[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 16] [House] [Pages 21920-21924] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2007 The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 579, proceedings will now resume on the bill (H.R. 2831) to amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes, as amended. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER pro tempore. When proceedings were postponed on Monday, July 30, 2007, 6 minutes remained in debate. The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and the gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) each control 3 minutes. Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, in order to speak in favor of this restoration of the law, I am pleased to acknowledge the majority leader of the House for 1 minute. Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman. Madam Speaker, when the Supreme Court wrongly decides a case, as they do from time to time, particularly when congressional intent is at issue, the United States Congress can and should act to remedy it. That is precisely what this carefully crafted measured legislation, the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, is designed to do. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), and I thank the ranking member as well for the work that they do on this committee. Make no mistake. The Court's 5-4 decision on May 29 in Ledbetter v. Goodyear was wrongly decided. The merits of Lilly Ledbetter's wage discrimination claim seemed beyond doubt. A Federal jury agreed that she was discriminated against. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agreed with Ms. Ledbetter's claims, although the Bush administration switched its position once the case got to the Supreme Court. Most importantly, Lilly Ledbetter was paid less than all of her male counterparts, all of her male counterparts, even those who had less seniority. This clearly was not a case where her performance was suspect. Goodyear gave her a top performance award in 1996. The fact is, the Court majority took an extremely cramped view of the title VII of the Civil Rights Act, holding that Ms. Ledbetter and claimants like her must file their pay discrimination claims within 180 days of the original discriminatory act. In other words, even if the discriminatory acts continued, every week, every biweek, every month, that they would have to look back to the original first check. There are at least three serious problems with the Court's flawed analysis. First, the unlawful discrimination against Ms. Ledbetter did not begin and end with Goodyear's original decision to pay her less than they paid her male counterparts. In fact, every paycheck that Lilly Ledbetter received after Goodyear's decision to pay her less was a continuing manifestation of Goodyear's illegal discrimination. As Justice Ginsburg said in dissent, each subsequent paycheck was ``infected'' by the original decision to unlawfully discriminate. Secondly, the Court dismissed the realities of the workplace far too casually. Detecting pay discrimination is not easy, and sometimes it may take years to uncover. Now, each of us in this body knows what the other Member of the body makes, but that is not true in almost every workplace in America. Why? Because people generally do not talk [[Page 21921]] openly with their coworkers about their salaries, raises and bonuses. In fact, many employers strive to keep such information confidential. Just consider, Ms. Ledbetter apparently did not become aware that she had been discriminated against until she received an anonymous letter alerting her to the discrimination. Third, the Court majority ignored its own holdings that Congress intended title VII, the majority ignored its own holdings that Congress intended title VII to have a broad, remedial purpose, to make persons whole for injuries suffered on accounts of unlawful employment discrimination. Finally, let me say that those who claim that this bill somehow eliminates the statue of limitations are incorrect. Under this bill, as we thought the law was for 30 years, an employee must still file a charge within the statutory filing period after receiving a discriminatory paycheck. This bill is fair, it is just, and it comports with the intent of this Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act. I urge my colleagues to support this bill, to make sure that what Congress intended is, in fact, what the law remains. Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. Madam Speaker, I would urge our colleagues in both the Republican and Democratic Parties to vote ``yes'' in favor of this bill. The opponents have raised two arguments. I believe both of them are wrong. The first is that the bill repeals or eliminates the statute of limitations. This is not correct. What is, in fact, correct, is that once 180 days have passed from the final act of discrimination, the final tainted paycheck, then the plaintiff's claim would be barred. The second argument that has been raised by the opponents of the bill is that there would be a flood of litigation and a flood of claims that would vex employers across the country. This is not so. We are restoring the law as it has existed for more than three decades. During those three decades, there was no such flood or plague of litigation. This conclusion is borne out by the Congressional Budget Office, which, in analyzing the costs of this bill, concluded that there would be no appreciable increase in the number of claims filed with the EEOC. So, for these reasons and others, the arguments raised against the bill are invalid. Members should vote ``yes'' in favor of the bill. {time} 1315 Mr. McKEON. