[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 25]
[House]
[Pages 34036-34051]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




      TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2007

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 
862, I call up the bill (H.R. 4299) to extend the Terrorism Insurance 
Program of the Department of the Treasury, and for other purposes, and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 4299

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Terrorism 
     Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definition of act of terrorism.
Sec. 3. Reauthorization of the program.
Sec. 4. Annual liability cap.
Sec. 5. Enhanced reports to Congress.
Sec. 6. Coverage of group life insurance.
Sec. 7. Large event reset.
Sec. 8. Availability of life insurance without regard to lawful foreign 
              travel.
Sec. 9. Program trigger.
Sec. 10. Applicability.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF ACT OF TERRORISM.

       Section 102(1)(A)(iv) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
     of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended by striking ``acting 
     on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest''.

     SEC. 3. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE PROGRAM.

       (a) Termination Date.--Section 108(a) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended by 
     striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2014''.
       (b) Additional Program Years.--Section 102(11) of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(G) Additional program years.--Except when used as 
     provided in subparagraphs (B) through (F), the term `Program 
     Year' means, as the context requires, any of Program Year 1, 
     Program Year 2, Program Year 3, Program Year 4, Program Year 
     5, or any of calendar years 2008 through 2014.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--The Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) in section 102(7)(F)--
       (A) by inserting ``and each Program Year thereafter'' 
     before ``, the value''; and
       (B) by striking ``preceding Program Year 5'' and inserting 
     ``preceding that Program Year'';
       (2) in section 103(e)(1)(A), by inserting ``and each 
     Program Year thereafter'' after ``Year 5'';
       (3) in section 103(e)(1)(B)(ii), by inserting before the 
     period at the end ``and any Program Year thereafter'';
       (4) in section 103(e)(2)(A), by striking ``of Program Years 
     2 through 5'' and inserting ``Program Year thereafter'';
       (5) in section 103(e)(3), by striking ``of Program Years 2 
     through 5,'' and inserting ``other Program Year''; and
       (6) in section 103(e)(6)(E), by inserting ``and any Program 
     Year thereafter'' after ``Year 5''.

     SEC. 4. ANNUAL LIABILITY CAP.

       (a) In General.--Section 103(e)(2) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) by striking ``(until such time as the Congress may act 
     otherwise with respect to such losses)''; and
       (B) in clause (ii), by striking ``that amount'' and 
     inserting ``the amount of such losses''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before the period at 
     the end ``, except that, notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any 
     other provision of Federal or State law, no insurer may be 
     required to make any payment for insured losses in excess of 
     its deductible under section 102(7) combined with its share 
     of insured losses under paragraph (1)(A) of this 
     subsection''.
       (b) Notice to Congress.--Section 103(e)(3) of the Terrorism 
     Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end the following: ``The Secretary 
     shall provide an initial notice to Congress not later than 15 
     days after the date of an act of terrorism, stating whether 
     the Secretary estimates that aggregate insured losses will 
     exceed $100,000,000,000.''; and
       (2) by striking ``and the Congress shall'' and all that 
     follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting a 
     period.
       (c) Regulations for Pro Rata Payments; Report to 
     Congress.--Section 103(e)(2)(B) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``For purposes'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(i) In General.--For purposes''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(ii) Regulations.--Not later than 240 days after the date 
     of enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
     Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Secretary shall issue final 
     regulations for determining the pro rata share of insured 
     losses under the Program when insured losses exceed 
     $100,000,000,000, in accordance with clause (i).
       ``(iii) Report to congress.--Not later than 120 days after 
     the date of enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
     Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Secretary shall provide a 
     report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services 
     of the House of Representatives describing the process to be 
     used by the Secretary for determining the allocation of pro 
     rata payments for insured losses under the Program when such 
     losses exceed $100,000,000,000.''.
       (d) Disclosure.--Section 103(b) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs 
     (4) and (5), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) in the case of any policy that is issued after the 
     date of enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
     Reauthorization Act of 2007, the insurer provides clear and 
     conspicuous disclosure to the policyholder of the existence 
     of the $100,000,000,000 cap under subsection (e)(2), at the 
     time of offer, purchase, and renewal of the policy;''.

[[Page 34037]]

       (e) Surcharges.--Section 103(e) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (7)--
       (A) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``133 percent of'' 
     before ``any mandatory recoupment''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(E) Timing of mandatory recoupment.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the Secretary is required to collect 
     terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums under subparagraph 
     (C)--

       ``(I) for any act of terrorism that occurs on or before 
     December 31, 2010, the Secretary shall collect all required 
     premiums by September 30, 2012;
       ``(II) for any act of terrorism that occurs between January 
     1 and December 31, 2011, the Secretary shall collect 35 
     percent of any required premiums by September 30, 2012, and 
     the remainder by September 30, 2017; and
       ``(III) for any act of terrorism that occurs on or after 
     January 1, 2012, the Secretary shall collect all required 
     premiums by September 30, 2017.

       ``(ii) Regulations required.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of enactment of this subparagraph, the Secretary 
     shall issue regulations describing the procedures to be used 
     for collecting the required premiums in the time periods 
     referred to in clause (i).
       ``(F) Notice of estimated losses.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of an act of terrorism, the Secretary shall 
     publish an estimate of aggregate insured losses, which shall 
     be used as the basis for determining whether mandatory 
     recoupment will be required under this paragraph. Such 
     estimate shall be updated as appropriate, and at least 
     annually.''; and
       (2) in paragraph (8)--
       (A) in subparagraph (C)--
       (i) by striking ``(including any additional amount included 
     in such premium'' and inserting ``collected''; and
       (ii) by striking ``(D))'' and inserting ``(D)''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (D)(ii), by inserting before the period 
     at the end ``, in accordance with the timing requirements of 
     paragraph (7)(E)''.

     SEC. 5. ENHANCED REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       (a) Study and Report on Insurance for Nuclear, Biological, 
     Chemical, and Radiological Terrorist Events.--Section 108 of 
     the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 
     note) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(f) Insurance for Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and 
     Radiological Terrorist Events.--
       ``(1) Study.--The Comptroller General of the United States 
     shall examine--
       ``(A) the availability and affordability of insurance 
     coverage for losses caused by terrorist attacks involving 
     nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological materials;
       ``(B) the outlook for such coverage in the future; and
       ``(C) the capacity of private insurers and State workers 
     compensation funds to manage risk associated with nuclear, 
     biological, chemical, and radiological terrorist events.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
     Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Comptroller General shall 
     submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services 
     of the House of Representatives a report containing a 
     detailed statement of the findings under paragraph (1), and 
     recommendations for any legislative, regulatory, 
     administrative, or other actions at the Federal, State, or 
     local levels that the Comptroller General considers 
     appropriate to expand the availability and affordability of 
     insurance for nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological 
     terrorist events.''.
       (b) Study and Report on Availability and Affordability of 
     Terrorism Insurance in Specific Markets.--Section 108 of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) Availability and Affordability of Terrorism Insurance 
     in Specific Markets.--
       ``(1) Study.--The Comptroller General of the United States 
     shall conduct a study to determine whether there are specific 
     markets in the United States where there are unique capacity 
     constraints on the amount of terrorism risk insurance 
     available.
       ``(2) Elements of study.--The study required by paragraph 
     (1) shall contain--
       ``(A) an analysis of both insurance and reinsurance 
     capacity in specific markets, including pricing and coverage 
     limits in existing policies;
       ``(B) an assessment of the factors contributing to any 
     capacity constraints that are identified; and
       ``(C) recommendations for addressing those capacity 
     constraints.
       ``(3) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
     Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Comptroller General shall 
     submit a report on the study required by paragraph (1) to the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House 
     of Representatives.''.
       (c) Ongoing Reports.--Section 108(e) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by inserting ``ongoing'' before ``analysis''; and
       (B) by striking ``, including'' and all that follows 
     through the end of the paragraph, and inserting a period; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by inserting ``and thereafter in 2010 and 2013,'' after 
     ``2006,''; and
       (B) by striking ``subsection (a)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1)''.

     SEC. 6. COVERAGE OF GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.

       (a) Findings and Purpose.--Section 101 of the Terrorism 
     Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (8); and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(6) group life insurance companies are important 
     financial institutions whose products make life insurance 
     coverage affordable for millions of Americans and often serve 
     as their only life insurance benefit;
       ``(7) the group life insurance industry, in the event of a 
     severe act of terrorism, is vulnerable to insolvency because 
     high concentrations of covered employees work in the same 
     locations, because primary group life insurers do not exclude 
     terrorism risks while most catastrophic reinsurance does 
     exclude such risks, and because a large-scale loss of life 
     would fall outside of actuarial expectations of death; and''; 
     and
       (2) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting ``and group life 
     insurance'' after ``property and casualty insurance''.
       (b) Definitions.--Section 102 of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note), as amended by 
     the preceding provisions of this Act, is further amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(B)(ii), by inserting ``and group life 
     insurance'' before ``losses'';
       (2) in paragraph (5), in the matter preceding subparagraph 
     (A)--
       (A) by inserting ``, or group life insurance to the extent 
     of the amount at risk,'' after ``property and casualty 
     insurance'';
       (B) by inserting a comma after ``insurer''; and
       (C) by adding after and below subparagraph (B) the 
     following:

     ``Such term shall not include any losses of an insurer 
     resulting from coverage of any single certificate holder 
     under any group life insurance coverages of the insurer to 
     the extent such losses are not compensated under the Program 
     by reason of section 103(e)(1)(D).'';
       (3) in paragraph (6)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by inserting ``, or group life 
     insurance,'' after ``excess insurance''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``or, in the case of 
     group life insurance, that receives direct premiums,'' after 
     ``insurance coverage,'';
       (4) in paragraph (7)--
       (A) in subparagraph (F)--
       (i) by striking the first comma and inserting ``(i) with 
     respect to property and casualty insurance,''; and
       (ii) by inserting before the semicolon the following: 
     ``(ii) with respect to group life insurance, the value of an 
     insurer's amount at risk for a covered line of insurance over 
     the calendar year immediately preceding such Program Year, 
     multiplied by 0.0351 percent'';
       (B) in subparagraph (G)--
       (i) by inserting ``with respect to property and casualty 
     insurance, and such portion of the amounts at risk with 
     respect to group life insurance,'' after ``such portion of 
     the direct earned premiums''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``and amounts at risk'' after ``such 
     direct earned premiums'';
       (5) by redesignating paragraph (16) as paragraph (18); and
       (6) by inserting after paragraph (15) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(16) Group life insurance.--The term `group life 
     insurance' means an insurance contract that provides life 
     insurance coverage, including term life insurance coverage, 
     universal life insurance coverage, variable universal life 
     insurance coverage, and accidental death coverage, or a 
     combination thereof, for a number of individuals under a 
     single contract, on the basis of a group selection of risks, 
     but does not include `Corporate Owned Life Insurance' or 
     `Business Owned Life Insurance,' each as defined under the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any similar product, or 
     group life reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance.
       ``(17) Amount at risk.--The term `amount at risk' means 
     face amount less statutory policy reserves for group life 
     insurance issued by any insurer for insurance against losses 
     occurring at the locations described in subparagraph (A) of 
     paragraph (5).''.
       (c) Mandatory Availability.--Section 103(c) of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is 
     amended by striking ``During each Program Year'' and all that 
     follows through ``property and casualty insurance'' in 
     paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
       ``(1) Availability of coverage for insured losses.--During 
     each Program Year, each entity that meets the definition of 
     an

[[Page 34038]]

     insurer under section 102 shall make available, in all of its 
     insurance policies for property and casualty insurance and in 
     all of its insurance policies for group life insurance,''.
       (d) Federal Share of Compensation.--Section 103(e)(1) of 
     the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 
     note) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(D) Limitation on compensation for group life 
     insurance.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
     the Federal share of compensation under the Program paid by 
     the Secretary for insured losses of an insurer resulting from 
     coverage of any single certificate holder under any group 
     life insurance coverages of the insurer may not during any 
     Program Year exceed $1,000,000.''.
       (e) Separate Retention Pool.--Section 103(e)(6)(E) of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is 
     amended by striking clauses (i) and (ii) and inserting the 
     following new clauses:
       ``(i) for property and casualty insurance, the lesser of--

       ``(I) $27,500,000,000; and
       ``(II) the aggregate amount, for all such insurance, of 
     insured losses during such Program Year; and

       ``(ii) for group life insurance, the lesser of--

       ``(I) $5,000,000,000; and
       ``(II) the aggregate amount, for all such insurance, of 
     insured losses during such Program Year.''.

