[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 22154-22179]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Ensign amendment now being the pending 
question, the Senate stands in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
  Whereupon, the Senate, at 3:43 p.m, recessed subject to the call of 
the Chair and reassembled at 4:59 p.m. when called to order by the 
Presiding Officer (Ms. Murkowski.)
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, we are now prepared to vote in relation 
to the Ensign amendment. I ask unanimous consent that following that 
vote, Senator Feingold be recognized to offer his amendment and that 
there be 90 minutes equally divided on that amendment. I further ask 
unanimous consent that following the use or yielding back of time on 
that amendment, it be set aside, and Senator Boxer be recognized in 
order to offer her amendment; provided further that there be 45 minutes 
equally divided in relation to that amendment. Further, that following 
that time the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Feingold 
amendment, to be followed by a vote in relation to the Boxer amendment, 
with no second-degrees in order, and following these votes, the bill be 
read for a third time and the Senate proceed to a vote on passage of 
the House bill as provided in the previous order. I would also ask that 
there be 2 minutes equally divided for debate prior to each vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. We are now prepared to vote in relation 
to the Ensign amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do Senators yield time on the amendment?
  Mr. LUGAR. Yes.


                       Vote on Amendment No. 5181

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded. The question is on 
agreeing to the amendment. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Thomas).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords) 
is necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 27, nays 71, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 267 Leg.]

                                YEAS--27

     Allard
     Bunning
     Coburn
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     DeMint
     Dole
     Dorgan
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Frist
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kyl
     Lott
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Smith
     Snowe
     Sununu

                                NAYS--71

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Burns
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Talent
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Jeffords
     Thomas
       
  The amendment (No. 5181) was rejected.
  Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Isakson). Under the previous order, the 
Senator from Wisconsin is recognized. Will the Senator suspend?
  Did the distinguished chairman wish to be recognized?
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, just for clarification, I ask unanimous 
consent that the Feingold and Boxer amendments be in order, 
notwithstanding adoption of the Harkin amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a parliamentary 
inquiry?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how long did we spend in that last 15-
minute rollcall?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We spent approximately 39 minutes.
  Mr. LEAHY. Thirty-nine?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty-six. I apologize.
  Mr. LEAHY. Thirty-six for a 15-minute rollcall. I am just curious, 
for those of us who might actually have a life after dark around this 
place, how much longer the rest will be.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would recognize that the 
distinguished majority leader's retirement recognition with the Vice 
President was being held, and that was probably the delay, for the 
meeting.
  The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President.


                           Amendment No. 5183

  Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk, and I ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 5183.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

[[Page 22155]]



(Purpose: To require as a precondition to United States-India peaceful 
 atomic energy cooperation determinations by the President that United 
     States nuclear cooperation with India does nothing to assist, 
encourage, or induce India to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or 
                    other nuclear explosive devices)

       On page 8, beginning on line 17, strike ``Group; and'' and 
     all that follows through ``(8) the Nuclear'' on line 18 and 
     insert the following:

     Group;
       (8) the scope and content of United States nuclear 
     cooperation with India in the proposed nuclear cooperation 
     agreement pursuant to section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act 
     of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)) does nothing to directly or 
     indirectly assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture 
     or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
     explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive 
     devices, specifically that--
       (A) India cannot use United States-origin equipment, 
     technology, or nuclear material in an unsafeguarded facility 
     or nuclear weapons-related complex; and
       (B) India cannot replicate and subsequently use United 
     States-origin technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility 
     or unsafeguarded nuclear-related complex, or for any activity 
     related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture 
     of nuclear explosive devices;
       (9) India has provided sufficient assurances that the 
     provision by the United States of nuclear fuel will not 
     facilitate the increased production by India of fissile 
     material in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; and
       (10) the Nuclear

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the relationship between the United 
States and India is very important. As we look ahead to the coming 
decades, it is clear that United States-India relations will be 
integral to establishing a secure, sustainable, and prosperous 
international system--not only in the Asian region but around the world 
as India increasingly grows into its role as a global power.
  And, of course, India, in many ways, is a natural ally of the United 
States. We share a great deal in common as ethnically diverse, 
religiously tolerant democratic societies. Our peoples are innovative, 
driven, and eager to participate in the global economy. We both face 
the threat of terrorism. India occupies an important position in an 
important part of the world, and by itself represents over l7 percent 
of the world's total population. We absolutely should be working to 
strengthen our relationship with this important partner, and seeking 
ways to deepen our strategic ties.
  While I want to strengthen the relationship between the United States 
and India, this bill would do more than simply bring our two nations 
closer together. It would pave the way for civilian nuclear cooperation 
between the United States and India for the first time since India 
exploded a nuclear device in the 1970s. If this bill is passed, it will 
dramatically shift 30 years of nonproliferation policy. Specifically, 
this bill would have serious consequences for the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the international nonproliferation regime, and 
U.S. national security. Such a fundamental change in policy should not 
be undertaken lightly, which is why it is crucial that this body fully 
discuss and understand the implications of this bill.
  In my work on the Foreign Relations Committee, I have had a chance to 
study this issue and this legislation closely. I have talked to a 
number of people, on all sides of this issue: senior officials from the 
administration, business groups, nonproliferation and arms control 
experts, Indian officials, and concerned citizens in my home State of 
Wisconsin. The committee held a number of hearings to examine the 
issue, and the panelists we heard from represented a wide range of 
opinions on the prospect of nuclear cooperation with India. And after 
all of this careful consideration, I have to report that I am left with 
some deep concerns regarding what this legislation means for United 
States national security.
  The primary consideration for us in the U.S. Senate as we debate this 
bill should be this: will this legislation make the citizens of the 
United States more secure or less? As we consider this fundamental 
shift in the international nonproliferation regime, we must make sure 
that we have adequate protections in place to guard against the further 
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology.
  The threat of nuclear weapons to the United States and the spread of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear material are among the gravest dangers that 
our country faces. It is crucial to our national security that the 
nuclear non-proliferation framework remains strong. I want to make sure 
that the United States, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, is working to strengthen the international treaties and regimes 
that have been designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. A 
world with more nuclear weapons is, simply put, a more dangerous world.
  So that is why I am offering an amendment to this bill that spells 
out in greater detail that nuclear cooperation between the United 
States and India will be only civilian in nature, and that none of the 
assistance the United States provides will be used for strengthening or 
further developing India's nuclear weapons arsenal. This is completely 
in line with President Bush's and Secretary Rice's statements about the 
deal, and is something the United States is already committed to under 
article I of the NPT. My amendment simply makes it a binding 
requirement: Before the nuclear cooperation agreement can go into 
effect, the President of the United States must certify that the scope 
and content of the agreement does nothing to contribute directly or 
indirectly to the development of India's nuclear weapons arsenal. This 
amendment will strengthen this bill. It will enhance transparency. And 
it will send a clear message to the world that the United States will, 
in fact, abide by its commitments and is working within the letter and 
spirit of the agreements and treaties to which it is party.
  Allow me to quote from article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, because I think it will help to set forth the obligations of 
the agreement the United States is a party to. Article I states that:

       Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
     not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons 
     or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
     weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not 
     in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear 
     weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
     weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
     such weapons or explosive devices.

  Let me repeat that second clause, because it is what my amendment 
intends to address: ``not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce 
any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices.''
  India is considered to be a nonnuclear weapon state for the purposes 
of the NPT, and we are therefore prohibited from assisting their 
nuclear weapons program. My amendment will require the President to 
make determinations to ensure that we are in line with that treaty 
obligation. First, the President would have to certify to Congress that 
the scope and content of the nuclear cooperation agreement that he 
negotiates will not contribute to India's nuclear weapons program--
specifically that it does not: Allow for the use of U.S.-origin 
equipment, technology, or material in an unsafeguarded Indian nuclear 
facility; or allow for the replication and subsequent use of U.S.-
origin technology for any activity related to nuclear explosive 
devices.
  Second, the President would have to certify that he had received 
sufficient assurances from the Government of India that nuclear fuel 
provided by the United States will not facilitate the increased 
production by India of fissile material for weapons use.
  Both India and the United States should feel comfortable with this 
amendment; it only requires that the United States certify that this 
deal is in line with our current commitments. It will go a long way to 
enhance transparency and reassure all sides that this civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement does not have any military aspects.
  This is particularly important now, as we face nuclear crises in 
North Korea and Iran. While we are pressuring those countries to submit 
to

[[Page 22156]]

international inspections and abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, it is crucial that we not simultaneously be seen to undermine 
the NPT's foundations by our actions. My amendment sends a clear 
message that the United States stands by the spirit and the letter of 
the NPT. Rejecting my amendment would send a dangerous signal to Iran, 
North Korea and other states that we are not taking seriously our 
international commitments, and that the NPT is no longer relevant.
  As you can see, my amendment is quite detailed in spelling out 
exactly how assistance to India's weapons program is defined, and what 
activities should be prohibited under the terms of the agreement. The 
second determination, which relates to the provision of nuclear fuel by 
the United States, is particularly important, because it gets to the 
heart of concerns about a possible buildup of nuclear weapons. 
Currently, India's production of weapons grade plutonium is constrained 
by its limited domestic supply of natural uranium. Experts, from former 
Senator Sam Nunn former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation Bob Einhorn, have expressed concern that by providing 
nuclear fuel to India through this agreement, India's domestic supply 
of uranium might be freed up in order to accelerate the production of 
nuclear weapons materials.
  And in fact, the Indians themselves have expressed this possibility. 
Listen to the words of a former head of the Indian National Security 
Advisory Board, less than a year ago:

       Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up 
     our minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as 
     possible, it is to India's advantage to categorize as many 
     power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refueled bv 
     imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for 
     weapons grade plutonium production.

