[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 3]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 3447-3449]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              IRAQ POLICY

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. PETER HOEKSTRA

                              of michigan

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, February 7, 2007

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I believe that Congress should continue 
to encourage an open and robust debate about its Iraq policy. I found 
former Speaker Newt Gingrich's recent testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in Iraq of particular 
interest. I would like to share it with my colleagues.

             [From Gingrich Communications, Jan. 23, 2007]

       The Cost of Defeat in Iraq and the Cost of Victory in Iraq


            Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                           (By Newt Gingrich)

       Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the 
     committee: Thank you for allowing me to testify.
       This is an extraordinarily important series of hearings on 
     a topic of enormous national importance.
       The United States finds itself in a global struggle with 
     the forces of Islamic fascism and their dictatorial allies.
       From a fanatic American near Chicago who attempted to buy 
     hand grenades to launch a personal Jihad in a Christmas mall, 
     to 18 Canadians arrested for terrorist plots, to the Scotland 
     Yard disruption of a plot in Britain to destroy ten civilian 
     airliners in one day that if successful would have shattered 
     worldwide confidence in commercial aviation and potentially 
     thrown the world into a deep economic contraction.
       We are confronted again and again with a worldwide effort 
     to undermine and defeat the system of law and order which has 
     created more prosperity and more freedom for more people than 
     any previous system.
       The threats seem to come in four different forms:
       First, from individuals who are often self recruited and 
     randomly inspired through the internet, television and 
     charismatic social and religious friendships.
       Second, from organized non state systems of terror of which 
     Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas are the most famous. Additional 
     groups have sprung up and provide continuity, training, and 
     support for terrorism.
       Third, from dictatorships in the Middle East most notably 
     Iran and Syria who have been consistently singled out by the 
     State Department (including in 2006) as the largest funders 
     of state supported terrorism in the world. These 
     dictatorships are investing in more advanced conventional 
     weapons and in chemical and nuclear weapons.
       Fourth, from a strange assortment of anti-American 
     dictatorships including North Korea, Venezuela and Cuba.
       This coalition of the enemies of freedom has growing power 
     around the world. Its leaders are increasingly bold in their 
     explicit hostility to the United States.
       To take just two recent examples: Ahmadinejad of Iran has 
     said ``[t]o those who doubt, to those who ask is it possible, 
     or those who do not believe, I say accomplishment of a world 
     without America and Israel is both possible and feasible.'' 
     He has also said that Israel should be ``wiped off the map.'' 
     Chavez of Venezuela, just last week in a joint appearance 
     with the Iranian leader in Latin America, announced a multi 
     billion dollar fund to help countries willing to fight to end 
     ``American imperialism.''
       Both of these statements were on television and are not 
     subject to misinterpretation.
       Similarly there are many web pages and other public 
     statements in which various terrorists have described in 
     great detail their commitment to killing millions of 
     Americans. I described these publicly delivered threats in a 
     speech on the fifth anniversary of 9/11 which I gave at the 
     American Enterprise Institute. The text of this speech is 
     attached as an appendix to this testimony.
       These threats might be ignored if it were not for the 
     consistent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons 
     by these enemies of freedom.
       I first wrote about the extraordinary increase in the 
     threat to our civilization from nuclear weapons in the hands 
     of terrorists in Window of Opportunity in 1984. Attached to 
     this testimony is a copy of the relevant pages from this 
     book.
       It is not accurate to suggest today that people were not 
     aware of terrorism or were not warning about the threat to 
     America's very survival prior to 9/11.
       Many sophisticated observers and professional military and 
     intelligence officers have been issuing these warnings for 
     two decades.
       What has been amazing to watch has been the absolute 
     inability of our system of government to analyze the problem 
     and react effectively.
       It is this collapse of capacity for effectiveness which is 
     at the heart of our current dilemma.
       The United States is now in a decaying mess in Afghanistan 
     and an obviously unacceptable mess in Iraq.
       While this language may seem harsh to defenders of the 
     current policy, it is sadly an accurate statement of where we 
     are.
       Efforts to think through and solve the problems of 
     Afghanistan and Iraq have to be undertaken in a context of 
     looking at a wider range of challenges to American leadership 
     around the world and potentially to our very survival as a 
     country. These larger challenges are described in my attached 
     presentation entitled ``The Real World and The Real War''.
       With these caveats I want to focus on the challenge of 
     Iraq.