       (f) Separate Recoupment.--Section 103(e)(7) of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note), 
     as amended by the preceding provisions of this Act, is 
     further amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) in clause (i), by inserting ``applicable'' before 
     ``insurance''; and
       (B) in clause (ii), by striking ``all insurers'' and 
     inserting ``all applicable insurers (pursuant to subparagraph 
     (G))'';
       (2) in subparagraph (B)--
       (A) in the heading, by inserting ``applicable'' before 
     ``insurance''; and
       (B) by inserting ``applicable'' before ``insurance''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(G) Separate recoupment.--``The Secretary shall provide 
     that--
       ``(i) any recoupment under this paragraph of amounts paid 
     for Federal financial assistance for insured losses for 
     property and casualty insurance shall be applied to property 
     and casualty insurance policies; and
       ``(ii) any recoupment under this paragraph of amounts paid 
     for Federal financial assistance for insured losses for group 
     life insurance shall be applied to group life insurance 
     policies.''.
       (g) Policy Surcharge for Terrorism Loss Risk-Spreading 
     Premiums.--Section 103(e)(8) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``Any'' 
     and inserting ``Subject to paragraph (7)(G), any'';
       (B) in clause (i), by inserting ``and group life insurance 
     policies'' after ``policies''; and
       (C) by striking clause (iii) and inserting the following 
     new clause:
       ``(iii) be based on--

       ``(I) a percentage of the premium amount charged for 
     property and casualty insurance coverage under the policy; 
     and
       ``(II) a percentage of the amount at risk for group life 
     insurance coverage under the policy.''; and

       (2) in subparagraph (C)--
       (A) by inserting ``with respect to property and casualty 
     insurance,'' after ``annual basis,''; and
       (B) by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: ``and, with respect to group life insurance, the 
     amount equal to 0.0053 percent of the amount at risk for 
     covered lines under the policy''.

     SEC. 7. LARGE EVENT RESET.

       The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 
     note) is amended--
       (1) in section 102(7)--
       (A) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (G), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(H) notwithstanding subparagraph (F)(i), if aggregate 
     industry insured losses resulting from a certified act of 
     terrorism exceed $1,000,000,000, for any insurer that 
     sustains insured losses resulting from such act of terrorism, 
     the value of such insurer's direct earned premiums over the 
     calendar year immediately preceding the Program Year, 
     multiplied by a percentage, which--
       ``(i) for the Program Year consisting of calendar year 2008 
     shall be 5 percent; and
       ``(ii) for each Program Year thereafter, shall be 50 basis 
     points greater than the percentage applicable to the 
     preceding Program Year, except that if an act of terrorism 
     occurs during any such Program Year that results in aggregate 
     industry insured losses exceeding $1,000,000,000, the 
     percentage for the succeeding Program Year shall be 5 percent 
     and the increase under this clause shall apply to Program 
     Years thereafter;

     except that for purposes of determining under this 
     subparagraph whether aggregate industry insured losses exceed 
     $1,000,000,000, the Secretary may combine insured losses 
     resulting from two or more certified acts of terrorism 
     occurring during such Program Year in the same geographic 
     area (with such area determined by the Secretary), in which 
     case such insurer shall be permitted to combine insured 
     losses resulting from such acts of terrorism for purposes of 
     satisfying its insurer deductible under this subparagraph; 
     and except that the insurer deductible under this 
     subparagraph shall apply only with respect to compensation of 
     insured losses resulting from such certified act, or combined 
     certified acts, and that for purposes of compensation of any 
     other insured losses occurring in the same Program Year, the 
     insurer deductible determined under subparagraph (F)(i) shall 
     apply.''; and
       (2) in section 103(e)(1)(B)--
       (A) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (B) by adding after and below clause (ii) the following:

     ``except that if a certified act of terrorism occurs for 
     which resulting aggregate industry insured losses exceed 
     $1,000,000,000, the applicable amount for any subsequent 
     certified act of terrorism shall be the amount specified in 
     section 102(1)(B)(ii).''.

     SEC. 8. AVAILABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE WITHOUT REGARD TO 
                   LAWFUL FOREIGN TRAVEL.

       Section 103(c) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
     (15 U.S.C. 6701 note), as amended by the preceding provisions 
     of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Availability of life insurance without regard to 
     lawful foreign travel.--During each Program Year, each entity 
     that meets the definition of an insurer under section 102 and 
     any other entity that issues insurance contracts that provide 
     life insurance coverage shall make available, in all of its 
     life insurance policies issued after the date of the 
     enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
     Reauthorization Act of 2007 under which the insured person is 
     a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence in the United States, coverage that 
     neither considers past, nor precludes future, lawful foreign 
     travel by the person insured, and shall not decline such 
     coverage based on past or future, lawful foreign travel by 
     the person insured or charge a premium for such coverage that 
     is excessive and not based on a good faith actuarial 
     analysis, except that an insurer may decline or, upon 
     inception or renewal of a policy, limit the amount of 
     coverage provided under any life insurance policy based on 
     plans to engage in future lawful foreign travel to occur 
     within 12 months of such inception or renewal of the policy 
     but only if, at time of application--
       ``(A) such declination is based on, or such limitation 
     applies only with respect to, travel to a foreign 
     destination--
       ``(i) for which the Director of the Centers for Disease 
     Control and Prevention of the Department of Health and Human 
     Services has issued a highest level alert or warning, 
     including a recommendation against non-essential travel, due 
     to a serious health-related condition;
       ``(ii) in which there is an ongoing military conflict 
     involving the armed forces of a sovereign nation other than 
     the foreign destination to which the insured person is 
     traveling; or
       ``(iii)(I) that the insurer has specifically designated in 
     the terms of the life insurance policy at the inception of 
     the policy or at renewal, as applicable; and
       ``(II) with respect to which the insurer has made a good-
     faith determination that--

       ``(aa) a serious fraudulent situation exists which is 
     ongoing; and
       ``(bb) the credibility of information by which the insurer 
     can verify the death of the insured person is substantially 
     compromised; and

       ``(B) in the case of any limitation of coverage, such 
     limitation is specifically stated in the terms of the life 
     insurance policy at the inception of the policy or at 
     renewal, as applicable.''.

     SEC. 9. PROGRAM TRIGGER.

       Section 103(e)(1)(B)(ii) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended by striking 
     ``$100,000,000'' and inserting ``$50,000,000''.

     SEC. 10. APPLICABILITY.

       The amendments made by this Act shall apply beginning on 
     January 1, 2008. The provisions of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002, as in effect on the day before the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, shall apply through the 
     end of December 31, 2007.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Israel). Pursuant to House Resolution 
862, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) and the gentleman 
from Alabama (Mr. Bachus) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.


                             General Leave

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and insert extraneous material on the pending legislation.

[[Page 34039]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Massachusetts?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the House passed a version of the terrorism risk 
insurance program by a large vote, 300-something to 100-something, 
earlier this year. It happened after a very open process at the 
subcommittee and committee level. We had a very good set of meetings. 
There were concerns raised. I think there was general agreement that 
terrorism insurance had to go forward, but there were some very 
legitimate debates about how to do it. Not all of them, obviously, have 
been resolved.

                              {time}  1500

  We had, unusual for our committee and I think maybe for other 
committees, a full markup in subcommittee followed by a full markup in 
committee. The bill that emerged was much closer to a consensus 
product, although obviously not unanimous. There were amendments 
offered by both sides. There were bipartisan compromises worked out. We 
came to the floor. It wasn't as open a process as I would have hoped, 
but it still represented, we thought, a fairly good piece of 
legislation, and, of course, it got well over 70 percent of the House 
Members voting for it. Then it went to the Senate and nothing happened 
for a very long time, and I regret that. We had hoped that we could 
continue this process and in fact have a conference. The Senate did not 
act.
  Finally, the Senate acted and sent us a bill which was an extension 
of the current program, better in my view than the current program, not 
as comprehensive as the bill we passed. And we were told by the Senate, 
as we have been from time to time this year: This is all we can do. 
Take it or leave it. That seemed to me to be a problem and, now, not so 
much for substance as for institutional concerns. Members have asked, 
well, in the end we may just have to accept what the Senate sent us. 
That is possible, and we have preserved the option to do that.
  Let me be very clear, Mr. Speaker. We are here dealing with a new 
bill that we introduced. The Senate bill still sits at the desk. It 
will be available if the Senate continues to refuse to act in any kind 
of a bicameral manner. But I am not ready to give up yet, Mr. Speaker, 
on some important issues, the most important of which is the 
institutional one. It is simply not in the spirit of the United States 
Constitution for one of the Houses to say, this is it, take it or leave 
it, especially when you contrast the way in which the two Houses acted. 
We had subcommittee and committee markup and debate on the floor. The 
Senate had one of their not very open processes. The bill emerged from 
some quiet conversations among the senior members of both parties and 
went to the floor, no amendments, no votes, here it is. As I said, I 
regret that. We may not be able to prevent it from happening in this 
instance. I do think it is important for us to send the message that we 
do not want to see this sort of procedure repeated.
  So what we did was to in effect have a virtual conference. We looked 
at the Senate bill, we looked at our bill, and we came up with what I 
think might well have resulted had there been a conference. The bill we 
passed had a 15-year extension. The reason for a long extension is that 
we are talking here about building projects. We are talking about the 
need for terrorism risk insurance if we are to get large commercial 
buildings, or residential, but especially commercial buildings built in 
our big cities. You can't get those buildings obviously without bank 
loans and you can't get the bank loans without insurance. That is why 
the Chamber of Commerce scores this as an important bill, why the real 
estate industry, the cities, a whole range of business and urban 
interests tell us this is important. And you need to have some 
assurance of a timeframe in which to build. We thought 15 years. The 
Senate said 7 years. We didn't here come with a split-the-difference. 
We have accepted the Senate's 7 years. We were told at the last minute 
that there was a PAYGO problem in a calculation by the Congressional 
Budget Office that I still do not understand, but we have no option but 
to abide by it. We came up with a PAYGO solution which was not a very 
good one. The Senate came up with, and I give them credit here, a much 
better PAYGO solution. They had more time to work on it, but they did 
it well. We have accepted the Senate PAYGO solution. So we accept that 
term of years, we accept that PAYGO solution.
  We had also broadened this from simply being in case a building was 
destroyed to include group life insurance and protection against what 
sadly we cannot rule out, nuclear, biological, chemical, or 
radiological attacks. The Senate rejected both of those. We split the 
difference. We accepted their rejection of nuclear, biological, 
chemical and radiological attacks. We did feel that group life 
insurance should be in. I should say that including the group life 
provision is something that was called to our attention on a bipartisan 
basis from Members from Florida which says that you should not have 
your life insurance cancelled if you go to Israel. That is basically 
what we are talking about, or maybe some other areas where the 
insurance companies think there is a problem when there isn't one. And 
we checked, and the number of payoffs they have had to make of people 
who died going to Israel or other countries on their list is 
negligible, zero, from what we could tell. So we included a provision 
in our bill that was overwhelmingly supported by both sides, to say 
that there were rules; not that you couldn't deny someone life 
insurance if they were going to a hazardous area, but that you had to 
have a rational process by which you defined that.
  We put group life back in. Members will remember that after the 2001 
mass murders of so many innocent Americans by vicious thugs, we adopted 
a very expensive program to compensate people. A better way to do that 
would be to have this group life insurance as part of the terrorism 
risk insurance.
  And at the request of smaller insurance companies, we lowered the 
trigger from $100 million to $50 million per incident, because small 
insurance companies said to us: We would like to be able to insure some 
of these buildings. Our colleagues from some of the smaller States 
brought this to our attention. But if it is $100 million that you have 
to absorb before this kicks in, we can't do it; we can do it at $50 
million.
  So we accept the Senate version on 7 years versus our 15. We accept 
their version of PAYGO. We accept their rejection of nuclear, 
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. We do ask that group 
life insurance be kept in with the travel provision I mentioned, and 
that the trigger go from $100 million to $50 million.
  Finally, there is the reset provision, which says that if you have 
once been attacked and you have to deal with it, should that same area 
be attacked again, the clock starts again. That is, you would not be in 
a position where, having been attacked once by these vicious murderers, 
you would be unable to get full insurance if they did it a second time.
  Those are the differences. As I said, we have no guarantee that the 
Senate will do this or pay even serious attention. We have retained a 
vehicle in case they don't. But I don't want, and I said this earlier, 
we are not debating preemptive strikes here. We are debating preemptive 
surrender. I don't want to have a situation where the United States 
Senate passes legislation, sends it to us and says, You may not even 
think about changing things.
  We are prepared to compromise. But I think inclusion of group life 
and that travel protection is important. We think that the smaller 
insurance companies had a legitimate concern. We think the reset 
provision is legitimate.
  We are asking the Senate again to consider them. We can't compel 
that. But I think it would be a mistake for us to set the precedent 
that, when they confront us with these ultimata, that we simply cave 
in.
  Let me repeat, because I got it right now. I was quoting before the 
lyric

