[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 22059-22066]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


                                  IRAQ

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, it continues to be my hope that there 
will be a consensus reached among Senators as to how to move forward in 
Iraq. This is indispensable if there is to be an accommodation between 
the President and Congress.
  I had hoped to make a floor statement on Iraq during the Senate's 
consideration of the DoD authorization bill, but the majority leader 
took that bill off the floor after there was only consideration of the 
Levin-Reed amendment. That action deprived the Senate of an opportunity 
to consider the Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander amendments and 
perhaps other amendments which might have secured the requisite 60 
votes to structure a new U.S. policy for Iraq.
  When a tally is made of the Senators who have voted for or 
cosponsored legislation aimed at altering or reevaluating U.S. policy 
in Iraq, the total is 62. When Senators are added who have made public 
statements critical of the President's policy, the number could 
possibly reach or exceed two-thirds of the Senate membership.
  A July 2007 vote, had it been successful, would have had no binding 
effect since the President already had sufficient funding to continue 
until September 30 and would need additional funding only in the next 
fiscal year, 2008, beginning October 1.
  The time for Congress to have asserted its constitutional power of 
the purse to withhold funding was this spring during consideration of 
supplemental funding for approximately $120 billion. On April 26, 2007, 
following a vote in the House of Representatives of 218-208, the Senate 
passed the conference report to H.R. 1591, the fiscal year 2007 Troop 
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act on a vote of 51-46. However, because this bill 
contained target dates for withdrawal, on May 1, 2007, the President 
vetoed the bill.
  After the House failed to gather the two-thirds majority required to 
override the President's veto, on May 24, 2007, the Congress approved a 
bill, H.R. 2206, which did not include targeted dates for withdrawal 
and which was subsequently signed into law by President Bush on May 25, 
2007, Public Law 110-28.
  When the Levin-Reed amendment was considered, it was a forgone 
conclusion that there were not anywhere near 60 votes to invoke 
cloture, let alone the 67 votes needed to override a veto. With the 
removal of the bill from the floor, the Senate was prevented from 
considering alternatives to the Levin-Reed proposal, and denied the 
opportunity to have a vote or votes to demonstrate dissatisfaction with 
the President's policy.
  This action deprived the Senate of an opportunity to craft a 
compromise around Warner-Lugar or Salazar-Alexander to get the 60 votes 
and put the president squarely on notice that funding in September was 
unlikely unless the President's policy showed significant progress. 
Perhaps the Levin-Reed proponents would have rejected the other 
amendments as being insufficiently forceful, but Senators never know 
for sure how they will ultimately vote until there is floor debate, 
careful

[[Page 22060]]

analysis, informal discussions on the floor and corridors, and talk in 
the cloakroom. Much of the Senate's productive work occurs during 
quorum calls when Members hassle and jawbone on the issues. Since so 
many Senators demonstratively want a change, it was at least worth a 
try in daylight compared to the futile all-nighter.
  Of particular interest to me were the provisions of the Warner-Lugar 
proposal on having a contingency plan and redefining the mission. For 
three decades, Senators Lugar and Warner have served on the Foreign 
Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee, respectively, with 
both rising to chairman. Their combined tenures in the Senate are more 
than 60 years. To say these colleagues bring a significant amount of 
thought and authority to this debate is an understatement.
  Regrettably, we did not have the opportunity to debate and vote on 
their proposal.
  The Warner/Lugar amendment is an attempt to ensure that the U.S. is 
prepared to implement changes to U.S. policy following the September 
report, to be provided by General Petaeus and Ambassador Crocker, on 
the progress of the President's current strategy in Iraq.
  The Warner-Lugar amendment recognizes that conditions in Iraq have 
changed considerably since the initial invasion to topple Saddam 
Hussein's regime and States that the joint resolution passed by 
Congress in 2002 to authorize ``the use of the Armed Forces of the 
United States against Iraq'' requires ``review and revision.''
  In addition, the amendment calls for enhanced U.S. diplomatic efforts 
to work with the Government of Iraq to establish a consistent 
diplomatic forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties in the 
Middle East. Because of the potential for the Warner-Lugar amendment to 
provide a basis for a Senate consensus, I am cosponsoring this 
amendment.
  As explained on the floor by Senator Lugar on July 13, 2007:

       The purpose of the forum would be to improve transparency 
     of national interests so that neighboring states and other 
     actors avoid missteps . . . Such a forum could facilitate 
     more regular contact with Syria and Iran with less drama and 
     rhetoric. The existence of a predictable and regular forum in 
     the region would be especially important for dealing with 
     refugee problems, regulating borders, exploring development 
     initiatives, and preventing conflict between the Kurds and 
     Turks.

  This type of planning and diplomatic engagement should be occurring 
today. I believe a vote confirming this could have led the President to 
do that.
  Prior to the 2002 U.S. invasion of Iraq, I publicly stated my 
concerns about the potential fallout from such an action. On February 
13, 2002, I took to the Senate floor to express my belief that there 
should be a comprehensive analysis of the threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein and what an invasion would amount to in terms of U.S. 
casualties:

       We need to know, with some greater precision, the threat 
     posed by Saddam Hussein with respect to weapons of mass 
     destruction. There also has to be an analysis of what the 
     costs would be, some appraisal in terms of casualties. Then 
     there is the issue as to what happens after Saddam Hussein is 
     toppled.

  As I stated on the Senate floor on December 6, 2006:

       It has been my view that had we known Saddam Hussein did 
     not have weapons of mass destruction, we would not have gone 
     into Iraq.

  Eight months after my February 13 statement, on October 7, 2002, I 
returned to the floor to express my concerns over the lack of a 
comprehensive plan for Iraq:

       What happens after Saddam Hussein is toppled has yet to be 
     answered in real detail.
       What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over 
     weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of 
     casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the 
     consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was 
     toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the 
     Arab world, and the impact on Israel?
       In previous briefings, I have sought the administration 
     plan as to what will be done after Saddam Hussein is toppled, 
     and I think that is an area where a great deal more thought 
     needs to be given. The situation in Iraq would obviously be 
     contentious, with disputes between the Sunnis and the 
     Shi'ites, with the interests of the Kurds in an independent 
     state, and it means a very long-term commitment by the United 
     States.

