[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 17250-17254]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  A COURSE CHANGE IN IRAQ: CONNECTING IRAQ STRATEGY TO VITAL INTERESTS

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to offer observations on the 
continuing involvement of the United States in Iraq. In my judgment, 
our course in Iraq has lost contact with our vital national security 
interests in the Middle East and beyond. Our continuing absorption with 
military activities in Iraq is limiting our diplomatic assertiveness 
there and elsewhere in the world. The prospects that the current 
``surge'' strategy will succeed in the way originally envisioned by the 
President are very limited within the short period framed by our own 
domestic political debate. And the strident, polarized nature of that 
debate increases the risk that our involvement in Iraq will end in a 
poorly planned withdrawal that undercuts our vital interests in the 
Middle East. Unless we recalibrate our strategy in Iraq to fit our 
domestic political conditions and the broader needs of United States 
national security, we risk foreign policy failures that could greatly 
diminish our influence in the region and the world.
  The current debate on Iraq in Washington has not been conducive to a 
thoughtful revision of our Iraq policy. Our debate is being driven by 
partisan political calculations and understandable fatigue with bad 
news--including deaths and injuries to Americans. We have been debating 
and voting on whether to fund American troops in Iraq and whether to 
place conditions on such funding. We have contemplated in great detail 
whether Iraqi success in achieving certain benchmarks should determine 
whether funding is approved or whether a withdrawal should commence. I 
would observe that none of this debate addresses our vital interests 
any more than they are addressed by an unquestioned devotion to an ill-
defined strategy of ``staying the course'' in Iraq.
  I speak to my fellow Senators, when I say that the President is not 
the only American leader who will have to make adjustments to his or 
her thinking. Each of us should take a step back from the sloganeering 
rhetoric and political opportunism that has sometimes characterized 
this debate. The task of securing U.S. interests in the Middle East 
will be extremely difficult if Iraq policy is formulated on a partisan 
basis, with the protagonists on both sides ignoring the complexities at 
the core of our situation.
  Commentators frequently suggest that the United States has no good 
options in Iraq. That may be true from a certain perspective. But I 
believe that we do have viable options that could strengthen our 
position in the Middle East, and reduce the prospect of terrorism, 
regional war, and other calamities. But seizing these opportunities 
will require the President to downsize the United States military's 
role in Iraq and place much more emphasis on diplomatic and economic 
options. It will also require Members of Congress to be receptive to 
overtures by the President to construct a new policy outside the binary 
choice of surge versus withdrawal. We don't owe the President our 
unquestioning agreement, but we do owe him and the American people our 
constructive engagement.
  In my judgment, the costs and risks of continuing down the current 
path outweigh the potential benefits that might be achieved. Persisting 
indefinitely with the surge strategy will delay policy adjustments that 
have a better chance of protecting our vital interests over the long 
term.
  I do not come to this conclusion lightly, particularly given that 
General Petraeus will deliver a formal report in September on his 
efforts to improve security. The interim information we have received 
from General Petraeus and other officials has been helpful and 
appreciated. I do not doubt the assessments of military commanders that 
there has been some progress in security. More security improvements in 
the coming months may be achieved. We should attempt to preserve 
initiatives that have shown promise; such as engaging Sunni groups that 
are disaffected with the extreme tactics and agenda of al-Qaida in 
Iraq. But three factors--the political fragmentation in Iraq, the 
growing stress on our military, and the constraints of our own domestic 
political process--are converging to make it almost impossible for the 
United States to engineer a stable, multi-sectarian government in Iraq 
in a reasonable time frame.
  First, it is very doubtful that the leaders of Iraqi factions are 
capable of implementing a political settlement in the short run. I see 
no convincing evidence that Iraqis will make the compromises necessary 
to solidify a functioning government and society, even

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if we reduce violence to a point that allows for some political and 
economic normalcy.
