[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 153 (2007), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1367-1368]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




            THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PERSPECTIVE ON IRAQ

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Kansas, who made 
the point well that we cannot afford to lose in Iraq. I thought my 
colleagues, and maybe those who may be interested--if anybody is paying 
attention and watching the floor--may be interested to hear what the 
intelligence community said in public. It is rare we have public 
hearings in the Intelligence Committee, but once a year at least we 
have the worldwide threat hearing.
  Last Thursday, we had that hearing and we spent about 5\1/2\ hours. 
It was very informative and mostly dealt with Iraq. Present were the 
Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador Negroponte; Director 
Hayden of the CIA; Director of the DIA General Maples; Mr. Foote from 
the State Department INR; and FBI Director Robert Mueller. Much of the 
questioning was about what is going on in Iraq. I think the consensus 
of the intelligence community was that while things have not gone well, 
the new commitment by Prime Minister Maliki and the rest of his 
Government--not just the Shia Prime Minister but the Kurds and the 
Sunnis--was to take over and take ownership of ending the insurgency in 
Iraq. That gave us the best hope of achieving a peaceful solution that 
would leave Iraq a stable country--not perfect by any means, with no 
guarantee of success, but this was the opportunity to get the three 
major elements in Iraq--the Shia, Sunnis, and the Kurds--to come 
together on what we believe will be and should be a long-term solution.
  Frankly, one of the real problems we have had has been the reluctance 
of the Iraqi Government to let us go in and eliminate Shia militia, 
such as the Moqtada al-Sadr Mahdi army. This has been a serious 
problem. The American forces have been held back. Now it is our 
understanding--and the intelligence community believes what they have 
told the policymakers in the executive branch--that this is now the 
best chance, because they realize time is running out, that while our 
commitment was strong to Iraq, it is not an unending one, infinite.
  They are going to have to take control if they don't want to see 
their country descend into chaos. So there was a lot of talk about the 
pros and cons of the policy the President announced to turn over the 
responsibility to the Iraqi military, for ending the insurgency in 
Baghdad, and to send our troops into the Al Anbar province to deal with 
radical Islamists, such as al-Qaida, who continue to stir up problems 
and who we believe were responsible for the bombing of the Golden 
Mosque in Samara, which escalated the insurgency.
  So I asked another question and the answers, I thought, were very 
telling. They were not covered in the media. I asked what if we decided 
now or within 2 or 3 months to withdraw and turn it over to the Iraqi 
Government, and the consensus was uniform and frightening.
  Admiral Negroponte said:

       And I think the view pretty much across the community is 
     that a precipitous withdrawal could lead to a collapse of the 
     government of that country, and a collapse of their security 
     forces, because we simply don't think that they are ready to 
     take over, to assume full control of their security 
     responsibilities.
       We think that that is a goal that can be achieved on a 
     gradual basis and on a well-planned basis. But to simply 
     withdraw now, I think, could have catastrophic effects. And I 
     think that's a quite widely held view inside of Iraq itself.

  Later, I went back and asked what it would mean in terms of the 
worldwide terrorist threat of al-Qaida. Director Negroponte responded:

       I think in terms of al-Qaida's own planning, if you look at 
     the letter that Zawahiri wrote to Zarqawi last year about 
     establishing in Iraq a sort of beachhead for the expansion of 
     al-Qaida's ideology throughout the Islamic world, 
     establishing the caliphate, it would be the very sanctuary 
     for international terrorism that we are seeking to avoid.

  In other words, the No. 2 man under Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, wrote 
to the notorious, infamous butcher Zarqawi, who had beheaded Americans 
and others on television, to tell him to cool it; we are trying to 
establish a basis for al-Qaida to operate out of Iraq. This would be, 
in Zawahiri's and bin Laden's own words, establishing the range of the 
caliphate. What they mean by that is to establish a Taliban style of 
government, such as we saw in Afghanistan, on a regionwide and 
ultimately a global basis.
  I asked General Maples about the impact of withdrawal, precipitous or 
immediate, or politically, a timetable withdrawal, determined by what 
we want in Washington, rather than what is available on the ground. He 
said:

       . . . I believe that a failure in Iraq would empower the 
     jihadist movement. It would give that base of operations from 
     which the jihadist movement would expand. And it's consistent 
     with the goals of al-Qaida in Iraq to establish that Islamic 
     state, and then to expand it into the caliphate.

  He went on to say there would be regional impacts and that there 
would be a tremendous economic impact. He cited hydrocarbons and, 
obviously, we know Iraq is very rich in oil reserves, and it would make 
oil reserves available to fund the activities of al-Qaida and the 
international radical Islamist terrorist movements. He also said it 
would have an impact on the world market on oil, driving up the power 
of oil. He concluded by saying it would give Iran the power to expand 
its evil empire, which President Ahmadi-Nejad is urgently trying to 
expand not only in the Middle East but throughout Latin America.
  I think probably the best summary of the intelligence community 
estimates of the impact of the choices--and we are talking about 
choices--is there is nothing good in terms of choices. One option has 
been put forward by President Bush. I happen to believe it is the best 
available option to support the Iraqis who have committed to end the 
insurgency, to bring the Sunnis into a government that would share in 
the oil revenues and take responsibility for ending the insurgency, 
while our troops go after the external forces, the terrorists coming in 
from other countries and joining the al-Qaida movement.
  I asked General Hayden to give me a concise statement of his view and 
the view of the intelligence community on the second option, which 
would be to withdraw now, or to set a short timetable deadline in 2 or 
3 months. I will read what he said:

       Yes, sir, Senator. When I went before the Iraq Study Group, 
     I prefaced my remarks by saying I think I'll give a rather--
     I'm going to be giving a rather somber assessment of the 
     situation in Iraq. But before I do that, I said, let me tell 
     you. If we leave under the current circumstances, everything 
     gets worse.

