[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 21]
[Senate]
[Pages 28776-28780]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  NOMINATION OF JUDGE MICHAEL MUKASEY

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to urge the swift confirmation of 
Judge Michael Mukasey as Attorney General. It has been 6 weeks now, and 
the Senate Judiciary Committee has not even taken up the nomination. It 
is past time to fill this vacancy.
  There is no question this nominee is qualified to serve. I don't need 
to recite his qualifications. They were mentioned by many Members at 
Judge Mukasey's nomination hearing.
  The distinguished majority leader said:

       Judge Mukasey has strong professional credentials and a 
     reputation for independence. A man who spent 18 years on the 
     Federal bench surely understands the importance of checks and 
     balances and knows how to say no to the President when he 
     oversteps the Constitution.

  There is no question, the Nation would be well served by Judge 
Mukasey's confirmation. Indeed, in recommending Judge Mukasey to serve 
on the Supreme Court, Senator Schumer noted that Judge Mukasey, and the 
others he recommended:

       . . . were legally excellent, ideologically moderate, 
     within the mainstream, and have demonstrated a commitment to 
     the rule of law.

  Surely, if a man is qualified and independent enough to be on the 
Supreme Court, we should have far fewer concerns when nominating him to 
serve the remaining time of about 1 year as Attorney General.
  It seems to me that what this debate boils down to is politics. Some 
Members want more information about his views. I would note that he 
testified for 2 full days and has answered nearly 500 written 
questions. The initial reaction from many of my Democratic colleagues 
was that he was extremely forthcoming and they were pleased with his 
candidness. But for some Senators, apparently this is not enough. It 
almost seems to me as if some of my colleagues are willing to hold this 
nomination hostage until he gives them exactly the answers they want, 
even when he is unable as a legal matter to do that.
  Let me explain why. Judge Mukasey has not been briefed on classified 
programs, and he will not be briefed on

[[Page 28777]]

classified programs until he becomes the Attorney General, but some of 
my colleagues now seem to be saying he should have to make 
pronouncements about the legalities of those programs even when he 
doesn't know their details--can't know their details. How is this 
independent?
  I would suggest this: My colleagues don't want an Attorney General 
who is independent; they want an Attorney General who will kowtow to 
their views and make pronouncements over issues on which he is not 
legally allowed to opine. That is, of course, the opposite of 
independence.
  Since the beginning of this Congress, Democratic Senators have 
repeatedly called for new leadership at the Department of Justice. They 
have said the work of the Department is too important to delay 
confirmation of a new Attorney General. Well, now is the time for them 
to act.
  Before the nomination, Senator Schumer said:

       Let me say, if the President were to nominate somebody, 
     albeit a conservative, but somebody who put the rule of law 
     first, someone like a Mike Mukasey, my guess is that they 
     would get through the Senate very, very quickly.