[[Page 34040]]

from ``MacArthur Park.'' What the Senate tells us is, Look, we were 
able to do this, but we can't do it again. You just have to accept it 
as it is. And the theme song apparently is, if people will remember; I 
will say it because I sing something awful.
  ``Someone left the cake out in the rain.
  I don't think that I can take it
  'Cause it took so long to bake it
  And I'll never have the recipe again.''
  If someone in the Senate tells us, we left the bill out in the rain, 
or at least they are telling us that if we were to try to get them to 
change it, it would be leaving the bill out in the rain, and they 
couldn't remake it because they don't have the recipe.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it's time to send the Senate back to their 
recipe books and ask them to keep track. I understand in the end we may 
not be able to change things, but I do not want this House simply at 
this point to say, Okay, you gave us an ultimatum, we accept it.
  I would hope, and we are going to be here obviously next week, that 
the small life insurance companies, people interested in the ability to 
travel to Israel and others would then at least go to Senators and say, 
Can't we at least even have a vote on this? Can't you even consider 
this?
  And that is why I ask that today we send this bill back over. We 
retain a vehicle if the Senate remains impervious, but I think it's 
worth a try.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Members of the body, first let me address the practicalities of where 
we are. I am going to talk about the policies in a few minutes after 
others have had an opportunity to speak, but let's just talk about 
where we are.
  The chairman has talked about the Senate this, the House this. But 
the truth is that the present legislation expires December 31. That is 
in 19 days. Businesses across the country are trying to arrange their 
insurance coverages for next year, and they have no certainty as to 
whether or how much there will be a Federal safety net in place. 
Nineteen days.
  Even if Congress were to act today, there is hardly time enough for 
insurance companies to develop new policy forms, to obtain approval 
from 50 State regulators, to get them in the marketplace for review by 
the brokers, and to finish negotiating coverage with their 
policyholders. There is just not time.
  Now, it can be the Senate problem. The House passed a bill earlier 
this year. That is all true, but that doesn't change the facts. 
Nineteen days. Nineteen days. Each additional day that we fail to get a 
bill on the President's desk means less ability in the marketplace to 
adjust and to respond to the new mandates in this program, or the 
Senate program, particularly the mandates on domestic terrorism. 
Policies are going to have to be rewritten. And both the House and the 
Senate bill does that, so it doesn't really matter which bill 
ultimately passes.
  Mr. Speaker, I share Chairman Frank's frustration with the Senate. He 
described this ping pong, back and forth. A House-Senate conference 
would have been nice to work out our differences, although in a minute 
I will say why I personally believe the Senate bill is more in keeping 
with our original intention. The chairman of the full committee and I 
were two of the authors of the original legislation. And it says in 
that legislation it was intended as a very temporary Federal backstop 
until the private market could fill in, and I will talk about that and 
why I support the Senate bill later.
  But as a practical matter, whether I supported the Senate or the 
House bill, there is only one bill that is going to pass. I think the 
chairman knows that, I know that, Members of this body know that. 
That's the Senate bill.
  The administration has indicated they are going to veto anything but 
the Senate bill. If we pass this bill, they will veto it. The Senate 
has agreed unanimously to their bill. They came together unanimously. I 
regret we weren't able to do that. But it was, at that time, a 15-year 
permanent bill. So we didn't come together. But we have got to put this 
behind us and adopt legislation that has a realistic possibility of 
becoming law, and to do it right now. We need to do that on the 
alternate minimum tax. It is staring us in the face.
  I don't think the American people, the taxpayers, I don't think the 
accounting industry care whether or not the Senate did this to the 
House or the House did this to the Senate. On terrorist insurance, I 
don't think the insurance companies, the developers, the policyholders, 
I am not sure they care about all the internal fights between this body 
and that body. They are caught in the middle, and you do have a bill 
available. It's a Senate bill that will go to the President to be 
signed and take away this uncertainty.
  The Senate has made it clear that they are not going to pass the 
legislation that the chairman is offering. It is not me; that is the 
Senate. The White House has issued a Statement of Administrative Policy 
indicating that if presented with the bill we are going to vote on 
today, the President will veto it. That's with less. The Senate is not 
going to take it up, so it won't ever get to the President. So that is 
just theoretical because the Senate said they are not going to pass it. 
And we have got 3 weeks left before the program expires.
  Now, some of our Members think that the private market, that the TRIA 
5 years after 9/11, a 3-year bill and a 2-year extension, that TRIA has 
served its purpose. And in a few minutes I am going to talk about the 
Treasury and that they believe that it has fulfilled its purpose and 
from now on it just retards the private market.
  But we can vote this bill down, we can bring up the Senate bill, and 
we can put a bipartisan TRIA extension on the President's desk. We can 
do it this week. The time for further deliberation or argument has 
passed. Time has run out on us.
  With all due respect to the chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee, I recommend we vote down this legislation, we bring up the 
Senate legislation, we do it in a motion to recommit, we do it in a 
unanimous consent, we do it in a suspension. We move it, we pass it 
over to the Senate, and we end the uncertainty.
  If it is such a vital program that many Members think it is, why 
don't we need it in place? Why would we wait until a week or two or 
even after it expires to reauthorize it?
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, first of all, there is no 
chance of waiting until after it expires. I don't know why the 
gentleman would have said that. He knows there is zero chance of that.
  Now, I agree it has waited too long. But I would have been more 
impressed with the urgency if I had had people joining us in trying to 
get the Senate to act. We passed the bill months ago. We would have 
liked to have seen an act. But I didn't hear all this passion trying to 
force the Senate to act, and it was partly the minority in the Senate 
that was blocking it, that is, block the ability to have a conference.

                              {time}  1515

  Here is the point. I think telling the life insurance companies that 
they should not be restricting people's ability to travel unfairly is 
important. We think group life is important. We think that not allowing 
your community to be disadvantaged if it has been attacked once is 
important. And we may not be able to accomplish them this year, but we 
think it is important not simply to cave in and say those aren't even 
worth fighting for.
  We are going to send a message, I hope, by voting for those 
principles because we pass the bill this year, and we may have to 
accept a minimal position, but we will be back here in a month or two 
and we hope to renew some of these things.
  So I just reject the notion that the Senate can achieve this by 
waiting and waiting and waiting and then saying, Oh, well, there isn't 
enough time. There is not enough time because they held it up. No one 
can seriously argue that having seen this delay of many months, and 
again I didn't hear all this

[[Page 34041]]

passion trying to make the Senate act for all of those months, nobody 
can argue that another day or two is going to make a difference. And 
that's what we're talking about.
  So I reiterate, there is no chance of this expiring. Everybody knows 
that. We have preserved our ability at any point simply to accept this 
bill. The question is do we give up now or do we send them the message 
that the ability to travel to Israel, the concern for the small 
insurance companies being able to insure commercial properties and the 
concern for group life and not just property, that those are important 
issues.
  We can take that vote today and send that message. And if we have to, 
we will accommodate reality. But we will have sent that message, and it 
gives us a basis upon which to act next year.
  I yield now 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman).
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, it has been almost a year since the 
Committee on Financial Services began the process of reauthorizing the 
terrorism risk insurance program. It has been 9 months since our 
committee held a field hearing in New York at which we heard experts, 
insurers, developers and reinsurers testify about the private market 
for terrorism insurance which has not grown enough since 9/11 to 
sufficiently meet the demand in many of our Nation's so-called high-
risk areas.
  It has been over 4 months since we held a subcommittee and a full 
committee markup and almost 3 months since the House overwhelmingly 
approved H.R. 2761, a strong reauthorization that would have extended 
TRIA for 15 years, provided group life insurance as well as nuclear, 
chemical, biological and radiological coverage, and significantly 
lowered the program's trigger level.
  Most importantly of all, and after constructive negotiations and 
compromise with the minority, the House bill included a reset mechanism 
to address increased capacity shortages following major terrorist 
attacks such as those that may occur anywhere in our country.
  And yet despite a proactive bipartisan effort in the House 
spearheaded by Chairman Frank and Ranking Member Bachus, we find 
ourselves in the 11th hour with TRIA set to expire at the end of the 
month, and we are faced with a weak Senate bill that was deliberately 
sent to us only after we had recessed for Thanksgiving, effectively 
stalling the negotiation process between the two Chambers.
  The Senate bill, a 7-year reauthorization that only amends the TRIA 
program by eliminating the distinction between foreign and domestic 
acts of terrorism simply does not provide developers, insurers, and 
reinsurers with enough of the stability they need in our free-market 
economy to plan, finance, insure and build our Nation's major 
development projects.
  Mr. Speaker, for TRIA to be truly effective in addressing the 
shortages in the terrorism insurance market, we must recognize that the 
market is dynamic. The terrorism insurance market behaves much 
differently in the wake of a terrorist attack than it does before an 
attack. The reset contained in this compromise bill is identical to the 
reset provision that was included in the House-passed TRIA extension in 
September, on which I and Mr. Baker of the minority came to a mutually 
acceptable agreement. Under those terms, which are in this compromise 
bill, in the event of a terrorist attack with losses of a billion 
dollars or greater, the deductibles for any insurance company that pays 
out losses due to the event immediately lower to 5 percent while the 
nationwide trigger for any insurer for future events drops to $5 
million.
  Mr. Baker and I also reached agreement on my proposal to enable the 
Secretary of the Treasury to aggregate the total losses of two or more 
attacks that occur in the same geographic area in the same year so if 
the total insured losses of those events are over a billion dollars, 
the reset mechanism would be triggered. The inclusion of this language 
is absolutely vital to every high-risk area across the country, and 
many of us consider this to be the most essential, must-be-included 
aspect of the legislation.
  My colleagues may recall that the TRIA extension passed by the House 
in September was subject to PAYGO concerns because the CBO had assessed 
its cost at roughly $10 billion over 10 years. With this CBO score, 
some of our friends on the other side of the aisle argued that even 
though no funds would have been appropriated unless the country was 
attacked, our bill would have been too much of a burden on the American 
taxpayer. Not knowing who else to bill for an attack on America, I 
disagreed with that view and with the CBO scoring; but I, too, am 
committed to a fiscally responsible bill.
  I am pleased to say that my fiscally conservative friends on both 
sides of the aisle can now vote for this bill without any hesitation 
thanks to the inclusion of language from the Senate bill, and more 
significantly, because the reset language, this compromise legislation 
has been assessed to a positive CBO score of $200 million. Let me say 
that again. This compromise bill that we are debating today will result 
in a net gain of $200 million. Legislation that protects developers and 
the insurance industry from terrorist attacks and provides taxpayers 
with a return on their dime is something that I believe we should all 
support.
  Mr. Speaker, the next terrorist attack against the United States, 
like the one on 9/11, is going to damage more than just buildings. We 
must acknowledge that the structural losses associated with a terrorist 
incident will be accompanied by the loss of human life. The legislation 
before the House today recognizes this fact and includes group life 
insurance coverage because this Congress is concerned not only with the 
value of buildings but the people inside of them as well.
  Our bill lowers the program trigger in the Senate bill from $100 
million to $50 million. Our lower trigger would prevent smaller 
insurance companies from being priced out of the terrorism insurance 
market. And, with a greater supply of insurance, we can expect a higher 
degree of stability for large-scale developers all over America.
  Mr. Speaker, in the absence of a formal conference which most of us 
in this body would have preferred, we have taken it upon ourselves to 
consider this legislation in which we have compromised with the Senate 
on many of their issues but hold firm on those provisions that we 
believe must be included in TRIA: the reset mechanism, group life 
coverage, and lower triggers.
  I urge all of our colleagues to support this important compromise 
legislation and, as the clock strikes 11:59, to place the burden of 
responsibility back on the broad shoulders of the United States Senate.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling).
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I am reminded of a quote from late President Reagan, and perhaps I 
can paraphrase: The closest thing to eternal life on Earth is a Federal 
program.
  Indeed, we have had speaker after speaker come before in this debate 
to tell us how TRIA was going to be a temporary program. And I see the 
able gentlelady from New York, the chairwoman of our Financial 
Institutions Subcommittee. I wasn't here in this body when TRIA was 
originally passed, but I took the time to review the record of the 
debate. At that time she said, ``We are simply working to keep our 
economy on track with a short-term program that addresses the new 
terrorist threat.''
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania, the chairman of our Capital Markets 
Subcommittee said, ``We wisely design the TRIA Act as a temporary 
backstop to get our Nation through a period of economic uncertainty 
until the private sector can develop models.''
  And if you look at the Record, Mr. Speaker, of those who proposed 
TRIA in the first place, all said it would be a temporary program. 
Perhaps temporary is in the eye of the beholder. What started out as a 
3-year program has since become a 5-year program. The House attempted 
to extend it 15

