[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 22]
[House]
[Pages 30621-30628]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1400
 PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3355, HOMEOWNERS' DEFENSE ACT OF 
                                  2007

  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 802 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 802

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 3355) to ensure the availability and 
     affordability of homeowners' insurance coverage for 
     catastrophic events. The first reading of the bill shall be 
     dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of 
     the bill are waived except

[[Page 30622]]

     those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. General 
     debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one 
     hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
     ranking minority member of the Committee on Financial 
     Services. After general debate the bill shall be considered 
     for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in 
     order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
     amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on 
     Financial Services now printed in the bill. The committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered 
     as read. All points of order against the committee amendment 
     in the nature of a substitute are waived except those arising 
     under clause 10 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding clause 11 of 
     rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed 
     in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for 
     that purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII and except pro forma 
     amendments for the purpose of debate. Each amendment so 
     printed may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be 
     printed or a designee and shall be considered as read. At the 
     conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the 
     Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with 
     such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may 
     demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted 
     in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
     amendments thereto to final passage without intervening 
     motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.
       Sec. 2.  During consideration in the House of H.R. 3355 
     pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of 
     the previous question, the Chair may postpone further 
     consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated 
     by the Speaker.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ross). The gentlewoman from Florida is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions). All 
time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only.
  I yield myself such time as I may consume.


                             General Leave

  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members be 
given 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on 
H. Res. 802.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 802 provides for consideration of 
H.R. 3355, the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007, under an open rule with 
a preprinting requirement. This rule allows for floor consideration of 
any amendment that is in compliance with the House rules and the 
Congressional Budget Act and has been preprinted in the Congressional 
Record.
  Mr. Speaker, in the face of natural catastrophes that too often 
strike our communities, the Congress today will initiate a new planning 
effort through H.R. 3355 and this rule. This new effort will assist our 
communities and hopefully tackle the rising cost of homeowners property 
insurance.
  My colleagues from Florida, Representative Ron Klein and 
Representative Tim Mahoney, have led this bipartisan effort. I thank 
them for their tireless work and leadership, their leadership that 
should help our neighbors back home and folks across this country find 
affordable and available homeowners insurance.
  Following some of the most expensive natural disasters in our 
Nation's history, like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Wilma and the 
fires and the floods and the earthquakes, homeowners across this 
country have been subjected to wild fluctuations and horrendous cost 
increases for their property insurance. Insurance premiums are out of 
sight. They have skyrocketed. Well, we understand. We feel it in our 
own bills.
  I hear it from the retired older woman in West Tampa back home who 
has owned her house for 30 years and is on a fixed income. But this 
exponential increase in insurance that she has suffered may force her 
to sell her long-time home.
  I also hear it from the hardworking folks in south St. Petersburg who 
have been cancelled by their insurance companies after decades of 
paying their premiums without making any claim upon that insurer.
  Due to all of the policy cancellations, we now have a crisis. 
Insurers have fled the State. In some areas, insurance premiums have 
gone beyond what any reasonable person would consider anything that 
they can handle in their everyday lives. A rate increase of over 600 
percent is not unheard of. Some of our neighbors are having to rethink 
their retirements because they can no longer afford to live in their 
homes. But if they tried to sell, nobody can afford to buy those homes.
  And, unbelievably, the State of Florida is now the largest provider 
of homeowners property insurance in our State. This problem is not 
limited to the State of Florida, however. Across the country over the 
past 5 years, homeowners insurance premiums have increased by over 45 
percent on average. In Florida, that average increase is over 77 
percent. And there seems to be no end in sight unless we work to create 
innovative options, like this bill, that will bring stability back to 
the marketplace and sanity back to insurance premiums.
  Over 3 million loyal policyholders, many of whom have never submitted 
a single claim, have received letters from their insurance companies, 
nondescript envelopes that carry the message, ``Your policy is not 
eligible to be renewed.''
  Last month a story caught my eye entitled, ``Home Insurers Canceling 
in the East.'' It said that insurance companies have essentially begun 
to redraw the outline of the eastern United States somewhere west of 
the Appalachian Trail.
  Faced with the risk of their citizens being priced out or thrown out 
of private insurance markets, States have begun to take action. The 
State insurance program in Massachusetts has doubled as a result of the 
insurance crisis. My home State of Florida is now insuring 1.3 million 
policyholders. But the States did not ask to be put in this position. 
They tried to reason with the private insurance companies. They created 
incentives, they pushed, they urged them not to leave folks high and 
dry and to keep insurance available and affordable. Even though the 
insurance industry made record profits the year of Hurricane Katrina, 
private insurers have still left the gulf coast.
  Times of crisis like these often lead to innovative solutions, 
however. My colleagues, Representative Ron Klein and Representative Tim 
Mahoney, national insurance risk consortium that will allow States 
better access to private capital as a backstop for these huge, 
catastrophic losses. The consortium will help States work together to 
bundle that risk into bonds that can succeed on the private capital 
markets. Because this program is voluntary and relies on private 
investment, the new consortiums should not expose Federal taxpayers to 
any risk whatsoever. Catastrophe bonds through the consortium will help 
stabilize insurance markets, bring down premiums, and move forward in 
providing available, affordable insurance to our constituents.
  The bill, with foresight and commonsense, also addresses the worst-
case scenario, because, God forbid, there will be another catastrophic 
event and States will be on the hook to pay claims. And most of the 
time this will not be a problem, but there are some disasters for which 
no preparation is enough. In those cases, historically this body, the 
Congress, has written emergency assistance bills, and it is right that 
we should do so. But this bill allows States to take control of their 
own fates by lessening the need for those Federal disaster 
appropriations by making Federal loans available to help States pay 
claims when that colossal disaster happens.
  This is a compassionate, fiscally responsible way to ensure that 
Americans are not left without aid in their time of greatest need. This 
bill is a simple, effective way to tackle the crisis of skyrocketing 
property insurance. I ask my colleagues to support the rule and the 
underlying legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this rule 
and to