  This is from an article entitled ``India and the Nuclear Deal,'' in 
the Times of India on December 12, 2005.
  This is a former high-level Indian Government official, arguing less 
than a year ago that India should increase its production of weapons 
material through the provision of imported uranium. I am, frankly, 
concerned by that prospect. India has said that its strategic nuclear 
weapons program, and the production of fissile material, is unrelated 
to this deal. Secretary Rice and other members of the administration 
have assured us of the same thing. In fact, in its official response to 
one of Senator Lugar's questions last year, the State Department noted 
that ``nothing to be provided to India under the Initiative will be 
used to enhance India's military capability or add to its military 
stockpile.''
  If that is truly the case--and I believe both sides when they say 
that expanding India's nuclear weapons arsenal is not a goal of this 
agreement--then my amendment should be absolutely uncontroversial. It 
simply makes those claims binding, by requiring the President to make 
such a determination.
  Some of my colleagues might ask, if we are already committed to non-
assistance under the NPT, and if members of the administration have 
assured us that this is the case, why is this amendment necessary? 
After all, requiring a presidential determination is a big deal. My 
response is that this issue is a big deal. Nonassistance to India's 
nuclear weapons program is such a critical aspect of this agreement 
that it must be spelled out within the legislation in clear, concrete 
terms, leaving no question or ambiguity. It is an issue that demands 
the high bar of a presidential determination to Congress.
  And there is a significant precedent for such determination The 1985 
Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and China 
required a presidential determination on nonassistance to China's 
nuclear weapons program--one of only two binding presidential 
determinations included in that legislation. Specifically, the law 
stated that the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement could not go 
into force until the President provided a certification to Congress 
that the agreement was designed ``to be effective in ensuring that any 
nuclear material, facilities, or components provided under the 
Agreement shall be utilized solely for intended peaceful purposes as 
set forth in the Agreement.''
  In 1985, the Members of this body deemed that one of the two things 
the President of the United States should have to make a certification 
about prior to nuclear cooperation with another country was that our 
civilian cooperation would in no way assist that country's weapons 
program. My amendment is identical in scope and purpose, and should be 
passed. If anything, there are even more reasons to push for such a 
determination with regard to India, given that India is a nonsignatory 
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  Some may argue that the President cannot make such a determination--
that the President cannot know in advance what India will do with 
material we provide to them. But this amendment is about the scope and 
content of the agreement, and about assurances received from the Indian 
government. It is about our current actions, and the strength of the 
agreement that the President negotiates. And in fact, the President 
made exactly such a determination, in 1998, when he submitted 
Presidential Determination 98-10 to the U.S. Congress to enable nuclear 
cooperation with China to move forward under that agreement.
  If this body is afraid that the President would be unable to make 
such a determination with respect to India, I ask one question: why 
then are we pursuing this deal? If we cannot be reasonably certain that 
this agreement will not help India to expand its nuclear arsenal, how 
good a deal is this? This should be a simple calculation based on the 
best interests of the United States.
  My colleagues are aware that I voted against this legislation in 
committee. I stated at the time of my vote that I was not opposed to 
the deal in principle, but was committed to working constructively to 
strengthen this bill when it came to the floor, because I still had 
concerns that had not been addressed. I stand by that statement. I 
would like to see an agreement that brings our countries closer 
together strategically, while preserving our national security 
interests.
  However, since the time of the committee hearing, more information 
has come to light that further justifies the concerns I expressed 
earlier, and which I would like to share with my colleagues.
  First of all, since that time, the State Department released a report 
sanctioning two Indian firms for illicit missile-related transactions 
with Iran. This report was 10 months overdue and was not released until 
1 day after the House voted on its version of this legislation. There 
are a number of things that I find troubling about this report and the 
way it was released, but the biggest is that it seems to contravene the 
Bush administration's assertions that India has a stellar 
nonproliferation record. At a minimum, this report demonstrates that 
there continue to be legitimate concerns about the spread of dangerous 
weapons technology, know-how, and equipment--in India and elsewhere.
  Secondly, there have been troubling signals coming from the Indian 
Government itself about its commitment to nonproliferation controls. In 
an August 17 speech to the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Singh 
declared that India would not agree to any changes to the nuclear deal 
imposed by the U.S. Congress: ``We will stick to the parameters of the 
agreement signed in Washington last year and this alone will be the 
basis of nuclear cooperation,'' he said. He specifically noted that 
India would not allow ``external supervision'' of its strategic nuclear 
programs, and argued that President Bush had committed to providing an 
``uninterrupted supply of fuel''--presumably, even if India were to 
detonate another nuclear device. Prime Minister Singh also stated that 
``there is no question of India being bound by a law passed by a 
foreign legislature.'' This raises significant concerns in my mind as 
to whether India would accept the important elements of this 
legislation that the U.S. Congress will put in place if it passes.
  Finally, there have been signs of an increasingly warm official 
relationship between India and Iran. I note the

[[Page 22157]]

irony of the timing: at the same time we are debating passage of a bill 
that will lend considerable assistance to India's nuclear program, we 
are doing everything in our power to prevent Iran from furthering its 
own nuclear program. I would like to read a couple of quotes from 
Indian Prime Minister Singh, who had a meeting with Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Cuba 
in September. Following the meeting, Prime Minister Singh stated that 
``India is determined to consolidate cultural, economic, and political 
ties with Iran,'' and he expressed regret over the ``misunderstanding 
caused about India's stance on Iran's peaceful nuclear program,'' 
stressing that India would ``never join any efforts against Iran.'' I 
don't think it takes very much reading between the lines to doubt that 
India will support us in our efforts to curtail Iran's nuclear 
program--one of the most important national security challenges facing 
our country at this time.
  As further evidence of the support for my amendment, I would like to 
submit for the Record a letter that was recently signed by a wide range 
of non-proliferation experts, former senior government officials, and 
respected scientists. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                 Fix the Nuclear Trade Deal With India

                                                November 13, 2006.
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC,
     Attn: Foreign Affairs Staff.
       Dear Senator: We are writing again to urge you and your 
     colleagues to support amendments that would address serious 
     flaws that still plague the proposed U.S.-Indian nuclear 
     trade legislation (S. 3709), which may be considered this 
     month. Despite some important adjustments made to the 
     administration's original proposal by the Foreign Relations 
     Committee, the arrangement would have far-reaching and 
     adverse effects on U.S. nonproliferation and security 
     objectives. We believe the legislation must include further 
     improvements in several key areas, among them:
       A determination, prior to resumption of full nuclear 
     cooperation, that India has stopped the production of fissile 
     material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons 
     or else joined a multilateral fissile production cutoff 
     agreement;
       A determination and annual certification that U.S. civil 
     nuclear trade does not in any way assist or encourage India's 
     nuclear weapons program;
       Measures to ensure that the United States does not continue 
     to provide nuclear assistance directly or through other 
     suppliers in the event that India breaks the nonproliferation 
     commitments outlined on July 18, 2005; and
       A determination that the Government of India (GOI) or GOI-
     affiliated entities are not engaged in illicit procurement of 
     WMD-related items.
       We believe these measures are necessary because India has 
     neither joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), nor 
     accepted safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities, and 
     India's nonproliferation policy is not fully consistent with 
     the nonproliferation practices and responsibilities expected 
     of the original nuclear-weapon states.
       Under the proposed nuclear cooperation deal, India has 
     pledged to accept safeguards at only eight additional 
     ``civilian'' nuclear facilities by 2014. India has not yet 
     agreed that safeguards on these facilities would be 
     permanent. Current and future military-related nuclear 
     reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and weapons 
     fabrication facilities would remain unsafeguarded. Partial 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards would do 
     nothing to prevent the continued production of fissile 
     material for weapons in unsafeguarded facilities. 
     Consequently, foreign supplies of nuclear fuel to India could 
     assist India's bomb program by freeing-up its existing 
     limited capacity to support the production of highly enriched 
     uranium and plutonium for weapons.


