[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 12]
[House]
[Pages 16135-16138]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACE AND NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2007

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 885) to support the establishment of an international regime 
for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to 
authorize voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel 
bank, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                H.R. 885

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation 
     Act of 2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

 TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL 
                           FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Statements of policy.
Sec. 104. Report.

               TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy 
              Agency.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations.

 TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL 
                           FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

     SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

        Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1946, the United 
     States has believed that an increase in the number of 
     countries that possess nuclear weapons and the means to 
     create such weapons makes the world less secure and stable by 
     increasing the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A 
     world in which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure 
     for all concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, 
     as more countries will be tempted to arm themselves with 
     nuclear weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess 
     nuclear weapons.
       (2) It is therefore in the general security interest of all 
     countries, and in the vital national security interest of the 
     United States, that the number of countries that possess a 
     nuclear weapons capability necessarily be kept to a minimum 
     and ultimately reduced.
       (3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
     facilities produce nuclear material that can either be used 
     for peaceful purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or 
     can be used to produce uranium and plutonium for nuclear 
     weapons. As such, these facilities are inherently a 
     proliferation risk, allowing their possessor to be just 
     months away from the production of a nuclear explosive 
     device.
       (4) It is also therefore in the general security interest 
     of all countries that the number of countries that operate 
     uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities 
     also be kept to a minimum, consistent with the global demand 
     for nuclear power reactor fuel.

[[Page 16136]]

       (5) The financing and construction of additional uranium 
     enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities in 
     additional states around the world is indefensible on 
     economic grounds alone, given current and future supplies of 
     uranium and existing providers of uranium enrichment and 
     spent-fuel reprocessing services to the world market.
       (6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-
     fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries, 
     therefore, is often based upon considerations other than 
     economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is 
     often elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration 
     to the world that the country that possesses this technology 
     has arrived at a level of technological development 
     comparable to that of the United States and other countries 
     with advanced civil nuclear power programs.
       (7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and 
     spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a 
     demonstration of the developing world's independence from 
     technological domination by the more developed states. 
     Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'') recognizes that 
     State Parties have an ``inalienable right . . . to develop 
     research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
     purposes without discrimination.''. However, this is a 
     qualified right conditioned by a State Party acting in 
     conformity with the NPT's obligation for such countries not 
     to acquire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear 
     explosive devices.
       (8) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of 
     national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
     facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of 
     new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments, 
     nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have 
     for decades recognized the need to address this problem 
     through multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply 
     of nuclear fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of 
     nuclear energy, an international fuel bank to provide fuel if 
     the fuel supply to a country is disrupted, and even 
     multilateral participation in international uranium 
     enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, as a means 
     of reducing incentives of countries to develop and construct 
     such facilities themselves.
       (9) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more 
     than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-
     market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, 
     combined with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess 
     such technology and equipment to provide the basis for 
     nuclear weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a 
     new urgency.
       (10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable 
     international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for 
     developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
     reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also 
     produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear 
     weapons.
       (11) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last 
     year to address these concerns. The United States has 
     proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which 
     envisions a consortium of countries with advanced nuclear 
     capabilities providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and 
     recovery of used fuel--to other countries that agree to 
     employ nuclear energy only for power generation purposes, 
     without possessing national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
     reprocessing facilities.
       (12) The United States also joined France, the Russian 
     Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands 
     on May 31, 2006, in proposing a ``Concept for a Multilateral 
     Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel'' that would 
     facilitate or create new arrangements between suppliers and 
     recipients to provide fuel to countries with good 
     nonproliferation credentials in case of market failure.
       (13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel should 
     meet the condition outlined by President George W. Bush on 
     February 11, 2004, that ``The world's leading nuclear 
     exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at 
     reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as 
     those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing.''.
       (14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its 
     uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international 
     management and oversight, as part of a ``Global Nuclear Power 
     Infrastructure'' proposal to create international nuclear 
     fuel cycle centers.
       (15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system 
     to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at current 
     market prices, under appropriate safeguards and conditions, 
     could reassure countries that are dependent upon or will 
     construct nuclear power reactors that they will have an 
     assured supply of nuclear fuel at current market prices, so 
     long as such countries forgo national uranium enrichment and 
     spent-fuel reprocessing facilities and are committed to the 
     nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

     SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

        It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the ``Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable 
     Access to Nuclear Fuel'', proposed by the United States, 
     France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
     and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should 
     be expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;
       (2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian 
     Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities 
     under international management and oversight is also a 
     welcome development and should be encouraged by the United 
     States;
       (3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of 
     $50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an 
     international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States 
     and other member states of the IAEA should pledge 
     collectively at least an additional $100,000,000 in matching 
     funds to fulfill the NTI proposal; and
       (4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently 
     engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs 
     (1) through (3) and other initiatives should seek to identify 
     additional incentives to be included in an international 
     regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful 
     means at current market prices, including participation in 
     non-weapons-relevant technology development and fuel leasing 
     to further persuade countries that participation in such a 
     multilateral arrangement far outweighs the temptation and 
     expense of developing national uranium enrichment and 
     plutonium reprocessing facilities.

     SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

       (a) General Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the 
     United States to support the establishment of an 
     international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel 
     for peaceful means under multilateral authority, such as the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (b) Additional Statement of Policy.--It is further the 
     policy of the United States to--
       (1) oppose the development of a capability to produce 
     nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
     outside of the NPT;
       (2) encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the 
     right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear 
     energy for peaceful purposes,'' as described in Article IV of 
     the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by 
     the overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of 
     nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by 
     refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state party 
     that has not demonstrated that it is in full compliance with 
     its NPT obligations, as determined by the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency; and
       (3) strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines 
     concerning consultation by members regarding violations of 
     supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the 
     practice of a timely and coordinated response by Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group members to all such violations, including 
     termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, 
     that discourage individual Nuclear Suppliers Group members 
     from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such 
     time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been 
     achieved.

     SEC. 104. REPORT.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the 
     activities of the United States to support the establishment 
     of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear 
     fuel for peaceful means at current market prices under 
     multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency. The report shall include an assessment of the 
     feasibility of establishing an international fuel services 
     center within the United States.

               TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

     SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC 
                   ENERGY AGENCY.

       (a) Voluntary Contributions Authorized.--The President is 
     authorized to make voluntary contributions on a grant basis 
     to the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter in 
     this section referred to as the ``IAEA'') for the purpose of 
     supporting the establishment of an international nuclear fuel 
     bank to maintain a reserve of low-enriched uranium for 
     reactor fuel to provide to eligible countries in the case of 
     a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by normal market 
     mechanisms.
       (b) Requirements.--Voluntary contributions under subsection 
     (a) may be provided only if the President certifies to the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
     and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that--
       (1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total amount of not 
     less than $100,000,000 and is in receipt of not less than 
     $75,000,000 of such pledges for the purpose of supporting the 
     establishment of the international nuclear fuel bank referred 
     to in subsection (a);
       (2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
     subsection (a) will be established within the territory of a 
     non-nuclear weapon state, and will be under the oversight of 
     the IAEA, only if--

[[Page 16137]]

