[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 22895-22898]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




SENATE RESOLUTION 303--CENSURING THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

  Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. Harkin) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

                              S. Res. 303

       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE.

       (a) National Security Agency Wiretapping.--The Senate finds 
     the following:
       (1) Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and in so doing 
     provided the executive branch with clear authority to wiretap 
     suspected terrorists inside the United States.
       (2) Section 201 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 states that it and the criminal wiretap law are 
     the ``exclusive means by which electronic surveillance'' may 
     be conducted by the United States Government, and section 109 
     of that Act makes it a crime to wiretap individuals without 
     complying with this statutory authority.
       (3) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 both 
     permits the Government to initiate wiretapping immediately in 
     emergencies as long as the Government obtains approval from 
     the court established under section 103 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) within 
     72 hours of initiating the wiretap, and authorizes wiretaps 
     without a court order otherwise required by the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for the first 15 days 
     following a declaration of war by Congress.
       (4) The Authorization for Use of Military Force that became 
     law on September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 
     note), did not grant the President the power to authorize 
     wiretaps of Americans within the United States without 
     obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
       (5) The President's inherent constitutional authority does 
     not give him the power to violate the explicit statutory 
     prohibition on warrantless wiretaps in the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
       (6) George W. Bush, President of the United States, 
     authorized the National Security Agency to wiretap Americans 
     within the United States without obtaining the court orders 
     required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     for more than 5 years.
       (7) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United 
     States and as Counsel to the President, reviewed and defended 
     the legality of the President's authorization of wiretaps by 
     the National Security Agency of Americans within the United 
     States without the court orders required by the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
       (8) President George W. Bush repeatedly misled the public 
     prior to the public disclosure of the National Security 
     Agency warrantless surveillance program by indicating his 
     Administration was relying on court orders to wiretap 
     suspected terrorists inside the United States.
       (9) Alberto R. Gonzales misled Congress in January 2005 
     during the hearing on his nomination to be Attorney General 
     of the United States by indicating that a question about 
     whether the President has the authority to authorize 
     warrantless wiretaps in violation of statutory prohibitions 
     presented a ``hypothetical situation,'' even though he was 
     fully aware that a warrantless wiretapping program had been 
     ongoing for several years.
       (10) In statements about the supposed need for the National 
     Security Agency warrantless surveillance program after the 
     public disclosure of the program, President George W. Bush 
     falsely implied that the program was necessary because the 
     executive branch did not otherwise have authority to wiretap 
     suspected terrorists inside the United States.
       (11) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, despite his 
     admitted awareness that congressional critics of the program 
     support wiretapping terrorists in accordance with the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of

[[Page 22896]]