  Five years later, we are in the midst of a highly controversial troop 
surge in Iraq.
  Following the announcement of the President's plan to surge, I met 
with President Bush on two occasions. Following these meetings I told 
the President directly that I could not support a troop surge. I also 
had extensive discussions on the President's plan with the highest 
ranking members of his national security team including Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and 
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte.
  I met with GEN David Petraeus on January 31, 2007, who has been 
confirmed as the United States' top commander in Iraq. Following these 
meetings, I was not convinced the administration possessed a 
comprehensive plan to deal with the situation in Iraq and too many 
uncertainties persisted to warrant my support for a surge of U.S. 
personnel.
  On February 5, 2007, I spoke on the Senate floor regarding the surge:

       On this state of the record, I cannot support an additional 
     allocation of 21,500 troops because it is my judgment that 
     would not be material or helpful in what is going on at the 
     present time. This comes against the backdrop of extensive 
     hearings in the Armed Services Committee and Foreign 
     Relations Committee, and in the context of the military 
     having given many estimates with many of those in key command 
     position saying that no more troops are necessary. This comes 
     with the Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki saying a variety of 
     things but at some times saying he doesn't want any more 
     troops.

  At this time, I have not seen a plan that sufficiently addresses a 
strategy for victory in Iraq. Various reports indicate military 
advisers differ on the impact of an increased troop level in Iraq. It 
is not clear what the surge will ultimately accomplish and if it will 
be successful. Nonetheless, there are indicators that mandate we create 
contingency plans and consider other options. The Iraqi Government has 
failed to deliver on prior pledges which makes me hesitant to think 
they have the ability to deliver on new ones. According to many 
measurements, progress in Iraq has been poor and the situation is 
deteriorating. What is clear is that any solution will necessarily 
include political compromises by Iraq's various sects as well as an 
emphasis on a regional dialogue--something for which the Iraq Study 
Group advocated.
  Another proposal offered by Senators Salazar and Alexander would have 
used the work of the Iraq Study Group, which was led by former 
Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton, 
as a guide for our policy in Iraq. This legislation garnered bipartisan 
support including five Republicans and seven Democrats.
  The amendment states that U.S. support should be conditioned on the 
Government of Iraq's political will and substantial progress towards 
national reconciliation, revision of de baathification laws, equitable 
sharing of Iraqi oil revenues, free and fair provincial elections and 
mechanisms to ensure the rights of woman and minorities.
  Like the Warner-Lugar proposal, this amendment calls for enhanced 
diplomatic efforts. Specifically, the measure calls for a new 
``Diplomatic Offensive'' to deal with the problems in Iraq and the 
region; energize other countries to support reconciliation in Iraq; 
engage directly with the Governments of Iran and Syria to obtain their 
commitment to constructive policies towards Iraq and the region, 
encourage the holding of a conference in Baghdad of neighboring 
countries and convey to the Iraqi Government that continued American 
support is contingent upon substantial progress toward and assist in 
the achievement of the milestones.
  Because of the potential for the Salazar-Alexander amendment to 
provide a basis for a Senate consensus, I am cosponsoring this 
amendment. There is no inconsistency in cosponsoring both Warner-Lugar 
and Salazar-Alexander. They complement each other.
  Both the Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander proposals address the 
issue of diplomacy in the region. I have consistently urged the 
administration to

[[Page 22061]]

work with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, in order to 
develop cooperative stabilization efforts. To that end, I have met with 
President Bashar Assad of Syria. I have met with Iran's Ambassadors to 
the United Nations, Seyed Muhammed Hadi Nejad Hosseinian and Muhammad 
Javad Zarif, on four occasions in New York and Washington, DC. 
Additionally, I was the only Member of Congress to attend the September 
2006 address by former President Khatami at the National Cathedral.
  During my meetings with Iranian officials, I developed a proposal for 
an exchange of visits by Members of Congress to Iran and Iranian 
parliamentarians to the United States to try to open dialogue between 
our two countries. In January 2004, my efforts to foster such a 
dialogue were successful. There was a tentative agreement for U.S. 
Members of Congress to meet with Iranian parliamentarians in Geneva. 
Regrettably, this parliamentary exchange never came to fruition.
  In an effort to jumpstart this exchange, on May 3, 2007, I sent a 
letter, with support from Senators Biden, Hagel and Dodd and 
Representatives Lantos, English, Moran, Gilchrest and Meeks, to the 
Speaker of Iran's Parliament suggesting we convene a meeting of U.S. 
and Iranian parliamentarians.
  I have amplified my strong belief that dialogue with nations such as 
Iran and Syria is necessary in an extensive Senate speech on June 16, 
2006 and most recently in an essay ``Dialogue With Adversaries'' 
published in the winter edition of The Washington Quarterly. While we 
can't be sure that dialogue will succeed, we can be sure that without 
dialogue there will be failure.
  I am not alone in calling for enhanced dialogue with U.S. 
adversaries. Of the many suggestions gleaned from the Baker-Hamilton 
commission, one passage crystallizes their conclusion:

       Our most important recommendations call for new and 
     enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the 
     region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in 
     Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its 
     combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these 
     two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one 
     another.

  However, the President's plan places a disproportionate emphasis on 
military force while neglecting the needed diplomacy and political 
efforts.
  Having served in the Senate for 26 years, holding the chairmanship of 
the Intelligence Committee and senior positions on the Appropriations 
subcommittees on Defense and Foreign Operations, I am aware of what 
challenges nations like Iran and Syria pose to the United States. A 
world in which Iran seeks nuclear weapons and supports terrorist groups 
such as Hezbollah is not a safe world. A world in which Syria provides 
refuge for Hamas and Hezbollah and permits its territory to be used as 
a conduit for terrorism is counterproductive to peace and stability. I 
expressed my views on the danger the connectivity between Iran, Syria 
and Hezbollah poses to peace and security in an August 2, 2006, floor 
statement.
  Today, however, Americans are not dying from nuclear weapons or from 
direct attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah. Many are dying policing a civil 
conflict.
  President Assad, during our December 2006 meeting in Damascus, 
suggested that a conference with regional players and the United States 
would be beneficial to addressing the issues confronting Iraq. On 
January 22, 2007, I conveyed this proposal and my support for it to 
Secretary Rice in a meeting in her office at the State Department. One 
month later, on February 27, 2007, during her testimony before the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Rice announced such a 
proposal:

       Before I discuss our specific request for Iraq, I would 
     like to take this opportunity to announce a new diplomatic 
     initiative relating to Iraq's future. I am pleased to tell 
     Members of Congress that there is now being formed a 
     neighbors' conference to support Iraq. Invitees will include 
     Iraq's immediate neighbors, as well as representatives from 
     other regional states, multilateral organizations, and the UN 
     Permanent Five (the U.S., France, Britain, Russia and China). 
     I would note that both Syria and Iran are among Iraq's 
     neighbors invited to attend.
       The violence occurring within Iraq has a decided impact on 
     Iraq's neighbors. Iraq's neighbors have a clear role to play 
     in helping Iraq to move forward, and this conference will 
     provide a needed forum in order to do just that.