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time. We have had a good debate last night and this morning, and the other side has tried to make this an emotional debate about discrimination, but that is not debate. We all, both Democrat and Republican, oppose discrimination. Madam Speaker, in Congress bad process usually makes for bad product. Let there be no mistake, the process that brought H.R. 2831 to the floor today was incredibly sloppy. Likewise, the product itself could not be sloppier. The title of this bill should be, ``The End of the Statute of Limitations.'' This bill was hastily patched together by the Education and Labor Committee Democrats at the behest of the House majority leadership with the hope of grabbing a few headlines just a month after the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the 1964 Civil Rights Act statute of limitations. Neither House Republicans nor many key outside stakeholders were consulted as the bill was drafted, and the bill was not considered at a single legislative hearing. Then, again, at the behest of the House Democrat leadership, the Rules Committee granted a completely closed rule, locking out nearly 400 Members from amending or even considering amendments for this legislation. Had this bill truly been a narrow fix, as its supporters would have the American people believe, this sloppy process may not have been such a problem. However, this is a major fundamental change to civil rights law and no less than four separate statutes. The last change to civil rights law of this magnitude, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, took 2 years of negotiation, debate, and bipartisan accord to accomplish. By comparison, this bill took just 2 months. It cheapens our legislative process and, indeed, it cheapens the work that has gone into decades of serious considerate civil rights lawmaking. The legislative product itself, as my Republican colleagues and I have discussed, is no less flawed. It guts the statute of limitations contained in current law and, in so doing, would allow an employee to bring a claim against an employer decades after the alleged initial act of discrimination occurred. And trial lawyers, you can be sure, are salivating at this prospect. Madam Speaker, this is a bad bill that is the result of an equally bad process. The President has threatened to veto it should it arrive at his desk, and rightfully so. But we should never let it get to that point. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this bill. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Madam Speaker, this is a narrow bill that supports a very broad principle. The broad principle is that discrimination has no place in the lives of Americans. This House has people working in it whose families came here who could not speak English but now their sons and daughters write the law. This House has people in it whose ancestors were brought here as slaves but now who write the law of the land. And this House has one person in it whose grandmother could not vote but who now is the woman who is Speaker of the House of Representatives. When we eliminate discrimination, great things happen in America. When we restore discrimination, America moves backwards. This country is bigger and stronger than the worst thoughts of any bigot. Discrimination has no place in our law, no place in our hearts, and no place because of technicalities. Vote ``yes'' in favor of restoring this strong tool against discrimination. Mr. HARE. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and commend my Chairman, Mr. Miller for his efforts to bring this legislation forward. The Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter versus Goodyear was a setback for fundamental equal rights. As a Member of the Education and Labor Committee I am pleased that the House is standing up today for America's workers by essentially invalidating this misguided ruling. Mrs. Ledbetter's pay discrimination case was dismissed--not because she was not being discriminated against--but because the Supreme Court believed she filed her claim too late. Under this decision, employees in Ledbetter's position are forced to live with discriminatory paychecks for the rest of their careers. Moreover, the Court's decision ignores the realities of the workplace-- where employees generally do not know enough about what their co- workers earn or how decisions regarding pay are' made to file a complaint precisely when discrimination first occurs. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would clarify that every paycheck resulting from a discriminatory pay decision constitutes a violation of the Civil Rights Act. When the Supreme Court sanctions discrimination through technicalities or misinterpretation, it is the job of Congress to clarify the intent of the law. We start this process today by passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. I urge all my colleagues to vote for H.R. 2831. Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. I regret that this legislation is even necessary in the 21st Century, but even today, we see instances of pay discrimination time and time again. The reason we are bringing this legislation to the Floor today is because unfortunately, activist judges on the U.S. Supreme Court have changed the rules to make it much, much harder for an employee suffering pay discrimination to bring his or her case to court. Prior to that case, an employee had 180 days from her previous paycheck to file a lawsuit for pay discrimination. However, five members of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Samuel Alito, changed those rules. Now, an employee has 180 days from the time of the decision to file a lawsuit. However, oftentimes it is extremely difficult to know when pay discrimination is occurring. [[Page 21922]] In the Supreme Court case under which the new rules were decided, Lilly Ledbetter filed her lawsuit because she was being paid far less than the lowest paid male employee holding the same position as hers. And she only found out about this because an anonymous person slipped her a note that showed her that fact. There was no way that Ms. Ledbetter could have known about her pay discrimination if she had not received this anonymous note. However, the five Supreme Court Justices decided that she could not sue because it had been more than 180 days since her employers had decided to pay her less than the men. This legislation is not only beneficial to employees, it is good for employers as well. With the current strict time limits, employees have more of an incentive to file lawsuits if they suspect discrimination, simply because if they delay their suit, they will give up their right to sue. It does not make sense to encourage people to sue before they have all the facts. We should ensure that we have a statute of limitations that makes sense. I have fought against pay discrimination since my first day in Congress. Discrimination of any kind should never be allowed, and I intend to keep fighting against it. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is commonsense legislation that should be enacted into law as we work to end discrimination at all levels. Madam Speaker, I strongly support H.R. 2831, and I would encourage all of my colleagues to do the same. Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. Colleagues, I wish that I did not have to stand here today; I wish that we did not have to have this debate. However, in reversing decades of precedent and placing new limits on the ability of victims of pay discrimination to pursue their claims, the Supreme Court's May 29 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear makes our debate here today critically necessary to ensuring a better America for all of our citizens. Some on the other side of the aisle have complained that this legislation will dismantle the statute of limitations established by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. They maintain that this legislation will allow an employee to sue for pay discrimination resulting from an alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred 5, 10, 20, or even 30 or more years earlier and that under H.R. 2831 a worker or retiree could seek damages against a company run by employees and executives that had nothing to do with the initial act of alleged discrimination that occurred dozens of years ago. These arguments represent nothing more than an attempt to muddy the waters. The reality is that Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does nothing to disturb the current law's 180-day charge-filing period and employees continue to be subject to these time limits. Instead, the bill merely clarifies the conduct that triggers the running of the 180-day clock. Under the legislation, if an employee wants to challenge discriminatory pay, he or she must file within 180 days of the discriminatory conduct, such as the payment of a discriminatory wage. If the employee waits longer than 180 days after the discriminatory conduct, the 180-day clock will run out and a charge will become untimely. The fact of the matter is that pay discriminatory is often difficult to discover and takes place over many years. Many employers have policies explicitly forbidding employees from talking to one another about their pay. Workplace norms also discourage employees from asking each other about their pay. Additionally, discriminatory pay tends to have a cumulative effect--what may seem like a minor discrepancy at first builds up over time. By the time the discrimination is noticed, it would be too late to file a charge under the Supreme Court's ruling. These facts were undoubtedly the reason why a jury of her peers originally awarded Lilly Ledbetter more than $3.5 million; finding ``more likely than not'' that sex discrimination during her 19-year career led to her being paid substantially less than her male counterparts. By passing this legislation here today, Congress will be heeding Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's call to stand up and ensure that no American's income should be determined by race, sex, creed, color, or sexuality. Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, as cosponsor of this legislation, I rise in strong support and urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. This legislation corrects and clarifies a serious misinterpretation by the Supreme Court when it ruled earlier this year in the case of Ledbetter v. Goodyear. In that 5-4 decision, the majority ruled that Lilly Ledbetter, the lone female supervisor at a tire plant in Gadsden, AL, did not file her lawsuit against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. in the timely manner specified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court determined a victim of pay discrimination must file a charge within 180 days of the employer's decision to pay someone less for an unlawfully discriminatory reason, such as race, sex, religion, etc. Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, the widely accepted rule in employment discrimination law was that every discriminatory paycheck was a new violation that restarts the 180-day clock. H.R. 2831 restores the law prior to the Supreme Court's Ledbetter decision, by clarifying that the clock for filing a discrimination charge starts when a discriminatory pay decision or practice is adopted, when a person becomes subject to the pay decision or practice, or when a person is affected by the pay decision or practice, including whenever she receives a discriminatory paycheck. The Supreme Court must not be able to roll back workers' rights in one ruling. Congress must pass this legislation to ensure workers are protected and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 2831. Mr. BISHOP of New York. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, HR 2831. Although women have made great strides towards income equality in the workplace, a gap still exists. According to the Census Bureau, women continue to make 77 cents to every dollar that their male counterparts earn. No one knows this fact better than Lilly Ledbetter. She worked hard at a Goodyear tire plant for 19 years. Initially, Ms. Ledbetter was paid the same as her male colleagues but over time her salary did not continue to rise at the same rate as male colleagues. However, like many employees, she was unaware of the discrepancy for years. By the time she discovered it, the Supreme Court said she was too late to receive justice, a finding that overturns 30 years of established case law. The Supreme Court held, that the plaintiff must file suit within 180 days of the initial so called discrimination. This may seem like a reasonable amount of time, but for wage discrimination cases, this is often not feasible. Many employers forbid workers from discussing their salaries and employees are often not even aware that they have been discriminated against until after they leave their job. This finding stands in stark contrast with 30 years of case law, which has found that the 180 day ``clock'' starts anew with each discriminatory paycheck. This bill codifies by starting the clock for filing a discrimination charge starts when a discriminatory pay decision or practice is adopted, when a person becomes subject to the pay decision or practice, or when employees affected by the pay decision or practice, including whenever receive a discriminatory paycheck. During her testimony in June at an Education and Labor Committee hearing, Lilly Ledbetter said: What happened to me is not only an insult to my dignity, but it had real consequences for my ability to care for my family. Every paycheck I received, I got less than what I was entitled to under the law. Sadly, Ms. Ledbetter's case is not unique, in fact from 2001-2006, some 40,000 wage discrimination cases were filed from workers, much like Lilly Ledbetter. This bill will finally give workers the ``what they are entitled to under the law''. I thank Chairman Miller and my colleagues for bringing this legislation to the floor so quickly. Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. The recent Supreme Court ruling in the Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire case turns the clock back on decades of progress. As a result of this ruling it is now even more difficult for employees to exercise their rights for equal pay and equal treatment as determined under the law. This decision was based on a questionable technicality, not on the fact that Ms. Ledbetter was paid 20 percent less than even the least qualified of her male counterparts. Ms. Ledbetter did nothing wrong throughout the process. She toiled for 19 years and deserved equal pay and treatment by her employers. For centuries, women, minorities, and many others have fought for equal rights and consideration under the law. Congress is being forced to invoke its constitutional powers to restore balance and justice for the sake of equality. Today we send a strong message that discrimination and injustice on the basis of gender is intolerable. Simply said Madam Speaker, H.R. 2831 is not about turning back the clock on civil rights law; this legislation protects these hard-fought and hard-earned guarantees. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, women who work full time, earn, on average, only 77 cents for [[Page 21923]] every dollar men earn. The figures are even worse for women of color. Clearly, discrimination is not a relic of the past. I know that many, many Members of Congress recognize the importance of this legislation. I ask all of my colleagues to vote yes. I hope that the President will stand for equality and justice by signing this important bill. Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for bringing this important bill to the House floor. H.R. 2831 is designed to be an important but narrow reversal of the Ledbetter decision, without upsetting any other current law. As many of us here today know, earlier this year, the Supreme Court decision Ledbetter versus Goodyear made it much harder for workers to pursue pay discrimination claims based on the fact that plaintiffs would need to file their charge of pay discrimination within 180 days of the employer's decision to pay them less. What was particularly disturbing about this decision was the fact that it stripped Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of its longstanding position that every paycheck resulting from an earlier discriminatory pay decision is considered a violation of the Civil Rights Act. The importance of this consideration of each and every paycheck is vital to the CRA. Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision was untenable. Employees often do not know what their co-workers earn, or how and when pay decisions are made. These dynamics in the workplace make it nearly impossible to file a complaint precisely when discrimination first occurs. Many times they find this out far after the fact, and thus need a filing deadline that takes this time delay into account. The bill before us today maintains the law's current statute of limitations and limits on back pay recovery. It states that an employee must still file a charge within the statutory filing period after receiving a discriminatory paycheck but would provide a realistic timeline consistent with the Civil Rights Act. Again, I thank the Chairman for bringing up this bill that calls attention to the fact that we need to make our pay discrimination laws work in a much more realistic and fair way for all parties involved. Mrs. BOYDA of Kansas. Madam Speaker, on May 29th, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled on Ledbetter vs. Goodyear. Lilly Ledbetter was a 19-year employee of the Goodyear Tire Plant in Gadsden, AL. After discovering a substantive wage gap between herself and her seemingly equal, male co- workers, Ledbetter filed suit claiming gender wage discrimination. While Ledbetter won the case in a Federal court, Goodyear appealed and the case made it to the Supreme Court. In a thin margin, 5-4, the Supreme Court decided that Ledbetter had missed her legal window. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employees have 180 days after an alleged act of discrimination takes place to file a complaint. While this 180-day deadline has commonly been interpreted to start over with each additional paycheck, the Supreme Court limited this right and claimed that only the first paycheck counts as the act of discrimination. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was one of the four Supreme Court justices who disagreed with the ruling, and she called upon Congress to act. H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is Congress's response. This bill will reverse this Supreme Court decision by making the original Congressional intent clear--renewing the 180-day deadline every time a worker receives a discriminatory paycheck. This strengthens measures to ensure paycheck fairness and to address unfair wage gaps through legal measures, as well as strengthens the rights of employees. This ruling is in blatant disregard of how the average employment environment functions. It means that unless employees discover a potentially discriminatory action within the first 180 days of their first paycheck, or last pay change, they have no legal ground to challenge it. This ruling was made with the assumption that new employees enter their workplace with a clear knowledge of what their coworkers earn and that more established employees already know the wages of their coworkers. This is not the case. Many employees do not feel comfortable talking about their wages in the workplace, or disputing their wages too soon after beginning a new job. Moreover, many workplaces discourage their employees from discussing their wages at all. Yet, if employees do discover that they have been discriminated against, and it's past the 180-day deadline, employers have legal immunity. While I respect the Supreme Court, I believe that Justice Ginsburg was correct when she stated that the Court's decision ignored real- world employment practices. This is not a gender issue; all employees should have an equal chance of getting a just wage. I believe that Congress must find a way to fix the problem that the Ledbetter decision poses for employees who have experienced discrimination. However, I do not believe that this bill was the best way to accomplish that. By not establishing any deadlines after the initial hire date, Congress has now gone too far; similar to the Supreme Court decision, they have ignored the realities of the average employment environment. I agree that employees need more time than 180 days, but I also believe that employers need to be afforded some timeline as well. I hope to work with both women's organizations and businesses to find an equal balance--we owe both sides that degree of security about what our anti-discrimination laws mean. Mr. TIAHRT. Madam Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Although I join with all my colleagues in steadfast opposition to pay discrimination, this ill- advised, over-reaching, and disingenuous overhaul of civil rights law is the wrong approach. Pay discrimination is not a partisan issue. Pay discrimination strikes at the heart of the American Dream. For more than 40 years, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has made it illegal for employers to determine an employee's pay-scale based on his or her gender. I whole-heartedly agree and support this law. Every American should be able to work hard, play by the rules, and make a living for his or her family. We do not stand for gender discrimination in the workplace. This legislation is bad politics rather than good policy. H.R. 2831 was supposedly written to remedy a sad situation for one person--Lilly Ledbetter. She was apparently paid significantly less than her counterparts at Goodyear Tire Company during her tenure there. Decades later Ms. Ledbetter filed a claim of discrimination. Taking her claim through the courts, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on May 29, 2007, that the statute of limitations had unfortunately run out. Despite saying that H.R. 2831 simply restores prior law, by overturning a Supreme Court ruling against Ms. Ledbetter, in reality, Democrats will gut a decades-old statute of limitations that prevents the filing of ``stale'' claims and protects against abuse of the legal system. Current law rightly provides a statute of limitations to file a discrimination claim, up to 300 days after the alleged workplace discrimination occurred. However, under this bill, employees or retirees could sue for pay discrimination years, even decades, after the alleged discrimination. How can a company defend itself when the accused offenders left the company decades before? The answer is--they can't. And that is exactly the answer desired by the trial lawyers who