     1978, attempted to create the opposite impression by making 
     public statements such as ``[s]ome people will argue that 
     nothing could justify the Government being able to intercept 
     conversations like the ones the Program targets''.
       (12) President George W. Bush inaccurately stated in his 
     January 31, 2006, State of the Union address that 
     ``[p]revious Presidents have used the same constitutional 
     authority I have, and federal courts have approved the use of 
     that authority.'', even though the Administration has failed 
     to identify a single instance since the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 became law in which another 
     President has authorized wiretaps inside the United States 
     without complying with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978, and no Federal court has evaluated whether the 
     President has the inherent authority to authorize wiretaps 
     inside the United States without complying with the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
       (13) At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on February 6, 
     2006, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales defended the 
     President's misleading statements in the January 31, 2006, 
     State of the Union address.
       (14) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales has misled 
     Congress and the American people repeatedly by stating that 
     there was no serious disagreement among Government officials 
     ``about'' or ``relate[d] to'' the National Security Agency 
     program confirmed by the President.
       (15) According to testimony from former Deputy Attorney 
     General James Comey, Alberto R. Gonzales, while serving as 
     Counsel to the President, participated in a visit to then-
     Attorney General John Ashcroft in the intensive care unit of 
     the hospital in an attempt to convince Mr. Ashcroft to 
     overturn the decision by Mr. Comey, then serving as Acting 
     Attorney General due to Mr. Ashcroft's illness, not to 
     certify the legality of a classified intelligence program, in 
     what Mr. Comey described as ``an effort to take advantage of 
     a very sick man''.
       (b) Detainee and Torture Policy.--The Senate finds the 
     following:
       (1) The United States is a party to the Convention Against 
     Torture, the Geneva Conventions, and the International 
     Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
       (2) Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires 
     that detainees in armed conflicts other than those between 
     nations ``shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,'' 
     and the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners 
     of War provides additional protections for detainees who 
     qualify as ``prisoners of war''.
       (3) United States law criminalizes any ``act specifically 
     intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
     suffering'' under sections 2340 and 2340A of title 18, United 
     States Code, and the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441) and 
     recognizes the gravity of such offenses by further providing 
     for civil liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act 
     and the Alien Tort Claims Act.
       (4) In a draft memorandum dated January 25, 2002, Alberto 
     R. Gonzales, in his capacity as Counsel to the President, 
     argued that the protections of the Third Geneva Convention 
     should not be afforded to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees, and 
     described provisions of the Convention as ``quaint'' and 
     ``obsolete''.
       (5) The January 25, 2002, memorandum by then-Counsel to the 
     President Alberto R. Gonzales cited ``reduc[ing] the threat 
     of domestic criminal prosecution'' as a ``positive'' 
     consequence of disavowing the Geneva Conventions' 
     applicability, asserting that such a disavowal ``would 
     provide a solid defense to any future prosecution'' in the 
     event a prosecutor brought charges under the domestic War 
     Crimes Act.
       (6) Secretary of State Colin Powell responded in a January 
     26, 2002, memorandum that such an attempt to evade the Geneva 
     Conventions would ``reverse over a century of U.S. policy and 
     practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine 
     the protections of the rule of law for our troops''.
       (7) Despite the warnings of the Secretary of State and in 
     contravention of the language of the Third Geneva Convention, 
     President George W. Bush announced on February 7, 2002, 
     that--
       (A) he did not consider the Convention to apply to al Qaeda 
     fighters; and
       (B) Taliban detainees would not be entitled to ``prisoner 
     of war'' status under the Convention, despite the fact that 
     Article 5 of the Convention and United States Army 
     regulations expressly require such determinations to be made 
     by a ``competent tribunal''.
       (8) The Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, confirmed 
     that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to 
     Taliban forces and al Qaeda forces, and characterized a 
     central legal premise by which the President sought to avoid 
     the obligations of international law as ``erroneous''.
       (9) Alberto R. Gonzales, acting as Counsel to the 
     President, solicited and accepted the August 1, 2002, Office 
     of Legal Counsel memorandum entitled ``Standards of Conduct 
     for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  2340-2340A'', 
     which took the untenable position that ``mere infliction of 
