[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 16]
[House]
[Pages 22771-22783]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1915
 IMPROVING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE TO DEFEND THE NATION AND 
                      THE CONSTITUTION ACT OF 2007

  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 3356) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain electronic 
surveillance.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3356

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Improving Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance to Defend the Nation and the 
     Constitution Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

       The purpose of this Act is to facilitate the acquisition of 
     foreign intelligence information by providing for the 
     electronic surveillance of persons reasonably believed to be 
     outside the United States pursuant to methodologies proposed 
     by the Attorney General, reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court, and applied by the Attorney General 
     without further court approval, unless otherwise required 
     under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).

[[Page 22772]]



     SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING CERTAIN 
                   ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting 
     after section 105 the following:


   ``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS OUTSIDE THE 
                             UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105A.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     Act, a court order is not required for the acquisition of the 
     contents of any communication between persons that are not 
     located within the United States for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information, without respect 
     to whether the communication passes through the United States 
     or the surveillance device is located within the United 
     States.


 ``ADDITIONAL PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING CERTAIN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

       ``Sec. 105B.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this title, the Attorney General, upon the 
     authorization of the President, may apply to a judge of the 
     court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, 
     or an extension of an order, authorizing electronic 
     surveillance for periods of not more than 1 year, for the 
     purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information, in 
     accordance with this section.
       ``(b) Application.--
       ``(1) Specific persons and places not required.--An 
     application for an order, or extension of an order, submitted 
     under subsection (a) shall not be required to identify--
       ``(A) the persons, other than a foreign power, against whom 
     electronic surveillance will be directed; or
       ``(B) the specific facilities, places, premises, or 
     property at which the electronic surveillance will be 
     directed.
       ``(2) Contents.--An application for an order, or extension 
     of an order, submitted under subsection (a) shall include--
       ``(A) a statement that the electronic surveillance is 
     directed at persons reasonably believed to be outside the 
     United States;
       ``(B) the identity of the Federal officer seeking to 
     conduct such electronic surveillance;
       ``(C) a description of--
       ``(i) the methods to be used by the Attorney General to 
     determine, during the duration of the order, that there is a 
     reasonable belief that the targets of the electronic 
     surveillance are persons outside the United States; and
       ``(ii) the procedures to audit the implementation of the 
     methods described in clause (i) to achieve the objective 
     described in that clause;
       ``(D) a description of the nature of the information 
     sought, including the identity of any foreign power against 
     whom electronic surveillance will be directed; and
       ``(E) a statement of the means by which the electronic 
     surveillance will be effected and such other information 
     about the surveillance techniques to be used as may be 
     necessary to assess the proposed minimization procedures.
       ``(c) Application Approval; Order.--
       ``(1) Application approval.--A judge considering an 
     application for an order, or extension of an order, submitted 
     under subsection (a) shall approve such application if the 
     Attorney General certifies in writing under oath, and the 
     judge upon consideration of the application determines, 
     that--
       ``(A) the acquisition does not constitute electronic 
     surveillance within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (3) of 
     section 101(f);
       ``(B) the methods described by the Attorney General under 
     subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) are reasonably designed to determine 
     whether the persons are outside the United States;
       ``(C) a significant purpose of the electronic surveillance 
     is to obtain foreign intelligence information;
       ``(D) the proposed minimization procedures meet the 
     definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h).
       ``(2) Order.--A judge approving an application pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall issue an order that--
       ``(A) authorizes electronic surveillance as requested, or 
     as modified by the judge;
       ``(B) requires a communications service provider, 
     custodian, or other person who has the lawful authority to 
     access the information, facilities, or technical assistance 
     necessary to accomplish the electronic surveillance, upon the 
     request of the applicant, to furnish the applicant forthwith 
     with such information, facilities, or technical assistance in 
     a manner that will protect the secrecy of the electronic 
     surveillance and produce a minimum of interference with the 
     services that provider, custodian, or other person is 
     providing the target of electronic surveillance;
       ``(C) requires such communications service provider, 
     custodian, or other person, upon the request of the 
     applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved by 
     the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the 
     aid furnished;
       ``(D) directs the Federal Government to compensate, at the 
     prevailing rate, a person for providing information, 
     facilities, or assistance pursuant to such order; and
       ``(E) directs the applicant to follow the minimization 
     procedures as proposed or as modified by the court.
       ``(3) Assessment of compliance with minimization 
     procedures.--At or before the end of the period of time for 
     which electronic surveillance is approved by an order or an 
     extension under this section, the judge may assess compliance 
     with the minimization procedures by reviewing the 
     circumstances under which information concerning United 
     States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.
       ``(d) Guidelines for Surveillance of United States 
     Persons.--Not later than 15 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, the Attorney General shall 
     establish guidelines that are reasonably designed to ensure 
     that an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise 
     required by this Act, when the Attorney General seeks to 
     initiate electronic surveillance, or continue electronic 
     surveillance that began under this section, of a United 
     States person.
       ``(e) Submission of Orders, Guidelines, and Audits.--
       ``(1) Orders.--Upon the entry of an order under subsection 
     (c)(2), the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress such order.
       ``(2) Guidelines.--Upon the establishment of the guidelines 
     under subsection (d), the Attorney General shall submit to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress and the court 
     established under section 103(a) such guidelines.
       ``(3) Audits.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and every 60 days thereafter until 
     the expiration of all orders issued under this section, the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete 
     an audit on the compliance with the guidelines established 
     under subsection (d) and shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, and the court established under 
     section 103(a)--
       ``(A) the results of such audit;
       ``(B) a list of any targets of electronic surveillance 
     under this section determined to be in the United States; and
       ``(C) the number of persons in the United States whose 
     communications have been intercepted under this section.
       ``(f) Immediate Emergency Authorization.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this title, during the first 15 days following the date of 
     the enactment of this section, upon the authorization of the 
     President, the Attorney General may authorize electronic 
     surveillance without a court order under this title until the 
     date that is 15 days after the date on which the Attorney 
     General authorizes such electronic surveillance if the 
     Attorney General determines--
       ``(A) that an emergency situation exists with respect to 
     the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign 
     intelligence information before an order authorizing such 
     surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and
       ``(B) the electronic surveillance will be directed at 
     persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
       ``(2) Pending order.--
       ``(A) Initial extension.--If at the end of the period in 
     which the Attorney General authorizes electronic surveillance 
     under paragraph (1), the Attorney General has submitted an 
     application for an order under subsection (a) but the court 
     referred to in section 103(a) has not approved or disapproved 
     such application, such court may authorize the Attorney 
     General to extend the emergency authorization of electronic 
     surveillance under paragraph (1) for not more than 15 days.
       ``(B) Subsequent extension.--If at the end of the extension 
     of the emergency authorization of electronic surveillance 
     under subparagraph (A) the court referred to in section 
     103(a) has not approved or disapproved the application 
     referred to in subparagraph (A), such court may authorize the 
     Attorney General to extend the emergency authorization of 
     electronic surveillance under paragraph (1) for not more than 
     15 days.
       ``(3) Maximum length of authorization.--Notwithstanding 
     paragraphs (1) and (2), in no case shall electronic 
     surveillance be authorized under this subsection for a total 
     of more than 45 days without a court order under this title.
       ``(4) Minimization procedures.--The Attorney General shall 
     ensure that any electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) or (2) is in accordance with minimization 
     procedures that meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures in section 101(h).
       ``(5) Information, facilities, and technical assistance.--
     Pursuant to an authorization of electronic surveillance under 
     this subsection, the Attorney General may direct a 
     communications service provider, custodian, or other person 
     who has the lawful authority to access the information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
     such electronic surveillance to--
       ``(A) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner 
     that will protect the secrecy of the electronic surveillance 
     and produce a minimum of interference with the services that 
     provider, custodian, or other person is providing the target 
     of electronic surveillance; and

[[Page 22773]]

       ``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished.
       ``(g) Prohibition on Liability for Providing Assistance.--
     Section 105(i), relating to protection from liability for the 
     furnishing of information, facilities, or technical 
     assistance pursuant to a court order under this Act, shall 
     apply to this section.
       ``(h) Effect of Section on Other Authorities.--The 
     authority under this section is in addition to the authority 
     to conduct electronic surveillance under sections 104 and 
     105.
       ``(i) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' 
     means--
       ``(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
       ``(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended 
     by inserting after the item relating to section 105 the 
     following:

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of persons 
              outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Additional procedure for authorizing certain electronic 
              surveillance.''.

       (c) Sunset.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     effective on the date that is 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, sections 105A and 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by subsection 
     (a), are hereby repealed.
       (2) Exception.--Any order under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by this Act, 
     in effect on such date that is 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, shall continue in effect until the 
     date of the expiration of such order.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.