[[Page 34042]]

years. I think we are now looking at a 7-year extension. I believe for 
all intents and purposes, we are looking at giving birth de facto to a 
new Federal permanent insurance program to go along with the scores of 
others, few of which are financially sound.
  So again, what was meant to be temporary, and I hope had I been in 
this body at that time I would have voted for it. I was here for the 
vote on the first extension, and I supported that extension. I believe 
there was, indeed, a great calamity in this marketplace. I believe that 
people in the marketplace needed time to react, to plan, to model. But 
again, is this something that is going to go on in perpetuity?
  The question again is begged, and that is, Who can do a better job in 
the reinsurance market, the Federal Government or private industry? I 
have no doubt that private industry would love to have the subsidies 
that are represented by TRIA. Any time the government is going to hand 
out something free or at a subsidized rate versus the market rate, who 
wouldn't accept it? Such a deal. I certainly understand that they might 
be favoring this.
  Now, I haven't heard in this debate, but in previous iterations of 
the debate I have heard many come and talk about the great tragedy of 
9/11, and I want to let it be known again, we are talking about 
terrorism reinsurance. It does nothing to prevent terrorism in the 
first place. We are talking about coming in after the fact and 
providing this Federal backstop, which many of us don't believe is any 
longer necessary, putting the taxpayer on the hook at a time when 
markets could develop.
  I would take the argument more serious if more people on the other 
side of the aisle would vote to strengthen, for example, the FISA 
legislation. Unfortunately, many of them are voting to make it even 
more difficult for our Federal Government to listen in on the 
conversations of known terrorists. Most of the Democrats, most of my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, Mr. Speaker, in May voted 
against the Hoekstra amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act 
which would have eliminated that section of the bill requiring the 
Director of National Intelligence to use resources, and I paraphrase 
him, to study bugs and bunnies instead of suspected terrorists. They 
have supported expanding the legal rights of terrorist detainees, 
holding up passage of the 9/11 Commission Recommendation Implementation 
bill to give union bargaining advantages to TSA screeners, and the list 
goes on and on.
  So if we want to talk about terrorism, let's talk about what we can 
do to prevent it in the first place as opposed to what we can do to 
subsidize large insurance companies after the fact.
  Another point I would like to make, and everybody is certainly 
entitled to their own opinion, and I have looked very carefully at the 
President's working group position on this, and they have observed what 
I have observed, and that is the availability and affordability of 
terrorism risk insurance has improved since the initial terrorist 
attacks. And despite increases in risk retentions under TRIA, insurers 
have allocated additional capacity to terrorism risk. Prices have 
declined. Take-up rates have increased.
  I simply don't buy into the argument, Mr. Speaker, that we have a 
market failure here that somehow, some way the market can't create this 
particular insurance product.

                              {time}  1530

  I mean, how are we ever going to know, once again, if we're going to 
hand out something free or at a subsidized rate, as opposed to people 
having to buy it at the market rate?
  And let me quote from the President's working group: ``The presence 
of subsidized Federal reinsurance through TRIA appears to negatively 
affect the emergence of private reinsurance capacity because it dilutes 
demand for private sector reinsurance.''
  Now, some have said, well, again, that terrorism is a very unique 
risk. Well, of course it is. But our reinsurance industry has faced 
these challenges in the past. At one point they had to figure out how 
to model for the risk of loss of electronic data. At one time in our 
history they had to figure out how to model for airline crashes.
  Many say that we will never have major construction in the United 
States unless we have a government, Federal reinsurance backstop for 
acts of terrorism. I simply don't observe that in real life.
  And how, Mr. Speaker, during the Cold War, when thousands of nuclear 
weapons were poised, aimed at our Nation, how did construction take 
place during that time in our history? Yet there are those who will 
maintain that somehow it cannot take place today.
  Again, I'm not saying that reinsurance is not an important aspect of 
our market. It is. But I disagree with those on the other side of the 
aisle who say that even after 5 years that the market is simply 
incapable of creating a product that those who wish it can pay for at 
an affordable rate.
  Another point I would make is that even if this were a valuable 
program to the Nation, what are we going to do to pay for it, and what 
are the long-term implications?
  Again, as I mentioned earlier, Uncle Sam does not have a particularly 
stellar track record when it comes to running insurance programs.
  Social Security, according to the latest report of the trustees of 
the Social Security and Medicare trust funds, owes $6.8 trillion, 
trillion with a T, more in benefits than it's receiving in taxes, and 
has a long-term deficit of almost $9 trillion, not a particularly good 
track record there.
  The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is currently running a 
deficit of $18.1 billion, with an additional off-balance sheet 
liability of $73.3 billion.
  The National Flood Insurance Program has a shortfall of $1.3 billion 
a year over the long term and, according to the Congressional Budget 
Office, its current financial situation is unsustainable.
  Medicaid, $317 billion a year. The National Governors Association 
says, ``The growth of a program that is unsustainable in its current 
form.''
  The Federal crop insurance program requires Federal subsidies. The 
list goes on and on and on and on. As history is my guide, Mr. Speaker, 
forgive me if I don't share the enthusiasm and optimism of those on the 
other side of the aisle who say that somehow this is not going to prove 
painful for future taxpaying generations. I believe it will be.
  I believe the private market can handle this. I think they will 
handle this if we give them the opportunity. I do not think the private 
insurance companies need this huge subsidy.
  And when, Mr. Speaker, are we finally going to do something about the 
long-term financial implications of entitlement spending in these 
insurance programs?
  Now, something's got to give. The Comptroller General has said that 
we're on the verge of being the first generation in America's history 
to leave the next generation with a lower standard of living because of 
out-of-control spending. Instead, we add burden on top of burden on top 
of burden.
  Because of all those reasons, Mr. Speaker, I oppose this legislation, 
I oppose this report and would urge the House to oppose it as well.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney), a representative from the 
city who is Chair of the Financial Institution Subcommittee and has 
been very active on this issue.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for his extraordinary 
leadership and for yielding.
  I would like to respond to some of the comments of my good friend on 
the other side of the aisle and to remind my colleagues that New York, 
and he mentioned it several times in his statement, was attacked not as 
a city, and our State was not attacked as a State. This was a national 
attack against our country, at our Pentagon, a symbol of our military 
strength, and New York, one of the symbols of our economic strength. 
And after that attack, this body was united and determined, and I thank 
all of my colleagues for your aid and support.

[[Page 34043]]

  But the most important act by this body to get New York moving again 
and our other economic centers was voting for TRIA, the anti-terrorism 
risk insurance plan.
  My good friend stated that construction can go forward without it. 
After 9/11 you could not even build a hot dog stand. Nothing moved 
until we got the anti-terrorism risk insurance in place.
  I am told by the businesses in New York and other large cities in our 
country that they cannot get insurance now. They get insurance up to 
the date that TRIA expires, and they are not given insurance unless 
there is agreement or a condition that TRIA will continue.
  He argued that TRIA was not homeland security. I will say very 
strongly that part of our homeland security is our economic security, 
and a very important part of our economic security is having a Federal 
support system for terrorism risk insurance.
  The TRIA bill was a top priority of the Financial Services Committee. 
It was one of the first bills reported out, and I thank Chairman Frank 
for his continued support for a long-term TRIA, including a reset 
provision to increase the availability of terrorism insurance for areas 
that have been targets of terror acts like my city of New York.
  The reset language in this bill, though, treats equally everyone 
across this country. We are including in this bill absolutely 
everything that was in the Senate-passed bill. The only change is we 
come from the 15 years down to the 7 years of the Senate. But the other 
key provisions that were dropped, we are putting back in, such as the 
lower trigger level so that more insurers can be part of this program. 
This is very important. Group life insurance. Life insurance for 
fairness for travelers, and the very important reset mechanism for the 
anti-terrorism risk insurance.
  We need this bill and we need it promptly to avoid interruptions in 
coverage and the disruptions that that will cause in our economy.
  I would say that TRIA has created jobs and helped America's economy 
grow despite the continuing terrorist threat. I thank the chairman and 
this body on both sides for supporting it.
  I appreciate the opportunity to speak in support of this bill.
  I would like to thank Chairman Frank for his continued strong support 
for a long term renewal of TRIA including the reset provisions to 
increase the availability of terrorism insurance for areas that have 
been targets of terror attacks like my city of New York.
  I appreciate the chairman's insistence on having the House debate and 
vote on a bill that includes four key provisions from the original 
House-passed bill.
  Most important of these, in my view, is the reset provision. To 
encourage companies to write insurance in an area that has been a 
target of terrorism, after a significant terrorist attack, that is, an 
attack causing over $1 billion in damages, the bill would lower both 
the deductible and the trigger for terrorism insurance policies in the 
targeted area, to rebuild market capacity and then gradually increase 
private sector obligations over time.
  This reset mechanism applies equally for everyone across the country. 
For example, the lower deductible would apply to all the insurers that 
were affected by the significant terrorist attack, regardless of where 
the attack occurred.
  Also, the bill lowers the ``trigger'' level--the size of an attack at 
which the Federal Government would provide aid to insurers--back to the 
$50 million in the original House bill. The TRIA extension enacted in 
2005 set the limit at $50 million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007. The 
Senate bill provides a trigger of $100 million. A lower trigger will 
allow more insurers to participate in the program and thereby increase 
the availability of terrorism insurance, and will also address a 
serious concern of the small insurers who fear they will be driven out 
of business by terrorist attacks that cause less than $100 million in 
insured losses that would not trigger the protection provided by TRIA.
  The bill includes the provision from the House bill putting group 
life insurance in TRIA. TRIA should cover not only buildings but also 
the people who work in them. Group life carriers face insolvency if a 
terrorist event affects a large group of people. It is important to the 
economic security of America's workers and their families that group 
life carriers remain solvent and capable of paying claims after a 
terrorist attack.
  Finally, like the original House bill, the bill prohibits life 
insurance companies from denying or reducing coverage to an individual 
based on their foreign travel.
  It is critical that these provisions be included in the bill we send 
back to the Senate. We need to send a strong message that these 
provision are important, and that this body will not be cowed by the 
White House's foolish threat to veto this legislation.
  I could not more strongly disagree with the White House when they 
insist the program should be short term and temporary. That will 
exacerbate market disarray and harm our economy--exactly what the 
terrorists want.
  The administration's continued opposition to this bill is another 
example of the stubborn wrongheadedness for which this White House has 
become renowned.
  On a bipartisan basis, business leaders, law enforcement, and the 
American people strongly support a long term TRIA bill that protects 
our economy and our security.
  Recognizing the significant benefits that TRIA has for our entire 
economy, the US Chamber of Commerce said, and I quote:

       The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act has promoted long-term 
     availability of terrorism risk insurance for catastrophic 
     terror events and has provided a standard of stability for 
     financial markets and recovery after such an attack. [TRIA] 
     has created jobs and helped America's economy grow despite 
     the continuing terrorist threats against the United States. . 
     . . It is essential that Congress not allow this vital law to 
     expire.