[[Page 30623]]

the underlying legislation which asks taxpayers from across the country 
to subsidize the risky housing choices of residents of one State at the 
expense of the private marketplace.
  This legislation does nothing to promote responsible and effective 
disaster mitigation standards or any other risk-reduction measures to 
lower the costs in the terrible event of a natural disaster. Instead, 
it promotes widespread moral hazard and inefficient decisionmaking by 
distorting the costs associated with living in high-risk areas through 
national subsidies.
  These bail-out mechanisms will promote overdevelopment in areas most 
vulnerable to hurricanes, flooding, and other natural disaster damage, 
which is why groups like the National Wildlife Federation have come out 
in opposition to this bill, recognizing that the legislation subsidies 
will ``result in continued encouragement of risky development in our 
Nation's coastal areas and floodplains,'' and that more development in 
these areas will lead to ``more loss of life, more loss of property, 
and more loss of wildlife habitat.''
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Congressional Record a letter signed 
by the National Wildlife Federation and the chairman of The Florida 
Coalition for Preservation, both of whom are opposing this bill.

                                 National Wildlife Federation,

                               Washington, DC, September 24, 2007.
     Hon. Barney Frank,
     Chair, House Financial Services Committee, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Spencer Bachus,
     Ranking Member, House Financial Services Committee, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Frank and Ranking Member Bachus: On behalf of 
     the National Wildlife Federation and the Florida Coalition 
     for Preservation, we write to express our opposition to H.R. 
     3355, the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007, as it is currently 
     drafted. For over 20 years, the environmental community has 
     worked to promote change in the public insurance arena, 
     especially through reform of the National Flood Insurance 
     Program (NFIP). We support reforms that promote ecologically-
     sound floodplain management to reduce loss of life, property, 
     and important wildlife habitat.
       We applaud Representatives Klein and Mahoney and the 
     Financial Services Committee for raising the Nation's 
     awareness of the increasing risks associated with coastal 
     storms, which are predicted to become more powerful and of 
     longer duration, due to rising sea levels and warming of the 
     climate. The UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
     Change (IPCC) and many of the Nation's prominent climate 
     scientists have warned that the increasing intensity of such 
     destructive storms is a likely result from global warming due 
     to buildup of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide.
       We understand that the devastating human toll that 
     Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma created in 2005, plus the 
     four powerful hurricanes that struck Florida in 2004, have 
     increased the public's awareness of the need for adequate 
     insurance coverage after natural disasters. H.R. 3355 
     establishes a federally-chartered national catastrophe risk 
     consortium, where States can pool risk and sell catastrophe 
     bonds and reinsurance contracts. It also establishes a 
     national homeowners insurance stabilization program, which 
     mandates that the Secretary of the Treasury give liquidity 
     and catastrophe loans to State reinsurance and insurance 
     plans. We are concerned, however, that H.R. 3355's subsidies 
     could inadvertently result in continued encouragement of 
     risky development in our Nation's coastal areas and 
     floodplains. With more development in these environmentally-
     sensitive areas, the bill could lead to more loss of life, of 
     property, and of wildlife habitat. The safety of our citizens 
     should be the number one priority of any government program 
     dealing with natural disasters. Unfortunately, H.R. 3355 
     falls short of this goal.
       Specifically, we have the following concerns with H.R. 
     3355:
       No Requirement for Meaningful Hazard Mitigation. As 
     currently drafted, H.R. 3355 does not require any 
     demonstration that a State has implemented meaningful hazard 
     mitigation reforms to be eligible to participate in the 
     consortium. Hazard mitigation must be a primary goal of any 
     Federal backstop for State insurance and reinsurance 
     programs. Effective hazard mitigation will save lives, reduce 
     damage, limit Federal taxpayers burdens, and will help reduce 
     the cost of insurance.
       Low Interest Loans Provide Added Incentive for Increased 
     Risky Development in Hazard-Prone, Ecologically-Sensitive 