                      Fissile Material Production

       To help ensure that U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation is 
     not in any way advancing India's weapons program and is not 
     contributing to nuclear arms competition with Pakistan and 
     China, Congress should require that the President determines 
     that India has stopped fissile material production for 
     weapons or has joined a multilateral production ban before 
     the United States resumes full civil nuclear assistance to 
     India. Four of the five original nuclear-weapon states--
     France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States--
     have publicly declared that they have stopped fissile 
     material production for weapons. China is also believed to 
     have stopped such production.
       India's commitment to support U.S. efforts to negotiate a 
     global fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) is a laudable 
     but somewhat hollow promise. Differences between the United 
     States and most other states (including India) on whether 
     such a treaty should be verified and competing priorities at 
     the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament make the prospects 
     for the conclusion of an FMCT difficult.
       If India is truly committed to a ``minimal credible 
     deterrent,'' India should be able to declare as a matter of 
     national policy that it has stopped fissile material 
     production for weapons, or else join the United States, 
     China, France, Pakistan, Russia, and the United Kingdom in a 
     multilateral fissile cutoff agreement, pending the completion 
     of a global, verifiable FMCT. The Congress should direct the 
     President to actively pursue the early conclusion of such an 
     interim cutoff agreement with India and other relevant 
     parties, pending the entry into force of a global FMCT.


            Nonassistance to India's Nuclear Weapons Program

       The Senate bill should also require that prior to 
     implementation of a U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation 
     agreement, the President make a determination that the 
     proposed U.S. civil nuclear assistance will not, in any way, 
     assist India's nuclear weapons program. Such a determination 
     should take into account the possible replication and 
     subsequent use of any U.S.-origin technology in an 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facility and the provision of nuclear 
     fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased 
     production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in 
     unsafeguarded nuclear facilities for weapons purposes. Such a 
     determination would help maintain confidence that the United 
     States is complying with its NPT Article I commitment not to 
     assist other states' nuclear weapons programs. The Senate 
     should also agree to provisions in the House bill (H.R. 5682) 
     requiring annual executive branch reports on whether any such 
     assistance has occurred, and on India's uranium mining and 
     fissile material production rates, and other related matters.


            Termination of Trade and Fuel Supply Assurances

       S. 3709 now makes clear that if India conducts another 
     nuclear test explosion or otherwise violates the terms of an 
     agreement for nuclear cooperation, U.S. nuclear assistance 
     would be jeopardized. The bill also states that it is the 
     policy of the United States not to facilitate nuclear trade 
     by other nations with India if U.S. exports are interrupted.
       However, India is insisting that the United States help 
     provide an assured nuclear fuel supply, even in the event 
     that the New Delhi government conducts a nuclear test 
     explosion or otherwise violates the terms of a future 
     agreement for nuclear cooperation with the United States. 
     Such a guarantee would be unprecedented and unwise. Congress 
     should further clarify that the United States shall not 
     provide or facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel to India if 
     the Government of India resumes nuclear testing or fails to 
     meet other provisions in U.S. law.


                  guarding against illicit procurement

       The Senate should also address the fact that some Indian 
     government-affiliated enterprises have a history of 
     attempting to bypass export laws designed to keep U.S. and 
     other foreign technology from contributing to its weapons 
     effort. Congress should require that before the 
     implementation of any U.S.-Indian agreement for civil nuclear 
     cooperation, the President must make a determination that the 
     Indian government or entities under its jurisdiction are not 
     engaged in the illicit procurement of commodities controlled 
     under the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or 
     the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).


               retain useful nonproliferation provisions

       We also urge Congress to retain several important elements 
     already included in S. 3709 that would help reduce the 
     adverse impacts of the initiative. Among these are the 
     provisions requiring that a new safeguards agreement between 
     the IAEA and India has entered into force and that such 
     safeguards are consistent with IAEA standards, principles, 
     and practices, and that such safeguards are permanent before 
     any expanded nuclear cooperation can take place. To date, 
     India has not begun formal talks with the IAEA on such 
     safeguards and is reportedly seeking ``India-specific'' 
     safeguards that would be contingent on continued fuel 
     supplies. This is not consistent with the IAEA safeguards 
     applicable in the Indian case, which are known as INFCIRC/
     66.Rev.2 safeguards.
       With respect to the Section 106 provision restricting the 
     transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, for 30 
     years U.S. nonproliferation policy has sought to discourage 
     the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. As President Bush 
     said in February 2004, ``enrichment and reprocessing are not 
     necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for 
     peaceful purposes.'' Current U.S. nuclear cooperation 
     agreements, including those with EURATOM, Japan, and China, 
     expressly prohibit transfers of such technologies, which can 
     be used to make nuclear bomb material. India should not in 
     any way be an exception to that important policy.

[[Page 22158]]

       To ensure that India is meeting other key obligations 
     outlined in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, the Senate 
     should retain language in the House bill requiring that a 
     U.S. Indian agreement for nuclear cooperation shall be 
     terminated if India makes a materially significant transfer 
     that does not conform with the guidelines of the NSG or MTCR. 
     Congress should recall that in the past 20 months, seven 
     Indian entities have been sanctioned by the U.S. Government 
     for transfers of weapons-related items to Iran, including 
     sanctions announced in July for transfers of chemicals useful 
     for missile propellant manufacture.
       Finally, the legislation wisely codifies commitments made 
     by senior Bush administration officials that before the 
     United States may engage in wider nuclear trade with India, 
     it must also secure the consensus approval of the 45-nation 
     NSG. The group operates under guidelines established in 1992 
     that restrict trade with states (such as India) that do not 
     accept full-scope safeguards on all of their nuclear 
     facilities. If the United States or other states seek to 
     sidestep the NSG's consensus decision-making process, the NSG 
     may cease to function as an important barrier against the 
     transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and technologies for 
     weapons purposes.
       Without the inclusion of the provisions we have described, 
     the legislation for renewed nuclear cooperation with India 
     will have far-reaching and adverse implications for U.S. 
     nuclear nonproliferation and international objectives.
       While we agree that building upon the already strong U.S.-
     Indian partnership is an important goal, we remain convinced 
     that it can and should be pursued without undermining the 
     U.S. leadership efforts to prevent the proliferation of the 
     world's most dangerous weapons.
           Sincerely,
         Harold Bengelsdorf, Consultant, and former Director of 
           the Office for Nonproliferation Policy at the Energy 
           Department and former Office Director for Nuclear 
           Affairs at the State Department; Joseph Cirincione, 
           Senior Vice President for National Security and 
           International Policy, Center for American Progress; 
           Ralph Earle II, Former Director, U.S. Arms Control and 
           Disarmament Agency; Robert J. Einhorn, Former Assistant 
           Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Lt. General 
           Robert G. Gard, Jr. (USA, ret.); Ambassador Robert 
           Grey, Director, Bipartisan Security Working Group, and 
           Former U.S. Representative to the Conference on 
           Disarmament; Frank von Hippel, Professor of Public and 
           International Affairs, Program on Science and Global 
           Security Princeton University; John D. Holum, Former 
           Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
           International Security Affairs and Former director of 
           the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; John D. 
           Isaacs, President, Council for a Livable World; 
           Spurgeon M. Keeny, Former Deputy Director U.S. Arms 
           Control and Disarmament Agency; Daryl G. Kimball, 
           Executive Director, Arms Control Association; Lawrence 
           Korb, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
           Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics; 
           Fred McGoldrick, Consultant, and Former Director of 
           Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the State 
           Department; Kelly Motz, Associate Director, Wisconsin 
           Project on Nuclear Arms Control; Christopher Paine, 
           Senior Nuclear Program Analyst, Natural Resources 
           Defense Council; William Potter, Institute Professor, 
           Monterey Institute of International Studies; Lawrence 
           Scheinman, Distinguished Professor at the Center for 
           Nonproliferation Studies, and former Assistant Director 
           of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 
           Leonard Weiss, Former Staff Director of the Senate 
           Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation and 
           the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Briefly, the letter notes that there are still flaws 
that remain in S. 3709, and urges the Senate to adopt at least four 
measures to address them. The second of their four recommendations for 
improvements is that there be ``a determination and annual 
certification that U.S. civil nuclear policy does not in any way assist 
or encourage India's nuclear weapons program.'' My amendment is 
directly in line with the advice of these leading experts, and 
addresses an important shortfall in the legislation as it stands now.
  I acknowledge that the U.S. business community has come out strongly 
in support of this legislation. I would only like to add a note of 
caution to their optimism. There is nothing in this deal that would 
secure U.S. contracts or guarantee an increase in U.S. business. The 
U.S. is not the only one in the nuclear market. Australia and Russia 
have already indicated they are working with India to sell fuel, and 
companies from Great Britain, France, and Russia have viable civil 
reactor technology that they will certainly pitch to India. It is far 
from a foregone conclusion that U.S. companies will directly benefit 
from the deal. In the 8 years that nuclear trade has been permitted 
with China, the United States has sold exactly zero nuclear reactors to 
China--zero. I bring this up to point out that some of the benefits of 
this deal may be exaggerated, and we should remember the overriding 
priority as we consider this legislation: whether it will make the 
citizens of the United States more safe, or less.
  Mr. President, in closing, I would like to put in a brief word of 
appreciation for the substantial amount of work done on this bill by 
Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, and their staffs. This bill is a real 
improvement over the original proposal put forward by the 
administration, but there are still a few shortcomings that remain. My 
amendment would address what I, and many others, see as one of the main 
outstanding concerns with the bill. It will ensure that this agreement 
is in line with our non-proliferation obligations and protects U.S. 
national security, without putting any undue burdens on the U.S. or our 
Indian partners. It is a nonpartisan, commonsense amendment, in line 
with previous legislation, and I hope that all of my colleagues will 
consider voting in favor of it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Wisconsin for his very important contributions to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the specific contributions he has made to the 
discussion of this legislation. Reluctantly, I rise in opposition to 
his amendment.
  In my judgment--and I don't use the term unadvisedly--this is truly a 
killer amendment. If accepted, it would require the United States and 
India to renegotiate the civilian nuclear agreement on which we are 
having our debate this evening. I state categorically: India has 
nuclear weapons. Let me repeat that: India has nuclear weapons and has 
stated its intent to keep them. The critical issue we must consider in 
examining each of the amendments that have come before us is whether 
the U.S. national security is advanced by engaging India and by 
increasing the IAEA oversight of the India nuclear program. I believe 
the answer is yes, and as a result I support this agreement and I 
oppose amendments such as the one now before us that would require 
renegotiation or make implementation of the agreement impossible.
  While the Feingold amendment appears harmless, it requires the 
President to certify that no form of the U.S. civilian nuclear 
cooperation with India will in any way assist, encourage, or induce 
India to manufacture or otherwise acquire more nuclear weapons in the 
future. This certification demanded by the amendment is impossible to 
make, and even if it could be made, it would be ineffective. How do we 
expect the President of the United States to predict the future? 
Clearly we do not expect, plan, or intend for this agreement to aid 
India's nuclear program. We have taken numerous steps to prevent this 
from happening. We are confident that we have already put the necessary 
provisions in place in this agreement.
  A Presidential certification as required by the amendment is a legal 
pledge to Congress. Senate bill 3709 requires a number of 
certifications, but it does so based upon information in the 
President's possession. We do not ask the President to predict the 
future or make a judgment when the necessary information is 
unavailable.
  This is not the first time the Senator from Wisconsin has offered 
this amendment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 13 to 5 to 
defeat the same amendment during our markup of S. 3709. During the 
markup, the administration strongly opposed the amendment and expressed 
its view that it was a killer amendment.
  Senator Biden and I do not believe this amendment is necessary. We 
share

