[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3461-3467]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

   NOMINATION OF GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, 
                           UNITED STATES ARMY

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to executive session to resume consideration of Calendar No. 
15, which the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read the nomination of General George W. Casey, Jr., 
to be Chief of Staff, United States Army.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will be 50 
minutes for debate, with the time equally divided and controlled by the 
senior Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, and the senior Senator from 
Arizona, Mr. McCain, or their designees, and 10 minutes for each of the 
leaders.
  The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, may I inquire, how much time do I have 
again?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 50 minutes total. The Senator from 
Arizona gets 15 minutes and 15 minutes for the Senator from Michigan, 
and the leaders have 10 minutes each.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair.
  I ask the clerk to tell me when I have consumed 8 minutes.
  I come again this morning to the not particularly pleasant task of 
opposing the nomination of General Casey to be Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Army. I preface my remarks, again, with my appreciation for 
honorable service to the country, his family, and the sacrifices they 
have made for many years. This isn't a question of character because 
his character is outstanding; it is a question of judgment.
  I will try to put this in context, why I am in opposition. For 
several years, I and a number of others have bemoaned and complained 
and criticized and been saddened as we have watched this train wreck in 
Iraq. Not long after the initial invasion, I came back from a visit to 
Iraq and visited with the then-Secretary of Defense, who bears great 
responsibility for this debacle, and history will judge him very badly 
for his performance as Secretary of Defense. I told him how it was that 
we were not going to win, we were not going to succeed, that we didn't 
have enough troops over there, that Anbar Province was going to erupt--
basically all the things many of us saw were going to transpire. 
General Casey, for 2\1/2\ years up until recently, would come back to 
the Congress and say that things were going well. I quoted many quotes 
yesterday, from time to time, including in 2005, saying we could start 
withdrawing by 2006 and on and on and on, completely divorced from 
reality on the ground, as was the Secretary of Defense.
  I will state at the beginning that Presidents are responsible, but 
Presidents also rely on the advice and counsel of their military 
leaders. That is a normal thing and has happened in every conflict.
  President Bush said time and time again: I have said to the American 
people, as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. But I have also said 
our commanders on the ground will make that decision. We will talk to 
General Casey. On and on. The Army is getting on its feet. We have 
turned over a lot of territory to the Army. They are good fighters. I 
have spent a great deal of time with General Abizaid and General Casey. 
They are in Washington. They are generals who will be happy to tell me 
the way it is, not the way they think I would like to it be.
  Time after time, it has been clear that the President of the United 
States, as appropriate, has been relying on the advice and counsel of 
commanders in the field who did not give him appropriate information or 
recommendations. We are all responsible. In the military, you are 
responsible for the decisions you make on the battlefield, particularly 
when they cost our most valuable and important asset--American blood.
  In his opening statement at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing 
on September 29, General Casey said: ``The capacity of Iraqi security 
forces has increased quantitatively and qualitatively over the past 
year'' and ``we have also developed with the Iraqis a readiness 
reporting system, not unlike the one we have in place for our own 
forces. So over the past 18 months we have built enough Iraqi capacity 
where we can begin talking seriously about transitioning this 
counterinsurgency mission to them.''
  Did he realize at the time that statement was wrong? And when did he 
tell someone?
  At the same hearing, General Casey said:

       More coalition is not necessarily better. More and more 
     capable Iraqi security forces are better. Increased coalition 
     presence speeds the notion of occupation. It contributes to 
     the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coalition. It 
     extends the amount of time it will take for Iraqi security 
     forces to become self-reliant and exposes more coalition 
     forces to attacks at a time when Iraqi security forces are 
     increasingly available and increasingly capable.

  There has been no sign of that. Why did it take 15 months for General 
Casey to change that assessment and then not even agree with the new 
strategy of five additional brigades, which most of us pray is enough 
and most of us believe is a direct contravention to the Powell 
doctrine, which is, use overwhelming force in order to gain military 
victory?
  President Bush said General Casey will make decisions as to how many 
troops we have there. Why did it take 2\1/2\ years? Why did it have to 
take 2\1/2\ years of steady degradation for General Casey to figure out 
we didn't have enough troops there, and the situation is worsening in 
Iraq.
  The NIE that came out yesterday should frighten anyone, any American, 
because of the stark depiction in the NIE--the public document--that 
states