  Very little has happened to effectuate that ``new diplomatic 
initiative.'' The Iraq Study Group clearly states:

       Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events 
     within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the 
     United States should try to engage them constructively.

  It would have been my hope that these types of meetings would have 
occurred frequently in the intervening months. However, I am pleased 
that the President has recently indicated a commitment to ramp up 
diplomatic efforts in the region.
  Had there been Senate consideration and debate on the Warner-Lugar 
and Salazar-Alexander proposals, there would have been an opportunity 
for more senators to explicitly put the President on notice that 
funding beyond September was in jeopardy without significant 
improvement.
  I think this time would have also allowed Members to share concerns 
about the overall struggle to combat terrorism. While considering U.S. 
policy in Iraq, it is important we do not neglect other threats to U.S. 
security.
  Waziristan is a semi-autonomous tribal region in Pakistan's 
mountainous Northwest Frontier province that shares a porous border 
with Afghanistan. It is populated primarily by ethnic Pashtuns who do 
not recognize the authority of President Musharrafs government in 
Islamabad. Many of the Taliban who fled Afghanistan in 2001 found safe 
haven in Waziristan with their Pashtun brethren.
  Some accounts, including the 9/11 Commission report, indicate 
Pakistan's willingness to assist the United States. Following direct 
U.S. engagement with Pakistan after the September 11 attacks, the 9/11 
Commission report stated that, ``Secretary of State Powell announced at 
the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had 
agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism.''
  However, that was 6 years ago. According to the Congressional 
Research Service, CRS, ``Despite clear successes in disrupting al-Qaida 
and affiliated networks in Pakistan since 2001, there are increasing 
signs that anti-U.S. terrorists are now benefiting from what some 
analysts call a Pakistani policy of appeasement in western tribal areas 
near the Afghan border.''
  GEN Pervez Musharraf took a largely hands-off approach to the region 
after signing a truce with tribal leaders in September 2006. The truce 
came after 4 years of unsuccessful army operations into the region in 
which the government forces suffered heavy casualties and achieved 
little. Some accounts indicate this policy has enhanced al-Qaida's 
abilities: ``By seeking accommodation with pro-Taliban leaders in these 
areas, the Musharraf government appears to have inadvertently allowed 
foreign (largely Arab) militants to obtain safe haven from which they 
can plot and train for terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western 
targets.''
  Assistant Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher confirmed that al-
Qaida thrived under the truce between the tribal leaders and General 
Musharraf: ``they were able to operate, meet, plan, recruit, and obtain 
financing in more comfort in the tribal areas than previously.''
  Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, who 
served for 29 years with the CIA and held various positions such as 
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East 
Affairs at the National Security Council, 1997-2002, stated in his May/
June 2007 essay in Foreign Affairs:

       Al Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it has ever 
     been before and the organization now has a solid base of 
     operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective 
     franchise in western Iraq.

  Riedel further suggests that:

       The United States and its partners, including NATO, also 
     need to take a firmer position with the Pakistani government 
     to enlist its help in tracking down al-Qaeda leaders. 
     President Pervez Musharraf has taken some important steps 
     against al-Qaeda, especially

[[Page 22062]]

     after its attempts to assassinate him, and he has promised 
     more than once a full crackdown on extremism. But mostly he 
     has sought to tame jihadists--without much success--and his 
     government has tolerated those who harbor bin Laden and his 
     lieutenants, Taliban fighters and their Afghan fellow 
     travelers, and Kashmiri terrorists. Many senior Pakistani 
     politicians say privately that they believe Pakistan's Inter-
     Services Intelligence (ISI) still has extensive links to bin 
     Laden; some even claim it harbors him. Apprehending a few al-
     Qaeda officers would not be enough, and so a systematic 
     crackdown on all terrorists--Arab, Afghan, and Kashmiri--is 
     critical. Hence, Pakistan should no longer be rewarded for 
     its selective counterterrorism efforts.

  Since September 11, 2001, the United States has provided Pakistan 
with roughly $9 billion in aid. According to the Congressional Research 
Service, CRS:

       The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, 
     while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither 
     neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious 
     extremism in that country, nor have they tributed 
     sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan.

  As Congress considers administration's request for an additional $785 
million for fiscal year 2008, it is incumbent upon us to evaluate our 
relationship with them and their performance in the war on terror.
  Waziristan provides al-Qaida with much of what it lost in Afghanistan 
after September 11, 2001: safe haven; territory to train and base 
operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and beyond; and a populace 
sympathetic to their aims. Failing to recognize and address the 
situation in Waziristan risks negating the costly advances made in 
Afghanistan over the past 6 years and jeopardizes U.S. security.
  As the Senate continues to deliberate, it is my hope that we will 
return to the proposals offered by Senators Warner, Lugar, Salazar and 
Alexander. These should have been debated in great length as they make 
more sense in the context of not infringing on the President's 
authority as Commander in Chief. Rather, these bipartisan efforts would 
allow the President to fulfill a congressional requirement that he 
ought to be considering and planning for the next steps.
  The Senate is known as the most deliberative body in the world. 
Regrettably, the Senate was not permitted the opportunity to 
demonstrate this as we did not debate the various options before us.
  As I stated on the Senate floor on March 14, 2007, during a similar 
debate on whether to continue with the status quo in Iraq or to 
legislate a date certain for withdraw:

       It is equally undesirable, however, to view the current 
     situation in Iraq, which looks like an endless tunnel--a 
     tunnel without a light at the end. We are faced with very 
     considerable discomfort in this body. I think it is very 
     important that we debate this matter, that we exchange our 
     views, that we stimulate discussion that will go beyond this 
     Chamber and will resound throughout the country, resound 
     throughout the editorial pages and the television and radio 
     talk shows, and by our colleagues in the corridors and in the 
     cloakroom so that we can try to work our way through an 
     extraordinarily difficult situation where, as I see it, there 
     is no good answer between the two intractable alternatives to 
     set a timetable where our opponents simply have to wait us 
     out or to keep proceeding down a tunnel which, at least at 
     this juncture, appears to be endless and has no light. We 
     don't know where the end is, let alone to have a light at the 
     end of the tunnel.

