[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 8]
[House]
[Pages 11075-11077]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               IRAQ WEEK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time 
of the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from 
Washington is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, this is Iraq Week in the House of 
Representatives, called by the Republican majority in hopes that they 
can stop the bleeding, not on the ground in Iraq, but in the opinion 
polls in this country.
  They want to capitalize on the success of the U.S. military last week 
and

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define progress in Iraq all over again. Over the last 3 years, the 
definition of progress by the Republican majority has been as elusive 
as the President's plan for Iraq.
  Still, later this week after lots of Republican speech making, the 
majority leader will force-feed the American people a new resolution 
telling them what to think about the Iraq war. In the fine print is a 
desperate effort by the Republicans to cling to power in the November 
election. That is what this week is all about.
  Republican leaders hope to commandeer the news cycle and convince the 
American people that Republicans deserve to stay despite their record 
on Iraq. In other words, Iraq Week is a staged Republican campaign 
event.
  The resolution the Republicans will force through the House of 
Representatives on Friday will have nothing to do with increasing the 
safety of our Nation or the security of our soldiers on the ground in 
Iraq. It is about the security of the Republican grip on power. The 
Republicans fear the American people have answered Newt Gingrich's 
question. Do you remember it? ``Had enough?'' Well, they have. Poll 
after poll says the American people indeed have had enough of 
Republican power. The American people always have accepted sacrifice 
when it comes to defending the Nation. But one thing they have never 
accepted is being misled by their leaders. The American people have 
heard enough to know the trust they placed in the President over his 
justification to invade Iraq was misplaced.
  The American people have seen enough to know this administration and 
the Republican Congress have no plan except to keep declaring progress. 
The words, however, pale compared to the images they see on TV every 
day. Enough facts have emerged for the American people to know that 
Iraq has become a grim lesson we learned a long time ago in Vietnam. 
But instead of transferring responsibility, the President declares the 
tide has turned, U.S. troops will stay in Iraq, and there will be 
difficult days ahead.
  That is a Presidential declaration that more American soldiers will 
die, more American soldiers will suffer grave physical injuries, more 
American soldiers will be exposed to depleted uranium, and more 
American soldiers will return home traumatized by post-traumatic stress 
disorder.
  This is today's reality, and the truth is there is no end in sight. 
And you will not hear that from the President. Earlier this year, U.S. 
military commanders talked about significant force reductions by the 
end of the year. They have stopped talking about it. That is because 
the reality on the ground in Iraq defies the Republican spin.
  But the spinning goes on. Yesterday at Camp Neocon, that is what they 
used to call Camp David, the President called together the 
administration in a new effort to define progress. It was a campaign 
meeting meant to manage the news the American people receive about 
Iraq. Today, the President made a surprise visit to Iraq, not unlike 
landing on an aircraft carrier to declare mission accomplished. It 
wasn't then and it isn't now.
  Soon, the Republican leaders will tell the American people what to 
think, without the information on which to make an informed decision. 
Here is something they do not want to talk about: the U.S. is building 
Fortress Iraq, a $600 million embassy, the biggest in the world.
  What lurks ahead for the United States is another grim and painful 
lesson we learned a long time ago. The administration would like to 
divert your attention while it orders the military to pour concrete 
runways and bunkers across Iraq. Tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers are 
going to be stationed in Iraq indefinitely. These bases will be called 
something else for the American people, but they will still be targets 
for the insurgents.
  Not everyone has access to enterprise journalism being produced by 
the mainstream news organizations. So in the interest of promoting a 
resolution of truth about Iraq, I will enter into the Record two recent 
news articles. The first is from the Los Angeles Times entitled: ``Give 
the Defense Department an F.'' ``A Roadblock to Unity in Iraq'' was 
published in the Salt Lake City Tribune. Read them. Make up your own 
mind.
  The definition of progress in Iraq is not a Republican resolution 
force-fed to the Congress, as they would have you believe. The 
definition of progress is bringing our soldiers home, all of them, in 
significant numbers every month from this moment on until they are out 
of harm's way and we are out of the war that we should never have been 
in in the first place.