                  Two Very Hard Paths Forward in Iraq

       America is faced with two very hard paths forward in Iraq.
       We can accept defeat and try to rebuild our position in the 
     region while accommodating the painful possibility that these 
     enemies of freedom in Iraq--evil men, vicious murderers, and 
     sadistic inflictors of atrocities will have defeated both the 
     millions of Iraqis who voted for legal self government and 
     the American people and their government.
       Alternatively we can insist on defeating the enemies of 
     America and the enemies of the Iraqi people and can develop 
     the strategies and the implementation mechanisms necessary to 
     force victory despite the incompetence of the Iraqi 
     government, the unreliability of Iraqi leaders, and the 
     interference of Syria and Iran on behalf of our enemies.
       Both these paths are hard. Both involve great risk. Both 
     have unknowable difficulties and will produce surprise 
     events.
       Both will be complicated.
       Yet either is preferable to continuing to accept an 
     ineffective American implementation system while relying on 
     the hope that the Iraqi system can be made to work in the 
     next six months.


             The Inherent Confusion in the Current Strategy

       There are three fundamental weaknesses in the current 
     strategy.
       First, the strategy relies on the Iraqis somehow magically 
     improving their performance in a very short time period. Yet 
     the argument for staying in Iraq is that it is a vital 
     AMERICAN interest. If we are seeking victory in Iraq because 
     it is vital to America then we need a strategy which will win 
     even if our Iraqi allies are inadequate. We did not rely on 
     the Free French to defeat Nazi Germany. We did not rely on 
     the South Koreans to stop North Korea and China during the 
     Korean War. When it mattered to American vital interests we 
     accepted all the help we could get but we made sure we had 
     enough strength to win on our own if need be.
       President Bush has asserted that Iraq is a vital American 
     interest. In January 2007 alone he has said the following 
     things:
       But if we do not succeed in Iraq, we will leave behind a 
     Middle East which will endanger America in the future.
       [F]ailure in one part of the world could lead to disaster 
     here at home. It's important for our citizens to understand 
     that as tempting as it might be, to understand the 
     consequences of leaving before the job is done, radical 
     Islamic extremists would grow in strength. They would be 
     emboldened. It would make it easier to recruit for their 
     cause. They would be in a position to do that which they have 
     said they want to do, which is to topple moderate 
     governments, to spread their radical vision across an 
     important region of the world.
       If we were to leave before the job is done, if we were to 
     fail in Iraq, Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of 
     nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have safe havens from 
     which to launch attacks. People would look back at this 
     moment in history and say, what happened to them in America? 
     How come they couldn't see the threats to a future 
     generation?
       The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic 
     extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They 
     would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, 
     create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund 
     their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of 
     nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from 
     which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On 
     September

[[Page 3448]]

