[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 20]
[House]
[Pages 27471-27482]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          RESTORE ACT OF 2007

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 746, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 3773) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions 
of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes, and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3773

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, 
     Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 
     2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States 
              persons outside the United States.
Sec. 3. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 8. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of 
              United States persons.
Sec. 9. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign 
              intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 10. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic 
              surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign 
              intelligence information.
Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 12. Sunset; transition procedures.

     SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                       OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105A.  (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a court 
     order is not required for the acquisition of the contents of 
     any communication between persons that are not United States 
     persons and are not located within the United States for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information, 
     without respect to whether the communication passes through 
     the United States or the surveillance device is located 
     within the United States.
       ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside 
     of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance 
     that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of 
     a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States and not a United States person for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as 
     defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by 
     targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
       ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 
     105B; or
       ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 
     105 or 105C.''.

     SEC. 3. PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


   ``PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
        UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105B.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the 
     court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, 
     or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up 
     to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that 
     are reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
     paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those 
     persons.
       ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under 
     subsection (a) shall include--
       ``(1) a certification by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
       ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,

[[Page 27472]]

     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications; and
       ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
       ``(2) a description of--
       ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the 
     duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable 
     belief that the targets of the acquisition are persons that 
     are located outside the United States and not United States 
     persons;
       ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the 
     identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition 
     will be directed;
       ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with 
     respect to such acquisition; and
       ``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an 
     application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required 
     by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to conduct 
     electronic surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be 
     located in the United States.
       ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under 
     subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be 
     directed.
       ``(d) Review of Application.--Not later than 15 days after 
     a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the 
     judge shall review such application and shall approve the 
     application if the judge finds that--
       ``(1) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection 
     (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(2) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(3) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is 
     filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, 
     when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic 
     surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in 
     the United States.
       ``(e) Order.--
       ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under 
     subsection (d) shall issue an order--
       ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the 
     communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
       ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or 
     custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service 
     provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
     the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with 
     the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or 
     agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of 
     the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved 
     by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the 
     aid furnished;
       ``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
       ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for 
     providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to 
     such order; and
       ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing 
     the person to comply with the order to such person; and
       ``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
       ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as 
     proposed or as modified by the judge;
       ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; 
     and
       ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     as proposed or as modified by the judge.
       ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with 
     an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may 
     invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) 
     to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order 
     of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of 
     court. Any process under this section may be served in any 
     judicial district in which the person may be found.
       ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, 
     no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person 
     for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in 
     accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
       ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the court established under subsection 
     103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a 
     period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such 
     order is issued.
       ``(5) Assessment of compliance with minimization 
     procedures.--At or before the end of the period of time for 
     which an acquisition is approved by an order or an extension 
     under this section, the judge may assess compliance with the 
     minimization procedures referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(ii) 
     and the guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(iii) by 
     reviewing the circumstances under which information 
     concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or 
     disseminated.''.

     SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
        UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105C.  (a) Application After Emergency 
     Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 
     7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section, 
     an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in 
     accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge 
     referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval 
     of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
       ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information for a period 
     of not more than 45 days if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General jointly determine that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an 
     authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an 
     order approving the acquisition under such section can with 
     due diligence be obtained;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(D) there are reasonable procedures in place for 
     determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
     information under this section will be acquired by targeting 
     only persons that are reasonably believed to be located 
     outside the United States and not United States persons;
       ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications;
       ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
       ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to 
     such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that 
     an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise 
     required by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to 
     conduct electronic surveillance of a person reasonably 
     believed to be located in the United States; and
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having 
     jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at 
     the time of the authorization under this section that the 
     decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information.
       ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
     Pursuant to an authorization of an acquisition under this 
     section, the Attorney General may direct a communications 
     service provider, custodian, or an officer, employee, or 
     agent of such service provider or custodian, who has the 
     lawful authority to access the information, facilities, or 
     technical assistance necessary to accomplish such acquisition 
     to--
       ``(1) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner 
     that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce 
     a minimum of interference with the services that provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the 
     target of the acquisition; and
       ``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid 
     furnished.''.

     SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by

[[Page 27473]]

     inserting after section 105C the following new section:


  ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES 
              PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105D.  (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not 
     later than 7 days after an application is submitted under 
     section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress--
       ``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the 
     application, including the certification made under section 
     105B(b)(1); and
       ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, 
     including the procedures and guidelines referred to in 
     section 105B(e)(1)(E).
       ``(b) Quarterly Audits.--
       ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall 
     complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance 
     with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) 
     the results of such audit, including, for each order 
     authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under 
     section 105B--
       ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such 
     order that were later determined to be located in the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such order;
       ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated 
     containing information on a United States person that was 
     collected under such order; and
       ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose 
     communications were acquired under such order.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion 
     of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the 
     court established under section 103(a) a report containing 
     the results of such audit.
       ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days 
     thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under 
     section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a 
     report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the 
     previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this 
     section shall include a description of any incidents of non-
     compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), 
     including incidents of non-compliance by--
       ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
       ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
       ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with 
     guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
       ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under such order.
       ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
     containing the number of emergency authorizations of 
     acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any 
     incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization 
     under such section.
       ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' 
     means--
       ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.''.

     SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

       Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) In any case where the court established under 
     subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review 
     a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of 
     the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any 
     orders related to such matter.''.

     SEC. 7. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs 
     of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of 
     communications conducted without a court order on or after 
     September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance 
     Program referred to by the President in a radio address on 
     December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all 
     documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda 
     concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations 
     of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, 
     and court orders.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report 
     containing the results of such audit, including all documents 
     acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the 
     investigation and adjudication of an application by the 
     Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a 
     security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit 
     under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as 
     possible.

