[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 11]
[Senate]
[Page 15375]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                SOMALIA

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, later this week, Somalia's fragile 
Transitional Federal Government, also known as the TFG, is expected to 
convene a National Reconciliation Conference originally intended to 
negotiate genuine power-sharing arrangements, establish a credible 
political process, and prevent Somalia from descending back into chaos 
and lawlessness.
  Unfortunately, this conference has been postponed again--for the 
third time. Equally disappointing is the failure of the TFG to take the 
critical steps needed to broaden its base and ensure genuine 
negotiations occur when, or if, the conference actually takes place.
  I have been watching Somalia closely for quite some time and I am 
deeply concerned that the small window of opportunity we saw earlier 
this year is closing quickly--if it has not already closed. To date, 
the power struggle between the Ethiopian-backed TFG and various clan-
based and extremist militias in Mogadishu runs parallel to a brutal 
crackdown by Ethiopian and Somali troops that led to enormous civilian 
deaths and displacement. The increasing prevalence of suicide bombings 
and other guerilla tactics is a serious setback for Somalis, and for 
our own national security interests on the Horn.
  The United States should be encouraging and supporting efforts to 
facilitate a government in Somalia that is widely perceived--internally 
and externally--as legitimate. Unfortunately, this effort is 
complicated by the Aministration's flawed and self-defeating approach 
to counterterrorism. By bringing long-term stability to Somalia, we can 
help root out global terrorists who thrive on instability and weak or 
failed governments. Pursuing individual terrorists is not a substitute 
for addressing the conditions that allow safe havens to persist.
  There is no quick and easy answer to Somalia's problems. But there 
are a few things we can, and must, do better if Somalia is not to 
descend further into a bastion of instability with potentially dire 
consequences for our national security and that country's future. We 
must redouble our efforts and work with international and regional 
communities--and in particular with the Ethiopians--to ensure this 
National Reconciliation Conference not only occurs, but that it brings 
together a broad range of actors to create a framework for a government 
that is capable and committed to overcoming divisive clan dynamics, 
protecting human rights, and isolating and eliminating elements of 
extremism.
  The United States has been forthcoming with financial resources for 
this conference, as newly appointed Special Envoy to Somalia Ambassador 
John Yates recently reported. Indeed, we are supplying half of the 
conference's budget through the United Nations Development Program. 
These resources are significant, and while I encourage other donors to 
step up to the plate before it is too late, financial assistance is not 
the only deficit Somalia's political project faces.
  Equally worrisome is the lack of consistent messages from the 
international community as to what this conference is expected to 
achieve. I am concerned that the focus on getting the conference up and 
running--while critical--has nonetheless sidelined the need for it to 
produce the blueprint--the blueprint--for rebuilding Somalia.
  Along with appointing a new diplomat and providing substantial funds, 
this administration, as well as the broader international community, 
needs to set clear expectations for the TFG to make sure recent history 
in that country is not repeated.
  It is important to note that these are only the latest efforts to 
cobble together a viable political path for Somalia. Over the past 
decade, there have been approximately 14 other similar initiatives, all 
of which have failed. If the fragile political space created by the TFG 
closes, we are going to be stuck back at square one with the same 
disastrous results we have been dealing with for more than 10 years.
  The upcoming reconciliation conference is only one benchmark of steps 
forward for the TFG. It is critical that all Somali stakeholders are 
included and that they own the process, that international 
organizations are invited to observe and offer advice, and that an 
outcome document laying out a roadmap for a sustained and pervasive 
process is produced.
  Even if this public event meets all these goals--which remains far 
from clear--to be truly successful, it must also set the stage for what 
will be needed down the road, including the restoration of 
infrastructure and institutions required in a functioning state, the 
provision of services and security to citizens, and the weaving of 
Somalia's complex social fabric into a viable civil society.
  The road to peace and security in Somalia is long and riddled with 
obstacles, but we must not stray from the goal. This most recent 
postponement illustrates the consequences of insufficient influence and 
inadequate policy coordination by the U.S. and the international 
community.
  Accordingly, we must strive to produce a cohesive policy and 
effective action by clarifying our objectives, coordinating closely 
with our allies, and creating benchmarks with consequences. The United 
States and others--especially Ethiopia--must use whatever leverage they 
still possess to demand and work toward demonstrable progress towards a 
sustainable political solution for Somalia.
  Mr. President, I certainly thank the Senator from Washington for her 
courtesy in letting me go first.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Washington.

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