[[Page 22159]]

the concerns Senator Feingold has expressed, but we believe we have 
addressed them in the committee-passed bill in a manner consistent with 
our agreement with India and in a way that avoids renegotiation.
  First, the United States is obligated by article I of the 
nonproliferation treaty not to engage in any nuclear cooperation that 
would assist India's nuclear weapons program. Nothing in the United 
States-India agreement violates this obligation. In reality, this 
agreement encourages India to produce fewer nuclear weapons by 
requiring more Indian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards. We 
must remember that the United States will not cooperate with any Indian 
facility, site, or location that is not under IAEA safeguards. In other 
words, the IAEA will have inspection rights at those places where U.S. 
exports are utilized.
  Second, S. 3709 requires that the IAEA safeguards be supplemented by 
bilateral end-use monitoring requirements under section 107. In other 
words, if the IAEA were forced to suspend their oversight of India's 
commitments, the administration is required to have a backup plan in 
place to ensure that American technologies and materials are not 
misused or misdirected to India's nuclear program.
  Third, the bill requires the President of the United States to inform 
Congress of any Indian violation of their commitments under the 
agreement. This preserves Congress's oversight role and permits us to 
act should Indian behavior require a reexamination of the cooperative 
agreement.
  Fourth, section 109 states that no authority under S. 3709 can be 
used to violate U.S. commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. U.S. contributions to the Indian nuclear program would be a 
blatant violation of this treaty commitment. Senator Biden and I 
thought it was critically important to reinforce the Senate's strong 
support for the NPT by insisting that our country continue to comply 
with its requirements.
  Lastly, sensitive transfers most likely to aid India's nuclear 
programs are prohibited by this bill. Section 106 forbids trade in 
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technologies unless those 
transfers are under international supervision and then only to create 
proliferation-resistant versions. By prohibiting the transfer of these 
technologies, we ensure that U.S. assistance does not inadvertently 
assist India's weapons program.
  India is not required to declare to the IAEA any information on the 
production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Its nuclear 
enrichment and processing plants will also be outside IAEA safeguards. 
Without access to this information, it will be impossible for the 
United States to evaluate Indian production of fissile material. 
Consequently, it is impossible to determine whether an increase in 
Indian military fissile material production occurred because of foreign 
nuclear reactor fuel supply. In fact, India's own uranium mining and 
milling will probably play a much larger role in any analysis on this 
subject.
  In sum, it is simply not possible to verify the relationship between 
the delivery of foreign fuel exports to India and the possibility of 
increases in Indian production of highly enriched uranium or separated 
plutonium, nor is it possible to analyze the relationship between 
future exports and domestic production. India is not required to share 
this information. The IAEA does not have access to these facilities. 
Requiring the President of the United States to certify something he 
has insufficient information to determine is unwise and potentially 
harmful, and the amendment clearly demands that the President make that 
certification. Congress will be kept completely informed on 
developments in this area through the existing reporting requirements 
of S. 3709.
  Mr. President, for all of these reasons, I oppose this amendment. I 
ask Senators to vote no when the roll is called.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Indiana. It is 
late, and I think that people already have a sense of where they will 
go with this amendment, but I do want to make a couple of points for 
the record, given how important this amendment is and how important 
this agreement is.
  The chairman suggests that what we would do here with this amendment 
would somehow force the renegotiation of the agreement. I don't accept 
that notion. But I would say, given the importance of making sure this 
isn't used for nuclear weapons, it is well worth renegotiating if it 
actually required that. But I don't think it does.
  More importantly, it just doesn't make any sense to me that such an 
amendment would require the full renegotiation of the agreement when 
you look at the fact that the bill before us today already, in section 
105, requires eight different Presidential determinations. I am just 
adding two additional ones. There are already Presidential 
determinations that have to be made, so how can it be that the 
additional requirement that there be determinations by the President of 
the United States, not by Indian officials--how can that force the 
renegotiation of this agreement? It doesn't direct the Indians to do 
anything. So I reject the notion that somehow this would require the 
renegotiation of the agreement, and if it did, I think it would be 
better than not changing it.
  Now, the biggest problem with the chairman's argument is that he is 
relying on an earlier version of our amendment which we offered in 
committee, which I thought was worth passing. But the chairman 
correctly notes that we were defeated in the committee 13 to 5. One of 
the criticisms was that somehow this amendment would force the 
President to certify some facts, that he couldn't necessarily know for 
sure what the Indians were exactly doing or what they might do in the 
future. I recognize that point. That is why I drafted this amendment to 
only relate to the scope and content of the agreement. There is nothing 
in my amendment that requires the President to certify what might 
happen in the future. And this is the critical distinction. This 
amendment does not have the flaw that was argued in committee. It only 
talks about the President certifying with regard to the scope and 
content of this agreement and also getting assurances from the Indian 
Government that the purpose of this agreement is not about nuclear 
weapons but is about civil purposes. So it is, in fact, different from 
the amendment in committee, and that is an important distinction as 
Members think about whether they want to vote for this version on the 
floor of the Senate. It is more modest, but it still accomplishes an 
important goal.
  This is not unheard of. This is exactly what was done in the China 
agreement in the 1980s. I described it in my original statement. The 
agreement called for a Presidential certification of this kind. It 
worked, and the President, in fact, made such a certification. So this 
is both necessary and practical from that point of view.
  I believe I have responded to each of the arguments made by the 
Senator from Indiana. Obviously, I have enormous respect for him and 
his leadership of the committee, but I would urge my colleagues to join 
me in supporting this amendment which would allow me to feel 
comfortable supporting this agreement, because I do want us to have a 
good agreement with India. I just think we need to have this sort of an 
assurance that my amendment provides.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, would the Senator yield 4 minutes from 
his time?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the Senator from New York such time as he 
needs.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise to support the India nuclear trade 
agreement because it strengthens America's relationship with a critical 
ally, but it also creates strong incentives for other countries to 
support our nonproliferation efforts by rewarding them with our 
valuable nuclear technology.
  Proliferation of nuclear technology is a very serious issue. Make no 
mistake about that. India has a good nonproliferation record and will 
be a true