  There are few issues so important to our Nation's economy as a stable 
long term federal support system for terrorism risk insurance.
  We need a new TRIA bill and we need it promptly, to avoid 
interruptions in coverage and the disruptions that will cause.
  We all fervently hope there will be no more terrorist attacks on our 
soil. But we must recognize that insuring against that dreadful 
contingency is a fundamental part of making our country safer. It is a 
part of homeland security that we cannot afford to ignore. I urge my 
colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, TRIA, provides a free 
Federal backstop to private insurers to protect them against acts of 
terrorism in the United States so they can have insurance. It was 
enacted, as all of us recall, right after 9/11 for 3 years as a very 
temporary measure. It was intended to give the insurance industry 
developers a 3-year period of transition to a private market, allow 
them to stabilize, to price terrorism insurance, and the third goal was 
to rebuild capacity.
  Now, in 2005, Republicans agreed. We came together bipartisanly and 
extended it for 2 years. However, that same year, the Treasury did a 
study on TRIA, and here's what they said. They said, by 2005, 2 years 
ago, the program had achieved all its purposes. The insurance market 
had stabilized. They were pricing terrorism insurance, and they were 
rebuilding capacity.
  I will submit for the Record the Treasury Department study that they 
found had achieved all its goals. Now, let me read from the Treasury 
study of 2 years ago: ``The availability and affordability of terrorism 
risk insurance has improved since the terrorist attacks of September 
11. Despite increases in risk retentions under TRIA, insurers have 
allocated additional capacity to terrorism risk, prices have declined, 
and take-up (purchase) rates have increased.'' But we extended it.
  And then we passed the legislation that the chairman has talked about 
today, and it went over to the Senate. And the Senate, unanimously, 
passed a TRIA bill. One hundred Republicans and Democrats came together 
and passed that legislation, and the President said he would sign it.
  Now, there are things about this bill that some of my colleagues on 
this side support. The gentlelady from Florida has a provision that I 
think would be beneficial. But it deals with group life. I'm sure she's 
going to talk about that provision in a minute.
  But let me say this. The Senate has said they're not going to include 
group life. So why put a provision in about group life when the Senate 
has already said they're not going to include group life?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BACHUS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

[[Page 34044]]


  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. The gentleman said why put the provision 
in if the Senate said it's not going to talk about group life? Because 
I don't think that we should have a de facto amendment to the House 
rules that puts the Senate in charge of what we can discuss.
  Mr. BACHUS. Well, as I said a few minutes ago to the chairman, with 
all respect to the chairman, we have 19 days. We've talked about the 
importance, particularly on that side of the aisle, and many Members on 
our side, the importance, if we are going to have a bill, let's have a 
bill. If the program is important, let's have the program. Let's not 
let it expire.
  If terrorist risk insurance will shut down New York, if in the 
absence of this bill you can't build a hotdog stand in New York, why 
would we let a bill expire that will, quote, shut down the economy of 
New York? We have an alternative. The alternative is to pass a bill 
that passed unanimously in the Senate.

                           Executive Summary

       The Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 requires 
     the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to 
     perform an analysis regarding the long-term availability and 
     affordability of insurance for terrorism risk, including 
     group life coverage; and coverage for chemical, nuclear, 
     biological, and radiological events; and to submit a report 
     of its findings to Congress by September 30, 2006.
       In conducting this analysis, the PWG was assisted by staff 
     of the member agencies who reviewed academic and industry 
     studies on terrorism risk insurance, and sought additional 
     information and consultation through a Request for Comment 
     published in the Federal Register. Staff also met with 
     insurance regulators, policyholder groups, insurers, 
     reinsurers, modelers, and other governmental agencies to 
     gather further information.
       The key findings of the PWG's analysis are set forth below. 
     The findings are presented under three main areas: the 
     general availability and affordability of terrorism risk 
     insurance; coverage for group life insurance; and coverage 
     for chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological events. 
     Further detail on each finding is provided in the body of the 
     report.


                              Key Findings

     Long-Term Overall Availability and Affordability of Terrorism 
         Risk Insurance
       The availability and affordability of terrorism risk 
     insurance have improved since the terrorist attacks of 
     September 11, 2001. Despite increases in risk retentions 
     under TRIA, insurers have allocated additional capacity to 
     terrorism risk, prices have declined, and take-up (purchase) 
     rates have increased. The take-up rate--or the percentage of 
     companies buying terrorism coverage--has reportedly increased 
     from 27 percent in 2003 to 58 percent in 2005, while the cost 
     of coverage has generally fallen to roughly 3 to 5 percent of 
     total property insurance costs. These improvements have 
     transpired in a marketplace that has had access to a Federal 
     backstop that has gradually contracted through the life of 
     the temporary TRIA Program. Insurers' retention of risk has 
     steadily increased under the TRIA Program: deductibles have 
     increased from 7 percent of direct earned premium in 2003 to 
     17.5 percent in 2006, and other changes made to TRIA in 2005 
     have also increased insurer retentions. The general trend 
     observed in the market has been that as insurer retentions 
     have increased under TRIA and policyholder surpluses have 
     risen, prices for terrorism risk have fallen and take-up 
     rates have increased.
       The improvement in the terrorism risk insurance market is 
     due to several important factors, including better risk 
     measurement and management, improved modeling of terrorism 
     risk, greater reinsurance capacity, and a recovery in the 
     financial health of property and casualty insurers. State 
     regulation does not appear to have had a significant impact 
     on capacity, and a significant number of policyholders are 
     still not purchasing terrorism coverage. How these factors 
     continue to evolve will importantly affect further 
     developments in the long-term availability and price of 
     terrorism risk insurance.
       Insurers have made great strides in measuring and managing 
     their risk accumulations. The amount of capital an individual 
     insurance company is willing to allocate to a particular risk 
     in a given location depends on its understanding of its 
     maximum loss under different scenarios. Since September 11, 
     insurers have made greater use of sophisticated models that 
     allow them to identify and manage concentrations of risk in 
     order to avoid accumulating too much risk in any given 
     location. This improvement in risk accumulation management 
     has allowed insurers to better diversify and control their 
     terrorism risk exposures, which has enhanced their ability to 
     underwrite terrorism risk.
       A significant effort has been made by the insurance 
     industry in modeling the potential frequency and severity of 
     terrorist attacks, which helps insurers to assess their 
     potential loss exposures. An understanding of the potential 
     frequency and severity of terrorist attacks is important for 
     insurers to properly evaluate their risk exposures. 
     Improvements in probability modeling of terrorist attacks 
     have likely had a positive impact on insurers' willingness to 
     provide coverage for terrorism risk following the re-
     evaluation of terrorism risk that took place after September 
     11. However, unlike other catastrophic exposures (e.g., 
     natural disasters) where there are more refined methods of 
     modeling frequency, modeling terrorism risk frequency relies 
     largely on analysis of terrorist behavior. Given the 
     uncertainty of terrorism in general and, in particular, the 
     uncertainty associated with these modeling efforts, insurers 
     appear to have limited confidence in these models for 
     evaluating their risk exposures.
       The quantity of terrorism risk reinsurance capacity has 
     increased since the period following September 11. 
     Reinsurance for terrorism risk all but vanished after 
     September 11 as reinsurers withdrew from the market. The 
     market has since improved and reinsurers have gradually 
     allocated more capital to terrorism risk. The key 
     determinants in the capital allocation decisions of 
     reinsurers include pricing, which is influenced largely by 
     demand, loss experience, underwriting performance, and 
     probability of loss for a given risk at a given location. 
     These determinants also factor into the willingness of other 
     capital providers (e.g., through catastrophe bonds or other 
     mechanisms) to allocate capital to terrorism risk. The 
     presence of subsidized Federal reinsurance through TRIA 
     appears to negatively affect the emergence of private 
     reinsurance capacity because it dilutes demand for private 
     sector reinsurance.
       The financial health and capacity of insurers has recovered 
     since September 11. There has been improvement in the 
     financial health of the insurance industry, which plays a 
     role in how much capacity an insurer is willing to expose to 
     terrorism risk. Since September 11, policyholder surpluses in 
     the property and casualty industry have risen, as the 
     industry has remained profitable (even with the 2005 
     hurricane season losses) and has benefited from increased 
     rates of return on assets. As a result, insurers have more 
     available capital to allocate, and they apparently have 
     chosen to allocate additional capacity to terrorism risk as 
     demonstrated by the increased provision of terrorism risk 
     insurance coverage over the past few years.
       States require that some types of terrorism risk insurance 
     be provided and otherwise regulate aspects of the terrorism 
     risk insurance market. However, it is unclear whether these 
     requirements have reduced capacity significantly. State laws 
     and regulations govern various aspects of the insurance 
     marketplace (e.g., mandating certain types of coverage, 
     approving forms and rates, and monitoring financial 
     solvency), and the provision of terrorism risk insurance 
     falls within this general structure. In terms of pricing, 
     although states regulate commercial insurance rates to 
     various degrees (to a larger extent with workers' 
     compensation insurance), commercial terrorism risk insurance 
     for large property risks may be exempt from state price 
     regulation or not subject to state price regulation (or other 
     state mandates) when purchased from non-admitted surplus 
     lines insurers. In addition, some insurers do not even charge 
     for the terrorism coverage that is included in their 
     policies. In lines of insurance with the greatest amount of 
     price regulation and coverage mandates (such as workers' 
     compensation insurance), insurers have generally remained in 
     the market, even as their TRIA retentions have increased, 
     despite not having the flexibility to fully price for 
     terrorism risk. Therefore, while state regulations have the 
     potential to significantly interfere with the operation of 
     the insurance markets, it does not appear that such 
     restrictions have had a significant impact in the market for 
     terrorism risk insurance in the post-TRIA environment.
       While take-up rates have increased as prices have fallen, a 
     significant number of policyholders are still not purchasing 
     coverage. The willingness of consumers to pay for terrorism 
     risk insurance is a determinant of how much capital insurers 
     will allocate. It is unclear why approximately 40 percent of 
     all policyholders do not purchase coverage, although the 
     Treasury's 2005 study and others have found that the primary 
     reasons were price and assessment of their individual risk to 
     terrorist attack. Individual perceptions of low risk are 
     likely related to the lack of a successful terrorist attack 
     within the U.S. since 2001, and perhaps to some degree an 
     expectation that Federal aid might be available if a 
     significant attack occurs.
       Further improvements in insurers' ability to model and 
     manage terrorism risk will likely contribute to the long-term 
     development of the terrorism risk insurance market. However, 
     the high level of uncertainty currently associated with 
     predicting the frequency of terrorist attacks, along with 
     what appears to be a general unwillingness of some insurance 
     policyholders to purchase insurance coverage, makes any 
     prediction of the potential degree of long-term development 
     of the terrorism risk insurance market somewhat difficult. 
     The post-September 11

