[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19742-19748]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  MRAP

  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I want to explain an amendment I hope to 
get adopted when we return to the Defense authorization bill and that I 
have filed today.
  Let me be very frank. This is a very expensive amendment. It is also, 
literally, priceless. It makes good on this commitment: So long as a 
single American soldier or marine remains in Iraq, we will provide him 
or her with the best protection this country can provide.
  Let me start with the basics. There are two critical issues facing 
our soldiers and marines today: Improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, 
and explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs. IEDs are planted in roads 
and on the side of roads to hit the bottom of vehicles with powerful 
explosives. EFPs are shaped charges that come into the side armor of 
vehicles at high speeds.
  We know that IEDs now cause about 70 percent of all American 
fatalities. Since 2003, in any given month, IEDs have caused between 30 
and 76 percent of American fatalities. For every death, there are 
usually 2 to 10 Americans wounded. Over the past year, we have also 
seen a growing threat from EFPs. They are not yet everywhere in Iraq, 
but they are spreading and they are very lethal.
  The military has a strategy for dealing with both. First, they seek 
to disrupt the organizations that produce IEDs and EFPs. They go after 
the people and the supplies. Second, they attempt to use tactics and 
technology to prevent IEDs and EFPs from being activated when American 
personnel are close enough to be harmed. Third, they attempt to survive 
a direct hit. It is

[[Page 19743]]

the third area where we could and should have done much more to make a 
difference years ago but where still today we can and must make a 
difference.
  The military has tested, both at testing centers and in the field, 
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, also called an MRAP. The 
MRAP provides dramatically improved protection against IEDs. The 
military has said that it is four to five times as good as an up-
armored HMMWV. More important, military commanders tell us that it will 
reduce deaths and casualties from IEDs by 67 to 80 percent. The 
Brookings Institution found that 1,400 Americans died in Iraq due to 
IEDs from March of 2003 through June of 2007. If we had had MRAPs in 
the field from the start--and we could and should have--938 to 1,120 
Americans would be alive today.
  And let me just clarify for my colleagues that this is not new 
technology. It has been used successfully in Africa, by nations much 
poorer than ours, since the 1970s. I don't want to get bogged down in 
history, but this is not rocket science. Every day we delay, another 
soldier or marine is killed or injured by an IED. If we just look at 
this year, IEDs killed 309 Americans; 207 to 247 would still be alive 
today if they had been in MRAPs. We need to make sure that for the 
second half of 2007, those MRAPs are there and those lives are saved.
  What about the threat from these shape charges that come in from the 
side, the EFP? The Army's Rapid Equipping Force and the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization started working on that 
last year. In conjunction with industry, they produced a vehicle 
nicknamed ``the Bull'' and officially called the Highly Survivable 
Urban Vehicle Ballistic Protection Experiment Program. This vehicle was 
tested and shown to defeat EFPs and also tested against the first level 
of MRAP requirements. That testing was completed in March of this year. 
For some reason, the military has not asked for another vehicle to do 
the MRAP level two tests. So we do not actually know how capable this 
vehicle might be for all threats, but we know it works against EFPs. 
Instead of trying to get ahead of the enemy and get this technology 
into the field, the military seems to be sitting on its hands while the 
EFP threat has increased. Why wouldn't you field something you know 
works?
  The perfect vehicle would be a complete MRAP with EFP protection, but 
that appears to be many months away, although some MRAP producers tell 
me that their vehicles have survived EFP hits in the field. So again, 
we do not have the complete picture. We have also been told that Frag-
Kit-6 armor can defeat EFPs, but it is too heavy for MRAPs. So vehicles 
must be redesigned and retested. This will take time. I understand that 
and support that effort, but Americans are dying today. Again, as with 
the MRAP, we have a technology that could keep them alive, and we 
should be using it while we work to perfect it.
  I do not know if all of my colleagues saw the USA Today article that 
appeared on Monday detailing some of the history surrounding the MRAP. 
I will summarize a few points but will ask to have the entire article 
printed in the Record.
  This article details efforts to get MRAPs going back to 2003. It also 
details the reasons for delay, and that is what I want to point out to 
my colleagues.
  First, apparently, the leadership at the Pentagon did not expect this 
war to last this long. Well, that is no surprise. We all remember the 
``Mission Accomplished'' speech and the promise of roses in the 
streets. We remember Vice President Cheney telling us that the 
insurgency was in its death throes. We remember Secretary Rumsfeld 
telling us that crime in Baghdad was not any worse than that in 
Washington, DC. I remember all of that. Sadly, none of those leaders 
remember the hearings that Senator Lugar and I held before the war 
began that predicted the need for a long-term American presence and 
engagement. They don't remember some of us, starting before the war, 
repeatedly urged the President to level with the American people about 
the likely duration, cost, and danger of this war. Perhaps even more 
tragically, this uncertainty about future force levels continues to 
limit the military commitment to fielding more MRAPs and EFP protected 
vehicles.
  Second, these vehicles were seen as contrary to Secretary Rumsfeld's 
vision for the transformed military, a lighter, more agile force. While 
it depends on what armored humvee you are talking about, many believed 
that MRAPs were heavier and slower than humvees. The stifling effect 
Secretary Rumsfeld's views and management style had on military leaders 
is well known to everyone who follows military issues. In this 
instance, it meant that officers were predisposed against the heavier 
vehicle and didn't push the issue when our forces in the field asked 
for MRAP technology. Instead, they focused on the first two parts of 
the anti-IED strategy I talked about earlier.
  Finally, and most disturbing to me, many believed that Congress would 
not support funding the MRAP while also fielding better armored 
humvees. I do not know of a single wartime funding request that 
Congress has denied. There have been some items added to the 
supplemental bills that were clearly not urgent or war related, but 
nothing directly linked to current operations was refused. Nonetheless, 
it appears that the military did not believe that our support for 
needed equipment was for real. Even today, I hear that leaders are 
concerned that they must cut multiple existing programs to pay for this 
growing MRAP requirement. There may be programs that we could all agree 
are not as vital for a wartime Army, but I do not want that debate and 
concern to slow lifesaving equipment.
  I understand that this program will be the third largest procurement 
program in the Pentagon. As I said, it is very costly. We can work 
together in the future to find the lower priority programs that simply 
should not be funded if they are competing with lifesaving programs. We 
do not have any more time to delay spending the money needed to buy 
these vehicles, however, if we are going to save lives.
  Leadership is about making hard choices, and I look forward to 
working with my colleagues and the administration to do whatever it 
takes. I am even willing to cut programs I support because saving lives 
and limbs under fire today must truly be our first priority. So, today, 
with this amendment I hope we can make it clear that we will provide 
whatever funding is needed, so that military leaders do not fear being 
honest about their needs.
  In addition to the issues brought out in the article, I have also 
heard a regular concern that some in the military do not believe MRAPs 
will be needed in the future--that when we leave Iraq, we will leave 
most of these vehicles behind. I was happy to see the Secretary of the 
Army, Peter Geren, state clearly in his confirmation hearing that he 
believes MRAPs will be needed in future conflicts. It is clear to me 
that until we show America's enemies that we can handle IEDs, they will 
continue to use them throughout the world. We are already seeing an 
increased use of IEDs in Afghanistan.
  It is also clear to me that those who worry about what the military 
will be driving in 5 years are missing the boat here. I understand that 
there are great advancements being developed for our future force. But 
we have a sacred trust to those on the front lines today, right now. 
Right now, we are saying to them: If you survive this war, we will get 
you really good protection for the next one. Give me a break. To 
paraphrase a former Secretary of Defense, you fight the war you are in, 
not the war you might be in down the road. Ideally, you do both, but 
your priority has to be protecting the men and women under fire now. 
End of story. Can anyone imagine Roosevelt saying, ``Listen, we may not 
need some of those boats after Normandy, so maybe we should not build 
so many?'' Of course not. War is inherently wasteful and this war is no 
exception. I am willing to waste money and equipment if it means we 
don't waste lives and limbs. The fact that we may not need all of