  In recent months, we have seen votes in the Iraqi parliament calling 
for a withdrawal of American forces and condemning security walls in 
Baghdad that were a reasonable response to neighborhood violence. The 
Iraqi parliament struggles even to achieve a quorum, because many 
prominent leaders decline to attend. We have seen overt feuds between 
members of the Iraqi Government, including Prime Minister Maliki and 
Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who did not speak to each other for 
the entire month of April. The Shia-led government is going out of its 
way to bottle up money budgeted for Sunni provinces. Without strident 
intervention by our embassy, food rations are not being delivered to 
Sunni towns. Iraqi leaders have resisted de-Baathification reform, the 
conclusion of an oil law, and effective measures to prevent oil 
smuggling and other corrupt practices.
  Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari has told me that various aspects of an 
oil law and revenue distribution could be passed by September. But he 
emphasized that Iraqis are attempting to make policy in a difficult 
environment by broad consensus--not by majority vote. He believes other 
policy advancements will take considerable time, but that consensus is 
the safest and most appropriate approach in a fledgling democracy.
  This may be true, but Americans want results in months. Meanwhile, 
various Iraqi factions are willing to wait years to achieve vital 
objectives. Even if the results of military operations improve in the 
coming months, there is little reason to assume that this will diminish 
Sunni ambitions to reclaim political preeminence or Shia plans to 
dominate Iraq after decades of Saddam's harsh rule. Few Iraqi leaders 
are willing to make sacrifices or expose themselves to risks on behalf 
of the type of unified Iraq that the Bush administration had 
envisioned. In contrast, there are many Iraqi leaders who are deeply 
invested in a sectarian or tribal agenda. More often than not, these 
agendas involve not just the protection of fellow Sunnis, Shiites, and 
Kurds, but the expansion of territorial dominance and economic 
privileges.
  Even if United States negotiators found a way to forge a political 
settlement among selected representatives of the major sectarian 
factions, these leaders have not shown the ability to control their 
members at the local level. After an intense year-and-a-half of 
bloodletting, many subfactions are thoroughly invested in the violence. 
We have the worst of both worlds in Iraq--factional leaders who don't 
believe in our pluralist vision for their country and smaller 
subfactions who are pursuing violence on their own regardless of any 
accommodations by more moderate fellow sectarians. As David Brooks 
recently observed in the New York Times, the fragmentation in Iraq has 
become so prevalent that Iraq may not even be able to carry out a 
traditional civil war among cohesive factions.
  Few Iraqis have demonstrated that they want to be Iraqis. We may 
bemoan this, but it is not a surprising phenomenon. The behavior of 
most Iraqis is governed by calculations related to their history, their 
personal safety, their basic economic existence, and their tribal or 
sectarian loyalties. These are primal forces that have constrained the 
vision of most ordinary Iraqis to the limits of their neighborhoods and 
villages.
  In this context, the possibility that the United States can set 
meaningful benchmarks that would provide an indication of impending 
success or failure is remote. Perhaps some benchmarks or agreements 
will be initially achieved, but most can be undermined or reversed by a 
contrary edict of the Iraqi Government, a decision by a faction to 
ignore agreements, or the next terrorist attack or wave of sectarian 
killings. American manpower cannot keep the lid on indefinitely. The 
anticipation that our training operations could produce an effective 
Iraqi army loyal to a cohesive central government is still just a 
hopeful plan for the future.
  I suspect that for some Americans, benchmarks are a means of 
justifying a withdrawal by demonstrating that Iraq is irredeemable. For 
others, benchmarks represent an attempt to validate our military 
presence by showing progress against a low fixed standard. But in 
neither case are benchmark tests addressing our broader national 
security interests.
  Equally unproven is the theory voiced by some supporters of a 
withdrawal that removing American troops from Iraq would stimulate a 
grand compromise between Iraqi factions. Some Iraqi leaders may react 
this way. But most assume that we will soon begin to withdraw troops, 
and they are preparing to carry on or accelerate the fight in the 
absence of American forces. Iraqi militias have shown an ability to 
adapt to conditions on the ground, expanding or contracting their 
operations as security imperatives warrant.
  American strategy must adjust to the reality that sectarian 
factionalism will not abate anytime soon and probably cannot be 
controlled from the top.