                             General Leave

  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on the bill under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Texas, Silvestre Reyes, chairman of the Committee on 
Intelligence, and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to control 
that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  There probably is no Member in this body who has a greater concern 
about civil rights and civil liberties than this Member. It is a cause 
I have worked on for all of my years in this body, and it is one that 
goes to the very heart of the protections provided under the 
Constitution and our Bill of Rights.
  I am equally sensitive to the need to protect our Nation from 
terrorism and terrorists. I have chaired recently three classified 
briefings on this matter in the last week and have spent the last 
period of time seeking to forge common ground on this issue.
  That is why we are here today, to ensure that our government has the 
tools it needs to respond to the threat of terrorism, while at the same 
time respecting our citizens' right to privacy.
  That is why the bill before us permits the Attorney General to apply 
to the FISA court to obtain a basket of warrants for the surveillance 
aimed outside of the United States. That is why we provide an emergency 
exception. That is why we specify that foreign-to-foreign 
communications do not require a court order. These are all changes to 
current law that will help our Nation respond to the threat of 
terrorism.
  At the same time, however, the legislation is respectful of our civil 
liberties. That is why we sunset the bill in 4 months, to see if this 
stop gap approach is working, how it is working, and allow us to gather 
further information. That is why we require that the court approve 
international surveillance procedures. That is why we insist on 
periodic audits. None of these safeguards exist under the current law, 
and all will serve to protect our precious rights and liberties.
  The bill before us today responds to each and every concern raised by 
the distinguished Director of National Intelligence in our 
negotiations. In particular, yesterday he asked us to make three 
changes: expanding the bill to cover foreign intelligence; allowing the 
administration to approve guidelines for recurring communications; and 
allowing additional foreign targets to be added to the warrant by the 
court. I was concerned that some of these changes may have gone too 
far, but in the spirit of accommodation we made all three changes. 
Sometimes people simply don't want to accept ``yes'' for an answer.
  I urge every Member in this body to support this important and 
balanced measure.
  Madam Speaker, I include for the Record today's New York Times 
editorial entitled ``Stampeding Congress, Again.''

                       [From the New York Times]

                       Stampeding Congress, Again

       Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration 
     has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not feel bound by 
     the law or the Constitution when it comes to the war on 
     terror. It cannot even be trusted to properly use the 
     enhanced powers it was legally granted after the attacks.
       Yet, once again, President Bush has been trying to stampede 
     Congress into a completely unnecessary expansion of his power 
     to spy on Americans. And, hard as it is to believe, 
     Congressional Republicans seem bent on collaborating, while 
     Democrats (who can still be cowed by the White House's with-
     us-or-against-us baiting) aren't doing enough to stop it.
       The fight is over the 1978 Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act, which requires the government to obtain a 
     warrant before eavesdropping on electronic communications 
     that involve someone in the United States. The test is 
     whether there is probably cause to believe that the person 
     being communicated with is an agent of a foreign power or a 
     terrorist.
       Mr. Bush decided after 9/11 that he was no longer going to 
     obey that law. He authorized the National Security Agency to 
     intercept international telephone calls and e-mail messages 
     of Americans and other residents of this country without a 
     court order. He told the public nothing and Congress next to 
     nothing about what he was doing, until The Times disclosed 
     the spying in December 2005.
       Ever since, the White House has tried to pressure Congress 
     into legalizing Mr. Bush's rogue operation. Most recently, it 
     seized on a secret court ruling that spotlighted a technical 
     way in which the 1978 law has not kept pace with the Internet 
     era.
       The government may freely monitor communications when both 
     parties are outside the United States, but must get a warrant 
     aimed at a specific person for communications that originate 
     or end in his country. The Los Angeles Times reported 
     yesterday that the court that issues such warrants recently 
     ruled that the law also requires that the government seek 
     such an individualized warrant for purely foreign 
     communications that, nevertheless, move through American data 
     networks.
       Instead of asking Congress to address this anachronism, as 
     it should, the White House sought to use it to destroy the 
     1978 spying law. It proposed giving the attorney general 
     carte blanche to order eavesdropping on any international 
     telephone calls or e-mail messages if he decided on his own 
     that there was a ``reasonable belief'' that the target of the 
     surveillance was outside the United States. The attorney 
     general's decision would not be subject to court approval or 
     any supervision.
       The White House, of course, insisted that Congress must do 
     this right away, before the August recess that begins on 
     Monday--the same false urgency it used to manipulate Congress 
     into passing the Patriot Act without reading it and approving 
     the appalling Military Commissions Act of 2006.
       Senator Jay Rockefeller, the chairman of the Senate 
     Intelligence Committee, offered a sensible alternative law, 
     as did his fellow Democrat, Senator Russ Feingold. In either 
     case, the attorney general would be able to get a broad 
     warrant to intercept foreign communications routed through 
     American networks for a limited period. Then, he would have 
     to justify the spying in court. This fix would have an 
     expiration date so Congress could then dispassionately 
     consider what permanent changes might be needed to FISA.
       Congress was debating this issue yesterday, and the final 
     outcome was unclear. But there are very clear lines that must 
     not be crossed.

[[Page 22774]]

       First, all electronic surveillance of communication that 
     originates or ends in the United States must be subject to 
     approval and review by the FISA court under the 1978 law. 
     (That court, by the way, has rejected only one warrant in the 
     last two years.)
       Second, any measure Congress approves now must have a firm 
     expiration date. Closed-door-meetings under the pressure of a 
     looming vacation are no place for such serious business.
       The administration and its Republican supporters in 
     Congress argue that American intelligence is blinded by FISA 
     and have seized on neatly timed warnings of heightened 
     terrorist activity to scare everyone. It is vital for 
     Americans, especially law-makers, to resist that argument. It 
     is pure propaganda.
       This is not, and has never been, a debate over whether the 
     United States should conduct effective surveillance of 
     terrorists and their supporters. It is over whether we are a 
     nation ruled by law, or the whims of men in power. Mr. Bush 
     faced that choice and made the wrong one. Congress must not 
     follow him off the cliff.

  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, this bill should be opposed by anyone who wants to 
protect America from terrorists.
  It is a pitiful sight to see the majority denying the Director of 
National Intelligence the tools he needs to protect our country from 
terrorist attacks. The director warned Congress that ``the House 
proposal would not allow me to carry out my responsibility to provide 
warning and to protect the Nation, especially in our heightened threat 
environment.''
  According to the Director, the current Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, or FISA, does not allow the intelligence 
community to be effective. Specifically, the Director is unable to 
collect crucial information involving foreign terrorists.
  Neither the Constitution nor Federal law restricts the ability of law 
enforcement or intelligence agents to monitor overseas communications; 
however, the bill would require the Director to obtain a court order to 
monitor calls from a foreign country to the United States. For 
instance, a foreign terrorist in Iraq who calls another terrorist in 
New York City would require or could require a court order. That 
jeopardizes American lives.
  We are a Nation at war with foreign terrorists who continue to plan 
deadly attacks against America. We have an urgent need to modernize the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
  Telecommunications technology has evolved dramatically over the last 
30 years. Terrorist tactics are constantly changing in response to our 
efforts to disrupt their plots, and essential tools that we use must be 
modernized to keep up with this changing environment.
  The safety of Americans depends on action by Congress. Al Qaeda 
recently released a video promising a big surprise in coming weeks. 
This threat, along with other activity, has heightened the concern 
among our intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, this bill fails to 
provide the fix that the Director has repeatedly told us is urgent.
  First, the bill sunsets in 120 days. In 4 months, we will be right 
back where we started, dealing with the issue once again.
  Second, the bill imposes bureaucratic requirements on the FISA 
process that will hamper efforts to protect America.
  Third, the bill will interject the FISA court into a role that it has 
never had before. The bill will make it harder for the Director to do 
his job.
  The majority could have solved the problem months ago. In April, the 
Director submitted to Congress a comprehensive proposal to modernize 
FISA. That proposal should already have been enacted. The majority 
failed to do so.
  I hope, Madam Speaker, that there are no attacks before we revisit 
the issue and do what we should have done today. I urge my colleagues 
to oppose this legislation.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, we are in times of peril for a great 
country. All of us I think agree on that.
  As I listened to the previous debates, the one providing assistance 
to Minnesota and also the one discussing the resolution prior to us 
coming on the floor, I was reflecting on the many men and women around 
the world that right now are putting their lives on the line to keep 
this country safe. They don't do it for glory; they don't do it for 
fame. They do it with an inherent trust in us that we will do the right 
thing to provide them the proper tools to do their jobs and keep us 
safe. That is what this bill does.
  Mike McConnell, the Director of the National Intelligence Service, 
came to us and asked us for three things initially.
  We gave him those three things. He told us we were at a time of 
heightened threats. We recognize that; so we worked in a bipartisan 
manner with the DNI to craft a bill, only to be told that it wasn't 
everything that he needed, yesterday.