     SEC. 8. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop 
     and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track 
     of--
       (1) the instances where the identity of a United States 
     person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an 
     element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
     that collected the communications to other departments or 
     agencies of the United States; and
       (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created 
     under subsection (a), including the number of instances 
     referred to in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

       There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of 
     Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector 
     General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and 
     other appropriate elements of the National Security Division, 
     and the National Security Agency such sums as may be 
     necessary to meet the personnel and information technology 
     demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of--
       (1) applications and other submissions to the court 
     established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
       (2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
       (A) section 105D of such Act; and
       (B) section 7; and
       (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements 
     under section 8.

     SEC. 10. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH 
                   ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR 
                   GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of 
     gathering foreign intelligence information.
       (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
     Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory 
     authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an 
     amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific 
     statutory authorization shall be the only exception to 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the 
     following new items:

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United 
              States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.

[[Page 27474]]

``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of persons 
              located outside of the United States.''.
       (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
       (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America 
     Act.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 
     110-55) are hereby repealed.

     SEC. 12. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     effective on December 31, 2009--
       (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) are hereby repealed; and
       (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 
     is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 
     105B, 105C, and 105D.
       (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any 
     authorization or order issued under section 105B of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 
     this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in 
     effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization 
     or order.
       (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
       (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this 
     Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall 
     remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such 
     authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of 
     enactment, whichever is earlier.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 
     110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in 
     accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, 
     including--
       (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 
     105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be 
     located in the United States;
       (B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such section;
       (C) the number of reports disseminated containing 
     information on a United States person that was collected 
     under such section;
       (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based 
     upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition 
     authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
       (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with 
     an authorization under such section, including incidents of 
     non-compliance by--
       (i) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
       (ii) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of 
     such section; and
       (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
       (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 746, in lieu of 
the amendments recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence printed in the bill, the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part A of House 
Report 110-385, modified by the amendment printed in part B of the 
report, is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 3773

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, 
     Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 
     2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States 
              persons outside the United States.
Sec. 3. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States who 
              may be communicating with persons inside the United 
              States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters.
Sec. 8. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic 
              surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign 
              intelligence information.
Sec. 9. Enhancement of electronic surveillance authority in wartime and 
              other collection.
Sec. 10. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 11. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of 
              United States persons.
Sec. 12. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign 
              intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 13. Document management system for applications for orders 
              approving electronic surveillance.
Sec. 14. Training of intelligence community personnel in foreign 
              intelligence collection matters.
Sec. 15. Information for Congress on the terrorist surveillance program 
              and similar programs.
Sec. 16. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 17. Sunset; transition procedures.

     SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                       OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, a court order is not required for electronic 
     surveillance directed at the acquisition of the contents of 
     any communication between persons that are not known to be 
     United States persons and are reasonably believed to be 
     located outside the United States for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information, without respect 
     to whether the communication passes through the United States 
     or the surveillance device is located within the United 
     States.
       ``(2) Treatment of inadvertent interceptions.--If 
     electronic surveillance referred to in paragraph (1) 
     inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one 
     party to the communication is located inside the United 
     States or is a United States person, the contents of such 
     communication shall be handled in accordance with 
     minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General that 
     require that no contents of any communication to which a 
     United States person is a party shall be disclosed, 
     disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer 
     than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is 
     obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the 
     information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 
     harm to any person.
       ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside 
     of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance 
     that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of 
     a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States and not a United States person for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as 
     defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by 
     targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
       ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 
     105B; or
       ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 
     105 or 105C.''.

     SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
                   COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:

[[Page 27475]]




  ``ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
  UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
          COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105B.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the 
     court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, 
     or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up 
     to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that 
     are reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
     paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those 
     persons.
       ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under 
     subsection (a) shall include--
       ``(1) a certification by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
       ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 
     who may be communicating with persons inside the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications; and
       ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
       ``(2) a description of--
       ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the 
     duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable 
     belief that the persons that are the targets of the 
     acquisition are located outside the United States and not 
     United States persons;
       ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the 
     identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition 
     will be directed;
       ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with 
     respect to such acquisition; and
       ``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an 
     application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required 
     by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition is 
     to acquire the communications of a specific United States 
     person reasonably believed to be located in the United 
     States.
       ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under 
     subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be 
     directed.
       ``(d) Review of ``Application; Appeals.--
       ``(1) Review of application.--Not later than 15 days after 
     a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the 
     judge shall review such application and shall approve the 
     application if the judge finds that--
       ``(A) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection 
     (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(B) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(C) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is 
     filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, 
     when a significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire 
     the communications of a specific United States person 
     reasonably believed to be located in the United States.
       ``(2) Temporary order; appeals.--
       ``(A) Temporary order.--A judge denying an application 
     under paragraph (1) may, at the application of the United 
     States, issue a temporary order to authorize an acquisition 
     under section 105B in accordance with the application 
     submitted under subsection (a) during the pendency of any 
     appeal of the denial of such application.
       ``(B) Appeals.--The United States may appeal the denial of 
     an application for an order under paragraph (1) or a 
     temporary order under subparagraph (A) in accordance with 
     section 103.
       ``(e) Order.--
       ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under 
     subsection (d) shall issue an order--
       ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the 
     communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
       ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or 
     custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service 
     provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
     the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with 
     the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or 
     agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of 
     the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved 
     by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the 
     aid furnished;
       ``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
       ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for 
     providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to 
     such order;
       ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing 
     the person to comply with the order to such person; and
       ``(iii) a certification stating that the acquisition is 
     authorized under this section and that all requirements of 
     this section have been met; and''.
       ``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
       ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as 
     proposed or as modified by the judge;
       ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; 
     and
       ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     as proposed or as modified by the judge.
       ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with 
     an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may 
     invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) 
     to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order 
     of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of 
     court. Any process under this section may be served in any 
     judicial district in which the person may be found.
       ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, 
     no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person 
     for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in 
     accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
       ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the court established under subsection 
     103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a 
     period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such 
     order is issued.
       ``(5) Assessment of compliance with court order.--At or 
     before the end of the period of time for which an acquisition 
     is approved by an order or an extension under this section, 
     the court established under section 103(a) shall, not less 
     frequently than once each quarter, assess compliance with the 
     procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E) and 
     review the circumstances under which information concerning 
     United States persons was acquired, retained, or 
     disseminated.''.

     SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
                   COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
  UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
          COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105C.  (a) Application After Emergency 
     Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 
     7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section, 
     an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in 
     accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge 
     referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval 
     of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
       ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information (as defined 
     in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) for a period of 
     not more than 45 days if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General jointly determine that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an 
     authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an 
     order approving the acquisition under such section can with 
     due diligence be obtained;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 
     who may be communicating with persons inside the United 
     States;
       ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(D) there are procedures in place that will be used by 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General during the duration of the authorization to determine 
     if there is a reasonable belief that the persons

[[Page 27476]]

     that are the targets of the acquisition are located outside 
     the United States and not United States persons;
       ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications;
       ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
       ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to 
     such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that 
     an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise 
     required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an 
     acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific 
     United States person reasonably believed to be located in the 
     United States; and
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having 
     jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at 
     the time of the authorization under this section that the 
     decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information.
       ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
       ``(1) Directive.--Pursuant to an authorization of an 
     acquisition under this section, the Attorney General may 
     direct a communications service provider, custodian, or an 
     officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or 
     custodian, who has the lawful authority to access the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish such acquisition to--
       ``(A) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner 
     that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce 
     a minimum of interference with the services that provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the 
     target of the acquisition; and
       ``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished.
       ``(2) Parameters; certifications.--The Attorney General 
     shall provide to any person directed to provide assistance 
     under paragraph (1) with--
       ``(A) a document setting forth the parameters of the 
     directive;
       ``(B) a certification stating that--
       ``(i) the emergency authorization has been issued pursuant 
     to this section;
       ``(ii) all requirements of this section have been met;
       ``(iii) a judge has been informed of the emergency 
     authorization in accordance with subsection (b)(2); and
       ``(iv) an application will be submitted in accordance with 
     subsection (a); and
       ``(C) a certification that the recipient of the directive 
     shall be compensated, at the prevailing rate, for providing 
     information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such 
     directive.''.

     SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH 
                   PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     105C the following new section:


  ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES 
 PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING 
                 WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105D.  (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not 
     later than 7 days after an application is submitted under 
     section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress--
       ``(1) in the case of an application--
       ``(A) a copy of the application, including the 
     certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and
       ``(B) a description of the primary purpose of the 
     acquisition for which the application is submitted; and
       ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, 
     including the procedures and guidelines referred to in 
     section 105B(e)(1)(E).
       ``(b) Regular Audits.--
       ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall 
     complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance 
     with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) 
     the results of such audit, including, for each order 
     authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under 
     section 105B--
       ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such 
     order that were later determined to be located in the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such order;
       ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated 
     containing information on a United States person that was 
     collected under such order; and
       ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose 
     communications were acquired under such order.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion 
     of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the 
     court established under section 103(a) a report containing 
     the results of such audit.
       ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days 
     thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under 
     section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a 
     report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the 
     previous period. Each report submitted under this section 
     shall include a description of any incidents of non-
     compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), 
     including incidents of non-compliance by--
       ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
       ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
       ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with 
     guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
       ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under such order.
       ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
     containing the number of emergency authorizations of 
     acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any 
     incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization 
     under such section.
       ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' 
     means--
       ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.''.

     SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

       Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) In any case where the court established under 
     subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review 
     a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of 
     the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any 
     orders related to such matter.''.

     SEC. 7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT MATTERS.

       (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803(a)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
       (2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)--
       (A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and
       (B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United 
     States judicial circuits''; and
       (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and 
     indenting such paragraph, as so designated, two ems from the 
     left margin.
       (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section 
     is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as 
     designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to 
     approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to 
     section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than 
     24 hours after the receipt of such application by the 
     court.''.

     SEC. 8. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH 
                   ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR 
                   GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of 
     gathering foreign intelligence information.

[[Page 27477]]

       (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
     Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory 
     authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an 
     amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific 
     statutory authorization shall be the only exception to 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 9. ENHANCEMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY IN 
                   WARTIME AND OTHER COLLECTION.

        Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are 
     amended by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``Congress or 
     an authorization for the use of military force described in 
     section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 
     1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific 
     authorization for foreign intelligence collection under this 
     section, or if the Congress is unable to convene because of 
     an attack upon the United States.''.

     SEC. 10. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs 
     of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of 
     communications conducted without a court order on or after 
     September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance 
     Program referred to by the President in a radio address on 
     December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all 
     documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda 
     concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations 
     of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, 
     and court orders.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report 
     containing the results of such audit, including all documents 
     acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the 
     investigation and adjudication of an application by the 
     Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a 
     security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit 
     under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as 
     possible.