     the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the 
     other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own 
     cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in 
     Iraq.
       Iraq is a central component of defeating the extremists who 
     want to establish safe haven in the Middle East, extremists 
     who would use their safe haven from which to attack the 
     United States, extremists and radicals who have stated that 
     they want to topple moderate governments in order to be able 
     to achieve assets necessary to effect their dream of 
     spreading their totalitarian ideology as far and wide as 
     possible.
       This is really the calling of our time, that is, to defeat 
     these extremists and radicals, and Iraq is a component part, 
     an important part of laying the foundation for peace.
       The inherent contradiction in the administration strategy 
     is simple. If Iraq matters as much as the President says it 
     does (and here I agree with the President on the supreme 
     importance of victory) then the United States must not design 
     and rely on a strategy which relies on the Iraqis to win.
       On the other hand if the war is so unimportant that the 
     fate of Iraq can be allowed to rest with the efforts of a 
     new, weak, untested and inexperienced government then why are 
     we risking American lives.
       Both propositions cannot be true.
       I accept the President's analysis of the importance of 
     winning in Iraq and therefore I am compelled to propose that 
     his recently announced strategy is inadequate.
       The second weakness is that the current strategy debate 
     once again focuses too much on the military and too little on 
     everything that has not been working. The one instrument that 
     has been reasonably competent is the combat element of 
     American military power. That is a very narrow definition and 
     should not be expanded to include the non-combat elements of 
     the Department of Defense which also have a lot of 
     difficulties in performing adequately.
       The great failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns 
     have been in non-combat power. Intelligence, diplomacy, 
     economic aid, information operations, support from the 
     civilian elements of national power. These have been the 
     great centers of failure in America's recent conflicts. They 
     are a major reason we have done so badly in Iraq. The gap 
     between the President's recent proposals and the required 
     rethinking and transforming of our non-combat instruments of 
     power is simply breathtaking.
       No military leader I have talked with believes military 
     force is adequate to win in Iraq. Every one of them insists 
     that the civilian instruments of power are more important 
     than the combat elements. They all assert that they can hold 
     the line for a while with force but that holding the line 
     will ultimately fail if we are not using that time to achieve 
     progress in nonmilitary areas.
       This failure of the non-combat bureaucracies cannot be 
     solved in Iraq. The heart of the problem is in Washington and 
     that brings us to the third weakness in the current strategy.
       The third weakness in the current strategy is its inability 
     to impose war-time decision-making and accountability in 
     Washington.
       The interagency process is hopelessly broken.
       This is not a new phenomenon. I first wrote about it in 
     1984 in Window of Opportunity when I asserted:
       [W]e must decide what sort of executive-branch planning and 
     implementation system are desirable.
       At a minimum, we will need closer relationships between the 
     intelligence agencies, the diplomatic agencies, the economic 
     agencies, the military agencies, the news media and the 
     political structure. There has to be a synergism in which our 
     assessment of what is happening relates to our policies as 
     they are developed and implemented. Both analyses and 
     implementation must be related to the new media and political 
     system because all basic policies must have public support if 
     they are to succeed.
       Finally, once the professionals have mastered their 
     professions and have begun to work in systems that are 
     effective and coordinated, those professionals must teach 
     both the news media and the elected politicians. No free 
     society can for long accept the level of ignorance about war, 
     history, and the nature of power which has become the norm 
     for our news media and our elected politicians. An ignorant 
     society is on its way to becoming an extinct society.
       In 1991 my concern for replacing the broken interagency 
     system with an integrated system of effective coordination 
     was heightened when General Max Thurmond who had planned and 
     led the liberation of Panama told me unequivocally that the 
     interagency process was broken.
       In 1995 that process was reinforced when General Hartzog 
     described the failures of the interagency in trying to deal 
     with Haiti.
       As early as 2002 it was clear that the interagency had 
     broken down in Afghanistan and I gave a very strong speech in 
     May 2003 at the American Enterprise Institute criticizing the 
     process.
       By the summer of 2003 it was clear the interagency was 
     failing in Iraq and by September and October 2003 we were 
     getting consistent reports from the field of the gap between 
     the capability of the combat forces and the failure of the 
     civilian systems.
       No senior officer in the Defense Department doubts that the 
     current interagency cannot work at the speed of modern war. 
     They will not engage in a fight with the National Security 
     Council or the State Department or the various civilian 
     agencies which fail to do their job. But in private they will 
     assert over and over again that the interagency system is 
     hopelessly broken.
       It was very disappointing to have the President focus so 
     much on 21,500 more military personnel and so little on the 
     reforms needed in all the other elements of the executive 
     branch.
       The proposals for winning in Iraq outlined below follow 
     from this analysis.