     Coastal Areas and Floodplains. We are concerned that the 
     liquidity and catastrophe loans in Title II of H.R. 3355 do 
     not have any real ceiling amounts, so that the taxpayers' 
     liability may be limitless. The loans are well below market 
     rates, mandatory, and of at least 5 to 10 years duration. The 
     Secretary of the Treasury may extend the loans upon a simple 
     request. These loans may also result in the creation of more 
     State catastrophe funds, which may unreasonably concentrate 
     risk at the State level, and effectively subsidize 
     development in high risk areas. According to the Insurance 
     Information Institute, for example, the State of Florida's 
     Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, which was supposed 
     to be only the insurer of last resort, has become Florida's 
     largest homeowners' insurer. It is predicted that Citizens 
     will grow to nearly 2 million policyholders by the end of the 
     year, giving it more than one third of the total market and 
     exposure to loss of more than $400 billion. Citizens was 
     expected to shrink gradually, but it has expanded 
     exponentially. Some critics of H.R. 3355 have called this 
     bill a ``pre-emptive bailout'' of Florida's state insurance 
     program and others have called it ``The Developers' Dream 
     Act.''
       As Evidenced by the National Flood Insurance Program, 
     Continued Subsidized Risky Development in Ecologically-
     Sensitive Areas Will Jeopardize Citizen Safety and 
     Unnecessarily Burden Taxpayers. The experience of the 
     National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) should provide some 
     degree of caution to the framers of H.R. 3355. We have been 
     concerned for many years that the NFIP is having severe 
     difficulties managing the growth of flood-related risk (as 
     well as the costs). Nearly a decade ago, the National 
     Wildlife Federation released a report called ``Higher 
     Ground'' on the problems of repetitive losses in the NFIP, 
     where, in thousands of communities, buildings were 
     experiencing repeated flood losses only to be reconstructed 
     again and again with little or no mitigation of risk, in part 
     for lack of incentive to ``move out of harm's way.'' Part of 
     the lack of incentive for mitigation was driven by rates that 
     are below (some of them far below) true actuarial rates, 
     flood hazard maps that are inaccurate or out of date and 
     failing to consider changing conditions, and failure of 
     communities and FEMA to enforce even minimum standards of the 
     program, let alone set higher standards to reduce or avoid 
     risk.
       Today, we still find that after Congress passed amendments 
     in 2004 to reform the NFIP and began to provide funds to 
     address repetitive losses, the new program is still largely 
     not implemented and has failed to spend much of the funds 
     made available to start changing the pattern. Since 1998, the 
     number of repetitive loss properties has grown from 74,500 at 
     the time of the NWF study to now over 135,000 properties, and 
     the cost to the NFIP of these buildings has more than tripled 
     to over $8.5 billion in payments. The NFIP continues to face 
     enormous challenges, and public confidence is lacking in the 
     program's ability to reduce risks, manage costs and protect 
     the environment. Another taxpayer-funded ``backstop'' has the 
     potential to increase the myriad of problems with our current 
     public insurance programs.
       We therefore oppose H.R. 3355 in its current form. We hope 
     that the Committee will address our concerns during mark-up, 
     and we urge the Committee to work with the Nation's private 
     insurance industry to assure that insurance adjustments are 
     completed quickly, fairly, and accurately after natural 
     disasters. We also urge the Committee to consider creating 
     incentives for homeowners in high risk areas to use a full 
     range of mitigation techniques, including retrofitting 
     properties to mitigate storm damage or to relocate out of 
     harm's way.
       We believe that the intricacies of H.R. 3355 require 
     thoughtful assessment, and we urge the Committee not to rush 
     to judgment on a bill of this complexity. Safety is of 
     paramount importance to our organizations, and we cannot 
     support legislation that does not consider meaningful hazard 
     mitigation. Nor can we support public subsidies in this 
     legislation that, in turn, could further result in additional 
     loss of human life, property, and wildlife habitat in the 
     Nation's most ecologically-sensitive coastal areas and 
     floodplains. We stand ready to work with you to address these 
     concerns.
       We very much appreciate your consideration of our views on 
     H.R. 3355.

