[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2840-2843]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, about a week ago, I think it was on the 
23rd, my colleagues, the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Ben Nelson, and the 
Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, and I, together with several 
cosponsors, put into the Record a resolution--I underline put into the 
Record--so that all could have the benefit of studying it.
  We three have continued to do a good deal of work. We have been in 
consultation with our eight other cosponsors on this resolution, and we 
are going to put in tonight, into the Record--the same procedures we 
followed before--another resolution which tracks very closely the one 
that is of record. But it has several provisions we believe should be 
considered by the Senate in the course of the debate. How that debate 
will occur and when it will occur. I cannot advise the Senate, but I do 
hope it is expeditious. I understand there is a cloture motion that 
could well begin the debate, depending upon how it is acted upon.
  We have also had a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
last Friday. We had a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
again this morning. Friday was in open session. The session this 
morning was in closed session. The three of us, as members of the Armed 
Services Committee, have learned a good deal more about this subject 
and, I say with great respect, the plan as laid down by the President 
on the 10th of January. We believed we should make some additions to 
our resolution.
  We have not had the opportunity, given the hour, to circulate this 
among all of our cosponsors so at this time it will not bind them, but 
subsequently, tomorrow, I hope to contact all of them, together with my 
two colleagues, and determine their concurrence to go on this one. I am 
optimistic they will all stay.
  But let me give the Senate several examples of what we think is 
important in the course of the debate--that these subjects be raised. 
We put it before the Senate now in the form of filing this resolution, 
such that all can see it and have the benefit, to the extent it is 
reproduced and placed into the public domain. Because the three of us 
are still open for suggestions, and we will continue to have 
receptivity to suggestions as this critical and very important subject 
is deliberated by the Senate.
  Our objective is to hope that somehow through our efforts and the 
efforts

[[Page 2841]]

 of others, a truly bipartisan statement--I don't know in what form it 
may be made--a truly bipartisan statement can evolve from the debate 
and the procedure that will ensue in the coming days, and I presume 
into next week. We feel very strongly that we want to see our Armed 
Forces succeed in Iraq to help bring about greater stability to that 
country, greater security to that country, so that the current elected 
government, through a series of free elections--the current elected 
government can take a firmer and firmer hand on the reins of 
sovereignty. We believe if for political reasons all Members of the 
Senate go over to vote with their party, and the others go over to vote 
with their party, we will have lost and failed to provide the 
leadership I believe this Chamber can provide to the American people so 
they can better understand the new strategy, and that the President can 
take into consideration our resolution hasn't been changed.
  We say to the President: We urge that you take into consideration the 
options that we put forth, the strategy that we sort of lay out, in the 
hopes that it will be stronger and better understood by the people in 
this country. Their support, together with a strong level of bipartisan 
support in the Congress for the President's plan, hopefully as slightly 
modified, can be successful. We want success, Madam President. We want 
success.
  So that is the reason we come this evening. I am going to speak to 
one or two provisions, and my colleagues can address others.
  First, the unity of command. We have a time-honored tradition with 
American forces that wherever possible, there be a unity of command 
from an American commander, whatever rank that may be, down to the 
private, and that our forces can best operate with that unity of 
command and provide the best security possible to all members of the 
Armed Forces that are engaged in carrying out such mission as that 
command is entrusted to perform.
  A number of Senators, in the course of the hearing on Friday and the 
hearing this morning, raised questions about this serious issue of 
unity of command. I say serious issue because the President, in his 
remarks, described--and this is on January 10--described how there will 
be an Iraqi commander, and that we will have embedded forces with the 
Iraqi troops. Well, we are currently embedding forces, but I think the 
plan--and that is what I refer to, the President's announcement on 
January 10 in the generic sense as the plan--will require perhaps a 
larger number of embedded forces. But the plan envisions an Iraqi chain 
of command. The Iraqis indicated, in working with the President, this 
plan in many respects tracks the exchange of thoughts that the 
President and the Prime Minister have had through a series of meetings 
and telephonic conversations. So the plan embraces the goals of the 
Prime Minister of Iraq, the goals of our President.
  But this is a unique situation where the Iraqis have a complete chain 
of command, from a senior officer in each of the nine districts in 
Baghdad, and the United States likewise will have a chain of command in 
that same district or such segments of this plan as the military 
finally put together--each will have a chain of command, the Iraqi 
forces and the United States forces.
  In the course of the testimony that we received, particularly 
testimony from the retired Vice Chief of the U.S. Army on Friday 
afternoon, he was concerned, as a number of Senators are concerned--and 
our provision literally flags this, and flags it in such a way that we 
call upon the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to look at that plan and to bring such clarification forward 
as may be necessary, and to do it in a way that will secure the safety 
of our forces, the protection of our forces, and yet go forward with 
this idea of a greater sharing of the command responsibility in the 
operations to take place in Baghdad. So we simply call on the 
administration to bring such clarification and specificity to the 
Congress and the people of the United States to ensure the protection 
of our force and that this command structure will work because I 
believe it doesn't have--I am trying to find a precedent where we have 
operated like this. I have asked the expert witnesses in hearings, and 
thus far those witnesses have not been able to explain the command 
structure that we have conceived, the concept of the plan of January 
10, just how it will work.
  Likewise, we put in a very important paragraph which says that 
nothing in this resolution should be construed as indicating that there 
is going to be a cutoff of funds. Given the complexity of this 
situation, there has been a lot of press written on the subject of our 
resolution. Colleagues have come up to me and said: Well, can you 
assure me that this doesn't provide a cutoff of funds.
  Now, the cutoff of funds is the specific power given under the 
Constitution to the Congress of the United States. I personally think 
that power should not be exercised, certainly not given the facts and 
the circumstances today where this plan--which I hope in some manner 
will succeed and we are working better with the Prime Minister and his 
forces. So at this point in time I think it is important that our 
resolution carry language as follows:

       The Congress should not take any action that will endanger 
     United States military forces in the field, including the 
     elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, as 
     such an action with respect to funding would undermine their 
     safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned 
     missions.

  So I think that very clearly eliminates any consideration there.
  At this time I would like to yield the floor so that my colleagues 
can speak, and maybe I will have some concluding remarks.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a 
unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I really feel, if we could more fully--
--
  Mr. LEVIN. It is just a unanimous consent request.
  Mr. WARNER. Does it affect what we are trying to lay down in any way?
  Mr. LEVIN. I was just going to ask unanimous consent that I be added 
as a cosponsor of the resolution.
  Mr. WARNER. That is fine. I didn't realize that was coming to pass. 
It is late in the day, and I suppose we could anticipate a lot of 
things. But anyway I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. As I understand, the resolution has not yet been sent to 
the desk.
  Mr. WARNER. It momentarily will be.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to 
the resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
  Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Madam President, tonight I believe we have 
seen the introduction of a resolution which not only has had bipartisan 
support in its prior form but will receive very strong bipartisan 
support in its current form, as amended.
  I rise to support this resolution for a number of reasons. I think it 
is important that we continue to support our troops in the field and 
those who support the troops across the world. I think it is important 
that we thank them for their service and that we make it very clear 
that this resolution does not impair their ability to move forward in 
their command.
  It is also important to point out that while some of the cosponsors 
haven't had the opportunity to review this, it is being circulated to 
them so that they do have the opportunity to review it. And I am sure 
they will become cosponsors with the new resolution.
  It is important to point out that in this resolution, benchmarks are 
included that I believe will help break the cycle of dependence in Iraq 
by empowering and requiring the authority

[[Page 2842]]