     pain'' is not ``torture'' unless ``the victim . . . 
     experiences intense pain or suffering of the kind that is 
     equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious 
     physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or 
     permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body 
     function will likely result.''.
       (10) According to the ``Review of Department of Defense 
     Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques'' 
     (the ``Church Report''), issued on March 7, 2005, then-
     Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, 
     authorized the use on Guantanamo Bay detainees of harsh 
     interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual, 
     including stress positions, hooding, the use of military dogs 
     to exploit phobias, prolonged isolation, sensory deprivation, 
     and forcing Muslim men to shave their beards.
       (11) According to the ``Article 15-6 Investigation of 
     CJSOTF-AP [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
     Arabian Peninsula] and 5th SF [Special Forces] Group 
     Detention Operation (Formica Report)'' and Department of 
     Defense documents released under the Freedom of Information 
     Act, Guantanamo Bay detainees were chained to the floor, 
     subjected to loud music, fed only bread and water, and kept 
     for some period of time in cells measuring 4 feet by 4 feet 
     by 20 inches.
       (12) The March 2004 investigative report of Major General 
     Antonio Taguba documented ``sadistic, blatant and wanton 
     criminal abuses'' against detainees at the Abu Ghraib 
     detention facility, including sexual and physical abuse, the 
     threat of torture, the forcing of detainees to perform 
     degrading acts designed to assault their religious identity, 
     and the use of dogs to frighten detainees.
       (13) According to Department of Defense documents released 
     under the Freedom of Information Act, the United States Armed 
     Forces held certain Iraqis as ``ghost detainees,'' who were 
     ``not accounted for'' and were hidden from the observation of 
     the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
       (14) Military autopsy reports and death certificates 
     released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act revealed 
     that at least 39 deaths, and probably more, have occurred 
     among detainees in United States custody overseas, 
     approximately half of which were homicides and 7 of which 
     appear to have been caused by ``strangulation,'' 
     ``asphyxiation'' or fatal ``blunt force injuries''.
       (15) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush stated 
     that he had authorized the incommunicado detention of certain 
     suspected terrorist leaders and operatives at secret sites 
     outside the United States under a ``separate program'' 
     operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (16) President George W. Bush has authorized the indefinite 
     detention, without charge or trial, of more than 700 
     individuals at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the ground that 
     they are ``enemy combatants'' and therefore may be held until 
     the cessation of hostilities under the laws of war.
       (17) Department of Justice lawyers, representing President 
     George W. Bush and the Department of Defense in a Federal 
     lawsuit brought on behalf of Guantanamo detainees, took the 
     unprecedented position that the term ``enemy combatant'' 
     could in theory justify the indefinite detention of a 
     ``little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what 
     she thinks is [a] charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan 
     but is really a front to finance al-Qaeda activities'' and 
     ``a person who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda 
     member''.
       (18) After the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul 
     v. Bush rejected the claim that an alleged ``enemy 
     combatant'' could be detained indefinitely without any 
     meaningful opportunity to challenge the designation, the 
     Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an order on July 7, 2004, 
     creating ``Combatant Status Review Tribunals'' (CSRTs) for 
     the stated purpose of ``review[ing] the detainee's status as 
     an enemy combatant''.
       (19) Such Order--
       (A) did not allow detainees to be represented by counsel in 
     Combatant Status Review Tribunal proceedings, but instead 
     specified that a ``military officer'' would be assigned to 
     ``assist[ ]'' each detainee and required such military 
     officers to inform the detainees that ``I am neither a lawyer 
     nor your advocate,'' and that ``[n]one of the information you 
     provide me shall be held in confidence'';
       (B) allowed the detainee to be excluded from attendance 
     during review proceedings involving ``testimony or other 
     matters that would compromise national security if held in 
     the presence of the detainee'';
       (C) allowed the decision-maker to rely on hearsay evidence 
     and specified that ``[t]he Tribunal is not bound by the rules 
     of evidence such as would apply in a court of law''; and
       (D) specified that ``there shall be a rebuttable 
     presumption in favor of the Government's evidence''.
       (20) The Government has relied on the above procedures to 
     deprive individuals of their liberty for an indefinite period 
     of time without a meaningful opportunity to confront and 
     rebut the evidence on which that detention is predicated.
       (21) President George W. Bush and the Department of Defense 
     designated at least 2