[[Page 19744]]

the vehicles we buy today in 5 years, is no reason to shortchange the 
soldiers and marines who truly need the vehicles today.
  I have given my colleagues some of this history so they will 
understand why we must stand up for our marines and soldiers on this 
issue. We must cut through the ``business as usual'' bureaucracy. I 
applaud Secretary Gates for making MRAPs the top priority of the 
military, but I am concerned that even now, some of the same problems 
continue. After all, Army commanders in Iraq concluded that they need 
17,700 MRAPs. That is 15,200 more than currently being bought. We must 
act now to put money in the pipeline to order the additional vehicles 
and expand production capacity.
  Instead, we find out that 2 months later, the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council has yet to approve the Army request as a ``validated 
joint requirement.'' I don't get it.
  The President tells us that the most important thing in this war is 
the judgment of our commanders in the field. Now, I may disagree with 
the policy being executed, but I would agree that when it comes to 
tactical decisions about the best way to implement our policies, this 
is the right approach. Apparently, others feel that the commanders 
should only be listened to selectively, when it does not cost too much 
money.
  The commanders in the field have said that they need an additional 
15,200 mine resistant vehicles for the Army. They have also said that 
they need thousands of vehicles with EFP protection. So, why the delay?
  No one from the Pentagon has been able to explain it to me.
  Last, some argue that the real problem is production capacity. I 
simply don't buy it. We are being told that American industry cannot 
handle this or does not care enough about our soldiers and marines to 
do it. I don't buy it. These are purely military vehicles. If the 
military does not place the orders, industry will not build them, and 
they certainly won't create new production capacity. They cannot sell 
the extras to your neighbor or mine. So we must put the money up front 
and challenge our companies to deliver quickly. We did that on the 
supplemental where Congress accepted my amendment adding $1.2 billion. 
Because that led to increased production capacity, Secretary Gates has 
reprogrammed another $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2007 to take 
advantage of that new capacity.
  We made it to the Moon by putting money up front and challenging 
Americans to do their best to get there. MRAPs and EFP protected 
vehicles are basically modified trucks. America knows how to make 
trucks and how to make a lot of them. As I said before, this is not 
rocket science. If we buy it, they will build it.
  What if they cannot? What if industry can only get 15,000 or 20,000 
of the 23,000 we need built by the end of fiscal year 2008? Well, I 
tell my colleagues, than we will know that we gave them every chance to 
succeed. More important, we gave our soldiers and marines their best 
chance to survive this war.
  And the downside is simply that all of the funds we provide cannot be 
spent in 1 year and all of the vehicles cannot be purchased. In that 
situation, all we have to do is authorize reprogramming the unspent 
funds for the next fiscal year. Compared to taking a chance on saving 
our kids, that is an easy downside to accept.
  I opened by saying that this was a very expensive amendment, and it 
is. Let me be clear. It provides $23.6 billion for Army MRAPs, enough 
money to buy the 15,200 the commanders in the field are asking for. The 
amount is based on the last cost estimate I was given by the Pentagon 
on July 9. The amendment also provides an additional $1 billion that I 
have been told is needed for the purchase of 7,774 MRAPs currently 
planned for and funded in this bill. The increased funds are needed for 
airlift, training, and maintenance costs not originally included in the 
program budget.
  In addition, the amendment provides $400 million for EFP protection. 
Half is to field 200 of the vehicles already tested and half is for the 
joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to continue to 
work on and field better vehicles. The Bull may not be the perfect 
answer, but it gives us a chance to save American lives today. While we 
work on the perfect solution, an MRAP with EFP protection, we should 
still be giving our soldiers and marines the best we have today. The 
military needs to see if the Bull can provide full MRAP protection. 
They also need to look at other ideas for improving MRAPs, but while 
they do, we should take advantage of the proven technology we have at 
hand.
  Last, this amendment asks Secretary Gates to report back to us within 
30 days on any legal authorities he needs to produce and field these 
protective vehicles faster.
  Let me also clarify what we are adding these funds to. The Armed 
Services Committee added $4.1 billion to the President's initial 
request for a mere $441 million for MRAPs in this bill. At the time, 
that was all that was thought to be needed to meet the 7,774 
requirement and I applaud the committee for meeting that need. The 
situation has changed since the bill came out of committee. We now know 
that the Army commanders on the ground want far more. We cannot get 
such a large order produced if we continue to delay.
  For me, this is very simple. I believe that when our sons and 
daughters are getting blown up and we have vehicles proven to 
dramatically improve their odds of survival, we must get the vehicles 
to them. This amendment allows us to do that. When the Senate returns 
to debate on the Defense Authorization Act, I hope all of my colleagues 
will support it.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article to which 
I referred printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    [From USA Today, July 16, 2007]

