[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 2]
[House]
[Pages 1933-1948]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1015
               RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION REGARDING IRAN

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, pursuant to the previous order of 
the House, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 341) 
condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international 
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts 
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, and ask for its 
immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
  The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

                            H. Con. Res. 341

       Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
     Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly 
     referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''), 
     under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the 
     Treaty, ``not to receive the transfer from any transferor 
     whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
     devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices 
     directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise 
     acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
     and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture 
     of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'';
       Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
     Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 
     1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards Agreement''), 
     which requires Iran to report the importation and use of 
     nuclear material, to declare nuclear facilities, and to 
     accept safeguards on nuclear materials and activities to 
     ensure that such materials and activities are not diverted to 
     any military purpose and are used for peaceful purposes and 
     activities;
       Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
     reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing an 
     undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and had 
     covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out 
     over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, 
     separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its 
     nuclear facilities and activities;
       Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director 
     General of the IAEA on November 10, 2003, of its decision to 
     suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and 
     stated that the suspension would cover all activities at the 
     Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed 
     material for enrichment, and the importation of any 
     enrichment-related items;
       Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the 
     Government of Iran specified the scope of suspension of its 
     enrichment and reprocessing activities, which the IAEA was 
     invited to verify, including the suspension of the operation 
     or testing or any centrifuges, either with or without nuclear 
     material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, the 
     suspension of further introduction of nuclear material into 
     any centrifuges, the suspension of the installation of new 
     centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the 
     installation of centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at 
     Natanz, and, to the extent practicable, the withdrawal of 
     nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment facility;
       Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran 
     informed the IAEA of its decision to expand the scope and 
     clarify the nature of its decision to suspend to the furthest 
     extent possible the assembly and testing of centrifuges and 
     the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including 
     those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that 
     any components that are manufactured under existing contracts 
     that cannot be suspended will be stored and placed under IAEA 
     seal, invited the IAEA to verify these measures, and 
     confirmed that the suspension of enrichment activities 
     applied to all facilities in Iran;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 
     13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious 
     concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 
     did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's 
     past and present nuclear programme considered essential by 
     the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that 
     the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced 
     centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing 
     activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser 
     enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle 
     highly radioactive materials;
       Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern 
     that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the 
     development of its enrichment technology to its current 
     extent, and that a number of other questions remain 
     unresolved'';
       Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United 
     Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with 
     Iran on Iran's nuclear program (commonly referred to as the 
     ``Paris Agreement''), securing a formal commitment from the 
     Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment 
     operations in exchange for discussions on economic, 
     technological, political, and security issues;
       Whereas on August 29, 2005, Iran's Atomic Energy 
     Organization announced it has mastered the technique of using 
     biotechnology to extract purer uranium, adding that this 
     method ``substantially decreases the cost . . . in the 
     process that leads to the production of yellowcake'', which 
     is a part of the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle;
       Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires 
     the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of 
     any member of the IAEA with its IAEA safeguards obligations 
     to all members and to the Security Council and General 
     Assembly of the United Nations;
       Whereas Article III.B-4 of the Statute of the IAEA 
     specifies that ``if in connection with the activities of the 
     Agency there should arise questions that are within the 
     competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify 
     the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main 
     responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
     security'';
       Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors 
     adopted a resolution finding that Iran's many failures and 
     breaches of its obligations to comply with the Safeguards 
     Agreement constitute noncompliance in the context of Article 
     XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and that matters concerning 
     Iran's nuclear program have given rise to questions that are 
     within the competence of the Security Council as the organ 
     bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
     international peace and security;
       Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, in 
     an October 26, 2005, speech, his hope for ``a world without 
     America'' and his desire ``to wipe Israel off the map'' and 
     has subsequently denied the existence of the Holocaust;
       Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran 
     announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research 
     efforts;
       Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence 
     of IAEA inspectors, began to remove IAEA seals from the 
     enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;
       Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ``[i]t 
     is obvious that if Iran cannot be brought to live up to its 
     international obligations, in fact, the IAEA Statute would 
     indicate that Iran would have to be referred to the U.N. 
     Security Council'';
       Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ``The Iranian 
     government and nation has no fear of the Western ballyhoo and 
     will continue its nuclear programs with decisiveness and 
     wisdom.'';
       Whereas the United States joined with the Governments of 
     Britain, France, and Germany in calling for a meeting of the 
     IAEA Board of Governors to discuss Iran's noncompliance with 
     its IAEA safeguards obligations;
       Whereas on February 4, 2006, Resolution GOV/2006/14 of the 
     IAEA Board of Governors relayed an ``absence of confidence 
     that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful 
     purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's 
     nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other 
     issues arising from the Agency's verification of declarations 
     made by Iran since September 2002'';
       Whereas Resolution GOV/2006/14 further expressed ``serious 
     concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify 
     some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, 
     including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document 
     on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as 
     reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the 
     fabrication of nuclear weapon components'';

[[Page 1934]]

       Whereas on February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors 
     reported Iran's noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards 
     obligations to the Security Council;
       Whereas Iran has, since February 4, 2006, taken additional 
     steps confirming its unwillingness to comply with its nuclear 
     nonproliferation obligations; and
       Whereas Iran has been designated a state sponsor of 
     terrorism for over two decades and the Department of State 
     has declared in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism 
     that Iran ``remained the most active state sponsor of 
     terrorism'': Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring), That Congress--
       (1) condemns in the strongest possible terms the many 
     breaches and failures of the Government of Iran to comply 
     faithfully with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations, 
     including its obligations under the Agreement Between Iran 
     and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
     Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on 
     the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna 
     June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards 
     Agreement''), as reported by the Director General of the IAEA 
     to the IAEA Board of Governors since 2003;
       (2) commends the efforts of the Governments of France, 
     Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek a meaningful and 
     credible suspension of Iran's enrichment- and reprocessing-
     related activities and to find a diplomatic means to address 
     the non-compliance of the Government of Iran with its 
     obligations, requirements, and commitments related to nuclear 
     nonproliferation;
       (3) calls on all members of the United Nations Security 
     Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the 
     People's Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and 
     take action in response to the report of Iran's noncompliance 
     in fulfillment of the mandate of the Security Council to 
     respond to and deal with situations bearing on the 
     maintenance of international peace and security;
       (4) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 
     almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards 
     Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a 
     nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and 
     enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, 
     and facilities;
       (5) calls on all responsible members of the international 
     community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran 
     the ability to develop nuclear weapons; and
       (6) urges the President to keep Congress fully and 
     currently informed concerning Iran's violation of its 
     international nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Miller of Michigan). Pursuant to the 
order of the House of Wednesday, February 15, 2006, the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lantos) each will control 30 minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to claim time in 
opposition.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Ohio?
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Reserving the right to object, we understand that 
the ranking member is on his way, and he seeks time on the bill. 
Therefore, accordingly, I would object to that request.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 341, a 
resolution that I had the pleasure of drafting with my good friends, 
the distinguished chairman of the House International Relations 
Committee, Henry Hyde, and our ranking member, Congressman Tom Lantos.
  I want to express my appreciation to our leadership for recognizing 
the importance for the House to be heard on this important issue and 
for moving this resolution expeditiously to the floor today.
  Madam Speaker, for at least two decades, the Iranian regime has been 
pursuing a covert nuclear program using multiple approaches and 
technology to achieve a nuclear status. It has undertaken a number of 
efforts for the manufacture and testing of centrifuges, including at 
facilities owned by military industrial organizations.
  It has sought completion of a heavy water reactor that would be well 
suited for plutonium production, while seeking uranium enrichment 
through the use of lasers.
  The Iran saga within the context of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency began almost 4 years ago. Every step along the way, Iran has 
demonstrated contempt for the request of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and has mocked the EU 3 nations composed of France, Great 
Britain and Germany, as they provided incentives to convince Iran to 
suspend its enrichment activities.
  It is important to quickly summarize the sequence of events of the 
last few years, Madam Speaker, in order to fully comprehend the need 
for this resolution as a basis for stronger legislative action 
regarding Iran.
  In November of 2003, for example, the IAEA reported that Iran had 
been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for close to 
two decades and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, 
had carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium 
metal, it had separated plutonium, and it had concealed many other 
aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities.
  That same month, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency 
of its decision to temporarily suspend enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities. It stated that the suspension would cover all 
activities in the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all 
feed material for enrichment and the importation of any enrichment-
related items.
  But that was not to be, Madam Speaker. Iran continuously 
reinterpreted its commitment. By September of 2004, Iran announced that 
it had resumed large-scale uranium conversion. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency called on Iran to stop. Then Secretary of State Colin 
Powell called for the Iran case to be referred to the United Nations 
Security Council for sanctions to be imposed.
  Faced with this possibility, Iran temporarily halts these activities 
in those nuclear facilities known to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the EU 3.
  By April of 2005, Iran announces that it will resume uranium 
conversion in the Isfahan facility. This was met with a warning from 
the EU 3 that their negotiations on trade and economic incentives with 
Iran would end if Iran acted on this threat.
  In August of 2005, the new radical leader is installed as Iran's new 
president. Immediately following, Iran proceeded to remove the 
International Atomic Energy Agency seals on the uranium conversion 
plant at Isfahan, announced that it could successfully use 
biotechnology for its nuclear program, decreasing the cost for the 
production of the feed material for nuclear weapons. It announced that 
it would provide nuclear technology to other Islamic states. Iran's 
defense minister said that it is Iran's absolute right to have access 
to nuclear arms, and Iran's leader publicly stated his willingness to 
share nuclear expertise with other Islamic nations.
  The IAEA inspectors were finally allowed into the Parchin military 
site. However, after all the time Iran was given to sanitize this site, 
that is to hide, to remove all signs of their nuclear activities, even 
IAEA inspectors and foreign diplomats acknowledged in news reports that 
they did not expect the inspections to yield any firm results.
  Experts further noted that there may be no nuclear material present 
at Parchin if the Iranians did dry testing of nuclear bomb simulations.
  Fast forward to Tuesday of this very week. Madam Speaker, on 
Valentine's Day, 2006, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization announced 
it has restarted uranium enrichment efforts which could also be 
developed for use in nuclear weapons.

