[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 11]
[Senate]
[Page 15413]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




             EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE OF CFE STATES PARTIES

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, on May 28, 2007, Russia requested an 
Extraordinary Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe--the CFE Treaty--to discuss what 
Russia identified as ``exceptional circumstances'' that may lead them 
to suspend implementation of the treaty. Russia complains that most of 
their former Warsaw Pact allies have now joined NATO, significantly 
altering, in Russia's view, the ``balance'' of forces in Europe. This 
Extraordinary Conference is now under way in Vienna, Austria. What 
happens there will have tremendous implications for the security of 
Europe and for U.S.-Russian relations. Both sides must avoid actions 
that could lead to the potential unraveling of a treaty that has served 
as a cornerstone of European security since the end of the Cold War.
  In 1990, the CFE was conceived as a mechanism to reduce post-Cold-War 
arsenals of conventional weapons in Europe and has evolved into a 
stabilizing influence through its wide range of agreed verification 
measures. This treaty should not be relegated to the dustbin of 
history. That is not in the interest of all European States, including 
Russia, nor of the United States.
  The CFE Treaty was originally designed to limit the possibility of a 
surprise attack on Europe, when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact still 
existed. It imposes numerical limits on major conventional military 
weapons--battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat 
aircraft, and attack helicopters--that can be deployed within Europe. 
These limits are verifiable through an extensive regime of inspections, 
transparency measures, and data exchanges. To be sure, since the Cold 
War ended, most countries, especially in central Europe, have reduced 
their levels of conventional weapons well below the limits specified by 
the treaty. Nonetheless, the verification measures that continue in 
place to the present day provide a level of openness and predictability 
important to the continued stability of Europe.
  The ``exceptional circumstances'' referred to in Russia's request for 
an Extraordinary Conference of the CFE States Parties are of Russia's 
own making, and Russia holds the key to their resolution. At the end of 
the last decade, the CFE Treaty was updated to reflect post-Cold-War 
realities in Europe. The Adapted CFE Treaty was signed in 1999 at 
Istanbul, Turkey; however, it has not entered into force. Ratification 
of the treaty by the United States and its NATO allies will not occur 
until Russia implements two political commitments it made at the time 
of the treaty's signing.
  In 1999, Russia pledged that it would fully withdraw its forces from 
the territories of Georgia and Moldova, which were part of the former 
Soviet Union. One of the CFE Treaty's fundamental tenets is that a 
nation must give its consent for the stationing or deployment of 
foreign military forces on its territory. NATO nations have insisted 
that Russia live up to this fundamental principle and abide by its 
commitments. In the Senate, we have made clear to administration 
officials that we would give advice and consent to ratification of the 
Adapted CFE Treaty's provisions only when and if Russia satisfied these 
commitments.
  Russia has protested that its commitments regarding Georgia and 
Moldova were not related to the CFE Treaty. However, both the Georgian 
and Moldovan Governments have said repeatedly that they want Russian 
forces withdrawn from their territories. This has become a central 
issue in the CFE Treaty debate. Russia possesses the ability and the 
means to fulfill these commitments, needing only to close a single, 
largely abandoned Russian base in Georgia, and to withdraw a few 
hundred troops and an ammunition storage depot in Moldova. Russia has 
made progress in Georgia, but very little in Moldova since 2004.
  The United States is prepared to find ways to work through its 
differences with Russia on important security issues in ways that 
recognize shared interests. Russia's threatened suspension of the CFE 
does not demonstrate a reciprocal view and could lead to the unraveling 
of the CFE Treaty itself. Nevertheless, the Extraordinary Conference 
can serve as an opportunity to modernize the Cold-War-era CFE Treaty in 
a direction that reflects the current security environment in Europe 
and one in which all parties can completely fulfill their commitments.
  The administration's proposal to multilateralize the current Russian 
peacekeeping forces in Moldova, perhaps under the auspices of the NATO-
Russia Council, merits serious consideration. In Georgia, Russia has 
already taken significant steps to reduce its troop presence the 
remaining steps are far less demanding but just as important. The 
Extraordinary Conference should offer a new beginning, rather than the 
beginning of the end.
  The United States and its NATO Allies believe that the Adapted CFE 
Treaty offers the best path toward ensuring a Europe united and at 
peace, one in which Russia honors its commitments. If this were to 
occur, then, and only then, would the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the United States Senate be likely to begin a careful, 
expeditious review leading to U.S. ratification of the Adapted CFE 
Treaty.

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