                              {time}  1930

  We can't afford to leave and go on recess without passing this 
critical piece of legislation. This piece of legislation that sunsets 
in 120 days gives him the tools that he needs to keep us safe and to 
keep the trust with those men and women around the world that expect us 
to do the right thing.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished minority whip, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  This is clearly a critical debate. The spirit of the chairmen, 
Chairman Reyes and Chairman Conyers both, are exactly right in our need 
to solve this. My concern is that we're not in a place where we're 
about to solve it yet. The very worst thing I actually think we could 
do is pass a bill, have the Senate pass a separate bill, all go home 
and say we tried to solve this problem and didn't get it solved.
  I'm most concerned, in this effort to get two-thirds of the Members 
to agree, that the Director of National Intelligence thinks this bill 
isn't the right bill and apparently our friends on the other side of 
the building are not in agreement yet that this is the right bill. I 
just say, whatever we do, let's not cast a vote here only so we can say 
we did something. Let's figure out how to do something that exactly 
makes a difference. Let's figure out how to do something that gets 
signed into law. Let's figure out how to do something so that these 
enemies of ours, truly we're doing everything we can to listen to what 
they say, to try to track their actions, to try to anticipate what 
they're going to do.
  This is clearly a very dangerous time for the country and the world. 
It's easier to follow up on the activities under our law of organized 
crime or even white collar crime than it is at this moment to follow up 
on the activities of our enemies in the terrorist camps of the world.
  I hope, Madam Speaker, that we don't just take a vote for the sake of 
having a vote and, if this bill does fail, we all continue to work for 
however long is necessary to arrive at an agreement in this building 
that winds up with a bill on the President's desk that winds up with 
our intelligence agencies doing everything they can.
  Mr. CONYERS. I am now pleased to recognize the chairman of the 
Constitution Subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, Jerry Nadler, 
for 1 minute.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, we were told by the administration, by the 
Director of National Intelligence, a couple of weeks ago that they 
needed two things: They needed to clarify that we didn't need a court 
order for a foreign-to-foreign communications. This bill does it. They 
needed an assurance that telecommunications companies would be 
compelled to assist in gathering of national security information under 
this bill. This bill contains it.
  Yesterday, we were told they needed three more things: They needed 
that we should deal with not just relating to terrorism but to matters 
relating to our foreign intelligence. It's in this bill. We were told 
we should eliminate the requirement that the FISA Court adjudicate our 
recurring communications to the U.S. from foreign targets

[[Page 22775]]

would be handled. It's in this bill. We were told that we should allow 
for foreign targets to be added to the basket warrant after the warrant 
was approved. It's in this bill.
  The DNI, Admiral McConnell, said that this bill would significantly 
enhance America's security until he spoke to the White House, and now 
he changes politically, and he says we need more. This is the bill that 
gives them everything they said they needed. It's the bill we should 
pass to protect our civil liberties, and we should go no further.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Franks), a member of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. I thank the gentleman.
  Madam Speaker, over the past three decades, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act has become increasingly archaic, and our intelligence 
community has been inhibited from acting with speed and agility to 
conduct necessary surveillance of foreign targets. The consequence of 
missing terrorist communications materialized before our eyes on the 
morning of 9/11; and, Madam Speaker, in the eyes of our enemy, 9/11 is 
only the beginning.
  Madam Speaker, if we knew exactly where every terrorist in the world 
was at this moment, the war on jihad would be, in practical terms, over 
in about 6 weeks. However, in this 21st century, it is intelligence 
that is our most critical challenge. Without intelligence, our entire 
national defense structure is rendered ineffective and the lives of 
millions of Americans are placed at the mercy of an enemy possessed 
with a merciless ideology and a relentless vision of the Western World 
in nuclear flames.
  Just this week, Madam Speaker, a new al Qaeda propaganda ad appeared 
on the Internet entitled, ``Wait for the Big Surprise.'' And it closed 
with these words: ``Soon, God willing.''
  Just today, Madam Speaker, the Director of National Intelligence 
issued an unequivocal statement that the bill we are now considering is 
an unacceptable solution and one that would keep him from fulfilling 
his duty to anticipate threats and to protect our Nation.
  Madam Speaker, al Qaeda will not adjourn when we do. Today, this 
night, is our opportunity to address this vital issue. If we let 
partisan bickering cause us to fail, we should start now to write our 
apology to the children of the next generation who may see nuclear 
jihad and the generation beyond that that may see dangers beyond our 
imagination.
  Madam Speaker, we must not fail.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, it is now my privilege to yield 3 minutes 
to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney).
  Mr. TIERNEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Madam Speaker, for some time now, for months, the administration has 
been contending that it needed relief from a warrant obligation to 
intercept communications between a foreign agent and a foreign agent. 
But we all know that doesn't apply. You don't need a warrant in those 
situations. So it has long been our contention that that wasn't needed 
and we did not need to approve the administration's sweeping request 
for the authority to tap every American citizen based on that premise. 
We offered legislation to just clarify that fact, and the Republicans 
voted against it, and the administration turned it down.
  Now, last week, the DNI came forward and informed us of a critical 
collection gap in electronic surveillance. So we went to work again and 
met with the DNI to try to resolve and identify just what it was and 
negotiate a resolution. We did that despite the fact the administration 
has been withholding documentation that would help us do that.
  But now the President has started to politicize it. He took to the 
airwaves and began pressing for essentially warrantless surveillance 
and searches on all Americans' phone calls, e-mails, homes, offices and 
personal records for at least 3 months and probably a lot longer than 
that by virtue of heading all the way through the appeals process.
  He also sought authority to search concerning a person abroad. Didn't 
even have to target a person abroad, a foreign person. In other words, 
the search did not have to be directed in that direction, just 
concerning a person abroad.
  It would also authorize any search inside the United States if the 
government can claim it concerns an al Qaeda or affiliate.
  And it also sought authority for the Attorney General to authorize 
surveillance into and out of the United States with a court review only 
to determine that the procedures of the Attorney General clearly were 
erroneous; and, even if they found that, it was only advisory, 
apparently, because there was no remedy. No review or audit by a 
Department of Justice Inspector General to see how this was 
implemented. No sunset provision forcing review. Essentially an 
indefinite suspension of our constitutional rights and our civil 
liberties. Based on the word of this Attorney General? This one? And 
this President?
  Intercepts United States citizens without finding a foreign agent is 
involved; rather, only that the conversations were believed. By this 
Attorney General? To concern people that were involved with al Qaeda? 
For any foreign intelligence, not just those related to terror or al 
Qaeda-related. No clerk, no judge, nobody in the balance to review 
this. No sunset.
  The rule of law is still critical in this country. It is exactly when 
the government thinks that it can be the sole fair arbiter that we most 
need a judicial system to stand in and strike the balance. Even after 
our leadership agreed to do what the DNI mostly wanted, this 
administration still turned it down, still was on TV, still 
politicizing this effort.
  Let's tell the President that we don't need a politician right now in 
the White House, we need a leader, somebody to stand up and draw this 
country together, somebody to make sure that we get the intelligence we 
need, that knows how to say ``yes'' when the DNI's requests are done.
  The President went on TV saying that when the DNI told him that the 
deal was acceptable, that the war would work, he would accept it. Well, 
when the DNI talked to Democrats and leadership and said he was fine 
with what they suggested, a change would work, he went back to the 
White House and instead we got this sweeping law.
  Let's make our Constitution work. We can have security and our civil 
liberties.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my friend and 
colleague from Texas and a member of the Homeland Security Committee 
(Mr. McCaul).
  Mr. McCAUL of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Madam Speaker, our most solemn duty in the United States Congress is 
to protect the American people; and while this bill may be well 
intentioned, it fails to do that. In fact, just the opposite. It puts 
the American people in great danger.
  Before running for Congress, I worked in the Justice Department. I 
worked on national security, wiretaps or FISAs. The intention of the 
FISA Act was never to apply to agents of a foreign power in a foreign 
country. It was to apply to agents of a foreign power in this country. 
This bill does just the opposite. It expands it to bar a collection of 
foreign intelligence on foreign targets in foreign countries.
  FISA is a cumbersome and time-consuming process. I am concerned that 
if we cannot collect intelligence overseas that we cannot protect our 
war fighter in the battlefield. We put them in danger, and we put the 
citizens of this country in danger.
  We all know that al Qaeda is looking at hitting us again. It may be 
very soon. And with the anniversary of 9/11 approaching, we must do 
everything we can to protect her.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am happy to yield to the Chair of the 
Immigration subcommittee in the House of Representatives Judiciary 
Committee, Zoe Lofgren of California, 1 minute.
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Madam Speaker, I think that there is