         Oppose H.R. 3355, the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007

       This bill does nothing to promote responsible and effective 
     mitigation standards or other risk-reduction measures. 
     Instead it creates a bailout mechanism which will promote 
     over-development in areas known to be vulnerable to 
     substantial damage resulting from hurricanes, flooding, and 
     other natural disasters.
       This bill has no retained loss requirement for 
     participating State reinsurance funds. Once the trigger is 
     met, a fund may qualify for a loan, without any ``skin in the 
     game.'' This bill could be improved by requiring States to 
     first sustain a loss before receiving a loan from Treasury. 
     The loans could help States manage their losses above the 
     retained loss requirement.
       Although the trigger has been raised for catastrophic 
     loans, according to the manager's amendment, a State 
     reinsurance fund is eligible for a liquidity loan if it has a 
     ``capital liquidity shortage,'' no matter the size of the 
     event. This change makes the liquidity loan provision very 
     open-ended and

[[Page 30624]]

     could discourage States from sufficiently capitalizing their 
     reinsurance funds.
       The Consortium created by this bill is unnecessary. States 
     can currently diversify their natural catastrophe risk right 
     now through the global reinsurance market. While there is no 
     indication that the Consortium would even work, it could 
     potentially dump billions of dollars in catastrophe bonds 
     into the market, irrespective of demand.
       This bill will encourage States other than Florida to 
     create reinsurance funds in order to provide cheap 
     reinsurance, possibly crowding out the private reinsurance 
     market. Reinsurance is more expensive in States like Florida, 
     where the risk is higher. Masking the true cost of insurance 
     does nothing but encourage risky development, and in the case 
     of these Federal loans, could expose taxpayers to billions of 
     dollars in losses.
       The loans created by this bill represent a transfer from 
     States that do not suffer frequent natural catastrophes to 
     those that do. If States suffer repeated losses and qualify 
     for multiple loans, there will be incredible pressure on 
     Congress to forgive the loan.
       This bill mandates that Treasury provide open-ended, 
     subsidized loans to States, but ties its hands. It does not 
     grant Treasury the appropriate discretion to adjust the 
     program as conditions warrant.
           Sincerely,
     David R. Conrad,
       Senior Water Resources Analyst, National Wildlife 
     Federation.
     Honorable Thomas B. Evans, Jr.,
       Chairman, The Florida Coalition for Preservation.

  It is without doubt, Mr. Speaker, that as the Nation's most 
hurricane-prone State, Florida has had a long-vested interest in 
providing its residents with accessible and affordable property 
insurance. Despite this desire, there has been a noticeable lack of 
political will in Florida for enacting good public policies to 
encourage this desired result.
  State regulations that prevent insurers from charging risk-based 
prices, limits on capital movement and well-founded uncertainty over 
the legal and regulatory enforcement of contracts in Florida have 
caused many private insurers to reduce their exposures to this 
political risk by reducing new underwriting in the State.
  But rather than addressing the root causes of this market failure, 
Florida has decided to deal with the problem by creating a State-backed 
insurer to compete with private companies in the delivery of this 
coverage, which was billions of dollars in debt within 3 years of its 
creation. Things have not gotten much better for the government entity 
with its overwhelming exposure of almost $450 billion, which has 
already been bailed out by Florida taxpayers at a cost of $715 million.
  So now once again, instead of addressing the root causes of their 
problem, Florida supporters of this fund have come to Congress to try 
and spread their State's exposure nationwide, meaning to other States 
and other States' taxpayers, by exposing them to massive liabilities 
which would further encourage development along hurricane-prone 
coastlines.

                              {time}  1415

  Mr. Speaker, supporters of this legislation will undoubtedly come to 
the floor to explain that participation in this Federal consortium is 
voluntary. What they will undoubtedly omit, however, is that there is 
nothing stopping States from engaging in this kind of partnership 
already today and that only one additional value being placed on this 
bill is an implicit Federal guarantee that provides a subsidy to this 
government program and that the private sector does not enjoy and 
places the Federal Government at risk for covering any potential losses 
experienced by this program.
  In other words, said another way, this new Democrat majority is 
looking for other States to pay for taxpayers, caused by mistakes in 
one State.
  Mr. Speaker, I oppose this legislation that the Congressional Budget 
Office estimates will cost taxpayers $120 million over the next 5 years 
just to implement, and that is only counting what they will have to pay 
before they are asked to bail out this program.
  I insert the Congressional Budget Office's score of this legislation 
into the Congressional Record at this point, as well as the 
administration's Statement of Policy which makes it clear that the 
President's senior advisers would advise this legislation's veto if it 
makes it to the President's desk.