  In a democracy, the voters ultimately decide U.S. policy. As detailed 
in Federalist No. 57, elected representatives must be responsive to the 
people:

       Duty gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords 
     by which [representatives] will be bound to fidelity and 
     sympathy with the great mass of the people. Hence, the House 
     of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the 
     members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the 
     people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the 
     mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of 
     power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when 
     their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be 
     reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which 
     they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful 
     discharge of their trust shall have established their title 
     to a renewal of it.

  If this is not understood and reflected by elected representatives, 
the framers placed elections into the system to remind them. Federalist 
No. 57 further states:

       The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic 
     policy of republican government . . . The means relied on in 
     this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are 
     numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a 
     limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a 
     proper responsibility to the people.

  This was the case last November when the electorate spoke loudly 
disagreeing with United States policy in Iraq. As I stated on March 14, 
2007:

       Last November, the American people spoke in a resounding 
     manner, in a way that could only rationally be interpreted as 
     rejecting the conduct of the war in Iraq.

  I am making this extensive floor statement at this time to put the 
administration on notice of my reservations on supporting open-ended 
appropriations for the Iraq war in September. This statement further 
urges the majority leader to structure the Senate debate in September 
to consider the Warner-Lugar amendment, the Salazar-Alexander 
amendment, and other possible amendments, as well as the Levin-Reed 
amendment, to give the Senate the full range of alternatives to provide 
the basis for 60 or more votes to change U.S. policy in Iraq.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, during the recent debate of the Defense 
authorization bill, we saw attempt after attempt to declare the new 
strategy, General Petraeus' strategy, in Iraq a failure. The other side 
of the aisle wanted to declare that the strategy, which had been in 
full force only a couple of weeks, had failed and direct the President 
to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq, which is today the central front 
in the war against terrorists. Indeed, after the other side lost a vote 
to withdraw the troops, the majority leader pulled the bill from the 
floor, thus leaving important business for our military unfinished.
  The Democratic majority's insistence that the General Petraeus' 
strategy has failed makes it easy to overlook what the strategy has 
accomplished and what the strategy seeks to accomplish.
  In that regard, I ask unanimous consent to have an article by Michael 
Gordon from New York Times of July 24 printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   [From nytimes.com, July 24, 2007]

                U.S. Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least '09

                         (By Michael R. Gordon)

       Baghdad, July 23.--While Washington is mired in political 
     debate over the future of Iraq, the American command here has 
     prepared a detailed plan that foresees a significant American 
     role for the next two years.
       The classified plan, which represents the coordinated 
     strategy of the top American commander and the American 
     ambassador, calls for restoring security in local areas, 
     including Baghdad, by the summer of 2008. ``Sustainable 
     security'' is to be established on a nationwide basis by the 
     summer of 2009, according to American officials familiar with 
     the document.
       The detailed document, known as the Joint Campaign Plan, is 
     an elaboration of the new strategy President Bush signaled in 
     January when he decided to send five additional American 
     combat brigades and other units to Iraq. That signaled a 
     shift from the previous strategy, which emphasized 
     transferring to Iraqis the responsibility for safeguarding 
     their security.
       That new approach put a premium on protecting the Iraqi 
     population in Baghdad, on the theory that improved security 
     would provide Iraqi political leaders with the breathing 
     space they needed to try political reconciliation.
       The latest plan, which covers a two-year period, does not 
     explicitly address troop levels or withdrawal schedules. It 
     anticipates a decline in American forces as the ``surge'' in 
     troops runs its course later this year or in early 2008. But 
     it nonetheless assumes continued American involvement to 
     train soldiers, act as partners with Iraqi forces and fight 
     terrorist groups in Iraq, American officials said.
       The goals in the document appear ambitious, given the 
     immensity of the challenge of dealing with die-hard Sunni 
     insurgents, renegade Shiite militias, Iraqi leaders who have 
     made only fitful progress toward political reconciliation, as 
     well as Iranian and Syrian neighbors who have not hesitated 
     to interfere in Iraq's affairs. And the White House's interim 
     assessment of progress, issued on July 12, is mixed.
       But at a time when critics at home are defining patience in 
     terms of weeks, the strategy may run into the expectations of 
     many lawmakers for an early end to the American mission here.

[[Page 22063]]