[[Page 22776]]

common ground here in the House despite some of the comments we have 
just met. We all know from the press reports and Admiral McConnell 
himself that there is a need to make sure that we intercept 
communications, foreign to foreign, and I think there is 100 percent 
agreement in this House on that point. I would note that line 18 of the 
second page of the bill makes that abundantly clear.
  We all know that, as technology changes, we need to continually 
update our laws to make sure that they work well in a changing 
environment. We have this bill for 120 days if we do, as we know we 
must, pass it. I think of that 120 days as an assignment for the 
Congress, so that we understand the technology, so that we can make 
good decisions.
  This is a cell phone. If I bring this cell phone to London and call 
San Jose, the phone company knows I'm in London and the call is made to 
San Jose.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Arizona, a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee (Mr. 
Shadegg).
  Mr. SHADEGG. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I think the gentlelady is correct. I think intellectually we could 
come to an agreement.
  Sadly, the language of this bill is fatally flawed. Page 3, line 18, 
the language she refers to is not workable for reasons that I think 
both sides understand. It says that no warrant is required when you 
know that both persons are outside the United States. It is impossible 
to know that both the person placing the call and the person receiving 
the call are outside the United States. So section 3 grants no 
authority whatsoever. You might as well make it blank paper, because it 
does not give us any authority, even if well-intended.

                              {time}  1945

  Second, the bill, for the first time in the 200-year history of this 
Nation, says that when our executive branch wants to gather foreign-to-
foreign intelligence, it must first go to the judiciary. That is a 
violation of the Constitution, and it places the duty for protecting 
American citizens in the hands of unelected judges.
  In reality in this Nation, the duty to protect us from enemies 
foreign and domestic is in the hands of the executive branch.
  This legislation is fatally flawed, even if well intended.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I now would like to yield 45 seconds to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman of the committee for 
yielding.
  One of the characteristics of oppressive governments that we detest 
is that they spy on their own people. The chilling intrusion into 
people's lives, effects, and relationships must be controlled even if 
the government's officers think the intrusion is necessary to preserve 
safety, security, and order. Indeed, civil protections are necessary, 
especially if the government officers say they are trying to protect 
safety, security, and order.
  Courts must establish that there is a probable cause to believe an 
American is a threat to society, and it must be the courts, not the 
Attorney General, not the Director of National Intelligence, who 
determine that the standard is met.
  The issue here is not about foreign-to-foreign intercepts. It is 
about how our government treats its citizens.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren), who is a member of both the 
Judiciary Committee and the Homeland Security Committee.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Madam Speaker, I am dismayed to hear some suggest that Admiral 
McConnell would somehow yield to political pressure. This is the 
gentleman who was the NSA Director under President Clinton. I never 
heard that argument on that side of the aisle or this side of the 
aisle. Many of us relied on the intelligence that came through his 
activity at that point in time. I see nothing in his record, I see 
nothing in his performance that would suggest that he would yield to 
politics.
  He has come before us and said, We have tried to work under what is 
the legal construct that you are repeating in this bill, and it doesn't 
work. He has said it has denied him the opportunity to do that kind of 
foreign-to-foreign intelligence gathering because of the way the law is 
applied and because of the way the judge has interpreted it. And he 
even told us the judge said, Go to the Congress to change it.
  You don't have to be against civil liberties to suggest that we 
listen to what he has to say. When he talks about the minimization 
procedure, it is a time-honored procedure we have used for 28 years in 
this context and for over 50 years in the criminal justice context.
  If people will recall, when FISA was first written, it was 
specifically written to exclude international signals, intelligence 
activities, and electronic surveillance conducted outside the United 
States. What we used to grasp technologically then was never under 
FISA, he has said, because we take it technologically now in a 
different way. We shouldn't change it, because if we do that, it does 
not allow us to respond.
  And why are we here? He has said openly, and it has appeared in 
print, because the chatter has increased to levels that are so serious, 
we need to act now.
  Please, please don't deny what he has suggested to us. Let us pass a 
proper bill that can be effective.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to now yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished member of the Judiciary, Mr. Adam Schiff.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  There really is a lot of common ground in this debate. My friends on 
the minority side of the aisle want to make sure that when one 
foreigner is talking to another on foreign soil, that doesn't need to 
go through a FISA court, and we agree.
  The only real area of disagreement is when we make an effort to 
surveil a foreign suspect, and whether inadvertently or advertently we 
capture the conversations of Americans, should there be court 
supervision. If the programs expand and, in fact, we capture the 
conversations of thousands of Americans, should there be some court 
oversight of that?
  I think on a bipartisan basis the Members of this body feel there 
should be. The courts should be involved, the Congress should be 
involved when we are talking about the surveillance of Americans on 
American soil, whether they were the target or the incidental effect of 
that surveillance. And I also think that if we got three Members from 
our side of the aisle and three Members from yours and sat down with 
the admiral, in about an hour, we could hammer this out.
  We ought to do supervision when Americans are surveilled. This bill 
provides that, and I urge its passage.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Hunter), a former chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee and now ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. HUNTER. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Let me just say that I have examined and analyzed a number of 
battlefield situations and that this bill does not take care of a 
problem that we have with respect to accessing communications in time 
to take action in a meaningful way. Whether the insurgents are making a 
strike, moving people, moving equipment, moving hostages, those first 
few hours are what you might analogize as the golden hours, the time 
when you can make a difference. And right now we have a substantial 
delay on the battlefield that could have been fixed with this bill. It 
is not fixed with this bill, and I am deeply disappointed because of 
that. And I hope, my colleagues, that we can fix this in the near 
future.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers), who is also a member of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I was an FBI agent and I

[[Page 22777]]

worked organized crime in Chicago, and I did criminal title III work, 
which is equivalent to FISA on the intelligence side. I developed the 
sources. I did the debriefings. I did the surveillances. I did the 
interviews. I talked to lawyers. I talked to more lawyers. It is a very 
high standard to gain probable cause to listen to United States 
citizens' conversations. And it should be, and we should protect it. It 
should be that hard.
  But I am going to tell you what we are going to do with this bill 
today. We are going to make it harder for us to go after terrorists who 
are trying to kill Americans than it was for me to go after organized 
criminals in Chicago. That is wrong.
  And I think the intentions are right, but we did take the time to 
read the bill that we got this afternoon. There are some real problems 
with the language in here.
  Number one is this whole thing was established so that we could be 
technology neutral. And I am just going to address the first paragraph. 
I think others are going to talk about other things. Because often you 
are referring to section 105 where it says a court order is not 
required for those who are not located in the United States. But if you 
read that whole paragraph, it's not technology neutral. You have set 
the bar beyond what our technology will be allowed in order to comply 
with the law.
  It shouldn't matter if a terrorist is calling a terrorist from 
Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. We shouldn't care how or what technology they 
use. It should not matter. If what you say that you don't care that 
foreign terrorists who are talking to foreign terrorists, that we 
should not have to have a warrant, this language is wrong. It's wrong. 
And the people who have to follow the law tell us it's wrong.
  If you honestly believe this, then let's sit down. The gentleman from 
California was right. In about an hour we could have this worked out. 
Everybody would be happy, and we could protect the citizens of the 
United States, not only their civil liberties at home but from the 
terrorists who are today planning attacks against the United States.
  And we all know in a classified way the fact that this is not fixed 
has cost American lives.
  No more screwing around. Let's sit down. Let's work it out. Let's get 
this right.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  I want to relieve the tensions of my friend from Michigan. Foreign to 
foreign does not require a warrant. I don't know how many times I am 
going to have to say that. Foreign to foreign does not require a 
warrant.
  The second thing that will make you much happier than you are now: 
Basket warrants authorized by the court make it easier to get warrants, 
not harder, Mr. Rogers.
  Madam Speaker, I am happy to yield 1 minute to Jane Harman from 
California, the former ranking member on the Intelligence Committee for 
many years.
  Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Madam Speaker, only a few of us in this House are fully briefed on 
the terrorist surveillance program. It gives those who implement it 
incredible tools to find people who would harm us or to engage in 
unprecedented violations of Americans' constitutional rights for 
improper political or ideological reasons.
  Most of this bill is not in dispute. But the key disagreement is 
whether a foreign surveillance program with unprecedented reach into 
the personal communications of terrorists or innocent Americans should 
be subject to supervision by an article III court. As you have just 
heard, that review comes in the form of a single warrant approving the 
contours of the program, called a ``basket warrant.'' Our bill permits 
time to get that warrant while engaging in surveillance.
  So a vote for our bill is a vote for sophisticated surveillance tools 
needed to catch terrorists and a vote to assure that those tools are 
not abused. I urge its bipartisan support.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a member of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Speaker, the Director of National 
Intelligence came to the Congress in April and told us that we were not 
listening to things we needed to be listening to, that we had a 
problem. And since then we have had numerous hearings, most of them in 
closed session, about the scope and scale of this problem. And it is 
worse than we ever thought it was. And, Ms. Harman, I would tell you it 
is much worse than when you served on the committee.
  He said, in open session in the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, ``We are missing a significant portion of what we should 
be getting.''
  It is imperative that we solve this problem before we leave here.
  This morning without any agreement, without any prior discussion, the 
Democrats' leadership introduced the bill we are considering tonight. 
There is no agreement on the text with Republicans in the House; there 
is no agreement with the Senate, Democrat or Republican; and there is 
no agreement with the Director of National Intelligence or with the 
President. In fact, the Director of National Intelligence had not seen 
the bill until after we were discussing the rule here on the floor.
  I rise today to oppose this legislation. I must oppose it because it 
doesn't solve the problem that we must solve. And, in fact, it makes it 
worse.
  The Director of National Intelligence told us this afternoon in 
writing that ``The House proposal is unacceptable and I strongly oppose 
it.'' He also said, ``The House proposal would not allow me to carry 
out my responsibility to provide warning and to protect the Nation.''
  This bill will not allow our Director of National Intelligence, who 
has 40 years of experience in this field, the former Director of the 
National Security Agency under President Clinton, it would not allow 
him to carry out his duties to protect this Nation. We are going in the 
wrong direction.

