hold the 
country together after Saddam's regime was removed. The Bush 
administration failed to heed the warnings of experienced, senior 
military officers who stressed the need for a large force structure in 
country to provide security.
  In particular, on the eve of the invasion, then Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Eric Shinseki, predicted ``something on the order of 
several

[[Page 3485]]

hundred thousand solders'' would be required to keep peace in a postwar 
Iraq.
  While it is evident that General Shinseki was on the mark with his 
force calculations, the general's comments were quickly dismissed by 
the Department of Defense as ``wildly off the mark.'' Consequently, the 
U.S. invaded with what proved to be an insufficient number of troops to 
secure a postwar Iraq.
  Immediately after the invasion, it was readily apparent that serious 
miscalculations, poor prewar planning, misguided assumptions, and 
wildly optimistic administration reporting was the order of the day. 
When the Iraqi Government collapsed, there was no framework in place 
capable of filling the military, political, and economic void.
  U.S. combat units were assigned to patrol large urban areas with no 
sense of their mission and no standard set of operating procedures. 
Looting and other criminal activities were rampant. The U.S. forces 
were vastly inadequate to control the mounting violence, since the Bush 
administration had mistakenly believed that U.S. forces would be 
greeted as liberators rather than as occupiers. The reality was 
widespread lawlessness throughout the country.
  To make matters worse, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld denounced 
the extent of the chaos as simply an expression of pent-up hostility 
towards the old regime.
  ``It's untidy.'' Rumsfeld said. ``And freedom's untidy. And free 
people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes.''
  We clearly underestimated the disorder and chaos the toppling of the 
regime would cause. Then we failed to effectively respond to it once it 
did. The Bush administration simply did not believe that a major 
reconstruction effort would be required and they were unprepared when 
the Iraqi infrastructure collapsed. As a result, interagency rivalry 
and turf wars between the Departments of Defense and State plagued the 
immediate restoration of security and basic services.
  Amid the escalating violence and civil disorder, the Department of 
Defense deployed a small reconstruction effort, led by retired 
Lieutenant General Jay Garner. Garner became the Bush administration's 
fall guy for the problems and chaos in Iraq. He was blamed for not 
implementing key services or restoring order fast enough. Yet, he was 
prevented from cooperating with planners in the Central Command and 
denied key personnel increases. He was replaced less than one month 
after reconstruction efforts began.
  At this critical juncture, perhaps the single most important event in 
the destabilization of Iraq after the cessation of large scale military 
operations occurred--Garner's replacement, Ambassador Paul Bremer, 
demobilized the Iraqi Army.
  The abrupt decision in May 2003 to disband the entire force, 
including apolitical conscripts, may have been one of the most grievous 
mistakes made by our occupying force. The decision allowed enemies of a 
democratic Iraq the time necessary to regroup and infiltrate the under-
secured nation.
  We disbanded an organization that would have been vital for providing 
security and assisting in the rebuilding. The 300,000 strong force 
almost immediately morphed from soldiers to bitter, unemployed, armed 
terrorists who became prime recruits for the insurgency efforts. The 
result of this one decision, gave an enormous boost to the forces of 
instability in Iraq.
  In the fall of 2003, the administration faced the dilemma of securing 
a nation with a limited occupation force and no Iraqi security 
structures in place.
  While the Bush administration could have opted to deploy additional 
forces from the United States, the Department of Defense chose to speed 
up the Iraqi Army training program. The effect, inevitably, produced 
Iraqi soldiers who were neither properly trained nor fully committed to 
the mission.