       The plan, developed by Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior 
     American commander, and Ryan C. Crocker, the American 
     ambassador, has been briefed to Defense Secretary Robert M. 
     Gates and Adm. William J. Fallon, the head of the Central 
     Command. It is expected to be formally issued to officials 
     here this week.
       The plan envisions two phases. The ``near-term'' goal is to 
     achieve ``localized security'' in Baghdad and other areas no 
     later than June 2008. It envisions encouraging political 
     accommodations at the local level, including with former 
     insurgents, while pressing Iraq's leaders to make headway on 
     their program of national reconciliation.
       The ``intermediate'' goal is to stitch together such local 
     arrangements to establish a broader sense of security on a 
     nationwide basis no later than June 2009.
       ``The coalition, in partnership with the government of 
     Iraq, employs integrated political, security, economic and 
     diplomatic means, to help the people of Iraq achieve 
     sustainable security by the summer of 2009,'' a summary of 
     the campaign plan states.
       Military officials here have been careful not to guarantee 
     success, and recognized they may need to revise the plan if 
     some assumptions were not met.
       ``The idea behind the surge was to bring stability and 
     security to the Iraqi people, primarily in Baghdad because it 
     is the political heart of the country, and by so doing give 
     the Iraqis the time and space needed to come to grips with 
     the tough issues they face and enable reconciliation to take 
     place,'' said Col. Peter Mansoor, the executive officer to 
     General Petraeus.
       ``If eventually the Iraqi government and the various sects 
     and groups do not come to some sort of agreement on how to 
     share power, on how to divide resources and on how to 
     reconcile and stop the violence, then the assumption on which 
     the surge strategy was based is invalid, and we would have to 
     re-look the strategy,'' Colonel Mansoor added.
       General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will provide an 
     assessment in September on trends in Iraq and whether the 
     strategy is viable or needs to be changed.
       The previous plan, developed by Gen. George W. Casey Jr., 
     who served as General Petraeus's predecessor before being 
     appointed as chief of staff of the Army, was aimed at 
     prompting the Iraqis to take more responsibility for security 
     by reducing American forces.
       That approach faltered when the Iraqi security forces 
     showed themselves unprepared to carry out their expanded 
     duties, and sectarian killings soared.
       In contrast, the new approach reflects the 
     counterinsurgency precept that protection of the population 
     is the best way to isolate insurgents, encourage political 
     accommodations and gain intelligence on numerous threats. A 
     core assumption of the plan is that American troops cannot 
     impose a military solution, but that the United States can 
     use force to create the conditions in which political 
     reconciliation is possible.
       To develop the plan, General Petraeus and Ambassador 
     Crocker assembled a Joint Strategic Assessment Team, which 
     sought to define the conflict and outline the elements of a 
     new strategy. It included officers like Col. H. R. McMaster, 
     the field commander who carried out the successful ``clear, 
     hold and build'' operation in Tal Afar and who wrote a 
     critical account of the Joint Chiefs of Staff role during the 
     Vietnam War; Col. John R. Martin, who teaches at the Army War 
     College and was a West Point classmate of General Petraeus; 
     and David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency expert 
     who has a degree in anthropology.
       State Department officials, including Robert Ford, an Arab 
     expert and the American ambassador to Algeria, were also 
     involved. So were a British officer and experts outside 
     government like Stephen D. Biddle, a military expert at the 
     Council on Foreign Relations.
       The team determined that Iraq was in a ``communal struggle 
     for power,'' in the words of one senior officer who 
     participated in the effort. Adding to the problem, the new 
     Iraqi government was struggling to unite its disparate 
     factions and to develop the capability to deliver basic 
     services and provide security.
       Extremists were fueling the violence, as were nations like 
     Iran, which they concluded was arming and equipping Shiite 
     militant groups, and Syria, which was allowing suicide 
     bombers to cross into Iraq.
       Like the Baker-Hamilton commission, which issued its report 
     last year, the team believed that political, military and 
     economic efforts were needed, including diplomatic 
     discussions with Iran, officials said. There were different 
     views about how aggressive to be in pressing for the removal 
     of overtly sectarian officials, and several officials said 
     that theme was toned down somewhat in the final plan.
       The plan itself was written by the Joint Campaign Redesign 
     Team, an allusion to the fact that the plan inherited from 
     General Casey was being reworked. Much of the redesign has 
     already been put into effect, including the decision to move 
     troops out of large bases and to act as partners more fully 
     with the Iraqi security forces.
       The overarching goal, an American official said, is to 
     advance political accommodation and avoid undercutting the 
     authority of the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. 
     While the plan seeks to achieve stability, several officials 
     said it anticipates that less will be accomplished in terms 
     of national reconciliation by the end of 2009 than did the 
     plan developed by General Casey.
       The plan also emphasizes encouraging political 
     accommodation at the local level. The command has established 
     a team to oversee efforts to reach out to former insurgents 
     and tribal leaders. It is dubbed the Force Strategic 
     Engagement Cell, and is overseen by a British general. In the 
     terminology of the plan, the aim is to identify potentially 
     ``reconcilable'' groups and encourage them to move away from 
     violence.
       However, groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a Sunni Arab 
     extremist group that American intelligence officials say has 
     foreign leadership, and cells backed by Iran are seen as 
     implacable foes.
       ``You are not out there trying to defeat your enemies 
     wholesale,'' said one military official who is knowledgable 
     about the plan. ``You are out there trying to draw them into 
     a negotiated power-sharing agreement where they decide to 
     quit fighting you. They don't decide that their conflict is 
     over. The reasons for conflict remain, but they quit trying 
     to address it through violence. In the end, we hope that that 
     alliance of convenience to fight with Al Qaeda becomes a 
     connection to the central government as well.''
       The hope is that sufficient progress might be made at the 
     local level to encourage accommodation at the national level, 
     and vice versa. The plan also calls for efforts to encourage 
     the rule of law, such as the establishment of secure zones in 
     Baghdad and other cities to promote criminal trials and 
     process detainee cases.
       To help measure progress in tamping down civil strife, Col. 
     William Rapp, a senior aide to General Petraeus, oversaw an 
     effort to develop a standardized measure of sectarian 
     violence. One result was a method that went beyond the 
     attacks noted in American military reports and which 
     incorporated Iraqi data.
       ``We are going to try a dozen different things,'' said one 
     senior officer. ``Maybe one of them will flatline. One of 
     them will do this much. One of them will do this much more. 
     After a while, we believe there is chance you will head into 
     success. I am not saying that we are absolutely headed for 
     success.''

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wanted to insert this article in the Record 
because it provides an objective description of the Petraeus plan and 
how it came to be. The goals of the strategy are ``ambitious,'' as the 
article notes, but that is all the more reason to support the plan and 
not undermine it in the Senate.
  Those who have criticized the surge at this early stage have offered 
few options for dealing with the aftermath. One option is to follow the 
recommendation of the Baker-Hamilton Commission.
  At this point, I request unanimous consent to print in the Record a 
column by Steven Biddle that appeared in the July 11 Washington Post.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

                   [From washingtonpost.com, July 11]

                        Iraq: Go Deep or Get Out

                          (By Stephen Biddle)

       The president's shaky political consensus for the surge in 
     Iraq is in danger of collapsing after the recent defections 
     of prominent Senate Republicans such as Richard Lugar (Ind.), 
     Pete Domenici (N.M.) and George Voinovich (Ohio). But this 
     growing opposition to the surge has not yet translated into 
     support for outright withdrawal--few lawmakers are 
     comfortable with abandoning Iraq or admitting defeat. The 
     result has been a search for some kind of politically 
     moderate ``Plan B'' that would split the difference between 
     surge and withdrawal.
       The problem is that these politics do not fit the military 
     reality of Iraq. Many would like to reduce the U.S. 
     commitment to something like half of today's troop presence 
     there. But it is much harder to find a mission for the 
     remaining 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers that makes any sense 
     militarily.
       Perhaps the most popular centrist option today is drawn 
     from the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations of last 
     December. This would withdraw U.S. combat brigades, shift the 
     American mission to one of training and supporting the Iraqi 
     security forces, and cut total U.S. troop levels in the 
     country by about half. This idea is at the heart of the 
     proposed legislative effort that Domenici threw his support 
     behind last week, and support is growing on both sides of the 
     aisle on Capitol Hill.
       The politics make sense, but the compromise leaves us with 
     an untenable military mission. Without a major U.S. combat 
     effort to keep the violence down, the American training 
     effort would face challenges even