               [From the Los Angeles Times, June 3, 2006]

                    Give the Defense Department an F

                       (By Anthony H. Cordesman)

       If the United States is to win in Iraq, it needs an honest 
     and objective picture of what is happening there. The media 
     and outside experts can provide pieces of this picture, but 
     only the U.S. government has the resources and access to 
     information to offer a comprehensive overview.
       But the quarterly report to Congress issued May 30 by the 
     Department of Defense, ``Measuring Stability and Security in 
     Iraq,'' like the weekly reports the State Department issues 
     on Iraq, is profoundly flawed. It does more than simply spin 
     the situation to provide false assurances to lawmakers and 
     the public. It makes basic analytical and statistical 
     mistakes, fails to define key terms, provides undefined and 
     unverifiable survey information and deals with key issues by 
     omission. It deserves an overall grade of F.
       The report provides a fundamentally false picture of the 
     political situation in Iraq and of the difficulties ahead. It 
     does not prepare Congress or the American people for the 
     years of effort that will be needed even under ``best-case'' 
     conditions nor for the risk of far more serious forms of 
     civil conflict. Some of its political reporting is simply 
     incompetent. For example, the report repeatedly states that 
     77 percent of the Iraqi population voted in the December 2005 
     election. Given that the CIA estimates that almost 40 percent 
     of the population is 14 or younger, there is no conceivable 
     way that 77 percent of the population could have voted. The 
     report says 12.2 million voters turned out. The CIA estimates 
     Iraq's population is 26.8 million. This means roughly 46 
     percent of the population voted.
       The far more serious problem, however, is the spin the 
     report puts on the entire Iraqi political process. Political 
     participation surely rose. But that wasn't because of 
     acceptance of the new government or an embrace of a 
     democratic political process; it reflected a steady 
     sharpening of sectarian divisions, as Sunnis tried to make up 
     for their decision to boycott earlier elections.
       The report touts a ``true unity government with broad-based 
     buy-in from major electoral lists and all of Iraq's 
     communities.'' But its own data tell a different story. The 
     one largely secular party won only 9 percent of parliament. 
     The sectarian Shiite party, the United Iraqi Alliance, got 47 
     percent. The equally sectarian Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front 
     got 16 percent, and the Kurdish Coalition got 19 percent. 
     That hardly adds up to ``unity.''
       The five-month delay in forming a government after the 
     elections, the failure to appoint ministers of defense or 
     interior and the fact that former Prime Minister Ibrahim 
     Jafari relinquished his post only after strong pressure from 
     the United States and from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani are 
     signs that progress is likely to be slow in the future as 
     well. Sectarian conflict has become almost as serious a 
     threat as the insurgency.
       It is scarcely reassuring to be told by the Defense 
     Department that the February attack on the Golden Mosque in 
     Samarra marked a defeat for the insurgents and Islamic 
     extremists because it did not instantly lead to all-out civil 
     war. It is hard to think of a worse definition of victory.
       The economic section of the report contains useful data and 
     reflects some real progress in the Iraqi financial sector. 
     However, its analysis is flawed to the point of being 
     actively misleading. No meaningful assessment is provided of 
     the successes and failures of the U.S. aid effort, and no 
     mention is made of the massive corruption and mismanagement 
     of U.S. aid discovered by the special inspector general for 
     Iraqi reconstruction.
       Nor is there meaningful analysis of oil developments, 
     budget and revenue problems or future needs for aid. More 
     than $30 billion in U.S. funds and nearly $35 billion in 
     Iraqi money is involved, yet there is a serious risk that the 
     Bush administration will do more than omit the inspector 
     general's report. In fact, some State Department officials 
     and Republicans in Congress are trying to put the inspector 
     general out of business.
       The report's handling of the key issue of Iraqi 
     unemployment is symptomatic of the victory of spin over 
     content. The report quotes vague national figures of 18 
     percent unemployment and states that other estimates range 
     between 25 percent and 40 percent. By saying that 
     unemployment and poverty ``remain concerns'' but that there 
     are ``substantial difficulties in measuring them 
     accurately,'' it glosses over one of the most destabilizing 
     aspects of Iraq. It ignores the

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     failure of the aid program to create real jobs, especially 
     for young men in areas of high crime and insurgency. 
     Unemployment is not a casual macroeconomic factoid; it is 
     central to bringing stability and security and to defeating 
     the insurgency.
       The Defense Department's reporting on the Iraqi police 
     forces simply cannot be trusted. Death squads rampage in 
     police uniforms, but there is only passing mention of staff 
     problems, corruption, sectarian tensions or horrific prison 
     abuses. There is no meaningful analysis of problems so severe 
     that the U.S. has called for a ``year of the police'' and 
     Iraq's new prime minister, Nouri Maliki, is considering 
     reorganizing the entire force.
       The United States is making real progress in some aspects 
     of building the Iraqi regular military. Yet there is still a 
     tendency to promise too much, too soon, to understate the 
     risk and the threat, and to disguise the fact that the U.S. 
     must be ready to support Iraq at least through 2008 and 
     probably through 2010.
       The U.S. cannot afford to repeat the mistakes it made in 
     Vietnam. Among them was dangerous self-delusion. The strategy 
     President Bush is pursuing in Iraq is high risk. If it is to 
     have any chance of success, it will require bipartisan 
     persistence and sustained American effort. This requires 
     trust, and trust cannot be built without integrity. That 
     means credible reporting.
       The American people and Congress need an honest portrayal 
     of what is happening, not halftruths by omission and spin.
                                  ____


