[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 18]
[House]
[Pages 22861-22877]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 5682, HENRY J. HYDE UNITED STATES-INDIA 
             PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT OF 2006

  Mr. BOEHNER (during the Special Order of Mr. Kirk) submitted the 
following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 5682) to 
exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a 
proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India:

                  Conference Report (H. Rept. 109-721)

  The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two 
Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 5682), to 
exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a 
proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India, having met, 
after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do 
recommend to their respective Houses as follows:
  That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the 
Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:
  In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate 
amendment, insert the following:

          TITLE I--UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde United 
     States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
     2006''.

     SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other 
     weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and 
     the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United 
     States foreign policy;
       (2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
     and strengthening its implementation, particularly its 
     verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States 
     nonproliferation policy;
       (3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing 
     the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and 
     maintaining a stable international security situation;
       (4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and 
     remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential 
     challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global 
     nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken 
     the NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons 
     capabilities;
       (5) it is in the interest of the United States to the 
     fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that 
     are not States Party to the NPT are responsible in the 
     disposition of any nuclear technology they develop;
       (6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter 
     into an agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant 
     to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2153) with a country that has never been a State Party to the 
     NPT if--
       (A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with 
     respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to 
     nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
       (B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted 
     democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is 
     congruent to that of the United States, and is working with 
     the United States on key foreign policy initiatives related 
     to nonproliferation;
       (C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate and 
     implement substantially improved protections against the 
     proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and 
     the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that 
     would further the development of its nuclear weapons program; 
     and
       (D) such cooperation will induce the country to give 
     greater political and material support to the achievement of 
     United States global and regional nonproliferation 
     objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, 
     and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that 
     sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to 
     acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass 
     destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
       (7) the United States should continue its policy of 
     engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between 
     India and Pakistan;
       (8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the 
     national interest of the United States;
       (9) the United States and India share common democratic 
     values and the potential for increasing and sustained 
     economic engagement;
       (10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
     United States and other countries has the potential to 
     benefit the people of all countries;
       (11) such commerce also represents a significant change in 
     United States policy regarding commerce with countries that 
     are not States Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation 
     of the international nonproliferation regime;
       (12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
     United States and other countries must be achieved in a 
     manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or 
     regional arms races and maximizes India's adherence to 
     international nonproliferation regimes, including, in 
     particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     (NSG); and
       (13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or 
     encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any 
     other party if such exports are terminated under United 
     States law.

     SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

       (a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the 
     United States:
       (1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce 
     nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
     outside of the NPT.
       (2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the 
     right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear 
     energy for peaceful purposes'', as set forth in Article IV of 
     the NPT, as being a right that applies only to the extent 
     that it is consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT 
     to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons 
     capabilities, including by refraining from all nuclear 
     cooperation with any State Party that the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full 
     compliance with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards 
     obligations.
       (3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines 
     for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of 
     Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and 
     Related Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions 
     related to the those guidelines, and the rules and practices 
     regarding NSG decisionmaking.
       (4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning 
     consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and 
     recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a 
     timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such 
     violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an 
     involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members 
     from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such 
     time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been 
     achieved.
       (5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and 
     technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
     reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of 
     heavy water, work with members of the NSG, individually and 
     collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such 
     equipment and technologies, including to India.
       (6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear 
     equipment, materials, or technology from other participating 
     governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear 
     transfers to that country are suspended or terminated 
     pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.
       (b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the 
     policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
       (1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on 
     the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive 
     purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion 
     and implementation of a treaty banning the production of 
     fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United 
     States and India become parties.
       (3) Secure India's--
       (A) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative;
       (B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
     Principles of such Initiative;
       (C) public announcement of its decision to conform its 
     export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
     Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
     Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
       (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
     implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and
       (E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on 
     Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna 
     on September 12, 1997.
       (4) Secure India's full and active participation in United 
     States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, 
     sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons 
     of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability 
     and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear 
     fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
       (5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in 
     South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual 
     elimination.
       (6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian 
     nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United 
     States except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures 
     required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)).
       (7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium 
     described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in 
     paragraph (2), encourage India not to increase its production 
     of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
       (8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional 
     Protocol to which India is a party

[[Page 22862]]

     with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any export or reexport 
     to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.
       (9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any 
     agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to 
     section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
     meet the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) and 
     a.(3) through a.(9) of such section.
       (10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the 
     Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear 
     facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor 
     operating requirements.

     SEC. 104. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

       (a) In General.--If the President makes the determination 
     described in subsection (b), the President may--
       (1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India 
     arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the requirement of subsection 
     a.(2) of such section;
       (2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports 
     to India; and
       (3) waive with respect to India the application of--
       (A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
     (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
       (B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding any 
     actions that occurred before July 18, 2005.
       (b) Determination by the President.--The determination 
     referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the 
     President that the following actions have occurred:
       (1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA with 
     a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear 
     facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a 
     declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials with 
     the IAEA.
       (2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps 
     required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement 
     requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in 
     accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices 
     (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) 
     to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs 
     as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including 
     materials used in or produced through the use of India's 
     civil nuclear facilities.
       (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
     toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA 
     principles, practices, and policies that would apply to 
     India's civil nuclear program.
       (4) India is working actively with the United States for 
     the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the 
     cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in 
     nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
       (5) India is working with and supporting United States and 
     international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
     reprocessing technology to any state that does not already 
     possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing 
     plants.
       (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear 
     and other sensitive materials and technology, including 
     through--
       (A) the enactment and effective enforcement of 
     comprehensive export control legislation and regulations;
       (B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, 
     policies, and practices with the guidelines and practices of 
     the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; and
       (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with 
     the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.
       (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to 
     India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.
       (c) Submission to Congress.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees the determination made 
     pursuant to subsection (b), together with a report detailing 
     the basis for the determination.
       (2) Information to be included.--To the fullest extent 
     available to the United States, the report referred to in 
     paragraph (1) shall include the following information:
       (A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United 
     States and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military 
     nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the 
     declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India's 
     civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, 
     including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and 
     declaration, together with copies of the plan and 
     declaration.
       (B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered into 
     between India and the IAEA requiring the application of 
     safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil 
     nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in 
     subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, and 
     a description of the progress toward its full implementation.
       (C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and 
     implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and 
     the IAEA, including a description of the scope of such 
     Additional Protocol.
       (D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work 
     with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral 
     treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear 
     weapons, including a description of the steps that the United 
     States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify 
     and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop 
     production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 
     unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or 
     treaty.
       (E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent 
     the spread of nuclear-related technology, including 
     enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can 
     be used to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, as well as 
     the support that India is providing to the United States to 
     further United States objectives to restrict the spread of 
     such technology.
       (F) A description of the steps that India is taking to 
     secure materials and technology applicable for the 
     development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass 
     destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the 
     application of comprehensive export control legislation and 
     regulations, and through harmonization with and adherence to 
     MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement 
     guidelines, compliance with United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation 
     Security Initiative.
       (G) A description and assessment of the specific measures 
     that India has taken to fully and actively participate in 
     United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, 
     and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts 
     to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear 
     weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or 
     reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of 
     mass destruction.
       (H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating to 
     nuclear cooperation with India, including whether nuclear 
     cooperation by the United States under an agreement for 
     cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is consistent with the 
     decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.
       (I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation 
     envisioned by the United States and India that will be 
     implemented under the agreement for nuclear cooperation, 
     including whether such cooperation will include the provision 
     of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
       (J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that 
     proposed United States civil nuclear cooperation with India 
     will not in any way assist India's nuclear weapons program.
       (d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers.--
       (1) In general.--Pursuant to the obligations of the United 
     States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title 
     constitutes authority to carry out any civil nuclear 
     cooperation between the United States and a country that is 
     not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any 
     way assist, encourage, or induce that country to manufacture 
     or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive 
     devices.
       (2) NSG transfer guidelines.--Notwithstanding the entry 
     into force of an agreement for cooperation with India 
     arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this title, no item 
     subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer 
     guidelines of the NSG, or to NSG decisions related thereto, 
     may be transferred to India if such transfer would be 
     inconsistent with the transfer guidelines of the NSG in 
     effect on the date of the transfer.
       (3) Termination of nuclear transfers to india.--
       (A) In general.--Notwithstanding the entry into force of an 
     agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to 
     section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
     and pursuant to this title, and except as provided under 
     subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related 
     material, equipment, or technology to India shall be 
     terminated if there is any materially significant transfer by 
     an Indian person of--
       (i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or 
     technology that is not consistent with NSG guidelines or 
     decisions, or
       (ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or 
     technology that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines,

     unless the President determines that cessation of such 
     exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
     United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise 
     jeopardize the common defense and security.
       (B) Exception.--The President may choose not to terminate 
     exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, 
     and technology to India under subparagraph (A) if--
       (i) the transfer covered under such subparagraph was made 
     without the knowledge of the Government of India;
       (ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Government of 
     India did not own, control, or direct the Indian person that 
     made the transfer or the Indian person that made the transfer 
     is a natural person who acted without the knowledge of any 
     entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 
     110(5); and
       (iii) the President certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that the Government of India has 
     taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement 
     actions against the Indian person with respect to such 
     transfer.
       (4) Exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers to india 
     related to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water 
     production.--
       (A) In general.--
       (i) Nuclear regulatory commission.--The Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission may only issue licenses for the export or reexport 
     to India of any equipment, components, or materials related 
     to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing

[[Page 22863]]

     of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water if 
     the requirements of subparagraph (B) are met.
       (ii) Secretary of energy.--The Secretary of Energy may only 
     issue authorizations for the transfer or retransfer to India 
     of any equipment, materials, or technology related to the 
     enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear 
     fuel, or the production of heavy water (including under the 
     terms of a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160)) if the 
     requirements of subparagraph (B) are met.
       (B) Requirements for approvals.--Exports, reexports, 
     transfers, and retransfers referred to in subparagraph (A) 
     may only be approved if--
       (i) the end user--

       (I) is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-
     approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel 
     cycle capabilities; or
       (II) is a facility participating in, and the export, 
     reexport, transfer, or retransfer is associated with, a 
     bilateral or multinational program to develop a 
     proliferation-resistant fuel cycle;

       (ii) appropriate measures are in place at any facility 
     referred to in clause (i) to ensure that no sensitive nuclear 
     technology, as defined in section 4(5) of the Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3203(5)), will be 
     diverted to any person, site, facility, location, or program 
     not under IAEA safeguards; and
       (iii) the President   determines that the export, reexport, 
     transfer, or retransfer will not assist in the manufacture or 
     acquisition of nuclear explosive devices or the production of 
     fissile material for military purposes.
       (5) Nuclear export accountability program.--
       (A) In general.--The President shall ensure that all 
     appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability 
     with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology 
     sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India so as to 
     ensure--
       (i) full implementation of the protections required under 
     section 123 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2153 (a)(1)); and
       (ii) United States compliance with Article I of the NPT.
       (B) Measures.--The measures taken pursuant to subparagraph 
     (A) shall include the following:
       (i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions 
     pursuant to the export licensing authorities of the Nuclear 
     Regulatory Commission and the Department of Commerce and the 
     authorizing authorities of the Department of Energy, 
     including, as appropriate, conditions regarding end-use 
     monitoring.
       (ii) A detailed system of reporting and accounting for 
     technology transfers, including any retransfers in India, 
     authorized by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 57 
     b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such 
     system shall be capable of providing assurances that--

       (I) the identified recipients of the nuclear technology are 
     authorized to receive the nuclear technology;
       (II) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be 
     used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities and 
     will not be used for any military or nuclear explosive 
     purpose; and
       (III) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will 
     not be retransferred without the prior consent of the United 
     States, and facilities, equipment, or materials derived 
     through the use of transferred technology will not be 
     transferred without the prior consent of the United States.

       (iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement 
     safeguards as required by an agreement for cooperation 
     arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate assurance that 
     arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are 
     consistent with the requirements of section 123 a.(1) of such 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance of 
     safeguards as set forth in the agreement regardless of 
     whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any 
     reason.
       (C) Implementation.--The measures described in subparagraph 
     (B) shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances 
     that the recipient is complying with the relevant 
     requirements, terms, and conditions of any licenses issued by 
     the United States regarding such exports, including those 
     relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure 
     transit, and storage of such exports.
       (e) Joint Resolution of Approval Requirement.--Section 123 
     d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) is 
     amended in the second proviso by inserting after ``that 
     subsection'' the following: ``, or an agreement exempted 
     pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the Henry J. Hyde United 
     States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
     2006,''.
       (f) Sunset.--The authority provided under subsection (a)(1) 
     to exempt an agreement shall terminate upon the enactment of 
     a joint resolution under section 123 d. of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) approving such an agreement.
       (g) Reporting to Congress.--
       (1) Information on nuclear activities of india.--The 
     President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees 
     fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of 
     any significant nuclear activities of India, including--
       (A) any material noncompliance on the part of the 
     Government of India with--
       (i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the 
     Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of 
     the United States and the Prime Minister of India;
       (ii) the separation plan presented in the national 
     parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail 
     on May 11, 2006;
       (iii) a safeguards agreement between the Government of 
     India and the IAEA;
       (iv) an Additional Protocol between the Government of India 
     and the IAEA;
       (v) an agreement for cooperation between the Government of 
     India and the United States Government arranged pursuant to 
     section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
     or any subsequent arrangement under section 131 of such Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 2160);
       (vi) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses 
     regarding the export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-
     use material, equipment, or technology; and
       (vii) United States laws and regulations regarding such 
     licenses;
       (B) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after 
     the date of the enactment of this title;
       (C) significant changes in the production by India of 
     nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile 
     material produced; and
       (D) changes in the purpose or operational status of any 
     unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
       (2) Implementation and compliance report.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date on which an agreement for cooperation 
     with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) enters into force, and 
     annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report including--
       (A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and 
     nuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or 
     intends to place under IAEA safeguards;
       (B) a comprehensive listing of--
       (i) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear 
     Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy for exports 
     and reexports to India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, 
     Code of Federal Regulations;
       (ii) any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce 
     for the export or reexport to India of commodities, related 
     technology, and software which are controlled for nuclear 
     nonproliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the 
     Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of title 15, 
     Code of Federal Regulation, or any successor regulation;
       (iii) any other United States authorizations for the export 
     or reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and
       (iv) with respect to each such license or other form of 
     authorization described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)--