  This problem became even more severe with the creation of the Iraqi 
Civil Defense Corps. The Corps' purpose was to provide local militia 
forces as adjuncts to the Iraqi army. However, the Bush administration 
was impatient to create more Iraqi troops to illustrate that additional 
U.S. forces were unnecessary.
  They once again increased the training pace which restricted the 
vetting process of the Iraqi troops. The result was an Iraqi Civil 
Defense Corps limited in its combat capability, thoroughly infiltrated 
by insurgents, who predictably collapsed whenever committed to combat.
  With nothing to fill the power void left by the regime's fall, the 
U.S. ended up creating a failed state that allowed the insurgency to 
develop.
  The United States did not anticipate the deeply divided Iraqi 
society--one with the Sunnis resentful over the loss of their dominant 
position and the Shiites seeking power commensurate with their majority 
status--would devolve the country into sectarian violence.
  The Bush administration was clearly unprepared for the likelihood 
that these ethnic differences and the dramatic shift in the power 
dynamics would cause the sects to engage in violent conflict. Perhaps 
even more importantly, the administration did not foresee that the U.S. 
military, as an occupying force, would itself be the target of 
resentment and armed attacks.
  Since the invasion, lingering Shiite resentment and Sunni fears 
associated with the shift in power have helped transform local and 
individual political or economic disputes into broader religious 
confrontations. Moreover, the Bush administration insisted that all of 
the problems of the country were caused by the insurgency, rather than 
that all of the problems of the country were helping to fuel the 
insurgency. Security was not established after the fall of the 
Ba'athist government and still remains beyond our grasp.
  As a result, the hardening of sectarian and ethnic identities in a 
postwar Iraq has created significant anxiety among Iraq's neighbors, 
many of whom also have religiously and ethnically diverse populations. 
Toppling the regime and dismantling the Iraqi armed forces removed a 
potential military threat to the Middle East region. Yet, it also 
eliminated the area's principal strategic counterbalance to Iran. The 
instability and violence in Iraq, coupled with Iraq's neighbors' fears 
of an emboldened and potentially hostile Iran, has created new concerns 
among Middle Eastern nations and sparked increased interest in the 
future of Iraq.
  In particular, Gulf governments worry that escalating sectarian 
violence in Iraq could spread to Iraq's mainly Sunni neighbors and 
force them into conflict with Shiite-controlled Iran. Gulf governments 
also believe that regions in Iraq could become safe havens for 
terrorist organizations if the Iraqi government collapses or the U.S. 
withdraws troops precipitously.
  As we debate a strategy for Iraq, we need to make certain we paint 
the big picture and understand what is at stake. If we precipitously 
withdraw our troops, we will open the door for the Iranians to exert 
even more influence in both Iraq and the Middle East.
  Iran clearly has regional aspirations that will significantly 
increase without a counterbalance in the Persian Gulf.
  However, more than just the strategic balance of the region is at 
stake. The oil reserves in Iraq are vast--believed to be only second in 
size in the Middle East to those of Saudi Arabia. Imagine over half the 
world's oil in the hands of the mullahs in Tehran. Picture the world 
with another nuclear power that hates the United States and all it 
stands for. The President is correct when he states that those who say 
the future of Iraq is not a direct threat to our national security are 
deluding themselves.
  Madam President, we are now living with the consequences of 
successive policy failures. The blunders, miscalculations, and failed 
leadership made by the Bush administration continue to this day.
  As I stand here today, one thing is clear--we are at a crossroads.
  One month ago, President Bush addressed the Nation and outlined a new 
strategy in Iraq. Since that time, the merit and purpose of escalating 
U.S. troops has been debated around the