[[Page 22064]]

     bigger than those our troops are confronting today. An 
     ineffective training effort would leave tens of thousands of 
     American trainers, advisers and supporting troops exposed to 
     that violence in the meantime. The net result is likely to be 
     continued U.S. casualties with little positive effect on 
     Iraq's ongoing civil war.
       The American combat presence in Iraq is insufficient to end 
     the violence but does cap its intensity. If we draw down that 
     combat presence, violence will rise accordingly. To be 
     effective, embedded trainers and advisers must live and 
     operate with the Iraqi soldiers they mentor--they are not 
     lecturers sequestered in some safe classroom. The greater the 
     violence, the riskier their jobs and the heavier their 
     losses.
       That violence reduces their ability to succeed as trainers. 
     There are many barriers to an effective Iraqi security force. 
     But the toughest is sectarian factionalism. Iraq is in the 
     midst of a civil war in which all Iraqis are increasingly 
     forced to take sides for their own survival. Iraq's security 
     forces are necessarily drawn from the same populations that 
     are being pulled apart into factions. No military can be 
     hermetically sealed off from its society--the more severe the 
     sectarian violence, the deeper the divisions in Iraqi society 
     become and the harder it is for Americans to create the kind 
     of disinterested nationalist security force that could 
     stabilize Iraq. Under the best conditions, it is unrealistic 
     to expect a satisfactory Iraqi security force anytime soon, 
     and the more severe the violence, the worse the prospects.
       The result is a vicious cycle. The more we shift out of 
     combat missions and into training, the harder we make the 
     trainers' job and the more exposed they become. It is 
     unrealistic to expect that we can pull back to some safe yet 
     productive mission of training but not fighting--this would 
     be neither safe nor productive.
       If the surge is unacceptable, the better option is to cut 
     our losses and withdraw altogether. In fact, the substantive 
     case for either extreme--surge or outright withdrawal--is 
     stronger than for any policy between. The surge is a long-
     shot gamble. But middle-ground options leave us with the 
     worst of both worlds: continuing casualties but even less 
     chance of stability in exchange. Moderation and centrism are 
     normally the right instincts in American politics, and many 
     lawmakers in both parties desperately want to find a workable 
     middle ground on Iraq. But while the politics are right, the 
     military logic is not.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. Biddle provides a need evaluation of the flaws in the 
Baker-Hamilton. Among those flaws, as he explains, our combat forces 
are restraining the intensity of the violence in Iraq, and removing 
them would cause the violence to rise. This rise in violence would put 
the safety of Americans who remain to train Iraqis in even greater 
jeopardy.
  Of course, prematurely withdrawing our troops would have many other 
consequences. Indeed, a sobering assessment of the risks of withdrawal 
is too often missing from debates about the U.S. mission in Iraq.
  In this regard, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the July 
17 Washington Post be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, July 17, 2007]

 Exit Strategy: Would Iran Take Over Iraq, Would Al-Qaeda? The Debate 
About How and When to Leave Centers on What Might Happen After the U.S. 
                                  Goes

                 (By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks)

       If U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq in the near 
     future, three developments would be likely to unfold. 
     Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed 
     areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in 
     civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would 
     solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. 
     In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate 
     nations.
       That was the conclusion reached in recent ``war games'' 
     exercises conducted for the U.S. military by retired Marine 
     Col. Gary Anderson. ``I honestly don't think it will be 
     apocalyptic,'' said Anderson, who has served in Iraq and now 
     works for a major defense contractor. But ``it will be 
     ugly.''
       In making the case for a continued U.S. troop presence, 
     President Bush has offered far more dire forecasts, arguing 
     that al-Qaeda or Iran--or both--would take over Iraq after a 
     ``precipitous withdrawal'' of U.S. forces. Al-Qaeda, he said 
     recently, would ``be able to recruit better and raise more 
     money from which to launch their objectives'' of attacking 
     the U.S. homeland. War opponents in Congress counter that 
     Bush's talk about al-Qaeda is overblown fear-mongering and 
     that nothing could be worse than the present situation.
       Increasingly, the Washington debate over when U.S. forces 
     should leave is centering on what would happen once they do. 
     The U.S. military, aware of this political battlefield, has 
     been quietly exploring scenarios of a reduced troop presence, 
     performing role-playing exercises and studying historical 
     parallels. Would the Iraqi government find its way, or would 
     the country divide along sectarian lines? Would al-Qaeda take 
     over? Would Iran? Would U.S. security improve or deteriorate? 
     Does the answer depend on when, how and how many U.S. troops 
     depart?
       Some military officers contend that, regardless of whether 
     Iraq breaks apart or outside actors seek to take over after a 
     U.S. pullout, ever greater carnage is inevitable. ``The 
     water-cooler chat I hear most often 
     . . . is that there is going to be an outbreak of violence 
     when we leave that makes the [current] instability look like 
     a church picnic,'' said an officer who has served in Iraq.
       However, just as few envisioned the long Iraq war, now in 
     its fifth year, or the many setbacks along the way, there are 
     no firm conclusions regarding the consequences of a reduction 
     in U.S. troops. A senior administration official closely 
     involved in Iraq policy imagines a vast internecine slaughter 
     as Iraq descends into chaos but cautions that it is 
     impossible to know the outcome. ``We've got to be very modest 
     about our predictive capabilities,'' the official said.


