[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 3]
[House]
[Pages 3403-3404]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1600
                            IRAQ STUDY GROUP

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Solis). Under a previous order of the 
House, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf) is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. WOLF. Madam Speaker, before I begin, I would also like to second 
what the Speaker said with regard to Leo McCarthy. He was also a member 
of the National Commission on Gambling, which I was the author of. And 
he came by my office a number times. And I was actually going to put 
his bio in the Congressional Record. So I thank the Speaker for that 
comment, and second it.
  Madam Speaker, I was the author of the amendment to set up the Iraq 
Study Group. I felt that more should be done to look at what we were 
doing in Iraq, and so we put together a group and picked 10 people. It 
was chaired by former Secretary of State Jim Baker and former 
Congressman Lee Hamilton, head of the 9/11 Commission. Also serving on 
it was former Secretary of State Larry Eagleberger; former prominent 
lawyer, Vernon Jordan; former Justice of the Supreme Court Sandra Day 
O'Connor; former Member of the House and Chief of Staff, in the Clinton 
administration, Leon Panetta; former Secretary of Defense, in the 
Clinton administration, Bill Perry; former Senator, and Governor from 
my State, Chuck Robb; and at one time, up until the end, a month 
before, current Secretary of Defense Gates, former head of the CIA.
  This group was provided the opportunity to, in depth, to take a look 
at what was going on in Iraq and to develop some recommendations. The 
resolution that I have introduced as House Con. Res., that puts the 
Congress on record in support of the recommendations of the Iraq Study 
Group.
  Now, here's a group that has taken 9 months to analyze extensive 
hearings. Also there were 45 military and diplomatic experts, retired 
and active duty, of all political persuasions, along with key 
congressional leaders that came up with these recommendations. So I am 
asking Members to support my resolution when it comes up next week in 
support of this.
  Secondly, it makes a major effort and encourages the administration 
to adopt also a diplomatic effort in addition to what it is doing. We 
urge the administration to engage Syria the same way that President 
Reagan during the 1980s, when we were defeating communism, President 
Reagan, God bless him, one of the greatest presidents we have ever had, 
gave the famous speech in Orlando about the evil empires. But he was 
also having his administration engage with the Soviet Union. And when 
Ronald Reagan then gave his speech, saying, ``Mr. Gorbachev, tear down 
that wall,'' Reagan also had emissaries going to Moscow to engage.
  Those of us in the Congress, when we used to go behind the Soviet 
Union, the Berlin Wall in the Soviet Union, during the 1980s would 
always meet with the dissidents, would always attempt to meet with the 
leadership of the government on behalf of freedom, on behalf of 
liberty.
  President Reagan was self-confident in what he believed. He believed 
that to engage the Soviets was not a sign of weakness. It was a sign of 
strength.
  Madam Speaker, I would like to put in the Record an article from the 
Wall Street Journal by Abraham D. Sofaer, who was counselor to 
Secretary of State Schultz, who also explains how Reagan engaged with 
the Soviets and how it is appropriate now how he would engage with 
Syria.
  I am hopeful and I ask all Members to support the resolution when it 
comes up.

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 20, 2006]

                  A Reagan Strategy for Iran and Syria

                         (By Abraham D. Sofaer)

       The Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the Bush 
     administration drop its preconditions and negotiate with 
     Syria and Iran has been praised as a ``no-brainer''--and 
     condemned as an improper effort to reward rogue regimes. 
     Neither reaction is correct. Negotiating with enemies can be 
     a useful aspect of effective diplomacy. But successful 
     negotiations with enemies result not from the talks 
     themselves but from the diplomatic strategy that accompanies 
     them. The Group's recommendations deserve support, but must 
     be effectively integrated into President Bush's strategy of 
     ending state-sponsored terror.
       The arguments against negotiating with Syria and Iran were 
     also made against negotiating with the Soviet Union, and by 
     some of the same people. Soviet misconduct easily matches 
     that of Syria or Iran in aggression, oppression, murder, 
     support for terrorist groups and mendacity. President Reagan 
     challenged Soviet behavior by supporting groups fighting 
     communist intervention, building the military, strengthening 
     NATO, condemning human-rights violations, commencing a 
     missile-defense program, and conveying the message of freedom 
     in every way possible. George Shultz supported these efforts 
     but sought to negotiate with the Soviets in an attempt to 
     increase stability, reduce nuclear weapons, attain freedom 
     for oppressed groups, and enhance understanding. To make 
     negotiations possible the U.S. adopted specific policies, 
     including:
       Regime acceptance. The U.S. refrained from activities aimed 
     at destroying the Soviet regime it was seeking to influence, 
     while vigorously denouncing its political and moral 
     legitimacy.
       Limited linkage. Negotiations on human rights, arms 
     control, regional issues and bilateral relations were pursued 
     without linkage to Soviet conduct, enabling negotiations to 
     proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds.
       Rhetorical restraint. Reagan vigorously criticized the 
     Soviet system and its behavior, but promised not to ``crow'' 
     when the Soviets agreed to U.S. proposals, enabling Soviet 
     leaders to avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands.
       Self-Interest. U.S. negotiating policy was based on 
     convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests.
       The Study Group's ``external'' strategy for Iraq contains 
     several elements necessary for successful diplomacy: the need 
     for both incentives and ``disincentives''; negotiations 
     ``without preconditions''; and negotiations that are 
     ``extensive and substantive,'' requiring a balancing of 
     interests. The general incentives identified by the Group are 
     unlikely, however, to lead to constructive discussions. While 
     Syria and Iran should realize that preventing a breakdown in 
     Iraq is in their interests, they see great advantages in 
     having the U.S. lose strength and credibility in a costly 
     effort to help a state they are relieved to see powerless. 
     The notion that they will help in order to have ``enhanced 
     diplomatic relations'' with the U.S. assumes that states, 
     will do what they know the U.S. wants simply because 
     Washington will not otherwise talk to them. The 
     pronouncements that accompany this Bush policy exemplify the 
     sort of rhetoric that discourages cooperation. The 
     possibility of obtaining U.S. assistance in joining the WTO 
     would be a real incentive in an ongoing negotiation, but it 
     is not a credible incentive in the context of hostile 
     confrontation and proliferating sanctions.
       The incentives proposed for negotiating with Syria are, by 
     contrast, concrete and substantial. Syria are, by contrast, 
     concrete