       (I) the number or other identifying information of each 
     license or authorization;
       (II) the name or names of the authorized end user or end 
     users;
       (III) the name of the site, facility, or location in India 
     to which the export or reexport was made;
       (IV) the terms and conditions included on such licenses and 
     authorizations;
       (V) any post-shipment verification procedures that will be 
     applied to such exports or reexports; and
       (VI) the term of validity of each such license or 
     authorization;

       (C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce 
     between India and other countries, including any such trade 
     that--
       (i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or 
     decisions of the NSG; or
       (ii) would not meet the standards applied to exports or 
     reexports of such material, equipment, or technology of 
     United States origin;
       (D) either--
       (i) an assessment that India is in full compliance with the 
     commitments and obligations contained in the agreements and 
     other documents referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) of 
     paragraph (1)(A); or
       (ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance 
     issues arising with regard to the adherence by India to its 
     commitments and obligations, including--

       (I) the measures the United States Government has taken to 
     remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues;
       (II) the responses of the Government of India to such 
     measures;
       (III) the measures the United States Government plans to 
     take to this end in the coming year; and
       (IV) an assessment of the implications of any continued 
     noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India 
     remains in the national security interest of the United 
     States;

       (E)(i) an assessment of whether India is fully and actively 
     participating in United States and international efforts to 
     dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain 
     Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
     including a nuclear weapons capability (including the 
     capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and 
     the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including a 
     description of the specific measures that India has taken in 
     this regard; and
       (ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively 
     participating in such efforts, a description of--
       (I) the measures the United States Government has taken to 
     secure India's full and active participation in such efforts;
       (II) the responses of the Government of India to such 
     measures; and
       (III) the measures the United States Government plans to 
     take in the coming year to secure India's full and active 
     participation;

[[Page 22864]]

       (F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear 
     cooperation with India is in any way assisting India's 
     nuclear weapons program, including through--
       (i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or 
     nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
     facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
       (ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United 
     States technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
     facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or 
     for any activity related to the research, development, 
     testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
       (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to 
     facilitate the increased production by India of highly 
     enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear 
     facilities;
       (G) a detailed description of--
       (i) United States efforts to promote national or regional 
     progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, 
     limiting, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, 
     including stockpiles for military purposes, pending creation 
     of a worldwide fissile material cut-off regime, including the 
     institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
       (ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such efforts; 
     and
       (iii) assistance that the United States is providing, or 
     would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote 
     the objectives in clause (i), consistent with its obligations 
     under international law and existing agreements;
       (H) an estimate of--
       (i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India during 
     the previous year;
       (ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used 
     or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; 
     and
       (iii) the rate of production in India of--

       (I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
       (II) nuclear explosive devices;

       (I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India's 
     nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during the 
     previous year and the proportion of such production that can 
     be attributed to India's declared civil reactors;
       (J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected 
     the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;
       (K) a detailed description of efforts and progress made 
     toward the achievement of India's--
       (i) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative;
       (ii) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
     Principles of such Initiative;
       (iii) public announcement of its decision to conform its 
     export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
     Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
     Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
       (iv) effective implementation of the decision described in 
     clause (iii); and
       (L) the disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear 
     fuel from India's civilian nuclear program, and any plans or 
     activities relating to future disposal of such spent nuclear 
     fuel.
       (3) Submittal with other annual reports.--
       (A) Report on proliferation prevention.--Each annual report 
     submitted under paragraph (2) after the initial report may be 
     submitted together with the annual report on proliferation 
     prevention required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
       (B) Report on progress toward regional nonproliferation.--
     The information required to be submitted under paragraph 
     (2)(F) after the initial report may be submitted together 
     with the annual report on progress toward regional 
     nonproliferation required under section 620F(c) of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).
       (4) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 105. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR 
                   NONPROLIFERATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

       Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action 
     in violation of an obligation of the United States under the 
     NPT.

     SEC. 106. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS.

       A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall 
     cease to be effective if the President determines that India 
     has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of 
     the enactment of this title.

     SEC. 107. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.

       Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the 
     purposes of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2797b).

     SEC. 108. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

       Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
     Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg 
     Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
     2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of 
     Public Law 10609113 and contained in appendix G of that Act; 
     113 Stat. 150109486)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon at the end;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(C) so much of the reports required under section 104 of 
     the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
     Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to verification or 
     compliance matters; and''.

     SEC. 109. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR 
                   NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through 
     the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration, is authorized to establish a cooperative 
     nuclear nonproliferation program to pursue jointly with 
     scientists from the United States and India a program to 
     further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, including 
     scientific research and development efforts, with an emphasis 
     on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred to as ``the 
     program'').
       (b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
     Defense.
       (c) National Academies Recommendations.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into 
     an agreement with the National Academies to develop 
     recommendations for the implementation of the program.
       (2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under 
     paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified 
     individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the 
     communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year 
     of--
       (A) recommendations for research and related programs 
     designed to overcome existing technological barriers to 
     nuclear nonproliferation; and
       (B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded 
     under this section are achieving the goals of the activities 
     and programs.
       (3) Public availability.--The recommendations and 
     assessments prepared under this subsection shall be made 
     publicly available.
       (d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All 
     United States activities related to the program shall be 
     consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

     SEC. 110. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) The term ``Additional Protocol'' means a protocol 
     additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as 
     negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a Model 
     Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular 
     (INFCIRC) 540.
       (2) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (3) The term ``dual-use material, equipment, or 
     technology'' means material, equipment, or technology that 
     may be used in nuclear or nonnuclear applications.
       (4) The term ``IAEA safeguards'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).
       (5) The term ``Indian person'' means--
       (A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of India;
       (B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
     society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, 
     organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of 
     India or has its principal place of business in India; and
       (C) any Indian governmental entity, including any 
     governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.
       (6) The terms ``Missile Technology Control Regime'', 
     ``MTCR'', and ``MTCR adherent'' have the meanings given the 
     terms in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2797c).
       (7) The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' means 
     source material, special nuclear material, production and 
     utilization facilities and any components thereof, and any 
     other items or materials that are determined to have 
     significance for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to 
     subsection 109 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2139(b)).
       (8) The terms ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' and 
     ``NPT'' mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 
     and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
       (9) The terms ``Nuclear Suppliers Group'' and ``NSG'' refer 
     to a group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least 
     annually since 1992, of Participating Governments that have 
     promulgated and agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear 
     Transfers (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and 
     Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
     Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology 
     (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).
       (10) The terms ``nuclear weapon'' and ``nuclear explosive 
     device'' mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous 
     release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear 
     material that is greater than the amount of energy that would 
     be released from the detonation of one point of 
     trinitrotoluene (TNT).
       (11) The term ``process'' includes the term ``reprocess''.
       (12) The terms ``reprocessing'' and ``reprocess'' refer to 
     the separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission 
     products from spent nuclear fuel.
       (13) The term ``sensitive nuclear technology'' means any 
     information, including information incorporated in a 
     production or utilization facility or important component 
     part thereof, that is

[[Page 22865]]

     not available to the public and which is important to the 
     design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance 
     of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility 
     or a facility for the production of heavy water.
       (14) The term ``source material'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2014(z)).
       (15) The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning 
     given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
       (16) The term ``unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity'' 
     means research on, or development, design, manufacture, 
     construction, operation, or maintenance of--
       (A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility, 
     conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, 
     plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special 
     fissionable material, or separate storage installation with 
     respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
     safeguards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant, or 
     installation that contains source or special fissionable 
     material; or
       (B) any existing or future heavy water production plant 
     with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
     safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in 
     connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.
       TITLE II--UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``United States Additional 
     Protocol Implementation Act''.

     SEC. 202. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
     explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national 
     security of the United States and its vital national 
     interests.
       (2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven 
     critical to limiting such proliferation.
       (3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be 
     effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must 
     conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, 
     and such agreements must be honored and enforced.
       (4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening 
     the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the 
     safeguards system. This can best be accomplished by providing 
     IAEA inspectors with more information about, and broader 
     access to, nuclear activities within the territory of non-
     nuclear-weapon State Parties.
       (5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and 
     access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA 
     in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing 
     safeguards agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional 
     Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states is essential to 
     enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty.
       (6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-
     weapon State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is 
     based on the Model Additional Protocol, but which also 
     contains measures, consistent with its existing safeguards 
     agreements with its members, that protect the right of the 
     United States to exclude the application of IAEA safeguards 
     to locations and activities with direct national security 
     significance or to locations or information associated with 
     such activities.
       (7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United 
     States in a manner consistent with United States obligations 
     under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage 
     other parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
     especially non-nuclear-weapon State Parties, to conclude 
     Additional Protocols and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help reduce the 
     threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of direct and 
     substantial benefit to the United States.
       (8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United 
     States is not required and is completely voluntary given its 
     status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States 
     has acceded to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its 
     commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make 
     United States civil nuclear activities available to the same 
     IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-nuclear-
     weapon State Parties.
       (9) In accordance with the national security exclusion 
     contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the 
     United States will not allow any inspection activities, nor 
     make any declaration of any information with respect to, 
     locations, information, and activities of direct national 
     security significance to the United States.
       (10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform 
     to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, 
     from the United States Permanent Representative to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of 
     the United Nations to the Director General of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.

     SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'', 
     when used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional 
     to the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
     Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, 
     signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-097).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on International 
     Relations, the Committee on Science, and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (3) Complementary access.--The term ``complementary 
     access'' means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as 
     set forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.
       (4) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (5) Facility.--The term ``facility'' has the meaning set 
     forth in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.
       (6) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency.
       (7) Judge of the united states.--The term ``judge of the 
     United States'' means a United States district judge, or a 
     United States magistrate judge appointed under the authority 
     of chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code.
       (8) Location.--The term ``location'' means any geographic 
     point or area declared or identified by the United States or 
     specified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 
     (21 UST 483).
       (10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon 
     state party.--The terms ``nuclear-weapon State Party'' and 
     ``non-nuclear-weapon State Party'' have the meanings given 
     such terms in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       (11) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise 
     provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, 
     firm, association, trust, estate, public or private 
     institution, any State or any political subdivision thereof, 
     or any political entity within a State, any foreign 
     government or nation or any agency, instrumentality, or 
     political subdivision of any such government or nation, or 
     other entity located in the United States.
       (12) Site.--The term ``site'' has the meaning set forth in 
     Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
       (13) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used 
     as a geographic reference, means the several States of the 
     United States, the District of Columbia, and the 
     commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United 
     States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or 
     control of the United States, including--
       (A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;
       (B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public 
     aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and 
     (41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United 
     States Code; and
       (C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
     defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
     Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
       (14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term ``wide-
     area environmental sampling'' has the meaning set forth in 
     Article 18g. of the Additional Protocol.

     SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this title, or the application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
     remainder of this title, or the application of such provision 
     to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it 
     is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
                     Subtitle A--General Provisions

     SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement 
     and carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional 
     Protocol and shall designate through Executive order which 
     executive agency or agencies of the United States, which may 
     include but are not limited to the Department of State, the 
     Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the 
     Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and 
     enforce regulations in order to implement this title and the 
     provisions of the Additional Protocol.
       (b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency 
     designated under subsection (a) that does not currently 
     possess the authority to conduct site vulnerability 
     assessments and related activities, the authority provided in 
     subsection (a) includes such authority.
       (c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) 
     does not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority 
     of any Federal department or agency already having such 
     authority.
                    Subtitle B--Complementary Access

     SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY 
                   ACCESS.

       (a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location 
     in the United States shall take place pursuant to the 
     Additional Protocol without the authorization of the United 
     States Government in accordance with the requirements of this 
     title.
       (b) Authority.--
       (1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in 
     the United States subject to access under the Additional 
     Protocol is authorized in accordance with this title.
       (2) United states representatives.--
       (A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary access to 
     a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the 
     Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and 
     Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health 
     Administration of the Department of Labor may participate in 
     the access.

[[Page 22866]]

       (B) Number.--The number of designated United States 
     representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be kept to 
     the minimum necessary.

     SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

       (a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a 
     location in the United States under the Additional Protocol 
     shall be conducted in accordance with this subtitle.
       (b) Notice.--
       (1) In general.--Complementary access referred to in 
     subsection (a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual 
     written notice by the United States Government to the owner, 
     operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the location to be 
     subject to complementary access.
       (2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or 
     agent as soon as possible after the United States Government 
     has received notification that the IAEA seeks complementary 
     access. Notices may be posted prominently at the location if 
     the United States Government is unable to provide actual 
     written notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
       (3) Content of notice.--
       (A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph (1) shall 
     specify--
       (i) the purpose for the complementary access;
       (ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or 
     other location for the complementary access sought;
       (iii) the activities that will be carried out during the 
     complementary access;
       (iv) the time and date that the complementary access is 
     expected to begin, and the anticipated period covered by the 
     complementary access; and
       (v) the names and titles of the inspectors.
       (4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be 
     provided each time that complementary access is sought by the 
     IAEA.
       (c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA 
     and representatives or designees of the United States 
     Government shall display appropriate identifying credentials 
     to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the 
     location before gaining entry in connection with 
     complementary access.
       (d) Scope.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued 
     under section 223, and subject to the rights of the United 
     States Government under the Additional Protocol to limit 
     complementary access, complementary access to a location 
     pursuant to this title may extend to all activities 
     specifically permitted for such locations under Article 6 of 
     the Additional Protocol.
       (2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol, 
     no inspection under this title shall extend to--
       (A) financial data (other than production data);
       (B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
       (C) pricing data;
       (D) personnel data;
       (E) patent data;
       (F) data maintained for compliance with environmental or 
     occupational health and safety regulations; or
       (G) research data.
       (e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying 
     out their activities, members of the IAEA complementary 
     access team and representatives or designees of the United 
     States Government shall observe applicable environmental, 
     health, safety, and security regulations established at the 
     location subject to complementary access, including those for 
     protection of controlled environments within a facility and 
     for personal safety.

     SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Procedure.--
       (A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an 
     appropriate official of the United States Government shall 
     seek or have the consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or 
     agent in charge of a location prior to entering that location 
     in connection with complementary access pursuant to sections 
     221 and 222. The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in 
     charge of the location may withhold consent for any reason or 
     no reason.
       (B) Administrative search warrant.--In the absence of 
     consent, the United States Government may seek an 
     administrative search warrant from a judge of the United 
     States under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the 
     issuance of an administrative search warrant shall be 
     conducted ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the United 
     States Government.
       (2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining access to 
     a location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional 
     Protocol in order to satisfy United States obligations under 
     the Additional Protocol when notice of two hours or less is 
     required, the United States Government may gain entry to such 
     location in connection with complementary access, to the 
     extent such access is consistent with the Fourth Amendment to 
     the United States Constitution, without obtaining either a 
     warrant or consent.
       (b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary 
     Access.--
       (1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For 
     complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant 
     to the Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of 
     a warrant is required, the United States Government shall 
     first obtain an administrative search warrant from a judge of 
     the United States. The United States Government shall provide 
     to such judge all appropriate information regarding the basis 
     for the selection of the facility, site, or other location to 
     which complementary access is sought.
       (2) Content of affidavits for administrative search 
     warrants.--A judge of the United States shall promptly issue 
     an administrative search warrant authorizing the requested 
     complementary access upon an affidavit submitted by the 
     United States Government--
       (A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;
       (B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other 
     location is subject to complementary access under the 
     Additional Protocol;
       (C) stating that the purpose of the complementary access is 
     consistent with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
       (D) stating that the requested complementary access is in 
     accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
       (E) containing assurances that the scope of the IAEA's 
     complementary access, as well as what it may collect, shall 
     be limited to the access provided for in Article 6 of the 
     Additional Protocol;
       (F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be searched 
     and seized;
       (G) stating the earliest commencement and the anticipated 
     duration of the complementary access period, as well as the 
     expected times of day during which such complementary access 
     will take place; and
       (H) stating that the location to which entry in connection 
     with complementary access is sought was selected either--
       (i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of 
     specific evidence, to believe that information required to be 
     reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations 
     promulgated under this title is incorrect or incomplete, and 
     that the location to be accessed contains evidence regarding 
     that violation; or
       (ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative plan 
     based upon specific neutral criteria.
       (3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph 
     (2) shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit 
     under that paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain 
     the identities of the representatives of the IAEA on the 
     complementary access team and the identities of the 
     representatives or designees of the United States Government 
     required to display identifying credentials under section 
     222(c).

     SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
     refuse to permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, 
     a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or an 
     entry in connection with such access.
               Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

     SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.

       Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the 
     United States Government under this title or under the 
     Additional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under 
     section 552 of title 5, United States Code.
                        Subtitle D--Enforcement

     SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
     refuse--
       (1) to establish or maintain any record required by any 
     regulation prescribed under this title;
       (2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to 
     the United States Government in accordance with any 
     regulation prescribed under this title; or
       (3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the 
     United States Government in accordance with any regulation 
     prescribed under this title.

     SEC. 242. PENALTIES.

       (a) Civil.--
       (1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in 
     accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224 
     or section 241 shall be required by order to pay a civil 
     penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each 
     violation. For the purposes of this paragraph, each day 
     during which a violation of section 224 continues shall 
     constitute a separate violation of that section.
       (2) Notice and hearing.--
       (A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a person 
     under paragraph (1), the head of an executive agency 
     designated under section 211(a) shall provide the person with 
     notice of the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the 
     notice, the person requests a hearing, the head of the 
     designated executive agency shall initiate a hearing on the 
     violation.
       (B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall be 
     conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall 
     be conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 
     554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so 
     requested, the order imposed by the head of the designated 
     agency shall constitute a final agency action.
       (C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge 
     determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received, 
     that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224 
     or section 241, the administrative judge shall state the 
     findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve 
     on such person an order described in paragraph (1).
       (D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--In 
     determining the amount of any civil penalty, the 
     administrative judge or the head of the designated agency 
     shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, 
     and gravity of the violation or violations and, with respect 
     to the violator, the ability to pay, effect on ability to 
     continue to do business, any history of such violations, the 
     degree of culpability,

[[Page 22867]]

     the existence of an internal compliance program, and such 
     other matters as justice may require.
       (E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this paragraph, 
     notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably served 
     upon the person or persons subject to an order described in 
     paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall--
       (i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of the 
     alleged violation or violations; and
       (ii) specify the administrative and judicial remedies 
     available to the person or persons subject to the order, 
     including the availability of a hearing and subsequent 
     appeal.
       (3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and 
     order of an administrative judge shall be the recommended 
     decision and order and shall be referred to the head of the 
     designated executive agency for final decision and order. If, 
     within 60 days, the head of the designated executive agency 
     does not modify or vacate the decision and order, it shall 
     become a final agency action under this subsection.
       (4) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected by a 
     final order may, within 30 days after the date the final 
     order is issued, file a petition in the Court of Appeals for 
     the District of Columbia Circuit or in the Court of Appeals 
     for the district in which the violation occurred.
       (5) Enforcement of final orders.--
       (A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a final 
     order issued against such person under this subsection and--
       (i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial review 
     of the order in accordance with paragraph (4), or
       (ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph (4) has 
     entered a final judgment in favor of the designated executive 
     agency,

     the head of the designated executive agency shall commence a 
     civil action to seek compliance with the final order in any 
     appropriate district court of the United States.
       (B) No review.--In any such civil action, the validity and 
     appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject to 
     review.
       (C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a final 
     order under this section shall include interest at currently 
     prevailing rates calculated from the date of expiration of 
     the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (3) or the date of 
     such final order, as the case may be.
       (b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or 
     section 241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil 
     penalty which may be imposed under subsection (a) for such 
     violation, be fined under title 18, United States Code, 
     imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

     SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States 
     shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the 
     head of an executive agency designated under section 211(a)--
       (1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or 
     section 241; or
       (2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under 
     this title or the Additional Protocol.
       (b) Civil Actions.--
       (1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) 
     may be brought--
       (A) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph 
     (1) of such subsection, in the United States district court 
     for the judicial district in which any act, omission, or 
     transaction constituting a violation of section 224 or 
     section 241 occurred or in which the defendant is found or 
     transacts business; or
       (B) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph 
     (2) of such subsection, in the United States district court 
     for the judicial district in which the defendant is found or 
     transacts business.
       (2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, process 
     shall be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may 
     reside or may be found.
                   Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

     SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD APPROVAL OF 
                   WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on 
     which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area 
     environmental sampling for use as a safeguards verification 
     tool, the President shall notify the appropriate 
     congressional committees.
       (b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall 
     contain--
       (1) a description of the specific methods and sampling 
     techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be 
     employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
       (2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be 
     conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; 
     and
       (3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods 
     and sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine 
     the conduct, type, and nature of nuclear activities.

     SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO WIDE-
                   AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

       In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, 
     the United States shall not permit any wide-area 
     environmental sampling proposed by the IAEA to be conducted 
     at a specified location in the United States under Article 9 
     of the Additional Protocol unless the President has 
     determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 
     committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental 
     sampling that--
       (1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is 
     necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect 
     undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-
     nuclear-weapon State Party;
       (2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling 
     will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, 
     activities, or information of direct national security 
     significance; and
       (3) the United States--
       (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
     consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
     complementary access involving wide-area environmental 
     sampling; or
       (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
     Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 
     United States that involves the use of wide-area 
     environmental sampling.

     SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO 
                   LOCATION-SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

       In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, 
     the United States shall not permit any location-specific 
     environmental sampling in the United States under Article 5 
     of the Additional Protocol unless the President has 
     determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 
     committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental 
     sampling that--
       (1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
     sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA 
     to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a 
     non-nuclear-weapon State Party;
       (2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
     sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, 
     activities, or information of direct national security 
     significance; and
       (3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental 
     sampling, the United States--
       (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
     consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
     complementary access involving location-specific 
     environmental sampling; or
       (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
     Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 
     United States that involves the use of location-specific 
     environmental sampling.

     SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       As used in this subtitle, the term ``necessary to increase 
     the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear 
     activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State 
     Party'' shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses of 
     environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in 
     detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a 
     non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--
       (1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of 
     such sampling; or
       (2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or 
     political support for such sampling in the territory of a 
     non-nuclear-weapon State Party.
 Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities

     SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

       (a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security 
     Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or 
     Department of Energy location, site, or facility of direct 
     national security significance shall be declared or be 
     subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.
       (b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--
     No information of direct national security significance 
     regarding any location, site, or facility associated with 
     activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of 
     Energy shall be provided under the Additional Protocol.
       (c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be 
     construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the 
     IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by the 
     provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 
     et seq.), including in particular ``Restricted Data'' as 
     defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42 
     U.S.C. 2014(y)).
       (d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
     construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the 
     IAEA or IAEA employees of national security information and 
     other classified information.

     SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

       (a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--
     No national of a country designated by the Secretary of State 
     under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2371) as a government supporting acts of international 
     terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to 
     carry out an inspection activity under the Additional 
     Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.
       (b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA 
     inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States 
     Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, 
     facilities, or activities in the United States under the 
     Additional Protocol.
       (c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President 
     shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related 
     assessments not less than every 5 years to ensure that 
     information of direct national security significance remains 
     protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities 
     in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection 
     under the Additional Protocol.
                          Subtitle G--Reports

     SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARATION.

       Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United 
     States declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, 
     the President shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, 
     locations, facilities, and activities in the United

[[Page 22868]]

     States that the President intends to declare to the IAEA, and 
     a report thereon.

     SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED STATES 
                   DECLARATION.

       Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any 
     revisions to the United States declaration submitted under 
     the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to 
     Congress a list of any sites, locations, facilities, or 
     activities in the United States that the President intends to 
     add to or remove from the declaration, and a report thereon.

     SEC. 273. CONTENT OF REPORTS ON UNITED STATES DECLARATIONS.

       The reports required under section 271 and section 272 
     shall present the reasons for each site, location, facility, 
     and activity being declared or being removed from the 
     declaration list and shall certify that--
       (1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in 
     the list has been examined by each agency with national 
     security equities with respect to such site, location, 
     facility, or activity; and
       (2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that 
     information of direct national security significance will not 
     be compromised at any such site, location, facility, or 
     activity in connection with an IAEA inspection.

     SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
                   ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS.

       Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the 
     Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on--
       (1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve 
     the adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards 
     agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and
       (2) assistance that has been or should be provided by the 
     United States to the IAEA in order to promote the effective 
     implementation of additional protocols to existing safeguards 
     agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties and the 
     verification of the compliance of such parties with IAEA 
     obligations, with a plan for providing any needed additional 
     funding.

     SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.

       The President shall notify Congress of any notifications 
     issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of 
     the Additional Protocol.
              Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

     SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out this title.
       And the Senate agree to the same.

     Henry Hyde,
     John Boehner,
     Tom Lantos,
                                Managers on the Part of the House.

     Richard G. Lugar,
     Chuck Hagel,
     George Allen,
     Bill Frist,
     Joe Biden,
     Chris Dodd,
                               Managers on the Part of the Senate.

       JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

       The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the 
     conference on the disagreeing votes of the two House on the 
     amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 5682), to exempt 
     from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a 
     proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India, submit 
     the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in 
     explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the 
     managers and recommended in the accompanying conference 
     report:
       The Senate amendment struck all of the House bill after the 
     enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.
       The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of 
     the Senate with an amendment that is a substitute for the 
     House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between 
     the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute 
     agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical 
     corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements 
     reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clarifying 
     changes.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

