[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 4033-4034]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   REPORT ON TRIP TO PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, TURKEY, AND ENGLAND

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I returned on Saturday evening from a trip 
to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, and England. The trip was led 
by a very dear friend of mine and a great leader of this Senate who 
happens to be the Presiding Officer at the moment, Senator Warner of 
Virginia, and it included Senator Sessions, Senator Thomas, Senator 
Bingaman, Senator Salazar, in addition to myself.
  I know if the Presiding Officer was allowed to speak in the position 
in which he sits that he would be the first to acknowledge that this 
was one of the most extraordinary trips either one of us has ever taken 
in the 28 years we have served together in the U.S. Senate.
  The focus of the trip was to assess the situation in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. We also conveyed to the men and women of our Armed Forces the 
extraordinary support for them in the Congress and throughout the 
Nation, regardless of our debates and differences over Iraq policy.
  In meeting with our troops, including many from my home State of 
Michigan, it was they who lifted our spirits. As always, I came away 
deeply impressed by the professionalism, dedication, and high morale of 
our troops. They are truly America's finest.
  The situation in Afghanistan is hopeful. President Karzai has led his 
nation with a firm and steady hand. He has successfully, albeit 
gradually, neutralized the warlords and demobilized and disarmed their 
forces. The Taliban has indeed regrouped to some extent and, together 
with a much weakened al-Qaida, are capable of causing casualties among 
the Afghan Army and coalition and NATO forces, but they are not a 
threat to the Afghan nation.
  Meanwhile, the Afghan Army is growing stronger, the training of the 
Afghan police is improving, a large number of provincial reconstruction 
teams are helping with local governance, and NATO is assuming more of 
the burden of providing security throughout the country. Serious work 
does remain, including the need to deal with poppy cultivation and the 
drug traffickers. But overall the situation in Afghanistan provides 
grounds for optimism.
  Sadly, the same cannot be said of Iraq. The situation in Iraq is 
deeply troubling and threatens to grow worse. Since the recent attack 
on the Golden Mosque in Samarra, there has been a huge increase in 
sectarian violence. The increase is so significant that our senior 
military leaders in Iraq say it has replaced the insurgent attacks on 
Iraqi and coalition forces as the No. 1 security problem there.
  Although there has been some progress in training the Iraqi Army, 
even a stronger Iraqi Army cannot prevent a civil war. Only the 
political and religious leaders and the police can do that. The police 
are not making significant progress in coming together as a cohesive 
force. In some critical areas, including Baghdad, where the militias 
continue to dominate, the police are not reliable and are still likely 
to respond to the sectarian calls of the clerics and the militias 
instead of the government.
  Do we need to succeed in Iraq now that we are there? Yes, because the 
outcome there will have a major effect on the region and on our own 
security. I define success as a stable Iraq with a government of 
national unity supported by a reliable national army and police who are 
not weakened by sectarian fissures.
  To achieve that success, General Casey, the Commander of U.S. and 
coalition forces in Iraq, reiterated to us that there is no military 
solution to the violence without a political solution.
  We need to do everything we can to help the Iraqis achieve a prompt 
political solution, which means the quick formation of a government of 
national unity involving representatives of the three main Iraqi 
factions. It also means a highly sectarian individual would not be 
heading up the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of the Interior. The 
alternative to a prompt formation of a government of national unity by 
Iraqi leaders is a continuation of this drift to all-out civil war.
  In Baghdad we met with Prime Minister Jaafari, who was nominated by 
the dominant Shiite faction--the United Iraqi Alliance--as their 
candidate for Prime Minister in the new government. Although he was 
confident that a national unity government would be formulated by the 
end of April, his optimism was not widely shared by others we met. 
Moreover, his one-vote victory for the nomination to continue on as 
Prime Minister is being contested from both within and without the 
Shiite coalition. I shared with him the letter to President Bush that 
Senators Collins, Jack Reed, and I had written, the bottom line of 
which is that:
       A prompt political settlement is not only essential to the 
     Iraqis, it is a condition of our continued presence.