     SEC. 11. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop 
     and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track 
     of--
       (1) the instances where the identity of a United States 
     person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an 
     element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
     that collected the communications to other departments or 
     agencies of the United States; and
       (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created 
     under subsection (a), including the number of instances 
     referred to in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 12. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office 
     of the Inspector General, the appropriate elements of the 
     National Security Division, and the National Security Agency 
     such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and 
     information technology demands to ensure the timely and 
     efficient processing of--
       (1) applications and other submissions to the court 
     established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
       (2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
       (A) section 105D of such Act; and
       (B) section 10; and
       (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements 
     under section 11.
       (b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration 
     of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance 
     and Physical Search.--
       (1) National security division of the department of 
     justice.--
       (A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division 
     of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such 
     additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the 
     prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of 
     applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence 
     purposes.
       (B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign 
     personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among 
     appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined 
     in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly 
     assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing 
     applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt 
     and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies 
     under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders.
       (2) Director of national intelligence.--
       (A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional 
     legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out 
     the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders 
     under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign 
     intelligence purposes.
       (B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and 
     among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), 
     including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly 
     assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing 
     applications described in that paragraph.
       (3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign 
     intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized 
     for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) 
     such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to 
     facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court 
     of applications under such Act for orders under such Act 
     approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
     purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall 
     perform such duties relating to the consideration of such 
     applications as that court shall direct.
       (4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by 
     this section are in addition to any other personnel 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 13. DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR APPLICATIONS FOR 
                   ORDERS APPROVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and 
     implement a secure, classified document management system 
     that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review 
     by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security 
     Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States 
     Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their 
     submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
       (b) Scope of System.--The document management system 
     required by subsection (a) shall--
       (1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of 
     applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and
       (2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel 
     submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and 
     provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of 
     all such applications and related matters with the court and 
     for their secure transmission to the National Archives and 
     Records Administration.

     SEC. 14. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL IN 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MATTERS.

       The Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General--
       (1) develop regulations to establish procedures for 
     conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance, 
     physical search, and the installation and use of pen 
     registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis, 
     and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving 
     applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978; and
       (2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the 
     personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))).

     SEC. 15. INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS ON THE TERRORIST 
                   SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND SIMILAR PROGRAMS.

       As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the 
     President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate on the following:

[[Page 27478]]

       (1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National 
     Security Agency.
       (2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until 
     the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part 
     or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States 
     persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or 
     other purposes, and which is conducted by any department, 
     agency, or other element of the United States Government, or 
     by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or 
     other element of the United States Government, without fully 
     complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States 
     Code.

     SEC. 16. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the 
     following new items:

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United 
              States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States who 
              may be communicating with persons inside the United 
              States.''.

       (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
       (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act 
     of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public 
     Law 110-55) are hereby repealed.

     SEC. 17. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     effective on December 31, 2009--
       (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) are hereby repealed; and
       (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 
     is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 
     105B, 105C, and 105D.
       (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any 
     authorization or order issued under section 105B of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 
     this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in 
     effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization 
     or order.
       (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
       (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this 
     Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall 
     remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such 
     authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of 
     enactment, whichever is earlier.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 
     110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in 
     accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, 
     including--
       (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 
     105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be 
     located in the United States;
       (B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such section;
       (C) the number of reports disseminated containing 
     information on a United States person that was collected 
     under such section;
       (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based 
     upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition 
     authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
       (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with 
     an authorization under such section, including incidents of 
     non-compliance by--
       (i) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
       (ii) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of 
     such section; and
       (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
       (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)).

     SEC. __. CERTIFICATION TO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS 
                   THAT ACQUISITIONS ARE AUTHORIZED UNDER FISA.

       (a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and 
     inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such 
     carrier with a certification stating that the electronic 
     surveillance is authorized under this section and that all 
     requirements of this section have been met''.
       (b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting ``;'';
       (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting 
     ``aid; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord, 
     custodian, or other person with a certification stating that 
     the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section 
     and that all requirements of this section have been met.''.

     SEC. __. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be 
     prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense under this 
     section unless the indictment is found or the information is 
     instituted not later than 10 years after the commission of 
     the offense.''.
       (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations 
     applicable to that offense has not run as of such date.

     SEC. __. NO RIGHTS UNDER THE RESTORE ACT FOR UNLAWFUL 
                   RESIDENTS.

       Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act 
     shall be construed to prevent lawfully conducted surveillance 
     of or grant any rights to an alien not lawfully permitted to 
     be in or remain in the United States.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Debate shall not exceed 90 minutes, with 60 
minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 30 minutes 
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Smith) each will control 30 minutes and the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each 
will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).

                              {time}  1230


                             General Leave

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material for the Record on H.R. 3773.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, 6 years ago the administration unilaterally chose to 
engage in warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court 
review. That decision created a legal and political quagmire. To fight 
terrorism and prevent another 9/11, we need to have an effective and 
legal system of intelligence gathering. That is what we are here to do 
today.
  When that old scheme broke down, the administration then forced 
Congress to accept an equally flawed statute in August, the Protect 
America Act. The Protect America Act granted broad, new powers to 
engage in

[[Page 27479]]