[[Page 1935]]

  In sum, referral of the Iran case to the U.N. Security Council has 
been a long time coming. We are gratified that the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Board of Governors earlier this month voted to report the 
Iran case to the Security Council, but it should not stop there, Madam 
Speaker.
  H. Con. Res. 341 therefore calls on all members of the U.N. Security 
Council to immediately consider the report and take the necessary steps 
to address Iran's behavior. The resolution frames the debate by 
condemning in the strongest possible terms the Iranian regime's 
repeated violations of its international obligations.
  More importantly, it underscores that, as a result of these 
violations, Iran no longer has the right to develop any aspect of a 
nuclear fuel cycle.
  As President Bush stated on February 11, 2004, proliferators must not 
be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and 
the infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.
  H. Con. Res. 341 reiterates previous U.S. calls to responsible 
members of the international community to impose economic sanctions to 
deny Iran the resources and the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
  But the grave threat posed by Iran is not limited to its nuclear 
pursuit. H. Con. Res. 341 therefore refers to Iran's support for 
Islamic jihadist activities worldwide.
  Madam Speaker, it includes language highlighting that Iran has been 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for over two decades and, 
according to our own State Department reports on global terrorism, it 
remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism worldwide.
  Madam Speaker, too much time has already passed. Let us not waste 
anymore. Let us begin by adopting this resolution and send a strong 
message to the Iranian regime and other potential proliferators that 
this behavior will not be tolerated.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in strong support of this resolution. Madam Speaker, unless 
the international community acts quickly and decisively, the world's 
chief terrorist state may soon possess the greatest weapon of terror 
ever created.
  A critical first step was taken on February 2 at an emergency session 
of the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board 
of Governors. By a vote of 27-3 they reported Iran's history of 
deception, lies and noncompliance to the United Nations Security 
Council.
  The ayatollahs of terror in Tehran were sent a bold and unambiguous 
message that their clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons and 
their transparent lies of peaceful intent will no longer be tolerated 
by the civilized world.
  Madam Speaker, Tehran sponsors terrorism as an official state policy. 
I wish to repeat this. Tehran sponsors terrorism as official state 
policy.
  I ask my colleagues to imagine this terrorist state armed with 
nuclear weapons and in possession of large amounts of nuclear weapons 
material. Even if it did not put these destructive materials up for 
sale, a nuclear armed Iran would terrorize and destabilize the entire 
Middle East. Terrorist-in-chief Ahmadinejad himself advocates wiping 
Israel from the map.
  Madam Speaker, Iran has flouted every nuclear safeguard agreement and 
reneged on every single commitment it has made. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency has documented that Iran acquired designs, 
equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons grade uranium and 
plutonium from the same nuclear black market that used to supply Libya. 
Iran experimented with trigger material for a nuclear bomb. There is 
every reason to believe that Tehran has acquired actual bomb 
blueprints, as Libya used to do.
  Iran has also reneged on its remaining empty assurances to negotiate 
in good faith with Britain, France and Germany by breaking the 
international seals on its uranium enrichment facility.
  Ahmadinejad, in a rare moment of lucidity, revealed Tehran's view of 
the relative balance of power in these negotiations; and I quote, ``the 
West needs us more than we need them.''
  With billions of dollars of existing western investment in Iran's oil 
and gas fields, Tehran's ruling elite has shrewdly calculated that the 
West will not impose far-reaching and meaningful sanctions against Iran 
over the nuclear issue.
  Madam Speaker, we must change Tehran's calculations, hopefully by 
diplomacy and pressure but with international sanctions if necessary. 
The United Nations Security Council should require all members of the 
U.N. to reject any and all investment and nonhumanitarian trade with 
Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear fuel and weapon 
material production capabilities.

                              {time}  1030

  But, Madam Speaker, we cannot wait for the Security Council to act. 
Responsible European and Asian governments must immediately ensure that 
their companies, banks, and other financial organizations will suspend 
and terminate their existing investments in Iraq.
  Some banks and oil companies are already leaving Iran over just the 
possibility of sanctions. Those that remain must be given immediate 
incentives by the international community to stop business as usual 
with a developing nuclear weapon terrorist state. As part of this, the 
United States must finally use the sanctions authority in U.S. law to 
punish and deter those who continue to invest in and thereby aid and 
abet a state bent on adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal of terror.
  Madam Speaker, this is the first resolution of the year regarding 
Iran. I guarantee you it will not be the last one. We must reauthorize 
the Iran Sanctions Act, which will be accomplished through the Iran 
Freedom Support Act, a bill offered by my good friend, the gentlewoman 
from Florida, and myself.
  Madam Speaker, our allies in Europe have learned a hard lesson: 
playing nice with a terrorist regime gets you nothing. Now that the 
Europeans are with us in demanding Security Council action, it is 
imperative that they take the next step by imposing a comprehensive 
sanctions regime against Tehran.
  Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this 
resolution.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).
  Mr. GINGREY. Madam Speaker, first of all, let me thank the 
gentlewoman from Florida for allowing me to speak on this resolution, 
and also let me thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and 
completely associate myself with the remarks that he just made. I think 
he is right on target.
  Madam Speaker, the passage of yesterday's resolution on the 
Palestinian Authority once again expressed our position against funding 
an ideology of terror in hope of maintaining the peace process in the 
Middle East. Today's resolution has a more direct message with the 
prospect, hopefully, of addressing the entire world.
  In our current struggle against terrorism, no country is more 
uncertain and dangerous than Iran. With an uncompromising foreign 
policy and repressed trade, it often feels like the only commodity that 
Iran exports involves disdain for Western culture. It is indeed 
disheartening to see a nation of good people commandeered by an 
individual with nuclear aspirations. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran must 
not be allowed to carry out threats against Israel, the United States, 
or any other peaceful nation. Nuclear weapons and the ideology of 
Wahabism are a dangerous combination, and they must be prevented.
  So, Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this resolution. I 
commend the gentlewoman from Florida and the gentleman from California 
for bringing it forward. I believe it is time for the United Nations 
Security

[[Page 1936]]

Council to take action against nuclear proliferation in Iran, and I ask 
the leaders of Iran to reconsider the path that they have chosen.
  Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the distinguished ranking member 
of our Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for 
allowing me to make comments on this, and I compliment the gentlewoman 
from Florida for her leadership in this regard as well.
  I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. This condemns Iran for 
violating its nonproliferation agreements and expresses support for 
efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
  Thank you, Mr. Lantos, for the opportunity to briefly address House 
Concurrent Resolution 341 on the Iranian nuclear situation. I think it 
is deadly serious.
  Madam Speaker, the situation in Iran is a critical matter that 
demands serious attention and serious action from this administration 
as well as from Congress. It threatens the security of our Nation, the 
future of the nonproliferation regime and stability in the Middle East.
  International support for referring Iran to the United Nations 
Security Council is very encouraging, but it is not enough to address 
the complexity of the nuclear situation or broader longer-term problems 
posed by Iran, including its involvement in Iraq, which evidently is 
quite substantial.
  Direct American leadership is long overdue. There must be a 
comprehensive interagency effort to develop and implement the necessary 
plan, and Congress must do its part. This must be a top bipartisan 
priority. And yet while the U.S. must act expeditiously, it must also 
act effectively. We must sufficiently consider all tools at our 
disposal, and we must take care not to inadvertently make matters worse 
by our rhetoric or by our actions.
  For example, we should consider ``smart sanctions'' that would target 
Iran's leadership, avoid harming the Iranian population and have strong 
international support.
  There are no easy answers or simple solutions; but as I have 
emphasized numerous times now, there are many tools at our disposal, 
many more than this administration has used to date. I am committed to 
doing whatever I can to effectively address the problems posed by Iran, 
and I ask my colleagues to join me in this effort.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Paul), a member of the International Relations 
Committee.
  Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this 
time.
  I rise to express a note of caution regarding this resolution. I see 
this resolution somewhat like some of the resolutions that we debated 
and passed prior to our commitment to go into Iraq. As a matter of 
fact, some of the language is very similar. If you substitute the word 
``Iraq'' for ``Iran,'' you would find out that these concerns are very 
similar.
  I do not quite have the concern that others have expressed that Iran 
is on the verge of having a nuclear weapon. They have never been found 
in violation. There has been a lot of talk and a lot of accusation, but 
technically they have never been found in any violation.
  My concern for this type of language and these plans is that nothing 
ever changes. This is the type of thing that occurred before. Of 
course, we went into Iraq, and yet today the success in Iraq is very 
questionable. Fifty-five percent of the American people say it was a 
mistake to have gone into Iraq. Only forty percent of the people 
support staying in Iraq. Attitudes have shifted now since the success 
in Iraq has been so poor.
  We went into Afghanistan to look for Osama bin Laden, and we sort of 
got distracted. We have forgotten about him just about completely. 
Instead we went into Iraq. Though the Iraq war is not going well, all 
of a sudden we are looking to take on another burden, another military 
mission. I find some things in the resolution that are very 
confrontational because it invokes sanctions. People say, well, 
sanctions are not that bad. That is no shooting or killing. But 
sanctions and boycotts and embargoes, these are acts of war. And, of 
course, many times our administration has expressed the sentiment that 
if necessary we are going to use force against Iran; we are going to 
start bombing. And why do we follow this policy? Especially since it 
literally helps the radicals in Iran. This mobilizes them. There is an 
undercurrent in Iran that is sympathetic to America, and yet this 
brings the radicals together by this type of language and threats. 
There is no doubt that our policy helps the hard-liners.
  There has been no talk, it has been implied, but there has been no 
serious talk that Iran is a threat to our national security. There is 
no way. Even if they had nuclear weapons, they are not going to be a 
threat to our national security. Pakistan, that is not a democratic 
nation. It happens to be a military dictatorship. They have nuclear 
weapons. India has nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, the nuclear 
weapons serve as a balance of power between two countries. The Soviets, 
had 30,000 nuclear weapons, and we followed a policy of containment. We 
did not say we have to go into the Soviet Union and bomb their 
establishment. No. Finally that problem dissipated. And yet we create 
unnecessary problems for ourselves. We go looking for trouble, and I 
see this as very detrimental for what we are doing with this 
resolution.
  There is one portion of the resolution that concerns me about our 
urging the Russians and China to take a firm stand, and that has to do 
with the resolved clause No. 3; it says to the people of Russia and 
China to ``expeditiously consider and take action in response to any 
report of Iran's noncompliance'' in fulfillment of the mandate of the 
Security Council to respond and deal with situations . . .
  Any report? I mean, some report in the newspaper? Is it an IAEA 
report? Or whatever. That is so open-ended that this is a risky, risky 
resolution.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on this resolution.
  Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, let me just indicate to my friend from 
Texas that he has now discovered the ultimate oxymoron, a benign 
Islamic fanaticism hell bent on developing weapons of mass destruction. 
This takes the concept of oxymoron to a new height.
  Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the distinguished Democratic whip.
  Mr. HOYER. Madam Speaker, the international community, not just 
America, is being challenged again by a dangerous, deceptive lawbreaker 
whose defiant pursuit of nuclear weapons threaten America's national 
security interests as well as international peace and security. Now, 
this is an obligation that the Iranians undertook freely and 
voluntarily. It was not imposed upon them.
  I believe that this grave and gathering danger commands the 
collective attention, effort, and action of the entire international 
community. This time the nations of the world which are committed to 
peace, security, and the rule of law must embrace their 
responsibilities, not flinch from them, as, unfortunately, has been too 
often the case.
  Through this resolution today, the House speaks with one voice in 
condemning in the strongest possible terms the many breaches and 
failures of the government of Iran to comply with its nuclear 
nonproliferation obligations. In this resolution, we call on all 
responsible members of the international community to impose economic 
sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons 
and to encourage its people to get the government to change its 
dangerous and reckless policies.