[[Page 3462]]

that the situation is grave and deteriorating in Iraq, which is also 
the conclusion of the Iraq Study Group, whether you happen to agree 
with their recommendations or not.
  Mr. President, responsibility is one of the first things that is 
taught at our service academies. We are responsible for our decisions. 
When the Missouri runs aground, we relieve the captain. When four 
sailors are washed overboard, we relieve the captain. Now we are 
rewarding failure as we did during the Vietnam war when we named 
General Westmoreland as Chief of Staff of the Army after a failed 
search and destroy. There are eerie parallels here. General 
Westmoreland employed the search and destroy strategy which is counter 
to any counterinsurgency strategy. That kind of strategy is clear, 
hold, and build. That is what General Petraeus is trying to do now. 
That is not what has been done in the past under General Casey.
  So what are we doing? We are promoting a general who has pursued a 
failed policy, advocated it to the President, whom he is responsible to 
advise, and he is advocating it to the Congress of the United States 
despite the overwhelming view by many of us that it was not a 
successful strategy. Still, today, where he will be in place if he is 
confirmed by the Senate, he will be responsible for the operation, 
training, and doctrine that will be employed in Iraq, and he still, to 
this day, as far as I know, from the hearing of a short time ago, 
believes--and I could give the quote--that we are not failing but we 
are succeeding. I don't know of anyone who believes that who is in a 
responsible position in Government.
  Mr. President, it is with a bit of regret that I do this. Again, I 
repeat what I said yesterday. Senator Levin asked him:

       I am wondering whether you would agree that what we are 
     doing in Iraq was maybe a slow failure.

  General Casey said:

       I don't actually see it as a slow failure. I actually see 
     it as slow progress.

  How could you depict the situation in Baghdad today, with six 
helicopters being shot down in the last few weeks, with a spike in 
casualties that has taken place, and the continued level of sectarian 
violence, as a slow progress?
  So I want to tell my friends that people in the military, 
particularly our young officers, are watching what we do here. We teach 
them in our service schools, and we teach our noncommissioned officers 
and junior officers: You are responsible for success or failure. That 
is why we appoint you as leaders. In this case, this leader, despite 
his honorable character and dedication to this country, has not led, 
and his responsibility has not been carried out.
  So I hope my colleagues will turn down this nomination and that we 
will appoint one of the many highly qualified senior military officers 
we have to fulfill this position.
  May I finally say that I am very nervous about this new strategy. I 
am very doubtful that we have enough troops. I don't know if the Maliki 
government will be strong enough. But if General Casey is appointed to 
this position, my confidence will be lowered because it is not 
appropriate to put someone who does not support wholeheartedly the new 
strategy in a position where he will be responsible for a great deal of 
it. To this day, he doesn't admit that this present strategy has 
failed.
  Do I have any time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, again, it is extraordinarily ironic that my 
good friend from Arizona says there is no one in a high position in 
this Government who thinks we are succeeding, when the President, just 
2 or 3 months ago, said we are absolutely winning in Iraq. That is the 
Commander in Chief--a pretty high position of responsibility. The Vice 
President, just last year, said that the insurgency is in its last 
throes, when it was not. So it was clear to everybody, and apparently 
to my good friend from Arizona because he says he had seen this for 
years--failure after failure in Iraq--identified by the highest levels 
and the highest level of this administration as being a success.
  Year after year, we were told this is a successful strategy. Now all 
of a sudden, a general who was assigned to carry out that strategy and 
did the best he could, acknowledging some mistakes in implementation, 
is going to be held accountable by some who will vote against his 
nomination for the massive failures at the highest levels of civilian 
authority. The strategy was wrong going into Iraq; it was poorly 
implemented. The Iraqi Army was disbanded. That was not General Casey; 
that was before he came.
  The people who made those decisions were given awards and medals by 
the administration. George Tenet was given a medal for his work. He 
said the intelligence was a slam-dunk, that there were weapons of mass 
destruction. Medal after medal was given to the civilian leaders. A 
Medal of Freedom was awarded to George Tenet. Ambassador Bremer was 
given a medal. He just disbanded the Iraqi Army and had a 
debaathification program, which was a complete failure because of its 
excess. He was given a Medal of Freedom.
  William Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense--his 
dubious legal judgment contributed to the interrogation abuses of 
detainees that led to the horrors of Abu Ghraib. He was given the 
Department of Defense medal for distinguished public service.
  Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, who hyped false intelligence 
used to justify the war in Iraq, was given a medal.
  Now you have a general who was given a strategy and was told to 
implement the strategy. Yes, he was optimistic that it could work. He 
is in charge of the morale of his troops. Now, suddenly, some say he 
should be, in effect, punished. He should carry the burdens that 
properly should be carried by the top civilian leaders of this Nation. 
It is not appropriate.
  It is not fair that General Casey be held responsible for massive 
failures that were caused by the wrong policies, the deceptions, the 
ignorance, the arrogance, and the cockiness of civilian leaders in this 
administration. It is just plain wrong that this all be heaped onto his 
back.
  What do we know about General Casey? By the way, we know he is 
forthright and acknowledges his mistakes. There is not a commander I 
know of who does not acknowledge his mistakes. Every commander worth 
his or her salt acknowledges mistakes, and General Casey has done that. 
In fact, he has given us a list of mistakes. We asked him what went 
wrong that you contributed to, and he gave us a list very openly. But 
you cannot lay the chaos and the violence in Iraq on General Casey's 
doorstep. This belongs on the doorstep of the top civilian leaders of 
this country who went into Iraq the way they did, who didn't plan for 
an aftermath, who disbanded the Iraqi army, and who perpetrated some of 
the other mistakes that have put us in some of the positions that we 
are in, in Iraq.
  General Casey is a long and distinguished servant in the military, 
including the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. This was 
preceded by assignments on the joint staff and a career commanding 
Infantry units at all levels, up to and including Division Command. He 
knows Iraq, he knows the challenges the Army faces in Iraq, he knows 
the Pentagon, and he knows the challenges he will be facing in the 
Pentagon if we confirm him. He has the knowledge and skills to carry 
out his primary responsibility as Chief of Staff, which is the training 
and equipping of soldiers, caring for them and their families.
  I want to discuss two issues that have been raised. One is the 
general's decision to support an increase in U.S. forces in Iraq after 
previously opposing such an increase, and also the proposition that 
General Casey somehow or other should be denied this position because 
of mistakes that he may have made in Iraq.
  First, the issue of additional troops. I pressed General Casey about 
this issue at his nomination hearing before the Armed Services 
Committee. He said his general view was that he agreed with

