[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 28153-28154]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to bring the attention of the 
Senate to a provision of the fiscal year 08 Defense Authorization Act, 
now in conference. Section 3122 of the bill undermines the Senate's 
position on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, without 
the benefit of neither the historical treaty consideration process nor 
a senous policy debate.
  It has been 9 years since the CTBT was the subject of any 
deliberation by the Senate, which ultimately concluded that its 
ratification was not in the Nation's interests. There were numerous 
objections that proved determinative then and remain true today.
  First, the U.S. deterrent cannot be maintained without testing. U.S. 
nuclear weapons have the highest average age of any in the world. Some, 
like the B-61 warhead, the backbone of the submarine-based component of 
our nuclear triad, date back to 1966, making them more than four times 
as old as the average American car.
  Given the high average age, now at its highest point in the six 
decade history of nuclear weapons, they require substantial, ongoing 
modification if they are to be maintained as a viable deterrent. As the 
then-Director of Sandia National Laboratories, Dr. C. Paul Robinson, 
testified to the Senate, ``To forego validation through testing is, in 
short, to live with uncertainty.'' We cannot afford uncertainty when it 
comes to the reliability, safety, and credibility of our most important 
weaponry.
  Some believe that the reliable replacement warhead, RRW, can be 
developed and introduced without underground testing. Even if that 
judgment proves correct, it will be many years before we no longer need 
to rely on the older designs in the current arsenal for deterrence. As 
the administration noted in a recent statement by Secretaries Bodman, 
Gates, and Rice, ``delays on RRW also raise the prospect of having to 
return to underground nuclear testing to certify existing weapons.'' 
But, underground testing would be an option permanently denied to the 
United States through ratification of CTBT as section 3122 endorses.
  This permanent loss of the testing option would be even more 
problematic if we need to continue to rely on these aging designs for 
decades more as we would if current plans, including those passed by 
the House and proposed in the Senate, that eliminate RRW funding are 
not rejected.
  Further, the cuts proposed to RRW compound the impact of current 
plans to cut more than $500 million in funding for the nuclear weapons 
complex that supports, maintains, and refurbishes the weapons currently 
in the complex. These proposed cuts to RRW and the nuclear weapons 
complex have been rejected by individuals of great authority, including 
Secretaries Kissinger and Schultz, and Dr. Sidney Drell.
  The second reason the Senate rejected the treaty in 1999, and would 
do

[[Page 28154]]