   Pentagon Balked at Pleas From Officers in Field for Safer Vehicles

         (By Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison and Tom Vanden Brook)

       Pfc. Aaron Kincaid, 25, had been joking with buddies just 
     before their Humvee rolled over the bomb. His wife, Rachel, 
     later learned that the blast blew Kincaid, a father of two 
     from outside Atlanta, through the Humvee's metal roof.
       Army investigators who reviewed the Sept. 23 attack near 
     Riyadh, Iraq, wrote in their report that only providence 
     could have saved Kincaid from dying that day: ``There was no 
     way short of not going on that route at that time (that) this 
     tragedy could have been diverted.''
       A USA TODAY investigation of the Pentagon's efforts to 
     protect troops in Iraq suggests otherwise.
       Years before the war began, Pentagon officials knew of the 
     effectiveness of another type of vehicle that better shielded 
     troops from bombs like those that have killed Kincaid and 
     1,500 other soldiers and Marines. But military officials 
     repeatedly balked at appeals--from commanders on the 
     battlefield and from the Pentagon's own staff--to provide the 
     lifesaving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, or MRAP, 
     for patrols and combat missions, USA TODAY found.
       In a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates late last 
     month, two U.S. senators said the delays cost the lives of an 
     estimated ``621 to 742 Americans'' who would have survived 
     explosions had they been in MRAPs rather than Humvees.
       The letter, from Sens. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Kit Bond, 
     R-Mo., assumed the initial calls for MRAPs came in February 
     2005, when Marines in Iraq asked the Pentagon for almost 
     1,200 of the vehicles. USA TODAY found that the first appeals 
     for the MRAP came much earlier.
       As early as December 2003, when the Marines requested their 
     first 27 MRAPs for explosives-disposal teams, Pentagon 
     analysts sent detailed information about the superiority of 
     the vehicles to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mails obtained 
     by USA TODAY show. Later pleas came from Iraq, where 
     commanders saw that the approach the Joint Chiefs embraced--
     adding armor to the sides of Humvees, the standard vehicles 
     in the war zone--did little to protect against blasts beneath 
     the vehicles.
       Despite the efforts, the general who chaired the Joint 
     Chiefs until Oct. 1, 2005, says buying MRAPs ``was not on the 
     radar screen when I was chairman.'' Air Force general Richard 
     Myers, now retired, says top military officials dealt with a 
     number of vehicle issues, including armoring Humvees. The 
     MRAP, however, was ``not one of them.'' Something related to 
     MRAPs ``might have crossed my desk,'' Myers says, ``but I 
     don't recall it.''
       Why the issue never received more of a hearing from top 
     officials early in the war

[[Page 19745]]

     remains a mystery, given the chorus of concern. One Pentagon 
     analyst complained in an April 29, 2004, e-mail to 
     colleagues, for instance, that it was ``frustrating to see 
     the pictures of burning Humvees while knowing that there are 
     other vehicles out there that would provide more 
     protection.''
       The analyst was referring to the MRAP, whose V-shaped hull 
     puts the crew more than 3 feet off the ground and deflects 
     explosions. It was designed to withstand the underbelly bombs 
     that cripple the lower-riding Humvees. Pentagon officials, 
     civilians and military alike, had been searching for 
     technologies to guard against improvised explosive devices, 
     or IEDs. The makeshift bombs are the No. 1 killer of U.S. 
     forces.
       The MRAP was not new to the Pentagon. The technology had 
     been developed in South Africa and Rhodesia in the 1970s, 
     making it older than Kincaid and most of the other troops 
     killed by homemade bombs. The Pentagon had tested MRAPs in 
     2000, purchased fewer than two dozen and sent some to Iraq. 
     They were used primarily to protect explosive ordnance 
     disposal teams, not to transport troops or to chase Iraqi 
     insurgents.


        The goal: Iraqis ``stand up'' so U.S. can ``stand down''