                              {time}  2000

  I would urge my colleagues to reject this bill before us tonight; and 
I would urge the Speaker, Ms. Pelosi, to bring another bill to the 
floor of this House that can be supported by the Senate, by the 
Republicans, by the Democrats and by our intelligence community and 
signed by the President so we can close this intelligence gap.
  But what does it matter? Why should people care? We all remember 
where we were the morning of 9/11 and who we were with, what we were 
wearing, who we called first, who we checked on. You never remember the 
crisis that doesn't happen because it's prevented by good intelligence.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo).
  Ms. ESHOO. I thank our distinguished chairman of the House 
Intelligence Committee.
  I have listened very, very intently to the discussion on the floor 
this evening, as well as the news programs that have covered the debate 
about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as well as 
participated in the many, many hearings and discussions at the House 
Intelligence Committee as a member of that committee and feel very 
privileged to have done so.
  I can't help but think of those whose shoulders we stand on, our 
predecessors in the House of Representatives in the Congress of over 
200 years. Would any of them, would any of them for a moment accuse 
another Member of not wanting to fully protect the Nation that we are 
sworn to protect and the Constitution that we are sworn to uphold? 
That's what this debate is about.
  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was born in 1978. And the 
reason our predecessors, Republicans and Democrats, set down this law 
was because of the abuses of those high in our government at that time, 
Richard Nixon. And Republicans and Democrats in the Congress as well as 
Republican and Democratic Presidents have honored the law, but they 
have also seen

[[Page 22778]]

fit to change it, from 1978 on, to fit the needs of this great Nation.
  And so to talk about blood on someone's hands, that there are some 
that do not love and want to protect this country does not deserve to 
be debated or even stated in this House. We all take the same oath. We 
all take the same oath. And when we take that oath, we say ``to defend 
the Constitution of the United States.'' That is the steel of our 
Nation. The flag that is behind us is the heart of our Nation, but the 
Constitution is the soul of our Nation.
  And so, in all of this we say ``rule of law.'' This is not to cheapen 
FISA. This is not, as the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, 
making fun of attorneys and saying we're sending it off to people that 
are going to quibble. We are talking about the rule of law.
  The Democratic leadership last night gave the principles to the DNI, 
Director of National Intelligence, last night. Something happened after 
that, and it's not satisfactory. But we will not turn over to an 
Attorney General who has misled the Congress, who has now made a 
hospital visit famous, who came to the Hill and lobbied for torture, we 
are not going to give over what we believe should dictate all of this, 
and that is the rule of law.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. McHugh), who is also a member of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. McHUGH. I thank the gentleman.
  Madam Speaker, I hadn't intended to speak; and I didn't intend to 
because, right now, the hearts and minds of the 10th Mountain Division 
family, which includes the district that I represent, are focused on 
two soldiers who are classified as ``missing, captured.'' And there has 
been speculation in the press recently whether or not FISA had some 
application, and I didn't want to cloud that water. But I thought that 
those soldiers, whatever the circumstances may be related to their 
condition, would want us to do everything that we could to defend what 
they fought for, that is, the future, the ability of this country to 
prosper as the greatest democracy the world has ever known.
  I have been listening to the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
a friend of mine, a gentleman and a leader, who said, ``This bill gives 
most of those things that the DNI wanted.'' I listened to my friend, 
Jerry Nadler, the gentleman from New York, a colleague of mine in both 
the State legislature and here: ``Most of.'' This is not a ``most of'' 
situation, Madam Speaker. This is a situation where we have to give 
what the war fighters need to protect them in the field.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize the 
chairman of the Crime Subcommittee on Judiciary, the distinguished 
gentleman from Virginia, Bobby Scott, for 1 minute.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Madam Speaker, it would be better to consider 
complicated wiretap laws in the process with committee consideration, 
public hearings, markups, and consider amendments with more than just 1 
minute of discussion, but we have been told that there is an urgent 
need for clarification in the wiretap law.
  Now, all of those clarifications are in this bill, especially the 
foreign-to-foreign communications. This bill honors our Constitution 
and provides the government all of the flexibility that we were told 
was needed, but it does not leave the decision of when wiretaps are 
allowed to the imagination of this Attorney General.
  The secret FISA court is appropriately involved. It does not restrict 
the ability of law enforcement to engage in appropriate surveillance, 
but it does respect our Constitution. We should adopt this very limited 
clarification in the law.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, once again, may I inquire as to 
how much time is remaining on each side?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas has 2 minutes; the 
gentleman from Texas has 1 minute; the gentleman from Michigan has 1 
minute, 5 seconds.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to 
the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), who is also 
the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  The great track record about the FISA bill designed and passed in 
1978 was that the intent was to protect American civil liberties, and 
it has done a very effective job of protecting American civil 
liberties.
  Nowhere in this debate over the last week, over the last number of 
months has about there been allegations that FISA did not work. There 
was a technical problem with FISA because technology has moved and 
evolved and the law did not. So the question becomes, take a look at 
the bill. If we're really intent on protecting Americans, read some 
sections of the bill.
  ``We require basket warrants for various targets, various 
countries.'' How many baskets are we going to put out there and are we 
going to require the DNI to prepare to bring to the court?
  And then take a look at what they require to put into the basket. 
Does this help protect Americans, where we say the DNI needs to go to a 
court and provide a description of the nature of the information sought 
for the various baskets, the China basket, the North Korea basket, the 
al Qaeda basket, the Syria basket?
  What happens if we outline the type of intelligence we want to gather 
and we're gathering it and we get something else? Do we need to 
minimize that? That is a ridiculous requirement.
  The bill goes on and it says, ``a statement of the means by which the 
electronic surveillance will be effected.'' This is going to the Court 
and saying, you need to identify all over the world how you are going 
to collect intelligence. There are certain intelligence collection 
methods that only two Members of this House may be aware of. Does that 
help keep America safe?
  This is a bad bill. It protects terrorists, not Americans.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, it is now my privilege to yield the 
remaining time to the distinguished majority leader from Maryland (Mr. 
Hoyer).
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  As has been stated on this floor, this is an extraordinary and 
important development and even more important issue.
  I want to comment first on the involvement of Mr. Reyes, Mr. Conyers, 
myself, the Speaker, and others. I have met on at least three occasions 
with my friend, Mr. Blunt. Every time we made a draft, I took it to him 
and discussed it with him. This was not something that I thought ought 
to be done on a partisan basis.
  I talked to the Director of National Intelligence on at least five 
different occasions individually and then in a conference call with 
Senator Rockefeller and Senator Levin, Mr. Reyes, Mr. Reid, the Speaker 
and myself. We talked over a number of hours. The conversation did not 
last hours. From time to time, we hung up and the DNI went to contact 
people.
  Mr. Speaker, we have spent a substantial amount of time trying to 
reach what our Founding Fathers wanted us to reach, and that was a 
balance of power, a balance of making sure that our country was secure 
and making sure that our individuals were secure. That's what our 
Founding Fathers were all about. They didn't want King George knocking 
on the door and coming in just because he wanted to come in. They 
thought that King George needed to be restrained. So they set up a 
separation of powers, they set up a judiciary and they set up a 
Constitution, and 10 amendments thereafter.
  Mr. Speaker, our highest duty, as Members of this body, is to defend 
our Nation, protect our people and uphold the Constitution of the 
United States, as we've talked about. And one has to be thoughtful in 
doing that because, at times, it would appear that those three duties 
may be in conflict with one another. It is our job to harmonize those 
to accomplish all three objectives. That is, we have a duty to keep 
this Nation safe from those who seek to harm us.
  And let there be no doubt, there are terrorists who seek to harm us. 
They