       With the fading of the Cold War's global divisions and the 
     rise of new challenges such as globalization and trans-
     national terrorism, there is increasing recognition in both 
     the United States and in India that significant benefits may 
     be obtained from closer cooperation across a broad spectrum 
     of activities and policies. These range from shared strategic 
     interests, such as enhanced stability and security in South 
     Asia and the international system as a whole, to more 
     specific priorities, including greater effectiveness in 
     combating the AIDS epidemic, combating terrorism, and 
     preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
     among others.
       To that end, on July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian 
     Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement 
     announcing a ``global partnership'' between the two 
     countries. The Joint Statement covered a range of issues and 
     common interests, including the re-establishment of civil 
     nuclear commerce between the United States and India.
       In the Joint Statement, India committed to placing more of 
     its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in perpetuity, signing and 
     adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian 
     nuclear facilities, working with the United States for the 
     conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, 
     refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
     technologies to states that do not have them and supporting 
     international efforts to limit their spread, ensuring that 
     the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear 
     materials and technology through comprehensive export control 
     legislation and through harmonization and adherence to 
     Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and continuing its 
     moratorium on further nuclear testing.
       For the United States, President Bush committed that he 
     would ``work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation 
     with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear 
     power and achieving energy security'' and to ``seek agreement 
     from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies'' to permit 
     that cooperation. President Bush also promised to ``work with 
     friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable 
     full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, 
     including but not limited to expeditious consideration of 
     fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.''
       The Administration's proposed legislation envisioned 
     Congress granting the President the authority to waive 
     certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) 
     that contain restrictions on cooperation that the 
     Administration deemed to be impediments to conducting civil 
     nuclear cooperation with India. Section 123 a.(2) of the AEA 
     requires that a non-nuclear weapon state have IAEA safeguards 
     on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities in 
     that state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its 
     control anywhere (commonly referred to as ``full-scope 
     safeguards'') as a condition of continued United States 
     nuclear supply and approval for new nuclear cooperation 
     agreements, a requirement that India does not meet and, as a 
     state with nuclear weapons, would be unlikely to meet for the 
     foreseeable future. Section 128 requires a non-nuclear weapon 
     state (under the NPT, which recognizes only five ``Nuclear 
     Weapon States''--Russia, France, China, the United Kingdom, 
     and the United States) to have full-scope safeguards as a 
     prerequisite for receiving U.S. civil nuclear exports. 
     Finally, Section 129 requires the termination of nuclear 
     exports if a non-nuclear weapon state has, among other 
     things, tested nuclear weapons after 1978, which India did in 
     1998. There are waivers available to the President for these 
     provisions in existing law. But the standard for such waivers 
     is very high.
       In addition, international civil nuclear commerce is 
     restricted pursuant to the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers 
     of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. NSG Guidelines permit such 
     trade with countries only when the receiving State has 
     brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the 
     application of safeguards on all source and special 
     fissionable material in its current and future peaceful 
     activities.
       The Administration's proposed legislation would have given 
     the President the authority to permanently waive these 
     provisions for India, subject to the President's 
     determination that India had achieved certain benchmarks, 
     such as engaging in negotiations with the IAEA on a 
     safeguards agreement and that the NSG has agreed to provide 
     an exemption for India to allow its participating states to 
     export civil nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to 
     India.
       Under existing law, a nuclear cooperation agreement with a 
     country that does have full-scope safeguards and that 
     satisfies other criteria under 123a. of the AEA would come 
     into force 90 days after its submission for congressional 
     review unless a resolution of disapproval were passed in both 
     Houses. In practice, it is very difficult to secure passage 
     of such resolutions because a veto by the President of the 
     joint resolution would require a two-thirds vote in both 
     Houses to override.
       By contrast, nuclear cooperation agreements with countries, 
     such as India, that do not satisfy all the conditions of 
     123a, such as full-scope safeguards, can come into effect 
     only if both Houses of Congress pass a joint resolution of 
     approval within 90 days. If either chamber does not approve 
     the resolution, the agreement does not enter into force.
       The Administration's legislative proposal sought to avoid 
     this latter procedure by providing for a process of 
     congressional consideration of a 123 agreement with India 
     such as that reserved for countries that do have full-scope 
     safeguards. In that event, a nuclear cooperation agreement 
     with India would come into force automatically unless both 
     Houses of Congress passed a joint resolution of disapproval. 
     In effect, the Administration's proposal would have given it 
     excessive latitude in negotiating a nuclear cooperation 
     agreement with India, leaving Congress with little ability to 
     influence the terms of that agreement, regardless of any 
     concerns it might have.
       Both the House International Relations Committee and the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected this approach, 
     believing that the Administration's proposal

[[Page 22869]]

     did not provide for appropriate congressional oversight over 
     what was, by any measure, an unprecedented nuclear 
     cooperative relationship with India. Both committees were 
     troubled by the lack of consultation by the Administration 
     with Congress before the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and 
     the March 2006 U.S.-India Declaration (in which the terms by 
     which India would separate its civil and military nuclear 
     facilities and further commitments by the United States were 
     announced).
       Consequently, both committees introduced legislation that, 
     while informed by the Administration's proposal, reverts to 
     existing procedures laid out in the AEA for approval of 123 
     agreements that do not meet the criteria of section 123 a. 
     The Conference agreement grants the President the ability to 
     waive the aforementioned sections of the AEA for a future 
     U.S.-India agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. However, 
     any such agreement cannot enter into force until it has been 
     submitted to the Congress, along with a completed IAEA-India 
     safeguards agreement and other documents and Presidential 
     determinations such as a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
     (required by the AEA and by this legislation, as detailed the 
     section-by-section review of this report), and approved by 
     both Houses according to the existing procedures of Section 
     130(i) of the AEA. Furthermore, the Administration's ability 
     to waive existing provisions of section 129 of the AEA, which 
     mandates the termination of U.S. civil nuclear exports to a 
     country if that country tests a nuclear explosive device, 
     terminates or abrogates IAEA safeguards, materially violates 
     an IAEA safeguards agreement, or engages in other activities 
     related to nuclear proliferation, is limited to any such 
     activities India engaged in prior to July 18, 2005. Any such 
     future activity by India would invoke Section 129, subject to 
     the waiver provisions already available to the President in 
     existing law. Thus, the Conference agreement provides that 
     for other conduct that, under section 129, would result in 
     termination of cooperation, that section would continue to 
     apply. If India were to terminate or abrogate IAEA safeguards 
     (129(1)(B)), materially violate IAEA safeguards (129(1)(C)), 
     violate an agreement for cooperation with the United States 
     (129(2)(A)), encourage a non-nuclear weapon state to engage 
     in proliferation activities involving source and special 
     nuclear material (129(2)(B)), or engage in unauthorized 
     proliferation of reprocessing technology (129(2)(C)), the 
     Conference agreement would terminate cooperation. The 
     Administration's bill would have made section 129 
     inapplicable to such future actions on the part of India.
       As further clarified in the section-by-section analysis 
     included in this report, the conferees believe that there 
     should be no ambiguity regarding the legal and policy 
     consequences of any future Indian test of a nuclear explosive 
     device. In that event, the President must terminate all 
     export and reexport of U.S.-origin nuclear materials, nuclear 
     equipment, and sensitive nuclear technology to India. The 
     conferees expect the President to make full and immediate use 
     of U.S. rights to demand the return of all nuclear-related 
     items, materials, and sensitive nuclear technology that have 
     been exported or reexported to India if India were to test or 
     detonate, or otherwise cause the test or detonation of, a 
     nuclear explosive device for any reason, including such 
     instances in which India describes its actions as being ``for 
     peaceful purposes.'' This legal condition is further 
     strengthened in the Conference agreement beyond section 129 
     of the AEA by a provision that the waiver authority in this 
     legislation terminates with any Indian test. The conferees 
     believe that termination would include the suspension and 
     revocation of any current or pending export or reexport 
     licenses, and that the return of U.S.-origin items and 
     materials should extend to any special nuclear material 
     produced by India through the use of any nuclear materials, 
     equipment, or sensitive nuclear technology exported or 
     reexported to India by the United States.
       The prohibition concerning a recipient country not engaging 
     in activities involving source or special nuclear material 
     under Section 129 are permanently waived for India, as India 
     will undoubtedly continue to produce fissile material, until 
     such time after it is able to fulfill its commitment in the 
     July 18, 2005, Joint Statement to work with the United States 
     toward conclusion of a future Fissile Material Cut-off 
     Treaty.
       H.R. 5682 reflects the widely held view in both the House 
     and the Senate that peaceful nuclear cooperation with India 
     can serve multiple U.S. foreign policy and national security 
     objectives but that this must be secured in a manner that 
     minimizes potential risks to the global nonproliferation 
     regime. Among the most important considerations are ensuring 
     that NSG guidelines and consensus decision-making are upheld 
     and that a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement and subsequent 
     U.S. nuclear exports are consistent with the decisions, 
     policies, and guidelines of the NSG. The conferees note that 
     the converse is equally important, namely that the United 
     States must ensure that any decision that the NSG makes 
     regarding granting an exemption for nuclear commerce does not 
     disadvantage U.S. industry by setting less strict conditions 
     for countries trading with India than those embodied in the 
     conditions and requirements of this Act. Since the NSG 
     operates by consensus, the United States possesses the 
     necessary leverage to ensure a favorable outcome, and the 
     conference agreement reflects this view.
       The bill requires, as a condition for the President to 
     exercise his waiver authority, that the NSG agree by 
     consensus to an exception to its guidelines specifically for 
     India and that no U.S. exports may be transferred to India 
     that do not comport with NSG guidelines and decisions. 
     Equally important is the need to ensure that U.S. cooperation 
     does not assist the Indian nuclear weapons program, directly 
     or indirectly, in order to avoid contributing to a nuclear 
     arms race in South Asia and in accordance with U.S. 
     obligations under the NPT.
       As in the Administration's proposed legislation, H.R. 5682 
     requires the President to determine that India is upholding 
     its July 18, 2005, commitments as a prerequisite for using 
     his waiver authority. The conferees believe that India's 
     continued implementation of those commitments is central to 
     the integrity of our bilateral relationship. Therefore, the 
     bill contains reporting requirements and a provision that 
     calls for termination of exports in the event of violations 
     of certain commitments. In addition, the bill seeks to uphold 
     existing statutory congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear 
     cooperation and exports. At a time when many countries are 
     considering nuclear energy as a viable and desirable 
     alternative to carbon-based energy sources, careful oversight 
     of its expansion is crucial.
       The establishment of a ``global partnership'' with India is 
     among the most important strategic diplomatic initiatives 
     undertaken by this Administration. This partnership, along 
     with the extensive set of cooperative agreements that 
     accompany it, embraces a long-term outlook that seeks to 
     strengthen U.S. foreign policy and enhance global stability.
       The House International Relations Committee and the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee studied carefully the 
     implications of the proposed agreement for nonproliferation 
     policy. Both committees were concerned about the precedent 
     this exception for India could establish and worked to ensure 
     that this agreement does not undercut U.S. compliance with 
     its responsibilities under the NPT. As a result of these 
     efforts, each committee's bill was approved overwhelmingly by 
     its respective chamber.
       The conferees believe that the conference agreement 
     achieves a proper balance among competing priorities and 
     concerns and will help solidify New Delhi's commitments to 
     implement strong export controls, separate its civilian 
     nuclear infrastructure from its weapons program, and place 
     additional civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. An 
     agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with India 
     approved by Congress according to the procedures and 
     conditions of this conference report would be a powerful 
     incentive for India to cooperate more closely with the United 
     States in stopping proliferation and to abstain from further 
     nuclear weapons tests.
       The Administration's decision to establish an increasingly 
     close relationship with this country of enormous potential, 
     and its declaration that the U.S. welcomes India's 
     advancement as a major economic and political player on the 
     world stage represents a new and significant strategic 
     opportunity to advance U.S. goals. Given that India already 
     possesses a vibrant democracy, a rapidly growing economy, and 
     a well-educated middle class greater than the entire U.S. 
     population, it can serve as an engine of global economic 
     growth. Its increasing economic, military, and political 
     power may also contribute significantly to promoting 
     stability in South Asia and other regions.
       India has the potential to become a valued partner in 
     countering the rise of extremism around the world as both 
     countries can cooperate to promote religious pluralism, 
     tolerance, and democratic freedoms. As a country with well-
     entrenched democratic traditions and the world's second 
     largest Muslim population, India can set an example of a 
     multi-religious and multi-cultural democracy in an otherwise 
     volatile region.
       The conferees believe that the conference agreement will 
     help solidify India's commitments to implement strong export 
     controls, separate its civilian nuclear infrastructure from 
     its weapons program, and place additional civilian facilities 
     under IAEA safeguards. An agreement for peaceful nuclear 
     cooperation with India approved by Congress according to the 
     procedures and conditions of this conference report would be 
     a powerful incentive for India to cooperate closely with the 
     United States in halting proliferation and abstaining from 
     additional tests of nuclear weapons. The conferees, along 
     with both Houses, place great emphasis on their expectation 
     that India's full cooperation with efforts by the U.S. and 
     the international community to prevent Iran from acquiring 
     the capability to produce nuclear weapons will be 
     forthcoming.
       India is already assuming a more prominent role in world 
     affairs. Its votes in the IAEA Board of Governors in 
     September 2005 and February 2006 regarding Iran's likely 
     efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability

[[Page 22870]]

     are evidence that the Government of India is able and willing 
     to adopt a more constructive role on international non-
     proliferation issues. The Conferees believe the true test of 
     the wisdom of this legislation, which will be the 
     effectiveness of India's new commitments and obligations 
     regarding nuclear nonproliferation, can be judged only over 
     time. India is determined to secure a more prominent role in 
     global affairs. This agreement will provide it with enhanced 
     incentives to use its rapidly expanding influence to promote 
     regional and international stability and global economic 
     progress.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion


          title I--united states and india nuclear cooperation

     Section 101. Short title
       Section 101 states that this title may be cited as the 
     ``Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
     Cooperation Act of 2006''.
     Section 102. Sense of Congress
       Section 102 combines provisions relating to the Sense of 
     Congress in the House bill and in the Senate amendment. It 
     expresses the Sense of Congress regarding the nuclear non-
     proliferation regime and the principles that should guide the 
     United States in entering into an agreement on nuclear 
     cooperation with a country that has never been a State Party 
     to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Paragraph (1) 
     states that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
     other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the means to 
     deliver these are critical objectives for United States 
     foreign policy. Paragraph (2) states that sustaining the NPT 
     and strengthening its implementation is the keystone of 
     United States non-proliferation policy. Paragraph (3) states 
     that the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the 
     spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to other countries and 
     in maintaining a stable international security situation. 
     Paragraph (4) states that countries that have never become a 
     party to the NPT and remain outside that treaty's legal 
     regime pose a potential challenge to the achievement of the 
     overall goals of global nonproliferation because those 
     countries have not undertaken the NPT's international 
     obligation to prohibit the spread of dangerous nuclear 
     technologies. Paragraph (5) states that it is in the interest 
     of the United States to ensure to the fullest extent possible 
     that those countries that are not States Party to the NPT act 
     responsibly in the disposition of any nuclear technology they 
     develop.
       Paragraph (6) states that it is in the interest of the 
     United States to cooperate with a country that has never 
     signed the NPT with respect to civilian nuclear technology if 
     that country meets certain criteria. These criteria include 
     demonstrating responsible behavior with respect to the 
     nonproliferation of nuclear weapons technology and the means 
     to deliver these weapons; the country has a functioning and 
     uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign 
     policy that is congruent with that of the United States, and 
     is working with the United States in key foreign policy 
     initiatives related to non-proliferation; such cooperation 
     induces the country to promulgate and implement substantially 
     improved protections against the proliferation of technology 
     related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them and 
     also to refrain from actions that would further the 
     development of its nuclear weapons program; and that such 
     cooperation will induce the country to give greater political 
     and material support to the achievement of U.S. global and 
     regional nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect 
     to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and 
     containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups 
     and that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability 
     or other WMD capability and the means to deliver such 
     weapons.
       Paragraph (7) states that the United States should continue 
     its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with 
     and between India and Pakistan. Paragraph (8) states that 
     strong bilateral relations with India are in the national 
     interest of the United States. Paragraph (9) states that the 
     United States and India share common democratic values and 
     the potential for increasing and sustained economic 
     engagement. Paragraph (10) states that commerce in civil 
     nuclear energy with India by the United States and other 
     countries has the potential to benefit the people of all 
     countries.
       Paragraph (11) states that civil nuclear commerce with 
     India represents a significant change in U.S. policy toward 
     countries not parties to the NPT and stresses that the NPT 
     remains the foundation of the international non-proliferation 
     regime. Paragraph (12) states that any commerce in civil 
     nuclear energy with India by the United States and other 
     countries must be achieved in a manner that minimizes the 
     risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and 
     maximizes India's adherence to international nonproliferation 
     regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group. Paragraph (13) states that the 
     United States should not seek to facilitate or encourage the 
     continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party 
     if such exports are terminated under United States law.
     Section 103. Statements of policy
       Section 103 contains provisions from the House bill and 
     from the Senate amendment and sets forth two sets of policies 
     of the United States: those general in nature and those 
     specific to South Asia.
       Subsection (a) states that it shall be the policy of the 
     United States to:
       1. Oppose the development of a capability to produce 
     nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
     outside of the NPT;
       2. Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right 
     to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
     for peaceful purposes'', as set forth in Article IV of the 
     NPT, as being a right that applies only to the extent that it 
     is consistent with the purpose of the NPT to prevent the 
     spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, 
     including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any 
     State Party that the IAEA determines is not in full 
     compliance with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards 
     obligations;
       3. Act in a manner fully consistent with the NSG guidelines 
     concerning nuclear transfers and transfers of nuclear-related 
     dual-use items;
       4. Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning 
     consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and 
     recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a 
     timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such 
     violations, including termination of all nuclear transfers to 
     an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG 
     members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until 
     such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has 
     been achieved;
       5. Given the special sensitivity of equipment and 
     technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
     reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of 
     heavy water, work with members of the NSG, individually and 
     collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such 
     equipment and technologies, including to India; and
       6. Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear 
     equipment, materials, or technology from other participating 
     governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear 
     transfers to that country are suspended or terminated 
     pursuant to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.
       Regarding the second statement, the conferees note that the 
     NPT was conceived for the specific and overriding purpose of 
     preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
     explosive devices, as stated in the Preamble and its first 
     three Articles. All provisions of the NPT must be interpreted 
     within the context of preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
     weapons and nuclear explosive devices; and Article IV 
     conditions a country's ``inalienable right to develop 
     research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
     purposes without discrimination'' on that country's 
     conformity with Articles I, II, and III, which obligate each 
     non-nuclear weapon State Party ``not to manufacture or 
     otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
     devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the 
     manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
     devices.''
       The conferees believe that, because the processes of 
     enriching uranium or separating plutonium for peaceful or 
     military purposes are essentially identical, they inherently 
     pose an enhanced risk of proliferation, even under strict 
     international safeguards. Rights under Article IV of the NPT 
     must be properly understood and exercised only insofar as 
     they are consistent with preventing the proliferation of 
     nuclear weapons. Therefore, the world must not accept a claim 
     by a non-nuclear weapon state of a right to develop or 
     possess a complete nuclear fuel cycle if that country has not 
     provided convincing evidence that its nuclear activities are 
     fully safeguarded from contributing to a nuclear weapons 
     capability.
       Regarding the third and fourth statements, the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group, although not a formal organization that can 
     issue legally-binding directives, is nonetheless one of the 
     most effective elements of the nuclear non-proliferation 
     regime. For a generation, U.S. Presidents have forged in this 
     forum an important international consensus on the need to 
     prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of 
     sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology. The 
     conferees believe strongly that no bilateral objective, even 
     the important objective of a new relationship with India, 
     should be allowed to undermine the NSG's effectiveness. The 
     United States must continue to abide by the NSG Guidelines, 
     which it has worked so diligently to achieve.
       Equally, the United States must maintain the consensus 
     decision mechanism of the NSG, and not look for any way 
     around that requirement. The conferees believe that the 
     effectiveness of the NSG rests upon its consensus decision-
     making, resulting in unified policies and enhanced compliance 
     with those policies. The conferees are mindful that a country 
     outside the regime that seeks an exception from NSG 
     guidelines could agree to

[[Page 22871]]

     stringent safeguards with some NSG members, but later import 
     only from other NSG members that did not impose such 
     requirements. To preclude such a scenario, the conferees urge 
     the Executive branch to persuade other NSG members to act in 
     concert in terms of the timing, scope, and safeguarding of 
     nuclear supply to all countries, including India. In 
     particular, the conferees intend that the United States seek 
     agreement among NSG members that violations by one country of 
     an agreement with any NSG member should result in joint 
     action by all members, including, as appropriate, the 
     termination of nuclear exports. In addition, the conferees 
     intend that the Administration work with individual states to 
     encourage them to refrain from sensitive exports.
       Regarding the sixth statement, if U.S. exports to a country 
     were to be suspended or terminated pursuant to U.S. law, it 
     will be U.S. policy to seek to prevent the transfer to such 
     country of nuclear equipment, material or technology from 
     other sources. This concern could arise if, for example, 
     there were a nuclear test explosion, termination or 
     abrogation of IAEA safeguards, material violation of IAEA 
     safeguards or an agreement of cooperation with the United 
     States, assistance or encouragement of a non-nuclear weapon 
     state in nuclear-weapons related activities or reprocessing-
     related activities, or (in India's case) failure to uphold 
     its July 18, 2005, Joint Statement commitments. In such a 
     circumstance, the conferees expect the United States to 
     encourage other supplier countries not to undermine U.S. 
     sanctions.
       On March 6, 2006, the Indian Prime Minister told the Indian 
     Parliament that the U.S. Government had said that if a 
     disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the U.S. would, 
     with India, jointly convene a group of friendly supplier 
     countries, such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom, to 
     pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India. 
     The conferees understand and expect that such assurance of 
     supply arrangements that the U.S. is party to will be 
     concerned only with disruption of supply of fuel due to 
     market failures or similar reasons, and not due to Indian 
     actions that are inconsistent with the July 18, 2005, 
     commitments, such as a nuclear explosive test.
       Subsection (b) states that, with respect to South Asia, it 
     shall be U.S. policy to:
       1. Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on 
     the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive 
     purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of 
     China;
       2. Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion 
     and implementation of a treaty banning the production of 
     fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United 
     States and India become parties;
       3. Secure India's full participation in the Proliferation 
     Security Initiative (PSI), formal commitment to the PSI's 
     Statement of Interdiction Principles, public announcement of 
     its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, 
     and policies with the Australia Group and with the 
     Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of the 
     Wassenaar Arrangement, and demonstration of satisfactory 
     progress toward implementing this decision; and ratification 
     of or accession to the Convention on Supplementary 
     Compensation for Nuclear Damage;
       4. Secure India's full and active participation in U.S. 
     efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and 
     contain Iran for its efforts to acquire WMDs, including a 
     nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich 
     uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver 
     WMDs;
       5. Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in 
     South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual 
     elimination;
       6. Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian 
     nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United 
     States except under procedures required under section 131f. 
     of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
       7. Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium or 
     treaty described in paragraphs (1) and (2), encourage India 
     not to increase its production of fissile material at 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
       8. Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional 
     Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably 
     safeguard any export or reexport to India of nuclear 
     materials and equipment;
       9. Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement 
     for cooperation with India meet the requirements set forth in 
     subsections a.(l) and a.(3) through a.(9) of section 123 of 
     the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); and
       10. Ensure that any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve 
     provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded 
     civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with 
     reasonable reactor operating requirements.
       The conferees believe that a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation 
     agreement will mark an important and positive turning point 
     in the U.S.-India relationship. This does not mean, however, 
     that the United States should sacrifice its long-standing 
     objectives for non-proliferation in South Asia. This 
     subsection states that U.S. policy must be to continue to 
     support a fissile material moratorium in South Asia and a 
     halt to the increase in nuclear arsenals in the region, which 
     would bring great benefits to India and its neighbors. The 
     United States must also continue to work for a broader 
     fissile material production halt, whether through Fissile 
     Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations or, for example, through 
     an agreement reached by all the countries that have fissile 
     material for nuclear weapons purposes.
       The conferees believe also that India has a significant 
     role to play in preventing the proliferation of dangerous 
     nuclear technologies to other countries and that India must 
     be a part of the international effort to prevent Iran from 
     acquiring weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear 
     weapons. The conferees fully expect and look forward to the 
     day when India joins the world community in conforming to the 
     full range of nonproliferation and export control regimes. In 
     the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, India committed to accept 
     the ``same responsibilities and practices and acquire the 
     same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with 
     advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.'' 
     India's welcome steps regarding nuclear and missile-related 
     export controls are important progress in this regard, but 
     the other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology 
     will expect India to join them also in stemming the flow of 
     items that can contribute to chemical and biological weapons 
     programs and of destabilizing types or amounts of certain 
     conventional weapons. India's participation in the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative would also be of great 
     benefit to the world and to the region.
       It is also vital that India hasten the day when it can halt 
     the production of fissile material for weapons, as four of 
     the five nuclear weapon states under the NPT have openly 
     done. The conferees understand that India cannot do this 
     alone, and therefore urge the Executive branch to pursue a 
     joint moratorium by India, Pakistan and China, as well as a 
     multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile 
     material for nuclear weapons.
       The conferees believe it is critical to secure India's full 
     participation in U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring 
     nuclear weapons, a position held by many members of both 
     houses of Congress. The conferees express their appreciation 
     for India's favorable votes on this issue in the IAEA Board 
     of Governors and its statements that Iran should indeed 
     cooperate with the IAEA and refrain from developing nuclear 
     weapons. They understand also that India has long-standing 
     ties with Iran. Precisely because India has those ties, it 
     can and must play a prominent and positive role in convincing 
     Iran that the path of cooperation and of nuclear development 
     with international assurances, but without an indigenous full 
     fuel cycle, is far preferable to the path of obduracy and 
     isolation in order to develop uranium enrichment and 
     plutonium production capabilities.
       The United States has an obligation under Article I of the 
     NPT not to ``in any way assist, encourage, or induce a non-
     nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
     nuclear weapons.'' Many nonproliferation experts have noted 
     the need to avoid a nuclear arms race in South Asia, as well 
     as to ensure that U.S. assistance does not encourage India to 
     increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded 
     nuclear facilities. The conferees understand that U.S. 
     peaceful nuclear cooperation with India will not be intended 
     to inhibit India's nuclear weapons program. At the same time, 
     however, such cooperation must be conducted in a manner that 
     does not assist that program. That is why the conferees 
     stress the need for effective safeguards on nuclear-related 
     exports or reexports to India, the need to meet the 
     requirements in sections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of 
     section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, and the need for any 
     nuclear fuel reserve provided to the Government of India to 
     be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 
     requirements, rather than of a size that would enable India 
     to break its commitments or end its moratorium on nuclear 
     testing and maintain its civil nuclear energy production 
     despite unilateral or international sanctions.
       Indian officials have publicly stated that under the U.S.-
     India agreement, India will be able to produce as much 
     fissile material for weapons purposes as it desires. At the 
     same time, however, many experts have said that there is no 
     reason why India would need or want to increase that 
     production significantly. The conferees hope that India will 
     demonstrate restraint and not increase significantly its 
     production of fissile material. If civil nuclear commerce 
     were to be seen, some years from now, as having in fact 
     contributed to India's nuclear weapons program, there could 
     be severe consequences for nuclear cooperation, for U.S.-
     Indian relations, and for the world-wide nuclear 
     nonproliferation regime.
       India's March 2006 nuclear facility separation plan stated: 
     ``The United States will support an Indian effort to develop 
     a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any 
     disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.'' 
     Congress has not been able to determine precisely what was 
     said on this matter in high-level U.S.-Indian discussions. 
     U.S. officials testified, however, that the United States 
     does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear 
     fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might 
     be imposed in response to Indian actions