warrantless searches within the United States, including physical 
searches of our homes, computers, offices, libraries and medical 
records. There was a valiant fight against it, but we did not prevail.
  Mr. Speaker, at this time I want to acknowledge the great work of the 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes, for what he 
did, and on the Judiciary Committee I am quite proud of Jerry Nadler of 
New York, the chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, and Sheila 
Jackson-Lee, the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas. Also the 
chairman of the Crime subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia.
  The PATRIOT Act granted broad new powers to engage in warrantless 
searches within the United States. It included, as I said, physical 
searches of our homes, of our computers, offices, libraries, and even 
medical records. The law contained no meaningful oversight whatsoever 
and went around the FISA Court. It should not be made permanent. That 
is why we are here today with the RESTORE Act, to create a framework 
for legal surveillance that includes the FISA Court.
  Careful consideration by the Judiciary and by the Intelligence 
Committees addresses the need for flexibility in intelligence gathering 
and delivers the ability to deal with the modern communications 
networks. More importantly, it is consistent with the rule of law, the 
Constitution, and our democratic values.
  Let's be clear about how the RESTORE Act's ``basket'' court orders 
work. These orders are not individual warrants for Osama bin Laden or 
other terrorists. They allow surveillance of an entire terrorist group 
or other foreign power through a flexible court process. This act 
prohibits reverse targeting to engage in warrantless spying on 
Americans. In approving the order, the court must also approve the 
guidelines and procedures that will be used to protect the rights of 
Americans under the Constitution and under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.
  When the intelligence community turns its attention to Americans at 
home, they will have to get a warrant. That isn't just good policy; 
this is the critically important fourth amendment in action. So RESTORE 
even brings the court into the emergency provisions. NSA must notify 
the court when they start emergency acquisition, and they must seek a 
court order within seven days. This is not a secret process. The court 
knows when it is started and is awaiting the application.
  Mr. Speaker, the phone company can't even turn on the switch unless 
it has a certification from the government that they are actively 
seeking that court order. If the application is turned down, the 
surveillance shuts off, unless the court specifically stays their 
ruling, pending appeal. That appeal must be resolved within 45 days. 
These emergency authorizations are not a backdoor way to avoid court 
review. In fact, the court will be looking at the emergency from the 
very first day.
  The bill also provides other critical safeguards: periodic audits by 
the inspector general; narrow scope of authority to security threats, 
not just anything. It protects privacy of Americans traveling abroad 
and, most important, sunsets the legislation in December of the year 
2009 so that we can review it one more time.
  Importantly, the bill has no retroactive immunity for 
telecommunications carriers whatsoever. Why? Because we have been 
refused the documents to determine whether retroactive immunity has any 
place or not. Interestingly enough, that was delivered to the Senate. 
They have the documents. We, begging, pleading, screaming, we don't 
have the documents. So no retroactive immunity. Until we receive these 
underlying documents, there is no way we can begin any consideration of 
that request. So the legislation before us today is a very, very 
important start-over improving the measure, the Protect America Act, 
that still exists.
  Please join with me in a careful consideration of everything in this 
measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, the Democratic leadership calls the RESTORE Act of 2007 
a compromise. Well, I agree. It compromises our national security.
  Why do Democrats want to make it more difficult to gather 
intelligence about terrorists after 9/11 than before 
9/11? Since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted 30 
years ago, our terrorist fighting agencies have been able to gather 
information about terrorists without obtaining a court order. Why 
burden our intelligence agencies now? Why make it harder to find Osama 
bin Laden? Why protect terrorists?
  This bill, for the first time, requires a court order to monitor 
foreign persons outside the United States. If Osama bin Laden makes a 
call and we don't know who it is to, a court order must be obtained. 
That takes many hours and could well mean we miss an opportunity to 
stop an attack.
  The bill omits liability protection for telephone companies that 
provided the Federal Government with critical information after 9/11. 
These companies deserve our thanks, not a flurry of frivolous lawsuits.
  The bill sunsets in 4 years, yet our agencies need certainty and 
permanence so they can develop new procedures and train employees.
  Mr. Speaker, we don't need the RESTORE Act. We do need to restore the 
ability of the Federal Government to gather information about 
terrorists and to stop them.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the minority whip, the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, the law in place today, the law that we brought up to 
today's technical standards in August, is essentially the law that the 
Congress passed in 1978, a Congress that had a majority of Democrats in 
it. Jimmy Carter, President Carter, signed that bill, and it has worked 
for 30 years now.
  The way this bill is drafted, the administration would be forced to 
seek warrants, as Mr. Smith just said, for foreign targets in case they 
might call the United States. If Osama bin Laden calls the United 
States, we should know it. If Osama bin Laden calls and it turns out to 
be a call that didn't matter, there are ways to minimize that. In all 
likelihood, if Osama bin Laden called, it shouldn't be a matter that we 
shouldn't know about. If he calls to order a pizza and says ``deliver 
the pizza to cave 56 in Bora Bora,'' that is something we ought to know 
at that minute. We should not have to go to court to monitor these 
calls, just in case they call somebody in the United States.
  Granting what in essence is de facto fourth amendment constitutional 
rights to noncitizens who are not in this country makes no sense at 
all. It is not the right direction. We need a permanent fix.
  This bill does not contain, as my good friend Mr. Conyers said, 
retroactive liability. We need to have liability for those companies 
that stepped up after 9/11 and immediately helped the country begin to 
monitor the things we needed to monitor. We still don't clarify in this 
bill what our intelligence agencies do.
  This does not solve any problems. It creates problems. When you have 
a system that has worked in one way, and effectively, for 30 years, 
there is no reason to change that system. This bill makes needless, 
dangerous changes.
  I hope we vote ``no'' on this bill today, and get down, as we did in 
late July, to the reality of what we have to do to defend the country.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, 6 years after the tragic attacks of 9/11, Osama bin 
Laden remains at large. The minority whip may make light about ordering 
pizza, but the reality is we still haven't gotten Osama bin Laden and 
America faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups.
  Just this week, Admiral Scott Redd, Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center, said that the Iraq war has created a giant 
recruiting tool for al Qaeda. When asked if we are safer as a