[[Page 22779]]

have harmed us. They are people that we need to stop. They are people 
that we need to identify. They are people whom we need to act against. 
And, yes, a duty to ensure that our government abides by the principles 
upon which it was founded.
  In 1978, as has been said, this Congress enacted the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act in an effort to balance these critical 
interests. It is with these principles in mind that we bring this bill 
to the floor to immediately fill the intelligence gap described to 
Congress by the Director of National Intelligence.
  Among other things, this legislation clarifies that no court order is 
required, as has been said over and over and over again, to intercept 
and conduct surveillance on foreign-to-foreign communications that pass 
through the United States. That's a new technological reality, because 
that switch is here and so we needed to accommodate that.
  The Director of National Intelligence discussed that with us. We made 
a change in the legislation that was proposed to accommodate that, and 
he was positive with respect to that change. I do not say he supported 
that change; I say he was positive.
  It reiterates that individual warrants based on probable cause are 
required when surveillance is directed at people within the United 
States, not incidental contacts but directed at people in the United 
States.
  It provides for an initial 15-day emergency authority so that 
international surveillance may begin immediately, so that we can 
empower the DNI to act now, and it allows for up to two 15-day 
extensions while the court considers the approval of surveillance 
procedures.

                              {time}  2015

  No one should be surprised that this majority is concerned about the 
actions of the administration after the last 4 years. The courts have 
been concerned. And the courts have acted because they did not believe 
that the administration was acting consistently with the duty to uphold 
and protect the laws and Constitution of this country.
  That ought to be a serious concern. Frankly, it ought to be a very 
serious concern for those who label themselves conservatives, who have 
historically been the most outspoken in their fear of Government 
exercise of power and their concern for the constraint on the use of 
that power.
  Our legislation also compels the cooperation of communications 
carriers during emergency periods, while it extends liability 
protection to those who assist in this intelligence-gathering effort. 
This was a very important provision. We understood that. It is 
controversial. But we thought it was important.
  The legislation also requires the Inspector General of the Department 
of Justice to conduct an audit every 60 days of communications 
involving Americans that are intercepted under ``basket warrants,'' 
because we know those basket warrants are going to be just that, broad-
reaching, because we wanted to give the DNI the authority to reach 
broadly and not be slowed down bureaucratically by individual requests. 
But we also thought that we needed to protect those individuals with an 
aftercheck, if you will, by the Inspector General. We think that is 
fair. We think conservatives ought to be for that. We think liberals 
ought to be for that. We think the American people are for that.
  Finally, the legislation provides that these provisions sunset in 120 
days, because it is imperative that we consider issues of this 
magnitude in a thoughtful manner.
  We have been working hard. I said how often I have talked to the DNI, 
how often I have been in meetings, and how recently I was in meetings 
with the DNI. It is imperative that we consider these issues consistent 
with the magnitude that they present, not only for the safety of our 
people, but for the integrity of our Constitution and laws.
  Now, some will say this bill doesn't go far enough. That may be so. 
And we ought to thoughtfully consider that in the months ahead as the 
committee, the ranking member, Republicans and Democrats, consider the 
permanent laws that may be put in place.
  Many of them support the administration's proposal, which would 
permanently authorize warrantless surveillance and searches of 
American's telephone calls, e-mails, homes, offices and personal 
records for at least 3 months and for however long an appeal to the 
Court of Review in the Supreme Court takes, as long as the search is, 
and I quote, ``concerning a person abroad.''
  In fact, the administration's proposal practically eliminates the 
role of the FISA court. That, of course, is the administration's 
intent. We understand that. The administration, in fact, undertook the 
TSP program, the Terrorist Surveillance Program, outside the ambit of 
the check and balance that we contemplated when we adopted the 
legislation.
  Madam Speaker, we have spent hours with the Director of National 
Intelligence and worked hard to give him the tools that were requested. 
The DNI asked that we expand the language in the bill from ``relating 
to terrorism'' to the much broader ``relating to all foreign 
intelligence.'' I support that change. I want to make sure that the DNI 
has a broad reach and view. So that is in this bill.
  The DNI asked that we eliminate the requirement that the FISA court 
adjudicate how recurring communications into the United States from 
foreign targets would be handled, and we agreed to that change.
  Madam Speaker, in closing, let me tell the Members that yesterday in 
that conference call I asked the Director of National Intelligence, 
Admiral McConnell, this question: Does this legislation improve or not 
the situation you find yourself in? I quote you his answer to me just 
about 24 hours ago. This legislation, which has been so harshly 
analyzed, I quote the Director of National Intelligence: ``It 
significantly enhances America's security.''
  That is a quote. It is a direct quote. I do not imply that he said he 
supported it. And we have a very harsh statement from him that we just 
got a few hours ago. I will tell you, it doesn't sound like the Admiral 
McConnell with whom I have talked over the past few weeks.
  Madam Speaker, the administration truly seeks a temporary fix to the 
FISA statute. This legislation provides one.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to 
vote for this important legislation. There are some on my side who 
believe it goes too far. There are some on your side that believe it 
goes not far enough. But it is, I suggest to you, a compromise that we 
can make that, as in the words of the Director of National 
Intelligence, significantly enhances our national security.
  Madam Speaker, I urge the support of this legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 30 seconds to 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the honorable Speaker of 
the House.
  Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I 
thank him for championing civil liberties in our country for such a 
long, long time. I want to express my admiration and respect for you, 
Mr. Conyers, as the distinguished Chair of the Judiciary Committee. And 
to the distinguished Chair of the House Intelligence Committee, Mr. 
Reyes, congratulations to you for this excellent work. It is difficult, 
because we have to balance security and liberty. Two great patriots 
have brought this bill to the floor. Mr. Reyes, you have served our 
country in many capacities to secure our country, and you are doing so 
in your capacity as Chair of the Intelligence Committee.
  Madam Speaker, in my service in Congress I have had the privilege of 
serving on the Intelligence Committee longer than anyone, 10 years as a 
member directly and now my fifth year ex officio as leader and now 
Speaker of the House.
  I considered it a service to our country that was important to our 
national security. I salute the men and women who serve our country in 
the intelligence community for their bravery and for their patriotism.

[[Page 22780]]

  Congress has always for many years had a special interest in 
intelligence. We all recognize that we want our President and our 
policymakers to have the best possible intelligence. We want to do so 
in a way, though, that again balances liberty and security. We want to 
use every tool at our disposal to collect the intelligence that we 
need, again, to protect the American people, but we must do so under 
the law. That is what we are talking about here tonight.
  In 1978, it was recognized that Congress had a role, the checks and 
balances, in determining how our intelligence was collected, analyzed 
and disseminated. Those are the three aspects of intelligence. Tonight, 
we are talking largely about collection.
  In 1978, when the FISA law was passed, we were in a different era. It 
is clear that as it established Congress' rights in this arena and the 
checks and balances necessary to protect the American people, we also 
have to recognize today that technology is vastly different than it was 
at that time. So Congress has always stood willing, in a bipartisan 
way, to make amendments to the FISA act that would reflect the change 
in technology.
  If anything in what we do should be nonpartisan, it is intelligence. 
It should be analyzed in a way that has no political approach to it, 
and the laws governing it should be written in a nonpartisan way.
  That is why so many of us worked so closely, the distinguished Chairs 
of the committees of jurisdiction, Judiciary and Intelligence, 
including the majority leader, who just spoke, we worked closely with 
the Senate leadership, with the administration, trying to work in a 
bipartisan way to meet the needs of the American people.
  As Mr. Hoyer indicated, and I won't go into it in detail, this 
involved a series of communications, both in person, on the telephone 
and otherwise, with the Director of National Intelligence. He presented 
to us, as I believe Congresswoman Harman has indicated and the chairmen 
have indicated, he presented us his three must-have provisions in the 
FISA law, and we wrote a bill that reflected, in fact echoed, the 
request of the Director of National Security.
  When we sent that to him, he came back and said, I have additional 
changes that I am requesting, and we accommodated them as far as we 
could under the balance of liberty and security.
  As Mr. Hoyer said, when we asked in the presence of the majority 
leader in the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chairs of the 
intelligence committees, House and Senate, and Armed Services from the 
Senate, the Director of DNI, that group of people gathered said that 
our bill would make us significantly safer. It was a positive 
contribution, as the leader said. Not that he endorsed the bill, 
because by then the administration had a different approach.
  It made it seem for some time, why we were going back and forth with 
this, trying to accommodate the DNI. I know that he was negotiating in 
good faith. I hope that he will accept what we are proposing in that 
same good faith.
  Some of the things that have been rejected since those conversations, 
but I hope will reappear in the Senate bill, are to diminish the role 
of the Attorney General in the decision-making on this. We have always 
said that there would be a third branch of government, the courts, to 
issue the warrants. The discretion in this situation is now given to 
the Attorney General.
  Without any reference to the current Attorney General, and there will 
be some who might question his judgment, I don't want Alberto Gonzales 
to have this much power, but in a Democratic administration, I would 
not want that Attorney General to have this much power. It should be a 
different branch of government.
  So we have seen them come up with these pieces of legislation that 
substitute the Attorney General for the FISA courts. It is just totally 
unacceptable.
  While we are trying to address the emergency concerns of the Director 
of National Intelligence, we know we will have a bigger bill down the 
road to go into some other issues of concern, but without the same 
urgency. That is why this legislation must be sunsetted, because no 
matter how you look at it, it gives extraordinary power to the 
administration beyond the intent of the FISA law, and certainly outside 
the values of our Founding Fathers, to balance liberty and security.
  Having made the changes to our proposal that respond to each of the 
Director's concerns and having him describe our proposal as a 
significant improvement in his current capabilities, I would have 
expected that he would be leading the charge for this bill's passage.