[[Page 3463]]

General Abizaid's view that more American forces prevent the Iraqis 
from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future. 
That is something, it seems to me, that is key to those of us who 
oppose this surge. That goes to the heart of our argument--the fact 
that General Casey believed more American forces prevent the Iraqis 
from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.
  So how is it that now General Casey supports the surge? That is the 
question I asked him:

       Senator Levin: We asked General Abizaid back in November 
     when he appeared before this committee whether we needed more 
     troops or he supported more troops going to Iraq. And this is 
     just last November. And this is what he said. He said that he 
     met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps 
     commander, General Dempsey. ``We all talked together, and I 
     said, `In your professional opinion, if you were to bring in 
     more American troops now, does it add considerably to our 
     ability to achieve success in Iraq?' And they all said no. 
     And the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It's 
     easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I 
     believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from 
     doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own 
     future.''

  I asked General Casey:

       Now, General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his 
     opinion reflected your opinion and all the other commanders. 
     Was that true when he said that?
       General Casey: I'm not exactly sure when in November it 
     was, but it was.
       Senator Levin: So you've changed your view since November?
       General Casey: As I described in my opening testimony, 
     Senator, in mid-November was when the reevaluation of the 
     plan was taking place. So I suspect John and I talked before 
     that. And that does reflect my general view on additional 
     U.S. forces in Iraq.
       Senator Levin: It reflects a general view, but then there 
     was some kind of reevaluation which took place in mid-
     November.
       General Casey: That's right, Senator. We're constantly 
     reevaluating how we're doing and what we need.
       Senator Levin: But that position that General Abizaid 
     stated was your position when you spoke to him in early 
     November presumably still remains your general view.
       General Casey: That's correct.
       Senator Levin: Well, if that's your general view, what is 
     the change? Why are you modifying your general view for this 
     surge?
       General Casey: What has changed, Senator, are several 
     things. One, the development of a plan, a new plan that was 
     conceived by the Iraqis and worked in concert with us; so 
     there is a plan that laid out requirements for those forces. 
     So just to say do you need more forces is one thing; to say 
     do you need more forces to execute this plan is quite 
     another. And we do need an additional two brigades to 
     implement that plan.

  Now, there is a new plan, a plan that I very strongly disagree with, 
the surge plan of the President. It is a new plan given to the 
commanders, and they are now told, with this new plan, to insert troops 
into neighborhoods of Iraq, hold that territory, and have more American 
troops--many more--embedded with Iraqi forces. That is the plan. That 
is the Commander in Chief's decision.
  Will that require more troops? And now General Casey gives his honest 
answer that it will require, in his judgment, two additional brigades.
  General Abizaid says it will require more brigades, but General Casey 
said two. I give him credit for giving his honest opinion.
  So what has changed? He still believes in general that putting more 
troops in there takes the Iraqis off the hook, but if you change your 
plan, you change your mission and you say, as the Commander in Chief 
has, that is now our mission, that is what we are going to do, it is 
obviously up to the commanders to say how many additional troops it 
would take to carry out that mission.
  That is an honest response, and that is the response we expect of our 
leaders. But his general view has been correct, and so has General 
Abizaid's. More American troops is a mistake. It takes the Iraqis off 
the hook. It lessens the responsibility on them to do what only they 
can do with their military and with their political leaders.
  People who have visited General Casey in Iraq--colleagues--have 
always found him to be honest about the situation in Iraq and true to 
the pledge that he would give Congress his personal views, even if 
those views differ from the administration in power. And he did this 
again at his nomination hearing when he disagreed with the Commander in 
Chief's sudden epiphany that things are not going well in Iraq.
  All of a sudden, now the Commander in Chief says we are on the road 
to slow failure. That is a new revelation. Until a few months ago, the 
Commander in Chief was telling the American people we are absolutely 
winning in Iraq. So now I pressed General Casey about that:

       Do you agree with the President that now the situation in 
     Iraq is maybe a slow failure?

