[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2928-2929]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to make a few brief comments 
this morning on the Warner resolution and the negotiations that went on 
yesterday, led by Senator Levin, to deal with Iraq.
  Three weeks ago before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Secretary Rice presented the President's plan for Iraq. The Presiding 
Officer, among others, was there. Its main feature was to send more 
American troops into Baghdad, in the middle of a sectarian war, in the 
middle of a city of over 6 million people.
  The reaction to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 
Republicans and Democrats alike ranged from profound skepticism to 
outright opposition. That pretty much reflected the reaction across the 
country.
  Consequently, Senators Hagel, Levin, Snowe, and I wrote a resolution 
to give Senators a way to vote their voices, vote what they had said. 
We believe, the four of us, and I know the Presiding Officer does, as 
well, that the quickest, most effective way to get the President to 
change his course is to demonstrate to him that his policy has little 
or no support in this Senate, in our committee, or, quite frankly, 
across the country.
  After we introduced our resolution, Senator Warner came forward with 
his resolution. The bottom line of the resolution is essentially the 
same, and it was: Don't send more American troops into the middle of a 
civil war.
  There was one critical difference between the Biden-Levin and the 
Warner amendment. Senator Warner's resolution, in one paragraph, left 
open, I think unintentionally, the possibility of increasing the 
overall number of American troops in Iraq--just not in Baghdad. So from 
our perspective it wasn't enough to say don't go into Baghdad with more 
troops; we wanted to say don't raise the number of troops, as well.
  The provision in the Warner amendment that allowed for that, if read 
by the President the way he would want to read it, I believe, would 
have allowed an increase in troops. We believe very strongly--Senator 
Levin, myself, Hagel, Snowe--that would send the wrong message. We 
ought to be drawing down in Iraq, not ramping up. We ought to be 
redeploying, not deploying into Baghdad. We should make it clear to the 
Iraqi leaders that they have to begin to make the hard compromises 
necessary for a political solution.
  A political solution everyone virtually agrees on is the precondition 
for anything positive happening in Iraq. Now, I make it clear, I and 
everyone else in this Senate knows that it is not an easy thing for the 
Iraqi leadership to do, but it is absolutely essential.
  So we approached Senator Warner several times to try to work out the 
difference between the Biden and the Warner resolutions. I am very 
pleased that last night, through the leadership of Senator Warner and 
Senator Levin, we succeeded in doing just that. The language Senator 
Warner removed from his resolution removed the possibility that it can 
be read as calling for more troops in Iraq.
  With that change, I am very pleased to join Senator Levin, now known 
as the Levin-Warner resolution, as a cosponsor of that resolution. For 
my intent, at the outset when I first spoke out about the President's 
planned surge of American forces in Iraq, when I spoke out before the 
new year, I made it clear that my purpose was to build bipartisan 
opposition to his plan because that was the best way to get him to 
reconsider. That is exactly what this compromise does.
  Now we have a real opportunity for the Senate to speak clearly. Every 
Senator will have a chance to vote on whether he or she supports or 
disagrees with the President's plan to send more troops into the middle 
of a civil war. If the President does not listen to the majority of the 
Congress--and I expect the majority of Congress will vote for our 
resolution--if he does not respond to a majority of the Congress and a 
majority of the American people, we will have to look for other ways to 
change his policy. But this is a very important first step.
  Also, I would like to take a moment to present what I believe are the 
principal findings of our 4 weeks of hearings, over 50 hours, if I am 
not mistaken, of hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. While no 
unanimous prescription has emerged, there is remarkably broad consensus 
on three main points: First, American troops cannot stop sectarian 
warfare in Iraq, only a political settlement can do that; the second 
point of consensus, we must engage in intensive regional diplomacy to 
support the settlement among Iraqis; third, the U.S. military should 
focus on combatting terrorists, keeping Iraq's neighbors honest, 
training Iraq's troops--not on policing a civil war. Indeed, combat 
troops should start to redeploy as soon as our mission is narrowed.
  Those three points were overwhelmingly agreed upon by an array of the 
most well informed foreign policy experts, both military and civilian, 
that we have arrayed before that committee in a long time.
  Since a political settlement is so critical, we have examined this 
issue in detail. We have looked at the benchmarks the President has 
proposed--on oil law, debaathification reform, constitutional reform, 
and provincial elections--but the divisions are so deep and passions 
run so high now in Iraq we may be beyond the point where such modest 
measures can stabilize Iraq.
  I believe, and have believed for some time, something much broader is 
necessary, something much bolder is necessary. Les Gelb, the chairman 
emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Defense 
Department

