[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 1]
[House]
[Pages 798-800]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       THE KUCINICH PLAN FOR IRAQ

  (Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to address the House for 
1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, the administration is preparing to 
escalate

[[Page 799]]

the conflict. They intend to increase troop numbers to unprecedented 
levels, without establishing an ending date. It is important for 
Congress to oppose the troop surge. But that is not enough. We must 
respond powerfully to take steps to end the occupation, close U.S. 
bases in Iraq and bring our troops home. These steps are necessary 
preconditions to the U.S. extricating itself from Iraq through the 
establishment of an international security and peacekeeping force.
  That is what the Kucinich plan which I am presenting Members of 
Congress today is all about. Congress as a co-equal branch of 
government has an urgent responsibility here. Congress under article I, 
section 8, has the war-making power. Congress appropriates funds for 
the war. Congress does not dispense with its obligation to the American 
people simply by opposing a troop surge in Iraq. It is simply not 
credible to maintain that one opposes the war and yet continues to fund 
it. If you oppose the war, then don't vote to fund it.

                       The Kucinich Plan for Iraq

       Dear Colleague: In November of 2006, after an October 
     upsurge in violence in Iraq, the American people moved 
     decisively to reject Republican rule, principally because of 
     the conduct of the war. Democratic leaders well understand we 
     regained control of the Congress because of the situation in 
     Iraq. However, two months later, the Congress is still 
     searching for a plan around which it can unite to hasten the 
     end of U.S. involvement in Iraq and the return home of 
     140,000 U.S. troops.
       The Administration is preparing to escalate the conflict. 
     They intend to increase troop numbers to unprecedented 
     levels, without establishing an ending date. It is important 
     for Congress to oppose the troop surge. But that is not 
     enough. We must respond powerfully to take steps to end the 
     occupation, close U.S. bases in Iraq and bring our troops 
     home. These steps are necessary preconditions to the U.S. 
     extricating itself from Iraq through the establishment of an 
     international security and peacekeeping force.
       Congress, as a coequal branch of government, has a 
     responsibility here. Congress, under Article 1, Section 8 of 
     the U.S. Constitution has the war-making power. Congress 
     appropriates funds for the war. Congress does not dispense 
     with its obligation to the American people simply by opposing 
     a troop surge in Iraq. It is simply not credible to maintain 
     that one opposes the war and yet continue to fund it. If you 
     oppose the war, do not vote to fund it. If you have money 
     which can be used to bring the troops home do not say you 
     want to bring the troops home while you appropriate money in 
     a supplemental to keep them in Iraq fighting a war that 
     cannot be won militarily. This is why the Administration 
     should be notified now that Congress will not approve of the 
     appropriations request of up to $160 billion in the spring 
     for the purposes of continuing the occupation and the war. 
     Continuing to fund the war is not a plan. It would represent 
     the continuation of disaster.
       In addition to halting funding of this war, a parallel 
     political process is needed. I am offering such a 
     comprehensive plan today. I appreciate your consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                               Dennis J. Kucinich,
     Member of Congress.
                                  ____