  He said:

       I actually don't see it as a slow failure. I actually see 
     it as slow progress.

  Do I agree with his assessment? I do not. I have seen chaos in Iraq--
consistent chaos, growing chaos. But do I admire an honest answer even 
when it disagrees with the Commander in Chief? I do. Even though I 
disagree with that answer, I think it was an honest answer that he gave 
to the committee.
  What about denying him confirmation as Chief of Staff because of the 
mistakes he may have made? Again, I think this is an ironic argument 
given the fact that the architects of these policies, the architects of 
the major failures which led to the mess General Casey was assigned to 
clean up, are given medals--Medals of Freedom, medals by the Defense 
Department. They are given the medals, and now some will want to lay on 
General Casey's doorstep the mess that was not created by his policies 
but by the policies of others.
  I want to read for the Record a statement of Senator Jim Webb on the 
Casey nomination. He is tied up in a hearing, and so I will read this 
very brief statement into the Record for Senator Webb:

       Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of GEN 
     George Casey, Jr.'s, nomination as the Chief of Staff of the 
     U.S. Army. General Casey's service to the Nation during a 
     long career and his experiences in Iraq qualify him well to 
     address the formidable challenges facing the U.S. Army today.
       Questions have been raised regarding General Casey's tenure 
     as commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq. The national 
     strategy in Iraq was flawed even before the invasion, and 
     attacks on General Casey's performance only divert attention 
     from the true architects of that strategy.
       The situation faced by General Casey in Iraq represents the 
     classic conundrum of military service at the highest level of 
     command. In this administration, it has not been unheard of 
     for some officers who spoke too loudly, very often, to have 
     lost their jobs. At the same time, to speak too softly often 
     causes the military leader, rather than the civilian boss, to 
     be blamed when things go wrong. While I believe strongly that 
     military leaders should be held accountable, General Casey 
     performed as well as one could expect given the strategy for 
     the war's direction that he inherited when he reported to 
     Baghdad.

  I wonder, Mr. President, if there is any time remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 25 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Presiding Officer.
  This is the conclusion of Senator Webb's statement:

       The consequences of a failed U.S. national strategy should 
     be raised at a far higher level than General Casey's in Iraq.
       Mr. President, I urge my esteemed colleagues to support 
     General Casey's nomination to be the next Chief of Staff of 
     the U.S. Army.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the two managers, is it possible 
that the Senator from Virginia could get 2, 3 minutes at most to speak?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator 
from Virginia be allowed 3 minutes to speak on this issue, not to be 
taken from the time remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, and I obviously will not 
object, I apologize to the Senator from Virginia. I didn't realize he 
was here to speak on the nomination. If he is speaking in favor, I 
would have reserved some time for him.