  Well, my colleague would have guessed wrong. It hasn't been quick. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee has not moved quickly, and this is all 
the worse because the average amount of time between nomination and 
confirmation of the last nine Attorneys General has been 21 days. 
Already Judge Mukasey has been pending for about twice that period of 
time--6 weeks--longer than any Attorney General nominee in 20 years. If 
these delays continue, obviously new records are sure to be broken.
  The bottom line here is that President Bush has nominated a 
distinguished and nonpolitical candidate to be the next Attorney 
General. The Senate should reciprocate by using the confirmation 
process not to settle old scores or to politicize the nomination. 
Independence has to mean something. We do not want an Attorney General 
who refuses to give his honest legal opinions to the President, and we 
don't want one who is forced to make commitments to the Senate that are 
not grounded in facts or law.
  The Department of Justice needs an Attorney General with the 
foresight and experience to resolve the issues the Nation's top law 
enforcement agency faces and to tackle the difficult challenges 
especially presented in a post-
9/11 world. The qualities and background of Judge Michael Mukasey, 
combined with his extensive experience in national security and 
terrorism cases, commend him to serve as Attorney General in these 
challenging times. It is important for the Senate to move on with this 
important business of the Nation so that Judge Mukasey can be voted on 
by the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I wish to be associated with the remarks of 
the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I think he summed it up pretty 
well, but let me just make some comments myself about the Mukasey 
nomination.
  Just when you thought it might be safe to venture back into the 
confirmation water, the partisan sharks rush in and push you right back 
onto the beach. Today is 40 days--40 days--since the Senate received 
the nomination of Judge Michael Mukasey to be Attorney General of the 
United States, 40 days in the partisan wilderness for a man who is 
superbly qualified and widely respected and whose service is 
desperately needed.
  Before addressing what is being done to Judge Mukasey, let me remind 
my colleagues who he is. Michael Mukasey has spent four decades serving 
the law and the country. He spent 16 years in private legal practice, 4 
years as a Federal prosecutor, and 19 years as a Federal district court 
judge. He was head of the Official Corruption Unit during his service 
as assistant U.S. attorney and chief judge during his last 6 years as a 
U.S. district judge, both in the Southern District of New York.
  Judge Mukasey's service in that particular jurisdiction gave him the 
expertise in national security issues that makes him especially 
qualified to lead a Justice Department that is being retooled for the 
war on terrorism and especially since the war on terrorism continues as 
we stand here on the floor. He presided over the 9-month trial of Omar 
Abdel Rahman and sentenced him to life in prison for the 1993 plot to 
blow up the World Trade Center.
  When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Judge 
Mukasey's decision, it took the unusual step of commenting on how he 
handled the trial. These are the appeals court's words. Judge Mukasey:

       . . . presided with extraordinary skill and patience, 
     assuring fairness to the prosecution and to each defendant 
     and helpfulness to the jury. His was an outstanding 
     achievement in the face of challenges far beyond those 
     normally endured by a trial judge.

  That was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on August 
16, 1999.
  That is a remarkable statement. Appeals courts review district court 
decisions, but rarely do they comment in this manner on district court 
judges.
  Both generally and specifically, by any reasonable or objective 
standard, Judge Mukasey is eminently qualified to be our next Attorney 
General. By the standards set by my Democratic colleagues themselves, 
Judge Mukasey should by now have become Attorney General Mukasey. My 
Democratic colleagues have repeatedly said that the Justice Department 
needs new leadership and needs it now. The Senator from New York, Mr. 
Schumer, whom my colleague from Arizona quoted, is a Judiciary 
Committee member and a serious one. He has said:

       We can't afford to wait because justice is too important.

  He is not alone in making that statement among the Democrats. The 
Democratic mantra is, justice is too important to wait; we need a new 
Attorney General now. My Democratic colleagues also offered criteria, 
offered a description of the kind of Attorney General we need right 
away. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, said:

       We want the best man or woman who can run the place, 
     restore the sense of commitment and restore the sense of 
     integrity to the Department of Justice.

  The Senator from New York, Mr. Schumer, who knows him well, said the 
nominee would have to be someone of unimpeachable integrity, 
experience, and someone who could hit the ground running.
  I respectfully say to my Democratic colleagues that Judge Mukasey 
fits your bill. He can run the place. He is a man of integrity and 
experience. He certainly can hit the ground running.
  It appeared for a short, brief time that my Democratic colleagues 
thought so too. After a full day of testimony, Chairman Leahy told 
Judge Mukasey that his answers showed his independence and his 
agreement that political influence has no place in law enforcement.
  Mr. Schumer, the distinguished Senator from New York, said:

       The most important qualities we need in an Attorney General 
     right now are independence and integrity, and looking at 
     Judge Mukasey's career and his interviews that we have all 
     had with him, it seems clear that Judge Mukasey possesses 
     these vital attributes.