                      Key Steps to Victory in Iraq

       1. Place General Petraeus in charge of the Iraq campaign 
     and establish that the Ambassador is operating in support of 
     the military commander.
       2. Since General Petraeus will now have responsibility for 
     victory in Iraq all elements of achieving victory are within 
     his purview and he should report daily to the White House on 
     anything significant which is not working or is needed
       3. Create a deputy chief of staff to the President and 
     appoint a retired four star general or admiral to manage Iraq 
     implementation for the Commander in Chief on a daily basis.
       4. Establish that the second briefing (after the daily 
     intelligence brief) the President will get every day is from 
     his deputy chief of staff for Iraq implementation.
       5. Establish a War Cabinet which will meet once a week to 
     review metrics of implementation and resolve failures and 
     enforce decisions. The President should chair the War Cabinet 
     personally and his deputy chief of staff for Iraq 
     implementation should prepare the agenda for the weekly 
     review and meeting.
       6. Establish three plans: one for achieving victory with 
     the help of the Iraqi government, one for achieving victory 
     with the passive acquiescence of the Iraqi government, one 
     for achieving victory even if the current Iraqi government is 
     unhappy. The third plan may involve very significant shifts 
     in troops and resources away from Baghdad and a process of 
     allowing the Iraqi central government to fend for itself if 
     it refuses to cooperate.
       7. Communicate clearly to Syria and Iran that the United 
     States is determined to win in Iraq and that any further 
     interference (such as the recent reports of sophisticated 
     Iranian explosives being sent to Iraq to target Americans) 
     will lead to direct and aggressive countermeasures.
       8. Pour as many intelligence assets into the fight as 
     needed to develop an overwhelming advantage in intelligence 
     preparation of the battlefield.
       9. Develop a commander's capacity to spend money on local 
     activities sufficient to enable every local American 
     commander to have substantial leverage in dealing with local 
     communities.
       10. Establish a jobs corps or civil conservation corps of 
     sufficient scale to bring unemployment for males under 30 
     below 10 percent (see the attached oped by Mayor Giuliani and 
     myself on this topic).
       11. Expand dramatically the integration of American 
     purchasing power in buying from Iraqi firms pioneered by 
     Assistant Secretary Paul Brinkley to maximize the rate of 
     recovery of the Iraqi economy.
       12. Expand the American Army and Marine Corps as much as 
     needed to sustain the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan while 
     also being prepared for other contingencies and maintaining a 
     sustainable rhythm for the families and the force.
       13. Demand a war budget for recapitalization of the 
     military to continue modernization while defeating our 
     enemies. The current national security budget is lower as a 
     percentage of the economy than at any time from Pearl Harbor 
     through the end of the Cold War. It is less than half the 
     level Truman sustained before the Korean War.
       14. The State Department is too small, too undercapitalized 
     and too untrained for the demands of the 21st century. There 
     should be a 50 percent increase in the State Department 
     budget and a profound rethinking of the culture and systems 
     of the State Department so it can be an operationally 
     effective system.
       15. The Agency for International Development is hopelessly 
     unsuited to the new requirements of economic assistance and 
     development and should be rethought from the ground up. The 
     Marshall Plan and Point Four were as important as NATO in 
     containing the Soviet Empire. We do not have that capability 
     today.
       16. The President should issue executive orders where 
     possible to reform the implementation system so it works with 
     the speed and effectiveness required by the 21st century.
       17. Where legislation is needed the President should 
     collaborate with Congress in honestly reviewing the systems 
     that are failing and developing new metrics, new structures 
     and new strategies.
       18. Under our Constitution it is impossible to have this 
     scale of rethinking and reform without deep support from the 
     legislative

[[Page 3449]]

     branch. Without Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg, 
     Democratic President Harry Truman could never have developed 
     the containment policies that saved freedom and ultimately 
     defeated the Soviet Empire. The President should ask the 
     bipartisan leaders of Congress to cooperate in establishing a 
     joint Legislative-Executive working group on winning the war 
     and should openly brief the legislative branch on the 
     problems which are weakening the American system abroad. Only 
     by educating and informing the Congress can we achieve the 
     level of mutual understanding and mutual commitment that this 
     long hard task will require.
       Thank you for this opportunity to share these proposals.

                          ____________________