[[Page 22897]]

     United States citizens as ``enemy combatants,'' claimed the 
     right to detain them indefinitely on United States soil 
     without charge and without access to counsel, and argued that 
     allowing meaningful judicial review of their detention would 
     be ``constitutionally intolerable''.
       (22) The Supreme Court established in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
     that meaningful review by a neutral decisionmaker of the 
     detention of United States citizens is constitutionally 
     required, that ``the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a 
     citizen's liberty . . . is very real,'' and that the 
     Constitution mandates that a United States citizen be given a 
     fair opportunity to rebut the Government's ``enemy 
     combatant'' designation.
       (23) The administration, having consistently claimed that 
     according United States citizens designated as ``enemy 
     combatants'' the due process protections accorded to criminal 
     defendants in civilian courts would jeopardize national 
     security interests of the utmost importance, elected to 
     pursue criminal charges against alleged ``enemy combatant'' 
     Jose Padilla in a civilian court after holding him in 
     military custody for 3 years.
       (24) The administration, having contended that alleged 
     ``enemy combatant'' and United States citizen Yaser Esam 
     Hamdi was so dangerous that merely allowing him to meet with 
     counsel ``jeopardizes compelling national security 
     interests'' because he might ``pass concealed messages 
     through unwitting intermediaries,'' released Mr. Hamdi from 
     custody after 3 years and allowed him to return to Saudi 
     Arabia.
       (25) President George W. Bush issued ``Military Order of 
     November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
     Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,'' which authorized 
     the creation of military tribunals to try suspected al Qaeda 
     members and other international terrorist suspects for 
     violations of the law of war.
       (26) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Counsel to the President, in a 
     November 30, 2001, newspaper editorial, defended these 
     military tribunals and misleadingly represented that they 
     would have adequate procedural safeguards, by stating: 
     ``Everyone tried before a military commission will know the 
     charges against him, be represented by qualified counsel and 
     be allowed to present a defense.''.
       (27) The military tribunals' procedural rules as outlined 
     in Military Commission Order No. 1, issued on March 21, 2002, 
     and as subsequently amended--
       (A) permitted the accused and his civilian counsel to be 
     excluded from any part of the proceeding that the presiding 
     officer decided to close, and never learn what was presented 
     during that portion of the proceeding;
       (B) permitted the introduction of any evidence that the 
     presiding officer determined would have probative value to a 
     reasonable person, thereby permitting the admission of 
     hearsay and evidence obtained through undue coercion; and
       (C) restricted appellate review of the commissions to a 
     panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense, followed by 
     review by the Secretary of Defense and a final decision by 
     the President, with no provision for direct appeal to the 
     Federal courts for review by civilian judges.
       (28) Nearly 5 years after the military order was signed, 
     the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld struck down the 
     military commissions as unlawful, finding that--
       (A) the military commissions as constituted were not 
     expressly authorized by any congressional act, including the 
     Authorization for Use of Military Force, the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice (UCMJ), and the Detainee Treatment Act;
       (B) the military commission procedures violated the UCMJ, 
     which mandates that rules governing military commissions be 
     as similar to those governing courts-martial ``as 
     practicable,'' and which affords the accused the right to be 
     present;
       (C) the military commission procedures violated Common 
     Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which is part of the 
     ``law of war'' under UCMJ Article 21 and requires trial in 
     ``a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
     guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
     peoples''.
       (29) President George W. Bush sought to prevent the 
     Guantanamo detainees from obtaining judicial review of their 
     indefinite confinement by claiming that the writ of habeas 
     corpus was categorically unavailable to non-citizens held at 
     Guantanamo Bay.
       (30) The Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush squarely rejected 
     this claim, holding that the legal precedent on which the 
     President relied ``plainly does not preclude the exercise of 
     [statutory habeas] jurisdiction'' over the detainees' claims, 
     and that the general presumption against extraterritorial 
     application of a statute, cited by the President, ``certainly 
     has no application'' with respect to detainees at Guantanamo 
     Bay where the United States exercises ``complete jurisdiction 
     and control''.
       (c) United States Attorney Firings and Executive 
     Privilege.--The Senate finds the following:
       (1) At least 9 United States Attorneys were told in 2006 
     that they must step down under the authority of President 
     George W. Bush, who had the final decision-making power in 
     terminating the employment of United States Attorneys.