                                                 October 30, 2007.
     Hon. Barney Frank,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
     prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3355, the 
     Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007.
       If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Daniel 
     Hoople.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Peter R. Orszag.
       Enclosure.
     H.R. 3355--Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007
       Summary: H.R. 3355 would authorize the appropriation of 
     $120 million over the 2008-2013 period to establish a 
     National Catastrophe Risk Consortium to help coordinate the 
     availability of reinsurance contracts between state 
     reinsurance entities and the private market. The consortium 
     also would act as an information repository for states on the 
     risk of natural disasters and research on the standardization 
     of risk-linked securities (for example, catastrophe bonds). 
     Assuming the appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO 
     estimates that implementing this provision would cost $75 
     million over the 2008-2012 period.
       The bill also would establish two new federal direct loan 
     programs within the Department of the Treasury for state 
     reinsurance programs facing certain levels of insured losses 
     following a natural disaster. Loans could be made only if a 
     reinsurer could not access capital in the private market and 
     repayment was secured by the full faith and credit of the 
     state. Treasury would develop procedures for state 
     reinsurance programs to prequalify for loans, including the 
     assessment of fees to cover the cost of administering the 
     program. CBO expects that such loans would be made very 
     rarely and would involve a minimal subsidy cost under the 
     terms specified in the legislation. As such, CBO estimates 
     that loans made under the bill would have an insignificant 
     cost over the next five years. Enacting H.R. 3355 would not 
     affect direct spending or revenues.
       This bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
     mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
     (UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
     governments.
       Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
     budgetary impact of this legislation is shown in the 
     following table. The costs of this legislation fall within 
     budget function 450 (community and regional development).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      By fiscal year, in millions of
                                                 dollars--
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                   2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorization Level.............      20      20      20      20      20
Estimated Outlays...............       3      12      20      20     20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: H.R. 3355 also would authorize the appropriation of $20 million in
  fiscal year 2013.

       Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
     bill will be enacted in early fiscal year 2008 and that the 
     necessary amounts will be appropriated for each fiscal year.
     National Catastrophe Risk Consortium
       H.R. 3355 would authorize the appropriation of $20 million 
     for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2013 to establish the 
     National Catastrophe Risk Consortium. The consortium would be 
     a federal entity managed by a board of directors made up of 
     designees from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and 
     Homeland Security, and members from each participating state. 
     Responsibilities of the Consortium would include: encouraging 
     and facilitating different avenues for state insurers to 
     enter into reinsurance agreements with the private market, 
     conducting research and analysis into the standardization of 
     risk-linked securities, and gathering insurance information. 
     Assuming the appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO 
     estimates that implementing this provision would cost $3 
     million in 2008 and $75 million over the 2008-2012 period for 
     staff and research expenses.
     Liquidity and catastrophe loans for state reinsurance 
         programs
       H.R. 3355 would establish two new direct loan programs 
     within the Department of Treasury for state reinsurance 
     programs facing a certain level of insured losses following a 
     natural disaster. Reinsurance programs insure primary 
     insurers or other reinsurers against losses in excess of 
     amounts specified by contract or law. Reinsurance programs 
     eligible for the new loan programs created under the bill 
     would only be those in which the authorizing state maintained 
     a financial interest. Examples of such reinsurance programs 
     include the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF) and the 
     California Earthquake Authority. In cases where a state does 
     not have a reinsurance program that meets the requirements 
     for a loan under the bill, a state residual insurer (for 
     example, wind pool programs) would be eligible to apply 
     during the five-year period following enactment.
       Procedures to Establish Loan Eligibility. H.R. 3355 would 
     direct the Secretary of the

[[Page 30625]]