[[Page 34045]]

     terrorism insurance market has developed in the presence of a 
     Federal backstop (albeit a progressively less generous one 
     over time), which creates inherent difficulties in evaluating 
     the long-term development of the terrorism risk insurance 
     market.
     Group Life Insurance
       Coverage for terrorism risk insurance in group life 
     insurance policies has remained generally available and 
     prices have declined, even though group life insurance is not 
     part of TRIA. Given these market signals, there is no reason 
     to expect negative developments in the group life insurance 
     market. Group life insurance is generally sold to employers 
     as part of employee benefit packages along with other 
     benefits, such as medical, dental, vision, and disability. In 
     some cases group life insurers partner with other providers 
     of employee benefit services. The group life insurance market 
     is highly competitive and insurers appear to be unwilling in 
     the face of such competition to raise prices (states do not 
     regulate group life insurance rates), or to decline to 
     provide terrorism coverage. Even though group life insurance 
     has not had access to the Federal backstop under TRIA, 
     private market forces (high competitiveness and extreme price 
     sensitivity) have ensured the continued availability and 
     affordability of group life insurance to employers and their 
     participating employees.
       As in the market for property and casualty reinsurance, 
     there have also been improvements in the availability of 
     catastrophic life reinsurance, and there is the potential for 
     continued market development. Just as with the property and 
     casualty reinsurance, catastrophic life reinsurance all but 
     disappeared after September 11, even though by most industry 
     metrics, September 11 was not a catastrophe in terms of 
     either individual or group life insurance losses. Still, the 
     lack or limited availability of catastrophic life reinsurance 
     following September 11 had no disruptive effect on the 
     availability and affordability of group life insurance to 
     consumers largely due to competitive market forces. Since 
     then, some catastrophic life reinsurance has again become 
     available in the marketplace, albeit at higher cost when 
     compared to pre-September 11 pricing. Today, group life 
     insurers are deciding whether to purchase reinsurance, or to 
     forgo and retain most of the risk--a decision that has not 
     had any impact on the availability and cost of group life 
     insurance to consumers.
       Similar to the situation with property and casualty 
     insurers, group life insurers have developed an increased 
     ability to measure and manage their accumulation of terrorism 
     exposure through the use of modeling, and there appears to be 
     potential for additional improvements. While group life 
     insurers face aggregation exposure (the risk of multiple 
     losses from a terrorist-related mass casualty event due to 
     concentrations of insured lives), they are capable of 
     managing this risk to some degree by managing risk 
     accumulations. Property and casualty insurers have made great 
     strides in modeling techniques, but it is unclear to what 
     extent group life insurers have made use of these tools. The 
     highly competitive environment in the group life market, the 
     general wider dispersion of overall life insurance risks (for 
     companies that sell both group and individual life), and some 
     institutional arrangements regarding how policies are sold, 
     may all influence how group life insurers view their need and 
     ability to manage accumulation risk.
     Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological (``CNBR'') 
         Coverage
       Historically, insurance coverage for losses associated with 
     chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological risks has 
     generally not been widely available unless it was mandated. 
     Insurers generally did not provide CNBR coverage even before 
     September 11, and for the most part they do not provide such 
     terrorism coverage even with a Federal backstop in place. 
     Given the general reluctance of insurance companies to 
     provide coverage for these types of risks, there may be 
     little potential for future market development. The factors 
     determining the availability and affordability of CNBR 
     coverage in the marketplace have more to do with the nature, 
     scale, and uncertainty of the damage and losses from CNBR 
     events--however caused--and less to do with terrorism 
     specifically. What coverage exists today is mostly tied to 
     state mandates, most prominently workers' compensation 
     insurance, as well as some aspects of fire insurance through 
     the Standard Fire Policy. In addition, a Federal mandate 
     requires some nuclear coverage for reactor operators and some 
     specialty coverage exists. There is virtually no CNBR 
     reinsurance available, and the modeling issues both for 
     exposure and probability become even more complicated for 
     CNBR.
       Some insurance consumers have expressed an interest in 
     purchasing CNBR coverage, but due to limited capacity and 
     relatively high prices, many have decided to forgo such 
     purchases. Policyholder expectations regarding their own 
     potential terrorism exposure and likelihood of post-disaster 
     Federal aid are probably higher for CNBR risks than for 
     relatively smaller-scale conventional terrorist attacks. The 
     2005 Treasury study found that the number of policyholders 
     that purchased CNBR terrorism coverage was relatively small 
     (except in the case of workers' compensation insurance where 
     coverage is mandated). Among the main reasons for not 
     purchasing CNBR terrorism coverage were that policyholders 
     believed either that they were not at risk or that the 
     premiums were too high. Most commercial policyholders remain 
     generally uninsured (except where coverage is mandated, such 
     as with workers' compensation). Some consumers may equate 
     CNBR coverage with other coverages that are not generally 
     available (e.g., war risk).
       Finally, there may be an even greater market expectation 
     that the Federal government would respond post-loss to a CNBR 
     event through Federal disaster aid than would be the case for 
     a smaller-scale conventional terrorist attack.

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  The gentleman has raised a red herring. There is no chance of it 
expiring, and the fact that he would talk about a nonexistent threat of 
expiration seems to me to be an indication that there's nothing 
substantive to talk about.
  In the end, we would retain the vehicle to pass this bill. But we 
will not give up talking about issues prematurely, and that's why we 
will not allow the Senate's unanimous consent agreement, very hastily 
done, to shut off debate here. But there is no chance of this expiring 
and the gentleman from Alabama knows that.
  I yield now 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Scott), a 
member of the committee.
  Mr. SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, it baffles me when, on this floor, 
we, who are Members of the House of Representatives, so quickly, so 
easily want to abdicate our responsibilities to the Senate. No wonder 
the Senate does what it does.
  Well, Mr. Speaker, we're not going to abdicate our responsibilities 
to the Senate. The Founders of this Constitution and this country 
dedicated two Houses, one, the Senate, that runs every 6 years, and 
they made a distinct decision to have the Members of the House of 
Representatives run every other year because the power of the House 
closest to the people is that House that the people look to to be most 
responsive to the day-to-day delicacies of their needs. This is what 
we're doing here. And the day-to-day delicacies says we've got to pass 
the most significant, the most meaningful terrorism risk insurance 
program possible. There's no greater threat we face.
  My colleagues on the other side have said, well, why can't the 
private sector do this? The private sector has come to us. We don't 
know how catastrophic these events may be. But one thing is for 
certain, Mr. Speaker, we must not allow the terrorists to shut down and 
destroy our economy. And unless we have this backstop, the insurers 
have said they cannot rebuild.
  Not only that, the insurers have come to us, who we've got to listen 
to, to say we need this backstop so that the economy will be stable. 
Perhaps we may not need to use it. Let us hope and let us pray that we 
will not have to.

                              {time}  1545

  But, Mr. Speaker, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, 
and we must prepare for the storm before the hurricane is raging.
  This is not a giveaway program. This is not a subsidy program. This 
is an insurance program, insurance that we hope and we pray that we 
will not need. But if we do, it is the House of Representatives who are 
responding to say, We need to insure life, not just property. You ask 
the American people. Property you can get again and again. Buildings 
you can rebuild. But a life, a life is gone like that and must be 
insured.
  This is the House of Representatives speaking, and I urge passage of 
this bill.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, we have 19 days till this program expires. 
Now, if, as you have said, this is such an essential program, we need 
to pass a bill today. The industry needed 6 months. They've only got 19 
days. Policies have to be written. We can continue to talk about not 
letting the Senate run over the House. We can continue to say we're 
going to stand up for our version of the bill, but ask yourself this 
question: How could 100 Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, come 
up with a unanimous bill, which many of

[[Page 34046]]

us in this bill support, and the President said he will take it up and 
sign it, why are we here today delaying the extension of what many of 
you have argued on the floor today is a very important bill?
  I'm going to say it again. Even if Congress were to act today, 
there's not enough time for insurance companies to develop new policy 
forms. There's not enough time for 50 State regulators to approve those 
forms. There's not time to get the finished product to the marketplace. 
There's not time to negotiate with policyholders.
  So this idea that we don't have to pass it today, no, we don't have 
to pass it today. No, we don't have to pass it tomorrow. We should have 
passed it 6 months ago. We did. The Senate passed a different version, 
and we are arguing at the end of this session, 19 days before this 
program expires, as to differences between the Senate and the House 
version.
  And quite frankly, as I have said, the Senate version, which is the 
version the Treasury Department urged on the House, the version the 
President has said he will sign, the insurance industry's happy with. 
It extends the TRIA program. Why are we here delaying? As I said, we're 
delaying this. We're putting this program at jeopardy. We're postponing 
a decision on AMT. The IRS is not going to have time to react to that, 
and here we are as if we have all the time in the world.
  The American people are not interested in differences between the 
House and the Senate bill. I believe the American people, you know, if 
a bill can pass unanimously out of the Senate, which it did, and the 
President take it up, why does this House continue to debate long after 
the time to act and pass legislation? It should have happened 6 months 
ago. It can happen today. It should happen today.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I would just say the 
gentleman from Alabama appears to have the Senate's preference for 
conflict avoidance confused with genuine consensus.
  There weren't 100 votes for that. They didn't have a roll call vote. 
They're barely able to act, and so a couple of Members worked out a 
deal and the rest of them waved it good-bye. But the notion that that 
comes with some great significance clearly misunderstands what's 
happening, and it certainly shouldn't keep us from legislating.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Sires).
  Mr. SIRES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 4299, the 
revised terrorist insurance act reauthorization. We've heard a lot 
today about how important this legislation is for New York, but it's 
also just as important for my home State of New Jersey, the region and 
this Nation.
  I have said before on this floor that I represent the two most 
dangerous miles in this country. I represent the tunnels, the Lincoln 
and the Holland Tunnels. I represent the ports, and I also represent 
the region which also has the largest repository of fuel on the east 
coast of this country. I represent part of Newark and Jersey City, 
which are both considered high threat areas. I know firsthand what it 
is like to have a district that deals with the threat of terrorism 
every day. That is why it's so important for my district, my State and 
the entire Nation that we extend TRIA in a way that ensures 
stabilization for all businesses across this country, as well as those 
in high-risk areas.
  Last year, New York City created some 50,000 jobs. It is thought that 
in the next 10 years New York City could possibly create another 
500,000 jobs. That is one of the reasons New Jersey and New York are 
talking about a new tunnel to bring people to fill some of those jobs, 
and they need this stability to know that these businesses can come 
into this city so those people can fill those jobs. And that's the 
engine not just for New York City or New Jersey but for the region and 
this country, quite frankly.
  And I want to thank, at this time, Chairman Frank for his hard work 
on trying to form a compromise on this bill while holding true to 
important aspects of the TRIA legislation already passed by this House. 
It is important that any TRIA reauthorization legislation include 
reasonable trigger levels, group life insurance and a reset mechanism.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I just want to end by 
saying I came to this Congress not to follow in lockstep with the 
Senate. I came in to represent my district, not knowing that I would 
have to bow to the Senate.
  This is important legislation today, and I urge my colleagues to 
support this legislation.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to myself such time as I may 
consume.
  It's all come down to this. We can continue to debate the Senate, we 
can continue to try to change this bill, or we can pass a bill, send it 
to the President, which extends this vitally important program as so 
many speakers on the majority side have said. Let's be honest with 
ourselves. We know that this bill should have passed 6 months ago. We 
know it probably should have passed 9 months ago. We know that it will 
not pass in time for new coverage to be written January 1. We know 
that.
  So here we are, arguing differences with the Senate, but I think the 
first thing we ought to acknowledge is the Senate unanimously passed 
this bill. Now, the chairman says that two people got together, agreed 
on everything and the other 98 waved good-bye. Well, let me say this. 
We, the majority of this body, almost all the Members on your side, if 
not all, and a good number of the Members on our side have said we need 
to extend this program and we needed to do it 6 months ago. It's time 
for us to pass the Senate language, send this bill to the President. 
You know, there comes a time when if what the Senate did is wave this 
bill good-bye, it's time for us to wave this bill good-bye.
  We have engaged in a debate. The Senate has been unfair to us. Quite 
frankly, policyholders don't care whether the Senate's unfair to the 
House. They don't care whether the House didn't get its way and the 
Senate did. The bill the Senate passed, I'm not supporting it because 
it's not only the only thing available today, although it is. Let me 
again read to you what the statement of the administration is.
  The administration continues to believe that any TRIA reauthorization 
should satisfy these three key elements: The program should be 
temporary and short-term, there should be no expansion of the program, 
and private sector retention should be increased. That was the original 
policies and the original bill we passed. However, the administration 
will not oppose the version of H.R. 2761 passed by the Senate on 
November 16, but the administration strongly opposes any amendments to 
the Senate-passed version of the bill away from the administration's 
key elements.
  And the only thing underlined in this statement to us is, 
accordingly, if H.R. 2761 passes, that's the bill before us, if it's 
presented to the President to be considered, his senior advisers will 
recommend him veto the bill. A very important program.
  It's already too late for insurance companies and policyholders to 
adopt the provisions as of January 1. State regulators don't have time 
to print the forms. It's time for us to pass the bill. It's time for us 
to say, Okay, we didn't settle all our differences with the Senate, and 
we can do that. And, quite frankly, I am very happy that it is the 
Senate bill we'll be passing, because the Senate bill is very, very 
close to what we Republicans some year ago proposed. And we've gone 
through a year.
  Provisions, the House has not gotten its way on certain provisions. 
It's time to act. It's past time to act, and we're going to have that 
opportunity today. We're going to have the opportunity to extend what 
you say is a vital program, what some of us say, well, actually we're 
not getting what we want because we believe that this program continues 
to be a free Federal backstop for private insurers and developers, and 
that's okay.