       (2) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and subordinates 
     under his supervision repeatedly misled Congress and 
     attempted to block legitimate congressional oversight efforts 
     concerning the firing of at least nine United States 
     Attorneys.
       (3) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales repeatedly 
     obscured the true scope of the firings, originally declining 
     to cite a specific number of individuals fired in his 
     testimony on January 18, 2007, acknowledging only seven in 
     his USA Today op-ed published on March 6, 2007, acknowledging 
     eight firings in his testimony on April 19, 2007, tacitly 
     conceding there had been nine individuals fired in his 
     testimony on May 10, 2007, and testifying on July 24, 2007, 
     that ``there may have been others'' but he did not know the 
     exact number.
       (4) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales initially 
     characterized the firings as ``an overblown personnel 
     matter,'' claiming that the United States Attorneys had lost 
     his confidence and were fired for ``performance reasons'' 
     when many of those same individuals had received only the 
     highest performance reviews prior to their dismissal.
       (5) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified before 
     the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he would ``never, ever 
     make a change in a United States attorney for political 
     reasons,'' but in later testimony on April 19, 2007, and July 
     24, 2007, admitted that he does not know who selected each 
     individual United States Attorney for firing or why they were 
     included on the list of United States Attorneys to be fired.
       (6) Prior to their selection for firing, both former New 
     Mexico United States Attorney David Iglesias and former 
     Washington United States Attorney John McKay received 
     inappropriate phone calls from Members of Congress or their 
     staffs regarding ongoing, politically sensitive 
     investigations and the White House received complaints about 
     the manner in which they were conducting those 
     investigations.
       (7) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified before 
     the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he would not fire a 
     United States Attorney ``if it would in any way jeopardize an 
     ongoing serious investigation,'' but later testified, as did 
     his subordinates, that concerns about whether ongoing 
     investigations would be jeopardized were not explored prior 
     to the firings and were specifically ignored when some fired 
     United States Attorneys asked for a delay in their departure 
     dates to allow them to wrap up ongoing investigations.
       (8) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on 
     March 13, 2007, that he was ``not involved in seeing any 
     memos, was not involved in any discussions about what was 
     going on'' regarding the process leading up to the firing of 
     the United States Attorneys, but later testimony from his 
     subordinates and documents released by the Department of 
     Justice indicate that the Attorney General was, in fact, 
     regularly briefed on the process and did receive at least one 
     memo in November 2005 regarding the planned firings.
       (9) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on 
     May 15, 2007, that Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty's 
     participation in the firing of the United States Attorneys 
     was of central importance to the validity of the process and 
     to the Attorney General's decision to fire the specific 
     individuals, but he had previously testified on April 19, 
     2007, that he did not discuss the process with Mr. McNulty 
     prior to firing the United States Attorneys, and that 
     ``looking back . . . I would have had the deputy attorney 
     general more involved, directly involved''.
       (10) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testified on May 
     10, 2007, that, after the start of the congressional 
     investigation into the firings, he had refrained from 
     discussing the firings with anyone involved because he did 
     not want to interfere with the ongoing investigations, but 
     former White House Liaison for the Department of Justice, 
     Monica Goodling, testified on May 23, 2007, that the Attorney 
     General spoke with her in late March of 2007 and ``laid out . 
     . . his general recollection . . . of some of the process 
     regarding the replacement of the United States Attorneys.''
       (11) Former White House Liaison for the Department of 
     Justice, Monica Goodling, also testified on May 23, 2007, 
     that she did not respond to what Attorney General Alberto R. 
     Gonzales said about his recollection because ``I did not know 
     if it was appropriate for us to both be discussing our 
     recollections of what had happened, and I just thought maybe 
     we shouldn't have that conversation.''
       (12) President George W. Bush has consistently stonewalled 
     congressional attempts at oversight by refusing to turn over 
     White House documents relating to the firing of at least 9 
     United States Attorneys and refusing to allow current or 
     former White House officials to testify before Congress on 
     this matter, based on an excessively broad and legally 
     insufficient assertion of executive privilege.
       (13) President George W. Bush has asserted executive 
     privilege in refusing even to turn over correspondence 
     between non-Executive Branch officials and White House 
     officials concerning the firings of at least 9 United