support this legislation. This legislation will not end pay discrimination, but it will certainly encourage frivolous claims and lawsuits. It is inevitable that under this legislation employees will sue companies for reasons that have little if anything to do with the accused discrimination. Not only is H.R. 2831 the wrong approach to deal with this serious issue, but this legislation also has the threat of a Presidential veto. A Presidential veto means there is no chance action will be taken on this important issue. If Democrats were serious about dealing with this issue, they would work with the President and Republicans to draft serious legislation rather than move forward with this political stunt. Madam Speaker, the issue of pay discrimination is too important to consider this poorly crafted, politically motivated piece of legislation. However, as much as we sympathize with Ms. Ledbetter, H.R. 2831 is bad legislation for our Nation. Let us join together, work in a bipartisan manner, and craft legislation that addresses pay discrimination while not destroying decades-worth of solid employment discrimination law. Until then, I ask my colleagues to join with me in opposing this legislation. Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, which will correct a gross injustice done in the recent Supreme Court decision in the case Ledbetter v. Goodyear. The Supreme Court's May 29, 2007, ruling in Ledbetter reversed decades of precedent that helped victims of pay discrimination to pursue claims against their employers. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employees illegally discriminated against in pay can file claims to recoup that pay within 180 days of being wrongfully denied pay. Unfortunately, the Ledbetter decision concluded that victims need to file claims within 180 days of a discriminatory decision being made, rather than within 180 days of receiving a discriminatory paycheck, as previous jurisprudence had mandated. [[Page 21924]] It is wholly unreasonable to require individuals who are discriminated against to file suit within 180 days of the illegal action. Workplace norms mean that co-workers rarely ask each other about their pay. Moreover, one relatively small discriminatory decision can compound over time, meaning that decisions that are not immediately obvious can nevertheless have profound impacts over the course of an employee's career. Congress recognized 43 years ago with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that it is wrong to treat people differently on the basis of their gender, religion or the color of their skin. The decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear effectively eliminates the primary remedy for thousands of Americans who face illegal and immoral discrimination. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act provides a straightforward and efficient solution for the mistaken decision in Ledbetter. This bill simply clarifies that each discriminatory paycheck qualifies as a new violation that gives employees 180 days to file claims to recover pay. This policy has been the law of the land for the last 43 years, has worked well and should be reinstated. For over four decades, the United States Federal Government has made it clear that discrimination on the basis of one's race, gender, or religion will not be tolerated. It is our responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that all employees are treated fairly and respectfully, and this bill is an important step forward in that direction. I am proud to be a co-sponsor of this legislation and I commend my colleague and friend, Mr. George Miller of California, for introducing the bill. Ms. McCOLLUM of Minnesota. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act to restore important protections for victims of pay discrimination. On May 29, 2007, in a 5-4 ruling the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of Ledbetter v. Goodyear making it much more difficult for workers discriminated against on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, national origin, or age to sue their employers because of disparate pay. In this decision, the Court ruled that Lilly Ledbetter, a former supervisor at a tire plant in Alabama, was not eligible to receive back pay for pay discrimination because she had not filed her claim within 180 days after the first ``unlawful employment practice occurred.'' However, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg highlighted in her dissent, pay discrimination occurs over time in small increments and is frequently not discovered for many years. It is more than disappointing that this decision increases the barriers to fair compensation for victims of pay discrimination. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, of which I am a cosponsor, will allow pay discrimination claims to be filed within 180 days of the issuance of any discriminatory paycheck, not necessarily the first paycheck as the Supreme Court ruled. This legislation restores the previously established interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. H.R. 2831 makes it clear to employers and employees alike that pay discrimination is unacceptable. It is unacceptable from the moment the first discriminatory paycheck is issued until the day that worker receives the compensation s/he earned. Madam Speaker, pay discrimination is unjust and it is illegal. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting fairness for working families and voting for H.R. 2831. Mr. ANDREWS. I yield back the balance of my time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired. Pursuant to House Resolution 579, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed. ____________________