       Even as the Pentagon balked at buying MRAPs for U.S. 
     troops, USA TODAY found that the military pushed to buy them 
     for a different fighting force: the Iraqi army.
       On Dec. 22, 2004--two weeks after President Bush told 
     families of servicemembers that ``we're doing everything we 
     possibly can to protect your loved ones''--a U.S. Army 
     general solicited ideas for an armored vehicle for the 
     Iraqis. The Army had an ``extreme interest'' in getting 
     troops better armor, then-brigadier general Roger Nadeau told 
     a subordinate looking at foreign technology, in an e-mail 
     obtained by USA TODAY.
       In a follow-up message, Nadeau clarified his request: 
     ``What I failed to point out in my first message to you folks 
     is that the U.S. Govt. is interested not for U.S. use, but 
     for possible use in fielding assets to the Iraqi military 
     forces.''
       In response, Lt. Col. Clay Brown, based in Australia, sent 
     information on two types of MRAPs manufactured overseas. ``By 
     all accounts, these are some of the best in the world,'' he 
     wrote. ``If I were fitting out the Iraqi Army, this is where 
     I'd look (wish we had some!)''
       The first contract for what would become the Iraqi Light 
     Armored Vehicle--virtually identical to the MRAPs sought by 
     U.S. forces then and now, and made in the United States by 
     BAE Systems--was issued in May 2006. The vehicles, called 
     Badgers, began arriving in Iraq 90 days later, according to 
     BAE. In September 2006, the Pentagon said it would provide up 
     to 600 more to Iraqi forces. As of this spring, 400 had been 
     delivered.
       The rush to equip the Iraqis stood in stark contrast to the 
     Pentagon's efforts to protect U.S. troops.
       In February 2005, two months after Nadeau solicited ideas 
     for better armor for the Iraqis and was told MRAPs were an 
     answer, an urgent-need request for the same type of vehicle 
     came from embattled Marines in Anbar province. The request, 
     signed by then-brigadier general Dennis Hejlik, said the 
     Marines ``cannot continue to lose . . . serious and grave 
     casualties to IEDs . . . at current rates when a commercial 
     off-the-shelf capability exists to mitigate'' them.
       Officials at Marine headquarters in Quantico, Va., shelved 
     the request for 1,169 vehicles. Fifteen months passed before 
     a second request reached the Joint Chiefs and was approved. 
     Those vehicles finally began trickling into Anbar in 
     February, two years after the original request. Because of 
     the delay, the Marines are investigating how its urgent-need 
     requests are handled.
       The long delay infuriates some members of Congress. ``Every 
     day, our troops are being maimed or killed needlessly because 
     we haven't fielded this soon enough,'' says Rep. Gene Taylor, 
     D-Miss. ``The costs are in human lives, in kids who will 
     never have their legs again, people blind, crippled. That's 
     the real tragedy.''
       Not until two months ago did the Pentagon champion the MRAP 
     for all U.S. forces. Gates made MRAPs the military's top 
     priority. The plan is to build the vehicles as fast as 
     possible until conditions warrant a change, according to a 
     military official who has direct knowledge of the program but 
     is not authorized to speak on the record. Thousands are in 
     the pipeline at a cost so far of about $2.4 billion.
       Gates said he was influenced by a news report--originally 
     in USA TODAY--that disclosed Marine units using MRAPs in 
     Anbar reported no deaths in about 300 roadside bombings in 
     the past year. His tone was grave. ``For every month we 
     delay,'' he said, ``scores of young Americans are going to 
     die.''
       One reason officials put off buying MRAPs in significant 
     quantities: They never expected the war to last this long. 
     Bush set the tone on May 1, 2003, six weeks after the U.S. 
     invasion, when he declared on board the aircraft carrier 
     Abraham Lincoln that ``major combat operations in Iraq have 
     ended.''
       Gen. George Casey, the top commander in Iraq from June 2004 
     until February this year, repeatedly said that troop levels 
     in Iraq would be cut just as soon as Iraqi troops took more 
     responsibility for security. In March 2005, he predicted 
     ``very substantial reductions'' in U.S. troops by early 2006. 
     He said virtually the same thing a year later.
       Casey wasn't the only optimist. In May 2005, Vice President 
     Cheney declared that the insurgency was ``in its last 
     throes.''
       Given the view that the war would end soon, the Pentagon 
     had little use for expensive new vehicles such as the MRAP, 
     at least not in large quantities. The MRAPs ordered for the 
     Iraqis were intended to speed the day when, to use Bush's 
     words, Iraqi forces could ``stand up'' and the United States 
     could ``stand down.''
       Nadeau, who wrote the e-mail that led to MRAPs for the 
     Iraqis, explains why he did so: ``The U.S. government knows 
     that eventually we're going to get out'' of Iraq. The United 
     States wants ``to help get (the Iraqis) in a position to take 
     care of themselves.''
       For U.S. forces, however, the answer was something else: 
     adding armor to Humvees. Nadeau and others say the choice 
     made sense because Humvees were already in Iraq and the 
     improvements--adding steel to the sides, upgrading the 
     windows and replacing the canvas doors--could be made 
     quickly, and far more cheaply. Adding armor to a Humvee cost 
     only $14,000; a Humvee armored at the factory cost $191,000; 
     today, an MRAP costs between $600,000 and $1 million, though 
     some foreign models cost only about $200,000 in 2004.
       The solution to the IED problem in 2003 had to be 
     ``immediate,'' says retired vice admiral Gordon Holder, 
     director for logistics for the Joint Chiefs until mid-2004. 
     ``We had to stop the bleeding.'' Holder says MRAPs seemed 
     impractical for the immediate need: ``We shouldn't take four 
     years to field something the kids needed yesterday.''
       Would it actually have taken four years? That depends upon 
     how much urgency the Pentagon and Congress attached to 
     speeding production. Force Protection Inc., the small South 
     Carolina company that landed the first significant MRAP 
     contracts, was criticized this month by the Pentagon's 
     inspector general for failing to deliver its vehicles on 
     time. But bigger defense contractors were available then--and 
     have secured MRAP contracts in recent weeks that call for 
     deliveries in as little as four months.
       A bigger obstacle might have been philosophical: The MRAP 
     didn't fit the Pentagon's long-term vision of how the 
     military should be equipped.
       Then-Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld regarded the Iraq 
     war ``as a means to change'' the military, ``make it lighter, 
     make it more responsive, make it more agile,'' Holder says. 
     The MRAP, heavier and slower than the Humvee, wouldn't have 
     measured up, he says.


              The commander: ``IEDs are my No. 1 threat''