                          Mistakes of the Past

       In April of last year, the Army and Joint Forces Command 
     sponsored a war game called Unified Quest 2007 at the Army 
     War College in Pennsylvania. It assumed the partition of an 
     ``Iraq-like'' country, said one player, retired Army Col. 
     Richard Sinnreich, with U.S. troops moving quickly out of the 
     capital to redeploy in the far north and south. ``We have 
     obligations to the Kurds and the Kuwaitis, and they also 
     offer the most stable and secure locations from which to 
     continue,'' he said.
       ``Even then, the end-of-game assessment wasn't very 
     favorable'' to the United States, he said.
       Anderson, the retired Marine, has conducted nearly a dozen 
     Iraq-related war games for the military over the past two 
     years, many premised on a U.S. combat pullout by a set date--
     leaving only advisers and support units--and concluded that 
     partition would result. The games also predicted that Iran 
     would intervene on one side of a Shiite civil war and would 
     become bogged down in southern Iraq.
       T.X. Hammes, another retired Marine colonel, said that an 
     extended Iranian presence in Iraq could lead to increased 
     intervention by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states on the 
     other side. ``If that happens,'' Hammes said, ``I worry that 
     the Iranians come to the conclusion they have to do something 
     to undercut . . . the Saudis.'' Their best strategy, he said, 
     ``would be to stimulate insurgency among the Shiites in Saudi 
     Arabia.''
       In a secret war game conducted in December at an office 
     building near the Pentagon, more than 20 participants from 
     the military, the CIA, the State Department and the private 
     sector spent three days examining what might unfold if the 
     recommendations of the Iraq Study Group were implemented.
       One question involved how Syria and Iran might respond to 
     the U.S. diplomatic outreach proposed by the bipartisan 
     group, headed by former secretary of state James A. Baker III 
     and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.). The gamers 
     concluded that Iran would be difficult to engage because its 
     divided government is incapable of delivering on its 
     promises. Role-players representing Syria did engage with the 
     U.S. diplomats, but linked helping out in Baghdad to a 
     lessening of U.S. pressure in Lebanon.
       The bottom line, one participant said, was ``pretty much 
     what we are seeing'' since the Bush administration began 
     intermittent talks with Damascus and Tehran: not much 
     progress or tangible results.
       Amid political arguments in Washington over troop 
     departures, U.S. military commanders on the ground stress the 
     importance of developing a careful and thorough withdrawal 
     plan. Whatever the politicians decide, ``it needs to be well-
     thought-out and it cannot be a strategy that is based on 
     `Well, we need to leave,''' Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin Mixon, a 
     top U.S. commander in Iraq, said Friday from his base near 
     Tikrit.
       History is replete with bad withdrawal outcomes. Among the 
     most horrific was the British departure from Afghanistan in 
     1842, when 16,500 active troops and civilians left Kabul 
     thinking they had safe passage to India. Two weeks later, 
     only one European arrived alive in Jalalabad, near the 
     Afghan-Indian border.
       The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, which began 
     in May 1988 after a decade of occupation, reveals other 
     mistakes to avoid. Like the U.S. troops who arrived in Iraq 
     in 2003, the Soviet force in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly 
     conventional, heavy with tanks and other armored vehicles. 
     Once Moscow made public its plans to leave, the political and 
     security situations unraveled much faster than anticipated. 
     ``The Soviet Army actually had to fight out of certain 
     areas,'' said Army Maj. Daniel Morgan, a two-tour veteran of 
     the Iraq war who has been studying the Soviet pullout at Fort 
     Leavenworth, Kan., with an eye toward gleaning lessons for 
     Iraq. ``As a matter of fact, they had to airlift out of 
     Kandahar, the fighting was so bad.''
       War supporters and opponents in Washington disagree on the 
     lessons of the departure most deeply imprinted on the 
     American

[[Page 22065]]

     psyche: the U.S. exit from Vietnam. ``I saw it once before, a 
     long time ago,'' Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a Vietnam 
     veteran and presidential candidate, said last week of an 
     early Iraq withdrawal. ``I saw a defeated military, and I saw 
     how long it took a military that was defeated to recover.''
       Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), also a White House 
     hopeful, finds a different message in the Vietnam retreat. 
     Saying that Baghdad would become ``Saigon revisited,'' he 
     warned that ``we will be lifting American personnel off the 
     roofs of buildings in the Green Zone if we do not change 
     policy, and pretty drastically.''


                          The Al-Qaeda Threat

       What is perhaps most striking about the military's 
     simulations is that its post-drawdown scenarios focus on 
     civil war and regional intervention and upheaval rather than 
     the establishment of an al-Qaeda sanctuary in Iraq.
       For Bush, however, that is the primary risk of withdrawal. 
     ``It would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al-
     Qaeda,'' he said in a news conference last week. ``It would 
     mean that we'd be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. 
     It would mean we'd allow the terrorists to establish a safe 
     haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan.'' 
     If U.S. troops leave too soon, Bush said, they would probably 
     ``have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that 
     is even more dangerous.''
       Withdrawal would also ``confuse and frighten friends and 
     allies in the region and embolden Syria and especially Iran, 
     which would then exert its influence throughout the Middle 
     East,'' the president said.
       Bush is not alone in his description of the al-Qaeda threat 
     should the United States leave Iraq too soon. ``There's not a 
     doubt in my mind that Osama bin Laden's one goal is to take 
     over the Kingdom of the Two Mosques [Saudi Arabia] and 
     reestablish the caliphate'' that ended with the Ottoman 
     Empire, said a former senior military official now at a 
     Washington think tank. ``It would be very easy for them to 
     set up camps and run them in Anbar and Najaf'' provinces in 
     Iraq.
       U.S. intelligence analysts, however, have a somewhat 
     different view of al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, noting that 
     the local branch takes its inspiration but not its orders 
     from bin Laden. Its enemies--the overwhelming majority of 
     whom are Iraqis--reside in Baghdad and Shiite-majority areas 
     of Iraq, not in Saudi Arabia or the United States. While 
     intelligence officials have described the Sunni insurgent 
     group calling itself al-Qaeda in Iraq as an ``accelerant'' 
     for violence, they have cited domestic sectarian divisions as 
     the main impediment to peace.
       In a report released yesterday, Anthony H. Cordesman of the 
     Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that 
     al-Qaeda is ``only one part'' of a spectrum of Sunni 
     extremist groups and is far from the largest or most active. 
     Military officials have said in background briefings that al-
     Qaeda is responsible for about 15 percent of the attacks, 
     Cordesman said, although the group is ``highly effective'' 
     and probably does ``the most damage in pushing Iraq towards 
     civil war.'' But its activities ``must be kept in careful 
     perspective, and it does not dominate the Sunni insurgency,'' 
     he said.


                         `Serious Consequences'

       Moderate lawmakers such as Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) 
     have concluded that a unified Iraqi government is not on the 
     near horizon and have called for redeployment, change of 
     mission and a phased drawdown of U.S. forces. Far from 
     protecting U.S. interests, Lugar said in a recent speech, the 
     continuation of Bush's policy poses ``extreme risks for U.S. 
     national security.''
       Critics of complete withdrawal often charge that ``those 
     advocating [it] just don't understand the serious 
     consequences of doing so,'' said Wayne White, a former deputy 
     director of Near East division of the State Department's 
     Intelligence and Research Bureau. ``Unfortunately, most of us 
     old Middle East hands understand all too well some of the 
     consequences.''
       White is among many Middle East experts who think that the 
     United States should leave Iraq sooner rather than later, but 
     differ on when, how and what would happen next. Most agree 
     that either an al-Qaeda or Iranian takeover would be 
     unlikely, and say that Washington should step up its regional 
     diplomacy, putting more pressure on regional actors such as 
     Saudi Arabia to take responsibility for what is happening in 
     their back yards.
       Many regional experts within and outside the administration 
     note that while there is a range of truly awful 
     possibilities, it is impossible to predict what will happen 
     in Iraq--with or without U.S. troops.
       ``Say the Shiites drive the Sunnis into Anbar,'' one expert 
     said of Anderson's war-game scenario. ``Well, what does that 
     really mean? How many tens of thousands of people are going 
     to get killed before all the surviving Sunnis are in Anbar?'' 
     He questioned whether that result would prove acceptable to a 
     pro-withdrawal U.S. public.
       White, speaking at a recent symposium on Iraq, addressed 
     the possibility of unpalatable withdrawal consequences by 
     paraphrasing Winston Churchill's famous statement about 
     democracy. ``I posit that withdrawal from Iraq is the worst 
     possible option, except for all the others.''