[[Page 22160]]

partner in our efforts to prevent nuclear weapons technology from 
falling into the wrong hands. India's history of nonproliferation of 
dual-use nuclear technology and its willingness to implement IAEA 
guidelines and standards at nuclear facilities make India a welcome 
member of the global nuclear community.
  Of course, the devil is in the details. That is why it is so 
important that this bill preserves congressional oversight of any 
agreement the administration reaches with the Indian Government. It is 
carefully crafted so that the U.S. agreement will not undermine the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or our obligations to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group.
  Under this bill, cooperation would end if India tests a nuclear 
weapon, proliferates nuclear weapons or materials, or breaks an 
agreement with the United States or the IAEA. India's access to nuclear 
cooperation will depend on its continued participation as a good 
citizen of the global nuclear community.
  A close relationship with India in general will help us to align our 
mutual goal of combating terrorism. Both our nations have been victims 
of serious attacks of terrorism, and we know that the greatest danger 
we face is a nuclear weapon falling into the wrong hands. Neither of us 
wants al-Qaida to gain a nuclear weapon. Neither of us wants Iran to go 
nuclear. The best way to ensure India's proper handling of its nuclear 
technology is not by distancing it but by working with it to address 
issues of mutual concern.
  Economic ties continue to bind our two countries through an 
increasing flow of goods, services, and cultural exchange. It is vital 
that we recognize this improving relationship and work toward common 
goals for international policy standards. The buildup of nuclear 
weapons throughout the world is one of the most serious dangers 
humanity faces. Especially in today's world, we must ensure that 
nuclear technology is developed and used according to global standards 
as set forth by the International Atomic Energy Association for 
peaceful purposes. An agreement with the United States will also 
provide an incentive for India to refrain from conducting future 
nuclear weapon testing and to work with our Government to curtail 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Most important, this legislation 
creates incentives for other countries that cooperate with our 
nonproliferation efforts. It will encourage other countries around the 
world to cooperate with the efforts of the United States to reduce the 
threat of nuclear weapons by rewarding those countries that behave 
responsibly with advanced American technology.
  I yield the remainder of the time I have to my friend from Wisconsin.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we have had a good debate. I note the 
presence of the distinguished Senator from California on the floor, 
which prompts me to inquire of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin 
whether he requires additional time? If the Senator is prepared to 
yield back his time, I will yield back time on our side, and then we 
could proceed to debate on the amendment of the Senator from California 
and maybe to a closer time for final passage, for Members who are 
requesting this of all of us.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Indiana. I yield back my time.
  Mr. LUGAR. I will yield the time on our side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). All time is yielded back. The 
Senator from California is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 5187

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer) proposes an 
     amendment numbered 5187.

  Mrs. BOXER. I ask unanimous consent the further reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with. I wanted the beginning read because this 
is a very simple amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To make the waiver authority of the President contingent upon 
 a certification that India has agreed to suspend military-to-military 
cooperation with Iran, including training exercises, until such time as 
     Iran is no longer designated as a state sponsor of terrorism)

       On page 8, beginning on line 8, strike ``Group; and'' and 
     all that follows through ``Nuclear'' on line 9 and insert the 
     following: ``Group;
       (8) India has agreed to suspend military-to-military 
     cooperation with Iran, including training exercises, until 
     such time as the Government of Iran no longer supports acts 
     of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of 
     State under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) and section 6(j) of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)); and
       (9) the Nuclear

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. What we 
are saying is this deal should not go forward until India has agreed to 
cut off military-to-military ties with Iran and that the President so 
certifies.
  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the keystone of our efforts 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Back in the 
1960s, there was widespread concern that dozens of nations would have 
nuclear weapons within a decade. Just months before his death, 
President Kennedy warned of this dire threat, saying:

       I ask you to stop and think for a moment, what it would 
     mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands . . . that 
     there would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real 
     security, no chance of effective disarmament. There would 
     only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an 
     increased necessity for the great powers to involve 
     themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

  But thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, there are less 
than 10 nuclear weapons states in the world today. In fact, since the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was first signed in 1968, more nations 
have ended nuclear weapons programs than have begun them. Countries 
such as Brazil, South Africa, and Japan decided to abandon their 
nuclear weapons program and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  India did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, instead 
choosing to develop nuclear weapons outside of the NPT regime. India 
developed a nuclear weapon in 1974 using a research reactor and 
materials provided by Canada and the United States of America in the 
1950s. India had pledged to use the reactor only for peaceful purposes, 
but it failed to keep that promise. So by giving India a special deal 
to both possess nuclear weapons and receive civil nuclear assistance, 
it will be harder to convince nonnuclear weapons states to keep their 
commitment to forgo nuclear weapons.
  The timing could not be worse. Right now, the international community 
is trying to convince one nonnuclear member of the NPT, Iran, to cease 
uranium enrichment because the IAEA cannot verify that its program is 
for peaceful purposes. We are also trying to roll back North Korea's 
nuclear program and convince them to rejoin the NPT.
  India is becoming a recognized de facto nuclear power, but it is not 
required to take on any of the commitments made by the five recognized 
nuclear powers.
  As The Economist reported earlier this year:

        . . . the recognized nuclear powers--America, Russia, 
     Britain, France and China--are committed under the NPT to 
     curb their arsenals . . . on the way to eventual disarmament; 
     the deal with America lets India build as many bombs as it 
     chooses.

  I think it is important to note what we are doing here. There is no 
limit on the number of bombs that India could build in this deal.
  The Economist goes on to say that the five nuclear powers have:

       at least all signed the treaty banning further nuclear 
     tests and have stopped producing more highly enriched uranium 
     and plutonium; India flatly refuses to do either.

  Experts believe that this deal could allow India to vastly increase 
its production of nuclear weapons from about 6 a year to about 50 a 
year. What a contribution this Senate is making to world peace. I am 
absolutely stunned. We are going to have 50 nuclear weapons, perhaps, 
made in India, touching off an arms race in the region. That would not 
be in any country's interests, including our own.

[[Page 22161]]

  Secretary Rice has argued that we are not helping India's nuclear 
weapons program because only a small amount of India's indigenous 
uranium would be needed for India's military weapons program. But 
listen to what the Congressional Research Service says:

       The question for the United States is not whether India 
     intends to ramp up its weapons program with freed-up uranium, 
     but whether the U.S. and other states' actions create a new 
     capability for India to do so.

  We call this fungible--fungible uranium. This should concern every 
single Senator, but unfortunately it doesn't appear to. It should 
concern every Senator who believes that the proliferation of nuclear 
materials is the most dangerous issue facing the country today and that 
is why I have supported all the amendments. Unfortunately, these 
amendments were defeated. They would have required the President to 
certify that this deal does not assist or encourage India to produce 
additional fissile material for weapons.
  The amendment I am offering addresses a second area where the 
administration has failed to receive commitments from India and that 
has to do with India's military-to-military relationships with Iran.
  Last spring, at the very same time that the President, our President, 
was in India to sign the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement, two Iranian warships were visiting the headquarters of the 
Indian Navy's Southern Command. At the very same time that President 
Bush was in India to sign the United States-India Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement, two Iranian warships were soliciting the 
headquarters of the Indian Navy's Southern Command. These warships were 
participating in a training program under the military cooperation 
agreement with Tehran that was signed in 2003.
  The fact that India would conduct training exercises with the world's 
leading state sponsor of terrorism while the President of the United 
States is visiting New Delhi is simply unbelievable. My amendment says 
that the President may not provide civil nuclear assistance to India 
until he certifies that India has agreed to suspend military-to-
military cooperation with Iran so long as the Government of Iran 
continues to support international terrorism.
  My amendment does not say they can never have this deal. But it says 
they must not cooperate, military to military, with Iran until the day 
Iran is taken off the list of terrorists.
  According to a March 2006 Defense News article:

       In 2003 India and Iran signed a strategic agreement to 
     cooperate in defense and other matters. The deal was cemented 
     by the visit of then Iran President Mohammed Khatami to the 
     Republic Day parade in New Delhi, an honor usually reserved 
     for key allies. India still considers Iran to be a key ally 
     and this agreement on military cooperation is still in place, 
     even though Iranian actions are leading to the deaths of 
     American soldiers in Iraq as we speak.

  General Casey has said that Iran is using surrogates to conduct 
terrorist operations, both against us and against the Iraqi people. He 
went on to say:

       We are quite confident that the Iranians, through the 
     special operations forces, are providing weapons, IED 
     technology and training to Shia extremist groups in Iraq.

  Of particular concern is the fact that Iran is providing a type of 
IED, or roadside bomb, that has a shaped charge and is particularly 
deadly.
  So don't you think that if we are giving India this deal of a 
lifetime to receive nuclear technology from us, the least they could do 
is sign an agreement not to have military-to-military exercises and 
relationships with a country that is, in essence, bringing death and 
destruction to our sons and daughters in the United States military?
  For more than 20 years, Iran has been the world's leading state 
sponsor of terrorism. It supports Hezbollah, several Palestinian terror 
groups such as Hamas and, according to the State Department, Iran is 
also:

       . . . unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qaida members 
     it detained in 2003 and has resisted numerous calls to 
     transfer custody of its al-Qaida detainees to their countries 
     of origin or to third countries for interrogation and/or 
     trial.

  It seems to me we should convince our friend--India--to suspend its 
military-to-military cooperation with Iran. The Boxer amendment will 
have that result, because they want this deal and I believe they would 
act to cut off these military-to-military relationships.
  It is also very important to point out that the United States has 
already sanctioned Indian entities and individuals for missiles and 
WMD-related transfers to Iran. In 2004, the United States imposed 
sanctions on two Indian scientists for nuclear-related transfers to 
Iran. Both scientists were high-ranking officials in the Nuclear Power 
Corporation of India, Limited. In December 2005, sanctions were imposed 
on two Indian chemical companies for transfer of chemical-related items 
to Iran, and as recently as last July, sanctions were imposed on two 
more chemical manufacturers in India for transfers to Iran. In May 
2005, India passed a law on weapons of mass destruction and their 
delivery systems. But according to CRS, the administration has not yet 
assessed India's export control law and regulation, and

       . . . some observers have stated that India does not have 
     the necessary regulations in place to implement the law, and 
     that India's resources for implementation are remarkably 
     limited.

