[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 23499-23501]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I wish to take this opportunity to talk a 
little bit about what I think is a very important debate, and that is 
about Iraq war policy. Next week, I believe, General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Crocker will be coming to the Congress to brief us about the 
situation as they see it. I think most of us in the Senate are very 
anxious to hear what our Ambassador has to say and our leading general 
in Iraq. There are GAO reports about benchmarks. The idea that we are 
trying to evaluate performance and progress in Iraq is a good thing. 
Some of the benchmarks have not been met, apparently, some have. It 
depends upon how you measure. The one thing I would caution my 
colleagues to not forget is that the biggest benchmark is whether our 
presence in Iraq should be maintained in terms of our national security 
interests or should we leave. If we do leave, how does that affect our 
long-term security interests?
  I think the biggest issue facing each Senator is how they view the 
war in Iraq. This is a legitimate debate. There are two different ways 
of looking at the engagement in Iraq. Some Senators believe our 
military presence in Iraq at such levels is propping up the Iraqi 
Government; they are relying too much upon us, they are putting off the 
hard decisions because we are doing the fighting and they can kind of 
take their time, and that we should put more pressure on the Iraqi 
Government by beginning to withdraw troops.
  There is another view that any presence in Iraq is creating more 
terrorism than it is preventing, that our presence in Iraq is creating 
instability and problems for the Mideast as a whole, and that we should 
basically get our eye back on the ball, Afghanistan, al-Qaida 
operations in other areas.
  Those are a couple of views. I hope I fairly summarized it. I do not 
want to put words in people's mouths. But I think there are a couple of 
ways of looking at Iraq.
  There is another way. It is my way--it does not mean it is right, it 
is just the way I have come out on this--that Iraq, to me, is part of a 
global struggle, not just an isolated event.
  Whether we should have gone into Iraq is sort of a moot question. The 
question for the country is: What happens in Iraq in terms of our 
national security interests? Does it really matter? I would argue that 
the enemy we are facing in Iraq is threefold. There is sectarian 
violence within the country. There is Sunni-Shia violence, or people 
within the Shiia community using violence to try to get the upper hand 
politically.
  There are people, Sunni insurgents, who do not want to have a 
democracy. They do not want to have a representative government. They 
are trying to achieve power by the use of violence. So there is 
definitely some sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shias. That is 
very real.
  But there is also an element in Iraq called al-Qaida. Their goal is 
not to dominate the Shiia population in Iraq. Their goal is much 
broader. It is to