  At that point, I commended him for being a master of understatement. 
He went on to say:

       Three quick areas. More Iraqis die from the disorder inside 
     Iraq. Iraq becomes a safe haven, perhaps more dangerous than 
     the one al-Qaida had in Afghanistan. And finally, the 
     conflict in Iraq bleeds over into the neighborhood and 
     threatens serious regional instability.

  I said, well, what would be the threat to the U.S. homeland? How does 
that affect us in Washington, in Rhode Island, Missouri, Kansas, New 
York, Los Angeles, and elsewhere? He said:

       The immediate threat comes from providing al-Qaida that 
     which they are attempting to seek in several locations right 
     now, be it Somalia, the tribal area of Pakistan or Anbar 
     province--a safe haven to rival that which they had in 
     Afghanistan.


[[Page 1368]]


  I have my views on this. This is the overwhelming consensus of the 
intelligence community. There are no great options, but the best 
option, they believe, is to provide American troops to support what the 
Government of Iraq has pledged to do, and that is to end the 
insurgency, to stop the Shia death squads, to cut the Sunnis in on a 
fair share of the Government, and take responsibility not only for 
clearing but for controlling the areas in Baghdad that have been the 
problem. So I think as we talk about the options available, it is 
vitally important that we listen to the intelligence community and 
their best assessments of what happens if we follow the President's 
plan or if we choose a course of continuing to do what we have been 
doing, without assisting the Iraqis to take control of their 
Government, or if we cut and run.
  I ask unanimous consent that the transcripts which I cited be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   SSCI Open Hearing: Current and Projected National Security Threats

       JANUARY 11, 2007
       NEGROPONTE (responding to a question from Sen. Bond): And I 
     think the view pretty much across the community is that a 
     precipitous withdrawal could lead to a collapse of the 
     government of that country, and a collapse of their security 
     forces, because we simply don't think that they are ready to 
     take over, to assume full control of their security 
     responsibilities.
       We think that that is a goal that can be achieved on a 
     gradual basis and on a well planned basis. But to simply 
     withdraw now, I think could have catastrophic effects. And I 
     think that's a quite widely held view inside of Iraq itself.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       NEGROPONTE: I think, in terms of Al Qaida's own planning, 
     if you look at the letter that Zawahiri wrote to Zarqawi last 
     year about establishing in Iraq a sort of a beachhead for the 
     expansion of Al Qaida's ideology throughout the Islamic 
     world, establishing the caliphate, it would be the very 
     sanctuary for international terrorism that we are seeking to 
     avoid,
       BOND: General Maples?
       MAPLES: Sir, I'd follow up on that statement by the 
     ambassador, because I truly believe that a failure in Iraq 
     would empower the jihadist movement. It would give that base 
     of operations from which the jihadist movement would expand. 
     And it's consistent with the goals of Al Qaida in Iraq to 
     establish that Islamic state, and then to expand it into the 
     caliphate.
       I also think that there, of course, will be very 
     significant regional impacts, both in terms of stability to 
     other countries in the region.
       There will be economic impacts with respect to, in 
     particular, hydrocarbons and the effect that that could have, 
     particularly if those resources were in the hands of 
     jihadists. And . . .
       BOND: In other words, they could get the profit off of the 
     high price of oil.
       MAPLES: Absolutely. And then I would follow with one last, 
     and that is the empowerment--further empowerment--of Iran 
     within the region.
       BOND: General Hayden?
       GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, Senator. When I went before the Iraq 
     Study Group, I prefaced my remarks by saying I think I'll 
     give a rather--I'm going to be giving a rather somber 
     assessment of the situation in Iraq. But before I do that, I 
     said, let me tell you. If we leave under the current 
     circumstances, everything gets worse. And . . .
       BOND: You have a masterful way of understating it.
       HAYDEN: Three very quick areas. More Iraqis die from the 
     disorder inside Iraq. Iraq becomes a safe haven, perhaps more 
     dangerous than the one Al Qaida had in Afghanistan. And 
     finally, the conflict in Iraq bleeds over into the 
     neighborhood and threatens serious regional instability.
       BOND: Any threat do you see--what threat to the United 
     States homeland?
       HAYDEN: The immediate threat comes from providing Al Qaida 
     that which they are attempting to seek in several locations 
     right now, be it Somalia, the tribal area of Pakistan or 
     Anbar province--a safe haven to rival that which they had in 
     Afghanistan.

  Mr. BOND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
  Mr. AKAKA. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Akaka pertaining to the introduction of S. 310 
are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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