  In other words, they have a Weapons Control Act, but experts believe 
they are not enforcing it. History tells us that they, in fact, have 
acted wrongly, to pass on technologies that are harmful, to Iran. So it 
seems to me, with this history, my colleagues should be supporting this 
amendment. I believe they should be and I regret that I need to offer 
it. I thought it would be accepted. I thought it would not be a 
problem. That it would be treated in many ways is obvious. The 
President, it seems to me, should have made severing military ties with 
Iran a precondition to civil nuclear cooperation. But, unfortunately, 
the United States is giving away more than it received in this deal.
  My friends who want to desperately see this passed tonight are voting 
down amendment after amendment. And we are taking a deal in which, as 
former Senator Nunn said, ``India was a lot better negotiator than we 
were.''
  That is Sam Nunn. We know how hard he worked with the current 
chairman of this committee to stop nuclear proliferation. What did he 
say of this agreement? ``India was a lot better negotiator than we 
were.''
  So those of us on the Senate floor who are trying to get a better 
deal, who are trying to change this deal, are being voted down--boom, 
boom, boom. We are taking a deal that Sam Nunn said essentially they 
``bested'' us on.
  I come from a State with a huge Indian population. Our Indo-Americans 
are prominent in our State. I support strong relations with India. 
India is the world's largest democracy. It is so important for us to 
work together to promote our mutual interests.
  I am proud to be a member of the Senate India Caucus and have nothing 
but the utmost respect for the Indian people. But this deal is not a 
good deal for America. This deal is not a good deal for the world.
  Proponents of this legislation say our bilateral relationship with 
India is important. I agree with them. I have great hopes for the 
future of our two nations. It is so important that we work together. 
But somebody tell me how we are better off when we have an India that 
can build up to maybe 50 bombs.
  Somebody explain to me how we are better off when we don't even have 
a clause in here that says that India has to receive military-to-
military relationships with Iran before this goes ahead. Somebody 
explain it to me. I don't think it has been explained.
  I am happy the Harkin amendment was adopted. It says that India has 
to work with us to make sure Iran doesn't get a nuclear capability, as 
they are trying to do now. If we adopted that amendment, why can't you 
adopt this amendment which simply says shut off those military-to-
military agreements between India and Iran before this goes forward?
  I wish the administration would have worked harder to craft a better 
deal, a

[[Page 22162]]

more balanced deal that would have been a net win for nonproliferation, 
while securing India's commitment to suspend its military relationship 
with Iran.
  As Robert Einhorn, a nonproliferation expert at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on which I am so proud to serve, ``the deal was concluded in 
great haste, driven by the calendar of the Bush-Singh meetings rather 
than by the seriousness and complexity of the task at hand.'' Everybody 
knows it. We knew it at the time. And I had hoped we could then make 
this a better deal.
  I have worked hard. I have tried. We have lost amendment after 
amendment after amendment. It is so regrettable. It is regrettable that 
we rushed into this agreement. But we have a chance to improve this 
agreement in behalf of the Boxer amendment. I urge its adoption.
  I retain the remainder of my time.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I have listened carefully, as all Members 
do, to the distinguished Senator from California, who is such a 
valuable member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And she has 
expressed some of the views which are contained in her statement this 
evening during the very important hearings the committee conducted.
  I will just say very clearly that Members on both sides of the aisle 
in committee felt that there were improvements that could occur with 
regard to the agreement, even if the agreement was negotiated in a 
fairly short period of time. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has 
taken ample time to work through this with the administration as well 
as with each other. I regret that we did not have unanimity in the 
committee on final passage. A vote of 16 to 2, however, indicated a 
very strong coming together, which clearly has been expressed on the 
floor of the Senate today in the votes on various amendments.
  But I must say that the amendment offered by the Senator from 
California is, in my judgment, a killer amendment. It goes far beyond 
the scope of the July 18 Joint Statement issued by President Bush and 
Prime Minister Singh.
  The amendment as written would not permit the U.S.-India agreement to 
go into effect until India abandoned its military-to-military contacts 
with Iran. This is a killer condition that, if adopted by Congress, 
would require renegotiation of the agreement.
  Few, if any, Members of Congress disagree with the sentiment 
expressed in this amendment; namely, that Iran is a destabilizing force 
in the Middle East. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
recently wrote in the Washington Post:

       Everything returns to the challenge of Iran. It trains, 
     finances and equips Hezbollah, the state within a state in 
     Lebanon. It finances and supports Moqtada al-Sadr's militia, 
     the state within a state in Iraq. It works on a nuclear 
     weapons program which would drive nuclear proliferation out 
     of control and provides a safety net for the systemic 
     destruction of at least the regional order.

  Iran is a critical challenge to U.S. diplomacy and global security. 
In this difficult environment the U.S. must cultivate a strong 
multilateral response to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and support 
for terrorism. An effective solution to the Iranian threat must include 
India. Holding New Delhi to a different standard than our closest 
allies or other nations we engage in nuclear commerce does not appear 
to be the best way to secure their support.
  On April 5, 2006, Secretary Rice testified before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations that India has ``low level military-to-military 
contacts.'' She noted ``that there are a number of countries that have 
relations with Iran, and it's, of course, the sovereign right of a 
country to have relations with whomever they would like to have 
relations.'' She argues that the U.S. ``is not going to do better in 
pulling India toward us by insisting that they cut off relations with 
other states.'' She concluded that she didn't ``think that's going to 
work very effectively.''
  The Secretary of State argues that the international community is 
changing its approach to Iran. She cites the exodus of banking and 
financial institutions. Perhaps most importantly she points out that 
India was the only member of the non-a1igned movement to vote for 
referral of the Iran to the U.N. Security Council for its illegal 
nuclear program. This was an important development because India was a 
founder and a longtime leader of the movement.
  Let me be clear, this amendment will reverse the important trend of 
countries distancing themselves from Tehran and future Indian 
multilateral nonproliferation cooperation. Some experts have indicated 
that this amendment could very well have the opposite effect, forcing 
New Delhi away from the U.S.-Indian Agreement.
  The administration has frequently made U.S. policy on Iran clear to 
the Indian Government. The U.S. has consistently expressed our desire 
for India's support of our efforts and policies. One of the unheralded 
diplomatic accomplishments of the 2005 Joint Statement is India's 
commitment to support international efforts to limit the spread of 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including to states such as 
Iran.
  I emphasize that point. If, in fact, we are deeply concerned--and I 
am, and the Senator from California certainly is--about the 
developments in Iran of a nuclear program and the commitment of India 
to work with us, to limit that spread of enrichment and reprocessing is 
very important. To deliberately take action which scuttles this 
agreement and indicates to the Indians that they can look elsewhere for 
partnership is to court disaster.
  l am pleased that India is committed to being a responsible member of 
the international community and it has made the decision that it is in 
its own national security interest to oppose Iran's weapons of mass 
destruction program.
  On a number of occasions the Indian-Iranian military relationship has 
been greatly exaggerated. This year an article alleged that India was 
providing military training for Iranian sailors. Secretary Rice 
responded that while Iranian ships have made port calls at India ports, 
she reported that New Dehli had denied that Iranian sailors had been 
trained in India.
  It is unfortunate that the Senator from California constructed the 
amendment in this manner. It would be more appropriate to address this 
issue in the sense of Congress section or as a statement of U.S. 
policy. If the amendment was modified in this manner, I am prepared to 
recommend that it be adopted by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, in 
its current form it makes it impossible for the President to meet the 
requirement and thus implementation is impossible.
  If this amendment is adopted, in my judgment, the United States-India 
agreement will be scuttled. That, I believe, would be a tragedy.
  I urge Senators to vote against the Boxer amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fourteen minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I wonder if the Chair would give me 3 minutes.
  Mr. LUGAR. I will yield whatever time the Senator will consume.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief.
  The Senator stated it well. And I don't like to argue with my friend 
from California; I seldom ever win, and I am very uncomfortable because 
I consider her one of my best friends in this body. So it is an 
uncomfortable position to be in.
  I want to make three points. The first is that right now, if India 
were to engage in transferring any lethal weaponry to Iran, it would be 
in violation of our law. It would damage the relationship and 
fundamentally alter our relationship. It is existing U.S. law.
  No country can transfer lethal weaponry to Iran and maintain our 
support. That is No. 1.
  The second point I would like to make is with the underlying 
concern--I know it is much broader than this--of my friend from 
California. I think if I read her correctly--and I may not be--