                       The Kucinich Plan for Iraq

       1. The US announces it will end the occupation, close 
     military bases and withdraw. The insurgency has been fueled 
     by the occupation and the prospect of a long-term presence as 
     indicated by the building of permanent bases. A U.S. 
     declaration of an intention to withdraw troops and close 
     bases will help dampen the insurgency which has been inspired 
     to resist colonization and fight invaders and those who have 
     supported US policy. Furthermore this will provide an opening 
     where parties within Iraq and in the region can set the stage 
     for negotiations towards peaceful settlement.
       2. U.S. announces that it will use existing funds to bring 
     the troops and necessary equipment home. Congress 
     appropriated $70 billion in bridge funds on October 1st for 
     the war. Money from this and other DOD accounts can be used 
     to fund the troops in the field over the next few months, and 
     to pay for the cost of the return of the troops, (which has 
     been estimated at between $5 and $7 billion dollars) while a 
     political settlement is being negotiated and preparations are 
     made for a transition to an international security and 
     peacekeeping force.
       3. Order a simultaneous return of all U.S. contractors to 
     the United States and turn over all contracting work to the 
     Iraqi government. The contracting process has been rife with 
     world-class corruption, with contractors stealing from the 
     U.S. Government and cheating the Iraqi people, taking large 
     contracts and giving 5% or so to Iraqi subcontractors. 
     Reconstruction activities must be reorganized and closely 
     monitored in Iraq by the Iraqi government, with the 
     assistance of the international community. The massive 
     corruption as it relates to U.S. contractors, should be 
     investigated by congressional committees and federal grand 
     juries. The lack of tangible benefits, the lack of 
     accountability for billions of dollars, while millions of 
     Iraqis do not have a means of financial support, nor 
     substantive employment, cries out for justice.
       It is noteworthy that after the first Gulf War, Iraqis 
     reestablished electricity within three months, despite 
     sanctions. Four years into the U.S. occupation there is no 
     water, nor reliable electricity in Bagdhad, despite massive 
     funding from the U.S. and from the Madrid conference. The 
     greatest mystery involves the activities of private security 
     companies who function as mercenaries. Reports of false flag 
     operations must be investigated by an international tribunal.
       4. Convene a regional conference for the purpose of 
     developing a security and stabilization force for Iraq. The 
     focus should be on a process which solves the problems of 
     Iraq. The U.S. has told the international community, ``This 
     is our policy and we want you to come and help us implement 
     it.'' The international community may have an interest in 
     helping Iraq, but has no interest in participating in the 
     implementation of failed U.S. policy. A shift in U.S. policy 
     away from unilateralism and toward cooperation will provide 
     new opportunities for exploring common concerns about the 
     plight of Iraq. The UN is the appropriate place to convene, 
     through the office of the Secretary General, all countries 
     that have interests, concerns and influence, including the 
     five permanent members of the Security Council and the 
     European community, and all Arab nations.
       The end of the U.S. occupation and the closing of military 
     bases are necessary preconditions for such a conference. When 
     the U.S. creates a shift of policy and announces it will 
     focus on the concerns of the people of Iraq, it will provide 
     a powerful incentive for nations to participate. It is well 
     known that while some nations may see the instability in Iraq 
     as an opportunity, there is also an ever-present danger that 
     the civil war in Iraq threatens the stability of nations 
     throughout the region. The impending end of the occupation 
     will provide a breakthrough for the cooperation between the 
     U.S. and the UN and the UN and countries of the region. The 
     regional conference must include Iran, Syria, Egypt, Saudi 
     Arabia and Jordan.
       5. Prepare an international security and peacekeeping force 
     to move in, replacing U.S. troops who then return home. The 
     UN has an indispensable role to play here, but cannot do it 
     as long as the U.S. is committed to an occupation. The UN is 
     the only international organization with the ability to 
     mobilize and the legitimacy to authorize troops. The UN is 
     the place to develop the process, to build the political 
     consensus, to craft a political agreement, to prepare the 
     ground for the peacekeeping mission, to implement the basis 
     of an agreement that will end the occupation and begin the 
     transition to international peacekeepers. This process will 
     take at least three months from the time the U.S. announces 
     the intention to end the occupation.
       The U.S. will necessarily have to fund a peacekeeping 
     mission, which, by definition will not require as many 
     troops. Fifty percent of the peacekeeping troops must come 
     from nations with large Muslim populations. The international 
     security force, under UN direction, will remain in place 
     until the Iraqi government is capable of handling its own 
     security. The UN can field an international security and 
     peacekeeping mission, but such an initiative will not take 
     shape unless there is a peace to keep, and that will be 
     dependent upon a political process which reaches agreement 
     between all the Iraqi parties. Such an agreement means fewer 
     troops will be needed. According to UN sources, the UN 
     peacekeeping mission in the Congo, which is four times larger 
     in area than Iraq, required about twenty thousand troops. 
     Finally the UN does not mobilize quickly because they depend 
     upon governments to supply the troops, and governments are 
     slow. The ambition of the UN is to deploy in less than ninety 
     days. However, without an agreement of parties the UN is not 
     likely to approve a mission to Iraq, because countries will 
     not give them troops.
       6. Develop and fund a process of national reconciliation. 
     The process of reconciliation must begin with a national 
     conference, organized with the assistance of the UN and with 
     the participation of parties who can create, participate in 
     and affect the process of reconciliation, defined as an 
     airing of all grievances and the creation of pathways toward 
     open, transparent talks producing truth and resolution of 
     grievances. The Iraqi government has indicated a desire for 
     the process of reconciliation to take place around it, and 
     that those who were opposed to the government should give up 
     and join the government. Reconciliation must not be confused 
     with capitulation, nor with realignments for the purposes of 
     protecting power relationships.
       For example, Kurds need to be assured that their own 
     autonomy will be regarded and therefore obviate the need for 
     the Kurds to align with religious Shia for the purposes of