  I told him his ``end of April'' commitment to President Jaafari, in 
my judgment, met that test of a prompt political settlement.
  We also met with leaders from the two main Sunni Arab parties: Mr. 
Hashimi and Mr. Samarai of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Mr. Mutlak of 
the Iraqi Dialogue Council. They were not optimistic about the 
negotiations and forcefully advocated a decisional role rather than a 
facilitating role for the United States in the negotiations. Mr. Mutlak 
argued:

       You are responsible for this mess and you must correct what 
     you have done. You have to dictate the result.

  The Sunni leaders were also of the view that Iraq has been in the 
midst of a civil war between the militias and the innocent Iraqis for 
some time, and they voiced their concern about Iranian influence over 
the Shiite parties. I told them, and I know the other members of our 
codel, of our delegation told them as bluntly as we know how that their 
dictator was removed at a great loss of American blood and treasure and 
that the Iraqis and only the Iraqis will decide their own fate, and 
that our continued presence should depend on their promptly choosing a 
path of reconciliation and unity against violence and terror.
  On our second day in Iraq we met with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 
Zalmay Khalilzad. One constant theme we found in Iraq and elsewhere in 
the region was the high regard with which all hold our Ambassador, Mr. 
Khalilzad. Unfortunately, although the parties are finally talking, 
more than 3 months after the elections, Ambassador Khalilzad was not 
encouraging that a political solution is in sight. He is putting modest 
pressure on the Iraqis. For instance, he told the Iraqis our response 
to continued deadlock of Iraq's political leaders might not be to their 
liking. He has told the Iraqi political leaders: It is your decision, 
and after you make it, we will make our own decision in response.
  Although his statement is on the right track, it is still too subtle. 
It is too oblique. The political leaders of Iraq are deadlocked, 
feuding while Iraq descends toward all-out civil war. There is little 
chance of achieving a government of national unity without our 
pointedly and forcefully persuading the parties to make the compromises 
necessary to achieve it.
  But what is the leverage that could be used to pointedly persuade the 
Iraqi leaders to make those needed compromises? We can't dictate to 
them who should be their leaders. That would undermine the President's 
belatedly arrived at explanation for his decision to attack Iraq, which 
is replacing a brutal dictator with a democracy. Yes, there should be a 
need to apply pressure. The prospect of sectarian clashes and the 
specter of civil war should be sufficient incentives on their own to 
end the deadlock. But, so far, they don't appear to be.
  To help break the political gridlock, a combination of carrots and 
sticks is required. The carrot is the provision of economic development 
funds, particularly from neighboring wealthy countries, on the 
condition that a national unity government is created and produces a 
coherent economic plan. The

[[Page 4034]]

biggest stick is clearly telling the Iraqis that our continued presence 
in Iraq is dependent upon their promptly putting together a government 
of national unity.
  Sadly, the rhetoric of the President and the administration has often 
worked against the pressure which needs to be applied against the Iraqi 
leaders.
  The President recently asked the American people, for instance, for 
their patience. I believe instead he should be telling the Iraqi 
leaders bluntly and openly that the American people are understandably 
downright impatient with Iraqi leaders fiddling while Baghdad is 
burning.
  The Secretary of State has said we are in Iraq as long as needed. I 
believe she should be telling the Iraqi leaders that our continued 
presence is dependent upon their doing what only they can do: reach an 
agreement on a government of national unity. That political settlement 
is not only the best hope, it is the only hope of ending the insurgency 
and the sectarian strife. The pressure to reach an agreement on a 
government of national unity needs to be applied clearly and 
forcefully, pointedly and publicly, not just by President Bush but also 
by the leaders of Iraq's neighbors.
  In our meeting with the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, we 
urged him to do just that, and he said he would. The leaders of all of 
Iraq's neighboring countries need to do the same because an unstable 
and civil war-torn Iraq threatens them even more than us.
  Is there a risk in this course of forcefully pressing Iraqi leaders 
to agree on a national unity government? Is there a risk in following 
that course? The answer is yes. But there is a greater risk in 
continuing on the current course of political gridlock while sectarian 
fires threaten to burn out of control.
  The President needs to act based on the reality that we confront in 
Iraq. He recently said if there were a premature departure of American 
troops that ``Iraq would become a place of instability.''
  Would become? Iraq is a place of grave instability, and to use the 
words of Ambassador Khalilzad in an interview he gave with a London 
newspaper: ``Iraq is moving towards civil war.''
  My conclusion is this: President Bush needs to forcefully transmit a 
message to the Iraqis in plain and simple language: your survival as a 
nation depends on your working things out together. Your survival as a 
nation is in the hands of your political leaders, not our military. 
Along with Senator Collins and Senator Jack Reed, as I indicated, we 
wrote the President on March 10, 2006, and ended with the following 
thoughts:

       We urge you to make it clear to the Iraqis how important it 
     is to us that they achieve a political settlement, form a 
     unity government, and make the necessary amendments to their 
     Constitution. We believe it is essential that the Iraqi 
     leaders understand that our continued presence is not 
     unconditional, and that whether they avoid all-out civil war 
     and have a future as a Nation is in their hands. If they 
     don't seize that opportunity, we can't protect them or save 
     them from themselves.

  We ended:

       The bottom line is this: The United States needs to make it 
     clear to Iraqi leaders that a prompt political settlement is 
     not only essential to them, it is a condition of our 
     continued presence.

  We all want to succeed in Iraq, regardless of the positions we took 
going in. Whether we favored or opposed our intervention, and whether 
we are critics or supporters of the administration's policies since 
then, we all want to succeed. We all want to try to leave Iraq in 
better condition, obviously, than we found it. But to maximize the 
chances of success, we need to maximize pressure on the leaders of Iraq 
to end their political deadlock. The insurgents and outside terrorists 
are not going to be defeated and civil war is not going to be averted 
if Iraqi leaders are at war with themselves. They should know that if 
they squander the chance to bring political unity to Iraq, we cannot 
and will not protect them from their own folly.
  Let me close by thanking our Presiding Officer for leading, again, 
one of the most extraordinary visits to a foreign country that I have 
ever participated in. His leadership was essential to making the visits 
that we were able to make and for all of us to come back with greater 
information and with thoughts about where the future lies.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this time that the letter 
that I referred to from the three Senators be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                   Washington, DC, March 10, 2006.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: There is a consensus among our senior 
     military commanders that a political settlement involving the 
     three main Iraqi groups is essential for defeating the 
     insurgency and that the Iraqis need to agree on a government 
     of national unity and make significant compromises to amend 
     their Constitution to achieve such a political settlement. A 
     political settlement is also essential to prevent all-out 
     civil war and is a critical element of our exit strategy for 
     our troops.
       In the midst of the spiral of violence, it is clear to us 
     that we must act to change the current dynamic in Iraq and 
     that the only thing that can produce that change is a 
     political settlement that is accepted by all the major 
     groups.
       But an Iraqi political settlement won't happen without 
     pressure from the United States. We can't make them form a 
     unity government, we can't decide who fills what positions in 
     that government, and we can't write the amendments to their 
     Constitution for them.
       By a 79-19 vote last year, the Senate said that:
       ``The Administration should tell the leaders of all groups 
     and political parties in Iraq that they need to make the 
     compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and 
     sustainable political settlement that is essential for 
     defeating the insurgency in Iraq, within the timetable they 
     set for themselves.''
       We urge you to make it clear to the Iraqis how important it 
     is to us that they achieve a political settlement, form a 
     unity government, and make the necessary amendments to their 
     Constitution. We believe it is essential that the Iraqi 
     leaders understand that our continued presence is not 
     unconditional, and that whether they avoid all-out civil war 
     and have a future as a nation is in their hands. If they 
     don't seize that opportunity, we can't protect them or save 
     them from themselves.
       The bottom line is this: The U.S. needs to make it clear to 
     Iraqi leaders that a prompt political settlement is not only 
     essential to them, it is a condition of our continued 
     presence.
           Sincerely,
     Carl Levin.
     Susan M. Collins.
     Jack Reed.

  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair again for his leadership, not only on 
this one trip but for his leadership in the Senate on so many matters 
of national security, including the ongoing effort that all of us are 
participating in to find a positive outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burr). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak in 
morning business for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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