     Treasury to develop procedures for reinsurance programs to 
     establish loan eligibility prior to a natural disaster. At a 
     minimum, insurance entities covered by the reinsurer would be 
     required to establish rate structures sufficient to cover 
     expected annualized costs and ensure that any new 
     construction or substantial renovation of insured properties 
     comply with applicable state and local building codes. As a 
     part of the precertification process, the Secretary would 
     assess a fee on state reinsurance programs to cover the costs 
     of administering the loan program. Those fees would be 
     credited in the budget as an offsetting collection and would 
     be available upon subsequent appropriation of a loan subsidy.
       Based on information about the characteristics of existing 
     state reinsurance programs and on information from the 
     Treasury, CBO expects that most state reinsurance programs 
     would meet the eligibility requirements set forth under the 
     bill and thus would be eligible to receive loans. In 
     addition, other qualified reinsurance programs may be 
     established in the future that also would be eligible to 
     receive loans.
       Liquidity Loans. Under H.R. 3355, a qualified reinsurance 
     program would be eligible to receive a liquidity loan if the 
     program demonstrates it is facing a liquidity shortage and is 
     not able to access capital at a reasonable rate in the 
     private market. The principal of such loans could not exceed 
     the ceiling coverage level--the maximum amount of liability 
     the program could incur under law. In addition, the full 
     faith and credit of the state in which the reinsurance 
     program is authorized would be required. Loans would be made 
     at a rate of not less than 3 percentage points above the 
     applicable Treasury rate and for a term of between five and 
     ten years.
       Based on information from the state of Florida, CBO expects 
     that those loans would most likely be used to address short-
     term liquidity shortages and would be repaid once adequate 
     capital became available through established reinsurance 
     agreements or through the private market. In cases where a 
     liquidity loan is held to term (which CBO expects would be 
     unlikely to occur because of the high interest rate of the 
     loan), CBO estimates that those loans would have no 
     significant cost to the federal government. As of June 2007, 
     rating agencies like Standard and Poor's have not issued a 
     credit rating below ``A'' for new general obligation bonds 
     issued by a state. Based on historical default rates and the 
     minimum terms specified in the bill, CBO estimates that the 
     default risk associated with a state's general obligation 
     bond rating would have to increase significantly before such 
     a loan would be estimated to have more than a negligible 
     subsidy cost. While the default risk of loans backed by the 
     full faith and credit of a state would likely increase 
     following a disaster, CBO expects that this increase would 
     not be significant. (Following Hurricane Katrina, for 
     example, Standard and Poor's announced it would adjust a 
     state's credit rating for the first time as a result of a 
     natural disaster by lowering Louisiana's rating from an A+ to 
     an A.) As such, CBO estimates that any liquidity loan made 
     under the bill would have an insignificant cost over the next 
     five years.
       Catastrophe Loans. Under the bill, a qualified reinsurance 
     program would be eligible to receive a catastrophe loan 
     following a disaster if insured losses exceeded 150 percent 
     of the aggregate amount of premiums assessed (whether 
     collected or not) for private property and casualty insurance 
     issued in the state over the previous 12-month period. The 
     principal of such a loan could not exceed the difference 
     between the total insured loss and the program's ceiling 
     coverage level, and repayment would be afforded the full 
     faith and credit of the state. Loans would be made at a rate 
     of not less than 20 basis points above the applicable 
     Treasury rate and for a term of not less than 10 years.
       Based on information from the states, CBO expects that few, 
     if any, reinsurance programs would apply for a catastrophe 
     loan following a disaster. State insurance commissions and 
     rating agencies often require that primary insurers are able 
     to cover at least a 100-year event to maintain their credit 
     rating. As such, not only would losses exceeding the ceiling 
     coverage level be outside the responsibility of the 
     reinsurer, they likely would be covered through existing 
     reinsurance agreements between the primary insurer and the 
     private market.
       For example, as a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf 
     Coast faced insured losses of over $40 billion. Such losses 
     well exceeded the minimum eligibility threshold for a 
     catastrophe loan under the bill. (Based on the aggregate 
     amount of direct written premium for private property and 
     casualty insurance, CBO estimates that the threshold probably 
     would have been around $12 billion for Louisiana in 2005.) 
     However, CBO expects that there would have been little demand 
     for a catastrophe loan following Katrina because a state 
     reinsurance program (if one had existed) would not have been 
     responsible for losses above its ceiling coverage level. 
     Furthermore, such losses would have been covered by existing 
     reinsurance agreements between primary insurers and the 
     private market. For those reasons, CBO estimates that 
     implementing this provision would have no cost over the next 
     five years.
       Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 3355 
     contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
     defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or 
     tribal governments.
       Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Daniel Hoople; Impact 
     on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell; 
     Impact on the Private Sector: MarDestinee C. Perez.
       Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
     Director for Budget Analysis.
                                  ____