  I ask unanimous consent that these and some other quotes be printed 
in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. HATCH. We need a new Attorney General now. In fact, we needed him 
40 days ago. Justice is too important to wait. Judge Mukasey meets the 
criteria. He is qualified. He is ready to lead. Then why is Judge 
Mukasey not already on the job leading the Justice Department to where 
Americans think it needs to be? Why is his nomination stalled, 40 days 
into the confirmation process, without even a committee vote?
  It is certainly not because this is the way Attorney General nominees 
have been treated in the past. In my 31 years in this body, we have 
taken an average of 3 weeks to move an Attorney General nominee from 
nomination to confirmation. It has already been twice that long--40 
days and counting--for

[[Page 28778]]

Judge Mukasey, and he was only today put on the Judiciary Committee 
agenda for next week.
  Let me rewind the confirmation clock to 1993, the last time a 
Democratic Senate evaluated a nominee for Attorney General. Janet Reno, 
the Democratic nominee, received very different treatment than this 
Republican nominee is receiving today. Miss Reno's nomination went 
through the entire confirmation process from initial receipt to final 
confirmation in less time than Judge Mukasey's nomination has been 
sitting in the Judiciary Committee since this hearing.
  While the Judiciary Committee will not vote on Mukasey's nomination 
until at least next week, the committee did not even wait for a markup 
to approve the Reno nomination.
  I was the ranking member on the Judiciary Committee, and I supported 
then-Chairman Biden's request to vote on Miss Reno's nomination at the 
end of the hearing. I knew Janet Reno was very liberal. I knew she 
didn't agree with most Republican Senators. But she was qualified. She 
was a decent person. To be honest with you, the Senate unanimously 
confirmed her the very next day after the hearing, without even a 
markup.
  While Senators gave Judge Mukasey nearly 500 written questions, after 
2 days of oral testimony--500 written questions, the answers to which 
he already has provided, I might add--no Senators gave even a single 
question to Miss Reno.
  What happened? Why such radically different treatment when a 
Democratic nominee for Attorney General comes up? It is simply because 
a Republican rather than a Democrat is in the White House and because 
we have a different approach toward matters.
  Most of us believe when a President is elected, that President, he or 
she, should have the right to the nominees they put up, as long as they 
are competent and decent.
  The need for new Justice Department leadership remains. Judge 
Mukasey's obvious qualifications are the same. What happened that his 
nomination is now being obstructed, slowed down, and delayed? The 
latest excuse is that Judge Mukasey will not state on the fly a legal 
conclusion for a Justice Department he has not yet led about whether 
the coercive interrogation technique known as waterboarding constitutes 
torture. He will not come to legal conclusions before he can apply 
appropriate legal standards to appropriate facts. I think that is a 
mark in his favor. He should be praised, not criticized, for taking 
this approach.
  Rather than focusing on his refusal to answer a question that he 
should not answer, I want to remind my colleagues what Judge Mukasey 
has said on this subject. Everyone appeared pleasantly surprised when 
Judge Mukasey denounced torture during his hearing. He went so far as 
to explain how torture violates not only statutes or treaties but the 
United States Constitution itself.
  Judge Mukasey said if waterboarding properly can be labeled torture, 
then it too is unconstitutional. In a letter dated yesterday, Judge 
Mukasey said he considers techniques such as waterboarding personally 
repugnant. But personal conclusions are not the same as legal 
conclusions. So Judge Mukasey outlined in detail the kind of analysis 
he would follow to decide whether such interrogation techniques 
constitute torture prohibited by the Constitution, or cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment prohibited by statute and the Geneva 
Conventions.
  I ask unanimous consent that his letter be printed in the Record 
following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 2.)
  Mr. HATCH. Judge Mukasey wrote:

       Legal questions must be answered based solely on the actual 
     facts, circumstances and legal standards presented.

  How can he possibly be criticized for making legal judgments by 
applying legal standards to appropriate facts? What kind of crazy, 
topsy-turvy confirmation process is this? My Democratic colleagues 
demanded over and over that, if confirmed, Judge Mukasey must exercise 
his own independent judgment and that he must answer legal questions on 
his own; that he must not base advice on political pressure. But now 
they criticize him for doing precisely what they told him to do. 
Democrats now criticize Judge Mukasey for saying he will exercise his 
own independent judgment and answer legal questions on his own, without 
basing his advice on political pressure. My Democratic colleagues 
cannot insist that Judge Mukasey be independent toward a Republican 
President but compliant toward a Democratic Senate. They cannot declare 
that the Constitution is not whatever President Bush says it is, but 
demand Judge Mukasey's agreement that the Constitution is whatever 
Senate Democrats say it is.
  We should stop playing partisan political games with this nomination. 
The Justice Department is too important for this type of stuff. Judge 
Mukasey is eminently qualified to provide the leadership the Department 
needs now. His insistence that independent legal judgment rather than 
emotion or partisan pressure will guide him only enhances his fitness 
for taking the helm at the Justice Department.
  Forty days into the partisan wilderness is more than enough. We 
should confirm Judge Michael Mukasey without further delay.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1