of the Iraqi Government and the responsibility of the Iraqi Government 
to take a greater role in the battle in Iraq, particularly as it 
relates to Baghdad. We generally believe that it is inappropriate for 
our troops to intercede in the battle between the Sunnis and the Shias 
on a sectarian basis in battles that are of a similar nature that 
certainly do involve sectarian violence. There is a greater role for 
the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi military. This resolution in its 
present form will assure the assuming of that greater role, that 
greater responsibility by the Iraqi Government and certainly by the 
Iraqi Army.
  It is a pleasure for me to introduce and thank our cosponsor, the 
Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, first let me thank Senator Warner and 
Senator Nelson for their continuing hard work in refining the language 
of this very important resolution, a resolution that I hope will garner 
widespread bipartisan support when it is brought to the Senate floor 
and debated next week.
  Since we first introduced our resolution last week, we have had the 
benefit of further consultations with experts. We have had the benefit 
of conversations with our colleagues. We have had the benefit of 
alternative resolutions that have been proposed by other Senators, and 
we have had the benefit, most of all, of additional hearings in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, including a classified briefing today. 
All of this activity has confirmed my belief that our resolution as 
originally proposed was on precisely the right track, but the benefit 
of these hearings, briefings, conversations and consultations has led 
us to improve our resolution by making four modifications that the 
distinguished Senators have just explained.
  Let me, for the benefit of our colleagues, run through them one more 
time.
  First, the resolution now makes very clear that nothing in it is to 
be construed as advocating any lessening of financial support for our 
troops. Indeed, it goes firmly on record as being opposed to cutting 
off funds that would be needed by our troops in Iraq. The language is 
very clear on that.
  Second, there has been a great deal of discussion about the need for 
the Iraqis to meet certain benchmarks--benchmarks that in the past they 
have not met. So we include language in this resolution that makes very 
clear that we expect the Iraqi Prime Minister to agree to certain 
benchmarks; for example, to agree to work for the passage and achieve 
the passage of legislation that would ensure an equitable distribution 
of oil revenues. That is a very important issue in Iraq.
  It also includes a benchmark that the Iraqis are going to produce the 
troops they have promised, and that they are going to operate according 
to the military rules of engagement without regard to the sectarian 
information or the sect of the people involved in the fighting. In 
other words, it doesn't matter whether an insurgent is a Sunni or a 
Shiite; if he is violating the law, engaging in violence, the Iraqi 
troops and our troops would be able to arrest and detain or otherwise 
battle these individuals.
  It clarifies the language regarding the troop increase that the 
President has proposed, and as the Senator from Virginia has explained 
to our colleagues, it calls for a clarification of the command and 
control structure so that we don't have a dual line of command. We want 
to have a very clear chain of command, and we call for that. That isn't 
the case now, and if you ask any military officer, he or she will tell 
you that having a clear chain of command, a unity of command, is 
absolutely essential. We have made these four changes in our 
legislation, in the resolution. We hope our colleagues will take a 
close look at it. I look forward to debating it more fully when we get 
on this issue next week.
  Again, I commend the distinguished Senators with whom I have been 
very privileged to work on this: Senator Warner, the former chairman of 
the Committee on Armed Services, my colleague, Senator Nelson, also a 
member of the Committee on Armed Services. All three of us serve on 
that committee. We have brought to bear our experience and what we have 
learned in the last week as we continue to study this very important 
issue, perhaps the most vital issue facing our country.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank our distinguished colleague from 
Maine.
  It has been a hard work in progress, but we reiterate, perhaps 
Members want to offer their own resolutions. We are open to 
suggestions. We are not trying to grab votes, just make ours stronger.
  I bring to the attention of my colleague, this is not to be construed 
as saying, Mr. President, you cannot do anything; we suggest you look 
at openings by which we could, hopefully, have substantially less 
United States involvement of troops in what we foresee as a bitter 
struggle of sectarian violence.
  The American GI, in my judgment, has sacrificed greatly, and their 
families, in giving sovereignty to this Nation. Now we see it is in the 
grip of extraordinary sectarian violence. Sunni upon Shia, Shia upon 
Sunni. I am not trying to ascribe which is more guilty than the other, 
but why should they proceed to try and destabilize the very government 
that gives all Iraqis a tremendous measure of freedom, free from 
tyranny and from Saddam Hussein. Why should the American GI, who does 
not have a language proficiency, who does not have a full understanding 
of the culture giving rise to these enormous animosities and hatreds 
that precipitate the killings and other actions--why should not that be 
left to the Iraqi forces?
  We have trained upwards of 200,000. We have reason to believe today 
there are 60,000 to 70,000 who are tested--in many respects they have 
been participating in a number of military operations, together with 
our forces. Let elements of that group be the principals to take the 
lead, as they proudly say, give them the lead, and go into the 
sectarian violence. That would enable our commanders, our President, to 
send fewer than 20,500 into that area.
  On the other hand, we support the President with respect to his 
options regarding the Anbar Province and the additional forces.
  Am I not correct in that?
  Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield on that point.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Ms. COLLINS. The resolution we drafted very carefully distinguishes 
between the sectarian violence engulfing Baghdad, where the Senator and 
Senator Nelson believe it would be a huge mistake for additional 
American troops to be in the midst of that, versus a very different 
situation in Anbar Province.
  In Anbar, the violence is not sectarian; the battle is with al-Qaida 
and with foreign fighters, the Sunni insurgencies, so we have Sunni 
versus Sunni. It is not sectarian. And what is more, local tribal 
leaders have recently joined with the coalition forces to fight al-
Qaida. It is a completely different situation in Anbar. I do support 
the addition of more troops in Anbar. Indeed, the one American 
commander whom I met with in December who called for more troops in 
Anbar was General Kilmer.
  Mr. WARNER. You refer to the one commander you met. I wonder if the 
Senator would reference your trip in December and what others told you 
about the addition of United States forces. I think that is important 
for the Record.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, if the Senator will continue to yield.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Ms. COLLINS. It was a very illuminating trip with other Senators. It 
has shaped my views on the issues before the Senate.
  One American commander in Baghdad told me a jobs program would do 
more good than additional American troops in quelling the sectarian 
violence. He told me many Iraqi men were joining the militias or 
planting roadside bombs simply because they had been unemployed for so 
long they were desperate for money and would do anything to support 
their families. This