[[Page 3464]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, would it be acceptable that I be given 2 
minutes to speak after Senator Warner?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask further unanimous consent--and I 
tell my colleagues that I will not seek further unanimous consent after 
this; I will object to a further unanimous consent request--that an 
additional 2 minutes be given to the Senator from Alabama to speak on 
this issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous consent request is 3 minutes for 
the Senator from Virginia and 2 minutes for the Senator from Alabama. 
Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. I thank the two managers 
of this very important nomination.
  Mr. President, I have the deepest respect for my colleague, Senator 
McCain. We have an association that goes back some 30 years. It is not 
often we are on different sides of an issue. I wish to respect Senator 
McCain's evaluation of a military officer. I think probably he is as 
well qualified as anyone in this Chamber to speak to those critical 
issues.
  I bring a different perspective to this nomination. There is going to 
be, clearly, a division of thought as to General Casey and his role as 
the senior officer in charge of our combat missions in Iraq. But I wish 
to clearly say that throughout the history of the United States, the 
doctrine is civilian control over the military.
  True, we hold accountable, as best we can, those who we feel have not 
carried out their responsibilities in the best interests of the 
country. I believe the accountability of General Casey has been spoken 
to by the general himself. He recognizes mistakes were made, and I 
think he accepted that level of accountability he, as a military 
officer, had. But, indeed, it is the civilians above him, if there is 
greater wrong, who should be held accountable.
  Second, I think of the institution of the U.S. Army. The Chief of 
Staff is the very pinnacle of the military service, and those 
nominations are exceedingly carefully thought out from the President on 
down through the Department of Defense before a nomination goes 
forward.
  I was privileged for some many years to serve as the Navy Secretary 
and witness the careful process that went through selecting a chief of 
service. I was personally involved in two of those processes for the 
U.S. Navy. So I say to my colleagues, do take into consideration the 
differing views of Senator McCain and others eminently qualified to 
assess this nomination, but I believe this nomination was carefully 
thought through at all levels. It represents the institution of the 
U.S. Army, and they have to take pride in their senior Chief of Staff.
  I believe that General Casey, when one looks at the entirety of the 
record, is deserving of the support of colleagues in the Senate.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for 
granting me this extra time. He is not required to do so.
  I think we have had a problem and a difference of opinion for some 
time. Senator McCain has been quite open that he is concerned about the 
troop levels in Iraq not being sufficient. History may well record he 
is right on that regard, but our policy was different.
  General Abizaid, the commander for that region, the Central Command, 
studied the area throughout his career. He was concerned about too many 
troops in Iraq from the beginning. General Casey came on after General 
Abizaid was CENTCOM commander and became the commander in Iraq. He was 
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army at that time, he was to be gone for 18 
months. He ended up being away from his family for 30 months, 2\1/2\ 
years, and he executed the policy as best he could.
  He testified that in his view, he didn't want to ask for a single 
soldier more than he needed to do the job. I don't know what the 
tension is, but there was a constant tension between the need to have 
more soldiers and to not take over the entire effort in Iraq.
  General Abizaid and General Casey made their recommendations. We 
followed them. That experience in Iraq, in my view, can only make him 
better as Chief of Staff.
  He was Vice Chief of Staff, lead our forces for 30 months in Iraq, 
and now he will be Chief of Staff. He was born in an Army hospital. His 
father was killed in Vietnam. He served 37 years in the Army. His son 
is a member of the Army.
  He should not bear the brunt of a difference of opinion about how we 
should have conducted the effort in Iraq. He gave his absolute best 
effort to it. He could not help but have learned a lot in the process. 
He will be a fine Chief of Staff.
  Mr. President, my time is up. I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I voted for GEN George W. Casey, Jr., to 
be U.S. Army Chief of Staff. While questions have been raised about 
General Casey's performance as U.S. commander in Iraq, I do not believe 
the general can be held responsible for the failures of a policy 
devised at the highest levels of this administration.
  But my vote to confirm General Casey does not change my opposition to 
the President's policies in Iraq. The President has made the wrong 
judgment about Iraq time and again, first by taking us into war on a 
fraudulent basis, then by keeping our brave troops in Iraq, and now by 
sending 21,500 more American troops into harm's way.
  The indefinite presence of U.S. military personnel in Iraq will not 
fix that country's political problems. And as we have seen over the 
last few years, sending more troops will not provide the stability in 
Iraq that can only come from a political agreement. Congress must 
develop the courage to confront this President on what has become one 
of the greatest foreign policy mistakes in our history.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to recognize the service of 
General Casey and speak in support of his confirmation as Chief of 
Staff of the Army.
  General Casey has had a long and distinguished career. After his 
graduation from Georgetown University in 1970, he received his 
commission and served in the mechanized infantry. During his career, he 
has commanded the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division and acted as 
the assistant division commander of the 1st Armored Division. In 1999, 
General Casey assumed command of the 1st Armored Division. 
Additionally, General Casey has served as Director of Strategic Plans 
and Policy at the Pentagon and as Director of the Joint Staff.
  As we all know, General Casey has most recently served as the 
commander of Multi-National Forces--Iraq. As commander of our forces in 
Iraq, General Casey faced extremely difficult issues everyday.
  I believe General Casey to be a good man, and I would like to again 
congratulate him on his promotion and thank him for his continued 
service to our country. I look forward to working with him while he 
serves as Chief of Staff of the Army.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the 
confirmation of General George Casey to become the next Chief of Staff 
of the U.S. Army.
  Let us be clear. Our soldiers are fighting a grueling and dangerous 
war. They need to know that their leaders will have no higher priority 
than their safety and well-being. I believe that General Casey will do 
just that.
  He has been on the frontlines of the war in Iraq. As commander of 
U.S. forces there, he has overseen operations on the ground; he 
understands our soldiers' basic needs and will take action to keep them 
fighting safely and effectively.
  I believe that in this new position, like GEN Peter Schoomaker before 
him, he will work hard to ensure that our soldiers have the equipment 
and support they need to get the job done.
  Regrettably, I am concerned that some in this administration and in 
this

[[Page 3465]]