       By June 2004, the military had lost almost 200 U.S. troops 
     to the homemade bombs. Gen. John Abizaid, then head of U.S. 
     Central Command, told the Joint Chiefs that ``IEDs are my No. 
     1 threat.'' He called for a ``mini-Manhattan Project'' 
     against IEDs, akin to the task force that developed the 
     atomic bomb during World War II.
       The Pentagon organized a small task force that, two years 
     later, morphed into a full-fledged agency: the Joint IED 
     Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO. Its leader, Montgomery Meigs, 
     is a retired four-star general. Its annual budget totals $4.3 
     billion. Its mission: to stop IEDs from killing U.S. troops.
       In one of its PowerPoint presentations, JIEDDO made its 
     priorities clear. First, prevent IEDs from being planted by 
     attacking the insurgency. Then, if a device is planted, 
     prevent it from exploding. ``When all Else Fails,'' reads 
     another slide, ``Survive the blast.'' That put solutions such 
     as the MRAP into the category of last resorts.
       JIEDDO did spend its own money for 122 MRAPs, but it 
     primarily focused on electronic jammers to prevent bombs from 
     being remotely detonated, unmanned surveillance aircraft to 
     catch insurgents putting bombs along roads and better 
     intelligence on who was building and planting bombs.
       The agency has claimed some successes. Insurgents in 2007 
     had to plant six times as many bombs as they did in 2004 to 
     inflict the same number of U.S. casualties, Meigs said in an 
     interview.
       But the insurgents--Sunnis loyal to the deposed leader 
     Saddam Hussein, Shiites who hated the U.S. occupiers and 
     foreigners aligned with al-Qaeda--often managed to stay one 
     step ahead of JIEDDO. They changed the kind of explosives 
     they planted and varied the locations of the devices and the 
     way they detonated them.
       When the Pentagon added armor to the sides of Humvees to 
     guard against bombs planted along roadsides, the insurgents 
     responded by burying bombs in the roads. The bombs could 
     blast through the vulnerable underbelly of the Humvees. The 
     insurgents also moved to larger, more sophisticated bombs, 
     some packed with as much as 100 pounds of explosives.
       Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, the No. 2 
     official at the Pentagon, testified on Capitol Hill in June 
     that ``as the threat has evolved, we have evolved. We work 
     very, very hard to be responsible to our troops.''
       Taylor, the Democratic congressman from Mississippi, 
     pressed England about why the

[[Page 19746]]

     Pentagon waited until May to request substantial numbers of 
     MRAPs. ``Are you telling me no one could see that (need) 
     coming, no one could recognize that the bottom of the 
     Humvee'' didn't protect troops, and ``that's why the kids 
     inside are losing their legs and their lives?'' Taylor asked.
       ``That is too simplistic a description,'' England replied. 
     ``People have not died needlessly, and we have not left our 
     people without equipment.''
       To Pentagon decision-makers, the Humvee seemed able to 
     handle the threat early in the war--roadside bombs, rather 
     than those buried in the roads. ``If anybody could have 
     guessed in 2003 that we would be looking at these kind of 
     (high-powered, buried) IEDs that we're seeing now in 2007, 
     then we would have been looking at something much longer'' 
     term as a solution, Holder says. ``But who had the crystal 
     ball back then?''
       Nadeau, now a major general in charge of the Army's Test 
     and Evaluation Command in Alexandria, Va., also defends the 
     Pentagon's choices. He says buried IEDs did not become a 
     serious threat to the armored Humvees until 2006. Critics 
     might say, ``Why didn't you guys buy 16,000 MRAPs a decade 
     ago?'' Nadeau says today. ``You know, I didn't need them.''
       Six officers interviewed by USA TODAY say the threat to the 
     Humvees surfaced sooner. Lt. Col. Dallas Eubanks, chief of 
     operations for the Army's 4th Infantry Division in 2003-04, 
     says IEDs became more menacing before he left Iraq. ``We were 
     certainly seeing underground IEDs by early 2004,'' he says.
       In mid-2005, two top Marines--Gen. William Nyland, 
     assistant Marine commandant, and Maj. Gen. William Catto, 
     head of Marine Corps Systems Command--testified before 
     Congress that they were seeing an ``evolving'' threat from 
     underbelly blasts. They said at the time that armored Humvees 
     remained their best defense.


              The congressman: MRAP's ``simple'' advantage

       Just after lunch on June 27, 2004, a group of enlisted men 
     parked a handful of armored vehicles near a cinderblock 
     building at Marine headquarters in Fallujah, Iraq.
       The day had turned sweltering, like every summer afternoon 
     in central Iraq. But this day was special. A congressional 
     delegation had arrived, and among the dignitaries was Rep. 
     Duncan Hunter, then the chairman of the House Armed Services 
     Committee. Hunter wasn't just a powerful congressman. He was 
     a Vietnam War veteran, and his son, then a 27-year-old Marine 
     lieutenant also named Duncan, was stationed at the base.
       More important to most of the Marines, the California 
     Republican had been instrumental in pushing the Pentagon to 
     get better armor for them. Humvees with cloth doors--canvas, 
     like the crusher hat that Hunter wore that day--had been 
     standard issue when the war began. The fabric worked well to 
     shield the sun; it offered no protection against explosives.
       Then, as now, Hunter was impatient with the pace of 
     procurement in Iraq. That winter, he had dispatched his staff 
     to steel mills, where they persuaded managers and union 
     leaders to set aside commercial orders to expedite steel 
     needed to armor the Humvees. He also worked with the Army and 
     its contractors to expand production.
       In Fallujah, Hunter recognized the Humvees. He couldn't 
     identify the two vehicles next to them. One was called a 
     Cougar, the other a Buffalo. Both were MRAPs, made by Force 
     Protection Inc., and both, he was told, were coveted. They 
     were used by explosives disposal teams, but combat units 
     ``looked at them and said, `We want those,''' Hunter recalls.
       Throughout most of Iraq, they still haven't arrived.
       Despite requests from the field, Pentagon officials decided 
     to ration the vehicle. In 2003 and 2004, they bought about 
     55, and only for explosives-disposal units. But they chose a 
     different approach for protecting the rest of the troops: 
     adding armor to Humvees. The choice was problematic. The 
     Humvee's flat bottom channels an explosion through the center 
     of the vehicle, toward the occupants.
       Memos and e-mails obtained by USA TODAY show a stream of 
     concerns about the decision to armor the Humvee. Most went up 
     the chain of command and withered:
       December 2003: At the direction of then-deputy Defense 
     secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who was troubled by the mounting 
     death toll from IEDs, the Joint Chiefs began to explore 
     options for giving troops better armor. Detailed information 
     on the Wer'Wolf, an MRAP made in the African country of 
     Namibia, was passed from analysts in the Pentagon to Lt. Col. 
     Steven Ware, an aide collecting information for the Joint 
     Chiefs.
       March 30, 2004: Gen. Larry Ellis, in charge of U.S. Forces 
     Command in Atlanta, sent a memo to the Army's chief of staff, 
     Gen. Peter Schoomaker. He complained that ``some Army members 
     and agencies are still in a peacetime posture.'' U.S. 
     commanders in Iraq told him that the armored Humvee ``is not 
     providing the solution the Army hoped to achieve.'' He didn't 
     recommend MRAPs but rather suggested accelerating production 
     of a combat vehicle called the Stryker. In response, the 
     military said new Humvee armor kits would suffice.
       April 28-29, 2004: Duncan Lang, a Pentagon analyst who 
     worked in acquisition and technology, suggested purchasing 
     the Wer'Wolf, the MRAP put before the Joint Chiefs in 
     December 2003. In an e-mail to colleagues and supervisors, 
     Lang said ``a number could be sent to Iraq ``as quickly as, 
     or even more quickly than, additional armored Humvees.'' He 
     called it ``frustrating to see the pictures of burning 
     Humvees while knowing that there are other vehicles out there 
     that would provide more protection.''
       April 30, 2004: Another Pentagon analyst, Air Force Lt. 
     Col. Bob Harris, forwarded details about MRAP options to a 
     member of the IED task force. The list included a variety of 
     MRAPs, among them the Wer'Wolf and Force Protection's Cougar. 
     ``There was no great clarity as to why they didn't pursue 
     these options,'' Harris says. ``I saw it as my job to 
     educate.'' Harris is now an acquisition officer at Hanscom 
     Air Force Base in Massachusetts.
       Hunter says the advantages the MRAP had on the Humvee were 
     clear. ``It's a simple formula,'' Hunter says. ``A vehicle 
     that's 1 foot off the ground gets 16 times that (blast) 
     impact that you get in a vehicle that's 4 feet off the 
     ground,'' like the MRAP.
       Although Hunter favored adding armor to Humvees, he now 
     calls the military's devotion to that approach a costly 
     mistake. ``It's true that they saved more lives by moving 
     first on up-armoring the Humvees,'' he says. ``The flaw is 
     that they did nothing on MRAPs. The up-armoring of Humvees 
     didn't have to be an exclusive operation.''
       Holder dismisses the idea that the Pentagon could have 
     moved on a dual track: armoring Humvees while ordering up 
     MRAPs. He doubts Congress would have funded both at the time. 
     But that's exactly what Congress is doing now--buying both 
     vehicles.
       ``We probably should've had the foresight'' to start buying 
     MRAPs earlier, says Ware, the Joint Chiefs aide (now retired) 
     who passed the information to superiors and counterparts in 
     the Army and Marines. But ``we just couldn't get them there 
     fast enough.'' Adding armor to the Humvee, Ware says, ``was 
     better than nothing.''


