[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 5]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 6253-6256]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  INTRODUCTION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT AND NATIONAL GUARD 
                        EMPOWERMENT ACT OF 2006

                                 ______
                                 

                             HON. TOM DAVIS

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, April 26, 2006

  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce the 
National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 
2006.
  In support of this proposal, consider the following:
  The U.S. continues to face a wide spectrum of threats at home and 
abroad, including terrorism, natural disasters, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and other emerging perils. In meeting these 
threats, the U.S. relies heavily on the men and women of the National 
Guard. The National Guard is a force essential to the Nation's security 
and safety.
  At no time in America's history has the National Guard played so 
critical a role in the security of our homeland and in our Nation's 
military objectives abroad.
  The National Guard is a critical component of Department of Defense's 
contribution to the security of our Nation and has been key to the 
Department's accomplishments at home and abroad. Much of the success 
DOD has had would not have been possible without the participation of 
National Guard forces.
  The National Guard's response to our Nation's emergencies in the post 
9/11 world has been unparalleled.
  The National Guard is a vital part of this Nation's security, and 
this country relies on the exemplary service provided this Nation by 
the members of the Guard, their families, their employers and their 
communities.
  The men and women of the National Guard have earned the right to be 
represented at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.
  To ensure the appropriate representation, manpower, training and 
equipment are provided to the National Guard for their future missions 
at home and abroad, the National Defense and National Guard Empowerment 
Act of 2006:
  Establishes the National Guard Bureau NGB as a joint activity of the 
Department of Defense rather than strictly of the Departments of the 
Army and Air Force as it is now.
  Increases the Chief of the National Guard Bureau billet from the 
grade of Lieutenant General to General.
  Tasks the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to serve as an advisor 
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and eliminates the current 
National Guard major general position established for that function.