                              {time}  1045

  We urge the members of the United Nations Security Council to take 
action in response to Iran's noncompliance with its international 
obligations.
  Let no one harbor any illusions: The government of Iran, which is 
recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism,

[[Page 1937]]

 believes it can exploit international irresolution, and it will prey 
on vacillation. The international community must stand as one against 
this lawbreaker, whose record leaves no doubt of its motivations.
  Iran failed to properly disclose the existence of a fuel enrichment 
plant and facility at Natanz until both were revealed by opposition 
groups. It has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguard 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to report all 
nuclear material it has imported. It confirmed that it had conducted 
research on uranium conversion processes, but only after it denied 
doing so. On February 4, in response to a 27-3 vote by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency board to report Iran to the Security 
Council, Iran ended voluntary cooperation with the agency and announced 
it would start large-scale enrichment activities.
  I suggest to us and to our international allies that standing silent, 
standing back, standing without action, is not an option. It goes 
without saying that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons constitutes a 
threat to the national security interests of the United States of 
America. Let me remind all of us, the gentleman from Texas indicated 
that they were not a threat to us. There are 250,000 Americans as we 
debate this resolution right now in range of Iranian weapons, so it is 
not just those who live in the Middle East who are put at risk, it is 
those of us who are there, and the security of the international 
community is put at risk.
  Our concerns are only heightened by the inflammatory, irresponsible 
statements of the Iranian president, who has stated his hope for ``a 
world without America.'' That is the nation that stands on the doorstep 
of becoming a nuclear power. He has further stated his desire to ``wipe 
Israel off the map.'' The United States will not stand still for that. 
A regime that has the objective to have nuclear weapons will make the 
Middle East more dangerous in an extraordinary geometric way.
  Madam Speaker, when the Security Council considers Iran's flagrant 
and deceptive abuse in March, I urge it to act as one. Today, I urge us 
to act as one in sending a very clear, very clear, unmistakable 
message: This will not stand.
  Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to my good 
friend from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank my friend and indicate that I rise in 
opposition.
  This rhetoric that we are hearing on the House floor from people who 
I have to say I do respect greatly is eerily reminiscent of the debate 
in this House prior to the United States authorizing an attack on Iraq. 
I think we can look back today and say that the U.S. rushed into war 
against Iraq, only to find that there were no weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Madam Speaker, I will include for the Record an article from the 
Washington Post dated August 2, 2005, which says, ``A major U.S. 
intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from 
manufacturing the key ingredients for nuclear weapons, roughly doubling 
the previous estimate of 5 years.'' It goes on to say that ``this 
carefully hedged assessment, which represents consensus among U.S. 
intelligence agencies, contrasts with forceful public statements by the 
White House. Administration officials have asserted but have not 
offered proof that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear 
arsenal.''
  I also include for the record the remarks of Angela Merkel, who is 
the leader of Germany, who says that we have not used all of our 
available windows of opportunity. She saw an opportunity for a 
negotiated settlement. As a matter of fact, in this news dispatch out 
of Berlin from yesterday, the German chancellor says there are real 
chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing crisis over Iran's 
nuclear program.
  Madam Speaker, I include for the record a news report out of Moscow 
and Tehran of yesterday which says that Iran and Russia will hold talks 
on Monday on a Russian offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran in 
the Russian territory. This would avert what is a building crisis.
  Madam Speaker, I include for the record an analysis that was done of 
the joint resolution on Iraq, this was done by myself, that pointed out 
the flaws in a resolution that was presented to this House. This is an 
analysis from October 2, 2002, that relates to analyzing the Iraq 
resolution. I think this would be very valuable when you compare it 
side by side with the resolution that we have now.
  Madam Speaker, I want to call to the Members' attention the same 
article that Mr. Paul called to Members' attention, section 3 of the 
enactment clause, which calls on members of the United Nations Security 
Council, particularly the Russian Federation and the People's Republic 
of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in response to the 
report of Iran's noncompliance. This is in response to a report of 
Iran's noncompliance and fulfillment of the mandate of the Security 
Council to respond and deal with situations bearing on the maintenance 
of international peace and security.
  The importance of this point and this amendment is that this point 
undermines and sets aside the only possibility for a peaceful 
resolution of this crisis, namely the offer by Russia to enrich uranium 
for Iran to use in its nuclear power plants. Iran would not operate any 
enrichment processing facilities of its own, so we have an opportunity 
to put aside this crisis if we see what is developing now. This 
resolution, unfortunately, would scuttle the Russian-led negotiated 
settlement. I ask Members to consider that this resolution would put us 
on the threshold of war.
  Now, I stand with Mr. Lantos in defense of the right of Israel to 
survive. I voted for legislation yesterday that challenges any nation 
that would call for the destruction of Israel, and we should do that. 
But we don't have to go to war against Iran or to set the stage for a 
war against Iran when we have diplomatic means of resolving this. We 
should continue to pursue diplomacy.
  Madam Speaker, I include the articles referred to earlier for the 
Record.

                [From washingtonpost.com, Aug. 2, 2005]

               Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb

                           (By Dafna Linzer)

       A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is 
     about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for 
     a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of 
     five years, according to government sources with firsthand 
     knowledge of the new analysis.
       The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus 
     among US. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful 
     public statements by the White House. Administration 
     officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that 
     Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The 
     new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran 
     over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he 
     wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that ``all 
     options are on the table.''
       The new National Intelligence Estimate includes what the 
     intelligence community views as credible indicators that 
     Iran's military is conducting clandestine work. But the 
     sources said there is no information linking those projects 
     directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is that 
     Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and 
     mastering technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking.
       The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether Iran's 
     ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear 
     arsenal, three U.S. sources said. Still, a senior 
     intelligence official familiar with the findings said that 
     ``it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left 
     to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear 
     weapons.''
       At no time in the past three years has the White House 
     attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as 
     it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion. 
     Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and 
     questioned why a country with as much oil as Iran would 
     require a large-scale nuclear energy program.
       The NIE addresses those assertions and offers alternative 
     views supporting and challenging the assumptions they are 
     based on. Those familiar with the new judgments, which have 
     not been previously detailed, would discuss only limited 
     elements of the estimate and only on the condition of 
     anonymity, because the report is classified, as is some of 
     the evidence on which it is based.
       Top policymakers are scrutinizing the review, several 
     administration officials said, as the White House formulates 
     the next steps of an Iran policy long riven by infighting and

[[Page 1938]]

     competing strategies. For three years, the administration has 
     tried, with limited success, to increase pressure on Iran by 
     focusing attention on its nuclear program. Those efforts have 
     been driven as much by international diplomacy as by the 
     intelligence.
       The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in 
     January, is the first major review since 2001 of what is 
     known and what is unknown about Iran. Additional assessments 
     produced during Bush's first term were narrow in scope, and 
     some were rejected by advocates of policies that were 
     inconsistent with the intelligence judgments.
       One such paper was a 2002 review that former and current 
     officials said was commissioned by national security adviser 
     Stephen J. Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the 
     possibility for ``regime change'' in Iran. Those findings 
     described the Islamic republic on a slow march toward 
     democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that 
     process, said the officials, who would describe the paper's 
     classified findings only on the condition of anonymity.
       The new estimate takes a broader approach to the question 
     of Iran's political future. But it is unable to answer 
     whether the country's ruling clerics will still be in control 
     by the time the country is capable of producing fissile 
     material. The administration keeps ``hoping the mullahs will 
     leave before Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability,'' said 
     an official familiar with policy discussions.
       Intelligence estimates are designed to alert the president 
     of national security developments and help guide policy. The 
     new Iran findings were described as well documented and well 
     written, covering such topics as military capabilities, 
     expected population growth and the oil industry. The 
     assessments of Iran's nuclear program appear in a separate 
     annex to the NIE known as a memorandum to holders.
       ``It's a full look at what we know, what we don't know and 
     what assumptions we have,'' a U.S. source said.
       Until recently, Iran was judged, according to February 
     testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the 
     capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S. 
     officials have continually estimated Iran to be ``within five 
     years'' from reaching that same capability. So far, it has 
     not.
       The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran 
     will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly 
     enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon, 
     before ``early to mid-next decade,'' according to four 
     sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the 
     shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical 
     limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line 
     with recently revised British and Israeli figures.
       The estimate is for acquisition of fissile material, but 
     there is no firm view expressed on whether Iran would be 
     ready by then with an implosion device, sources said.
       The time line is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect 
     a program moving full speed ahead without major technical 
     obstacles. It does not take into account that Iran has 
     suspended much of its uranium-enrichment work as part of a 
     tenuous deal with Britain, France and Germany. Iran announced 
     yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work if the 
     European talks fall short of expectations.
       Sources said the new timeline also reflects a fading of 
     suspicions that Iran's military has been running its own 
     separate and covert enrichment effort. But there is evidence 
     of clandestine military work on missiles and centrifuge 
     research and development that could be linked to a nuclear 
     program, four sources said.
       Last month, U.S. officials shared some data on the missile 
     program with U.N. nuclear inspectors, based on drawings 
     obtained last November. The documents include design 
     modifications for Iran's Shahab-3 missile to make the room 
     required for a nuclear warhead, U.S. and foreign officials 
     said.
       ``If someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he 
     has really good connections, he'll get that program 
     through,'' said Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's 
     nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the 
     presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction. ``But 
     that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear 
     weapon.''
       The commission found earlier this year that U.S. 
     intelligence knows ``disturbingly little'' about Iran, and 
     about North Korea.
       Much of what is known about Tehran has been learned through 
     analyzing communication intercepts, satellite imagery and the 
     work of U.N. inspectors who have been investigating Iran for 
     more than two years. Inspectors uncovered facilities for 
     uranium conversion and enrichment, results of plutonium 
     tests, and equipment bought illicitly from Pakistan--all of 
     which raised serious concerns but could be explained by an 
     energy program. Inspectors have found no proof that Iran 
     possesses a nuclear warhead design or is conducting a nuclear 
     weapons program.
       The NIE comes more than two years after the intelligence 
     community assessed, wrongly, in an October 2002 estimate that 
     then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass 
     destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear program. The 
     judgments were declassified and made public by the Bush 
     administration as it sought to build support for invading 
     Iraq five months later.
       At a congressional hearing last Thursday, Gen. Michael V. 
     Hayden, deputy director of national intelligence, said that 
     new rules recently were imposed for crafting NIBs and that 
     there would be ``a higher tolerance for ambiguity,'' even if 
     it meant producing estimates with less definitive 
     conclusions.
       The Iran NIE, sources said, includes creative analysis and 
     alternative theories that could explain some of the 
     suspicious activities discovered in Iran in the past three 
     years. Iran has said its nuclear infrastructure was built for 
     energy production, not weapons.
       Assessed as plausible, but unverifiable, is Iran's public 
     explanation that it built the program in secret, over 18 
     years, because it feared attack by the United States or 
     Israel if the work was exposed.
       In January, before the review, Vice President Cheney 
     suggested Iranian nuclear advances were so pressing that 
     Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it had done 23 
     years earlier in Iraq.
       In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton--then the 
     administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and 
     now Bush's temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador--said: ``If 
     we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be 
     too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons.''
       But the level of certainty, influenced by diplomacy and 
     intelligence, appears to have shifted.
       Asked in June, after the NIE was done, whether Iran had a 
     nuclear effort underway, Bolton's successor, Robert G. 
     Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, said: ``I 
     don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have 
     perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian 
     records what the Iranian leaders have said . . . lead us to 
     conclude that we have to be highly skeptical.''
                                  ____


                   [From Expatica.com, Feb. 15, 2006]