       (A) the non-nuclear weapon state, among other things--
       (i) has a full scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA and 
     an additional protocol for safeguards in force;
       (ii) has never been determined by the IAEA Board of 
     Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA full scope 
     safeguards agreement and its additional protocol for 
     safeguards; and
       (iii) has effective enforceable export controls regarding 
     nuclear and dual-use nuclear technology and other sensitive 
     materials comparable to those maintained by the United 
     States; and
       (B) the Secretary of State has never determined, for 
     purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
     section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other 
     provision of law, that the government of the non-nuclear 
     weapon state has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
     international terrorism;
       (3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
     subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country 
     only if, at the time of the request for nuclear reactor 
     fuel--
       (A) the country is in full compliance with its IAEA 
     safeguards agreement and has an additional protocol for 
     safeguards in force;
       (B) in the case of a country that at any time prior to the 
     request for nuclear reactor fuel has been determined to be in 
     noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the IAEA 
     Board of Governors determines that the country has taken all 
     necessary actions to satisfy any concerns of the IAEA 
     Director General regarding the activities that led to the 
     prior determination of noncompliance;
       (C) the country agrees to use the nuclear reactor fuel in 
     accordance with its IAEA safeguards agreement;
       (D) the country has effective and enforceable export 
     controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear technology 
     and other sensitive materials comparable to those maintained 
     by the United States;
       (E) the country does not possess uranium enrichment or 
     spent-fuel reprocessing facilities of any scale; and
       (F) the government of the country is not a state sponsor of 
     terrorism for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
     Act, or any other provision of law;
       (4) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
     subsection (a) will not contain uranium enrichment or spent-
     fuel reprocessing facilities; and
       (5) the nuclear reactor fuel referred to in paragraph (3) 
     will be provided to a country referred to in such paragraph 
     only at current market prices.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement of 
     subparagraph (F) of subsection (b)(3) if the President--
       (1) determines that it is important to the national 
     security interests of the United States to do so; and
       (2) transmits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate a report that contains the basis of 
     the determination under paragraph (1).
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to authorize voluntary contributions under 
     subsection (a) to support subsidization of the price of 
     nuclear reactor fuel whose supply would be assured by the 
     United States, the IAEA, or any other state or international 
     entity covered by this section.

     SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--To carry out section 201, there is 
     authorized to be appropriated to the President $50,000,000 
     for fiscal year 2008.
       (b) Availability of Appropriations.--Amounts appropriated 
     pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under 
     subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until 
     September 30, 2010.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.


                             General Leave

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on the bill under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of our resolution, 
and I yield myself such time as I might consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is a dramatic step forward in the epic 
struggle to contain the spread of nuclear arms around the globe. Our 
bill provides a safe, efficient and collaborative means of getting 
nuclear fuel to any country that pledges not to develop nuclear arms 
and delivers on that promise. It will help ensure stability and expose 
the subterfuge that we know Iran is perpetrating in order to further 
its nuclear weapons pursuit.
  We know full well, Mr. Speaker, that Tehran is actively pursuing a 
nuclear weapons program. But many are persuaded by Iran's argument that 
it needs access to a reliable nuclear fuel supply to meet its civilian 
power needs.
  Now, of course we know that Iran's argument is bogus, but Tehran has 
used the illusory threat of a global breakdown in the supply of nuclear 
reactor fuel to argue that it must have its own facilities to guarantee 
that its reactors are forever supplied with fuel. At the moment, Iran 
is going to have two of these reactors.
  We know that the Iranian pretext has been long recognized as a gap in 
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. A state can exploit the 
non-proliferation treaty's recognition of its good standing to develop 
peaceful uses of the atom and acquire potentially dangerous technology 
such as uranium enrichment. It could then turn around and use the 
technology to support a nuclear weapons program.
  Our legislation, the International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and 
Nonproliferation Act, addresses this gap in the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and removes Iran's pretext for its so-called 
peaceful enrichment plan. It does so by promoting the development of an 
international regime of assured supply of peaceful nuclear power fuel 
to countries in good standing on their nuclear non-proliferation 
commitments.
  Our legislation, Mr. Speaker, authorizes $50 million to support the 
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank supervised by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. This money will match the $50 
million offered by Mr. Warren Buffett to the Sam Nunn Nuclear Threat 
Initiative.
  The Sam Nunn program support is crucial to the realization of this 
initiative, but so is the political will of countries around the globe 
capable of cooperating in such a regime. So after this bill's passage 
today, I intend to work with key nations to establish the international 
nuclear fuel bank.
  I am very pleased, Mr. Speaker, that our Secretary of State, Dr. 
Condoleezza Rice, and our former distinguished colleague Senator Sam 
Nunn, who has perhaps done more to advance the cause of nuclear non-
proliferation than anyone else, have fully embraced this bill, and the 
administration is on record supporting it.
  Ours is a broadly supported, bipartisan bill. It would not have come 
to fruition without the enthusiastic support of my good friend, the 
ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, our colleague Ileana 
Ros-Lehtinen. It was approved by our committee unanimously, a rare 
phenomenon in this era of divisive partisanship.
  It is imperative that we keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of 
Iran and provide a source of peaceful nuclear fuel to all countries 
that are currently flirting with nuclear development programs. I, 
therefore, urge all of my colleagues to support this most important 
measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, again, it's a joy to bring another truly bipartisan bill 
to the floor, thanks to the very able and skilled leadership of 
Chairman Lantos of our Foreign Affairs Committee.
  This bill, as amended, Mr. Speaker, is a version of the original 
introduced by our esteemed Chairman Lantos and contains several new and 
important provisions that I would like to explain today.
  The first of these addresses the supposed right of all countries to 
manufacture their own nuclear fuel through enrichment or repossessing.
  The central problem of this assertion, Mr. Speaker, is that there's 
very little difference, as we know, in the technology that is used for 
civilian or for military purposes. So countries