               [From the Salt Lake Tribune, June 8, 2006]

                      A Roadblock to Unity in Iraq

                            (By Trudy Rubin)

       Baghdad, Iraq.--The air-conditioning has been broken for 
     three months in the cavernous convention center where Iraq's 
     national assembly meets, so the members were sweating 
     profusely in the 115-degree heat.
       Male delegates in Shiite turbans or the flowing robes of 
     sheikhs or shirts and slacks, along with women in enveloping 
     black chadors and colorful Kurdish dress--and a few females 
     with uncovered hair--gathered in clusters Sunday as they 
     waited for the session to begin.
       This was supposed to be the meeting that finally confirmed 
     the key members of an Iraqi government, five months after 
     elections last December. This is supposed to be the national 
     unity government of Shiites, Kurds--and Sunnis--on which the 
     Bush administration counts to undermine the Sunni-led 
     insurgency. The success of this national unity government is 
     a key to bringing American troops home.
       The delay in forming this government has sparked the worst 
     chaos in Baghdad since Saddam Hussein fell. So delegates were 
     eager for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to keep his pledge 
     to name the ministers of interior and defense. Those 
     ministers are essential to restoring some security to Iraq.
       Suddenly a buzz rippled through the hall.
       The session had been canceled.
       Squabbles among fellow Shiites over who should get the 
     ministries had prevented Maliki from keeping his promise. 
     That day painted a stark picture of the challenges 
     confronting this national unity government, on which Iraqi 
     and U.S. hopes hang.
       Rather than bring Iraqis together, this government has 
     reflected Iraq's fragmentation. The situation may be 
     salvaged, but it will take determined leadership from a 
     handful of key Iraqi politicians, as well as from the U.S. 
     ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad.
       Maliki tried from the start to act like a leader. He 
     promised a new plan to secure Baghdad and flew to the key oil 
     city of Basra to try to halt wars between Shiite militias and 
     gangs. He made the pledge to name the ministers.
       But Iraq's new constitution keeps the prime minister 
     impossibly weak--a reaction to the Hussein dictatorship. And 
     the Iraqi political culture ties him in knots.
       In order to choose his two ministers, Maliki first had to 
     get seven Shiite factions to agree among themselves on the 
     names (they couldn't), then win over Sunnis and Kurds and 
     Khalilzad. The prime minister lacks the power to take 
     decisions on his own.
       ``We all feel sympathy for the prime minister,'' I was told 
     by Adnan Ali al-Kadhimi, an adviser to the former prime 
     minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari. ``The constitution puts too 
     many ties on the prime minister, and political leaders give 
     themselves too many privileges.''
       Indeed, the current system, in which ministries are doled 
     out like fiefs to ethnic and religious parties, has led to 
     incredible corruption.
       ``Political position in Iraq has become a way to steal 
     money and then leave the country,'' says one official in the 
     defense ministry, where tens of millions of dollars vanished. 
     With few exceptions, the new crop of ministers, also picked 
     by party, does not appear much better than the old.
       This system has made many Iraqis sour on democracy quickly. 
     They are hungry for strong leadership. Over and over, I've 
     heard Iraqis say Hussein could have restored order in two 
     weeks.
       This is why it is so crucial for Maliki to be able to act 
     as a national leader who stands above the interests of 
     sectarian parties. But it isn't easy for Maliki to make that 
     leap. For one thing, he has virtually no experienced staff; 
     much of what he does have is limited to his Shiite religious 
     party, the Dawa.
       I asked one of the bright lights in the new government, 
     Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, what was to be done. 
     Salih, a Kurd whom I met over a kebab feast in his garden 
     with his peshmerga (Kurdish militia) guards, manages to 
     combine ethnic loyalty with a commitment to building an Iraq 
     for all its people.
       ``Prime Minister Maliki says he wants to transcend his Shia 
     affiliation and act as a national leader,'' Salih said. ``It 
     is incumbent on all of us in Iraq and Iraq's friends in the 
     international community to help us realize that objective.''
       It is unclear how or if that can be done. But the prospects 
     for Iraq and for U.S. troop withdrawals depend on whether 
     Maliki can lead.

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