             Iranian Nuclear Deal Is Still Possible: Merkel

       German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Wednesday she still 
     saw real chances for a diplomatic deal to defuse the ongoing 
     crisis over Iran's nuclear programme.
       ``We still have not used all our available window of 
     opportunity,'' Merkel said in a Stern magazine interview, 
     adding that she saw ``real chances for a negotiated 
     solution.''
       Merkel said Iran had to recognize that its decision to 
     resume uranium enrichment and to cut inspection rights for 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had left 
     Tehran isolated.
       Germany, France and Britain--the EU-3--led talks over the 
     past few years aimed at reaching a deal exchanging aid and 
     trade for cut-backs in Iran's nuclear research which the US 
     and many European countries believe is aimed at nuclear 
     weapons.
       But last month the EU-3 declared negotiations had reached a 
     ``dead end'' and referred Iran to the IAEA which voted to 
     send Tehran to the UN Security Council.
       Tehran insists its nuclear programme is for peaceful 
     purposes.
                                  ____


                  [The Indian Express, Feb. 16, 2006]

            Uranium Enrichment: Iran, Russia Talks on Monday

       Iran and Russia will hold talks on Monday on a Russian 
     offer to conduct uranium enrichment for Iran on Russian 
     territory. ``The Iran side has provided official notification 
     on their arrival . . ,'' Interfax reported.
       The confirmation from Iran comes a day after Iranian 
     parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel had called for 
     Venezuela to join his country in forming an alliance to 
     counter threats from the world's nuclear powers during his 
     visit to that country. He had accused the US of attacking 
     Iran's nuclear programme in order to undermine Iran's 
     independence.
       Haddad Adel, part of the Iranian delegation, had thanked 
     President Hugo Chavez's government for its ``favorable 
     position'' towards Iran, especially its support on the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency board earlier this month, 
     when Venezuela voted against referring Iran to the UN 
     Security Council.
       Asked by reporters if Iran would accept Moscow's proposal 
     to enrich uranium on Russian soil, Haddad Adel had said: ``If 
     that means we are deprived from peaceful use of nuclear 
     energy . . . we could study the Russian proposal.''
       Haddad Adel had also denied his country had flouted 
     international rules by resuming small-scale uranium 
     enrichment activities at Natanz, the country's main 
     enrichment plant. ``All we've done is reinitiate nuclear 
     energy research at the laboratory level. We have not said 
     anything new or committed any crime.''
       Iran's economy minister, meanwhile, warned that oil prices 
     could rise to unexpected levels if the Islamic republic was 
     subjected to sanctions over its disputed nuclear programme.
       ``Any sanctions in the current situation would be more 
     detrimental for the West than for Iran,'' Davoud Danesh-
     Jaafari was quoted

[[Page 1939]]

     as saying by the state TV. ``Iran is in a very important 
     regional situation, and any disturbance of the economic and 
     political situation of the country could turn the regional 
     situation into a crisis and increase price of oil higher than 
     what the West expects,'' he said.
       ``Iran has a high economic capacity, and by relying on its 
     experience during the war (with Iraq from 1980-88) is ready 
     to face any problem,'' he added.
                                  ____


       Analysis of Joint Resolution on Iraq by Dennis J. Kucinich

       Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression 
     against an illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States 
     forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its 
     people in order to defend the national security of the United 
     States and enforce United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions relating to Iraq;
       Key issue: In the Persian Gulf war there was an 
     international coalition. World support was for protecting 
     Kuwait. There is no world support for invading Iraq.
       Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq 
     entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement 
     pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other 
     things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical 
     weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, 
     and to end its support for international terrorism;
       Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, 
     United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led 
     to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical 
     weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and 
     that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program 
     that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than 
     intelligence reporting had previously indicated;
       Key issue: UN inspection teams identified and destroyed 
     nearly all such weapons. A lead inspector, Scott Ritter, said 
     that he believes that nearly all other weapons not found were 
     destroyed in the Gulf War. Furthermore, according to a 
     published report in the Washington Post, the Central 
     Intelligence Agency has no up to date accurate report on 
     Iraq's WMD capabilities.
       Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the 
     cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons 
     inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass 
     destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which 
     finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on 
     October 31, 1998;
       Key issues: Iraqi deceptions always failed. The inspectors 
     always figured out what Iraq was doing. It was the United 
     States that withdrew from the inspections in 1998. And the 
     United States then launched a cruise missile attack against 
     Iraq 48 hours after the inspectors left. In advance of a 
     military strike, the U.S. continues to thwart (the 
     Administration's word) weapons inspections.
       Whereas in 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing 
     weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United 
     States interests and international peace and security, 
     declared Iraq to be in ``material and unacceptable breach of 
     its international obligations'' and urged the President ``to 
     take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution 
     and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into 
     compliance with its international obligations'' (Public Law 
     105-235);
       Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national 
     security of the United States and international peace and 
     security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material 
     and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, 
     among other things, continuing to possess and develop a 
     significant chemical and biological weapons capability, 
     actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting 
     and harboring terrorist organizations;
       Key issues: There is no proof that Iraq represents an 
     imminent or immediate threat to the United States. A 
     ``continuing'' threat does not constitute a sufficient cause 
     for war. The Administration has refused to provide the 
     Congress with credible intelligence that proves that Iraq is 
     a serious threat to the United States and is continuing to 
     possess and develop chemical and biological and nuclear 
     weapons. Furthermore there is no credible intelligence 
     connecting Iraq to Al Qaida and 9/11.
       Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the 
     United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in 
     brutal repression of its civilian population thereby 
     threatening international peace and security in the region, 
     by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi 
     citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American 
     serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully 
     seized by Iraq from Kuwait;
       Key issue: This language is so broad that it would allow 
     the President to order an attack against Iraq even when there 
     is no material threat to the United States. Since this 
     resolution authorizes the use of force for all Iraq related 
     violations of the UN Security Council directives, and since 
     the resolution cites Iraq's imprisonment of non-Iraqi 
     prisoners, this resolution would authorize the President to 
     attack Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait citizens who may or 
     may not be in Iraqi prisons, even if Iraq met compliance with 
     all requests to destroy any weapons of mass destruction. 
     Though in 2002 at the Arab Summit, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to 
     bilateral negotiations to work out all claims relating to 
     stolen property and prisoners of war. This use-of-force 
     resolution enables the President to commit U.S. troops to 
     recover Kuwaiti property.
       Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its 
     capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction 
     against other nations and its own people;
       Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its 
     continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the 
     United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate 
     former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of 
     occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged 
     in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security 
     Council;
       Key Issue: The Iraqi regime has never attacked nor does it 
     have the capability to attack the United States. The ``no 
     fly'' zone was not the result of a UN Security Council 
     directive. It was illegally imposed by the United States, 
     Great Britain and France and is not specifically sanctioned 
     by any Security Council resolution.
       Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing 
     responsibility for attacks on the United States, its 
     citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred 
     on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;
       Key Issue: There is no credible intelligence that connects 
     Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to participation in those 
     events by assisting Al Qaida.
       Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other 
     international terrorist organizations, including 
     organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American 
     citizens;
       Key Issue: Any connection between Iraq support of terrorist 
     groups in Middle East, is an argument for focusing great 
     resources on resolving the conflict between Israel and the 
     Palestinians. It is not sufficient reason for the U.S. to 
     launch a unilateral preemptive strike against Iraq.
       Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 
     2001 underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the 
     acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international 
     terrorist organizations;
       Key Issue: There is no connection between Iraq and the 
     events of 9/11.
       Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to 
     use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current 
     Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a 
     surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces 
     or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, 
     and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the 
     United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine 
     to justify action by the United States to defend itself;
       Key Issue: There is no credible evidence that Iraq 
     possesses weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq has 
     successfully concealed the production of such weapons since 
     1998, there is no credible evidence that Iraq has the 
     capability to reach the United States with such weapons. In 
     the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had a demonstrated capability of 
     biological and chemical weapons, but did not have the 
     willingness to use them against the United States Armed 
     Forces. Congress has not been provided with any credible 
     information, which proves that Iraq has provided 
     international terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.
       Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 
     authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent 
     relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain 
     activities that threaten international peace and security, 
     including the development of weapons of mass destruction and 
     refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections 
     in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     687, repression of its civilian population in violation of 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and 
     threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in 
     Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 949;
       Key Issue: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, 
     including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN 
     resolutions.
       Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military 
     Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has 
     authorized the President ``to use United States Armed Forces 
     pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 
     (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council 
     Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 
     and 677'';
       Key Issue: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, 
     including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN 
     resolutions with military force.
       Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that 
     it ``supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the 
     goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as 
     being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military 
     Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),'' that 
     Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution

[[Page 1940]]

     688 and ``constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, 
     security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,'' and 
     that Congress, ``supports the use of all necessary means to 
     achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 688'';
       Key Issue: This clause demonstrates the proper chronology 
     of the international process, and contrasts the current march 
     to war. In 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution 
     asking for enforcement of its resolution. Member countries 
     authorized their troops to participate in a UN-led coalition 
     to enforce the UN resolutions. Now the President is asking 
     Congress to authorize a unilateral first strike before the UN 
     Security Council has asked its member states to enforce UN 
     resolutions.
       Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) 
     expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy 
     of the United States to support efforts to remove from power 
     the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a 
     democratic government to replace that regime;
       Key Issue: This ``Sense of Congress'' resolution was not 
     binding. Furthermore, while Congress supported democratic 
     means of removing Saddam Hussein it clearly did not endorse 
     the use of force contemplated in this resolution, nor did it 
     endorse assassination as a policy.
       Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the 
     United States to ``work with the United Nations Security 
     Council to meet our common challenge'' posed by Iraq and to 
     ``work for the necessary resolutions,'' while also making 
     clear that ``the Security Council resolutions will be 
     enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be 
     met, or action will be unavoidable'';
       Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the 
     war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international 
     terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of 
     mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under 
     the 1991 ceasefire and other United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions make clear that it is in the national security 
     interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war 
     on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of 
     force if necessary;
       Key Issue: Unilateral action against Iraq will cost the 
     United States the support of the world community, adversely 
     affecting the war on terrorism. No credible intelligence 
     exists which connects Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to those 
     terrorists who perpetrated 9/11. Under international law, the 
     United States does not have the authority to unilaterally 
     order military action to enforce UN Security Council 
     resolutions.
       Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the 
     war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and 
     funding requested by the President to take the necessary 
     actions against international terrorists and terrorist 
     organizations, including those nations, organizations or 
     persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the 
     terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or 
     harbored such persons or organizations;
       Key Issue: The Administration has not provided Congress 
     with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the 
     events of 9/11.
       Whereas the President and Congress are determined to 
     continue to take all appropriate actions against 
     international terrorists and terrorist organizations, 
     including those nations, organizations or persons who 
     planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks 
     that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons 
     or organizations;
       Key Issue: The Administration has not provided Congress 
     with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the 
     events of 9/11. Furthermore, there is no credible evidence 
     that Iraq has harbored those who were responsible for 
     planning, authorizing or committing the attacks of 9/11.
       Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution 
     to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of 
     international terrorism against the United States, as 
     Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization 
     for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and
       Key Issue: This resolution was specific to 9/11. It was 
     limited to a response to 9/11.
       Whereas it is in the national security interests of the 
     United States to restore international peace and security to 
     the Persian Gulf region;
       Key Issue: If by the ``national security interests'' of the 
     United States, the Administration means oil, it ought to 
     communicate such to the Congress. A unilateral attack on Iraq 
     by the United States will cause instability and chaos in the 
     region and sow the seeds of future conflicts all over the 
     world.
       Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Authorization 
     for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq''.

     SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

       The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by 
     the President to--
       (a) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security 
     Council all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable 
     to Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and
       (b) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security 
     Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, 
     evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies 
     with all relevant Security Council resolutions.
       Key Issue: Congress can and should support this clause. 
     However Section 3 (which follows) undermines the 
     effectiveness of this section. Any peaceful settlement 
     requires Iraq compliance. The totality of this resolution 
     indicates the Administration will wage war against Iraq no 
     matter what. This undermines negotiations.
       Sec. 3. Authorization for Use of United States Armed 
     Forces.
       Authorization. The President is authorized to use the Armed 
     Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary 
     and appropriate in order to--
       (1) defend the national security of the United States 
     against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
       (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions regarding Iraq.
       Key Issue: This clause is substantially similar to the 
     authorization that the President originally sought.
       It gives authority to the President to act prior to and 
     even without a UN resolution, and it authorizes the President 
     to use U.S. troops to enforce UN resolutions even without UN 
     request for it. This is a violation of Chapter VII of the UN 
     Charter, which reserves the ability to authorize force for 
     that purpose to the Security Council, alone.
       Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
     ``The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
     threat to the peace . . . and shall make recommendations to 
     maintain or restore international peace and security.'' 
     (Article 39). Only the Security Council can decide that 
     military force would be necessary, ``The Security Council may 
     decide what measures . . . are to be employed to give effect 
     to its decisions (Article 41) . . . [and] it may take such 
     action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
     maintain or restore international peace and security.'' 
     (Article 43). Furthermore, the resolution authorizes use of 
     force illegally, since the UN Security Council has not 
     requested it. According to the UN Charter, members of the UN, 
     such as the U.S., are required to ``make available to the 
     Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
     special agreement or agreements, armed forces. . .'' (Article 
     43, emphasis added). The UN Security Council has not called 
     upon its members to use military force against Iraq at the 
     current time.
       Furthermore, changes to the language of the previous use-
     of-force resolution, drafted by the White House and objected 
     to by many members of Congress, are cosmetic:
       In section (1), the word ``continuing'' was added to ``the 
     threat posed by Iraq''.
       In section (2), the word ``relevant'' is added to ``United 
     Nations Security Council Resolutions'' and the words 
     ``regarding Iraq'' were added to the end.
       While these changes are represented as a compromise or a 
     new material development, the effects of this resolution are 
     largely the same as the previous White House proposal.
       The UN resolutions, which could be cited by the President 
     to justify sending U.S. troops to Iraq, go far beyond 
     addressing weapons of mass destruction. These could include, 
     at the President's discretion, such ``relevant'' resolutions 
     ``regarding Iraq'' including resolutions to enforce human 
     rights and the recovery of Kuwaiti property.
       Presidential Determination.--
       In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in 
     subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to 
     such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but 
     no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make 
     available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
     the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination 
     that--
       (1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or 
     other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately 
     protect the national security of the United States against 
     the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to 
     lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and
       (2) acting pursuant to this resolution is consistent with 
     the United States and other countries continuing to take the 
     necessary actions against international terrorists and 
     terrorist organizations, including those nations, 
     organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed 
     or aided the terrorists attacks that occurred on September 
     11, 2001.
       (c) War Powers Resolution Requirements.--
       (1) Specific statutory authorization.--Consistent with 
     section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress 
     declares that this section is intended to constitute specific 
     statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of 
     the War Powers Resolution.
       (2) Applicability of other requirements.--Nothing in this 
     resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers 
     Resolution.

[[Page 1941]]

       Sec. 4. Reports to Congress.
       (a) The President shall, at least once every 60 days, 
     submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this 
     joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the 
     exercise of authority granted in section 2 and the status of 
     planning for efforts that are expected to be required after 
     such actions are completed, including those actions described 
     in section 7 of Public Law 105-338 (the Iraq Liberation Act 
     of 1998).
       (b) To the extent that the submission of any report 
     described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of 
     any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution 
     otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to 
     the reporting requirements of Public Law 93-148 (the War 
     Powers Resolution), all such reports may be submitted as a 
     single consolidated report to the Congress.
       (c) To the extent that the information required by section 
     3 of Public Law 102-1 is included in the report required by 
     this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the 
     requirements of section 3 of Public Law 102-1.

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume to refute some of the statements that have been made against 
the resolution.
  Madam Speaker, H. Con. Res. 341 clearly outlines the Iran threat, not 
just as assessed by the United States, not just as assessed by the 
Europeans, but by the International Atomic Energy Agency. After dealing 
with the Iran case for over 3 years, it reaffirms the position of the 
United States, of the U.S. Congress, as articulated through the passage 
of previous measures, that Iran has forfeited any right for any access 
to nuclear technology or materials.
  In response to previous statements regarding this resolution and 
sanctions, stating that it would isolate the Iranian people, on the 
contrary, Madam Speaker, sanctions would empower the Iranian people 
because it would weaken this regime.
  More importantly, due to the Iran economy's vulnerabilities, the 
sanctions and the denial of billions of dollars of oil investments 
would deny the regime in Tehran the funds that they need to carry out 
this nuclear program and to continue with its extremist terrorist 
activities.
  In closing, I would like to remind my colleagues that in the summer 
of 2001 Iran's ayatollah expressed Iran's commitment to bring America 
to its knees. Those were his statements. He added that ``the giant will 
fall,'' the giant being the United States of America.
  Combine this with what the director of the National Intelligence 
Agency, John Negroponte, said in his recent testimony. He said, while 
the assessment of when Iran would go nuclear is about 5 to 10 years 
from now, he also expressed grave concerns that we did not really know 
the extent of Iran's nuclear activities. He said that Iran's 20-year 
pursuit of a covert program means that we cannot truly confirm any 
specific timeframe.
  Mr. Negroponte also said that Iran's missile program, with a nuclear 
capability, posed a serious concern for our U.S. security interests.
  Madam Speaker, I am proud to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce).
  Mr. ROYCE. I thank the chairwoman for yielding.
  Madam Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. This resolution 
rightfully condemns Iranian noncompliance with its nonproliferation 
obligations and calls upon the U.N. Security Council to expeditiously 
consider this matter.
  Madam Speaker, this is a grave matter, one deserving of this House's 
full and careful consideration. Iran, the most active state sponsor of 
terrorism, is seeking nuclear weapons. Its regime denies it, but the 
U.S. and many other nations know otherwise. Iran has a long record of 
deceiving international inspectors and has a history of dealing with 
the A.Q. Khan network. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and 
Nonproliferation, nothing worries me more than this deadly combination 
of terrorism and WMD.
  For a closed country such as Iran, we actually know a great deal 
about the Iranian nuclear program. IAEA inspectors have played a key 
role in spotlighting Iranian behavior. In its most recent update to the 
35 member IAEA Board of Governors, inspectors reported that Iran has in 
its possession a document on the production of uranium metal 
hemispheres. This is of great significance, as the IAEA identified this 
document as being related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon 
components, the first time the international body has attributed a 
nuclear weapons purpose to activities by Iran.
  Madam Speaker, if Iran were to go nuclear, many other countries in 
this combustible region, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and 
Turkey, to name a few, might follow. This proliferation would pose a 
grave threat to our security and certainly the security of our allies.
  Some criticize our European partners for failing in their 
negotiations with Iran. I agree that it has taken us too long to get to 
this point, but, frankly, when you think about it, our hand is 
strengthened at this point because of the European involvement.
  At the IAEA vote the other week, we had the permanent five members of 
the Security Council united. I am under no illusions that this united 
front will last, but it is an important first step.
  We will also hear from some that the administration has outsourced 
its diplomacy to the Europeans and has stood by as Iran moves toward a 
nuclear weapon. I will remind those that we alone cannot meet all 
security threats. We need partners. It is time to start challenging the 
norms that have developed over time.
  The Iranians skillfully talk about their inalienable rights under the 
nonproliferation treaty to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, 
including its most sensitive aspects. Indeed, in the eyes of the IAEA, 
Iran's crime has been its failure to report its nuclear materials and 
the technology, not the nuclear activities themselves, including 
uranium enrichment.

                              {time}  1100

  Under the guise of the NPT, Iran is walking right up to the edge of 
developing nuclear weapons. This is a violation of the spirit if not 
the letter of the NPT.
  My subcommittee will soon take a close look at this issue. This 
notion of rights has to be challenged, because if we don't, the world 
will be a very, very dangerous place.
  Mr. Speaker, there are no easy answers. We need to think long and 
hard about what types of sanctions are constructive in reaching the 
goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. This challenge 
will require careful and marked consideration by the administration, 
Congress, and our partners as we move forward. It is too serious for 
anything else.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the record the statement of 
the American representative to the IAEA Special Board of Governors 
meeting on February 4.

       Mr. Chairman, I wish to join other colleagues in expressing 
     condolences to the Egyptian delegation, and through them to 
     the Egyptian people, for yesterday's tragedy on the Red Sea.
       My government is pleased to have joined an overwhelming 
     majority of Board members in signaling to Iran through 
     adoption of this resolution the Board's firm determination 
     that Iran must meet its nonproliferation obligations.
       The Board's September 24, 2005 resolution found Iran in 
     noncompliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to 
     Article XII.C.
       That resolution also found that pursuant to Article 
     III.B.4, Iran's nuclear program raises questions that fall 
     within the competence of the UNSC.
       At that time and again in November, we deferred reporting 
     Iran to the Council to give Iran yet another opportunity to 
     choose diplomacy over confrontation.
       Unfortunately, Iran did not take that opportunity. As a 
     result, the Board today carried forward the statutory process 
     begun in September, by voting to report this Board's past 
     findings and concerns regarding Iran's noncompliance.
       I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt that 
     today's report to the Security Council will not divest the 
     IAEA of the challenge posed by Iran.
       We continue to expect the Agency's investigation of Iran's 
     nuclear program to proceed actively and urgently and we look 
     forward to the Director General's implementation report in 
     March. We note that the DG's report will also be conveyed to 
     the UNSC immediately after our next meeting.
       By reporting Iran to the Security Council now, we seek to 
     add the Council's weight to reinforce the Agency's role, 
     reinforce its investigation, and add an imperative for Iran

[[Page 1942]]

     to choose a course of cooperation and negotiation over a 
     course of confrontation.
       The Agency has a specific mandate to deal with nuclear 
     safeguards issues. This mandate is without prejudice to the 
     rights and responsibilities of the Security Council to 
     address matters that raise questions of international peace 
     and security, as we have found is the case with Iran.
       That is why the IAEA Statute expressly contemplates the 
     Security Council's involvement in such instances of 
     noncompliance. And that is why the Board made clear in 
     September that such a report is mandatory.
       In his recent State of the Union address, President Bush 
     emphasized that, ``the Iranian government is defying the 
     world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the 
     world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear 
     weapons.''
       We believe that this Board decision sends a strong and 
     clear message to Iran's leaders to abandon their pursuit of a 
     nuclear weapons capability.
       We continue to seek a diplomatic solution and we do not 
     envision diplomacy ending as a result of this report.
       Quite the contrary, we see this as part of a new phase of 
     diplomacy, one aimed at strengthening the ongoing efforts of 
     the Agency to investigate Iran's deeply troubling nuclear 
     activities, and underscoring the calls on Iran to resolve our 
     concerns through peaceful diplomacy rather than threats and 
     confrontation.
       Through this path, and only through this path, can Iran 
     persuasively demonstrate that it has now chosen to confine 
     its nuclear program to exclusively peaceful purposes.
       And through this path Iran can also start to restore its 
     standing in the international community to the benefit of the 
     Iranian people.
       Thank you Mr. Chairman.