[[Page 3404]]

     and substantial. Syria would benefit economically from a 
     stable Iraq, and getting back the Golan Heights would give 
     President Bashar Assad's standing a much needed boost. Syria 
     has no deep commitment to Hezbollah or Hamas to prevent it 
     from accepting peace and with Israel and increased 
     cooperation in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian areas, in 
     exchange for the Golan and a constructive role in the area. 
     But the Study Group too casually assumes that the U.S. can 
     secure ``Syria's full cooperation with all investigations 
     into political assassinations in Lebanon.'' The ``full 
     cooperation'' of a sovereign state in such situations must be 
     negotiated, rather than made a precondition. Convincing 
     Israel to give up the Golan Heights will also be difficult, 
     and Syria's help in securing the release of Israeli soldiers 
     seized by Hamas and Hezbollah is a good place to start. While 
     the security threat posed by returning the Golan has largely 
     been worked out in prior negotiations, the challenge posed by 
     Syria's claim to access to the Sea of Galilee, and the 
     meaning of a ``full and secure peace agreement'' will require 
     great of forts. Still, bringing Syria into a responsible 
     nation-hood is an objective well worth pursuing.
       The anger and scorn heaped on the Study Group for 
     advocating negotiations with Syria echo the opposition to 
     negotiating with the Soviet Union. But Syrian behavior must 
     be addressed, not just condemned. Egypt, too, wrongfully 
     supported terrorism against Israel after the 1967 war, and 
     launched the 1973 war, to get back the Sinai. Yet, the U.S. 
     properly urged Israel to negotiate with Egypt, and the peace 
     between them serves the interests of both countries. 
     Similarly an agreement to return the Golan in exchange for 
     peace would have the support of most Israelis and the current 
     Israeli government, and would be consistent with governing 
     Security Council resolutions and the principle that precludes 
     acquiring territory by force.
       The Study Group is probably right that Iran is unlikely to 
     agree to negotiate with the U.S. to bring stability to Iraq. 
     The distrust between the U.S. and Iran suggests that 
     negotiations between them should commence on limited issues, 
     in a noncontroversial forum. The U.S./Iran Tribunal in The 
     Hague might well work. Iran resents that many of its 
     significant claims against the U.S. remain unresolved there 
     after over 20 years. The U.S. should offer to negotiate these 
     claims on an expedited basis. As progress is made, the 
     dialogue would likely expand to include such issues as 
     Afghanistan, Iraq, commercial matters and human-rights 
     concerns. (During my negotiations with Iran as legal adviser 
     between 1985 and 1990, we resolved many cases and discussed 
     other issues; my interlocutor eventually agreed, for example, 
     that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie could not be enforced 
     in any state outside Iran.) A successful negotiation will 
     include Iranian demands, such as an end to efforts at regime 
     change. Major change in Iran is in fact more likely to result 
     from normalization and internal activities, than by 
     opposition groups seeking to overthrow the regime.
       Finally, any effort to negotiate with Syria or Iran will 
     fail if based only on incentives. The Study Group's proposal 
     lacks a program of sufficient pressure to make diplomacy 
     potentially successful. James Baker was able to convene the 
     Madrid Conference in 1991 only after the U.S. had expelled 
     Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The effort to impose sanctions on 
     Iran for its nuclear program should continue as forcefully as 
     possible. Multilateral sanctions helped get Libya to abandon 
     its quest for nuclear weapons. A clear warning that Syria and 
     Iran must end all forms of state-sponsored terrorism, as now 
     required by Security Council resolutions, must be a central 
     element of U.S. negotiating policy, backed with meaningful 
     preparations for action. The power of the U.S. to inflict 
     damage on its enemies remains substantial, despite current 
     difficulties in Iraq. While it is now difficult to 
     contemplate military action against Syria or Iran, continued 
     sponsorship of terror against other states will eventually 
     provoke the American people, if not the international 
     community, to exercise their right of self-defense through 
     affordable wars of destruction instead of costly nation-
     building exercises.
       No one can convey this message more effectively than George 
     Bush, who remains determined to prevent a future of state-
     sponsored terror. He should accept the Study Group's sound 
     message on negotiating with enemies but supplement it with 
     the toughness that effective diplomacy demands.

                          ____________________