[[Page 16138]]

such as Iran, which are undoubtedly trying to acquire nuclear weapons, 
can innocently claim to be establishing a legitimate civilian nuclear 
program, a claim which can be virtually impossible for the outside 
world to disprove. For this reason, the acquisition of a similar 
capability by more and more countries, for whatever reason, means that 
the technology and the infrastructure needed to manufacture nuclear 
weapons will expand as well.
  The continued spread of this deadly capacity poses an existential 
threat to the United States and, indeed, the entire world. We cannot 
allow this to continue. Unfortunately, efforts to stop this growing 
danger are undermined by a common but erroneous interpretation of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, specifically article IV, 
which some assert gives every signatory country an absolute right to 
enrich and to reprocess.
  It is both surprising and disappointing that many of the most ardent 
opponents of continued proliferation throughout the globe are also 
strong advocates of this supposed unrestricted right. In fact, Mr. 
Speaker, the treaty clearly states that the right to nuclear technology 
is conditioned by articles I and II, which are aimed at preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons, including the capacity to manufacture them.
  As such, it is the responsibility of countries seeking this 
capability to go beyond mere assertion and adopt measures that will 
conclusively demonstrate that it can be used only for peaceful 
purposes. It should not be the responsibility of the rest of the world 
to prove that the opposite is true. Iran has taught us the deadly 
foolishness of that approach.
  I believe that it is profoundly wrong to hold the security of 
American people hostage to this flawed interpretation. Therefore, we 
have a responsibility to the people whom we represent to openly state 
the truth, that the NPT does not grant to all signatories an absolute 
right to enrich and reprocess. And the U.S. must work with our allies 
and others, as Mr. Lantos has pointed out, to ensure that this position 
becomes an integral element in the global non-proliferation effort.
  A second set of changes to the original legislation places conditions 
on any country seeking to host a nuclear fuel bank, as well as on 
states that wish to receive fuel from the bank. The most important of 
these conditions, Mr. Speaker, is that state sponsors of terrorism 
would be prohibited from hosting a nuclear fuel bank and also from 
receiving fuel from it. This provision is essential to ensure that 
terrorist states, such as Iran, especially in their nuclear programs, 
do not benefit from the establishment of such a bank.
  A further provision mandates that both host and recipient states have 
an effective and enforceable export control program regarding nuclear 
and dual-use technology comparable to that of the United States.
  In addition, there is a stipulation that countries seeking assistance 
from a fuel bank cannot possess enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
  A final set of changes, Mr. Speaker, would ensure that any fuel made 
available by the bank would be at the current market price, thereby 
sparing U.S. taxpayers from the open-ended burden of subsidizing the 
nuclear programs of other countries.
  With the inclusion of these measures, Mr. Speaker, I am proud to 
cosponsor Mr. Lantos' legislation, and I believe that it will prove to 
be a significant addition to the global non-proliferation effort.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no other speakers, and I yield back the balance 
of our time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, we have no additional requests for time, and 
we yield back the balance of our time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 885, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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