     democrats say the justice department needs new leadership now

       Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY): May 24, 2007: ``This nation 
     needs a new Attorney General, and it can't afford to wait.''; 
     August 27, 2007: ``the Justice Department . . . desperately 
     needs new leadership.''
       Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): June 11, 2007: ``the 
     U.S. Department of Justice is a precious institution in our 
     democracy . . . and we need to take some action.''


                     Democrats Praise Judge Mukasey

       Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY): May 22, 2007: ``If the 
     president were to nominate somebody . . . like a . . . Mike 
     Mukasey, my guess is they would get through the Senate very, 
     very quickly.''; October 17, 2007: ``The most important 
     qualities we need in an Attorney General right now are 
     independence and integrity. And looking at Judge Mukasey's 
     career and his interviews that we have all had with him, it 
     seems clear that Judge Mukasey possesses these vital 
     attributes.''; October 18, 2007: ``He could get a unanimous 
     vote out of this committee. . . . It's not a done deal yet. 
     But he could.''
       Senator Pat Leahy (D-VT): October 16, 2007: ``I would 
     expect him to be confirmed.''; October 17, 2007: ``I 
     appreciate [not only] the succinctness of your answers but 
     the clarity of them.''
       Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD): October 17, 2007: ``I've been 
     very impressed by the direct answers that you've given to 
     very important questions.''

                               Exhibit 2


                           michael b. mukasey

     Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Hon. Dianne 
       Feinstein, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Hon. Benjamin L. 
       Cardin, Hon. Edward M. Kennedy, Hon. Herb Kohl, Hon. 
       Russell D. Feingold, Hon. Richard J. Durbin, Hon. Sheldon 
       Whitehouse,
       Dear Chairman Leahy, Senators Kennedy, Biden, Kohl, 
     Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, Durbin, Cardin and Whitehouse: 
     Thank you for your letter of October 23, 2007. I well 
     understand the concerns of the Senators who signed this 
     letter that this Country remain true to its ideals, and that 
     includes how we treat even the most brutal terrorists in U.S. 
     custody. I understand also the importance of the U.S. 
     remaining a nation of laws and setting a high standard of 
     respect for human rights. Indeed, I said at the hearing that 
     torture violates the law and the Constitution, and the 
     President may not authorize it as he is no less bound by 
     constitutional restrictions than any other government 
     official.
       I was asked at the hearing and in your letter questions 
     about the hypothetical use of certain coercive interrogation 
     techniques. As described in your letter, these techniques 
     seem over the line or, on a personal basis, repugnant to me, 
     and would probably seem the same to many Americans. But 
     hypotheticals are different from real life, and in any legal 
     opinion the actual facts and circumstances are critical. As a 
     judge, I tried to be objective in my decision-making and to 
     put aside even strongly held personal beliefs when assessing 
     a legal question because legal questions must be answered 
     based solely on the actual facts, circumstances, and legal 
     standards presented. A legal opinion based on hypothetical 
     facts and circumstances may be of some limited academic 
     appeal but has scant practical effect or value.

[[Page 28779]]