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  Provides a seat on Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau.
  Elevates responsibility for development of the NGB charter from the 
Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to the Secretary of Defense.
  Specifies in law one of the functions of NGB to facilitate the use of 
National Guard forces for contingencies, military operations other than 
war, natural disasters and support to civil authorities--all in 
coordination with the States. This function exists in policy as part of 
the current NGB charter from the Departments of the Army and Air Force.
  Requires NGB to, in coordination with the State Adjutant Generals 
identify gaps between Federal and State emergency response capabilities 
which might best be filled through military assistance to civil 
authorities and to make recommendations for National Guard programs and 
capabilities to fill those gaps, in coordination with the States.
  Charges the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in coordination with 
the State Adjutant Generals, to validate state requirements for 
military assistance to civil authorities, develop doctrine and training 
requirements, and acquire materiel, etc. for this purpose, in 
coordination with the States.
  Requires a report on requirements for military assistance to civilian 
authorities that are validated but not funded--which in essence will 
become an unfunded requirements list.
  Changes the titles of the Directors of the Army and Air National 
Guard to Vice Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau for Army and Air 
respectively to reflect the unity of purpose inside the organization.
  Prohibits growth in the size of the NGB staff in order to answer 
concerns about the possibility of the NGB bureaucracy growing as a 
result of the changes sought herein.
  Strengthens the Total Force talent pool by encouraging the Department 
of Defense to include Reserve Component major generals of the line for 
promotion to fill Lieutenant General positions.
  Requires that the Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM be a National Guard 
officer.
  The Committee on Government Reform and the Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, have conducted oversight investigations and have held many 
hearings that have focused on the contributions of the men and women of 
the National Guard. The following are findings that I submit for the 
Record. These 50 findings represent the States in the Union we seek to 
defend.
  1. Within hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center, 1,500 New 
York National Guard troops reported for duty. Within 24 hours of the 
attacks, over 8,000 New York National Guard Soldiers and Air men and 
women were on active duty supporting New York State's security needs. 
These troops provided not just a calming presence on the streets of New 
York during unsettling times; they provided New York's first responders 
with critical perimeter security support, refueling for civilian 
emergency vehicles, emergency lighting, power generation, 
communications, emergency transportation, engineering assets and other 
logistical support.
  2. At the request of the President, State Governors supplemented the 
security of the Nation's airports with National Guard personnel. Their 
missions encompassed over 400 airports in 52 States and territories. 
National Guard troops along the northern and southern borders were used 
to support the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, and the Border Patrol in the heightened post 9/11 security 
posture.
  3. In contrast to Hurricane Andrew, 1992, in which National Guard 
forces constituted 24 percent of the military response, National Guard 
forces represented more than 70 percent of the military force for 
Hurricane Katrina.
  4. The response to Hurricane Katrina proved that the National Guard 
is the Nation's first military responder and that the overwhelming 
majority of forces that respond to disasters in the United States will 
be National Guard who will be on the scene before the Department of 
Defense is requested to respond.
  5. More than 9,700 National Guard soldiers and airmen were in New 
Orleans by August 30. National Guard deployed over 30,000 additional 
troops within 96 hours of the storms passing. In wake of the Hurricane 
Katrina devastation, the National Guard mobilized over 50,000 personnel 
in support of hurricane relief in the largest and fastest domestic 
deployment since World War II, saving over 17,000 lives. The Air 
National Guard flew nearly 3,500 flights and over 12,000 tons of cargo 
in support of all Hurricane relief in the last year.
  6. The National Guard Bureau will be a part of any large-scale 
emergency response. As demonstrated during the Hurricane Katrina 
response, the National Guard Bureau is a significant joint force 
provider for homeland security missions.
  7. The National Guard is continuously on active duty supporting State 
security missions, Federal security missions under Operation Noble 
Eagle and overseas military operations as part of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and more are engaged in regularly scheduled 
training and operational requirements around the Nation and the world. 
Under Title 32, counter-drug activities are a daily operational mission 
of the National Guard, fortifying a longstanding successful 
relationship with civil authorities.
  8. The Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force 
could not fulfill current title 10 responsibilities without the Army 
and Air National Guard. In 2005, National Guard units at one time made 
up 50 percent of the combat forces in Iraq.
  9. The National Guard has mobilized over 340,000 soldiers and 46,000 
airmen supporting the Global War on Terror since September 11, 2001.
  10. Since September 11, 2001, more than 85 percent of the Army 
National Guard has been mobilized. Since September 11, 2001, the Air 
National Guard has flown over 226,000 sorties accumulating over 680,000 
flying hours. These deployments abroad have created a battle hardened 
and seasoned force of experienced veterans ready for the challenges of 
the 21st century.
  11. National Guard forces have provided: 55 percent of the Army's 
combat capability; 55 percent of the Air Force's airlift capability; 50 
percent of the Army strategic and tactical manpower; 45 percent of all 
in-flight refueling missions; 33 percent of all aircraft in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom; 100 percent of Operation Enduring Freedom A-10 missions; 
66 percent of Operation Iraqi Freedom A-10 missions; 45 percent of all 
F-16 fighter missions; 86 percent of Operation Iraqi Freedom tanker 
sorties; 94 percent of Strategic Air Defense Alert; and 75 percent of 
all domestic combat air patrols in the Global War on Terror.
  12. The National Guard offers unique efficiencies between State and 
Federal, and domestic and overseas missions, operating under three 
different command relationships: Federal funding and Federal control; 
Federal funding and State control; and State funding and State control.
  13. National Guardsmen and women are their State's primary emergency 
response force, providing support in their communities and to civil 
authorities and other first responders throughout their States.
  14. The National Guard is invaluable to civil support mission, 
homeland defense and emergency preparedness. The National Guard has an 
undeniable record of military assistance to civilian authorities since 
the birth of this Nation, responding heroically and meeting every 
mission asked of them, particularly in times of crisis--terrorism, 
natural disasters, plane crashes, blizzards, wildfires, floods.
  15. There must be strong agreement between State and Federal 
leadership as to the operational objectives during emergencies. State 
concerns about maintaining sovereignty must be respected. Governors, 
who are most intimately familiar with and better understand the 
National Guard's unique capabilities, must retain the ability and 
authority to deploy their National Guard forces in times of crisis.
  16. Governors using State-to-State emergency mutual assistance 
compacts are an integral part of the use of National Guard resources in 
responding to emergencies at home.
  17. The National Guard and State Adjutants General provide an 
invaluable nexus of coordination between Federal and State planning, 
exercising and response to emergencies and disasters. Over 50 percent 
of State Adjutants General are also in charge of their State's 
Emergency Management operations, thereby offering unparalleled 
integration of planning, preparation and response capabilities in 
emergencies.
  18. National Guard forces are also uniquely positioned to engage 
within the U.S. and its territories by virtue of their geographic 
dispersal and relationships to State and local governments.
  19. The National Guard is familiar with the local area and local 
culture. The National Guard has close ties with first responders such 
as local and State law enforcement, fire departments, and other 
emergency service providers. The local community relies upon the 
National Guard because they are part of the community. National Guard 
personnel are more likely to have more experience working with local 
responders than the active component.
  20. WMD Civil Support Teams are a specialized homeland security 
capability based entirely in the National Guard.