                   Statement of Administration Policy


                   h.r. 3355--homeowner's defense act

       The Administration seeks to ensure that there is a stable 
     and well-developed private market for natural hazard 
     insurance and reinsurance. The Administration believes that 
     private markets are the most efficient, lowest cost, and most 
     innovative insurance providers. Therefore, the Administration 
     strongly opposes H.R. 3355, which creates a permanent role 
     for the Federal government in natural hazard insurance 
     markets. Accordingly, if H.R. 3355 were presented to the 
     President, his senior advisors would recommend that he veto 
     the bill.
       The Administration strongly opposes provisions creating a 
     Federally-backed consortium of States in order to pool 
     catastrophe risk. Although pooling can be an effective 
     mechanism for managing risk, there is no need for a Federal 
     role because States are currently free to associate to 
     address catastrophe risk. Further, the consortium's Federal 
     charter would create an implicit guarantee that the Federal 
     government backstops the consortium's financial obligations. 
     This implicit guarantee would result in an inequitable 
     Federal subsidy for certain State insurance programs and 
     policyholders.
       The Administration also strongly opposes provisions 
     establishing a Federal loan program to fund losses incurred 
     by State-sponsored reinsurance programs. This subsidized 
     Federal backstop would displace reinsurance currently 
     available from the private market and would clearly result in 
     a subsidy for insurers, State insurance programs, and their 
     policyholders. Federal subsidies for State insurance programs 
     would also encourage the creation of new State programs and 
     discourage States from charging risk-based rates, resulting 
     in the State programs crowding out the private sector. 
     Subsidized insurance rates also undermine economic incentives 
     to mitigate risks. Individuals facing subsidized rates would 
     be encouraged to take on risks that are inappropriate, 
     specifically putting themselves in harm's way because they do 
     not bear the full expected costs of potential damages. 
     Finally, shifting liabilities for catastrophe exposure from 
     the private sector and State insurance programs to the 
     Federal government would be fiscally irresponsible as the 
     Federal government could expect to face steep losses in 
     certain years. Financing these losses would require Federal 
     taxpayers to subsidize insurance rates for the benefit of 
     those people living in high-risk areas.

  Mr. Speaker, once again, the new Democrat majority is bringing to the 
floor something which will not only increase spending for all 
taxpayers, in addition to the high taxation that this new majority is 
already bringing to the floor, in addition to the rules and regulations 
which the new Democrat majority is bringing to the floor, and today we 
see an opportunity for the United States to bail out one State because 
they've got problems with their private sector initiatives.
  I will ask all of my colleagues to stand up for the American taxpayer 
today, not to subsidize the homeowners of one specific State. I urge 
them to vote ``no'' on this rule and the underlying legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I would inquire of the gentleman from Texas 
if he has any additional speakers.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I appreciate the gentlewoman asking. At this time, I do 
not have any additional speakers.
  Ms. CASTOR. Then I will reserve the balance of my time. Because I 
have the right to close, I will wait for the gentleman from Texas to 
make his closing remarks, and then I will make my closing statement.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to oppose the 
previous question so that I can amend the rule to have Speaker Pelosi, 
in consultation with Republican Leader Boehner, immediately appoint 
conferees to move forward a clean Military Construction and Veterans 
Affairs appropriations bill for 2008.
  Despite the fact that Veterans Day will likely come and go this year 
without the House living up to its commitments to our Nation's 
veterans, Democrats continue to play politics with this important 
funding for their own political gain.

[[Page 30626]]

  While the House Democrat leadership plays politics, however, our 
Nation's veterans are the ones paying the price. The Senate has already 
done its work and appointed conferees for the veterans appropriations 
bill, and for every day that House Democrats allow the veterans funding 
bill to languish without conferees for their own political agenda, our 
Nation's veterans lose $18.5 million, money that could be used for 
veterans housing, veterans health care, and other very important 
veterans support activities.
  The American Legion and the VFW already have, along with multiple 
requests from this Member, as well as Republican Members of the House, 
urged both Speaker Pelosi and Democrat Senate Majority Leader Reid to 
end their PR campaign and begin conference work on this important 
veterans funding issue.
  Unfortunately, it appears as though all these commonsense requests 
have fallen on deaf ears, and our Nation's veterans are being forced to 
pay the price for continued Democrat partisanship and lack of 
leadership on this issue.
  I ask all of my colleagues to support this motion to defeat the 
previous question so that we can put partisanship aside and move this 
important legislation forward without any further gimmicks or games.
  I know that this is a bold idea that hasn't yet been focused on by 
groups around the Democrat Party or by pollsters or those who work with 
moveon.org, but I think that our veterans deserve nothing less.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the 
amendment and extraneous material appear in the Record just prior to 
the vote on the previous question.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, we're here on the Homeowners' Defense Act of 
2007 and this rule. This is an innovative solution crafted by my very 
thoughtful colleagues from Florida, Representative Ron Klein and 
Representative Tim Mahoney, to tackle the rising cost of property 
insurance.
  While the problem is especially acute in the State of Florida, it is 
not limited to the State of Florida. Look all the way up the coastline 
from Florida to Georgia, up through New York. Everyone is suffering 
these double-digit percentage increases in their property insurance 
bills. Look across the country to California and, yes, to Texas. 
Florida is not alone and the gulf coast is not alone.
  What this requires is some innovative, thoughtful thinking that 
sometimes is all too often missing here in Washington, but thankfully 
this new Congress has elected some self-starters who have experience in 
business and know how business and government can work together to 
bring real solutions for the American people.
  These times of crisis demand innovative solutions, and my colleagues 
from Florida and the Financial Services Committee that passed this bill 
in a bipartisan vote, that has brought this to the floor today that we 
can act on will provide a voluntary, not all States participate, it's a 
voluntary national insurance risk consortium that will allow States to 
tap private capital. Despite the protests from the other side of the 
aisle, the way this bill is crafted is the taxpayers will not be on the 
hook for additional disaster claims. To the contrary, this is an 
attempt to alleviate having to come back to the Congress time and time 
again in a time of natural disasters.
  Now, will we be able to solve natural catastrophes in this bill? No. 
But is it a smart tool to plan ahead, to try to put some money aside 
early and create a backstop? Yes.
  So I thank all of my colleagues from Florida, especially 
Representative Klein and Representative Mahoney, because we have got to 
do something, and this is a simple and effective way to tackle the 
rising costs for property insurance. I ask my colleagues to support the 
rule and to support this innovative solution.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question and on the rule.
  The material referred to previously by Mr. Sessions is as follows:

