[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 23]
[Senate]
[Pages 31875-31876]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I wish to speak on the latest report from 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, on Iran's nuclear 
program. Yesterday, a copy of the IAEA's upcoming report on Iran was 
released. It is troubling.
  The IAEA gives an interesting description of Iran's nuclear 
development over the past 20 years. What is more relevant, however, is 
its report on Iranian nuclear proliferation in the present day. 
According to this latest document, Iran has continued to enrich uranium 
in violation of two U.N. Security Council resolutions passed under 
Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter. The resolutions, which are binding, 
were enacted specifically to prevent Iran from completing the nuclear 
fuel cycle. To ensure multilateral support at the U.N., they were made 
as soft as possible. Resolution 1737, passed in December 2006, only 
targeted items related to Iran's nuclear enrichment cycle. When that 
failed to have any impact, the UNSC passed Resolution 1747, which 
targeted specific members of the Iranian regime and made certain 
commitments related to Iranian arms sales.
  At the time, the United States was applauded for taking the 
multilateral route. Withering contrasts were made to our approach to 
Iraq. If I am not mistaken, we received these same accolades in 2003, 
when we allowed the EU-3--Germany, France, and the United Kingdom--to 
handle nuclear negotiations with Iran. And like then, these same 
accolades and multilateral approach have accomplished little. Instead, 
Iran's uranium enrichment program has greatly expanded, to the point 
where--as the IAEA notes--uranium hexafluoride has been fed into

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each of the 18 centrifuge cascades. There is almost no doubt at this 
point that Iran will ultimately have enough enriched uranium to create 
a nuclear weapon.
  There have been so many red lines broached during the past 5 years, 
it is almost hopeless to begin creating new ones. I will not try. What 
I will say, however, is that the issue of Iran creating highly enriched 
uranium has now become almost moot.
  Centrifuge technology is technologically difficult; of that, there is 
no question. The Iranians have failed to spend the usual time needed to 
test and measure their first centrifuge cascade before building new 
ones. But resolution of this potential problem is just a matter of 
time. The equipment is there. The necessary uranium and uranium gas are 
there. Thanks to Pakistan's A.Q. Khan network, the knowledge is there.
  Sometime in the future--not immediately but sometime not too far 
off--we will be approaching the endgame of this situation. I do not 
know what form the endgame will take. I hope and pray it is short of 
military confrontation; after all, that is why we have pursued the 
diplomatic track as long as we have. That is why I still believe 
diplomacy is the only answer. But we should remember that we in the 
United States have a luxury of sitting thousands of miles away from a 
nuclear-armed Iran. That is a reassuring expanse of mountains, plains, 
and oceans. Others do not have this luxury. Israel, one of our closest 
allies, is much closer, easily within Iran's missile range and 
certainly within Hezbollah's. Israel's decisionmaking process is 
certain to take this vulnerability into account.
  So how do we move forward from the IAEA's report? Over the next 
several months, our focus must be in securing a third U.N. Security 
Council resolution on Iran. The Russians and Chinese may well point to 
this recent report and drag their heels on further sanctions. They are 
excellent at that, on issues from Darfur to Burma to North Korea. But 
the point of the first two resolutions was to halt Iran's uranium 
enrichment, not to receive more documentation from the IAEA. Iranian 
uranium enrichment is still continuing. Therefore, I think it weighs 
heavily on the U.N. and the Security Council in particular to pass a 
third set of sanctions on Iran. These would need to be stronger than 
the past two resolutions; ideally, they would include serious 
prohibitions on military and energy-related items, as well as nuclear 
equipment.
  The time for foot-dragging is over. Every day that passes, that 
uranium hexafluoride becomes more enriched and the Islamic Republic 
draws nearer to a nuclear weapons capability. I believe that diplomacy 
is the best and only effective response to this growing threat. 
Therefore, Mr. President, it is time to pass the Iran Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2007, to complement America's recent sanctions, 
and to pave the way for further U.N. sanctions. I was proud to 
introduce this bill with my colleague Mr. Durbin, and I hope for quick 
passage.

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