  The second factor working against our ability to engineer a stable 
government in Iraq is the fatigue of our military. The window during 
which we can continue to employ American troops in Iraqi neighborhoods 
without damaging our military strength or our ability to respond to 
other national security priorities is closing. Some observers may argue 
that we cannot put a price on securing Iraq and that our military 
readiness is not threatened. But this is a naive assessment of our 
national security resources.
  American Armed Forces are incredibly resilient, but Iraq is taking a 
toll on recruitment and readiness. In April, the Defense Department 
announced it would lengthen tours of duty for soldiers serving in Iraq 
and Afghanistan from 12 to 15 months. Many soldiers are now on their 
way to a third combat tour.
  Last month, for the 27th consecutive year, in a ceremony witnessed by 
tens of thousands of Hoosiers, I swore in new military recruits on Pit 
Road at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. Over the course of the 
weekend, I visited with the recruits, with the recruiters, and with 
military officials. I heard personal stories of the 70-hour work weeks 
put in by recruiters to meet recruiting goals. I was impressed with 
each of the 66 young men and women I swore in. They are joining a 
military at war, and each of them is showing tremendous courage and 
commitment to our country.
  The swearing-in ceremony was preceded by a briefing from Army 
officials here in Washington who assured me that we are fielding the 
best equipped, best trained, and most capable force we have ever had. 
Yet, they also reported that the Army has exhausted its bench. Instead 
of resting and training for 3 to 12 months, brigades coming out of the 
field must now be ready almost immediately for redeployment.
  Basic recruiting targets are being met, but statistics point to 
significant declines in the percentage of recruits who have high school 
diplomas and who score above average on the Army's aptitude test. 
Meanwhile, the Army has dramatically increased the use of waivers for 
recruits who have committed felonies, and it has relaxed weight and age 
standards.
  The Army is asking for $2 billion more this year for recruitment 
incentives, advertising, and related activities. It needs $13 to $14 
billion a year to reset the force to acceptable readiness ratings, and 
they will need that amount for up to 3 years after the end of the 
current operations. The Army needs $52 billion more this year to fill 
equipment shortages and modernize. These figures do not include the 
billions of dollars required to implement the planned 65,000 soldier 
increase in the size of the active force.
  Filling expanding ranks will be increasingly difficult given trends 
in attitudes toward military service. This has been measured by the 
Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies Program, which produced a 
``Propensity Update'' last September after extensive research. The 
study found that only 1 in 10 youths has a propensity to

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serve--the lowest percentage in the history of such surveys. Sixty-one 
percent of youth respondents report that they will ``definitely not 
serve.'' This represents a 7 percent increase in less than a year. 
These numbers are directly attributable to policies in Iraq. When 
combined with the Army's estimate that only 3 of 10 youths today meet 
basic physical, behavioral, and academic requirements for military 
service, the consequences of continuing to stretch the military are 
dire.
  The United States military remains the strongest fighting force in 
the world, but we have to be mindful that it is not indestructible. 
Before the next conflict, we have much to do to repair this invaluable 
instrument. This repair cannot begin until we move to a more 
sustainable Iraq policy.
  The third factor inhibiting our ability to establish a stable, 
multisectarian government in Iraq is the timetable imposed by our own 
domestic political process. The President and some of his advisors may 
be tempted to pursue the surge strategy to the end of his 
administration, but such a course contains extreme risks for United 
States national security. It would require the President to fight a 
political rear-guard holding action for more than a year and a half 
against congressional attempts to limit, modify, or end military 
operations in Iraq. The resulting contentiousness would make 
cooperation on national security issues nearly impossible. It would 
greatly increase the chances for a poorly planned withdrawal from Iraq 
or possibly the broader Middle East region that could damage U.S. 
interests for decades.
  The President and his team must come to grips with the shortened 
political timeline in this country for military operations in Iraq. 
Some will argue that political timelines should always be subordinated 
to military necessity, but that is unrealistic in a democracy. Many 
political observers contend that voter `` dissatisfaction in 2006 with 
administration policies in Iraq was the major factor in producing new 
Democratic Party majorities in both Houses of Congress. Domestic 
politics routinely intrude on diplomatic and military decisions. The 
key is to manage these intrusions so that we avoid actions that are not 
in our national interest.