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     States Attorneys, even though such communications could not 
     reasonably be classified as falling within the privilege.
       (14) President George W. Bush has directed at least two 
     staff members, former and current, to ignore congressional 
     subpoenas altogether, ordering former Counsel to the 
     President Harriet Miers and current Deputy Chief of Staff and 
     Senior Adviser to the President Karl Rove not to appear at 
     Congressional oversight hearings based on the assertion that 
     immediate presidential advisors are ``immune from compelled 
     Congressional testimony about matters that arose during 
     [their] tenure,'' rather than simply instructing them to 
     refrain from answering questions that might be covered by a 
     proper assertion of executive privilege.
       (15) President George W. Bush has refused to work to find a 
     compromise with Congress or otherwise accommodate legitimate 
     congressional oversight efforts, disregarding the proper 
     relationship between the executive and legislative branches 
     and demonstrating a belief that he and his Administration are 
     above oversight and the rule of law.
       (d) Misleading Statements on the USA Patriot Act.--The 
     Senate finds the following:
       (1) President George W. Bush made misleading claims during 
     the course of the Administration's 2005 campaign to 
     reauthorize the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, by suggesting that 
     Federal officials did not have access to the same tools to 
     investigate terrorism as they did to investigate other 
     crimes.
       (2) In 2005 the Federal Bureau of Investigation transmitted 
     to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales multiple reports of 
     violations of law in connection with provisions of the USA 
     PATRIOT Act and related authorities, including unauthorized 
     surveillance and improper collection of communications data 
     that were serious enough to require notification of the 
     President's Intelligence Oversight Board.
       (3) Despite these reports, Attorney General Alberto R. 
     Gonzales told Congress and the American people in the course 
     of the Administration's 2005 campaign to reauthorize the USA 
     PATRIOT Act of 2001 that ``[t]he track record established 
     over the past three years has demonstrated the effectiveness 
     of the safeguards of civil liberties put in place when the 
     Act was passed,'' that ``[t]here has not been one verified 
     case of civil liberties abuse,'' and that ``no one has 
     provided me with evidence that the Patriot Act is being 
     abused or misused''.
       (4) The United States Department of Justice sent a 10-page 
     letter to Congress dated November 23, 2005--
       (A) stating that a November 6, 2005, Washington Post story 
     detailing the Federal Bureau of Investigation's use of 
     National Security Letters was a ``materially misleading 
     portrayal'' full of ``distortions and factual errors'';
       (B) defending its use of National Security Letters by 
     pointing to the Department's ``robust mechanisms for checking 
     misuse,'' ``significant internal oversight and checks,'' and 
     reports to Congress regarding the number of National Security 
     Letters issued; and
       (C) stating that the November 6, 2005, Washington Post 
     story was inaccurate in stating that ``The FBI now issues 
     more than 30,000 National Security Letters a year, . . . a 
     hundredfold increase over historic norms.''.
       (5) On March 9, 2007, the Inspector General for the United 
     States Department of Justice issued a report on the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation's use of National Security Letters 
     from 2003 through 2005--
       (A) that the Inspector General said found ``widespread and 
     serious misuse of the FBI's national security letter 
     authorities'' that ``in many instances . . . violated NSL 
     statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, or the FBI's own 
     internal policies,'' and found that ``the FBI did not provide 
     adequate guidance, adequate controls, or adequate training on 
     the use of these sensitive authorities''; and
       (B) that indicated the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     issued approximately 39,000 National Security Letter requests 
     in 2003, 56,000 National Security Letter requests in 2004, 
     and 47,000 National Security Letter requests in 2005.
       (6) The United States Department of Justice sent a letter 
     on March 9, 2007, to Congress, admitting that it had 
     ``determined that certain statements in our November 23, 2005 
     letter need clarification'' in light of the Inspector 
     General's findings and that ``the reports [The Department of 
     Justice] provided Congress in response to statutory reporting 
     requirements did not accurately reflect the FBI's use of 
     NSLs''.
       (e) Signing Statements.--The Senate finds the following:
       (1) President George W. Bush has lodged more than 800 
     challenges to duly enacted provisions of law by issuing 
     signing statements that indicate that the President does not 
     believe he must comply with such provisions of law.
       (2) Such signing statements effectively assign to the 
     executive branch alone the decision whether to fully comply 
     with the laws that Congress has passed.
       (3) On December 30, 2005, President George W. Bush signed 
     the Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental 
     Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, 
     and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, title X of which prohibits 
     the Government from subjecting any individual ``in the 
     custody or under the physical control of the United States 
     Government, regardless of nationality or physical location'' 
     to ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment''.
       (4) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to 
     such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply 
     with the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and 
     degrading treatment, stating: ``The executive branch shall 
     construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to 
     detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
     authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive 
     branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the 
     constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will 
     assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and 
     the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the 
     American people from further terrorist attacks.''.
       (5) On March 9, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the 
     USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
     which requires that the executive branch furnish reports to 
     Congress on certain surveillance activities.
       (6) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to 
     such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply 
     fully with these reporting requirements, stating: ``The 
     executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 
     that call for furnishing information to entities outside the 
     executive branch, such as sections 106A and 119, in a manner 
     consistent with the President's constitutional authority to 
     supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold 
     information the disclosure of which could impair foreign 
     relations, national security, the deliberative processes of 
     the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's 
     constitutional duties.''.
       (7) On December 20, 2006, President George W. Bush signed 
     the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, which protects 
     certain classes of sealed domestic mail from being opened 
     except in specifically defined circumstances.
       (8) President George W. Bush issued a signing statement to 
     such Act that suggested he believed he did not have to comply 
     with this provision, stating: ``The executive branch shall 
     construe subsection 404(c) of title 39, as enacted by 
     subsection 1010(e) of the Act, which provides for opening of 
     an item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against 
     inspection, in a manner consistent, to the maximum extent 
     permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent 
     circumstances, such as to protect human life and safety 
     against hazardous materials, and the need for physical 
     searches specifically authorized by law for foreign 
     intelligence collection.''
       (9) The American Bar Association Task Force on Presidential 
     Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
     concluded that President George W. Bush's misuse of signing 
     statements ``weaken[s] our cherished system of checks and 
     balances and separation of powers''.

     SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE SENATE.

       The Senate censures George W. Bush, President of the United 
     States, and Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the 
     United States, and condemns their lengthy record of--
       (1) undermining the rule of law and the separation of 
     powers;
       (2) disregarding statutes, treaties ratified by the United 
     States, and the Constitution; and
       (3) repeatedly misleading the American people.

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