       I have said repeatedly, and reiterate here, that no one, 
     including a President, is above the law, and that I would 
     leave office sooner than participate in a violation of law. 
     If confirmed, any legal opinions I offer will reflect that I 
     appreciate the need for the United States to remain a nation 
     of laws and to set the highest standards. I will be mindful 
     also of our shared obligation to ensure that our Nation has 
     the tools it needs, within the law, to protect the American 
     people.
       Legal opinions should treat real issues. I have not been 
     briefed on techniques used in any classified interrogation 
     program conducted by any government agency. For me, then, 
     there is a real issue as to whether the techniques presented 
     and discussed at the hearing and in your letter are even part 
     of any program of questioning detainees. Although I have not 
     been cleared into the details of any such program, it is my 
     understanding that some Members of Congress, including those 
     on the intelligence committees, have been so cleared and have 
     been briefed on the specifics of a program run by the Central 
     Intelligence Agency (``CIA''). Those Members know the answer 
     to the question of whether the specific techniques presented 
     to me at the hearing and in your letter are part of the CIA's 
     program. I do not.
       I do know, however, that ``waterboarding'' cannot be used 
     by the United States military because its use by the military 
     would be a clear violation of the Detainee Treatment Act 
     (``DTA''). That is because ``water- boarding'' and certain 
     other coercive interrogation techniques are expressly 
     prohibited by the Army Field Manual on Intelligence 
     Interrogation, and Congress specifically legislated in the 
     DTA that no person in the custody or control of the 
     Department of Defense (``DOD'') or held in a DOD facility may 
     be subject to any interrogation techniques not authorized and 
     listed in the Manual.
       In the absence of legislation expressly banning certain 
     interrogation techniques in all circumstances, one must 
     consider whether a particular technique complies with 
     relevant legal standards. Below, I provide a summary of the 
     type of analysis that I would undertake, were I presented as 
     Attorney General with the question of whether coercive 
     interrogation techniques, including ``waterboarding'' as 
     described in your letter, would constitute torture, cruel, 
     inhuman or degrading treatment, or a violation of Common 
     Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
       The statutory elements of torture are set forth in 18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 2340. By the terms of the statute, whether a 
     particular technique is torture would turn principally on 
     whether it is specifically intended to cause (a) severe 
     physical pain or suffering, or (b) prolonged mental harm 
     resulting from certain specified threats or acts. If, after 
     being briefed, I determine that a particular technique 
     satisfies the elements of section 2340, I would conclude that 
     the technique violated the law.
       I note that the Department of Justice published its 
     interpretation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2340 in a December 30, 2004 
     memorandum to then-Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey, 
     which superseded the memorandum of August 1, 2002 that I 
     testified was a ``mistake.'' I understand that the December 
     30, 2004 memorandum remains the Department's prevailing 
     interpretation of section 2340. Although the December 30, 
     2004 memorandum to Mr. Comey does not discuss any specific 
     techniques, it does state that ``[w]hile we have identified 
     various disagreements with the August 2002 Memorandum, we 
     have reviewed this Office's prior opinions addressing issues 
     involving treatment of detainees and do not believe that any 
     of their conclusions would be different under the standards 
     set forth in this memorandum.''
       Even if a particular technique did not constitute torture 
     under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2340, I would have to consider also 
     whether it nevertheless would be prohibited as ``cruel, 
     inhuman or degrading treatment'' as set forth in the DTA and 
     the Military Commissions Act (``MCA'')--enacted after the 
     Department of Justice's December 30, 2004 memorandum to Mr. 
     Comey--which extended the Convention Against Torture's 
     prohibition on ``cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment'' to 
     individuals in United States custody regardless of location 
     or nationality. Congress specified in those statutes, as the 
     Senate had in consenting to the ratification of the 
     Convention Against Torture, that the Fifth, Eighth, and 
     Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution would control 
     our interpretation of the phrase ``cruel, inhuman or 
     degrading treatment.''
       The Fifth Amendment is likely most relevant to an inquiry 
     under the DTA and MCA into the lawfulness of an interrogation 
     technique used against alien enemy combatants held abroad, 
     and the Supreme Court has established the well-known ``shocks 
     the conscience'' to determine whether particular government 
     conduct is consistent with the Fifth Amendment's due process 
     guarantees. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 
     850 (1998); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952). A 
     legal opinion on whether any interrogation technique shocks 
     the conscience such that it constitutes cruel, inhuman or 