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  21. As America prepares for an influenza pandemic, the National Guard 
has more domestic response training and decentralized capabilities than 
any other military organization and is ready to respond on a moment's 
notice.
  22. The National Guard Bureau has proved its ability to plan for and 
respond to natural and man-made events with the development of 
essential concepts including: Joint Force Headquarters-State, Joint 
Task Force State, CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, CERFP, 
National Guard Reaction Force, NGRF, and the Joint CONUS Communications 
Support Environment, JCCSE.
  23. The Department of Defense has not adapted to the significant role 
of the National Guard in this Nation's security.
  24. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army and the 
Department of the Air Force have not sufficiently integrated the 
National Guard into planning, procuring or decision-making processes.
  25. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army and the 
Department of the Air Force do not have a long-term strategy to equip 
the National Guard at a high level of readiness for overseas or 
domestic missions.
  26. The Department of Defense does not adequately resource or equip 
the National Guard for its current operational missions. Currently the 
National Guard receives only 4.5 percent of the Department of Defense's 
budget.
  27. The Army National Guard has long been equipped at less than war-
time readiness levels and is forced to transfer equipment to deploying 
units. Army National Guard units that have returned from overseas 
deployments have also been directed by the Department of the Army to 
leave behind hundreds and in many cases, thousands of equipment items 
for use by follow on units. Army officials do not track accurately or 
develop plans to replace this Guard equipment.
  28. Army and Air National Guard forces are generally expected to 
perform homeland defense and civil support missions only with equipment 
supplied for their warfighting mission or equipment supplied by the 
States.
  29. In the current budget, the Department of the Air Force does not 
fund the Air Sovereignty Alert, ASA, mission of the Air National Guard 
at full capacity.
  30. During the BRAC process, the Air Force failed to adequately 
solicit input of National Guard Bureau leadership and systemically 
failed to confer with State Adjutants General.
  31. When developing Future Total Force Strategy, the Air Force has 
failed to adequately consult Air National Guard leaders and State 
Adjutants General.
  32. The Department of Defense does not have adequate knowledge of the 
role of the National Guard at home nor has it incorporated the National 
Guard's significant capabilities into plans for homeland defense or 
security. Left unchecked, the Department of Defense will continue to 
ignore the Federal requirements of the National Guard to perform 
homeland defense and civil support missions.
  33. The Department of Defense has not recognized the value of 
including State Adjutants General in all homeland defense and military 
support to civilian authority planning.
  34. The Department of Defense has not recognized that Governors will 
rely on National Guard manpower and equipment before relying on Federal 
forces.
  35. Although DOD has a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support, which recognizes the National Guard's critical role in Federal 
and State missions, the strategy does not detail what the Army or Air 
National Guard's role or requirements will be in implementing the 
strategy.
  36. The Department of Defense and Northern Command have not 
articulated specific requirements or capabilities that National Guard 
forces need during major homeland disasters. Without formal 
requirements, equipment deemed necessary for the National Guard to 
assist civilian authorities in Katrina had not been purchased by the 
Department of the Army or the Department of the Air Force.
  37. The readiness of the National Guard to perform homeland missions 
that may be needed in the future is unknown because the National 
Guard's roles in these missions has not been defined; requirements for 
manpower, equipment and training have not been established; and 
preparedness standards and measures have not been developed by the 
Department of Defense. The Department of Defense does not provide for 
the purchase of equipment for the National Guard specifically for 
military assistance to civilian authorities.
  38. WMD Civil Support Teams' face challenges and shortfalls in 
personnel, equipment acquisition and facilities under current 
Department of Defense and service budgets.
  39. Lack of coordination of National Guard and active duty forces 
hampered the military response to Katrina. Advance planning between 
active-duty personnel and the Guard is vital during emergencies. The 
Department of Defense and the National Guard must plan and exercise 
together to prepare for events in the homeland.
  40. National Guard Bureau leadership and State Adjutants General are 
not adequately involved in Department of Defense planning guidance 
developed at Northern Command, including concept of operations plans 
and functional plans for military support to civilian authorities.
  41. There was a lack of coordination of Joint Task Force Katrina and 
the National Guard Joint Forces headquarters in supporting states.
  42. The Department of Defense has not adequately incorporated or 
funded the National Guard to participate in joint exercises in military 
assistance to civil authorities, which would have allowed for a more 
effective response to Hurricane Katrina and other homeland emergencies.
  43. Northern Command does not have adequate insight into State 
response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which 
contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the 
Katrina response.
  44. There is an unresolved tension between the Department of Defense 
and the States regarding the role of the military in emergency response 
that could be resolved if along with the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Department of Defense adopted and made the National 
Incident Management System a priority for emergency management.
  45. The National Guard lacked communications equipment during 
Hurricane Katrina, suggesting that the Pentagon does not assign 
homeland defense and military assistance to civilian authorities a 
sufficiently high priority.
  46. The Department of the Army decided to reduce Army National Guard 
force structure and end-strength without substantive consultation with 
National Guard Bureau leaders or State Adjutants General, and the Air 
Force has decided to reduce Air National Guard force structure and end-
strength without substantive consultation with National Guard Bureau 
leaders or State Adjutants General.
  47. The Department of the Army currently plans to scale back the Army 
National Guard to 324,000 soldiers from 350,000. The Department of the 
Air Force plans to scale back the Air National Guard by 14,000 airmen 
and women. To cut Guard manpower in this time of increased homeland 
need, and the fluxation of current Department of Defense transformation 
policies affecting the Army and Air National Guard, creates an 
unacceptable risk to the security of this Nation.
  48. States and Governors are not adequately represented at the 
Department of Defense when planning and exercising for homeland events.
  49. The role of the National Guard Bureau as the channel of 
communications between the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Homeland Security and the States needs to be enhanced.
  50. USNORTHCOM and its subordinate headquarters lack knowledge of 
their domestic theater of operations, specifically State emergency 
plans and resources, and knowledge of National Guard resources. 
USNORTHCOM and its subordinate headquarters need to be reformed to 
include substantially increased National Guard general officer command 
presence and participation by other senior National Guard personnel in 
all levels of their operations.
  Mr. Speaker, the front line in the global war against terrorism is 
right here at home. Cold War structures and distinctions separating 
projected active duty forces and stateside reserve components no longer 
meet the strategic imperatives of this century. This proposal updates 
those structures to reflect the integral role of the National Guard in 
the modern battle plan and ensures the Guard will have the clout and 
resources necessary to meet that vital mission.