Congress have decided to blame General Casey for the worsening 
situation on the ground. To them I would say that it is simply wrong, 
and frankly un-American, to hold one soldier responsible for the 
administration's policy failures in Iraq.
  In his book, ``Deriliction of Duty,'' H.R. McMasters put the blame 
for Vietnam on our military leaders. To McMasters, it was our generals 
who were at fault for not speaking out when they disagreed with the 
civilians at the Pentagon and White House.
  As a result of their silence, America became further entrenched in 
Vietnam. Nine years ago, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN 
Hugh Shelton took this message to heart; requiring all 17 four-star 
general commanders to read Major McMasters' book. The book had an 
impact. As the situation in Iraq has deteriorated, we have seen our 
generals stand up to civilian leaders--putting their country before 
their careers--and courageously advocating for alternative, more 
sensible policies.
  Unfortunately, the same arrogance and incompetence that has blinded 
U.S. foreign policy for the past 6 years has also allowed the dire 
warnings from these generals to fall on deaf ears. The candor from the 
likes of Generals Shinseki and Riggs, and now Abizaid, Casey, and 
Schoomaker, has been rewarded with dismissal, transfer or demotion.
  In my private meeting with General Casey in Iraq 2 months ago, he 
explained his concern over proposals to ``surge'' additional troops 
into Iraq if Iraqis are unable to meet their own responsibilities to 
unite politically and contribute more meaningfully to their own 
security.
  He echoed these objections along with then-Central Command's top 
general, GEN John Abizaid, in a Washington Post report on December 21, 
2006.
  Obviously, General Casey is uniquely qualified to make these 
statements. He has been thoroughly immersed in our Iraq operations. And 
it is for this reason that he is uniquely prepared to assume the Army 
Chief of Staff post.
  But there is another quality of his that I believe will also serve 
our Nation and our Army well during his tenure as Chief of Staff. It 
his is loyalty to our soldiers--from the newly enlisted private to the 
career officer.
  I observed this quality firsthand 3 years ago on a visit to Walter 
Reed Medical Center. I met with soldiers recuperating from injuries 
they had suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and expressed my gratitude 
for their brave service.
  General Casey happened to be at Walter Reed that day as well. I knew 
he was there for the same reason I was: to thank these soldiers for 
their service and to assure them that their sacrifices will never be 
forgotten.
  The Chief of Staff must constantly exhibit such loyalty to his 
troops. He must be their strongest advocate and continue to address 
their needs, even when doing so is in direct conflict with the orders 
being handed down from civilian leadership. General Schoomaker, the 
outgoing Chief of Staff, has been faced with this situation time and 
again as the administration proposed inadequate budgets to carry out 
their deeply flawed Iraq strategy. And he has performed superbly.
  As Chief of Staff for the last few years, General Schoomaker, has 
long voiced concern that the administration failed to budget for the 
replacement and repair of thousands of war-battered trucks, aircraft, 
and vehicles. In fact, it was General Schoomaker's testimony last year 
that compelled me to offer an amendment to fund these priorities and 
help begin restoring Army readiness. I regret that the White House 
decided to reward General Schoomaker's candor by replacing him at the 
Pentagon.
  At his recent confirmation hearing the other day, I was pleased to 
hear that General Casey will resume General Schoomaker's mission to 
ensure that our forces are outfitted with the equipment they need to 
get the job done.
  Mr. President, there are no easy answers in Iraq. But, when it comes 
to discerning tactics on the ground, our civilian leaders must defer to 
our generals. In this case, it is my sincere hope that the President 
takes heed of the advice of his newly installed Army Chief of Staff, to 
make the safety and well-being of our soldiers a top priority and not 
an afterthought. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
nominee for confirmation.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I support the nomination of General George 
Casey to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and disavow attempts to 
blame him for the failures in Iraq.
  The blame for the disastrous and reckless war in Iraq lies with the 
President, Vice President Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The blame 
starts at the top. It is they who must be held accountable.
  General Casey did not author the misguided doctrine of preemptive 
war. General Casey did not manipulate and politicize intelligence to 
sell the Iraq war to the American people. And General Casey did not 
fail to provide a political solution to end the sectarian violence that 
is now engulfing Iraq. It is the civilian leadership of the Bush 
administration that continues to fail us in Iraq.
  When I traveled to Iraq and met with General Casey, he told me the 
truth. He said that the U.S. presence was fueling the insurgency. I 
appreciated his candor. He fully understood the dangers and challenges 
in Iraq. Unlike so many in the Bush administration, his view of the 
situation in Iraq was not distorted by rose-colored classes.
  General Casey did not lead us down this dangerous path in Iraq. 
Therefore I cast a ``yes'' vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes 20 seconds.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, let me make it clear, I don't support 
medals for failure. I don't support promotion to a higher position for 
failure. I believe that the awards and accolades Senator Levin alluded 
to that have been provided to those who have committed egregious 
failures was not only inappropriate, it was absolutely insulting.
  I also, though, point out that history will judge many of these 
people who have been given medals of various types, and already that 
judgment has been harsh. All of us are more concerned about our place 
in history than we are medals. History and the American people are 
already judging the failures and the misleading statements, such as 
``stuff happens'' and ``mission accomplished'' and a few ``dead-
enders'' and ``last throes'' and all of those statements which have 
been made over the past 3\1/2\ years which led the American people to 
believe we were succeeding in Iraq when many of us knew we weren't 
because we violated a fundamental principle called the Powell doctrine: 
If you want to win, you go in with overwhelming force.
  The reason I am very concerned today, even though we have a very 
outstanding general in Petraeus, is that I am not sure we have enough 
troops still.
  Throughout our history, military commanders have been held 
responsible. Abraham Lincoln held General McClellan responsible and 
fired him. In World War II, those who were in command who were 
responsible for December 7, 1941, were held responsible. In the Korean 
war, General MacArthur was held responsible. The fact is that military 
leaders are held responsible as well as civilian leaders.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the 
number of times President Bush said that he relied on the judgment of 
the military commanders. Those military commanders did not exercise 
good judgment and therefore are responsible for the rosy scenario and 
the inaccurate depiction of facts on the ground in Iraq as they came 
before our committee, the Armed Services Committee, and spoke to the 
President of the United States and the American people.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