          The lieutenant colonel: ``Hope no one gets wasted''

       A PowerPoint presentation, dated Aug. 25, 2004, shows 
     wounded troops lying in hospital beds. Most are bandaged. One 
     is bloody. His left eye is barely open, his injured right is 
     covered by a patch. Each was maimed by an IED. Each, save 
     one, was in a Humvee.
       On another slide: ``Numerous vehicles on the market provide 
     far superior ballistic protection'' than the Humvee, wrote 
     then-lieutenant colonel Jim Hampton, the man who prepared the 
     presentation for the operations staff of the U.S. Army Corps 
     of Engineers in Baghdad.
       Safety is a passion for Hampton. He's so concerned with 
     security that he asks his wife, Kate, to take her pistol when 
     she goes for walks on their 80 acres in rural Mississippi. 
     When he got to Iraq in early 2004, he was tasked with looking 
     at armor options to protect the Corps of Engineers, the 
     agency sent to help with rebuilding efforts. For weeks, he 
     studied armor options. His conclusion: The corps should get 
     MRAPs to protect its people, specifically Wer'Wolves. Hampton 
     says he asked for 53 Wer'Wolves. The corps got four.
       Hampton couldn't have been more opposed to up-armoring the 
     Humvees and warned his superiors. He even e-mailed his wife 
     from Iraq. ``Hey Babe,'' his e-mail read. ``Just a little 
     aggravated with the bureaucracy. It is simply beyond my 
     comprehension why we're having to go through such (an ordeal) 
     to order confounded hard vehicles. I sure hope no one gets 
     wasted before the powers-that-be get off their collective fat 
     asses.''
       Finally, he wrote his congressman, Rep. Chip Pickering, R-
     Miss., urging him to investigate deaths involving the Humvee. 
     ``We would never consider sending troops'' in Humvees ``up 
     against armor or artillery,'' Hampton wrote, ``but this is 
     tantamount to what we're doing because these vehicles are 
     being engaged with the very ordnance delivered by artillery 
     in the form of improvised explosive devices.''
       By November 2004, Pentagon analyst Lang had grown 
     discouraged, an e-mail shows. ``I have found that you can 
     never put the word out too many times,'' he wrote on Nov. 17. 
     ``I send it on to (the Secretary of Defense's office), Army 
     and (Marine Corps) contacts I have. Some of it is getting to 
     the rapid fielding folks and force protection folks that are 
     looking at Iraq issues. I do not see much action.''
       Lang closed the message with a variation on his earlier 
     plea: ``For the life of me, I cannot figure out why we have 
     not taken better advantage of the sources of such vehicles,'' 
     he wrote. ``We should be buying 200, not 2, at a time. These 
     things work, they save lives and they don't cost much, if 
     any, more than what we are using now.'' At the time, a basic 
     Wer'Wolf cost about the same as a factory-made armored 
     Humvee: around $200,000.
       In December 2004, at a town hall meeting with troops in 
     Kuwait, a soldier asked Rumsfeld about the lack of armor on 
     military vehicles. Rumsfeld explained the situation this way: 
     ``You go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army 
     you might want or wish to have at a later time.''
       The concerns troops voiced at the meeting might have had an 
     impact. Within a week,

[[Page 19747]]

     the Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico posted its first 
     notice seeking information on MRAPs from potential 
     contractors.
       Back in Fallujah, the desire for the Cougar had grown. By 
     February 2005, the Marines were formally asking for more. 
     Field commanders sent their first large-scale request for 
     MRAPs, seeking 1,169 vehicles with specifications that 
     closely mirrored those of the Cougar. They no longer 
     envisioned the vehicle as limited to explosives-disposal 
     teams; they wanted MRAPs for combat troops, too.
       Roy McGriff III, then a major, drafted the request signed 
     by Brig. Gen. Hejlik. ``MRAP vehicles will protect Marines, 
     reduce casualties, increase mobility and enhance mission 
     success,'' the request read. ``Without MRAP, personnel loss 
     rates are likely to continue at their current rate.'' In 
     spring 2005, he would have a chance to argue his case before 
     top generals.