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the resolution 
adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic 
             of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006


                         the board of governors

       (a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on 
     Iran's nuclear programme,
       (b) Recalling also the Director General's reports,
       (c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non 
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in 
     the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable 
     rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, 
     production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
     without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and 
     II of the Treaty,
       (d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for 
     their professional and impartial efforts to implement the 
     Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding 
     safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by 
     Iran of the suspension,
       (e) Recalling the Director General's description of this as 
     a special verification case,
       (f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the 
     Director General noted that after nearly three years of 
     intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a 
     position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's 
     nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared 
     nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
       (g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its 
     obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and 
     the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is 
     exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history 
     of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of 
     those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's 
     verification of declarations made by Iran since September 
     2002,
       (h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that 
     Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the 
     Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/
     67),
       (i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's 
     cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, 
     materials and activities which have applications in the 
     conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well 
     as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director 
     General in GOV/2005/67),
       (j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General 
     reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related 
     to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to 
     metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining 
     of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into 
     hemispherical forms,
       (k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear 
     programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of 
     confidence-building is required from Iran,
       (1) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for 
     a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and
       (m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would 
     contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to 
     realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of 
     mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
       1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be 
     resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful 
     nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to 
     the calls for confidence building measures which the Board 
     has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for 
     Iran to:
       re-establish full and sustained suspension of all 
     enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including 
     research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
       reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated 
     by heavy water;
       ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional 
     Protocol;
       pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with 
     the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed 
     on 18 December 2003;
       implement transparency measures, as requested by the 
     Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend 
     beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement 
     and Additional Protocol, and include such access to 
     individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use 
     equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and 
     development as the Agency may request in support of its 
     ongoing investigations;
       2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security 
     Council of the United Nations that these steps are required 
     of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council 
     all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to 
     this issue;
       3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in 
     a position to clarify some important issues relating to 
     Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in 
     its possession a document on the production of uranium metal 
     hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this 
     process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon 
     components; and, noting that the decision to put this 
     document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran 
     to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a 
     full copy to the Agency;
       4. Deeplv regrets that, despite repeated calls from the 
     Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment 
     related and reprocessing activities which the Board has 
     declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran 
     resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility 
     on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment 
     activities on 10 January 2006;
       5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of 
     confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a 
     fissile material production capability against the background 
     of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous 
     Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its 
     position in relation to confidence-building measures, which 
     are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a 
     constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can 
     result in increased confidence;
       6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to 
     the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable 
     and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify 
     possible activities which could have a military nuclear 
     dimension;
       7. Underlines that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's 
     declarations is ongoing and requests the Director General to 
     continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's 
     Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional 
     Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with 
     a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence 
     of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to 
     pursue additional transparency measures required for the 
     Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and 
     reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's 
     past nuclear activities;
       8. Requests the Director General to report on the 
     implementation of this and previous resolutions to the next 
     regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and 
     immediately thereafter to convey, together with any 
     Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security 
     Council; and
       9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a brief by the 
Deputy Director General For Safeguards on Iran's development of nuclear 
weapons.

 Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in 
    the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran's 
      Suspension of Enrichment-Related and Reprocessing Activities

       The purpose of this brief is to provide an update on the 
     developments that have taken place since November 2005 in 
     connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards 
     Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and on the 
     Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of 
     enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The brief 
     provides factual information concerning those developments; 
     it does not include any assessments thereof.
       Iran has continued to facilitate access under its 
     Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act 
     as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by 
     providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and 
     access to locations.

[[Page 1943]]




                        1. Enrichment Programme

       As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November 
     2005, during meetings that took place in October and November 
     2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional 
     information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme. 
     Responses to some of these requests were provided during 
     discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between 
     Iranian officials and an Agency team, headed by the Deputy 
     Director General for Safeguards. This information is 
     currently being assessed.

                           1.A. Contamination

       As part of its assessment of the correctness and 
     completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment 
     activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the 
     source(s) of low enriched uranium, LEU, particles, and some 
     high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at 
     locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components 
     had been manufactured, used and/or stored.

                          1.B. The 1987 offer

       As previously reported to the Board, Iran showed the Agency 
     in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document 
     reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by 
     a foreign intermediary concerning the possible supply of a 
     disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and 
     specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings, 
     specifications and calculations for a ``complete plant''; and 
     materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also 
     made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive 
     equipment; a liquid nitrogen plant; a water treatment and 
     purification plant; a complete set of workshop equipment for 
     mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium 
     re-conversion and casting capabilities.
       On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that the one-page 
     document was the only remaking documentary evidence relevant 
     to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this 
     to the secret nature of the programme and the management 
     style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at 
     that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists, 
     such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports, 
     personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its 
     statements concerning that offer.

                  1.C. Genesis of the mid-1990s offer

       According to Iran, there were no contacts with the network 
     between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and by key 
     members of the network about the events leading to the mid-
     1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this 
     context, Iran has been asked to provide further clarification 
     of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI 
     staff members in the mid-1990s.
       P-1 centrifuge component deliveries in the mid-1990s: Iran 
     has been unable to supply any documentation or other 
     information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of 
     500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The 
     Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and 
     contents of these shipments.
       P-2 centrifuge programme: Iran still maintains that, as a 
     result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the 
     mid-1990s, the intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2 
     centrifuge components (which contained no supporting 
     specifications), and that no P-2 components were delivered 
     along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to 
     assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during 
     the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this 
     period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2 
     centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge 
     components. In light of information available to the Agency 
     indicating the possible deliveries of such components, which 
     information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November 
     2005 to check again whether any deliveries had been made 
     after 1995.
       In connection with the R&D work on a modified P-2 design 
     said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting 
     company between 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confirmed that 
     the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased, 
     magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. The Agency is 
     still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to 
     acquire such magnets. 2.


                            2. Uranium Metal

       Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to 
     have been the drawings, specifications and supporting 
     documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of 
     which are dated from the early- to mid-1980's. Among these 
     was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the 
     reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and 
     the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into 
     hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon 
     components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other 
     specifications for machined pieces for such components. 
     According to Iran, this document had been provided on the 
     initiative of the network, and not at the request of the 
     AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the 
     Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency 
     during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document 
     again and to place it under Agency seal.


                 3. Transparency Visits and Discussions

       On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a 
     military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances 
     regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 
     activities at that site, where several environmental samples 
     were taken. Final assessment is still pending the results of 
     the analysis of those samples.
       Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional 
     information and clarifications related to efforts made by the 
     Physics Research Centre (PHRC), which had been established at 
     Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment 
     that could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion 
     activities. The Agency has also requested interviews with the 
     individuals involved in the acquisition of those items.
       On 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency 
     documentation the Agency had previously requested on efforts 
     by Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a 
     number of specific dual use items (electric drive equipment, 
     power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye 
     laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation 
     suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had 
     actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical 
     university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor. 
     However, Iran declined to make him available to the Agency 
     for an interview. The DDG-SG reiterated the Agency's request 
     to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential 
     for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use 
     of the equipment, which included balancing machines, mass 
     spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment 
     (equipment that appears to be relevant to uranium 
     enrichment).
       On that same day, the Agency also presented to Iran a list 
     of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to 
     see, and to take environmental samples from, the equipment in 
     situ. The following day, some of the high vacuum equipment on 
     the Agency's list was presented at a technical university, 
     and environmental samples were taken from it.
       On 26 January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification 
     about its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use 
     material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium 
     and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005. 
     High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and 
     environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that 
     the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing, 
     but had not been used because of its specifications. Iran 
     agreed to provide additional information on inquiries 
     concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and 
     special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's 
     acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves, and 
     filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31 
     January 2006 for environmental sampling.
       On 5 December 2005, the Agency reiterated its request for a 
     meeting to discuss information that had been made available 
     to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the 
     Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium 
     dioxide into UF4 (``green salt''), as well as 
     tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile 
     re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear 
     dimension and which appear to have administrative 
     interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the 
     ``issues related to baseless allegations.'' Iran agreed on 23 
     January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the 
     clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to 
     address the other topics during that meeting. In the course 
     of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the 
     Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow 
     diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications 
     related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national 
     nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the 
     allegations were baseless and that it would provide further 
     clarifications later.


                             4. Suspension

       The Agency has continued to verify and monitor all elements 
     of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and 
     reprocessing activities.
       In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency 
     that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006, 
     ``those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which 
     ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and 
     non-legally binding suspension'' (GOV/INF/2006/1). On 7 
     January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran 
     requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz, 
     Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of 
     suspension of enrichment related activities (see GOV/INF/
     2006/2). The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January 
     2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors.
       Since the removal of the seals, Iran has started what it 
     refers to as ``small scale R&D''. As of 30 January 2006, 
     Agency inspectors had not seen any new installation or 
     assembly of centrifuges, or the feeding of UF6 
     material for enrichment. However, substantial renovation of 
     the gas handling system is underway at the Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, and quality control of 
     components and some rotor testing is

[[Page 1944]]

     being conducted at Farayand Technique and Natanz. Due to the 
     fact that all centrifuge-related raw materials and components 
     are without IAEA seals, the Agency's supervision of the R&D 
     activities being carried out by Iran cannot be effective 
     except at PFEP, where containment and surveillance measures 
     are being applied for the enrichment process. The two 
     cylinders at Natanz containing UF6, from which 
     seals had been removed on 10 January 2006, were again placed 
     under Agency containment and surveillance on 29 January 2006.
       The uranium conversion campaign which commenced at the 
     Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan on 16 November 
     2005 is continuing and is expected to end in March 2006. All 
     UF6 produced at UCF thus far has remained under 
     Agency containment and surveillance.
       Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to 
     monitor the ongoing civil engineering construction of the 
     Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak.