                              {time}  2030

  That is not happening, but that does not mean that this bill is 
inadequate. The judgment of the Director of National Intelligence 
stands. He knew to whom he was speaking that evening, and he was clear 
in his assessment.
  All of us in Congress want to do everything within our power to 
protect the American people from terrorism. As I say, as a 15-year 
member of the Intelligence Committee, both as a member and ex officio, 
I know full well and sadly the threats to our country. I know full well 
the capabilities that we have and some that we need. Every person, as 
Congresswoman Harman said, every person in this body is fully 
committed, is fully committed to collecting the intelligence that we 
need to protect the American people. But we must do it under the law, 
and sometimes that's where we differ.
  You will hear our colleagues stand on this floor and say, terrorist 
to terrorist in foreign lands, the Democrats don't want you to collect 
on them; and they want to make you have a warrant to do it.
  When I hear my colleagues say that, I think either they don't know or 
they don't care about the truth. Because that is patently untrue. And 
it has always been a mystery to me about this House of Representatives 
that somebody can misrepresent the facts, some would call, I don't like 
the word ``lie,'' but if you said they were lying, your words would be 
taken down. And yet misrepresentations about the intentions of Members 
of this body are being made here tonight that simply are not true.
  So let's put that aside and talk about how we can work together to 
honor the needs of our people, to recognize the changes in technology 
and to honor the oath of office that we take here to protect and defend 
the Constitution of the United States as we protect and defend the 
American people.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on this important legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield the remaining 
time that I have to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Texas is recognized for 
30 seconds.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Speaker, I have listened to the 
debate this afternoon and I only have these few words of a message. One 
great patriot said, ``Give me liberty or give me death.''
  I want to say to this body, the majority that I happen to be a part 
of will never endanger the American people. We have given to the DNI 
what he has asked for, but, most importantly, we have given to the 
American people their liberty, and we now give them their life. We 
protect them. Terrorists will not get away from us. This bill will 
protect the American people. I ask my colleagues to vote for this bill.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 3356, the 
Improving Foreign Intelligence Surveillance to Defend our Nation and 
Our Constitution Act. I would like to thank my colleagues Mr. Reyes and 
Mr. Conyers for their leadership on this important issue.
  This important legislation addresses the intelligence gap identified 
by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, by amending the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. Madam Speaker, FISA has 
served the nation well for nearly 30 years, placing electronic 
surveillance inside the United States for foreign intelligence and 
counter-intelligence purposes on a sound legal footing.
  This legislation contains a number of crucial provisions. It 
clarifies that no court order is required for foreign-to-foreign 
communications

[[Page 22781]]

that pass through the United States. It reiterates that individual 
warrants, based on probable cause, are required when surveillance is 
directed at people in the United States. This legislation requires the 
Attorney General to submit procedures for international surveillance to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for approval, and it allows 
the Court to issue a ``basket warrant'' without requiring the Court to 
make individual determinations about foreign surveillance. It provides 
for an initial 15-day emergency authority so that international 
surveillance can begin while the ``basket warrant'' is submitted to the 
Court. It allows for congressional oversight, requiring the Department 
of Justice Inspector General to conduct an audit every 60 days of U.S. 
person communications intercepted under the ``basket warrant,'' to be 
submitted to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. Finally, this 
is a short-term legislative fix, sunsetting in 120 days.
  In terms of the President's warrantless surveillance programs, there 
is still nothing on the public record about the nature and 
effectiveness of those programs to indicate that they require a 
legislative response, other than to reaffirm the exclusivity of FISA 
and insist that it be followed. This is accomplished by H.R. 5371, the 
``Lawful Intelligence and Surveillance of Terrorists in an Emergency by 
NSA Act, LISTEN Act,'' which I have co-sponsored last Congress with the 
Ranking Members of the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, Mr. 
Conyers and Ms. Harman. 
  There is still nothing on the public record about the nature and 
effectiveness of the President's warrantless surveillance programs to 
indicate that they require a legislative response, other than to 
reaffirm the exclusivity of FISA and insist that it be followed. This 
could have been accomplished last Congress by H.R. 5371, the ``Lawful 
Intelligence and Surveillance of Terrorists in an Emergency by NSA 
Act'' (LISTEN Act),'' which I was proud to have cosponsored last 
Congress with the then-Ranking Members of the Judiciary and 
Intelligence Committees, Mr. Conyers and Ms. Harman.
  The Bush administration has not complied with its legal obligation 
under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence 
Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence 
activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information 
from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must 
conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the 
United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those 
that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA.
  The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must 
include the operational details of each program of intelligence 
surveillance within the United States, including: (1) who the NSA is 
targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the 
program collects and disseminates; and most important; (4) whether the 
program advances national security interests without unduly 
compromising the privacy rights of the American people. Given the 
unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit 
electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing 
information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the 
communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring 
more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms 
for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted 
communications.
  Madam Speaker, this temporary legislative fix addresses the gap 
identified by Director McConnell. The Majority of both the House and 
the Senate have set aside partisan differences to work for the security 
of our Nation. We must ensure that our intelligence professionals have 
the tools that they need to protect our Nation, while also safeguarding 
the rights of law-abiding Americans. This is important legislation, and 
I strongly encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting it.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the bill. Despite 
the claims of those who support the Administration, this measure does 
nothing to protect those overseas who intend to do us harm. Instead, it 
is an important and vital effort to clarify the role of the FISA Court 
in light of advances in communications technology. As every member of 
the intelligence committee knows, the FISA Court already supervises 
aspects of foreign intelligence collection. The bill keeps the FISA 
Court engaged at the programmatic level, while ensuring that the 
Administration does not need individual warrants for foreign targets.
  The administration's proposal would cut the court out of the process 
and let the Attorney General decide when American's liberties are 
infringed. Our legislation establishes meaningful, independent judicial 
oversight by the FISA Court. It protects America without sacrificing 
our civil liberties.
  Our legislation is the responsible course, and I urge a YES vote.
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to this 
legislation--H.R. 3356.
  The Global War on Terrorism--the Long War--is the first conflict of 
the information age. With our technical assets and expertise, the 
United States is far better at gathering information than our enemies. 
This is an advantage we must exploit each and every hour of the day to 
better protect the American people from terrorists who are plotting 
against us at this very moment. We must never lose that technological 
edge!
  Last year, this House passed the Electronic Surveillance Act seeking 
to update the Foreign Intelligence Act (FISA) of 1978. That bill took 
into account 21st century technological developments which enable our 
intelligence agencies to spy on terrorists who may be planning the next 
attack.
  For example, the current FISA law (1978) covers only ``wire'' and 
``radio'' communications. FISA is a pre-internet, pre-cell phone law. 
It's a living anachronism! A dinosaur.
  That reform bill never became law and since that time various 
developments have further eroded our intelligence capabilities.
  The wording of the outdated FISA law and a court ruling earlier this 
year prevents our counterintelligence people from listening in on 
terrorists overseas if that communication is somehow routed thru 
``nodes'' in the United States.
  In our effort to ``connect-the-dots'' to prevent the next attack, 
this is a huge problem! The Director of National Intelligence has 
stated unequivocally that we continue to miss significant amounts of 
information that we should be collecting.
  Simply put--we should be fully protecting the American people, and we 
are not.
  The Democratic Leadership has known about these failures and has 
failed to act to correct them.
  Madam Speaker, it is critically important that this Congress 
immediately reform the FISA.
  Intelligence is our first line of defense against terrorists. Good 
intelligence can save American lives--our soldiers in the war zones and 
our fellow citizens here at home.
  During this summer of heightened threat warnings, there is no more 
important priority for this Congress today than to modernize FISA--
fully and completely.
  The lives of our constituents depend on it.
  Unfortunately, H.R. 3356 falls short in several specific areas and 
actually erects new burdens for our counterintelligence personnel as 
they work to keep Americans safe.
  It is opposed by the Director of National Intelligence.
  I, too, oppose this legislation.
  Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Madam Speaker, we are debating critical 
legislation that would update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA). This law must be updated to allow American agencies to listen 
to foreigners in foreign countries without a warrant. Like many of my 
colleagues, I believe that this is crucial to our national security. We 
must remain on the offense, and updating FISA will help us prevent 
future terrorist attacks.
  Just yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence issued a 
statement urging Congress to make changes to FISA so we may protect 
American families. He said, ``We must urgently close the gap in our 
current ability to effectively collect foreign intelligence. The 
current FISA law does not allow us to be effective. Modernizing this 
law is essential for the intelligence community to be able to provide 
warning of threats to the country.''
  Congress must act immediately to ensure that our intelligence 
community can do their job successfully. They should not be forced to 
obtain court orders that hinder them from learning of terrorist 
threats. We must ensure that those who help our Government and report 
suspicious activity are protected. I urge my colleagues to act now and 
help keep your constituents and our country safe from impending 
terrorist attacks.
  I have said many times on the floor of the House of Representatives 
that I have not forgotten September 11th. I urge my colleagues to act 
now to protect American families. We must face our enemies overseas so 
we do not have to face them here at home. Let's enact commonsense real 
reform that gives our intelligence officers the tools they need to 
effectively protect us.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Madam Speaker, I am extremely concerned about our 
national security and deeply troubled that our intelligence community 
has been prevented from doing the job they need to protect Americans, 
For that reason I strongly oppose H.R. 3356 as it will only further tie 
the hands of our intelligence community.