              The Marine major: ``Unnecessary'' casualties

       They convened March 29-30, 2005, at the Marine Corps Air 
     Station in Miramar, Calif. The occasion: a safety board 
     meeting, a regular gathering to address safety issues across 
     the Corps. In attendance: five three-star generals, four two-
     stars, seven one-stars and McGriff.
       McGriff knew the MRAP's history and the Pentagon's 
     reluctance to invest in the vehicle. He had learned about the 
     vehicle from a fellow Marine, Wayne Sinclair. Sinclair, then 
     a captain, wrote in the July 1996 issue of the Marine Corps 
     Gazette that ``an affordable answer to the land mine was 
     developed over 20 years ago. It's time that Marines at the 
     sharp end shared in . . . this discovery.''
       Addressing the generals, McGriff recommended analyzing 
     every incident involving Marine vehicles the same way 
     investigators probe aircraft crashes. Look at the vehicle for 
     flaws, McGriff recalls telling the officers, and examine the 
     tactics used to defeat it.
       Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson, commander of Marine Corps Forces 
     in the Pacific, and Lt. Gen. James Mattis, leader of the 
     Marine Combat Development Command, listened and then 
     conferred for a moment.
       The room grew quiet. ``Then they said, `OK, what do you 
     want to do?''' McGriff remembers.
       He recited the very plan that the Pentagon, under a new 
     Defense secretary, would embrace in 2007: ``A phased 
     transition. Continue to armor Humvees. At the same time, as 
     quickly and as expeditiously as possible, purchase as many 
     MRAPs as possible. Phase out Humvees.''
       According to McGriff, the room again grew silent. Then, 
     Mattis finally spoke: ``That's exactly what we're going to 
     do.'' Mattis' words failed to translate into action. The 
     urgent-need request McGriff drafted went unfulfilled at 
     Marine headquarters in Quantico. A June 10, 2005, status 
     report on the request indicated the Marine Corps was holding 
     out for a ``future vehicle,'' presumably the Joint Light 
     Tactical Vehicle--more mobile than the MRAP, more protective 
     than the Humvee, and due in 2012. In practical terms, that 
     meant no MRAPs immediately.
       McGriff foresaw some of the turmoil over vehicles in a 
     prophetic 2003 paper for the School for Advanced Warfighting 
     in Quantico.
       ``Currently, our underprotected vehicles result in 
     casualties that are politically untenable and militarily 
     unnecessary,'' his paper read. ``Failure to build a MRAP 
     vehicle fleet produces a deteriorating cascade of effects 
     that will substantially increase'' risks for the military 
     while ``rendering it tactically immobile.'' Mines and IEDs 
     will force U.S. troops off the roads, he wrote, and keep them 
     from aggressively attacking insurgents.
       The words were strong and the conclusions were damning. 
     Rhodesia, a nation with nothing near the resources of the 
     U.S. military, had built MRAPs more than a quarter-century 
     earlier that remained ``more survivable than any comparable 
     vehicle produced by the U.S. today,'' McGriff wrote.
       Despite his views then, McGriff, now a lieutenant colonel, 
     says he understands the delays. MRAPs needed to be tested to 
     ensure they could perform in combat. ``Nothing happens fast 
     enough when people are fighting and dying,'' he says today. 
     ``But amidst the chaos, you still have to make the right 
     choices. In the end, I think the Marines got the MRAP 
     capability as quickly and safely as possible.''
       Others disagree.
       Marine major Franz Gayl, now retired, was science adviser 
     to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq. He saw how 
     Marines were still being killed or maimed in Anbar in the 
     fall of 2006. If the Marine Corps had decided MRAPs were a 
     top priority, he says, it could and should have pursued them 
     with the same urgency the Pentagon is now showing.
       ``The ramp-up of industry capacity was delayed by over 1\1/
     2\ years,'' Gayl says, ``until it became the dire emergency 
     that it is today.''
       Bureaucrats didn't want the MRAP sooner ``because it would 
     compete against'' armored Humvees and ``many other favored 
     programs'' for funding, Gayl says. Gayl, who works as a 
     civilian for the Marines at the Pentagon, has filed for 
     federal whistleblower protection because he fears retaliation 
     for speaking out about the failure to get MRAPs sooner.


            Defense Secretary Gates: ``Lives are at stake''

       After McGriff addressed the generals in March 2005, another 
     15 months passed. Then the Marines in Iraq reiterated the 
     request for MRAPs. This time they sent the request directly 
     to the Joint Chiefs. This time they were successful.
       In December 2006, after insurgent bombs had killed almost 
     1,200 U.S. troops in Iraq, the Joint Chiefs validated 
     requests from Iraq for 4,060 MRAPs, and the formal MRAP 
     program was launched.
       By March 2007, Marine Corps Commandant James Conway called 
     the vehicle his ``No. 1 unfilled warfighting requirement.''
       In part, that's because he saw it save lives in Anbar 
     province. Brig. Gen. John Allen, deputy commander of 
     coalition forces there, says the Marines tracked attacks on 
     MRAPs since January 2006. The finding: Marines in armored 
     Humvees are twice as likely to be badly wounded in an IED 
     attack as those in MRAPs.
       Perhaps more convincing: No Marines have been killed in 
     more than 300 attacks on MRAPs there.
       The news, revealed in USA TODAY on April 19, drew the 
     attention of Defense Secretary Gates, four months into his 
     job at the Pentagon. He was traveling in Iraq and read about 
     the MRAP's success in the Pentagon's daily news roundup. 
     Weeks later, at a news conference, Gates said the Pentagon 
     would rush MRAPs to Iraq ``as best we can.''
       Late last month, top Pentagon officials approved an Army 
     strategy for buying as many as 17,700 MRAPs, allowing a one-
     for-one swap for its armored Humvees. About 5,200 MRAPs had 
     been approved for the other services. Now, Pentagon officials 
     decline to say exactly how many MRAPs they need.
       One official says they'll build MRAPs as fast as possible, 
     then recalibrate the military's needs as they assess 
     operations in Iraq, a tacit acknowledgment that they may need 
     fewer MRAPs as U.S. troops are withdrawn.
       During another news conference late last month, Gates 
     worried that the companies building the MRAP--not only Force 
     Protection but BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Oshkosh Truck, 
     Armor Holdings, International Military and Government and 
     Protected Vehicles--won't be able to get the vehicles to Iraq 
     fast enough.
       ``I didn't think that was acceptable,'' Gates said. ``Lives 
     are at stake.''