     degrading treatment requires an understanding of the relevant 
     facts and circumstances of the technique's past or proposed 
     use. This is the test mandated by the Supreme Court itself in 
     County of Sacramento v. Lewis in which it wrote that ``our 
     concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of 
     substantive due process demands an exact analysis of 
     circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as 
     conscience shocking.'' 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (emphasis 
     added). As the Supreme Court has explained, a court first 
     considers whether the conduct is ``arbitrary in the 
     constitutional sense,'' a test that asks whether the conduct 
     is proportionate to the governmental interests involved. Id. 
     at 847. In addition, the court must conduct an objective 
     inquiry into whether the conduct at issue is ``egregious'' or 
     ``outrageous'' in light of ``traditional executive behavior 
     and contemporary practices.'' Id. at 847 n.8. This inquiry 
     requires a review of executive practice so as to determine 
     what the United States has traditionally considered to be out 
     of bounds, and it makes clear that there are some acts that 
     would be prohibited regardless of the surrounding 
     circumstances.
       I would have to ensure also that any technique complies 
     with our Nation's obligations under the Geneva Conventions, 
     including those acts, such as murder, mutilation, rape, and 
     cruel or inhuman treatment, that Congress has forbidden as 
     grave breaches of Common Article 3 under the War Crimes Act. 
     With respect to any coercive interrogation technique, the 
     prohibition on ``cruel or inhuman treatment'' would be of 
     particular relevance. That statute, similar in structure to 
     18 U.S.C. Sec. 2340, prohibits acts intended (a) to cause 
     serious physical pain or suffering, or (b) serious and non-
     transitory mental harm resulting from certain specific 
     threats or acts. Also, I would have to consider whether there 
     would be a violation of the additional prohibitions imposed 
     by Executive Order 13440, which includes a prohibition of 
     willful and outrageous personal abuse inflicted for the 
     purpose of humiliating and degrading the detainee.
       As I testified, any discussion of coercive interrogation 
     techniques necessarily involves a discussion of and a choice 
     among bad alternatives. I was and remain loath to discuss and 
     opine on any of those alternatives at this stage for the 
     following three principal reasons: First, to repeat, I have 
     not been made aware of the details of any interrogation 
     program to the extent that any such program may be 
     classified, and thus do not know what techniques may be 
     involved in any such program that some may find analogous or 
     comparable to the coercive techniques presented to me at the 
     hearing and in your letter. Second, I would not want any 
     uninformed statement of mine made during a confirmation 
     process to present our own professional interrogators in the 
     field, who must perform their duty under the most stressful 
     conditions, or those charged with reviewing their conduct, 
     with a perceived threat that any conduct of theirs, past or 
     present, that was based on authorizations supported by the 
     Department of Justice could place them in personal legal 
     jeopardy. Third, for the reasons that I believe our 
     intelligence community has explained in detail, I would not 
     want any statement of mine to provide our enemies with a 
     window into the limits or contours of any interrogation 
     program we may have in place and thereby assist them in 
     training to resist the techniques we actually may use.
       I emphasize in closing this answer that nothing set forth 
     above, or in my testimony, should be read as an approval of 
     the interrogation techniques presented to me at the hearing 
     or in your letter, or any comparable technique. Some of you 
     told me at the hearing or in private meetings that you hoped 
     and expected that, if confirmed, I would exercise my 
     independent judgment when providing advice to the President, 
     regardless of whether that advice was what the President 
     wanted to hear. I told you that it would be irresponsible for 
     me to do anything less. It would be no less irresponsible for 
     me to seek confirmation by providing an uninformed legal 
     opinion based on hypothetical facts and circumstances.
       As I testified, if confirmed I will review any coercive 
     interrogation techniques currently used by the United States 
     Government and the legal analysis authorizing their use to 
     assess whether such techniques comply with the law. If, after 
     such a review, I determine that any technique is unlawful, I 
     will not hesitate to so advise the President and will rescind 
     or correct any legal opinion of the Department of Justice 
     that supports use of the technique. I view this as entirely 
     consistent with my commitment to provide independent judgment 
     on all issues. That is my commitment and pledge to the 
     President, to the Congress, and to the American people. Each 
     and all should expect no less from their Attorney General.

           Sincerely,
                                               Michael B. Mukasey.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The Senator from Texas is 
recognized.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, may I inquire how much more time this side 
of the aisle has in morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas would have 12 minutes.

[[Page 28780]]



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