so again today, is that the treaty is not verifiable. Militarily 
significant covert nuclear testing can--and almost certainly will--be 
conducted at low yields or in other ways aimed at masking the force of 
an explosion.
  Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter of the State Department's Bureau 
of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation recently made this 
point. She stated that the International Monitoring System set up to 
monitor compliance with CTBT is ``aimed to detect detonations over 1 
kiloton; smaller or concealed detonations are less likely to be 
identified. Evasion techniques can easily reduce the signature of a 
nuclear explosion by factors of 50 or 100.''
  Third, CTBT's unverifiability means a ban will not have uniform 
effects. Our inability under CTBT to monitor the state of foreign 
nuclear weapons programs effectively means that hostile or potentially 
hostile countries will be able to modernize their weapons even as the 
U.S. arsenal steadily degrades. As a result, the long-term effect of 
CTBT accession would translate into the inevitable, if gradual, 
unilateral disarmament of our Nation's deterrent.
  Fourth, CTBT would damage the struggle against proliferation. On the 
one hand, the inherent unverifiability of the CTBT can be expected to 
encourage rogue state regimes to believe they could pursue nuclear 
weapons programs with impunity. On the other, the attendant erosion of 
our deterrent would mean that allied countries--notably, Japan, Taiwan 
and perhaps South Korea--that currently rely on the U.S. deterrent 
``umbrella'' would be more likely to develop their own nuclear weapons.
  As Dr. James Schlesinger remarked in testimony before the Armed 
Services Committee in 1999, ``the chief barrier to proliferation in 
these last 55 years since Hiroshima has been confidence in the 
protection offered by the American deterrent. It is the reason, quite 
simply, that nations like [South] Korea or Japan, or more complicated, 
in the case of Germany, have not sought nuclear weapons. Because of the 
NATO agreement, because of the Japan Treaty, because of our agreements 
with the Koreans, they have not felt the necessity of taking that final 
plunge. As confidence on their part in the U.S. deterrent wanes over a 
period of . . . years, what is the likelihood that those nations will 
refrain from seeking nuclear weapons? I think that it is very modest.''
  Finally, the Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999 because it realized 
that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, SSP, is a ``crap-shoot,'' as 
Troy Wade, a retired Department of Energy nuclear scientist, referred 
to it in his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations in 
1999. It remains doubtful whether the SSP, supported by CTBT advocates 
as a substitute for nuclear testing, can adequately meet the 
maintenance and refurbishment needs of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a 
result, it will become ever more likely that dangerous anomalies in our 
weapons will pass unnoticed.
  Despite these abiding concerns and the Senate vote in 1999, the 2008 
Defense authorization bill would put the Senate on record in support of 
CTBT's ratification without hearings or debate. How can new Senators--
37 since 1999--be expected to have reached such a conclusion?
  Preordaining the ratification of a treaty, as is done in section 3122 
of this bill, does a disservice to the Senate's history of thoughtful 
consideration of treaties proposed for ratification, especially when 
the treaties were on issues with the gravity of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
  I would be remiss if I didn't reference the comments of Secretary of 
State Rice in a recent letter. She stated that the administration does 
not support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and ``does not 
intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification.''
  I also call the attention of the Senate to the Statement of 
Administration Policy on this bill which states strong opposition to 
section 3122 due to its dangerous implications for the reliability of 
our nuclear deterrent.
  Mr. President, I note that these are not simply the concerns of this 
Senator. The letter I will ask to have printed in the Congressional 
Record makes clear that 40 of my fellow Senators share many of these 
concerns about the CTBT and the unprecedented approach taken by this 
bill. My colleagues recognize as I do that since the reasons for the 
rejection of this treaty in 1999 have not changed, neither should the 
Senate's position.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the letter to which I 
just referred printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, October 23, 2007.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Levin: One of the Senate's most important 
     national security debates of the last decade was whether to 
     ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In 
     the end, following a rigorous and thorough debate, 51 
     Senators voted to reject the CTBT, 17 more than necessary to 
     assure its defeat.
       The principal reasons the Senate rejected the CTBT were its 
     lack of verifiability, adverse effect on the safety and 
     reliability of our nuclear stockpile, and potential to 
     increase nuclear proliferation.
       We are not aware of any congressional hearings on this 
     treaty since its rejection in 1999. The total absence of 
     discussion in the more than eight years since its rejection 
     belies the assertion in section 3122 of S. 1547 that the CTBT 
     now should be ratified. Moreover, the 37 Senators who have 
     joined the Senate since this treaty was rejected deserve to 
     have the benefit of a careful and measured review of this 
     treaty. There is no basis on which they can conclude that 
     CTBT should be ratified.
       The Constitution of the United States invests an 
     extraordinary responsibility in the Senate to provide 
     measured and thoughtful review of treaties when submitted by 
     the President for our consideration. The Senate has not had 
     the opportunity for such review since 1999. In a recent 
     letter, Secretary of State Rice stated that the 
     Administration does not support the Comprehensive Nuclear-
     Test-Ban Treaty and ``does not intend to seek Senate advice 
     and consent to its ratification.'' The Statement of 
     Administration Policy on S. 1547 likewise states strong 
     opposition to section 3122 due to its dangerous implications 
     for the reliability of our nuclear deterrent.
       Under all of these circumstances, we believe it denigrates 
     the serious role of the U.S. Senate to claim in section 3122 
     to express the ``sense of the Congress'' that the CTBT should 
     be ratified.
           Sincerely,
         Jon Kyl, John McCain, Johnny Isakson, James Inhofe, Mike 
           Crapo, Wayne Allard, Jeff Sessions, Michael B. Enzi, 
           Sam Brownback, C.S. Bond, Larry E. Craig, Bob Corker, 
           Saxby Chambliss, John Thune, Trent Lott, John Cornyn, 
           Jim DeMint, Jim Bunning, David Vitter, John Ensign, Kay 
           Bailey Hutchison, Ted Stevens, Pete V. Domenici, 
           Olympia Snowe, Mitch McConnell, Elizabeth Dole, John 
           Barrasso, Richard C. Shelby, Thad Cochran, Chuck 
           Grassley, Norm Coleman, Mel Martinez, Tom Coburn, 
           Lindsay Graham, Lisa Murkowski, Richard Burr, John E. 
           Sununu, Judd Gregg, Orin Hatch, Lamar Alexander, Pat 
           Roberts.

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