[[Page 2843]]

was an American commander who told me this.
  Prime Minister Maliki, in mid-December, made very clear he did not 
welcome the presence of additional American troops and, indeed, that he 
chafed at the restrictions on his control of the Iraqi troops. So I 
didn't hear it from Iraqi leaders, either.
  The only place where I heard a request for more troops was in Anbar 
Province where the situation, as we have discussed, is totally 
different than the sectarian violence plaguing Baghdad.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my colleague.
  In my trip in the October timeframe, I would see much the same 
expression from military and civilian. Our codel visited, and it was 
following my trip that I came back and said in a press conference, this 
situation is moving sideways.
  My observations, together with the observations of others--some in 
our Government, some in the private sector--induced the 
administration--I am not suggesting we were the triggering cause, but 
we may have contributed--to go to an absolutely, as you say in the 
Navy, ``general quarters'' to study every aspect of the strategy which 
then was in place, and which now is clearly stated as late as yesterday 
by the admiral who will be the CENTCOM commander, wasn't working.
  I commend the President for taking the study and inviting a number of 
consultants. That whole process was very thorough.
  The point the Senator is making, as late as December--mine in 
October, yours in December--we both gained the same impressions that no 
one was asking for additional United States troops at that time.
  Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield on that point, since the 
Senator was the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, as well, I 
would also share with our colleagues that the Senator presided over a 
hearing in mid-November at which General Abizaid, the central command 
general, testified before our committee that more American troops were 
not needed. He reported he had consulted widely with generals on the 
ground in Iraq, including General Casey, in reaching that conclusion.
  I say to our colleagues that I think the record is clear. If you look 
at the findings of your trip from October, the testimony before the 
Committee on Armed Services from General Abizaid in November, what I 
heard in mid-December, I have to say, respectfully, I do not believe 
the President's plan with regard to Baghdad--not Anbar but Baghdad--is 
consistent with what we were told.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
  We should add an important reference to work done by the Baker-
Hamilton commission. They have made similar findings. They mention a 
slight surge, but in my study of that one sentence in that report, I 
don't think they ever envisioned a surge of the magnitude that is here.
  They can best speak for themselves and, indeed, yesterday there was 
testimony taken from two senior members of that commission, but I don't 
know whether they were speaking for the entire commission, and whether, 
in their remarks, they may wish to amend portions of their report. I 
wasn't present for that testimony.
  I hope someone in the Foreign Relations Committee can make that 
clear. Were they speaking for the entire commission? Did they wish to 
have their remarks amend their report which we followed? It was one of 
the guideposts we used, the important work of that group.
  Again, we are doing what we think is constructive to help the Senate 
in preparing for its deliberations, to invite other colleagues to make 
suggestions. We stand open to consider other options that may come 
before the Senate.
  At this point in time, our resolution is the same form as the 
resolution we filed here a week or so ago. We are not changing any of 
the procedures by which the Senate takes into consideration our points. 
Whether we will be able to utilize this as a substitute should other 
amendments be called upon the floor, the rules are quite complex on 
that matter, and I will not bring all of that into the record at this 
point. But there are certain impediments procedurally as to how this 
specific resolution could ever be actually used for the purposes of a 
substitute.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Murray). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, in the colloquy I participated in with 
my distinguished colleagues, Senator Ben Nelson of Kansas and Senator 
Collins of Maine--and I take responsibility--somehow we had a 
misunderstanding about the status. We wish to send to the desk and ask 
that this be numbered a new S. Con. Res. and, therefore, have the same 
status as the current S. Con. Res. we had submitted a week ago.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and referred.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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