[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Page 22652]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          BALLOT INTEGRITY ACT

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to address an important 
development in the way our votes our counted. Last November, California 
elected a new chief election officer--Secretary of State Debra Bowen. 
Secretary Bowen served in the California Legislature, where she had a 
reputation as a dedicated advocate for greater protections of our 
voting systems. Upon becoming secretary of state, she called for a 
``top-to-bottom'' review of all voting systems used in California. This 
was a dynamic and appropriate step, given the heartburn that electronic 
voting systems have caused voters nationwide.
  The problems with paperless voting systems are clear. Computers are 
no substitute for a paper record. We want to know where our most 
important documents are--and we don't leave them on the computer. Votes 
should be no different.
  Many events over the last few years have raised great concerns about 
paperless voting systems. In a congressional race in Sarasota, FL, 
about 18,000 ballots had no recorded vote. The final vote count divided 
the candidates by only 300-odd votes. So-called ``under-votes'' occur 
in every election. But the rate in Florida's 13th Congressional 
District was unusually high. And because there was no verified paper 
record, we may never know who really won that election.
  Some say paper ballots can malfunction or be manipulated just as 
easily as these computers. I strongly disagree. When paper records 
fail, we can see that they have failed. If paper records are stolen, or 
disappear, we will notice their absence. But when malfunctions or 
security gaps occur in paperless voting systems, there is no easy way 
for voters or election officials to know that something has gone wrong. 
It is for this reason I support optical scan paper systems--or, at 
minimum, voting systems that produce a paper record verified by the 
voter.
  So it is entirely appropriate that Secretary Bowen performed this 
test. Californians go to the polls in 6 months to cast their votes in 
the presidential primary. They must have confidence in their voting 
systems. With the cooperation of several voting system vendors, the 
University of California assembled several teams to review the systems. 
The teams examined the systems' source code, their physical and 
software defenses, and the ability of people with disabilities to use 
these systems. The systems fell short in all three tests. In a short 
span of time, computer scientists identified a number of major 
vulnerabilities with the voting systems. And these experts were able to 
hack the vote in less than 5 weeks.
  It is important to note that many election officials employ security 
measures to protect their systems from these kinds of attacks. In this 
test, the focus was on the voting system's defenses alone--no external 
protections were employed. Even without such protections, the results 
of this examination clearly indicate we need to improve these systems.
  A few examples of what the University of California experts were able 
to do: First, researchers were able to gain access to the internal 
computer system by breaking or bypassing the locks in the voting 
systems. In the case of one voting system, ordinary office objects were 
used to gain access. Second, researchers were able replace existing 
software with a new, corrupt virus that fed incorrect election data to 
the system. This attack used a program that appeared to change the 
text, but instead replaced the original software with corrupted code. 
Many small jurisdictions may lack the technical ability to identify and 
protect against these attacks. Third, while election officials can test 
these systems, experts noted that software distinguishes between 
election mode and testing mode. This could allow a virus to instruct 
the system to run properly during a test--but allow it to be corrupted 
during an election. Even counties that test their systems often could 
be vulnerable. Finally, the team was able to develop a device that 
would allow unauthorized access--and allow someone wishing to corrupt 
the ballot box to change the system's vote count.
  What does all this mean for elections in the United States?
  It means we should to follow the lead of Secretary Bowen, and take a 
very careful look at our voting systems. It means the argument for 
paper as an essential part of voting systems is becoming more and more 
convincing. It means we should watch and carefully assess the new 
standards for testing voting systems that will be employed for the 
first time in December. I hope these standards have a significant 
impact, that they catch the vulnerabilities of these systems.
  I believe the bill I introduced in May will lead to great 
improvements in the technology and the processes of elections. The 
Ballot Integrity Act would immediately prohibit new purchases of 
paperless voting systems. By 2010, it would require a voter-verified 
paper record to be produced by all voting systems used in federal 
elections. It would ensure that laboratories that test voting systems 
would not be hand-picked by vendors. And it would bar wireless and 
internet components in voting systems. In addition, States would have 
to document which individuals have access to voting systems, and they 
would have to agree on ways to train poll workers on how to operate 
machinery. This approach deals with all elements of the voting 
process--and recognizes that good voting equipment cannot be secure 
without good procedures to protect the integrity of the vote.
  While the debate rages over how California should respond to this new 
report, it is important to stick to the basics. Vote verification is 
the new consensus. More than half the States use paper records to 
preserve the vote count.
  I know Americans are passionate about ensuring that their votes are 
counted. California has taken an important step--and uncovered some 
disturbing information. The Senate should support improving Federal 
elections by passing the Ballot Integrity Act.

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