[[Page 22872]]

     such as conducting another nuclear test. The conferees 
     understand that nuclear reactor facilities commonly have some 
     fresh fuel stored, so as to minimize down time when reactor 
     cores are removed. They endorse the Senate proposal, however, 
     that there be a clear U.S. policy that any fuel reserve 
     provided to India should be commensurate with normal 
     operating requirements for India's safeguarded reactors.
     Section 104. Waiver authority and Congressional approval
       The conference agreement adopts the framework of the House 
     bill, but adds a number of provisions from the Senate 
     amendment.
       Section 104(a) provides the President with authority to 
     exempt an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with India 
     and nuclear exports to India from certain sections of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) that would otherwise present 
     obstacles to approving and implementing such an agreement. 
     Specifically, the waiver authority applies to sections 123 
     a.(2), 128, and 129.
       Both the House of Representatives and the Senate concurred 
     with the administration regarding the need for relief from 
     the requirement in section 123 a.(2) of the AEA, which would 
     otherwise require that India agree to put all its nuclear 
     facilities under IAEA safeguards. They concluded, in 
     particular, that the Executive branch would be unable to meet 
     the standard in existing law for exempting a U.S.-India 
     agreement from this requirement, namely that failure to make 
     the proposed exception/waiver would be ``seriously 
     prejudicial to the achievement of United States 
     nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
     common defense and security.'' The conferees recommend 
     allowing the President to exempt an agreement with India from 
     the requirement in section 123 a.(2) of the AEA without 
     making this determination. Instead, subsection 104(a) 
     requires that the President make the determination in 
     subsection 104(b).
       The conferees emphasize their intent, however, that section 
     123 a.(2) be the only portion of the AEA from which their 
     recommendation provides relief. The Executive branch will 
     still be required to coordinate and submit to Congress a 
     Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement under section 123. 
     In addition, an agreement for cooperation with India will 
     still have to meet the requirements of section 123 a.(1) and 
     a.(3) through (9), unless the President can meet the standard 
     quoted above for exempting the agreement from one or more of 
     those requirements.
       The conferees recommend subsection 104(e), moreover, which 
     amends section 123 a. of the AEA so as to make clear that an 
     agreement with India for which the President has exercised 
     the waiver provided by subsection 104(a) of this title will 
     be considered under existing AEA procedures for approval of 
     an agreement for cooperation exempted from one of the 
     requirements of section 123 a. These procedures provide for 
     expedited consideration of a joint resolution of approval of 
     the agreement, but do not permit the agreement to enter into 
     force unless and until a joint resolution of approval is 
     enacted. Parliamentary practice in the two houses of Congress 
     is that the expedited joint resolution will not contain any 
     conditions to their approval of the agreement and will not be 
     subject to amendment. Congress could pass a joint resolution 
     of approval with conditions, but would have to proceed 
     without benefit of the expedited procedures offered by 
     sections 123 and 130 of the AEA.
       Section 104(a)(2) provides the President authority to waive 
     section 128 of the AEA with respect to exports to India, 
     without the additional limitations proposed in the House 
     bill.
       In addition, this title would allow the President to waive 
     the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the AEA for any 
     activity that occurred on or before July 18, 2005, and also 
     to waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(D). This would 
     provide authority to waive a termination of nuclear exports 
     that would otherwise be required because of President 
     Clinton's determination that India had tested a nuclear 
     explosive device in 1998, while keeping in place the 
     requirement to cut off exports should India test in the 
     future. It would also provide waiver authority for cessation 
     of U.S. nuclear exports to India in the event that the 
     President determines that India has ``engaged in activities 
     involving source or special nuclear material and having 
     direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of 
     nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps 
     which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient 
     progress toward terminating such activities.'' This waiver 
     will be necessary because India will presumably continue to 
     produce material for its nuclear weapons program, consistent 
     with its separation plan.
       Subsection (b) requires the President to make the following 
     determinations:
       (1) India has provided the United States and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to 
     separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, 
     and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil 
     facilities and materials with the IAEA;
       (2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps 
     required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement 
     requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in 
     accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices 
     (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) 
     to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs 
     as declared in its separation plan, including materials used 
     in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclear 
     facilities;
       (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
     toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA 
     principles, practices, and policies that would apply to 
     India's civil nuclear program;
       (4) India is working actively with the United States for 
     the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the 
     cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in 
     nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
       (5) India is working with and supporting U.S. and 
     international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
     reprocessing technology to any state that does not already 
     possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing 
     plants;
       (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear 
     and other sensitive materials and technology, including 
     through: the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive 
     export control legislation and regulations; harmonization of 
     its export control laws, regulations, policies, and practices 
     with the policies of the MTCR and the NSG, and adherence to 
     the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the procedures of 
     those regimes for unilateral adherence;
       (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to 
     India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.
       The conferees intend that the need for these determinations 
     will make certain that measures needed to ensure that the 
     agreement can safely come into force are in place, e.g., a 
     safeguards agreement negotiated with the IAEA, and that India 
     has fulfilled key obligations it undertook freely in its July 
     18, 2005, statement and in subsequent statements. The 
     conferees recognize that a number of these conditions will 
     require considerable expenditure of effort and resources to 
     satisfy, such as the negotiation of an Additional Protocol 
     that must be tailored to India's unique needs, and for that 
     reason have 15 allowed for significant latitude regarding 
     their completion. But the conferees believe that none of 
     these conditions, either singly or in combination with 
     others, is onerous. In addition, although they did not impose 
     rigorous measurements or deadlines, the conferees intend that 
     considerable substantive progress on the foregoing measures 
     can be demonstrated, including India's cooperation with the 
     United States to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
     reprocessing technology and its taking steps to strengthen 
     its export laws and regulations.
       The House bill required a determination that India and the 
     IAEA ``have concluded'' a safeguards agreement, while the 
     Senate version required that the agreement ``has entered into 
     force.'' The conferees want to ensure that the Congress can 
     have confidence that the text of the safeguards agreement, 
     which will be provided when an agreement with India is 
     submitted to Congress, is what will actually come into 
     effect. The conferees recognize, however, that there might 
     well be a delay between the approval of a safeguards 
     agreement and the date of its entry into force. They 
     understand also that India may be wary of signing a 
     safeguards agreement with the IAEA before an agreement for 
     cooperation with the United States has been approved.
       The conferees recommend that the President be required to 
     determine that India and the IAEA have concluded all legal 
     steps required prior to signature by the parties of a 
     safeguards agreement that conforms to IAEA standards, 
     principles, and practices. They have been assured that 
     signature is the final step in the process of negotiating and 
     approving a safeguards agreement. Normally, safeguards 
     agreements enter into force upon signature. The Executive 
     branch understands that Congress must be confident that the 
     India-IAEA safeguards agreement text it is shown when an 
     agreement for cooperation is submitted is, in fact, what will 
     be signed and come into force. The conferees believe that 
     Congress will be able to rely upon a text that has gone 
     through all legal steps required prior to signature by the 
     parties.
       With regard to Indian adherence to the MTCR and the NSG, 
     the conferees understand that there are specific procedures 
     that a country uses to unilaterally adhere to such regimes. 
     The conferees also understand that the Government of India is 
     aware of those procedures.
       Paragraph (7) requires a presidential determination that 
     the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided by consensus to 
     permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the 
     guidelines of the NSG. The conferees believe that it is vital 
     to maintain the role and effectiveness of the NSG, a position 
     which is consistent with statements by senior Administration 
     officials. This provision ensures that the NSG will change 
     its guidelines, or grant an exemption from them, only in 
     accordance with its longstanding practice that all such 
     changes require consensus among its participating 
     governments.
       Subsection (c) requires the President to submit to the 
     House International Relations

[[Page 22873]]

     Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the 
     determination described in subsection (b) and a report 
     regarding this determination that includes:
       (1) summaries and copies of India's separation plan and of 
     its declaration of which of its civil nuclear facilities will 
     be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the 
     credibility of the plan and declaration;
       (2) a summary of the safeguards agreement between India and 
     the IAEA, including a copy of the agreement and a description 
     of progress toward its full implementation
       (3) a summary of the progress made toward concluding and 
     implementing an Additional Protocol between India and the 
     IAEA, including a description of the scope of that Additional 
     Protocol;
       (4) a description of the steps India is taking to work with 
     the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty 
     banning the production of fissile material for nuclear 
     weapons, including a description of the steps the United 
     States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify 
     and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop 
     production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 
     unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or 
     treaty;
       (5) a description of the steps India is taking to prevent 
     the spread of nuclear-related technology, including 
     enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can 
     be used to acquire nuclear weapons technology, as well as the 
     support that India is providing to the United States to 
     restrict the spread of such technology;
       (6) a description of the steps that India is taking to 
     secure materials and technology applicable for the 
     development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass 
     destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the 
     application of comprehensive export control legislation and 
     regulations, and through harmonization and adherence to MTCR, 
     NSG, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, 
     as well as compliance with United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation 
     Security Initiative;
       (7) a description and assessment of the specific measures 
     that India has taken to fully and actively participate in 
     United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, 
     and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts 
     to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear 
     weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or 
     reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of 
     mass destruction;
       (8) a description of the NSG decision regarding India, 
     including whether the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation 
     agreement is consistent with the decision and with the 
     practices and policies of the NSG;
       (9) a description of the scope of peaceful cooperation 
     envisioned by the United States and India that will be 
     implemented under the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, 
     including whether such cooperation will include the provision 
     of enrichment and reprocessing technology; and
       (10) a description of the measures the United States will 
     take to prevent the use of any United States equipment, 
     technology, or nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded 
     nuclear facility or for any activity related to nuclear 
     explosive devices, and ensure that the provision of nuclear 
     reactor fuel does not result in increased production of 
     fissile material in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
       Since the IAEA Board of Governors resolved that Iran was in 
     noncompliance with its safeguards and NPT obligations in 
     September 2005, diplomatic negotiations to dissuade, sanction 
     and contain the Iranian nuclear program have been largely 
     unsuccessful. It is imperative to obtain the support of key 
     states to develop measures that would enable the world 
     community once again to have confidence in both Iran's 
     nuclear intentions and the ability to monitor developments. 
     India's support, as a long-time leader of the Non-Aligned 
     Movement and as a state with military and economic relations 
     with Iran, is particularly important. The conferees believe 
     that India's full and active participation in U.S. and 
     international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and contain 
     Iran's nuclear program would greatly benefit both the region 
     and the world, and that the report on its efforts in this 
     regard, required by subparagraph (c)(2)(G) will be of great 
     interest to many Members of Congress.
       There has been much concern about the possibility that the 
     provision of nuclear technology and nuclear fuel to India 
     could indirectly assist or encourage India's nuclear weapons 
     program. To increase confidence that no such developments 
     will take place, the conferees recommend the reporting 
     requirement in subparagraph (c)(2)(J). The report should 
     address the potential replication of U.S.-origin nuclear 
     technology in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in India, as 
     well as the possible utilization of foreign nuclear fuel 
     supplies in a manner that leads to the increased production 
     of fissile material in India's unsafeguarded nuclear 
     facilities using domestic uranium reserves. Further, the 
     conferees urge the Administration to encourage India to 
     exercise the utmost restraint with respect to its nuclear 
     weapons program, including with respect to any new reactor 
     that would increase India's plutonium production capability.
       Subsection (d) provides, in part, that:
       (1) nothing in this title constitutes authority to carry 
     out any civil nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and a 
     country that is not a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT 
     that would in any way assist, encourage, or induce that 
     country to manufacture of otherwise acquire nuclear weapons 
     or nuclear explosive devices;
       (2) no item subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG 
     may be transferred to India if such transfer would be 
     inconsistent with the guidelines in effect on the date of the 
     transfer; and
       (3) exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, 
     equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated if 
     India makes any materially significant transfer of nuclear or 
     nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that does 
     not conform to NSG guidelines or ballistic missiles or 
     missile-related equipment or technology that does not conform 
     to MTCR guidelines, unless the President either determines 
     that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial 
     to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or 
     otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security; or 
     chooses not to terminate exports because: the transfer was 
     made without the knowledge of the Government of India; at the 
     time of the transfer, either the Government of India did not 
     own, control or direct the Indian person that made the 
     transfer or the Indian person that made the transfer is a 
     natural person who acted without knowledge of any entity 
     described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 110(5); and 
     the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that the Government of India has taken or is 
     taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions 
     against the entity with respect to such transfer.
       As stated above, the conferees believe the NPT is the 
     keystone of U.S. nonproliferation policy and must be 
     sustained and strengthened. The United States has always 
     abided by its obligation under Article I of the NPT to not in 
     any way assist, encourage, or induce non-nuclear weapon 
     states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
     nuclear explosive devices. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
     of 1978 set a standard almost thirty years ago for the United 
     States in its civil nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear 
     weapon states by requiring those states to have full-scope 
     safeguards. In making an exception for a future nuclear 
     cooperation agreement with India in this bill, it is 
     paramount to ensure that nothing in such cooperation would 
     undermine America's commitment to abide by Article I of the 
     NPT. The conferees recommend paragraph 104(d)(I) to 
     underscore this view.
       Section 104(d)(2) is one of several provisions in the bill 
     intended to ensure that any civil nuclear cooperation between 
     the United States and India strengthens rather than weakens 
     the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. This provision 
     contributes to the achievement of this objective by 
     prohibiting the transfer to India of any item the transfer of 
     which is subject to (1) a U.S.-India agreement for 
     cooperation, (2) the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers 
     (INFCIRC/254, Part 1), or (3) the NSG Guidelines for 
     Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, 
     Software and Related Technology (INFCIRC/254, Part 2), if 
     such transfer would be inconsistent with either of the 
     aforementioned NSG guidelines as in effect on the date of the 
     transfer. No waiver authority is provided to permit transfers 
     to be made notwithstanding this restriction.
       This restriction will ensure that U.S.-India nuclear 
     cooperation continues to be carried out in a manner 
     consistent with the transfer guidelines and policies of the 
     NSG. The Administration has expressed confidence that the NSG 
     will adjust its guidelines in order to permit civil nuclear 
     cooperation along the lines contemplated by the July 18, 
     2005, Joint Statement of President Bush and Prime Minister 
     Singh. Further, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has 
     publicly assured Congress, by means of a letter dated June 
     28,2006, to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
     Richard Lugar, that: ``. . . in carrying out the laws and 
     regulations of the United States governing the export of 
     nuclear-related items, the United States Government will 
     continue to act in accordance with IAEA INFCIRC/254, as 
     amended, the Guidelines and Annexes of the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group. The U.S. will also continue to act within the policies 
     and practices of the decisions taken by the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group with respect to India. We intend to do so 
     notwithstanding any contrary actions by any other 
     participating countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.''
       Section 104(d)(3) reflects the importance the conferees 
     attach to India's commitments in the July 18, 2005, Joint 
     Statement to secure its nuclear materials and nuclear and 
     missile technology through comprehensive export control 
     legislation and through harmonization and adherence to MTCR 
     and NSG guidelines. These two steps are critical to bringing 
     India closer to the nonproliferation mainstream, one of the 
     benefits attributed to U.S. nuclear cooperation with India by 
     the Administration. Failure to conform to these nuclear and 
     missile export control guidelines, both in principle and in 
     practice,