                                        National Guard Association


                                   of the United States, Inc.,

                                   Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
     Hon. Thomas M. Davis III,
     Chairman, Committee on Government Reform,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Davis: The National Guard Association of the 
     United States (NGAUS) applauds your introduction of a House 
     version of the National Defense Enhancement and National 
     Guard Empowerment Act of 2006.
       This legislation is a powerful first step in providing the 
     appropriate presence for the leadership of the National Guard 
     in the decision making processes of the Department of 
     Defense. The security of American citizens was forever 
     altered on September 11, 2001. Since that date, the National 
     Guard has grown in stature and importance as a full partner 
     in ensuring their well-being.
       It is completely logical that the policies and procedures 
     that heretofore have guided

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     the effective use of the National Guard should be considered 
     for revision in light of the sweeping changes to the missions 
     and employment of our armed forces. NGAUS looks forward to 
     working with you and with members of the United States Senate 
     in passage of similarly innovative legislation.
       Thank you for your efforts on behalf of the National Guard.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Stephen M. Koper,
     Brigadier General (ret), President.
                                  ____

                                     Adjutants General Association


                                         of the United States,

                                   Washington, DC, April 26, 2006.
     Hon. Thomas M. Davis III,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Davis: The Adjutants General Association 
     of the United States heralds the introduction of the National 
     Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 
     2006. This legislation which you have created along with 
     members of the U.S. Senate bravely seeks to ensure the 
     National Guard will have a strong voice in matters of 
     national security, homeland defense, and homeland security.
       Events associated with Hurricane Katrina, BRAC, and QDR 
     highlighted important instances where National Guard 
     leadership was not consulted on key matters of national 
     interest and citizen safety. As the National Guard faces 
     major issues in re-equipping and transformation, a strong 
     voice in defense circles is more vital than ever.
       Thank you for your efforts on behalf of appreciative 
     Adjutants General.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Roger P. Lempke,
     Major General, Adjutant General.

                          ____________________