[[Page 2929]]

official, and I put forward just such a proposal 9 months ago. It is 
premised upon our conviction that the heart of the administration's 
strategy--building a strong central government--will, in fact, not 
succeed. As a matter of fact, in the testimony we heard, most pointed 
out where countries have been drawn by the slip of a pen by world 
leaders after World War I and World War II--the Balkans, Iraq, and many 
other places we could name--there have basically only been two models 
that have brought stability: A straw plan, a la Saddam, or a Federal 
system, a la the Iraqi Constitution.
  The reason a strong central government will not work, although 
desirable, is there is no trust within the Government, no trust of the 
Government by the people of Iraq, no capacity of the Government to 
deliver services, no capacity of this new Government to deliver 
security.
  In a sense, it is understandable. Indeed, we must bring Iraqis' 
problems and the responsibility of managing those problems down to 
local and regional levels where we can help the Iraqis build trust and 
capacity much more quickly and much more effectively.
  We have proposed that the Iraqis create what their constitution calls 
for: three or more ``regions'' they call them--not republics--three or 
four more regions consistent with their constitution. We call for 
Iraq's oil to be shared equally with a guarantee that the Sunnis get 
their share and have some international oversight to guarantee it. We 
call for aggressive diplomacy--which, again, most every witness called 
for, including the Iraq Study Group--we call for aggressive diplomacy 
in the creation of a contact group consisting of Iraq's neighbors and 
the major powers in the world, including large Islamic countries to 
support a political settlement.
  We believe we can redeploy most, if not all, of America's troops from 
Iraq within 18 months under this plan, leaving behind a small force in 
Iraq or in the region to strike at terrorists, the jihadists, the al-
Qaidaists, keeping the neighbors honest, and training Iraqi forces. The 
time has demonstrated this plan is more relevant and inevitable than it 
was even the day we put pen to paper and set it out 9 months ago. It 
takes into account the harsh reality of self-sustaining sectarian 
violence; it is consistent with Iraq's Constitution; and it can produce 
a phrase used by a New York Times columnist in describing our plan. It 
can produce ``a soft landing'' for Iraq and prevent a full-blown civil 
war that tears the country apart and spreads beyond its borders.
  I might also add, as people have come to understand, what I am 
calling for is not partitioning, not three separate republics; what I 
am calling for is what the Iraqi Constitution calls for: 
decentralization of control over security and local laws with the 
central government having responsibility for the Army, distribution of 
resources and currency and other things that a central government must 
do.
  As that has become clearer and clearer, some of the most powerful 
voices in the American foreign policy establishment have come forward 
to suggest it makes sense.
  Secretary Kissinger told our committee yesterday:

       I'm sympathetic to an outcome that permits large regional 
     autonomy. In fact, I think it is very likely this will emerge 
     out of the conflict that we are now witnessing.

  Former Secretary of State Albright said:

       . . . the idea of the . . . constitution of Iraq as 
     written, which allows for and mandates, in fact, a great deal 
     of regional autonomy, is appropriate.

  James Baker, former Secretary of State, coauthor of the Baker-
Hamilton commission report told us that there are indications that Iraq 
may be moving toward three autonomous regions, and ``if it is, we ought 
to be prepared to try and manage the situation.''
  Time is running out. We are going to have as a consequence of the 
compromise reached between the Biden-Levin resolution and the Warner 
resolution, now known as the ``Levin-Warner whoever else is attached to 
it'' resolution--we are going to have for the first time a full-blown 
debate in the Senate.
  I hope the administration will be listening. I suggest we are 
coequal--Congress, along with the President--in deciding when, if, how 
long, and under what circumstances to send Americans to war, for 
shedding America's treasure and blood.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10 
minutes in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. President.

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