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     self-protection. The problem in Iraq is that every community 
     is living in fear. The Shia, who are the majority, fear they 
     will not be allowed to government even though they are a 
     majority. The Kurds are afraid they will lose the autonomy 
     they have gained. The Sunnis think they will continue to be 
     made to pay for the sins of Saddam.
       A reconciliation process which brings people together is 
     the only way to overcome their fears and reconcile their 
     differences. It is essential to create a minimum of 
     understanding and mutual confidence between the Shiites, 
     Sunnis and Kurds.
       But how can a reconciliation process be constructed in Iraq 
     when there is such mistrust: Ethnic cleansing is rampant. The 
     police get their money from the U.S. and their ideas from 
     Tehran. They function as religious militia, fighting for 
     supremacy, while the Interior Ministry collaborates. Two or 
     three million people have been displaced. When someone loses 
     a family member, a loved one, a friend, the first response is 
     likely to be that there is no reconciliation.
       It is also difficult to move toward reconciliation when one 
     or several parties engaged in the conflict think they can win 
     outright. The Shia, some of whom are out for revenge, think 
     they can win because they have the defacto support of the 
     U.S. The end of the U.S. occupation will enhance the 
     opportunity for the Shia to come to an accommodation with the 
     Sunnis. They have the oil, the weapons, and support from 
     Iran. They have little interest in reconciling with those who 
     are seen as Baathists.
       The Sunnis think they have experience, as the former army 
     of Saddam, boasting half a million insurgents. The Sunnis 
     have so much more experience and motivation that as soon as 
     the Americans leave they believe they can defeat the Shia 
     government. Any Sunni revenge impulses can be held in check 
     by international peacekeepers. The only sure path toward 
     reconciliation is through the political process. All factions 
     and all insurgents not with al Qaeda must be brought together 
     in a relentless process which involves Saudis, Turks, Syrians 
     and Iranians.
       7. Reconstruction and Jobs. Restart the failed 
     reconstruction program in Iraq. Rebuild roads, bridges, 
     schools, hospitals, and other public facilities, houses, and 
     factories with jobs and job training going to local Iraqis.
       8. Reparations. The U.S. and Great Britain have a high 
     moral obligation to enable a peace process by beginning a 
     program of significant reparations to the people of Iraq for 
     the loss of lives, physical and emotional injuries, and 
     damage to property. There should be special programs to 
     rescue the tens of thousands of Iraqi orphans from lives of 
     destitution. This is essential to enable reconciliation.
       9. Political Sovereignty. Put an end to suspicions that the 
     U.S. invasion and occupation was influenced by a desire to 
     gain control of Iraq's oil assets by (A) setting aside 
     initiatives to privatize Iraqi oil interests or other 
     national assets, and (B) by abandoning efforts to change 
     Iraqi national law to facilitate privatization.
       Any attempt to sell Iraqi oil assets during the U.S. 
     occupation will be a significant stumbling block to peaceful 
     resolution. The current Iraqi constitution gives oil proceeds 
     to the regions and the central government gets nothing. There 
     must be fairness in the distribution of oil resources in 
     Iraq. An Iraqi National Oil Trust should be established to 
     guarantee the oil assets will be used to create a fully 
     functioning infrastructure with financial mechanisms 
     established protect the oil wealth for the use of the people 
     of Iraq.
       10. Iraq Economy. Set forth a plan to stabilize Iraq's cost 
     for food and energy, on par to what the prices were before 
     the U.S. invasion and occupation. This would block efforts 
     underway to raise the price of food and energy at a time when 
     most Iraqis do not have the means to meet their own needs.
       11. Economic Sovereignty. Work with the world community to 
     restore Iraq's fiscal integrity without structural 
     readjustment measures of the IMF or the World Bank.
       12. International Truth and Reconciliation. Establish a 
     policy of truth and reconciliation between the people of the 
     United States and the people of Iraq.

                          ____________________