[[Page 34047]]

  We want development, just like you do. We don't believe, as the 
Treasury does, many of us, that the program has served its purpose and 
it is actually impeding the private market, but we don't have to get 
there. We have compromised our beliefs and are willing to vote for a 7-
year extension. The Senate unanimously came together and compromised 
their various differences and voted unanimously for a version the 
President has said he will sign.
  The only thing that remains is on this side, the House side, that 
some in the majority have not gotten their way on certain provisions. 
And listen, I'm all for advocating a House position, but we've done 
that, and in the interests of the American people, in the interests of 
getting legislation, in the interests of closure, let's vote for the 
Senate version.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman's time has expired.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. How much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) 
has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).
  Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Frank for your 
hard work on the legislation, and with all due respect to the gentleman 
from Alabama, I can appreciate what you are saying about the Senate and 
our negotiations with them, but the Congress of the United States is 
not a unicameral institution.

                              {time}  1600

  The Founding Fathers created two Chambers, two bodies, and the 
opinions of this body are just as important as the opinions of the 
other body. And sending a strong message about the reset provisions and 
about the group life provisions for the policyholders that you say 
don't care about those provisions is why we have a bicameral Congress.
  The other issue that I want to raise is that the life insurance 
fairness provision in this legislation, which you have strongly 
supported consistently, can stand on its own. It is not dependent upon 
group life being included in this legislation overall and it has no 
ties to that provision.
  In the 109th Congress, we passed a bipartisan version of TRIA that 
included a provision that says that individuals will not be denied life 
insurance coverage based solely on where they might lawfully travel, 
and that is included in this provision again. Too often life insurance 
companies deny the applications of people who express the intent to 
travel internationally. That's particularly true when people say that 
they plan to travel to Israel because Israel and 26 other countries 
appear on the State Department's travel warning list. The life 
insurance industry is using the State Department's travel warning list 
as an underwriting tool. It was never intended to be an underwriting 
tool. Countries don't make that list based on an actuarial analysis. 
There are political and diplomatic considerations for those appearing 
on that list. Travel fairness language will protect consumers from 
unfair life insurance discrimination on the basis of past or future 
lawful travel, and this provision allows the insurers to price for risk 
according to an actuarial analysis. It's also fair to the insurance 
companies because it allows for denial based on war, serious health 
conditions in the country the person is traveling to, or fraud.
  The freedom to travel is a right that we cherish, and no American 
should have to choose between their children's financial security and 
having the right to travel freely. And that is what we are forcing 
Americans to do if we don't pass this travel fairness language as a 
part of the reauthorization of TRIA. If we allow insurance companies to 
deny coverage based on the notion of where a person might travel, we 
are giving in to the terrorists who wish to change our way of life.
  Life insurance companies have been using the State Department warning 
list as an underwriting tool. It was never meant to be utilized that 
way. I urge the Members to support the House-passed version of TRIA.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my 
time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Israel). The gentleman from New York is 
recognized for 1 minute.
  Mr. CROWLEY. I thank my friend and colleague from Massachusetts.
  I had a wonderful speech I was prepared to read to you today, but, 
quite frankly, I'm outraged by the discussion that has taken place 
here.
  There is the discussion of 19 days left to get this legislation 
passed as though a gun is put to our heads that either we pass the 
Senate bill or this does not get extended. That's hogwash. That's not 
the way in which we should make legislation. The notion that 100 
Senators came to the floor and passed this bill is hogwash. They hot-
lined this bill. It went to the floor without debate. The only debate 
that has taken place on this issue has taken place here on the floor of 
the House of Representatives.
  Chairman Frank in cooperation with the ranking member on the minority 
have worked diligently to get a qualified bill to this floor, that New 
York wants, that our country wants and deserves. We should not allow a 
hole in the middle of Manhattan to lie as a monument to Osama bin 
Laden, because that's what we're doing by not allowing for a reset 
provision in this legislation. This is not about New York City. That 
provision is the Osama bin Laden protection provision.
  We should pass the House version of this bill and reject the Senate 
bill. Pass the House version. I would also note that not one Republican 
Member from New York State has been to the floor to defend your 
position on this issue.
  During negotiations on providing appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008, 
the Republicans have opposed providing the emergency service workers 
who are sick from the pollution they were exposed to at Ground Zero 
with the care they need.
  And today, many are expected to oppose this legislation, which would 
enable New York City to rebuild at Ground Zero.
  But I hope that does not happen.
  Because Americans believe that those who served on the frontlines at 
Ground Zero, and are sick due to their service, should be cared for.
  Because Americans believe that New York City must be rebuilt--
stronger, prouder and better protected.
  Because Americans believe that in doing so we will send a message to 
al-qaeda that we won't back down.
  And that's what today's legislation is about--letting every terrorist 
organization know that you cannot break us. And if you try, we will 
only grow stronger.
  Let us take note, it was Chairman Frank's work on the terrorism risk 
insurance act that has moved the Bush Administration from an absolute 
position of opposition to being supportive of extending this program 
for 7 years.
  He successfully moved a bi-partisan bill earlier this year, in light 
of many Republicans ready to acquiesce to the President to kill this 
terrorism Insurance program.
  I welcome the new positions of the White House and many Republicans 
in this chamber today to finally support a real terrorism insurance 
bill, it is a welcome change.
  Now, let's talk some basic facts.
  We all know the Government will step in if there is another large 
scale attack like 9-11 on our country again.
  What TRIA does is actually put the private insurance markets on the 
hook to pay part of the damages, meaning TRIA is a cost savings to the 
taxpayer and ensure that the insurance industry does what it is suppose 
to do--insure.
  TRIA saves taxpayers money.
  Now onto a specific provision of to day's bill that I want to 
highlight.
  Part of today's bill includes a provision to honor those who were 
killed on 9-11, and protect the memories of others who, God forbid, may 
be killed in future attacks on our soil.
  This new language, language that was included in the House-passed 
TRIA bill, creates a re-assurance to insurers and developers to rebuild 
on previously hit sites.
  This is important because we all know al-Qaeda returns to the scene 
of their crime; they hit the Twin Towers in 1993, and they returned in 
2001. And knowing their mentality, they will try to return again.
  Those that ignore that, ignore history and fact.

[[Page 34048]]

  The impacted site in Lower Manhattan cannot continue to be a hole in 
the ground, or a sick tribute or trophy to Osama bin Laden--wherever he 
may be.
  Rather, we need to rebuild there, letting the terrorists know they 
can knock us down, but we will always pick ourselves up stronger.
  We need to pass this bill and get the Senate working on a strong 
compromise bill to ensure a real TRIA, one that won't let Osama bin 
Laden continue to use the pictures at Ground Zero as a recruiting tool 
against our soldiers in Afghanistan or for attacks against Americans in 
this country or anywhere in the world.
  We have seen the White House veto threat against this bill as it is 
``expanding'' the terrorism insurance program.
  Rebuilding at previously hit sites is not expanding the terrorism 
insurance program--it is the reason for the terrorism insurance 
program.
  If you are serious about supporting TRIA, vote for this bill and 
ensure Osama bin Laden and his evil partners view September 11, 2001 as 
the worst day in their lives, not the best.
  Mr. TERRY. Mr Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 4299, the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007. This 
legislation revises and extends the Terrorism Risk Insurance program 
established under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA 
has been a cornerstone of our Nation's comprehensive response to the 
events of September 11, 2001, providing a vital and necessary backstop 
for our insurance industry and its policyholders.
  I am pleased that H.R. 4299 does not reduce TRIA's complete coverage 
for nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological events. It should 
be noted that workers' compensation insurers are uniquely obligated by 
state law to provide coverage for these events to their policyholders; 
for them, especially, it is critical that TRIA provide a backstop for 
these events as well as for conventional acts of terrorism.
  It is important that TRIA serve the industry and its policyholders 
equally. Over the course of TRIA's life, the ``trigger level,'' or 
threshold of losses insurers must suffer from an act of terrorism 
before TRIA can kick in, has been raised from $5 million to $100 
million. For small- and medium-sized insurers--the majority of the 
industry--a trigger level of $100 million is too high. As a result, I 
support the provision which has survived in the House version in H.R. 
4299 which returns the trigger level to the 2006 level of $50 million.
  While I support H.R. 4299, it is important to note a significant 
omission which also affects our small- and medium-sized insurers and 
their policyholders. The deductible insurers' must pay under TRIA is 
potentially cost-prohibitive for these companies. Additionally, this 
deductible is calculated based on the amount of an insurer's direct 
earned premium over the previous year. Insurers' deductibles under TRIA 
should be tied to their capital, not the amount of their liabilities. 
As a result, I encourage the House to reexamine TRIA in the future to 
address this issue.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of 
H.R. 4299, which revises and extends the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(TRIA) for 15 years. I commend Chairman Frank and Congressman Capuano 
for their fine work in shepherding this critical legislation to the 
House floor. This act reminds us that the true measure of our 
homeland's preparedness against terrorist attack is our ability to 
prepare for such an attack comprehensively and that includes the 
insurance industry which is an essential part of our economic 
landscape.
  Mr. Speaker, the horrendous events of September 11, 2001, tested our 
nation's ability to defend itself in many ways. Along with the human 
and emotional toll these events took on all Americans, we noticed that 
not only our government but also our private industries were not 
sufficiently prepared to deal with the implications of a terrorist 
attack. Terrorist activity since September 1, 2001, has come to prove 
that our enemies are becoming more agile and technologically 
sophisticated. There is no doubt in my mind that terrorists are 
targeting not only our fellow citizens but also our critical 
infrastructure including our financial services sector, since they are 
determined to undermine the United States in the most fundamental of 
ways.
  History has shown that Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations 
will explicitly direct their efforts against American citizens and 
property in an effort to inflict economic harm. According to a RAND 
policy brief, ``there is reason to believe that al Qaeda is interested 
in continuing its efforts to disrupt the fiscal base of the United 
States by attacking its borders.'' If al Qaeda and others are 
determined to strike our financial targets, public policymakers need to 
examine possible financial mechanisms to mitigate these effects.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4299 is a critical and timely legislative response 
to the fact that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, many 
insurance companies excluded terrorism events from their policies. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many insurance companies excluded 
terrorism events from their insurance policies. As a result, Congress 
passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act as a three year temporary 
program in 2002. The act created a federal backstop to protect against 
terrorism related losses. In 2005, the measure was extended until 2007. 
TRIA is now set to expire at the end of this year, unless we today 
extend the law.
  Since its enactment, TRIA has ensured the availability of affordable 
terrorism risk insurance in the marketplace and thereby fostered 
continued urban development and real estate development in the United 
States. While the TRIA program has successfully kept terrorism 
insurance affordable, the President's Working Group on Financial 
Markets' most recent report concluded that a private market for 
terrorism reinsurance is virtually nonexistent--especially with regard 
to nuclear biological chemical and radiological (NBCR) acts of 
terrorism.
  Mr. Speaker, I support H.R. 4299 because it provides federal backstop 
for private terrorism insurance. One of the strongest features of the 
bill is that it comes at no cost to the American taxpayer unless there 
is a terrorist attack.
  The security of our country can not be ensured unless we make certain 
that the U.S government works hand-in-hand with the private sector to 
confront terrorist threats. H.R. 4299 exemplifies this idea.
  The bill before us is based on the idea that it is in the best 
interest of our country that the federal government coordinate with 
insurers to provide financial compensation to insured parties for 
losses from acts of terrorism. It will contribute to the stabilization 
of the United States economy at a time of national crisis.
  Mr. Speaker, I also support this bill because I believe that 
extending TRIA for 15 years will contribute to the long-term stability 
of two critical American industries, the construction and real estate 
industries. The long-term stability it provides will allow both 
industries to engage in large-scale building projects in areas 
considered high-risk for terrorism.
  Mr. Speaker, terrorist attacks target our country as a whole and not 
individual cities or states. I support the bill because it also 
exemplifies the critical idea that the risk from such attacks should be 
dealt at national level. H.R. 4299 should be seen as part of our 
broader efforts to confront and defeat the terrorist enemy.
  No legislative initiative, especially in such a critical field 
related to the security of our country, can become really effective 
unless it enjoys the support of the private industry it affects.
  Mr. Speaker, I understand that H.R. 4299 is broadly supported by 
insurance companies, insurance agents and brokers, policyholders, 
commercial developers, and construction companies.
  Another important provision in the bill is that it extends TRIA to 
cover both foreign and domestic terrorism. Currently it covers only 
foreign terrorism. It also adds group life insurance to the types of 
insurance for which terrorism insurance coverage must be made available 
by insurers. It also sets the ``trigger'' level--the size of an attack 
at which the federal government would provide aid to insurers--at $50 
million. Current law (P.L. 109-44), enacted in 2005, sets the level at 
$50 million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007. Yet another strong 
feature of the bill is it requires continuation of studies of the 
development of a private market for terrorism and risk insurance.
  Mr. Speaker, I support the passage of H.R. 4299 and call on my 
colleagues to do like wise because I strongly believe that it will 
strengthen our nation's efforts to confront the terrorist threat in a 
more comprehensive way and will provide long-term stability for 
critical American industries.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 862, the bill is considered read and the 
previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Bachus