[[Page 3486]]

country. This week, the Senate brought forth several resolutions 
expressing various viewpoints on the subject.
  One resolution, introduced by Senators Warner and Levin, disagrees 
with the troop escalation strategy, but like all the resolutions on 
Iraq, it is not binding. It cannot deter the President from sending 
more troops. It cannot withdraw the troops currently in Iraq. And it 
does not limit the President's power as Commander-in-Chief. That is set 
in the Constitution.
  However, what this resolution does is state that we, the United 
States Senate, the same body that 4 years prior authorized the use of 
force in Iraq, no longer has confidence in the U.S. strategy in Iraq.
  Far more significantly, it sends the message to our brave fighting 
men and women that although the Senate will not stop you from deploying 
and engaging the enemy, we do not think you can succeed in your 
mission. That is a message I refuse to send.
  Therefore, I do not support the Warner-Levin resolution. Our service 
members need clear direction--not mixed messages from the United States 
Senate. The Armed Forces need support, both materially and morally, 
from the policymakers who sent them into combat. Ambiguity has no place 
in our strategy or operations in Iraq.
  My opposition to this resolution, however, should not be confused 
with blind support of the President's policy. I have grave concerns and 
serious doubts about the future of Iraq and what role the United States 
will play there. As we scrutinize the new strategy put forth by the 
President, numerous and troubling questions arise about the future of 
U.S. involvement.
  Should we put more of our servicemembers in harm's way?
  Is the number of troops in the surge enough? Or do we need more?
  Is it too late to recover and should we just cut our losses and begin 
to withdraw our troops?
  If we did withdraw, what would be the cost?
  American prestige?
  An unleashing of transnational terrorism?
  The establishment of Iran as the dominant force in the Middle East?
  Will the Iraqi government step up to help secure the country? Or will 
sending more troops only delay Iraq's government from taking more 
responsibility?
  The questions could go on and on. In the words of Winston Churchill 
who once said, ``You ask, what is our policy? You ask, what is our 
aim?'' I believe there are three fundamental questions that must be 
answered before moving forward:
  What is our goal in Iraq? How do we measure success? Just stating 
that success is the establishment of a democratic and secure government 
in Iraq is too broad a definition. It represents an endless engagement 
for the U.S. We need more definable, measurable objectives. That is a 
basic principle of war.
  How do we achieve it? What is our strategy? Not just our military 
strategy, but our overall strategy involving military, political, 
economic, and social components.
  And is this new plan set forth by the President a viable option? Is 
it a rational strategy that will lead to achieving our objectives, 
which will in turn lead to success in Iraq?
  When combat operations began, our goal was straightforward--to enable 
Iraq to be stable, unified, and democratic, able to provide for its own 
security, a partner in the global war on terror, and a model for reform 
In the Middle East.
  Four years later, the country has descended into chaos. While the 
formal political framework for a democratic government has advanced, 
insurgent and sectarian violence has increased and become more 
widespread. Is it still plausible to believe that the U. S. can unify 
this country so that it will be able to sustain a viable democratic 
government?
  We are fighting an insurgency in Iraq. American forces and the Iraqi 
people have the same enemies--the Shiite, Sunni, and al-Qaida 
terrorists, illegal militias, Iranian agents, and Saddam loyalists who 
stand between the Iraqi people and their future as a free nation.
  Only through a combination of military force, political dialogue, 
economic development and reform, and increased security for the 
population will we be able to restore peace. Therefore, we are now 
confronted with this question: How . will the United States reverse 
Iraq's steady decline into sectarian and radical religious chaos and 
bring stability to violence-torn parts of the country?
  In the announcement of an imminent deployment of 21,500 additional 
U.S. servicemembers to Iraq, the Bush administration radically shifted 
its Iraq policy.
  By increasing the amount of ``boots on the ground,'' many of the 
basic tenets of the President's Iraq strategy thus far have been 
repudiated--in particular, that political progress would eventually 
suppress the violence. The question now becomes, will the increase in 
our armed forces in Baghdad help stabilize the country and stop the 
spiral into a civil war, or is it too late?
  We have entered into a quagmire, and there is no easy exit. This is 
not a war that will be won overnight and it is dangerous to believe 
that if we set an artificial time line to withdraw troops that the 
terrorist violence would not follow us home.
  The consequence of failure in Iraq is the strengthening and growth of 
radical extremists who will use the country as a safe haven for their 
terrorist organizations to threaten the safety and security of the 
United States and the entire free world.
  No one appears to have the answer to the calamity that is the current 
state of affairs in Iraq.
  Even those outspoken detractors of the Bush plan do not offer 
practical alternatives. Cutting and running is not an option, not for 
the United States. Even the appearance of doing so under another name 
is unacceptable, I believe, at any level. It is clear, though, that 
things cannot continue forward on this path. The administration and the 
Congress must find a viable strategy for U.S. involvement in Iraq.
  I will not stand before you, Madam President, and assert that the 
Bush plan is not without flaws, nor will I state I am completely 
confident an additional 21,500 troops will turn the war around, will 
stabilize Baghdad. We will know that answer soon enough, all of us. But 
what I do know is this: When you vote to send troops into combat, it 
becomes your responsibility to ensure their mission is clearly defined, 
they have realistic military objectives, and they have the best 
equipment to achieve these goals.
  As Congress debates the President's plan--and we will--as new ideas 
and strategies, perhaps new resolutions are brought forward, one thing, 
I submit, must remain constant: the support we give our soldiers, our 
service members around the world in harm's way.
  I acknowledge there are different views within Congress about the way 
forward in Iraq, but Congress, in my judgment, should never let 
political infighting lead to bartering for bullets. Cutting off funding 
for our troops or even under any kind of name or guise should never be 
an option. The members of the U.S. Armed Forces willingly face grave 
dangers for each and every one of us. They have bravely faced sometimes 
an unknown enemy and have done everything that has been asked of them. 
Abandoning our servicemembers, our soldiers, hampering their ability to 
fight or cutting off funds for necessary military equipment or supplies 
cannot be an alternative, in my judgment. We should never take any 
action that will endanger our Armed Forces fighting in combat.
  No one, I believe, wants to bring our troops safely home more than I 
do or you do, Madam President. Yet while many oppose sending more 
troops, no one in Congress has yet proposed an alternative that allows 
Iraq to stabilize. Therefore, the last question I pose to the Senate 
is: Why is no one looking for a way to win as opposed to simply a way 
out? This should be part of the debate in the few weeks ahead.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

[[Page 3487]]

  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, if I may inquire about the situation, are 
we now considering the continuing resolution, the appropriations bill?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in a period for the transaction 
of morning business. The Senator is permitted to speak for up to 10 
minutes.

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