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding back our time, may I just 
say fanaticism in the field of international affairs is always 
dangerous. But fanaticism armed with nuclear weapons is not just 
dangerous; it is unacceptable. Iran is determined to move in the 
direction of developing nuclear weapons. The civilized world cannot 
stand by.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume in closing.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my good friend, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Lantos), for his wise words. It is always a 
pleasure to work with him as well as with our chairman, Henry Hyde.
  Mr. Speaker the International Atomic Energy Agency in its February 4, 
2006 resolution said that after nearly 3 years the agency is not yet in 
a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials 
or activities in Iran.
  Iran needs to hear our message loud and clear. The United Nations 
Security Council now has the Iran case after 20 years of Iran's covert 
activities and after 3 years of mocking the international community. 
Let us send a message loud and clear today. Let us pass this 
resolution.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support H. Con. Res. 341, 
condemning Iran for violating its international nuclear 
nonproliferation obligations. Mr. Speaker, the United Nations Security 
Council must quickly consider Iran's repeated violations of 
international nuclear norms, impose a comprehensive sanctions regime 
and send an unequivocal message that the world rejects its nuclear 
ambitions.
  In addition to its refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, IAEA, Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has drawn 
considerable attention for his heinous calls for the United States' 
greatest ally, Israel, to be ``wiped off the map'' and his bold denial 
of the Holocaust. When offered a number of reasonable solutions to 
avert an international standoff, the Ahmadinejad regime has unwisely 
refused.
  It is a positive sign that Russia and Iran are continuing discussions 
on a proposal the U.S. and others have endorsed. This plan would have 
Russia enrich Iran's uranium and remove it once it's spent, thereby 
maintaining safeguards on the nuclear fuel. I am hopeful an agreement 
will be reached, but have no qualms about this body sending a resolute 
message to Iran that its breaches and failures to comply with its 
nuclear nonproliferation obligations will be met with strong 
resistance.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition of House 
Concurrent Resolution 341, which calls on the UN Security Council to 
expeditiously take action in response to reports of Iran's 
noncompliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
  I am gravely concerned about nuclear proliferation in Iran and in any 
other nation. But, this resolution is the wrong resolution at the wrong 
time.
  Right now, Russia is negotiating with Iran to avert their domestic 
production of enriched uranium. Russia and China also supported the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, decision to refer Iran to the 
Security Council, but requested that any action against Iran be delayed 
to March so these negotiations can continue.
  Yet, here we are on February 16th trying to supersede those 
negotiations by calling on the UN Security Council to act now. This 
strikes me as a step toward more unilateralism.
  In addition to my concern about interfering with ongoing 
negotiations, the latest U.S. National Intelligence Council analysis 
projects that Iran is a decade away from manufacturing the key 
ingredient for a nuclear weapon. This expert analysis gives me further 
reason to question this rush to unilateral action.
  I urge my colleagues to give peaceful negotiations the opportunity to 
succeed and vote against this resolution.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, some time yesterday, a Member introduced 
House Concurrent Resolution 341. Earlier today, without benefit of 
hearings or markup by any committee or subcommittee of the House, it 
was brought to the floor and the vast majority of members voted for it.
  They voted, I believe, for it for the best of reasons: to strengthen 
efforts by the international community to convince Iran to meet its 
obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  The resolution makes a number of important and factual points about 
Iran's lack of cooperation with IAEA and then sets out six statements 
of Congressional policy. The first two condemn Iran's breaches of its 
obligations and commend the efforts of several nations to find a 
diplomatic means to return Iran to compliance. The final clause urges 
the President to keep Congress informed on this issue. All well and 
good.
  But, for some reason, the fourth declaration goes beyond what 
international treaties require and beyond anything that Congress has 
carefully studied. It reads as follows:

       [Congress] declares that Iran, through its many breaches 
     for almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards 
     Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a 
     nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and 
     enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment 
     and facilities.

  Now, let's be clear on what ``nuclear fuel cycle'' means. It means 
any use of nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy for 
the provision of civilian electrical power.
  I think there is some level of agreement that our problem with Iran 
is not about nuclear power plants. And it is abundantly clear that Iran 
intends to insist on its right to nuclear energy. If Iran's leaders 
want to insist that they only seek to produce electricity, we should 
work with the IAEA to make sure there are so many inspectors assigned 
to Iran that they can't produce anything except electricity. A 
Congressional declaration that a country cannot use nuclear power for 
peaceful, minutely inspected, civilian purposes is neither practical 
nor helpful.
  Had there been hearings, I believe that the difficulties with this 
approach would have been identified. But once again, the Republican 
House leadership hasn't bothered with regular process, hasn't bothered 
with hearings and witnesses or even markups and amendments. The 
Republican leadership doesn't want to hear dissent, doesn't want to 
hear concerns, doesn't want to hear anything but ``yes, sir!''
  In addition, the convoluted language of the third declaration seems 
to call upon the Russian Federation to cease its unilateral efforts to 
bring Iran into compliance with its treaty obligations. Whether an 
arrangement can be designed that allows Iran access to nuclear power 
without creating its own enrichment facilities remains to be seen, but 
the attempt should not be scorned.
  So now the House is on record that the Iranian people should never be 
allowed to use nuclear power and that Russia should stop talking to 
Iran about solving this problem. If the resolution had not been brought 
to the floor today, just one day following its introduction, these 
problems might have been avoided.
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of 
this resolution.
  Iran must be condemned for following the path of nuclear 
proliferation. This past Tuesday, February 14, 2006, Iran announced 
that it has resumed uranium enrichment efforts, sending a signal to the 
world that it is taking steps to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Iran 
said it will no longer allow international inspectors to access its 
nuclear facilities. Therefore we must work to ensure that Iran is 
unsuccessful in the path that it has chosen.
  Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous and most horrible weapons man 
has ever invented. These weapons pose a threat to human kind; and an 
even graver threat when in the hands of a nation that supports 
terrorism. We need to work to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in 
our world.
  Iran must join the community of nations and lay down the instruments 
for the development of nuclear weapons. We must encourage all nations 
to lay down the burden and instruments of the most destructive weaponry 
known to human kind. There is enough madness on this little planet that 
we do not need to add more. There is not any room in our society for 
more nations to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction.

[[Page 1945]]

  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution. We must unite the 
community of nations and use all diplomatic means to rid our world of 
rogue nuclear threats.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Con. Res. 
341, which condemns the Government of Iran for violating its 
international nuclear nonproliferation obligations, and expressing 
support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security 
Council.
  Iran is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, which poses a 
threat to the national security of the United States and to the world. 
Iran has repeatedly violated its obligations to the international 
community, specifically the 1973 Safeguards Agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. In 2002 the world learned 
that Iran was illegally continuing to develop a secret nuclear program, 
which has led to years of negotiations with the international 
community. Last August, however, the Iranian government resumed its 
conversion of uranium. Earlier this month the IAEA voted 27 to 3 to 
report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for further action. 
I urge the Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to 
pressure Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA.
  The House should additionally take up and pass legislation to 
strengthen the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILSA. The House should pass 
H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act, which I have co-sponsored. The 
bill would strengthen ILSA, provide assistance to pro-democracy groups 
in Iran, and require that ILSA remain in effect until the President 
certifies to Congress that Iran has permanently and verifiably 
dismantled its weapons on mass destruction programs and has committed 
to combating their proliferation.
  I am pleased that the United States has continued to work closely 
with the international community--including the European Union, Russia, 
and China--on this urgent matter. I urge the President to keep Congress 
fully and current informed on this matter, as called for in this 
resolution. I urge the international community to impose economic 
sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
  We cannot allow a rogue nation such as Iran to obtain nuclear 
weapons. Iran has actively supported terrorist groups, such as 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran has funded 
suicide bombers in Israel and militant organizations elsewhere. Many of 
these terrorist groups are seeking weapons of mass destruction, WMD, so 
that they can kill or injure thousands or even millions of people. The 
Iranian President has publicly expressed his hope for ``a world without 
America,'' his desire to ``wipe Israel off the map,'' and has denied 
the existence of the Holocaust.
  I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I support House Concurrent Resolution 341 
condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international 
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts 
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council. As co-chairman 
of the Iran Working Group, I am increasingly concerned about Iran's 
movement towards the brink of a nuclear showdown. In response to the 
historic International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, referral of Iran to 
the United Nations Security Council, UNSC, Iran retaliated by halting 
snap inspections by IAEA inspectors. There are even reports that Iran 
resumed uranium-enrichment at its Natanz nuclear plant, a process that 
had been suspended for two years following the disclosure of Iran's 
covert program. Iranian President Ahmadinejad warned that Iran could 
withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if international 
pressure increased over its nuclear program.
  President Ahmadinejad repeatedly states that his nation will develop 
nuclear capabilities, and continually rebuffs efforts of nations such 
as Russia and the EU-3 in providing a way out of a conflict. Given the 
Iranian President's genocidal intentions of ``wiping Israel off the 
map,'' we cannot allow Iran to advance on its path towards a nuclear 
future.
  The Congress must consider many options to prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon. That is why I introduced House Concurrent 
Resolution 177, which calls on our allies and the U.S. to consider 
quarantining gasoline sales to Iran should the Iranians reject the 
international effort to end the nuclear impasse.
  Despite being one of the world's top oil producing nations, Iran is 
highly dependent on foreign gasoline due to severe mismanagement of its 
domestic energy supply. The need is so great that the Iranian 
government regularly debates rationing gasoline to manage its short 
supply. An oil embargo on exports from Iran could hurt Western 
economies, but a gasoline quarantine on imports to Iran would fall 
heavily on Iran alone.
  Now is the time for the Security Council to take strong action 
against Iran. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of House 
Concurrent Resolution 341.
  Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this 
resolution to condemn the Iranian government for violating its 
international nonproliferation obligations and to support efforts to 
report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
  Last week, the 35-nation International Atomic Energy Agency's, IAEA, 
Board of Governors overwhelmingly voted to report Iran to the U.N. 
Security Council, an important step in the international effort to 
prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons.
  Iran has made clear its plans to enrich uranium by building its 
centrifuge program and constructing a heavy-water reactor which could 
provide plutonium for nuclear weapons. Additionally, the IAEA revealed 
that Iran was in possession of a document describing the procedure for 
fabricating uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres, which form 
the core of a nuclear weapon.
  Following the vote on the resolution, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad ordered Iran's nuclear commission to end its cooperation 
with the IAEA and begin full-scale production of enriched uranium, 
which can be used to build nuclear weapons.
  The thought of Iran with a nuclear weapon is a frightening one, and 
if this issue is not addressed promptly Iran will soon have the ability 
and materials to produce such weapons. Nuclear proliferation alone is a 
threat to American interests and security; nuclear proliferation to a 
country with a radical Islamic leader who has supported terrorism is an 
even more immediate threat.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
resolution to condemn Iran's decision to advance its nuclear program 
and to urge the U.N. Security Council to address this issue at once.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. Iran 
has obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT, to not 
carry out a nuclear weapons program. Iran has ignored its obligations 
by carrying out a covert uranium enrichment program. It is becoming 
increasingly clear that this enrichment program is not merely aimed at 
producing nuclear fuel for a civilian energy program. According the 
IAEA, Iran has documents in their possession for casting of enriched 
and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres--something which has no 
legitimate civilian purpose and which appears clearly to be related to 
the fabrication of nuclear weapons components. Possession of these 
documents is a violation of the NPT.
  I support the work of the IAEA to monitor Iran's nuclear program, to 
press for Iran to agree to the Additional Protocol for enhanced 
monitoring and inspection of that program. The British, the French, and 
the Germans have tried for years to convince Iran to move away from 
nuclear weapons capability and to agree to increased international 
monitoring of its nuclear activities. Iran has rejected their efforts 
and made it clear that it is not willing to accept the type of 
negotiated solution proposed by the Europeans.
  Right now we face a crisis that challenges the future of the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime. If the international 
community cannot address the issue of Iran, then we risk the collapse 
of the NPT.
  I hope the U.N. Security Council can resolve this issue. Now that 
this matter has been referred to the Security Council, the 
international community needs to begin a dialogue about how best to 
respond to Iran's action. We need to start thinking about tough and 
enforceable sanctions that can send a clear signal to Tehran that 
ignoring the will of the international community on this issue has 
consequences.
  As we call upon Iran to stop their clandestine program, however, we 
must remember the United States also has obligations to the NPT. We can 
not ask the world to enforce regulation on Iran while we shirk our 
obligations to the NPT by opening up nuclear trade with India, a 
country which has not signed the Treaty. If we seek special exemptions 
from international and domestic nonproliferation law for India while 
simultaneously seeking strict enforcement of such laws for Iran, an NPT 
signatory, we will undermine our credibility as a leader on 
nonproliferation. Iran will accuse us of hypocrisy, and other nations 
may seek similar special exemptions.
  For example, we know that China has long had a close relationship 
with Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan has already asked the U.S. to 
make special exemptions for them from international and domestic 
nonproliferation law. China has called for that as well. Are we going 
to also exempt Pakistan from the international system of controls and 
safeguards established by the NPT and by U.S.