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make sure that representative government does not take hold in the 
Mideast in a way that would allow religious tolerance. Their goal is to 
make sure no representative government would spring up where a woman 
would have a say about her children.
  You know, we are all over the world militarily. You can see what is 
going on in Germany today. But al-Qaida chose to come to Iraq, I 
believe not because of what we are doing there or the fact that we are 
there, but because of what the Iraqi people may try to do. I do believe 
al-Qaida's international leadership has gone to Iraq to organize 
extremist forces within that country, religious extremists, because 
they fear more than anything else another Muslim nation, Islamic 
nation, Arab nation, being able to come together and live through 
representative democracy. That is why they are there.
  If they can defeat this effort at moderation, destabilize this 
government and drive us out, I think our worst days lie ahead. No 
matter how we wish to view Iraq, there is no doubt in my mind what that 
enemy would say, al-Qaida international would say: They beat America in 
the Land of the Two Rivers. Bin Ladin has called on all of those who 
believe as he does: Go to Iraq, join the fight, because now is the time 
to win a battle in the third world war and America must be defeated, 
not the Iraqi Shiia population but America.
  Now the Iranian involvement in Iraq. I have been on an 11-day tour 
over there as a Reserve lawyer. That was a wonderful experience, a very 
small contribution on my part. I learned how hard people work and how 
smart they are. I am awed by our military. I think every Senator shares 
that view. But one of the things I have learned from working on rule-
of-law programs is how deeply involved the Iranian Quds force and other 
organizations are in funding militia groups.
  The question for us all is why should Iran be involved in trying to 
fund groups dedicated to killing Americans? The Lieberman amendment 
that passed without objection in the authorization debate in July was a 
damning indictment of the Iranian involvement in Iraq. The question 
must be asked and answered: Why? Why does Iran want to destabilize this 
government? Why are they supporting extremist groups, mostly in the 
Shia community but not exclusively, designed to kill Americans? Why are 
they providing aid and comfort to those groups who wish to destroy our 
forces?
  I argue they view Iraq as a threat, just as al-Qaida does, if the 
Iraqi Government is able to stabilize itself. The Sunni and Shia Arabs 
coming together, along with their Kurdish colleagues, to form a 
representative government that will allow the people to elect their 
leaders is the biggest threat to Iranian theocracy. They are involved 
in Iraq from their own self-interest, not the interests of the Iranian 
people, but the self-interest of the radical leadership within Iran. 
They understand clearly if Iraq is able to stabilize itself and create 
a moderate form of government, representative in nature, their 
nightmare just begins. That is why they are trying to drive us out.
  The President of Iran, a questionable character at best, said, I 
think, last week, they stand ready to fill the vacuum created when we 
leave. I argue that we need not leave a vacuum that Iran can fill.
  There are three enemies: al-Qaida, sectarian violence, and the 
Iranian elements trying to destabilize the Iraqi Government. One of the 
biggest problems we have had since the fall of Baghdad is we didn't 
have enough troops to provide security. After about five or six visits, 
it was clear to me that the situation was deteriorating in Iraq. Before 
the surge, I came back more depressed after each visit. The level of 
violence grew and the secure environment deteriorated.
  Now we have a new strategy. We have put more combat power in place. 
It has made a real difference on the security front. Anbar Province, 
the western part of Iraq where the Sunnis dominated 6 months ago, was 
declared lost. It was an al-Qaida safe haven. We have heard the story 
time and time again. The news of Anbar is not so much that we beat al-
Qaida military, not so much that the Sunni Arabs turned on al-Qaida, 
joined the fight with us against al-Qaida. That is understandable given 
the way that al-Qaida treated the population in Anbar. What is the most 
exciting and encouraging is that in 2007 over 12,000 people have joined 
the local police force in Anbar. The sons of Anbar were called upon by 
the sheiks to take up arms by joining the police. This new police 
presence, once it is trained and equipped, will allow Anbar Province to 
be held by Iraqis.
  More encouraging than that, not only are people in Anbar beginning to 
join institutions that would allow al-Qaida to be defeated in a 
permanent fashion, they are beginning to reach out to Baghdad, and 
there is a movement going on between the Maliki government and 
leadership in Anbar to try to find a relationship where Baghdad is seen 
by the people of Anbar as a place you can do business. There is a lot 
of money being spent now by the central government on rule-of-law 
projects in Anbar. There is an old palace of one of the sons of Saddam 
that is going to be converted into a legal center where you can have 
terrorism courts, basic civil trials. You will have housing for judges 
that will be secure so they won't be assassinated. You will have a 
police training center there. There is a lot going on in terms of a 
relationship between Baghdad and Anbar that could lead to 
reconciliation.
  It is very true the political progress we had hoped for at the 
national level has not yet transpired. But what has astounded me is the 
amount of local reconciliation going on. Better security has led to 
better choices. People now feel more secure. They are telling us where 
al-Qaida operatives are hiding. They are giving us more information 
than we have ever received before about how al-Qaida operates, and 
other extremist groups. People are getting more confident to speak out. 
More than anything else, they are just war weary.
  The one thing I have learned on this trip that was more abundant than 
any other is that Iraqis at the local level, in provinces all over the 
country, are very war weary. They are trying to bring the country 
together, their local communities together. They are tired of the 
killing and the dying.
  So as we listen to what Ambassador Crocker has to say, and General 
Petraeus, we should be mindful of the challenges. To me, the successes 
are obvious, but the challenges are equally obvious. I never said, for 
the last 3\1/2\ years before the surge, that things were going great in 
Iraq because, to me, they weren't. Things were getting worse. It was 
obvious they were. But I do see a turnaround. I think the surge has 
accomplished some things militarily that have led to better choices, 
and there is an effort to reconcile the country from the bottom up. It 
is very real.
  The big pressure being applied to Baghdad is not what Senator Graham 
says or what any other Senator from the United States may say about the 
Maliki government. The pressure I see on the ground is coming from the 
people themselves. The people are war weary. They would like their 
representatives in Baghdad to come together and create a stability that 
they haven't known for 4 years.
  I am hopeful there will be political breakthroughs. Sunday a week ago 
the five major players in Iraq recommitted themselves to a plan to come 
back together, reform the government, and reconcile the Iraqi people, 
passing major legislation. Debaathification, the ability of Sunnis to 
hold jobs in the government, is a big piece of legislation that would 
transform Iraq. Local elections, allowing local people to pick their 
governors and representatives rather than Baghdad politicians making 
those appointments, if there were local elections, the Sunnis would 
participate in large numbers. In 2005, they boycotted the election. Now 
they are ready to engage in politics.
  I predict that based on the success of the surge militarily, the 
efforts of local reconciliation are real, that they are going to move 
up to the national level, and soon, very soon, we will have some 
breakthroughs in Baghdad in terms of political benchmarks that will 
transform the country. That is my hope, my

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desire. The way we can achieve that is to pour it on, continue the 
surge, let it run its course. It has been in place now, I think, since 
April. Let's keep pouring it on militarily, politically, and 
economically. We have the enemy on the mat. Let's don't let them up. 
Morale is sky high. Now is the time for America to exercise good 
judgment, long-term thinking, and reinforce Iraq instead of withdrawal.
  The message to withdraw, no matter how well intended, will not push 
Iraqi politicians to do anything faster. It will encourage an 
insurgency that is not being diminished.
  Those are the issues that face the Senate as we await news from Iraq. 
Let's concentrate on the long term. The year 2008 will be here before 
we know it, but the decisions we make about Iraq will have consequences 
long after the election of 2008.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Am I recognized for 20 minutes under morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.

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