  We do not know whether the next President will be a Democrat or a 
Republican. But it is certain that domestic pressure for withdrawal 
will continue to be intense. A course change should happen now, while 
there is still some possibility of constructing a sustainable 
bipartisan strategy in Iraq. If the President waits until Presidential 
election campaign is in full swing, the intensity of confrontation on 
Iraq is likely to limit United States options.
  I am not implying that debate on Iraq is bad. I am suggesting what 
most Senate observers understand intuitively: Little nuance or 
bipartisanship will be possible if the Iraq debate plays out during a 
contentious national election that will determine control of the White 
House and Congress.
  In short, our political time line will not support a rational course 
adjustment in Iraq, unless such an adjustment is initiated very soon.
  In January, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard from former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who recalled a half century of U.S. 
involvement in the Middle East. He argued that this history was not 
accidental. We have been heavily involved in the region because we have 
enduring vital interests at stake. We may make tactical decisions about 
the deployment or withdrawal of forces in Iraq, but we must plan for a 
strong strategic position in the region for years to come.
  This is not just a maxim from diplomatic textbooks. The vitality of 
the U.S. economy and the economies of much of the world depend on the 
oil that comes from the Persian Gulf. The safety of the United States 
depends on how we react to nuclear proliferation in the region and how 
we combat terrorist cells and ideologies that reside there.
  The risk for decision-makers is that after a long struggle in Iraq, 
accompanied by a contentious political process at home, we begin to see 
Iraq as a set piece--as an end in itself, distinct from the broader 
interests that we meant to protect. We risk becoming fixated on 
artificial notions of achieving victory or avoiding defeat, when these 
ill-defined concepts have little relevance to our operations in Iraq. 
What is important is not the precise configuration of the Iraqi 
Government or the achievement of specific benchmarks, but rather how 
Iraq impacts our geostrategic situation in the Middle East and beyond. 
The President's troop surge is an early episode in a much broader 
Middle East realignment that began with our invasion of Iraq and may 
not end for years. Nations throughout the Middle East are scrambling to 
find their footing as regional power balances shift in unpredictable 
ways.
  Although the Bush administration has scaled back its definition of 
success in Iraq, we are continuing to pour our treasure and manpower 
into the narrow and uncertain pursuit of creating a stable, democratic, 
pluralist society in Iraq. This pursuit has been the focal point of the 
administration's Middle East policy. Unfortunately, this objective is 
not one on which our future in the region can rest, especially when far 
more important goals related to Middle East security are languishing. I 
am not suggesting that what happens in Iraq is not important, but the 
Bush administration must avoid becoming so quixotic in its attempt to 
achieve its optimum forecasts for Iraq that it misses other 
opportunities to protect our vital interests in the Middle East.
  To determine our future course, we should separate our emotions and 
frustrations about Iraq from a sober assessment of our fundamental 
national security goals. In my judgment, we should be concerned with 
four primary objectives:
  First, we have an interest in preventing Iraq or any piece of its 
territory from being used as a safe haven or training ground for 
terrorists or as a repository or assembly point for weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Second, we have an interest in preventing the disorder and sectarian 
violence in Iraq from upsetting wider regional stability. The 
consequences of turmoil that draws neighboring states into a regional 
war could be grave. Such turmoil could topple friendly governments, 
expand destabilizing refugee flows, close the Persian Gulf to shipping 
traffic, or destroy key oil production or transportation facilities, 
thus diminishing the flow of oil from the region with disastrous 
results for the world economy.
  Third, we have an interest in preventing Iranian domination of the 
region. The fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni government opened up 
opportunities for Iran to seek much greater influence in Iraq and in 
the broader Middle East. An aggressive Iran would pose serious 
challenges for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab governments. 
Iran is pressing a broad agenda in the Middle East with uncertain 
consequences for weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of 
Israel, and other U.S. interests. Any course we adopt should consider 
how it would impact the regional influence of Iran.