             the young lieutenant: ``safest vehicle ever''

       As the sun began to bake the Iraqi countryside last month, 
     Marine 2nd Lt. George Saenz headed back to his base on the 
     outskirts in Fallujah. He felt oddly joyful.
       Saenz had just spent hours leading his platoon through one 
     of the most excruciating battlefield jobs--inching a convoy 
     along the crumbling streets of Fallujah, searching for 
     homemade bombs planted in the asphalt or dirt.
       The night before had proved dangerous. Two bombs had blown 
     up underneath Saenz's convoy, including one beneath his 
     vehicle.
       As Saenz turned through the gray blast walls protecting the 
     base, he says he couldn't help but think: If I had been 
     riding a Humvee, I wouldn't be here right now.
       Saenz knew why he was alive. His platoon in the 6th Marine 
     Regiment Combat Team had replaced its Humvees with MRAPs. The 
     two blasts produced just one injury, a Marine whose 
     concussion put him on light duty for a week.
       ``We're probably in the safest vehicle ever designed for 
     military use,'' Saenz says, recalling his platoon's record: 
     Three months. Eleven bomb attacks. No one dead.
       MRAPs have become legendary in Anbar since Marines began 
     using them on dangerous missions clearing roadside bombs. 
     Tank commanders, radio operators and others drop by Saenz's 
     platoon every day to do what Rep. Hunter had done three years 
     earlier--inspect the small fleet of MRAPs, knock on the 
     armor, sometimes crawl inside.
       Scores of MRAPs are scheduled to arrive in Anbar this 
     summer. That means they'll be available for the first time to 
     the Marines for tasks other than clearing IEDs, says Marine 
     Col. Mike Rudolph, logistics officer for U.S. forces in 
     western Iraq. No one has decided how MRAPs will be used, but 
     ``everybody wants one,'' Rudolph says.
       To be sure, the vehicle isn't perfect. Saenz's team warns 
     that MRAPs drive like trucks, plodding and heavy. Some models 
     are so bulky they have blind spots for troops peering over 
     the boxy hood and so noisy a driver has to shout at someone 2 
     feet away.
       ``They're just so heavy,'' Sgt. Randall Miller says. 
     ``These are virtually designed off a semi-truck platform.''
       After substantial testing, the military also has concluded 
     that MRAPs are vulnerable to explosively formed projectiles, 
     the newest and most devastating variation of the IED. More 
     armor has been developed for the MRAPs the Pentagon ordered 
     this spring.
       Miller isn't complaining. On his first tour in Iraq in 
     2004-05, Miller searched for land mines in a Humvee. His 
     detection technique was simple: ``Go real slow, cross your 
     fingers.'' He still drives slowly but feels safer

[[Page 19748]]

     knowing the MRAP's V-shaped hull will deflect a bomb blast. 
     ``I've seen our guys get hit and walk away,'' Miller says. 
     ``They're awesome, awesome vehicles.''


              the widow: ``they should've done it'' sooner

       Whom or what is to blame for the delay in getting safer 
     vehicles for the 158,000 U.S. troops in Iraq?
       Jim Hampton, now a retired colonel, questions why the 
     Pentagon and Congress didn't do more to keep the troops safe. 
     ``I have colleagues who say people need to go to jail over 
     this, and in my mind they do,'' Hampton says.
       Hunter, now running for president, blames the Pentagon 
     bureaucracy, which he says ``doesn't move fast enough to meet 
     the needs of the war fighter. We have a system in which the 
     warfighting requirements are requested from the field and the 
     acquisition people say, `We'll get it on our schedule.'''
       Other members of Congress blame Rumsfeld and his vision of 
     transforming the military into a leaner, faster fighting 
     force.
       Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., wonders if Rumsfeld's forceful 
     personality silenced some of the generals. ``Rumsfeld so 
     intimidated the military that I've lost confidence in them 
     telling us what they really need'' in Iraq, Murtha says.
       ``They all knew the Rumsfeld rule: Your career is over if 
     you say anything contrary'' to his policies, Murtha says. 
     ``It's much better now that Rumsfeld is gone. The military is 
     being much more honest.''
       If the Pentagon ``had just listened to the guys in the 
     field'' who wanted MRAPs, Murtha says, ``we'd have them in 
     Iraq right now.''
       USA TODAY could not determine what role, if any, Rumsfeld 
     played in MRAP deliberations. A spokesman for Rumsfeld, now 
     running a foundation in Washington, said last week that the 
     former Defense secretary would not comment.
       Aaron Kincaid's widow, Rachel, doesn't know who should be 
     held accountable. She is haunted by whether getting MRAPs to 
     Iraq earlier might have saved her husband's life. The bomb 
     that blew apart his Humvee lay along the path he and his unit 
     took, and no one noticed.
       Today, she wonders: Was his death really about the path 
     that he took, or about the path the Pentagon spent years 
     avoiding, the path that, in May, finally led them to the 
     vehicle that might have saved her husband's life?
       You think there is always something that could've been done 
     to prevent it,'' Rachel Kincaid says of her husband's death.
       ``If that's been around for that many years,'' she says of 
     the MRAP, ``why hasn't it been used? They should've done it 
     at the beginning of the war. They should've done it three 
     years ago, four years ago.''

                          ____________________