[[Page 27480]]

result of our invasion of Iraq, Admiral Redd said, ``Tactically, 
probably not.''
  Mindful of this threat, our committees have drafted the RESTORE Act. 
I wish to thank Chairman Conyers and members of both committees for 
their great work in drafting this legislation. The RESTORE Act arms our 
intelligence community with powerful new authorities to conduct 
electronic surveillance of terrorist targets around the world, but it 
also restores essential constitutional protections for Americans that 
were sharply eroded when the President signed the Protect America Act, 
or PAA, last August.
  Some on the other side want to extend the PAA permanently. That would 
be a huge mistake. According to expert testimony we have received in 
our committee, the PAA authorizes warrantless domestic searches of 
Americans' homes, mail, computers and medical records, as the chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee observed earlier.
  Although we don't have any information at this time that the Bush 
administration is using this authority in this way, we must guard 
against the possibility of abuse in the future. Our committee heard 
testimony that the PAA even allows spying without probable cause on our 
own soldiers deployed overseas talking to their families back home. 
That, Mr. Speaker, is wrong.
  The RESTORE Act helps restore the balance between security and 
liberty. The RESTORE Act puts the FISA Court back in the business of 
protecting Americans' constitutional rights, after the President and 
Vice President put the court out of business 6 years ago.
  Some will try to portray this bill as extending rights to terrorists. 
We have heard that this morning. That is absolutely false. This bill 
does not require individual warrants for terrorists such as Osama bin 
Laden. The bill does not extend fourth amendment rights to foreigners.
  What the RESTORE Act does is allow ``block surveillance'' of 
terrorists overseas with speed and agility. And we will never go dark, 
because the bill includes an emergency provision that allows 
surveillance to continue for 45 days, even before the court approves 
the procedures to protect Americans.
  This legislation will restore accountability and oversight in all 
three branches. It restores regular audits and reports by the 
Department of Justice, which will be reviewed by the Congress. It also 
requires an audit of the President's Domestic Surveillance Program and 
other warrantless surveillance programs.
  Perhaps most importantly, it ensures that when an American is the 
target of surveillance, an individualized warrant is required.
  Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle prefer an 
approach that would allow the administration to police itself. This 
simply is unacceptable. If we have learned anything from the past 6 
years, it is that unchecked executive power is a recipe for abuse and 
it has not made us safer.

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. Speaker, I have served my country as a soldier in combat in 
Vietnam, as a law enforcement professional on our southern border, and 
as a Member of Congress for the past decade. I have seen the great 
strength of our country; and in my view, the source of that great 
strength is our Constitution. The RESTORE Act provides tools to keep 
this Nation safe and upholds our Constitution and our laws. So I urge 
my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the RESTORE Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the former 
chairman and current ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. King).
  Mr. KING of New York. I thank the ranking member for yielding and, 
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, the United States has been at war with Islamic terrorism 
since September 11, 2001. This is a war which threatens our survival as 
a civilization, and it is a war where it is essential that we maximize 
the use of electronic surveillance which is one of the strongest 
weapons in our arsenal. It is a weapon which should not be trivialized, 
nor should the struggle be trivialized by using such terms as 
``spying'' and ``snooping.''
  It is important we keep in mind who the real enemy is. The real enemy 
is al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism, not the men and women of our own 
government who are working so hard to protect us.
  Mr. Speaker, the Protect America Act, which was passed less than 3 
months ago, updated FISA and struck the appropriate balance between 
protecting our citizens from terrorist attacks and protecting our civil 
liberties. Tragically, today's bill, the RESTORE Act, marks an 
undeniable retreat in the war against Islamic terrorism. It limits the 
type of foreign intelligence information that may be acquired and 
actually gives foreign targets more protections than Americans get in 
criminal cases here at home.
  By sunsetting this legislation in 2 years, the RESTORE Act fails to 
provide permanency and guidance to the intelligence community. The 
RESTORE Act also fails to provide legal protection and immunity to 
those American companies who answered the call of this administration 
and also answered the call of an administration which believed that 
this policy was legal, and not only this administration, but high-
ranking officials from previous administrations, Democrat and 
Republican, who believed that these policies were legal and 
constitutional. There was no personal gain for these companies. To 
allow them to be subjected to lawsuits for answering the Nation's call 
in time of great peril is mean-spirited, vindictive and shortsighted.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge defeat of this misguided legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to recognize the chairman of the 
Crime Subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia, for 3 minutes.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding and appreciate his leadership in efforts to address 
warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, or FISA, and for introducing a bill that corrects many of the 
shortcomings of the bill that passed the House last August.
  The RESTORE Act establishes a strong framework, much stronger than 
the administration's bill, to fight terrorism effectively, while 
providing reasonable safeguards to protect personal privacy. There are 
several important clarifications made in the bill.
  One important change draws the appropriate distinctions based on 
physical location and types of targets. There has never been any 
controversy over the fact that surveillance directed at people, all of 
whom are overseas, you don't need a warrant in that situation.
  The second is that the bill removes vague and overbroad language in 
the bill that passed last August that would allow wiretapping of 
conversations without a warrant if the communication was concerning a 
foreign target. That by its own wording suggests that if two citizens 
are in the United States talking about someone overseas, you could 
wiretap their communications without a warrant. The bill before us 
makes it clear that the persons involved in the conversation must be 
overseas, not just that the subject of the conversation must be 
overseas.
  Third, the RESTORE Act goes a step further than the administration's 
bill and only allows expanded wiretapping authority in cases involving 
foreign intelligence unless it relates specifically to national 
security, as opposed to the overexpansive nature of foreign 
intelligence. Foreign intelligence can include anything, a trade deal 
or anything of general foreign affairs activities. If you are talking 
about national security, let's talk about national security.
  Finally, the RESTORE Act was made even stronger in the committee by 
requiring the Department of Justice in its application to the court to 
specify the primary purpose of the wiretapping. Under FISA, when an 
agent wanted to obtain a warrant, he had to