       Amendment to H. Res. 802 Offered By Mr. Sessions of Texas

       At the end of the resolution, add the following:
       Sec. 3. The House disagrees to the Senate amendment to the 
     bill, H.R. 2642, making appropriations for military 
     construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related 
     agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008, and 
     for other purposes, and agrees to the conference requested by 
     the Senate thereon. The Speaker shall appoint conferees 
     immediately, but may declare a recess under clause 12(a) of 
     rule I for the purpose of consulting the Minority Leader 
     prior to such appointment. The motion to instruct conferees 
     otherwise in order pending the appointment of conferees 
     instead shall be in order only at a time designated by the 
     Speaker in the legislative schedule within two additional 
     legislative days after adoption of this resolution.

       (The information contained herein was provided by 
     Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the 
     109th Congress.)

        The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means

       This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous 
     question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. 
     A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote 
     against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow 
     the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an 
     alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be 
     debating.
       Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of 
     Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the 
     previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or 
     control the consideration of the subject before the House 
     being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous 
     question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the 
     subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling 
     of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the 
     House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes 
     the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to 
     offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the 
     majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated 
     the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to 
     a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to 
     recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: 
     ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman 
     from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to 
     yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first 
     recognition.''
       Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic 
     majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is 
     simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on 
     adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive 
     legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is 
     not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of 
     the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual 
     published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page 
     56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using 
     information from Congressional Quarterly's ``American 
     Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is 
     defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition 
     member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages 
     an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the 
     pending business.''
       Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
     the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a 
     refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a 
     special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the 
     resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21, 
     section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: ``Upon rejection of the 
     motion for the previous question on a resolution reported 
     from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member 
     leading the opposition to the previous question, who may 
     offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time 
     for debate thereon.''
       Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does 
     have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only 
     available tools for those who oppose the Democratic 
     majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the 
     opportunity to offer an alternative plan.

  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I 
move the previous question on the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous 
question.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX,

[[Page 30627]]

this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question will be followed 
by 5-minute votes on adoption of the resolution, if ordered, and 
adoption of the motion to instruct on H.R. 3074, if ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 222, 
nays 191, not voting 19, as follows:

                            [Roll No. 1065]

                               YEAS--222

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--191

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Mack
     Manzullo
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--19

     Bean
     Boren
     Braley (IA)
     Buyer
     Carson
     Cubin
     Dicks
     Giffords
     Hunter
     Jindal
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Marchant
     McMorris Rodgers
     Miller (FL)
     Oberstar
     Rothman

                              {time}  1449

  Ms. GRANGER and Mr. ROGERS of Alabama changed their vote from ``yea'' 
to ``nay.''
  So the previous question was ordered.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 225, 
noes 190, not voting 17, as follows:

                            [Roll No. 1066]

                               AYES--225

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--190

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Calvert

[[Page 30628]]


     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Bean
     Boren
     Braley (IA)
     Buyer
     Carson
     Cubin
     Giffords
     Hunter
     Jindal
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     McMorris Rodgers
     Miller (FL)
     Oberstar
     Rothman


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.

                              {time}  1458

  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________