      President George W. Bush on Support for Commanders/Generals

       President Bush: ``One of the things that's important is 
     for--and one of the reasons why

[[Page 3466]]

     you trust the commanders on the ground is because there needs 
     to be flexibility. And I explained to the Prime Minister that 
     I'll be making my decisions based upon the recommendations of 
     General Casey.'' (President George W. Bush, Press Conference, 
     7/31/06)
       President Bush: ``I have said to the American people, as 
     the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down. But I've also said 
     that our commanders on the ground will make that decision. 
     And I have--we'll talk to General Casey once he is--conferred 
     with the new Government of Iraq.'' (President George W. Bush, 
     Press Conference, 5/29/06)
       President Bush: ``And so the army is getting on its feet. 
     We've turned over a lot of territory to the army. And they're 
     good fighters; they really are. I spent a great deal of time 
     with General Abizaid and General Casey--they were in 
     Washington this past week--these are generals, you'd be happy 
     to hear, who tell me the way it is, not the way they think I 
     would like it to be.'' (President George W. Bush, Remarks On 
     The War On Terror And A Question-And-Answer Session, 
     Louisville, KY, 1/16/06)
       President Bush: ``The best people to give any politician 
     advice about whether or not we're achieving a military 
     objective is the people you put out there on the ground. I 
     told you I've got good confidence in these generals and the 
     people who report to them. These are honest, honorable, 
     decent, very capable, smart people, and they'll decide the 
     troop levels.'' (President George W. Bush, Remarks On The War 
     On Terror And A Question-And-Answer Session, Louisville, KY, 
     1/16/06)
       ``President Bush said he relies on military advisors and 
     other officials on the ground in Iraq to keep him abreast of 
     the situation in the country, and they're telling him civil 
     war is not imminent. `This notion that we're in civil war is 
     just not true according to them,' he told Wolf Blitzer in an 
     interview taped earlier this week that aired today. 
     (``President Bush: Iraq Not On Brink Of Civil War,'' 
     Congressional Quarterly, 9/24/06)
       ``Bush also has said he would rely on the opinions of U.S. 
     military commanders in the two countries for determining how 
     soon troops would be withdrawn. `As we see more of these 
     Iraqi forces in the lead, we'll be able to continue with our 
     desire, our stated strategy that says as Iraqis stand up, 
     we'll stand down,' the president said. ``In 2006, we expect 
     Iraqis will take more and more control of the battle space, 
     and as they do so, we will need fewer U.S. troops to conduct 
     combat operations around that country.'' (``Bush Says U.S. 
     Forces Will Be Reduced In Iraq, Afghanistan,'' State News 
     Service, 1/4/06)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in 2004, General Casey said:

       My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to 
     accomplishing our objectives . . . with Iraqi security forces 
     that are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying 
     Iraq as a safe haven for terror, and I believe we are on 
     track to get there by December of 2005.

  In September of 2005, General Casey said:

       We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we 
     are broadly on track in achieving our goals.