[[Page 22163]]

somehow this agreement is going to yield the prospect that India will 
be in a better position to transfer some kind of technology in this 
military-to-military relationship to Iran that will help Iran get the 
nuclear capability.
  The truth is, as the chairman has pointed out, they have entered into 
an agreement with us not to do that. But, secondly, they have voted in 
the IAEA with the Board of Governors to sanction Iran, to take issue 
with Iran, to report it to the U.N., and they voted with us in the U.N. 
So they are openly taking on Iran in terms of the thing of greatest 
concern to us all.
  I know my friend spoke eloquently about the support of terrorism by 
Iran. The implication is that any military-to-military assistance goes 
directly to helping the capability of the Iranians to help support 
Hezbollah and other organizations that are terrorist organizations 
around the world.
  I will make the following observation: She also stated accurately 
that Indian entities have been sanctioned for transferring materials to 
Iran. I must point out, so has Germany, so has the Spanish, so have 
European allies of ours. They also had entities sanctioned. It is not 
unique to India that an organization would, in fact, provide assistance 
to Iran in a way that would generate United States sanctions. Spain is 
the most recent offender.
  I conclude by saying this is the hardest piece to swallow--not what 
the Senator said, but what I am about to say is the hardest piece to 
swallow. Palmerston had the famous expression that countries don't have 
permanent friends, they have permanent interests.
  Look where India resides and look where Iran resides. One of the 
countries they are most concerned about is Pakistan. Now, it is not 
reasonable to assume that India and Iran would not want to have a 
military relationship where they shared information and/or concerns 
relative to Pakistan. So for them to forswear any kind of relationship 
at all with India that has a military or quasi-military relationship is 
to essentially suggest to them that they should not deal with a common 
enemy.
  Look what we are doing. We are dealing with a country that we 
sanctioned before, that we have clearly decided is not a democratic 
country, that clearly has probably the largest percentage of jihadists 
residing in it, with, arguably, the least significant effort to deal 
with these jihadists--the country of Pakistan. What are we doing? 
Because we have permanent interests, and our interests are that we have 
support in the war against jihadists and al-Qaida and terrorist 
organizations, we are cooperating with a country we otherwise probably 
would not cooperate with.
  How would we feel if a European country or any other country around 
the world said--or India said--we will not trade with you, the United 
States of America, as long as you continue to have a military-to-
military relationship with Pakistan, a country that is, in fact, 
exporting--or if they are not exporting, at least cooperating with or 
turning a blind eye to the terrorist organizations that reside within 
their country? We would say, Wait a minute. You want to trade with us, 
trade with us. You want to tell us whether out of our self-interest we 
can cooperate with Pakistan--which is not what you call a model 
democracy--then we would say no.
  The only generic point I want to make, I know of no evidence--it may 
exist, but I am unaware of it--where India is materially cooperating 
with Iran in order for Iran to be able to better supply, support, and/
or encourage terrorism. I know of no such interest and no such 
circumstance. Maybe my friend may know what I do not. She may have 
gotten a recent briefing with the Intelligence Committee where somebody 
said that, but I am unaware of any such cooperation that has the net 
effect of promoting terror.
  What I do know is we have built into the law now the ability to 
sanction India if, in fact, India does supply lethal weapons or was in 
any way cooperating with promoting Iran's nuclear program. Beyond that, 
it would break the spirit of the entire agreement we have with India. 
If it came to light that somehow there was evidence that India was in 
any way cooperating with Iran's nuclear program, this deal is done. 
This is over. It is finished. It is gone.
  At the root of this overall agreement, which my colleague, 
understandably, does not like, the underlying issue here is this 
agreement between India and the United States. The underlying premise 
is based upon a notion of a maturing relationship based on trust that 
they will not only not violate the letter but will not violate the 
spirit of this agreement.
  Let me conclude by saying what the spirit of the agreement is. The 
spirit of the agreement is we are not going to do anything, United 
States of America, that we would not otherwise be able to do; we will 
not do anything with what you provide for us that will increase our 
capacity, our ability, our desire, or our intent to deal with our 
nuclear program.
  They have said straightforwardly at the same time, We are keeping our 
nuclear program. We ain't giving it up.
  It is a little bit like us saying now--and this will be my last 
statement--you know, Pakistan violated the law, Pakistan violated our 
law. It went out and it broke the deal and it did what India did. On 
top of that, Pakistan was the largest proliferator in the history of 
the world of nuclear capability through A.Q. Khan. And guess what. We 
are going to bite our nose off to spite our face. Now that we need 
Pakistan in dealing with this war on terror, we are going to sanction 
Pakistan, we are not going to cooperate with Pakistan, we are going to 
do nothing with Pakistan even though we acknowledge that might give 
greater sustenance to al-Qaida, bin Laden, the Taliban, et cetera.
  Countries make hard choices. They are not neat and clean. I suggest 
if we are going to impose upon India a requirement to cease and desist 
with any military-to-military relationships notwithstanding they have 
common enemies and common concerns with Iran, as bad as Iran is, 
notwithstanding the fact that there is no evidence that they are 
promoting and/or giving the ability to support terrorism's greater 
thrust, notwithstanding the fact they have agreed to do everything they 
can to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, if we are going to 
sanction them this way, I ask the rhetorical question: Why wouldn't the 
rest of the world sanction us for our relationship with Pakistan. And 
why are we cooperating with Pakistan? If anybody in the deal is not the 
ideal partner right now, it is Pakistan.
  But what do we do? To steal a phrase from a former President that I 
often hear, comments we hear on CNN all the time, his comment always is 
``you got to accept life in the world as you find it.'' I am 
paraphrasing a former President. I think it is close to a quote. We 
have to accept the world as we find it, make the best out of it, and 
promote our interest to the greatest extent. Sometimes it means we make 
less than perfect deals.
  Had Chairman Lugar been President Lugar, had Senator Boxer been 
Senator Boxer, had I been their Secretary of State, I believe I could 
have gotten a better deal than we got. But the fact is, we are where we 
are, as the old trade expression goes, and I believe the downside of 
rejecting this treaty is so much further down than any downside that 
flows from supporting this changed law allowing this to go forward. In 
that sense, it is not a close call.
  I suggest to my friend, I think everything she says has merit in the 
abstract. But we are living in the world we live in now based on the 
parameters we are looking at. I think this amendment, which would kill 
the agreement, is not worth the candle because it would do that--not 
because it doesn't have underlying merit.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR. Do we have any time remaining on the opposition side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes.
  Mr. LUGAR. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. Let me 
summarize by saying I visited Delhi in

[[Page 22164]]

March right after the President had signed the historic agreements. I 
walked into a meeting of distinguished Indian officials asking if we 
could possibly confirm this treaty, this agreement.
  I knew nothing about it, so I did a tremendous amount of quick work 
with our agency to check out what the dangers might be. They came back 
and they told me India was the one most least likely to engage in 
nuclear proliferation. They saw this as a tremendous opportunity for us 
to improve on our relations with a country that had for too long been 
in the Soviet/Russian sphere.
  We have an opportunity to help them. They are a growing country. They 
have many needs. Civil nuclear power is the one most important thing 
they need because of their tremendous pollution problems. This enables 
us to help them reduce pollution. Not only are we interested in nuclear 
nonproliferation, we are interested in pollution nonproliferation. This 
moves us forward.
  Beyond that, securing a close relationship with India is one of our 
most important steps toward developing a peaceful environment and 
prosperity in south Asia. This opportunity cannot be wasted.
  This particular amendment, as has been stated, which is well-
intentioned and reflects understandable concerns, is, nevertheless, a 
poison pill. Many countries have relations with Iran. We do not like 
them. But many of those countries with which we have good working 
relationships don't like our relations with Israel. We are not going to 
change our relations with Israel. We are not going to stop helping 
them. But we are going to continue to work with those countries.
  As the Senator from Delaware has pointed out, we have relations with 
Pakistan and there are lots of questions about that. If we want to work 
with the Indians and develop a good relationship so they will not deal 
with Iran, the best thing we can do is to defeat these poison pill 
amendments and confirm the treaty so we will bring India and the United 
States together.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendments and to support the 
treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. BOXER. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six minutes.
  Mrs. BOXER. I will try not to take the full time, but I want to 
respond to my colleagues.
  The debate has been much ado about a very straightforward and simple 
amendment. My amendment has nothing to do with the transfer of lethal 
weapons. My colleague Senator Biden talked about that. Nothing to do 
with that. My amendment, in the real world, I don't believe could be 
seen as a killer amendment. It is a simple amendment.
  My colleague Senator Bond is right. He says a lot of other countries 
have relationships with Iran. No other country gets a deal like this 
where we give nuclear technology and there is absolutely no control on 
the number of bombs India could build. Experts tell us it could be as 
many as 50 a year. I don't think that makes the world safer.
  But to help me with this treaty, to give my constituents a feeling 
that we are protecting them, at the least, say you are getting this 
deal, you are going to be able to build a lot of weapons with it, then 
cut off your military-to-military ties with the leading terrorist 
nation in the world--Iran--a nation that is at this very moment hurting 
our troops in the field in Iraq.
  Now, my colleague Senator Biden, I agree with completely when he 
says--and I do believe this--Senator Lugar, if President, would have 
cut a better deal. I could say Senator Biden, if President, could have 
cut a better deal, but we don't have a better deal. And I don't live in 
a world where you sit back and say, oh, too bad. This isn't about 
buying a piece of cake. We are not going to the store and buying a toy. 
It is about giving nuclear technology to a country that has, in fact, 
been called out by our own country because it has in the past 
transferred information about WMDs, nuclear weapons, missiles, to Iran. 
We have called them out on that. So why can't we ask them simply to 
stop these military-to-military programs they have with Iran?
  Again, when we stand up and say, gosh, this is a killer amendment, 
they will walk away, it sounds weak to me. It does not sound as though 
we are the strongest nation in the world. Who would walk away from this 
deal? India is not a member of the NPT, not a signatory, and they are 
getting all this information from the United States of America on 
nuclear civilian technology, with no cap on the number of bombs they 
can build, and they are going to walk away from this because we simply 
ask them not to have military-to-military cooperation with the world's 
leading sponsor of terrorism?
  I don't get it. So I think my colleagues have made this complicated 
when it is really very simple. We do this deal with India, the least 
they can do is cut off their military-to-military cooperation with 
Iran.
  With that, Mr. President, I conclude my remarks. I yield back the 
remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would inquire of the Chair if the 
existing order now calls for a 2-minute debate on the Feingold 
amendment prior to a rollcall vote on that amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LUGAR. Further, I would ask the Chair for clarification: Does the 
2-minute debate then occur on the Boxer amendment, after the rollcall 
vote on Feingold?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LUGAR. Then, finally, an additional 2-minute debate before final 
passage of the bill, after the Boxer amendment is voted on?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair for that clarification.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that--the first rollcall vote, 
we understand, is 15 minutes--the subsequent rollcall votes be 10 
minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allen). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
  Senator Feingold is now recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.