[[Page 27481]]

certify the purpose of the wiretap. The standard was altered in the 
PATRIOT Act which says it only has to be a significant purpose.
  We have to put this change in context because the Department of 
Justice has not credibly refuted the allegations that some U.S. 
Attorneys were fired because they failed to indict Democrats in time to 
affect an upcoming election. So if the Department of Justice wiretapped 
someone when foreign intelligence is not the primary purpose, you have 
to wonder what the primary purpose is. This bill would require the 
administration to reveal the true purpose of the wiretap.
  Mr. Speaker, in the fight against terrorism, we do not have to 
sacrifice constitutional protections or trust this administration to 
secretly protect the rights of Americans without public accountability. 
It is important to note that everything that the administration can do 
in its own bill it can do under this bill. We just require them to get 
a warrant before they do it or get a warrant after they do it if they 
are in a hurry, but they can wiretap and get the information. We just 
provide a little modicum of oversight to ensure that the laws are being 
obeyed.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), the ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism 
and Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, as you listen to this debate and those 
watching at home listen to it, the only thing that they hear are 
Democrats saying one thing and Republicans saying another thing. They 
don't know who to believe. They listen to the debate and they hear 
hatred of the Presidency and hatred of Republicans. But, Mr. Speaker, 
we just invite you today, take a moment and a breath and put all of 
that hatred on the shelf for just a second, and to remember that the 
Director of National Intelligence, not an appointee from President Bush 
but from President Clinton, has stated that their approach will be 
devastating to the intelligence-gathering capability of the United 
States.
  Mr. Speaker, here are the facts that we know. In the late 1990s, we 
cut intelligence. Then we had 9/11 where we had the worst terrorist 
attack to ever hit our shores. Since that time, regardless of who did 
it and deserves the credit, we have not had a major terrorist attack 
hit the United States, and now we are trying to repeat the cycle and 
cut intelligence-gathering capability again. We all know what is going 
to happen if, and some would say when, another terrorist attack hits. 
We are going to bring law enforcement in and we are going to point our 
finger at them and say: Why didn't you stop it?
  Mr. Speaker, just recently we had one of our NFL football coaches get 
in trouble because he was trying to steal the signals of an opposing 
team. Everyone argued and agreed that wasn't fair. And they were right; 
but that was a game. Mr. Speaker, in this particular situation it is 
not a game. We don't want a fair fight. We want to steal every signal 
we can from enemies who are trying to harm this Nation, and we want to 
know what they are doing before they do it so we can protect and defend 
this country.
  Mr. Speaker, I just invite us to take the hatred off the shelf, take 
the rhetoric off the shelf, and to exchange it for ration and reason so 
we can do what we need to do to gather the intelligence to keep our 
people safe.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), a fellow Vietnam veteran, a 
member of the House Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, first I support this bill. It is a good 
bill, and it protects the Constitution.
  I would like to speak principally to my colleagues who, like me, are 
concerned about what the bill does and the fact that it does not 
address fully the issue of carrier liability. As you know, the 
administration and telecommunication companies have requested that we 
provide them with immunity from lawsuits or prosecutions arising out of 
information and assistance they may have provided to the intelligence 
community.
  Now, we don't precisely know what information they have provided. We 
don't know what they were told by the administration about the legality 
of what they were doing. I hope and believe those companies acted in 
good faith with patriotism. They were trying to do their part for 
national security, and I think they deserve our appreciation. I take 
seriously their concerns that they might be subject to liability.
  That being said, I don't believe it should be the responsibility of 
the telecommunications companies to prove that they provided the 
information in a legal way if the Federal Government fails to meet the 
burden of proof that the demand or request for information is brought 
forth in a legal manner. If that burden of proof is not met, it should 
be the government that should be held primarily accountable.
  I believe that eventually we should be able to take care of any 
company who acted in good faith and cooperated in the name of 
protecting our Nation. No one who acted out of good faith with a desire 
to protect America should be punished. But we must know what brought 
forth their action, and under what circumstances, and what pressure, if 
any, they acted. As this process moves forward, I expect to get more 
information from the administration on their generation of the demands 
or requests for information. Support the bill.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague 
and the former district judge from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), who is also the 
deputy ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. GOHMERT. I thank the ranking member.
  I appreciate Chairman Reyes' service to this country. I believe 
people on the other side of the aisle mean well when they say they want 
to protect the Constitution. The problem is this extends the 
Constitution beyond America to our enemies on foreign soil who cut off 
heads of Americans. That's just the way it is. It does that.
  Now, we keep hearing across the aisle: This has nothing to do with 
foreign-to-foreign calls; it has nothing to do with foreign terrorists 
on foreign soil calling foreign terrorists, and it says that in the 
bill. You don't have to worry about that. You don't need a warrant for 
that.
  The trouble is there is no conceivable time that an honest 
intelligence gatherer overseas can swear that a foreign terrorist that 
he wants to surveil will never under any circumstances call the United 
States. Since he can't swear to that and since there is a chance, 
especially since this law is public and the terrorists will know all 
they need to do is call America, order flowers, call time and 
temperature, they have made a call on American soil and they come 
within the requirement of getting a court order. It is very clear.
  This doesn't extend the Constitution in a way that it should be on 
American soil. It protects enemies. I know people on the other side, 
you just want to protect civil liberties, but what scares me is what 
will happen when a terrorist attack in the nature of 9/11 comes again. 
People will rush to take away civil liberties, and people will 
voluntarily give up civil liberties for protection, liberties that were 
so hard fought.
  So for those who are really going to be protected, I don't understand 
the concern. This is going to protect also Americans who get calls from 
foreign terrorists on foreign soil. That is what this is really going 
to do.
  I don't think it is too much in the interest of America, tell your 
American friends to tell their terrorist friends on foreign soil, don't 
call me, use some other means of communication.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) whose experience in 
intelligence matters and FISA in particular are well known, and I yield 
to her 2\1/2\ minutes.

                              {time}  1300

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Conyers for yielding to me 
and commend him, Chairman Reyes, and others for their work on this 
bill.