  Fourth, we have an interest in limiting the loss of U.S. credibility 
in the region and throughout the world as a result of our Iraq mission. 
Some loss of confidence in the United States has already occurred, but 
our subsequent actions in Iraq may determine how we are viewed for a 
generation.
  In my judgment, the current surge strategy is not an effective means 
of protecting these interests. Its prospects for success are too 
dependent on the actions of others who do not share our agenda. It 
relies on military power to achieve goals that it cannot achieve. It 
distances allies that we will need for any regional diplomatic effort. 
Its failure, without a careful transition to a back-up policy would 
intensify our loss of credibility. It uses tremendous amounts of 
resources that cannot be employed in other ways to secure our 
objectives. And it lacks domestic support that is necessary to sustain 
a policy of this type.
  A total withdrawal from Iraq also fails to meet our security 
interests. Such a withdrawal would compound

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the risks of a wider regional conflict stimulated by Sunni-Shia 
tensions. It would also be a severe blow to U.S. credibility that would 
make nations in the region far less likely to cooperate with us on 
shared interests. It would increase the potential for armed conflict 
between Turkey and Kurdish forces in Iraq. It would expose Iraqis who 
have worked with us to retribution, increase the chances of 
destabilizing refugee flows, and undercut many economic and development 
projects currently underway in Iraq. It would also be a signal that the 
United States was abandoning efforts to prevent Iraqi territory from 
being used as a terrorist base.
  Moreover, advocates of an immediate withdrawal have tended to 
underestimate the requirements and complexities of such an operation. 
Gen. Barry McCaffrey testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearing on January 18, 2007, that an immediate withdrawal aimed at 
getting out of Iraq as fast as possible would take 6 months. A 
carefully planned withdrawal that sought to preserve as much American 
equipment as possible, protect Iraqis who have worked with us, continue 
anti-terrorist operations during the withdrawal period, and minimize 
negative regional consequences would take months longer.
  Our security interests call for a downsizing and re-deployment of 
U.S. military forces to more sustainable positions in Iraq or the 
Middle East. Numerous locations for temporary or permanent military 
bases have been suggested, including Kuwait or other nearby states, the 
Kurdish territories, or defensible locations in Iraq outside of urban 
areas. All of these options come with problems and limitations. But 
some level of American military presence in Iraq would improve the odds 
that we could respond to terrorist threats, protect oil flows, and help 
deter a regional war. It would also reassure friendly governments that 
the United States is committed to Middle East security. A re-deployment 
would allow us to continue training Iraqi troops and delivering 
economic assistance, but it would end the U.S. attempt to interpose 
ourselves between Iraqi sectarian factions.
  Six months ago, the Iraq Study Group endorsed a gradual downsizing of 
American forces in Iraq and the evolution of their mission to a support 
role for the Iraqi army. I do not necessarily agree with every 
recommendation of the Iraq Study Group, and its analysis requires some 
updating given the passage of time. But the report provides a useful 
starting point for the development of a ``Plan B'' and a template for 
bipartisan cooperation on our Iraq strategy.
  We should understand that if the re-deployment of a downsized force 
is to be safe and effective, our military planners and diplomats must 
have as much time as possible to develop and implement the details. We 
will need the cooperation of the Iraqi Government and key states in the 
region, which will not come automatically. The logistics of a shift in 
policy toward a residual force will test military planners, who have 
been consumed with the surge. In 2003, we witnessed the costs that came 
with insufficient planning for the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. It 
is absolutely essential that we not repeat the same mistake. The longer 
we delay the planning for a re-deployment, the less likely it is to be 
successful.
  The United States has violated some basic national security precepts 
during our military engagement in Iraq. We have overestimated what the 
military can achieve, we have set goals that are unrealistic, and we 
have inadequately factored in the broader regional consequences of our 
actions. Perhaps most critically, our focus on Iraq has diverted us 
from opportunities to change the world in directions that strengthen 
our national security.