  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. BACHUS. In its current form, I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.

[[Page 34049]]

  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Bachus moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 4299, to the 
     Committee on Financial Services with instructions to report 
     the same back to the House forthwith with the following 
     amendment:
       Strike sections 6 through 10.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Alabama is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the Financial Services 
Committee, whom I have great respect for, indicated several times that 
we are here today because of the Senate's inaction and intransigence. 
Now, I'm not going to argue that point. The Senate, what they didn't do 
is they didn't take action on our bill, but what they did do is they 
came together and they unanimously passed legislation, and that 
legislation is very close to what House Republicans advocated from day 
one. They did take action. They passed legislation. The President said 
he'll sign it. It's legislation that Treasury said is consistent with 
the original declarations of the TRIA bill.
  I share the chairman's frustration on the predicament we find 
ourselves in. I wish the Senate had been willing to engage in a 
conference to allow Members the opportunity to work out their 
differences on the extension of this program. However, I will tell the 
chairman this: The House Republicans, many of us on that conference 
committee, would have voted to adopt the Senate language. So the Senate 
bill, in my opinion, had we conferenced, we would have still passed the 
Senate bill.
  Now, the chairman has expressed his frustration with the Senate that 
they are holding a gun to our head. I'm not going to characterize it in 
that regard. Whether it is or isn't, I wish it wasn't so. But the clock 
has run out on this Congress and the opportunity to get anything done 
on TRIA has, as a practical matter, gone by. But if it is so important, 
and most Members of this body believe it is, it's important to pass 
legislation today, and that's the Senate legislation.
  The motion to recommit removes additions in the bill offered by the 
majority and returns the TRIA language to that passed by the Senate 
last month by unanimous consent. The Senate bill reflects a bipartisan 
compromise with the administration. It extends the TRIA program for 7 
years, the same amount of time that we advocated in a bipartisan bill 
in the House. We didn't get a bipartisan bill in the House. It wasn't a 
bad bill. It wasn't a bad bill. But that bill when it passed and the 
bill today, the bill that was just offered, is not going to become law.
  The Senate bill includes coverage for domestic terrorism. Many in 
this body felt like it ought to include that. It imposes a liability 
cap for the marketplace. That's good. I think it's a responsible, 
measured approach to extending a vital program, as many have 
characterized it. Not all on this side agree. But the majority on this 
side will come together, the majority of the minority, and pass what 
you say is a vital program and we'll do it today. The administration 
has said they will veto the House bill. Both sides of the aisle and the 
Senate have indicated that the Senate is unwilling to consider it. We 
have a gripe against the Senate, but let's take that up with the 
Senate. A large number of Members in the House may continue to oppose 
the Senate bill. You have an opportunity to vote on it in just a 
minute.
  The only TRIA extension that can get enacted is the Senate 
compromise. Many say I wish it wasn't so. It is. The only responsible 
course for this House to take is to accept the Senate bill and move on. 
My motion is the Senate compromise.
  We have 19 days until TRIA expires. Let me say it again. That's not a 
practical time left for the industry to comply with legislation. In a 
reasoned society, a deliberative body would never pass a bill and ask 
the American people to adopt all that in 5 days.
  Mr. Speaker, we cannot risk TRIA's expiration. We need to get the job 
done now. A vote for this motion to recommit is a vote to promote 
economic vitality in this country.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I want to begin with the 
schizophrenic attitude towards the Senate. The gentleman said a number 
of times that the Senate passed this unanimously. Yes, by avoiding 
conference, by making a deal.
  But he also continually said, correctly, that this bill was passed 
way too late. Why are we here now? The answer as to why we're here now, 
Mr. Speaker, it's the Senate that he was so admiring of. Yes, the 
Senate passed it without a vote, on November 16. We passed the bill on 
September 19. The House passed the bill with 3\1/2\ months left to go 
in the year. The Senate passed the bill less than a month ago. The 
Senate passed the bill, by the way, a different bill than ours, after 
we had adjourned for the recess.
  So the Senate, whom he extols for having managed to put everything 
under the rug and make one of their deals where nobody gets 
fingerprinted for anything, they sent us this bill, and the earliest we 
could have passed it was last week. So all this rhetoric about 6 
months, et cetera, well, that's, Mr. Speaker, his friends in the Senate 
who caused that problem. If they had worked with us, we would have had 
several months.
  Now, we are going to pass a bill. We understand that. And we may well 
be able to pass only the Senate bill early next week. We have preserved 
our ability to do that. There is no chance of this expiring. The 
question is this: Should we acquiesce in a procedure by which the 
United States Senate waits until after we have adjourned for the 
Thanksgiving recess and sends us a bill and says, this is it, take it 
or leave it, or do we say, no, we don't like that and we're going to at 
least try to make you vote on things.
  Now, I know the gentleman from Alabama likes the Senate version 
apparently where you just have unanimity so-called. I prefer democracy. 
I prefer letting things get voted on. Maybe the Senate won't vote, but 
let's at least give them one more option. It may take us another 3 or 4 
days. So the notion that we are somehow delaying this for 3 or 4 days, 
no. We waited from our bill in September to theirs in November. Two 
months later they passed it. Three days or 4 days isn't going to make 
any difference and we'll get the bill through.
  Here's what we want to do. We want to say that the point that the 
gentlewoman from Florida made that you should not arbitrarily cancel 
people's life insurance because they're traveling to a country that's 
on the State Department watch list, whether it's the nation of Israel 
or others that Americans want to travel to. Yes, if you can show that 
there's danger there, you can cut off their insurance. But don't say 
that we're just going to give up on that. Maybe we can't do it this 
year. Let's take the motion to recommit, then, because we're going to 
pass this bill soon, anyway, and we may have to pass the Senate 
version. Let's have a referendum on the freedom to travel provision. 
Let's have a referendum on whether or not we include group life or say 
that we insure buildings in this country but not life. Let's have a 
referendum on whether smaller insurance companies should be able to 
participate. Under our bill they can. Under the Senate bill they can't. 
And let's have that reset mechanism that the gentleman from Queens, New 
York, talked about so eloquently, which says we're going to rebuild and 
any place that's hit, we will rebuild them again.
  Let me say, we have a referendum on those issues. We may not be able 
to win this year, but I want to be able, as chairman of the committee, 
to go back early next year and say to our friends in the Senate, okay, 
your rope-a-dope tactics may have worked, but they didn't work on the 
merits.

                              {time}  1615

  And we want to go back at you on small insurance companies and on 
group life and on the question of freedom to travel, and we want to 
bring it up again.
  And the last point, when we're talking about why is this being done 
now,

[[Page 34050]]

it's supposed to be temporary? I never thought it would be temporary. 
Here's the point: If you go through the private market, it is paid for 
by the insured, ultimately. I do not think that those people who are 
choosing to do business in areas that may be singled out by the 
terrorists ought to have to pay the higher cost of insuring themselves 
for that. Against fire, against theft, against liability for someone 
falling down, sure, that's their responsibility. But defending 
ourselves against terrorism is not a market matter; it's a matter of 
national security. And the whole country ought to come together in a 
unified way and say you may not threaten New York or Chicago or Atlanta 
or Miami, or any other part of America, or Los Angeles, as they 
threatened the airport. You may not threaten us and make us pay more. 
You cannot make it more expensive to do business in one part of this 
country than another. We will come together as one Nation in this 
program and say, yes, you are responsible for insuring yourself against 
various dangers. But for insuring yourself against murderous thugs 
seeking to do harm to this country, this country will come together as 
one in a national program and rebut that, and we will not allow them to 
intrude.
  Now, again, it may be that in the end the best we can get is the 
Senate bill. But at this point, I urge the Members not to vote down, in 
principle, a reset mechanism that says, okay, you only get hit once and 
then you're gone, or the freedom to travel, or group life, or smaller 
companies.
  I hope the motion to recommit is defeated and that we let the Senate 
know that we will continue to engage in democracy in this part of the 
Capitol.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.
  Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to 
recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by 
5-minute votes on passage of H.R. 4299, if ordered, and adoption of the 
conference report to accompany H.R. 1585.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 173, 
nays 246, not voting 12, as follows:

                            [Roll No. 1149]

                               YEAS--173

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Deal (GA)
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nunes
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--246

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gerlach
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mack
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh (NY)
     Walz (MN)
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Weldon (FL)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Carson
     Cubin
     Hooley
     Hunter
     Jindal
     Kind
     Matheson
     Miller, Gary
     Neugebauer
     Paul
     Spratt
     Tancredo


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.

                              {time}  1638

  Messrs. SAXTON, DENT, RUSH, GERLACH, LINCOLN DAVIS of Tennessee and 
Ms. SOLIS changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Messrs. SULLIVAN, CAMP of Michigan, LATHAM, WICKER and Ms. GINNY 
BROWN-WAITE of Florida changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 303, 
noes 116, not voting 12, as follows:

[[Page 34051]]



                            [Roll No. 1150]

                               AYES--303

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carter
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gerlach
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Graves
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hall (TX)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Herger
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hobson
     Hodes
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kirk
     Klein (FL)
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murphy, Tim
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nunes
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickering
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (MI)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sestak
     Shays
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walsh (NY)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (OH)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--116

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Costello
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Deal (GA)
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Flake
     Forbes
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Granger
     Hastings (WA)
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kline (MN)
     Lamborn
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCrery
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pitts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Radanovich
     Rehberg
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Walden (OR)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Westmoreland
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Young (AK)

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Carson
     Cubin
     Gohmert
     Hooley
     Hunter
     Jindal
     Matheson
     Miller, Gary
     Neugebauer
     Paul
     Spratt
     Tancredo


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised 2 
minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1647

  Mr. MARCHANT changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. GOODLATTE changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________