[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 2]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 2861-2862]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   ``WHITHER THE SIX PARTY PROCESS?''

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JAMES A. LEACH

                                of iowa

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, March 7, 2006

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, on September 19, 2005, China, Japan, North 
Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. signed a Joint Statement of 
principles under which North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs. In contrast to the hopes 
surrounding that pledge, the intervening 6 months have brought no 
substantive progress toward that end, and the Six Party process is 
beginning to appear moribund.
  This circumstance is particularly regrettable because time is on no 
one's side. Every day of the status quo is another day for the North 
Korean regime to produce additional fissile material, and another day 
that the people of North Korea fall further behind the remarkable 
economic and social march of the rest of Asia. At the same time that 
the malfeasance of the North Korean government has brought us to this 
impasse, it remains in the interest of the U.S. to initiate additional 
dialogue, even if prospects for its success are uncertain.

[[Page 2862]]

  Alternatively, to continue to maintain a reactive approach--such as 
placing unrealistic conditions on high-level contacts and other forms 
of meaningful engagement with the DPRK--cedes too much control to hard-
liners in a regime that does not yet feel sufficient pressure or 
incentive to denuclearize.
  We must continually test the intent of North Korea and not miss any 
opportunity for progress, however improbable. We are also obligated to 
consistently demonstrate to the other parties in the region that the 
intransigence impeding progress is not ours. Both of these priorities 
presuppose dialogue.
  Because we control what we say, we ought not fear additional 
discussions or supplementary avenues of discussion. Conversation is 
never concession if one is speaking the truth, advancing the national 
interest.
  At all levels of human interaction, including the international 
strategic level, there exists a significant psychological dimension: 
Between nations, as between people, the stronger party has greater 
strategic confidence and thus capacity to take the first conciliatory 
steps when intransigent differences arise. Given the enormity of the 
stakes at issue, it behooves the U.S. to take advantage of the greater 
flexibility we possess to creatively explore possibilities for 
resolving the challenges posed by North Korea.
  One has the sense that due to understandable frustrations relative to 
past North Korean actions, including cheating on international 
commitments, the White House has given exceedingly constrained options 
to our negotiators. But clear-headedness about the nature of the North 
Korean regime should not cloud the mind about devising techniques and 
processes to overcome differences.
  We have many assets, not the least of which is our professional 
diplomatic corps. American professionalism is exemplified by Assistant 
Secretary of State Christopher Hill, who has developed a constructive 
relationship with all of the parties to the Six Party Talks, including 
North Korea. The case for sending him to Pyongyang to test the 
boundaries--and push the implementation--of the Joint Statement is 
compelling.
  In particular, we should not be hesitant to begin considering the 
utility of negotiat[ing] a permanent peace regime on the Korean 
Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum, as envisioned by the Joint 
Statement and the recent U.S.-ROK strategic dialogue. Taking the 
initiative to formally end the Korean War would underscore our peaceful 
intent in an unparalleled fashion, and remind the Korean people that 
the U.S. singularly and unequivocally supports the peaceful 
reunification of the Peninsula. There may be sequencing concerns but 
forging ahead on this aspect of the statement of principles may 
increase the willingness of the other parties to exert greater pressure 
to enforce its critical core--the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula--and provide North Korea greater psychological as well as 
strategic comfort to accede to concerns of the outside world.
  While we speak directly to the North Korean delegation in Beijing at 
the Six Party Talks and have certain contacts with the North Korean 
ambassador to the United Nations, there is clearly a problem of 
communication between our two governments. Accordingly, it is time, 
perhaps with appropriate quid pro quos, that we explore the feasibility 
of establishing liaison offices in our two capitals.
  For the U.S. to continue to stand pat is to transfer initiative to 
others, indebting us to the diplomacy of countries that may have 
different interests, or simply ensconcing the status quo.
  It's time for the U.S. to lead.

                          ____________________