[[Page 1946]]

law? Are we going to stand by and do nothing if China goes ahead and 
sends the same type of nuclear technology and materials that we are 
talking about sending to India?
  We also know that Russia has historically had a close relationship 
with the Iranian nuclear program. They've been trying to get the 
Iranians to agree to a nuclear fuel supply arrangement in return for 
foregoing a domestic Iranian enrichment program. But what if Moscow 
decides now to go far beyond that and afford Iran broader access to 
controlled nuclear technology, citing what we're proposing to do with 
India?
  I think that if we want to send a strong signal to Iran that its 
flouting of international nuclear nonproliferation norms is 
unacceptable and will have adverse consequences, then now is not the 
time to be thinking of granting selective exemptions from 
nonproliferation laws and treaties for other nations, even if they are 
our friends. We need to be principled leaders on the most important of 
all issues facing our country. We do not want Iran, with a regime that 
has made it clear that it desires the destruction of Israel, a regime 
that is known to have provided material support to terrorist groups, to 
obtain its own nuclear arsenal.
  The time for us to act as an international community is now. There 
are forces within Iran that want to move away from extremism. We need 
to send a strong signal that the international community does not 
accept the current Iranian government's nuclear aspirations, and that 
there will be consequences, there will be sanctions, if Tehran persists 
in its current course of action.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a cosponsor of this 
resolution. Iran's resumption of nuclear activities and its non-
compliance with international commitments must be met by a united 
Congress and a united international community.
  For almost 3 years, the United States, the European Union, Russia, 
the IAEA and other parties have been working to negotiate an end to 
those parts of Iran's nuclear program that could allow it to produce 
nuclear weapons. Iran has continued to mislead the international 
community about its efforts. It has alternated diplomatic overtures 
with clandestine activity on its nuclear program.
  In June 2004, just a few months after making assurances to the 
international community, Iran was criticized by the IAEA for failing to 
cooperate with an inquiry of its nuclear activities. In November 2004, 
Iran agreed to suspend much of its uranium enrichment in a deal with 
the EU. However, in August 2005, Iran resumed its uranium conversion at 
its Isfahan plant and in January 2006, broke IAEA seals at its Natanz 
facility. It has since resumed enriching uranium at that facility.
  Experts indicate that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in as 
little as 3 to 5 years. According to a report issued by the IAEA to 
member governments on January 31, 2006, Iran has a clandestine effort, 
dubbed Green Salt, which has been working on uranium processing, high 
explosives and a missile warhead design. The report clearly 
demonstrates a nexus between Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear fuel 
cycle and Tehran's military, thus undercutting the Iranian government's 
repeated denials that it seeks to develop nuclear weapons.
  Iran's growing nuclear capability is compounded by a series of recent 
statements by Iran's president, in which he declared that a fellow 
member of the United Nations must be wiped off the map. These remarks 
demonstrate a disregard for human life and undermine the central 
principle of the United Nations. The world community cannot stand by 
while an outlaw regime announces its desire to annihilate millions of 
people and attempts to develop the nuclear weapons to do so. The 
community of nations has properly condemned these threats; now we must 
ensure that Iran will never develop the capability to act on them.
  I am hopeful that all members of the United Nations Security Council 
will take a strong stand for international peace and security when this 
issue is considered by the Security Council in March. I can think of no 
greater priority for the Council and believe that concerted action by 
the Council's Permanent Members represents the best opportunity to 
defuse this crisis.
  As a gesture of appreciation from the Congress, I, along with Mr. 
Kirk of Illinois and Mr. Andrews of New Jersey, am circulating a letter 
to the other Permanent Members of the Security Council. The letter 
thanks them for their support in reporting Iran to the Security Council 
and urges them to establish consequences to continued non-compliance. I 
encourage my colleagues to sign the letter.
  I am hopeful that with a united Congress and a united international 
community, we can prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons which 
could destabilize the entire region and which could be used to carry 
out Iran's professed desire to wipe millions of its neighbors off the 
map.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, several years ago, we learned that Iran was 
operating a secret program to enrich uranium and carry out other 
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
  Iran's failure to report these activities to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency was a blatant violation of its obligations under the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
  The more we learn about Iran's program, the more obvious it's become 
that Iran's true intention is not peaceful power generation, but the 
development of a nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States, 
our allies in the Middle East, and even Europe.
  Any seeds of doubt on this issue have been dispelled once and for all 
by Iran's rejection of a sensible proposal put forward by Great 
Britain, France and Germany, and more recently, its move to resume 
uranium enrichment.
  The election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad has made the urgency of 
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that much greater.
  With his comments about the Holocaust being a ``myth,'' endorsement 
for ``wiping Israel off the map,'' and enthusiastic support of 
Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations, this vile anti-
Semite has made his true intentions crystal clear.
  The IAEA's decision to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council is a 
long-overdue step in the right direction.
  But tough words must be backed by tough action. We must continue to 
push the other members of the Security Council--especially China and 
Russia--to meet their international obligations.
  Congress should also pass H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. 
This important legislation will close a loophole in the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act that has allowed successive administrations to avoid 
penalizing foreign firms that continue to invest in Iran's oil and gas 
sector.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 341. This 
resolution is closely modeled on a resolution, Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 78, introduced in the Senate by the majority leader, Senator 
Frist, csponsored by Senator Reid, the minority leader, Senators Lugar 
and Biden, and a bipartisan group totaling 32 Senators, and adopted 
unanimously on January 27. Our colleague, Representative Ros-Lehtinen 
of Florida, has worked with me and other members of the House Committee 
on International Relations, including our distinguished ranking 
Democrat, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, on this 
resolution. She has updated the text of the Senate resolution in the 
light of recent events and in the light of the understanding that we in 
the House have about Iran's actions and intentions.
  This House may be divided on precisely how to respond to every aspect 
of the Iranian challenge, but we are certainly united, as our vote will 
show, in our support for the current efforts to bring the weight of the 
Security Council of the United Nations to bear against Iran's 
continuing violations of its formal and informal obligations concerning 
its nuclear activities.
  These efforts are not only American efforts, but ones which involve 
many responsible members of the international community. The 
administration deserves credit for coaxing some of the reluctant states 
to this point: the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, has indeed 
reported to the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear program. 
Although the IAEA may make additional reports during the next month, 
the die is cast: the Security Council is in a position to take action, 
and it should do so. It should respond to what is clearly a threat to 
international peace and security--and making such responses in a 
collective way is precisely the purpose it is meant to serve.
  The administration deserves credit for having brought along the IAEA 
Board of Governors and, in particular, all of the permanent members of 
the Security Council, to this stage in the process. The signal to Iran 
could not have been more stark.
  Critical to arriving at this point was the support extended by the 
Bush administration for the so-called ``ED-3'' process, in which 
Britain, France, and Germany conducted negotiations with Iran--
negotiations that ultimately failed to contain Iran's efforts, to be 
sure, but which succeeded in keeping the international community moving 
forward in unison.
  At this point, we need to continue to keep the pressure on, but let 
us keep the pressure on the recalcitrant party--the Iranians--and not 
begin internecine warfare among the Western powers. It is only with the 
cooperation of other States that we can truly pressure Iran.

[[Page 1947]]

  As we consider other legislation in the next months--and the 
consideration of this resolution does not, in my mind, prejudice the 
ability of the House to consider other legislation--we should bear in 
mind that we need allies in this struggle. Sticking our finger in the 
eye of other states which are, in general terms, ``on our side'' will 
do nothing to bring Iran to heel.
  Another reason to work with our friends is that if the Security 
Council does not achieve consensus on how to deal with Iran, we will 
need to work with them to arrive at a ``Plan B,'' as an alternative. 
That plan should consist, in all likelihood, of a series of 
comprehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions.
  Those sanctions should be designed to serve several purposes. First, 
they should make it clear to the Iranian people that their leaders' 
course of action needs to change. Second, they should serve to inflict 
some pain on the Iranian leadership in an effort to coerce those 
leaders to behave in a responsible way. Finally, they should reduce the 
resources available to the Iranian state to continue their nuclear 
weapons program.
  In summary, Mr. Speaker, this is an important resolution; it 
indicates quite clearly that we are behind the administration's 
approach. I hope that we will continue to support it in the days ahead.
  Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my support of the 
resolution condemning Iran for violating its nonproliferation 
obligations and expressing support for efforts to report them to the 
United Nations Security Council.
  Early last month, the Iranian regime announced that it planned to 
restart its nuclear research program. This was in clear violation of a 
2004 agreement that had been reached with Britain, France and Germany 
to suspend uranium enrichment operations.
  Iran claims that the program is aimed at generating electricity, but 
I think the United States and the world know better. In fact, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency has already voted to report Iran to 
the U.N. Security Council.
  The president of the Iranian regime, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has also 
caused concern in the United States and Europe with his confrontational 
statements denying the Holocaust happened and stating his desire to 
annihilate Israel.
  The United States fully expects the Security Council to add its 
weight to the IAEA's calls for Iran to return to the 2004 agreement, 
suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activity, cooperate fully with 
the IAEA and return to negotiations with Great Britain, France and 
Germany.
  Only then will the Iranian regime restore any confidence that it is 
in fact, not seeking nuclear weapons under the guise of an 
``electricity program.''
  Mr. Speaker, with their continued defiance it's imperative that the 
United Nations act quickly. We must send a clear message to the Iranian 
regime that he world will not permit them to obtain nuclear weapons.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). All time for 
debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, February 15, 2006, 
the concurrent resolution is considered read and the previous question 
is ordered on the concurrent resolution and on the preamble.
  The question is on the concurrent resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 404, 
nays 4, answered ``present'' 4, not voting 20, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 12]

                               YEAS--404

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
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                                NAYS--4

     Kucinich
     McDermott
     Paul
     Stark

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--4

     Abercrombie
     Capuano
     Kaptur
     Lee

                             NOT VOTING--20

     Berman
     Bishop (UT)
     Blumenauer
     Campbell (CA)
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     Evans
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     Wasserman Schultz
     Westmoreland
     Woolsey


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington) (during the 
vote). Members are advised that there are 2 minutes remaining in this 
vote.

                              {time}  1131

  Mr. MOORE of Kansas changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  Ms. LEE changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``present.''

[[Page 1948]]

  So the concurrent resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to vote today on H. Con. Res. 
341 because I was traveling on official business to a Middle East 
regional security conference in Athens, Greece, and then on to Egypt 
and Israel for meetings with top government officials. Had I been 
present, I would have voted ``yea.''

                          ____________________