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a premature withdrawal would have severe 
consequences, all of which would pose severe risks. Clearly, we should 
allow General Petraeus's plan time to succeed.
  Finally, Mr. President, as I noted previously, by setting the aside 
the Defense authorization bill because he lost a vote to withdraw our 
troops, the Majority Leader left important business for our military 
undone. Recently, the Senate passed parts of the bill--a pay raise and 
``wounded warriors'' provisions--but more needs to be done.
  For instance, the Defense authorization bill should be the vehicle 
for setting our national security priorities, one of which is how we 
should deal with antisatellite weapons the Chinese could use against 
us.
  I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that an article on China's space 
weapons that appeared in the July 23 Wall Street Journal be inserted 
into the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2007]

                         China's Space Weapons

                         (By Ashley J. Tellis)

       On Jan. 11, 2007, a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile 
     slammed into an aging weather satellite in space. The 
     resulting collision not only marked Beijing's first 
     successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test but, in the eyes of 
     many, also a head-on collision with the Bush administration's 
     space policies.
       As one analyst phrased it, U.S. policy has compelled 
     China's leaders to conclude ``that only a display of 
     Beijing's power to launch . . . an arms race would bring 
     Washington to the table to hear their concerns.'' This view, 
     which is widespread in the U.S. and elsewhere, misses the 
     point: China's ASAT demonstration was not a protest against 
     the Bush administration, but rather part of a maturing 
     strategy designed to counter the overall military superiority 
     of the U.S.
       Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese strategists have 
     been cognizant of the fact that the U.S. is the only country 
     in the world with the capacity--and possibly the intention--
     to thwart China's rise to great power status. They also 
     recognize that Beijing will be weak militarily for some time 
     to come, yet must be prepared for a possible war with America 
     over Taiwan or, in the longer term, over what Aaron Friedberg 
     once called ``the struggle for mastery in Asia.'' How the 
     weaker can defeat the stronger, therefore, becomes the 
     central problem facing China's military strategy.
       Chinese strategists have struggled to find ways of solving 
     this conundrum ever since the dramatic demonstration of 
     American prowess in Operation Desert Storm. And after 
     carefully analyzing U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf, 
     Kosovo and Afghanistan, they believe they have uncovered a 
     significant weakness.
       The advanced military might of the U.S. is inordinately 
     dependent on a complex network of space-based command, 
     control, communications, and computer-driven intelligence, 
     surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that enables 
     American forces to detect different kinds of targets and 
     exchange militarily relevant information. This network is key 
     to the success of American combat operations. These assets, 
     however, are soft and defenseless; while they bestow on the 
     American military definite asymmetric advantages, they are 
     also the source of deep vulnerability. Consequently, Chinese 
     strategists concluded that any effort to defeat the U.S. 
     should aim not at its fundamental strength--its capacity to 
     deliver overwhelming conventional firepower precisely from 
     long distances--but rather at its Achilles' heel, namely, its 
     satellites and their related ground installations.
       Consistent with this calculus, China has pursued, for over 
     a decade now, a variety of space warfare programs, which 
     include direct attack and directed-energy weapons, electronic 
     attack, and computer-network and ground-attack systems. These 
     efforts are aimed at giving China the capacity to attack U.S. 
     space systems comprehensively because, in Chinese 
     calculations, this represents the best way of ``leveling the 
     playing field'' in the event of a future conflict.
       The importance of space denial for China's operational 
     success implies that its counterspace investments, far from 
     being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space 
     regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing 
     against superior American military power. Because having this 
     capacity is critical to Chinese security, Beijing will not 
     entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade 
     away its space-denial capabilities. This would only further 
     accentuate the military advantages of its competitors. For 
     China to do otherwise would be to condemn its armed forces to 
     inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power.

[[Page 22066]]

       This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they 
     are right. Any ``weaponization'' of space will indeed be 
     costly and especially dangerous to the U.S., which relies 
     heavily on space for military superiority, economic growth 
     and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are 
     correct when they emphasize that advanced powers stand to 
     gain disproportionately from any global regime that protects 
     their space assets. Yet they are wrong when they insist that 
     such a regime is attainable and, therefore, ought to be 
     pursued.
       Weaker but significant challengers, like China, simply 
     cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary because 
     of its deleterious consequences for their particular 
     interests. Consequently, even though a treaty protecting 
     space assets would be beneficial to Washington, its specific 
     costs to Beijing--in the context of executing China's 
     national military strategy--would be remarkably high.
       Beijing's attitude toward space arms control will change 
     only given a few particular developments. China might acquire 
     the capacity to defeat the U.S. despite America's privileged 
     access to space. Or China's investments in counterspace 
     technology might begin to yield diminishing returns because 
     the U.S. consistently nullifies these capabilities through 
     superior technology and operational practices. Or China's own 
     dependence on space for strategic and economic reasons might 
     intensify to the point where the threat posed by any American 
     offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing 
     to Beijing's own comparable efforts. Or the risk of conflict 
     between a weaker China and any other superior military power, 
     such as the U.S., disappears entirely.
       Since these conditions will not be realized anytime soon, 
     Washington should certainly discuss space security with 
     Beijing, but, for now, it should not expect that negotiation 
     will yield any successful agreements. Instead, the U.S. 
     should accelerate investments in solutions that enhance the 
     security of its space assets, in addition to developing its 
     own offensive counterspace capabilities. These avenues--as 
     the Bush administration has correctly recognized--offer the 
     promise of protecting American interests in space and 
     averting more serious threats to its global primacy.

  Mr. KYL. I asked that this article be printed in the Record because 
it is a wake-up call to a new threat we need to take seriously. By 
setting aside the Defense authorization bill, we missed an opportunity 
to deal with this threat from China.

                          ____________________