[[Page 22782]]

  The latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) clearly states that 
we are at risk of an attack. We have all read the reports this week 
about the very real concerns that our enemies intend to attack the in 
the next month or so. Police forces in the nation's capital have beefed 
up security in response to these perceived threats. But without good 
intelligence, they will not know when or how we may be attacked--never 
mind having a chance to thwart any plots. Due to Democrat undermining 
of our intelligence of our intelligence community and our military for 
the past couple of years--through leaks and political games--we are 
less prepared to uncover terrorist plots and prevent such attacks.
  We need to fix the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) so 
that the intelligence community can do its job. The American people 
know we need to fix the loopholes in FISA implementation that allow 
terrorists to bypass our intelligence capabilities. For several months 
Administration and Republican Leadership have repeatedly asked the 
Democrats to address this problem, and they have ignored these 
requests.
  As a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence I 
have been very disturbed by what I have seen this past year. The 
vitriol that Members on the other side of the aisle have for the 
President has clouded their judgment. In an effort to embarrass him, 
they have weakened our intelligence gathering capabilities and caused 
long term damage to the security of this nation. We do not monitor 
phone conversations, emails or finances of suspected terrorists and 
terrorist allies as we used to and the enemy knows it. It is time for 
us to strengthen, not weaken, terrorist surveillance.
  Unfortunately this bill does not address the needs of the 
intelligence community. The Director of National Intelligence Mike 
McConnell is strongly opposed to this bill:
  I have reviewed the proposal that the House of Representatives is 
expected to vote on this afternoon to modify the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act. The House proposal is unacceptable, and I strongly 
oppose it.
  The House proposal would not allow me to carry out my responsibility 
to provide warning and to protect the Nation, especially in our 
heightened threat environment.
  I urge Members of Congress to support the legislation I provided last 
evening to modify FISA and to equip our Intelligence Community with the 
tools we need to protect our Nation.
  I trust the DNI far more than the Democrat leadership that has 
clearly chosen to put politics over security. I urge my colleagues to 
vote against this bill and encourage the majority to bring a true FISA 
reform bin before this body so that the intelligence community can have 
every tool at its disposal to protect the United States of America.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Madam Speaker, I have reservations about this 
bill, but I will vote for It today.
  It has just been introduced, and we have had only a short time to 
review it. And those of us who do not serve on the Intelligence 
Committee have had to depend on news reports and the debate on the 
floor for information regarding the events that have led to its being 
considered today.
  We have been informed that Admiral McConnell, Director of National 
Intelligence, has asserted that under current law there is a critical 
collection gap in our electronic surveillance capabilities, and that 
the administration wants that gap to be addressed through legislation.
  The bill before us evidently is intended to respond to that request. 
It would make clear that no warrant or court order is required for our 
intelligence agencies to monitor communications between people located 
outside the United States, even if those communications pass through 
the United States or the surveillance device is located within the 
United States. The point of this clarification is to resolve doubts 
about the status of communications between foreign persons located 
overseas that pass through routing stations here in the United States.
  I have no reservation in supporting this clarification to help 
resolve questions related to changes in communications technology since 
enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. And I 
think it is useful that the bill reiterates that individual warrants, 
based on probable cause, are required when surveillance is directed at 
individuals in the United States.
  The bill requires the Attorney General to submit procedures for 
international surveillance to the FISA Court for approval and 
authorizes the court to issue a ``basket warrant'' for individuals or 
foreign powers, including al Qaeda, outside the United States based on 
a review of those procedures without making separate determinations 
about individuals to be subject to the surveillance. Under the bill, 
there would be an initial 15-day period when international surveillance 
can begin while a ``basket warrant'' is submitted to the FISA Court. It 
allows for up to two 15-day extensions while the court rules and allows 
the court to compel cooperation by carriers during that period. And it 
requires the Justice Department's Inspector General to conduct and 
provide to the court and the Congress an audit every 60 days of 
communications involving any U.S. persons that are intercepted under a 
``basket warrant.''
  In general, I am wary of the concept of ``basket warrants,'' which 
are not normal under our laws. But I am prepared to support this part 
of the bill on the understanding that it is limited in scope and not 
applicable within the United States and with the expectation that the 
question will be revisited if the audits indicate a need for 
reconsideration of this part of the legislation. In this context, I am 
glad to note that this legislation will expire in 120 days. I think 
that is appropriate in light of the very short time we have had to 
consider the bill and the importance of the subject. This sunset clause 
means that we will be required to revisit the issue and will reduce the 
likelihood that any errors caused by today's expedited procedure will 
persist for an undue period.
  Madam Speaker, the administration is not fully supportive of this 
bill and evidently would prefer a broader grant of authority for 
surveillance. I am prepared to consider their arguments, but in the 
meantime I will vote for this bill in order to provide an immediate 
response to the problem they have identified and to advance the measure 
to the Senate for further consideration.
  Mr. HALL of New York. Madam Speaker, in the interest of national 
security, I reluctantly voted in favor of H.R. 3356, the Improving 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance to Defend the Nation and the 
Constitution Act of 2007. Although I ultimately supported this bill, I 
am concerned that this bill provided expanded authority to the Attorney 
General, who I believe has previously violated U.S. law regarding the 
FISA courts and has breeched the trust of the American people. If this 
were a permanent change to law, I would have voted against it because I 
believe provisions of this bill could be abused and allow the Attorney 
General to authorize wiretaps on American citizens without a warrant. 
Since it expires in 120 days, I am willing to support it as a stop-gap 
measure. Should we hear any evidence that the Attorney General or any 
other administration official has blatantly abused provisions of H.R. 
3356, I will call for and support aggressive investigations into their 
actions.
  Mr. WU. Madam Speaker, one lesson we Americans learn as children is 
that we should guard our liberty and our security with equal vigor.
  The FISA bill before us, while reinstating the power to direct 
surveillance toward foreigners, protects Americans in two key ways:
  1. An independent judge, and not the attorney general or anyone else 
in the executive branch, will rule on surveillance applications.
  2. Nothing in this bill immunizes any potential illegal surveillance.
  Americans expect accountability, that their private lives remain 
private, and that their own government is one they need not fear, 
especially when we face difficult times. This bill strikes the 
appropriate balance between liberty and security.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 3356.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 218, 
nays 207, not voting 8, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 821]

                               YEAS--218

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell

[[Page 22783]]


     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watson
     Watt
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--207

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capuano
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holt
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Issa
     Jindal
     Johnson (IL)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Olver
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stark
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Waters
     Welch (VT)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Clarke
     Crenshaw
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Hayes
     Johnson, Sam
     LaHood
     Paul
     Waxman

                              {time}  2058

  Mr. WELCH of Vermont and Mr. JOHNSON of Illinois changed their vote 
from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. WEINER changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So (two-thirds not being in the affirmative) the motion was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                          ____________________