[[Page 22874]]

     would represent a failure by India to meet the 
     nonproliferation standards expected of other responsible 
     states.
       This provision mandates termination of exports under an 
     agreement for cooperation with India if an Indian person 
     engages in transfers that are not consistent with NSG or MTCR 
     guidelines. The term ``Indian person,'' which is defined in 
     subsection 110(5), is used in a legal sense, to encompass 
     both individuals and entities of all sorts that are under 
     India's jurisdiction, as well as governmental entities. The 
     term includes non-Indian nationals, if they are under India's 
     jurisdiction.
       As no export control system is perfect, the conferees 
     recommend that the threshold of violation be one of material 
     significance. This should eliminate any concern that the sale 
     of a ``widget'' to the wrong country could trigger the 
     sanction in paragraph 104(d)(2).
       The conferees recommend granting to the President two 
     separate waiver authorities regarding this sanction. The 
     first could be exercised if the President determines that 
     cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to 
     the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives 
     or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.
       The second waiver could be used if the offending transfer 
     was made without the knowledge of the Government of India, 
     such transfer was made either by an Indian person not owned, 
     controlled, or directed by the Government of India at the 
     time of the transfer, or by an individual who acted alone 
     without the knowledge of the relevant Indian entity, and the 
     President certified to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that the Government of India has taken or is 
     taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement actions 
     against the Indian person with respect to such transfer. The 
     conferees do not intend that an Indian individual working 
     alone for private gain and without the knowledge of the 
     entity for which that individual works would trigger the 
     restrictions in this section. However, if such individual is 
     a senior officer of such entity, the conferees believe that 
     constructive knowledge must be deemed to exist. In a case 
     where it is impossible for the Government of India to bring 
     judicial or other enforcement action against an Indian person 
     because the government cannot exercise jurisdiction over the 
     person or entity, or if the Government of India cannot bring 
     an enforcement action because of its good faith 
     interpretation of applicable law, or for some other reason, 
     the statutory requirement that ``appropriate'' action be 
     taken to avoid the termination required in subparagraph (A) 
     may be deemed fulfilled. The conferees thus intend not to put 
     an agreement for cooperation with India in jeopardy, but 
     rather to encourage India's compliance with its commitments 
     and to allow sanctions to be waived if compliance efforts are 
     in train. It is the President's responsibility, however, to 
     show in his certification to Congress that such circumstances 
     limiting the Government of India's enforcement actions truly 
     exist, and are not in reality an evasion of the intent of 
     this provision that India exercise true oversight over the 
     persons and entities that operate within its territory or 
     jurisdiction.
       The conferees understand that, if necessary, the President 
     could use his waiver authority to give India some time in 
     which to commence appropriate enforcement actions. The 
     conferees intend, however, that any such waiver would be for 
     a limited period and would be withdrawn if the expected 
     enforcement failed to materialize.
       Section 104(d)(4) derives from a provision in the Senate 
     bill that prohibited the export and reexport to India of any 
     equipment, materials, or technology related to the enrichment 
     of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the 
     production of heavy water to India, except where the Indian 
     end user is a multinational facility participating in an 
     IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national 
     fuel cycle capabilities or a facility participating in a 
     bilateral or multinational program to develop a 
     proliferation-resistant fuel cycle, and where the President 
     determines that the export or reexport will not improve 
     India's ability to produce nuclear weapons or fissile 
     material for military uses. The conferees recommend the 
     Senate provision with an amendment.
       Section 104(d)(4) regulates U.S. cooperation with India in 
     the areas of uranium enrichment, reprocessing of spent fuel 
     and heavy water production. Under the Atomic Energy Act, such 
     cooperation is not restricted, but agreements for cooperation 
     must specify if such cooperation is to take place.
       In dealing with such matters as related to India, the 
     conferees have paid particular attention to the general 
     status of such cooperation under U.S. law and with all 
     nations that currently have 123 agreements with the United 
     States, and to the policies of the present Administration. 
     The conferees note that all but one currently active Section 
     123 agreement (with Australia) specifically prohibit such 
     cooperation. In order to meet the requirement of Section 123 
     a.(9) of the Atomic Energy Act (that equipment, material, or 
     production or utilization facilities produced as a result of 
     a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement will be subject to all 
     the other requirements of Section 123 a.), it has been deemed 
     necessary to amend agreements for cooperation, submitting 
     them to Congress for approval. In 1999, when the United 
     States Government opted to expand U.S.-Australian nuclear 
     cooperation to allow for cooperation in the SILEX uranium 
     enrichment process, an amended agreement was submitted to 
     Congress for approval.
       The conferees intend that, should any such cooperation with 
     India be contemplated, either the original agreement for 
     cooperation would specify that such cooperation is authorized 
     or a subsequently amended agreement would be submitted to the 
     Congress. In either circumstance, existing congressional 
     prerogatives to review and approve such cooperation would be 
     maintained. The conferees note that the Administration has 
     already stipulated that ``full civil nuclear cooperation,'' 
     the term used in the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement between 
     President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh, will not 
     include enrichment or reprocessing technology. This is 
     consistent with President Bush's February 11, 2004, speech at 
     the National Defense University, in which he stated that 
     ``enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations 
     seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,'' 
     and the fact that, other than in the SILEX arrangement with 
     Australia, the United States does not currently engage in 
     cooperation regarding enrichment or reprocessing technology 
     with any country.
       The conferees recommend an additional provision, not 
     contained in the original Senate bill, that would add a 
     requirement that appropriate measures will be in place to 
     ensure that no sensitive nuclear technology (SNT), as defined 
     in section 4(5) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 
     (22 U.S.C. 3203(5)), will be diverted to any person, site, 
     facility, location, or program not under IAEA safeguards.
       The conferees believe that this language is necessary to 
     ensure that no SNT related to the enrichment of uranium 
     (which can be used to make highly-enriched uranium for 
     weapons), the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (which can 
     provide plutonium for weapons), or the production of heavy 
     water (which is used in reactors that produce weapons-grade 
     plutonium and tritium as a byproduct) is transferred to 
     India, unless under circumstances that provide assurance that 
     this technology would not be diverted to a similar site, 
     facility, location, or program not associated with peaceful 
     nuclear fuel-cycle activities.
       India currently produces heavy water, operates heavy-water 
     moderated reactors, reprocesses spent nuclear fuel, and has a 
     limited uranium enrichment capability. Only a portion of 
     India's facilities will be under IAEA safeguards, and 
     sensitive nuclear technologies will reside in India in both 
     safeguarded and un-safeguarded facilities. The conferees seek 
     to ensure that the United States does not provide, even 
     inadvertently, assistance to India that could further India's 
     development of these technologies for noncivilian purposes. 
     Such assistance could be viewed as a violation of U.S. 
     obligations under Article I of the NPT.
       The conferees intend that no licenses be issued pursuant to 
     Parts 110 and 810 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
     Regulations by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 
     the Secretary of Energy except under the requirements of 
     subparagraph (B) of subsection 104(d)(4). Such a restriction 
     on transfers would also extend to any Department of Energy 
     authority to transfer enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy 
     water production-related technology, not pursuant to a 
     Section 123 agreement.
       The conferees note that section 104(d)(4) cannot override 
     the terms of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged 
     pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act that may not 
     permit such cooperation and would thus bar such exports or 
     transfers, and the conferees do not intend to create such 
     authority. They expect that, as in other nuclear cooperation 
     agreements, the Executive branch would submit an amended or 
     new nuclear cooperation agreement to cover enrichment, 
     reprocessing, or heavy water production-related cooperation, 
     should such a change be undertaken in the future with India. 
     Such an agreement would not be pursuant to the terms of this 
     title, and would have to be submitted under the existing 
     exemption authority contained in section 123 of the AEA.
       Section 104(d)(5) contains broad requirements for a nuclear 
     export accountability program to be carried out with respect 
     to U.S. exports and re-exports of nuclear materials, 
     equipment, and technology sold, leased, exported, or 
     reexported to India. Such a program can provide increased 
     confidence in India's separation of its civilian from its 
     military nuclear programs, facilities, materials and 
     personnel, and also would further ensure United States 
     compliance with Article I of the NPT and implementation of 
     section 123a.(l) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The 
     provision is not intended to reflect poorly on India's July 
     18, 2005, Joint Statement commitments and its March and May 
     2006 separation documents. Rather, the conferees believe that 
     the resulting and regular cooperation between U.S. regulatory 
     agencies, in particular with the NRC, can

[[Page 22875]]

     provide a basis for even greater cooperation between the two 
     nations.
       Section 104(d)(5) provides a large degree of flexibility to 
     the President. Clauses (B)(i) and (ii) require sufficient 
     measures to ensure that all the assurances and conditions of 
     any licenses or authorizations issued for exports and 
     reexports to India by the NRC (which are issued under 10 CFR 
     Part 110) and by the Secretary of Energy (which are issued 
     pursuant to 10 CFR Part 810) are being met and complied with 
     in India. Clause (B)(ii) would require that, with respect to 
     any authorizations issued by the Secretary of Energy pursuant 
     to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 
     2077(b)): the identified recipients of the nuclear technology 
     are authorized to receive the nuclear technology; the nuclear 
     technology identified for transfer will be used only for 
     safeguarded nuclear activities and will not be used for any 
     military or nuclear explosive purpose; and the nuclear 
     technology identified for transfer will not be retransferred 
     without the prior consent of the United States, and 
     facilities, equipment, or materials derived through the use 
     of transferred technology will not be transferred without the 
     prior consent of the United States.
       Section 104(d)(5)(B)(iii) mandates that, in the event the 
     IAEA is unable to implement safeguards as required by an 
     agreement between the United States and India approved 
     pursuant to this title, there be appropriate assurance that 
     arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are 
     consistent with the requirements of section 123 a.(1) of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding 
     the maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the agreement 
     regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or 
     suspended for any reason. Assurances that there will be such 
     ``fall-back safeguards,'' if needed, are an important feature 
     of agreements for nuclear cooperation; they enable such 
     safeguards to exist more clearly in perpetuity. There is 
     always a possibility that budget or personnel strains in the 
     IAEA will render it unable to fulfill a safeguards mandate. 
     Such strains would likely have nothing to do with India, but 
     would have a major impact on the ability of the United States 
     to assure that U.S. exports were being used responsibly. The 
     conferees intend to assure that the requirements of section 
     123 a.(1) are fully met; they do not intend to impose a more 
     intrusive regime than arrangements that have been used before 
     in one or more U.S. agreements for cooperation.
       Section 104(e) makes a conforming amendment to section 123 
     d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The purpose of this 
     provision is to make clear that the U.S.-India agreement on 
     civil nuclear cooperation, even if exempted from subsection 
     a.(2) of section 123, may enter into force only if approved 
     by Congress by a joint resolution of approval, consistent 
     with current law with regard to an agreement that the 
     President exempts from any requirement of subsection a. of 
     section 123. As with any other agreement submitted under 
     section 123 d., the congressional approval procedures under 
     section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act would apply.
       Section 104(f) provides that the authority under subsection 
     (a)(1) to exempt a U.S.-India agreement on civil nuclear 
     cooperation will terminate if a joint resolution, approved as 
     required under section 123 d. (as amended by subsection (e)), 
     is enacted. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that a 
     future President may not use the authority of this title to 
     exempt a new U.S.-India agreement on civil nuclear 
     cooperation.
       Section 104(g) provides for several reports to Congress.
       Paragraph (1) requires the President to keep the 
     appropriate congressional committees fully and currently 
     informed of the facts and implications of any significant 
     nuclear activities of India. This requirement includes 
     information on any material noncompliance on the part of the 
     Government of India with the nonproliferation commitments 
     undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, the March 
     7, 2006, separation plan, the future IAEA-India safeguards 
     agreement and Additional Protocol, a peaceful nuclear 
     cooperation agreement between India and the United States, 
     the terms and conditions of any approved licenses regarding 
     the export or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use 
     material, equipment, or technology, and United States laws 
     and regulations regarding such licenses. This reporting 
     requirement also encompasses information regarding the 
     construction of a nuclear facility in India after the date of 
     the enactment of this title, significant changes in the 
     production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or 
     amounts of fissile material produced, and changes in the 
     purpose or operational status of any unsafeguarded nuclear 
     fuel cycle activities in India.
       The term ``fully and currently informed'' creates an 
     obligation upon the Executive branch to inform the 
     appropriate committees whenever significant information 
     becomes available, rather than waiting to include it in a 
     regularly scheduled report. This does not mean that the 
     committees can expect daily or weekly briefings; rather, the 
     Executive branch is trusted to use common sense in 
     determining how best to discharge its duty to keep the 
     committees up to date on important information.
       Paragraph (2) requires an ``Implementation and Compliance 
     Report'' by the President to Congress not later than 180 days 
     after the date on which a civil nuclear cooperation agreement 
     between the U.S. and India enters into force and annually 
     thereafter.
       This report must include a description of any additional 
     nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that the Government 
     of India has placed or intends to place under IAEA 
     safeguards; a comprehensive listing of all licenses that have 
     been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
     Secretary of Energy for exports and reexports to India under 
     parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations; 
     any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce for the 
     export or reexport to India of commodities, related 
     technology, and software which are controlled for nuclear 
     nonproliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the 
     Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of title 15, 
     Code of Federal Regulation, or any successor regulation; any 
     other United States authorizations for the export or reexport 
     to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and with respect 
     to each such license or other form of authorization as 
     described: (1) the number or other identifying information of 
     each license or authorization; (2) the name or names of the 
     authorized end user or end users; (3) the name of the site, 
     facility, or location in India to which the export or 
     reexport was made; (4) the terms and conditions included on 
     such licenses and authorizations; (5) any postshipment 
     verification procedures that will be applied to such exports 
     or reexports; and (6) the term of validity of each such 
     license or authorization.
       This report must also include information regarding any 
     significant nuclear commerce between India and other 
     countries, including any such trade that is not consistent 
     with applicable NSG guidelines or decisions, or would not 
     meet the standards applied to exports or reexports of such 
     material, equipment, or technology of United States origin. 
     In addition, the report must include either an assessment 
     that India is in full compliance with the commitments and 
     obligations contained in the agreements and other documents 
     referenced above; or an identification and analysis of all 
     compliance issues arising with regard to the adherence by 
     India to its commitments and obligations, including (1) the 
     steps the U.S. Government has taken to remedy or otherwise 
     respond to such compliance issues; (2) the responses of the 
     Government of India to such steps; (3) the steps the U.S. 
     Government will take to this end in the coming year; and (4) 
     an assessment of the implications of any continued 
     noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India 
     remains in the national security interest of the United 
     States.
       Further, the report must contain an assessment of whether 
     India is fully and actively participating in United States 
     and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if 
     necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to 
     acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear 
     weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or 
     reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of 
     mass destruction, including a description of the specific 
     measures that India has taken in this regard; and if India is 
     not assessed to be fully and actively participating in these 
     efforts, a description of: the measures the United States 
     Government has taken to secure India's full and active 
     participation, the responses of the Government of India to 
     such measures, and the measures the United States Government 
     plans to take in the coming year to secure India's full and 
     active participation.
       The report must provide an analysis of whether United 
     States civil nuclear assistance to India is in any way 
     assisting India's nuclear weapons program, including through 
     the use of any U.S. equipment, technology, or nuclear 
     material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or 
     nuclear-weapons related complex; the replication and 
     subsequent use of any U.S. technology by India in an 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear 
     weapons-related complex, or for any activity related to the 
     research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear 
     explosive devices; and the provision of nuclear fuel in such 
     a manner as to facilitate the increased production by India 
     of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded 
     nuclear facilities.
       A detailed description is also required regarding U.S. 
     efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and 
     Pakistan in disclosing, securing, limiting, and reducing 
     their fissile material stockpiles, including stockpiles for 
     military purposes, pending creation of a world-wide fissile 
     material cut-off regime, including the institution of a 
     Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; the responses of India and 
     Pakistan to such efforts; and assistance that the United 
     States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India 
     and Pakistan to promote the aforementioned national and 
     regional progress by India and Pakistan.
       The report must also contain an estimate of the amount of 
     uranium mined and milled in India during the previous year, 
     the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or 
     allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices, 
     and the rate of production in India of fissile material for 
     nuclear explosive devices and of nuclear explosive devices, 
     along with an estimate of the