  Our struggles in Iraq have placed U.S. foreign policy on a defensive 
footing and drawn resources from other national security endeavors, 
including Afghanistan. With few exceptions, our diplomatic initiatives 
are encumbered by negative global and regional attitudes toward our 
combat presence in Iraq.
  In this era, the United States cannot afford to be on a defensive 
footing indefinitely. It is essential that as we attempt to reposition 
ourselves from our current military posture in Iraq, we launch a 
multifaceted diplomatic offensive that pushes adversarial states and 
terrorist groups to adjust to us. The best counter to perceptions that 
we have lost credibility in Iraq would be a sustained and ambitious set 
of initiatives that repairs alliances and demonstrates our staying 
power in the Middle East.
  The Iraq Study Group report recommended such a diplomatic offensive, 
stating ``all key issues in the Middle East--the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism 
and terrorism--are inextricably linked.'' The report stressed that 
diplomacy aimed at solving key regional issues would ``help marginalize 
extremists and terrorists, promote U.S. values and interests, and 
improve America's global image.''
  A diplomatic offensive is likely to be easier in the context of a 
tactical draw-down of U.S. troops in Iraq. A drawdown would increase 
the chances of stimulating greater economic and diplomatic assistance 
for Iraq from multilateral organizations and European allies, who have 
sought to limit their association with an unpopular war.
  A first step is working with like-minded nations to establish a 
consistent diplomatic forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties 
in the Middle East. The purpose of the forum would be to improve 
transparency of national interests so that neighboring states and other 
actors avoid miscalculations. I believe it would be in the self-
interest of every nation in the region to attend such meetings, as well 
as the United States, EU representatives, or other interested parties. 
Such a forum could facilitate more regular contact with Syria and Iran 
with less drama and rhetoric that has accompanied some meetings. The 
existence of a predictable and regular forum in the region would be 
especially important for dealing with refugee problems, regulating 
borders, exploring development initiatives, and preventing conflict 
between the Kurds and Turks. Just as the Six-Party talks have improved 
communications in northeast Asia beyond the issue of North Korea's 
nuclear program, stabilizing Iraq could be the occasion for a 
diplomatic forum that contributes to other Middle East priorities.
  Eventually, part of the massive U.S. embassy under construction in 
Baghdad might be a suitable location for the forum. It is likely that 
the embassy compound will exceed the evolving needs of the United 
States. If this is true, we should carefully consider how best to use 
this asset, which might be suitable for diplomatic, educational, or 
governmental activities in Iraq.
  We should be mindful that the United States does not lack diplomatic 
assets. Most regional governments are extremely wary of U.S. 
abandonment of the Middle East. Moderate states are concerned by Iran's 
aggressiveness and by the possibility of sectarian conflict beyond 
Iraq's borders. They recognize that the United States is an 
indispensable counterweight to Iran and a source of stability. The 
United States should continue to organize regional players--Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States, and others--behind a 
program of containing Iran's disruptive agenda in the region.
  Such a re-alignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq and bringing 
security to other areas of conflict, including Lebanon and the 
Palestinian territories. The United States should make clear to our 
Arab friends that they have a role in promoting reconciliation within 
Iraq, preventing oil price spikes, splitting Syria from Iran, and 
demonstrating a more united front against terrorism.
  A diplomatic offensive centered on Iraq and surrounding countries 
would help lift American interests in the Middle East. But credibility 
and sustainability of our actions depend on addressing the two 
elephants in the room of U.S. Middle East policy--the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil. These are the two 
problems that our adversaries, especially Iran, least want us to 
address.

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They are the conditions that most constrain our freedom of action and 
perpetuate vulnerabilities. The implementation of an effective program 
to remedy these conditions could be as valuable to our long-term 
security as the achievement of a stable, pro-Western government in 
Iraq.
  The Arab-Israeli conflict will not be easily solved. Recent combat 
between the Hamas and Fatah Palestinian factions that led to Hamas's 
military preeminence in the Gaza Strip complicates efforts to put the 
peace process back on track. But even if a settlement is not an 
immediate possibility, we have to demonstrate clearly that the United 
States is committed to helping facilitate a negotiated outcome. 
Progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict would not end the sectarian 
conflict in Iraq, but it could restore credibility lost by the United 
States in the region. It also would undercut terrorist propaganda, slow 
Iranian influence, and open new possibilities related to Syria.
  Clearly, the United States does not have the influence to solve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict unilaterally. In contrast, our dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil is largely within our capacity to fix. Do not 
underestimate the impact on Iran and other nations of a concerted U.S. 
campaign to reduce our oil consumption. A credible well-publicized 
campaign to definitively change the oil import equation would 
reverberate throughout the Middle East. It would be the equivalent of 
opening a new front in Middle Eastern policy that does not depend on 
the good will of any other country.
  Many options exist for rapid progress in reducing our Persian Gulf 
oil dependence, but I would emphasize two. First, President Bush or his 
successor could establish the national goal of making competitively 
priced biofuels available to every motorist in America. Such an 
accomplishment would transform our transportation sector and cut our 
oil import bill. It would require multiple elements, including ensuring 
that virtually every new car sold in America is a flexible fuel vehicle 
capable of running on an 85 percent ethanol fuel known as E-85; that at 
least a quarter of American filling stations have E-85 pumps; and that 
ethanol production from various sources is expanded to as much as 100 
billion gallons a year within the next 15 to 20 years. Such a campaign 
could achieve the replacement of 6.5 million barrels of oil per day by 
volume--the rough equivalent of one-third of the oil used in America 
and one-half of our current oil imports. None of these goals are easy, 
but they are achievable if presidential advocacy and the weight of the 
Federal Government are devoted to their realization. Brazil already has 
achieved the large-scale deployment of ethanol as a national 
transportation fuel, and its success is a source of public pride in 
that country.
  Second, the President could commit to a radical increase in the miles 
per gallon of America's auto fleet. The Federal Government has numerous 
tools to make this happen, from direct Federal support for research, to 
Government fleet purchasing, to market regulations and incentives.
  Incredibly, cars in America today get less mileage per gallon than 
they did 20 years ago. Meanwhile, hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and fully 
electric cars are at or nearly at commercialization, yet there is not 
enough incentive for consumers to buy them or producers to make them on 
the mass scale necessary. For fiscal year 2008, the administration 
requested just $176 million for new vehicle technology research--an 
amount that was less than what was requested 5 years ago.
  Given that other developed nations have made great strides in 
improving fuel economy, this is fertile ground for rapid improvement. 
In fact, achievements on this front largely would be a matter of 
generating and sustaining political will that has, thus far, been 
disappointing.
  The issue before us is whether we will refocus our policy in Iraq on 
realistic assessments of what can be achieved, and on a sober review of 
our vital interests in the Middle East. Given the requirements of 
military planners, the stress of our combat forces, and our own 
domestic political timeline, we are running out of time to implement a 
thoughtful plan B that attempts to protect our substantial interests in 
the region, while downsizing our military presence in Iraq.
  We need to recast the geo-strategic reference points of our Iraq 
policy. We need to be preparing for how we will array U.S. forces in 
the region to target terrorist enclaves, deter adventurism by Iran, 
provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and generally 
reassure friendly governments that the United States is committed to 
Middle East security. Simultaneously, we must be aggressive and 
creative in pursuing a regional dialogue that is not limited to our 
friends. We cannot allow fatigue and frustration with our Iraq policy 
to lead to the abandonment of the tools and relationships we need to 
defend our vital interests in the Middle East.
  If we are to seize opportunities to preserve these interests, the 
administration and Congress must suspend what has become almost knee-
jerk political combat over Iraq. Those who offer constructive criticism 
of the surge strategy are not defeatists, any more than those who warn 
against a precipitous withdrawal are militarists. We need to move Iraq 
policy beyond the politics of the moment and reestablish a broad 
consensus on the role of the United States in the Middle East. If we do 
that, the United States has the diplomatic influence and economic and 
military power to strengthen mutually beneficial policies that could 
enhance security and prosperity throughout the region. I pray that the 
President and the Congress will move swiftly and surely to achieve that 
goal.

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