  Time after time, the American people were told that things were going 
fine, and they were not.
  I wish to emphasize again that I believe General Casey has served 
this Nation honorably. I think he and his family have made great 
sacrifices for this country. I have nothing but respect. But to reward 
failure is going to send a message all around the military that I don't 
think is a healthy one. I don't support promotion and I don't support 
medals for failure. I support people being held responsible, and I 
regret that those who are responsible on the civilian side have not 
been held more responsible, although, as we speak today, the American 
people, by their opinions as reflected in the polls, are certainly 
reflecting their judgment about the performance and responsibility of 
our civilian leaders.
  I hope we can move forward and obtain successes in Iraq under this 
new strategy. I am not sure right now that General Casey completely 
supports it, and I don't think that it enhances our chance for 
succeeding in Iraq. I urge my colleagues to vote against this 
nomination and select a leader, of which there are many, who is far 
more capable, in my view, of carrying out the new strategy in Iraq.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, as I see the 
majority leader here on the floor.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding that I will be the 
last speaker. The distinguished minority leader is not going to speak 
at this time. So after I speak, we will vote. Is that the understanding 
of the Chair?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That has not been made clear at this time.
  Mr. REID. That is what I have been told. But if the minority leader 
comes to the floor to speak, he can, and I will make my statement now.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, when Harry Truman was President, he put a 
sign on his desk. It said: The buck stops here. He chose this message 
because it conveyed to the American public that, as President, Truman 
was responsible for everything in his administration. Everything.
  The buck stops here. It is a phrase we should keep in mind as we vote 
on GEN George Casey's nomination to be Army Chief of Staff.
  Despite his service to our country, I know many Senators would like 
to vote no on General Casey's nomination because he has been associated 
with a broken Iraq policy. I understand others would like to vote no in 
an attempt to make the general a scapegoat for a war that has gone 
horribly wrong. I believe there are still others who are using this 
nomination as a way to express opposition to the President's escalation 
proposal, a plan General Casey once opposed but now supports. While I 
understand these reasons for voting no, I am reminded of that sign on 
President Truman's desk. In Iraq, the buck stops with President Bush. 
The Commander in Chief, not General Casey, is responsible for the 
failed policy in Iraq.
  Four years and running, the cost of the war has been staggering. We 
have lost, as of this morning, 3,111 of our soldiers and seen tens of 
thousands more wounded. The war has stretched our military and their 
families to the breaking point, depleted our Treasury of hundreds of 
billions of dollars, detracted our attention from al-Qaida and the real 
war on terror, and hurt our image in the Arab community and around the 
world. Yet despite all this sacrifice and all these costs and because 
of numerous errors by the Commander in Chief, America is less safe. We 
must change course.
  Unfortunately, President Bush's answer to this growing chaos and 
sectarian violence in Iraq is not a new direction but more of the same. 
He wants to send 48,000 more troops to Baghdad and give them mission 
impossible--policing an Iraqi civil war.
  This so-called surge policy has many critics, and one of them used to 
be General Casey. On January 2 of this year, the general is quoted as 
saying in the New York Times:

       It's always been my view that a heavy and sustained 
     American military presence was not going to solve the 
     problems in Iraq over the long term.

  In other words, escalation is not the answer. But just a month later, 
in his Senate confirmation hearing, he reversed course, saying:

       The increase in the U.S. forces is a key piece of our new 
     strategy to secure Baghdad.

  One day, escalation was not going to solve the problem; the next day, 
escalation was a key piece of our strategy. There is a troubling 
disconnect between General Casey's two statements. I understand he has 
since attempted to explain his change of heart by noting, in the time 
between his two comments, that a new strategy, the so-called surge, had 
been propounded by the White House and more troops were needed to 
institute the President's new policy. But does General Casey really 
believe this? Do we believe a general on the battlefield or in his 
plush Pentagon office? I will take General Casey at his word. After 
all, the buck stops with the President, not with General Casey.
  Even though I have grave concerns about the direction of the war and 
General Casey, I will vote for his confirmation to be Army Chief of 
Staff. I do, however, pray that General Casey has the courage to speak 
his convictions in his new post. The last thing our Nation and our 
troops need is a ``yes'' man with access to the Oval Office--someone 
who tells the President what he wants to hear and not what he needs to 
hear. ``Yes'' men, such as Vice President Cheney and former Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, led us into this Iraq quagmire. To 
end the war, the President is going to have to start listening to and 
heeding the advice of those who disagree with him in order to get us 
out.

[[Page 3467]]

  In the Senate this week, we attempted to give the President another 
chance to listen. We tried to give the bipartisan majority of Senators 
who oppose escalation the chance to send a clear message to President 
Bush. Unfortunately, our majority was silenced by a minority of 
Republicans who decided protecting the President was more important 
than sending him a message: Do not surge. Do not escalate.
  It is time the White House and its champions in Congress stopped 
playing politics in the war. We have had enough politics and far too 
little diplomacy. What we need is a strategy that will succeed in Iraq. 
I hope General Casey will play such a role in bringing such a strategy 
about and, thus, I will vote for his confirmation.
  Mr. President, I yield back all the time, and I ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination 
of General George W. Casey, Jr., to be Chief of Staff, United States 
Army?
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. 
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Florida (Mr. Martinez) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 83, nays 14, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 45 Ex.]

                                YEAS--83

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Brownback
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Tester
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--14

     Bayh
     Bond
     Bunning
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Harkin
     McCain
     Smith
     Sununu

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Johnson
     Martinez
     Voinovich
  The nomination was confirmed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motion to 
reconsider is laid upon the table, and the President shall be 
immediately notified of the Senate's action.

                          ____________________