[[Page 22876]]

     amount of electricity India's nuclear reactors produced for 
     civil purposes during the previous year, and the proportion 
     of such production that can be attributed to India's declared 
     civil reactors, given that India's military reactors produce 
     some electricity for use in the civil sector. In addition, 
     there must be an analysis as to whether imported uranium has 
     affected the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive 
     devices.
       The report must also provide a detailed description of 
     efforts and progress made toward the achievement of India's 
     full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
     and formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
     Principles of the PSI; public announcement of its decision to 
     conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies 
     with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
     Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and 
     effective implementation of these decisions.
       Finally, this report requires information regarding the 
     disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear fuel from 
     India's civilian nuclear program, and any plans or activities 
     relating to future disposal of such spent nuclear fuel.
       Paragraph (3) allows the President to submit the 
     aforementioned reports under Paragraph (2) with other annual 
     reports. The report shall be unclassified but may contain a 
     classified annex.
     Section 105. United States compliance with its Nuclear 
         Nonproliferation Treaty obligations
       Sec. 105 states that nothing in this title constitutes 
     authority for any action in violation of an obligation of the 
     United States under the NPT. As stated earlier in this 
     report, the conferees consider the NPT to be the cornerstone 
     of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. They expect the 
     Executive branch to keep its NPT obligations in mind when 
     considering each export or reexport, transfer,or retransfer 
     pursuant to an agreement for cooperation, and especially 
     pursuant to such an agreement with a state that is not a 
     State Party to the NPT.
     Section 106. Inoperability of determination and waivers
       Sec. 106 states that a determination and any waiver under 
     section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President 
     determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive 
     device after the date of the enactment of this Act. The 
     conferees intend this section to make absolutely clear a 
     point that already follows from section 129 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2158). This title affords no waiver 
     from section 129 for an Indian nuclear detonation after July 
     18, 2005.
     Section 107. MTCR adherent status
       Section 107 is included to clarify the status accorded to 
     India. Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
     mandates sanctions on transfers of MTCR equipment or 
     technology if the President determines that a foreign person 
     knowingly exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the 
     trade of any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to 
     the acquisition, design, development, or production of 
     missiles in a country that is not an MTCR adherent and would 
     be, if it were United States-origin equipment or technology, 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the 
     AECA; or if a foreign person conspires to or attempts to 
     engage in such export, transfer, or trade; or if a foreign 
     person facilitates such an export, transfer, or trade by any 
     other person; or if the President has made a determination 
     with respect to a foreign person under section 11B(b)(1) of 
     the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 USC App. 
     2410b(b)(1)). Section 73 of AECA is, however, inapplicable to 
     MTCR adherents if the export in question is ``any export, 
     transfer, or trading activity that is authorized by the laws 
     of an MTCR adherent, if such authorization is not obtained by 
     misrepresentation or fraud'' or if the export, transfer, or 
     trade of an item is to an end user in a country that is an 
     MTCR adherent (section 73(b)). Section 73 also provides for 
     the termination of sanctions when an MTCR adherent takes 
     steps toward effective judicial enforcement against persons 
     violating the prohibitions in section 73, if such actions are 
     ``comprehensive'' and are ``performed to the satisfaction of 
     the United States'' and the findings of such proceedings are 
     satisfactory to the United States (section 73(c)(1)(A) and 
     (B) and section 73(c)(2)).
       Secretary Rice has stated that ``India would not be 
     considered an `MTCR Adherent' as defined under Section 73'' 
     because:
       ``India has committed to unilaterally adhere to the Missile 
     Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. The missile 
     sanctions law would generally still apply to a ``unilateral 
     adherent'' to the MTCR.
       Unilateral adherence to the MTCR Guidelines means that a 
     country makes a unilateral political commitment to abide by 
     the Guidelines and Annex of the MTCR. In particular, an MTCR 
     unilateral adherent commits to control exports of missile-
     related equipment and technology according the MTCR 
     Guidelines, including any subsequent changes to the MTCR 
     Guidelines and Annex. Inter alia, this means that MTCR 
     unilateral adherent countries need to have in place laws and 
     regulations that permit them to control the export of MTCR 
     Annex equipment and technology consistent with the MTCR 
     Guidelines.
       An ``MTCR Adherent'' is a specially defined status in terms 
     of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (also referred 
     to as the missile sanctions law). An `MTCR Adherent,' as 
     defined in Section 73 of the missile sanctions law, is a 
     country that ``participates'' in the MTCR or that, ``pursuant 
     to an international understanding to which the United States 
     is a party, controls MTCR equipment and technology in 
     accordance with the criteria and standards set forth in the 
     MTCR.'' India's ``unilateral adherence'' to the MTCR would 
     not meet this requirement.
       Since India's unilateral adherence does not qualify it as 
     an MTCR adherent under section 73 of AECA, the conferees 
     included section 107 to clarify this point. While the 
     provision accomplishes this, it is also drafted in such a 
     manner as to permit India, should it so decide in the future, 
     to enjoy the benefits of AECA section 73 by becoming a full 
     adherent to the MTCR. Because the provision states a factual 
     finding by Congress, the provision would no longer have 
     effect if India were to meet the requirements laid out as in 
     Secretary Rice's statement. Under section 107, however, 
     India's transfers of missile or missile-related equipment, 
     technology and technical data, remain for now subject to U.S. 
     sanctions if they should violate subsection 73(a) of the 
     AECA.
     Section 108. Technical amendment
       Sec. 108 is a technical amendment regarding Section 
     1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
     Authorization Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. 
     Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
     Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section 
     1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in appendix G 
     of that Act; 113 Stat. 150IA-486).
     Section 109. United States-India Scientific Cooperative 
         Nuclear Nonproliferation Program
       Section 109 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to establish 
     a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program to pursue 
     jointly with scientists from the United States and India a 
     program to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, 
     including scientific research and development efforts, with 
     an emphasis on nuclear safeguards. The conferees believe that 
     there are exciting opportunities for cooperative efforts 
     between U.S. and Indian scientists and engineers in this 
     area, and they hope that the two countries' civil nuclear 
     power experts, in particular, will share new ideas and best 
     practices for the benefit of all. Section 109 is not intended 
     to create an obligation for India to meet, but rather to open 
     an avenue for increased cooperation on topics of concern to 
     both countries.
       Subsection (c) mandates that the Secretary of Energy enter 
     into an agreement with the National Academies to develop 
     recommendations for the implementation of the cooperative 
     nonproliferation program. The National Academies, which 
     include, inter alia, the National Academy of Sciences, the 
     National Academy of Engineering, and the National Research 
     Council, have a long and distinguished history of cooperation 
     with Indian scientists and are skilled at building bridges to 
     further joint efforts. The conferees encourage the Secretary 
     of Energy to arrange for this National Academies assistance 
     in the coming months, even if funds for the cooperative 
     program cannot be appropriated until fiscal year 2008.
     Section 110. Definitions
       Section 110 defines terms used in this Act.


       Title II--UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

       Title II is a Senate provision, based almost entirely upon 
     S. 2489, the U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act, 
     reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
     April 3, 2006, in Senate Report 109-226. It implements the 
     Additional Protocol between the United States and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (T. Doc. 107-7), to which 
     the Senate gave advice and consent to ratification on March 
     31, 2004.
       The Senate adopted amendments to the S. 2489 text when it 
     was debated as title II of this bill, and the conferees 
     recommend a small number of further amendments. The conferees 
     hereby incorporate by reference Senate Report 109-226, except 
     where provisions were later amended either in the Senate or 
     by the conferees.
       Sections 252 and 253 were modified by the Senate, 
     principally to require that location-specific IAEA 
     environmental sampling not be permitted in the United States 
     under Article 5 of the Additional Protocol unless the 
     President has determined and reported to the appropriate 
     congressional committees with respect to that proposed use of 
     environmental sampling that the proposed use of location-
     specific environmental sampling is necessary to increase the 
     capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear 
     activities in a non-nuclear weapon state. The conferees are 
     persuaded that the IAEA is unlikely to propose such sampling, 
     given that the United States, as a nuclear weapon state, is 
     not barred from using fissile material for military purposes.
       The conferees are further persuaded that these sections 
     will not prevent the United States from fulfilling its 
     obligations under the Additional Protocol. This is true even 
     though section 254, also added by the Senate,

[[Page 22877]]

     limits the purposes that may be construed as covered by the 
     phrase ``necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to 
     detect undeclared nuclear activities in a non-nuclear weapon 
     state.''
       Subtitle F of title II, Protection of National Security 
     Information and Activities, was added by the Senate. Section 
     261(a) provides that no current or former Department of 
     Defense or Department of Energy location, site, or facility 
     of direct national security significance shall be declared or 
     be subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol. 
     Similarly, under section 261(b), no information of direct 
     national security significance regarding such locations, 
     sites, or facilities shall be provided under the Additional 
     Protocol. These requirements parallel statements that 
     Administration officials have made for several years 
     regarding how the Additional Protocol's national security 
     exemption will be implemented.
       Sections 261(c) and 261(d) provide that nothing in this 
     title shall be construed to permit the communication or 
     disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data 
     controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
     or of national security information and other classified 
     information. These provisions parallel an understanding in 
     the resolution of ratification approved by the Senate in 2004 
     that the Additional Protocol does not require any such 
     disclosure. The conferees note that these provisions do not 
     bar the Executive branch, however, from using any other 
     authority that it may possess to provide classified 
     information to the IAEA.
       Section 262(a) provides that no national of a country 
     designated by the Secretary of State under section 620A of 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a 
     government supporting acts of international terrorism shall 
     be permitted access to the United States to carry out an 
     inspection activity under the Additional Protocol or a 
     related safeguards agreement. Both the Additional Protocol 
     and the underlying U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement allow the 
     United States to bar individual inspectors from engaging in 
     inspections in the United States, and the United States has 
     routinely exercised that right as appropriate. The conferees 
     know of no occasion on which a national of a state sponsor of 
     terrorism has conducted an IAEA inspection in this country.
       Section 262(b) requires that IAEA inspectors be accompanied 
     at all times by U.S. Government personnel when inspecting 
     sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the United 
     States under the Additional Protocol. The conferees 
     understand that this provision will not require any change in 
     current practices.
       Section 262(c) provides that the President shall conduct 
     vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments 
     not less than every 5 years to ensure that information of 
     direct national security significance remains protected at 
     all sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the 
     United States that are subject to IAEA inspection under the 
     Additional Protocol. The conferees understand that once this 
     title is enacted, the Executive branch will resume such 
     assessments.
       Subtitle G of title II provides for several reports from 
     the Executive branch. Sections 271 through 273 provide for 
     prior notice of sites, locations, facilities, and activities 
     in the United States to be declared to the IAEA or removed 
     from that status, along with the reasons for those decisions; 
     and certification that the necessary security assessments 
     have been conducted and appropriate measures taken to ensure 
     that information of direct national security significance 
     will not be compromised.
       Section 274 provides for reports on: measures that have 
     been or should be taken to achieve the adoption of additional 
     protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-
     nuclear-weapon States Party; and on assistance that has been 
     provided or should be provided by the United States to the 
     IAEA in order to promote the effective implementation of 
     additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed 
     by non-nuclear-weapon States Party and the verification of 
     the compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations, with a 
     plan for providing any needed additional funding. The 
     conferees believe that the safeguards function is a vital 
     element of U.S. nonproliferation policy and urge the 
     Executive branch to maintain robust funding for U.S. 
     assistance to the IAEA, taking into account the continuing 
     need for improved safeguards in countries of concern, the 
     additional safeguards load that the IAEA will have to bear 
     when India begins to engage in large-scale civil nuclear 
     commerce, and the likely advent of additional safeguards 
     requirements as the world moves to increase nuclear power 
     production.
       Section 275 provides that the President shall notify 
     Congress of any notifications issued by the IAEA to the 
     United States under Article 10 of the Additional Protocol. 
     Article 10 says that the IAEA shall inform the United States 
     of activities carried out under the Additional Protocol, 
     including those in response to questions or inconsistencies 
     the IAEA had brought to the attention of the United States, 
     the results of those IAEA activities, and the conclusions 
     that the IAEA has drawn. Article 10 notifications will take 
     place at least annually.

     Henry Hyde,
     John Boehner,
     Tom Lantos,
                                    Managers on Part of the House.

     Richard G. Lugar,
     Chuck Hagel,
     George Allen,
     Bill Frist,
     Joe Biden,
     Chris Dodd,
     Managers on the Part of the Senate.

                          ____________________