[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 13]
[House]
[Page 17999]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY FOR IRAQ

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Sestak) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SESTAK. Madam Speaker, I rise to speak for a few minutes about 
Iraq. Every Member of the House brings their experience with them. Mine 
happens to be 31 years in the military, including leading men and women 
in war. I have operated with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of 
China, entered the DMZ in North Korea, dealt with the Iranians at sea 
in the Persian Gulf.
  When I saw us about to go into Iraq, I was concerned. I felt it was a 
tragic misadventure, not because of Iraq solely by itself, but because 
of what it would do to our strategic security around this globe.
  I flew with my battle group over Iraq just prior to the war, after 
having left the war in Afghanistan. I have always been taken in the 
military by the power of our diplomacy, the power of our diplomats, 
because they are the ones who often have prevented us from having to 
use our military. I honestly believe there is a way to redeploy from 
Iraq that does not mean just getting out nor just bringing the troops 
home. Those are the wrong words.
  Iraq is a set piece in a strategic environment around this world that 
the United States has interest in. And there is a way to end this 
tragic misadventure, to redeploy out of Iraq so we might place our men 
and women where they need to be in Afghanistan, the western Pacific, 
and here at home to improve the readiness of our Army that has not one, 
not one active Guard or Reserve unit that is in a state of readiness to 
deploy anywhere to any other contingency in this world.
  And that strategy is really brought about by changing the behavior, 
in particular, of Iran, who I have operated with at sea, and Iraq and 
Syria, and the other nations in that region. We will not do that by 
doubling down once again on a bad bet with a surge of military forces. 
I know. I have watched it happen before.
  This can only be resolved by a strategy that sets a date, a date 
within a year by which we will redeploy out of Iraq, because that date 
is not just for ending this war, it has the value of a different 
strategy to leave an unfailed state, as Iran, recognizing that we will 
no longer be in that state, but we will remain in the region at our 
bases that we do have in Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab 
Emirates; and our carrier battle group and our amphibious ready group 
in that region because we have interests there.
  But by that date we change the behavior of Iran who does not want to 
deal by itself with the 2 million Iraqis who have been dislocated from 
their homes and have yet to overflow their borders, as 2 million others 
have.
  And Syria, that is Sunni, does not want as it fuels, after we leave 
there, a civil war, would be fueling the Sunnis against the Shia that 
the Iranians might be supporting. Neither nation wants a proxy war.
  If we work diplomatically with a date certain, because they don't 
want us to remain in that nation, we have the ability to bring to the 
table the interested parties who can work on the extreme elements in 
that nation, Iran and Syria; and we deal with the center, the 
government of Baghdad, with a date certain that makes them recognize 
they must also step up to the plate and assume responsibility for the 
country which they have done and presently have to do as we keep a lid 
politically and militarily on a simmering pot.
  There is a strategy which I believe we need to pursue, Republican and 
Democrat together, that sets a date of approximately a year, which 
gives us time to safely redeploy. Because, remember, it took us 6 
months to redeploy out of Somalia with only about 8,000 troops, when we 
have 160,000 in Iraq with over 100,000 U.S. contractors. We need time 
to safely redeploy with a strategy that works to bring Iran and Syria 
to the table because they have interests in accommodating stability as 
we remain in that region because of our interests, providing air cover 
if necessary from above, from bases outside or Special Forces from 
outside, as we begin to address our other security interests around the 
world and here at home.

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