[[Page 27482]]

  Though I no longer serve on the Intelligence Committee, I have 
followed this issue with intense interest. This bill contains many 
provisions that I and others authored over recent years. It is a strong 
bill and I strongly support it.
  It amends FISA to permit more speed and agility in the effort to 
conduct surveillance of those who would do us harm, but it also 
provides more resources in a court-approved framework to assure that 
the constitutional rights of Americans are protected.
  I continue to follow the intelligence in my role as Chair of the 
Homeland Security Intelligence Subcommittee, and threats against our 
homeland are real. Westerners are training in al Qaeda camps in the 
tribal areas of Pakistan. Europe, especially Britain, may experience 
more attacks. Plots have recently been foiled in Denmark and Germany. 
We helped Britain disrupt the so-called ``liquid bomb plot'' in August 
of 2006, a plot that could have killed more Americans than were killed 
on 9/11 as they flew on U.S.-bound airlines from England.
  Mr. Speaker, all Members want to protect America. All Members want to 
protect America. So it deeply saddens me that this is yet another 
partisan debate. It could have been otherwise.
  For several weeks, Pete Hoekstra, who chaired the Intelligence 
Committee when I was privileged to serve as ranking member, and I tried 
to fashion a bipartisan bill. Our list of principles could, I believe, 
have garnered broad support in both caucuses and led to a veto-proof 
majority in this House.
  Americans want Congress on a bipartisan basis to assure we disrupt 
plots to harm us and protect our Constitution. We could do both and we 
must do both. This is a strong bill. It does both. Vote ``aye.''
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the 
RESTORE Act, which reauthorizes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
program. As a Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I am 
deeply troubled that the majority has determined to handcuff the 
ability of the Intelligence Community, IC, to collect foreign 
intelligence information.
  Forgive me for stating the obvious, but ladies and gentleman, we are 
at war. We should be helping the IC in their efforts to protect 
Americans and fight the war on terror; this legislation needlessly ties 
our hands in collecting foreign intelligence information.
  Here are a few of the problems with this bill: No liability 
protection for the telecommunications companies who have responded to 
the IC's call for help since the 9/11 attacks; extends constitutional, 
4th Amendment, protections for terrorists by requiring FISA court 
approval to monitor individuals outside the U.S.; new and cumbersome 
FISA court guidelines for IC operations; Justice Department audits of 
IC activities and operations; onerous and duplicative reporting 
requirements by the DNI; and the list goes on . . . .
   Mr. Speaker, under this legislation, the Majority has made it clear 
that our Intelligence agencies should be guided by the tenants of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU, when monitoring terrorist 
activity.
  This policy is reckless and I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. BACA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask for support of the RESTORE 
Act. It provides important tools to support U.S. intelligence gathering 
efforts and protects against terrorists. And it does so while 
safeguarding Americans' civil liberties.
  I hope that as the legislative process plays out, the issue of 
carrier immunity is dealt with in a manner that will facilitate 
cooperation. Obtaining intelligence to protect our country against 
terrorists is the ultimate goal and this bill does this in a fair and 
balanced manner. Innocent Americans will have stronger protections and 
the intelligence needed to protect our country will not be compromised. 
Accountability is always a good thing.
  We will have much needed congressional oversight, compliance reports 
from the Attorney General and audit reports by the Inspector General of 
the Department of Justice.
  The RESTORE Act is a great balance and a positive move in the right 
direction.
  Please support this important legislation.
  Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Speaker, while I am pleased to stand here today and 
support the RESTORE Act of 2007 because I believe it is critical as 
part of our nation's defense, I urge us to work together in the coming 
weeks to end the uncertainty facing some of our corporate citizens in 
dealing with the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalists.
  Particularly, I am referring to our nation's telecommunications 
carriers, companies that historically have been a critical piece of our 
successful national security apparatus. These U.S. companies, who 
combined employ well over half a million Americans, should be treated 
with appreciation for the cooperation they display in the effort to 
keep our people safe.
  In the confusion and muddied backdrop of the debate, what has clearly 
been left aside is the longstanding and consistent policy of Congress 
and the courts that governs the way these companies may lawfully 
provide assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This 
policy is that telecommunications carriers are authorized to assist 
government agencies in a wide variety of circumstances; public policy 
encourages such cooperation; and, consistent with that policy, when a 
carrier cooperates in good faith with a duly authorized request for 
assistance, the carrier is immune from liability to third-parties. In 
the interest of our nation's security, these carriers should continue 
to have immunity when cooperating in good faith.
  We must work together over the coming weeks to clarify the role of 
carriers in this debate, and specifically offer the appropriate path to 
immunity when such highly sensitive matters are involved. 
Telecommunications carriers are nothing less than patriotic citizens 
fulfilling their role in our global struggle against terrorism.
  Mr. SHULER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to House 
Resolution 746, providing for consideration of H.R. 3773, the RESTORE 
Act of 2007. While I support many of the provisions of the underlying 
bill, I remain concerned that this bill is silent on the issue of 
carrier liability.
  This rule provides no opportunity to amend the bill to address this 
important issue. In my view that is a mistake, and one which I hope 
will be dealt with before the legislation is sent to the President for 
his signature.
  The failure of this House to address the issue of carrier liability 
may have significant long term implications for our future ability to 
protect our citizens. I encourage my colleagues to consider the 
incentives the legislation creates and find a constructive way to deal 
with the carrier liability issue.
  Therefore, while I do intend to support the underlying legislation 
when faced with an up or down decision later today, I oppose this 
closed rule, and urge the leadership of both Houses of Congress to work 
together during the conference process to address this issue. I urge my 
colleagues to vote ``no'' on this closed rule.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 
746, further proceedings on the bill will be postponed.

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