                           Amendment No. 5183

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would like to briefly recap what my 
amendment does and why I believe it is important for the Senate to 
adopt it.
  The amendment is very simple. It will require the President to make 
determinations that nothing in the nuclear cooperation agreement he 
negotiates with India will contribute to India's nuclear weapons 
program. Both the United States and India have stated that expanding 
India's nuclear arsenal is not an objective of this agreement, and my 
amendment simply makes those claims binding.
  The United States is prohibited under our current obligations in the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to directly or indirectly assist the 
nuclear weapons programs of other states. My amendment simply makes 
clear that the United States is actually abiding by its international 
commitments. It does not require the President to guarantee what India 
will do; he simply must certify that he is satisfied the agreement will 
not contribute to India's nuclear weapons program.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me, in brief response, say I understand 
the intent of the amendment. But the amendment uses the words, for 
example, ``India cannot use United States-origin equipment . . . ,'' 
``India cannot replicate and subsequently use. . . .'' No one can 
certify they cannot. It is possible they could. The question is whether 
we are insisting that they not use it. We are insisting they are not 
using it, and we have built into this agreement a requirement on the 
part of the administration to look at whether they are, in fact, doing 
it.
  So the question is not whether they can or cannot. Anything can 
happen. A President cannot certify it is not possible. That is what 
``cannot'' says. But

[[Page 22165]]

he can certify to the best of his knowledge it is not occurring. That 
is what we require. ``Cannot'' makes this a deal-breaker. No President 
could certify it. ``Cannot'' translates into ``it is not possible to 
replicate, it is not possible to . . . ,'' and no one can certify to 
that.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to 
be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will please call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. 
McCain) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Thomas).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 25, nays 71, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 268 Leg.]

                                YEAS--25

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Salazar

                                NAYS--71

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     McCain
     Thomas
  The amendment (No. 5183) was rejected.
  Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 5187

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is now 2 minutes equally divided on the 
Boxer amendment.
  The Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I will be very brief. We are giving India 
a one-of-a-kind deal that no one else gets: civilian nuclear technology 
and no cap on the number of bombs they can build.
  The least we can do is ask them to cut off their military ties with 
the biggest state sponsor of terrorism--Iran. Iran is building the IEDs 
that are killing our soldiers in Iraq. The least we can do is ask the 
President to certify that they have cut off military-to-military 
relationships with Iran.
  Why is it important? Look at this Defense News: ``Indian Navy Trains 
Iranian Sailors.''
  We know they have these ties. If we really believe we are doing 
something good, we should at least expect India to cut off military 
ties with the leading state sponsor of terrorism--Iran. I urge an 
``aye'' vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, Iran is a critical challenge to the United 
States, our diplomacy, our global security, but in this very difficult 
environment the United States must cultivate a strong multilateral 
response to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons in support of terrorism.
  I simply point out that India was the only member of the nonaligned 
movement to vote for referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council for 
its illegal nuclear program. Holding India to a different standard than 
all of our other closest allies or nations with whom we engage in 
nuclear commerce does not appear to be a good way to secure their 
support.
  Let me be very clear: If this amendment is adopted, the India nuclear 
agreement is kaput. This is it. This is a killer amendment, and I ask 
for Senators to vote no.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 5187. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. 
Thomas).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 38, nays 59, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 269 Leg.]

                                YEAS--38

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Clinton
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reid
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Wyden

                                NAYS--59

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nelson (NE)
     Reed
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Thomas
  The amendment (No. 5187) was rejected.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                     nonproliferation consequences

  Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the 
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, S. 3709. As 
I have said before, I believe strengthening the relationship between 
our two nations is an important strategic goal and this legislation 
helps us take a dramatic step in this direction.
  However, like many of my colleagues, I have concerns with potential 
nonproliferation consequences of this agreement. Much to my 
disappointment, the administration has done very little to address 
these concerns, instead, sending draft legislation to the Congress that 
was essentially a blank check.
  The managers of the bill, Senators Lugar and Biden, have done a 
tremendous job taking the administration's proposal and shaping it into 
meaningful, bipartisan legislation. The bill now before the Senate 
helps move us closer to India while addressing some key 
nonproliferation issues.
  However, I remain concerned about the issue of nuclear testing. A 
decision by the Indian Government to conduct such a test could trigger 
an arms race in South Asia that would be extremely dangerous and 
destabilizing.
  The good news is that the joint statement between President Bush and

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Prime Minister Singh of July 18, 2005 declared that India's unilateral 
moratorium on nuclear testing will continue. I take Prime Minister 
Singh at his word, but also believe in following President Reagan's 
mantra of ``trust but verify.''
  To this end, I am wondering if the chairman will take a few moments 
to clarify a couple matters concerning this legislation. Is it the 
managers' belief that section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, AEA, will 
apply prospectively to India--aside from the sections of the AEA that 
are explicitly amended by S. 3709?
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. Under our bill, the 
full force of section 129 would apply to any Indian detonation of a 
nuclear explosive device, any termination or abrogation of IAEA 
safeguards by India, and material violation of IAEA safeguards by 
India, all would result under section 129 in the termination of nuclear 
exports to India.
  Mr. OBAMA. On a related note, is it the chairman's interpretation of 
the legislation that, in the event of a future nuclear test by the 
Government of India, nuclear power reactor fuel and equipment sales, 
and nuclear technology cooperation would terminate; other elements of 
the United States-India nuclear agreement would likely terminate; and 
the United States would have the right to demand the return of nuclear 
supplies?
  Mr. LUGAR. Yes, under our bill, the only requirement which is waived 
is that in section 123.a(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, for full-
scope safeguards. India's 123 agreement would still have to meet the 
requirement of section 123.a(4), which requires that in the event of a 
test by India of a nuclear explosive device the United States shall 
have the right to request the return of supplies as you have 
stipulated.
  Mr. OBAMA. I offered an amendment that the managers have already 
accepted pertaining to the supply of nuclear power reactor fuel in 
safeguarded, civilian nuclear facilities. To further clarify this 
issue, is it the managers' understanding that provision of a fuel to 
the Government of India should be sized in a way to maintain a 
deterrent to Indian nuclear testing, while also providing protections 
against short-term fluctuations in the supply of nuclear fuel? In other 
words, is it your understanding that providing a fuel reserve to India 
is not intended to facilitate a resumption in nuclear testing?
  Mr. LUGAR. Yes, that is our understanding.
  Mr. OBAMA. Does the chairman believe that, as this agreement moves 
forward to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, the United States should 
work to ensure that other nations provide nuclear power reactor fuel in 
a similar fashion?
  Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I hope that would be the case.
  Mr. OBAMA. Finally, would the managers agree that section 105 of S. 
3709 requires that the President determine, prior to exercising the 
waivers in section 104, that ``an agreement between India and the IAEA 
requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance 
with IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear 
facilities, programs, and materials . . . has entered into force,'' and 
that the most logical approach, as U.S. officials have stated for the 
record, would be to use the IAEA INFCIRC/66, Rev. 2 agreement as the 
model for India's safeguards agreement?
  Mr. LUGAR. My understanding is that the administration, the IAEA, and 
participating governments in the NSG have all stated that they would 
prefer that any new Indian safeguards agreement be modeled on INFCIRC/
66 Rev. 2.
  Mr. OBAMA. I thank the managers.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I intend to oppose this legislation.
  One of the many lessons of the tragedy of September 11 is that 
America's overarching national security interest is keeping nuclear 
material and weapons out of the hands of terrorists. Nothing is more 
important for our national security than achieving this goal.
  The international nuclear nonproliferation regime flawed though it 
may be is our best hope of achieving this goal. While I believe America 
has a clear interest in strengthening our relationship with India, I do 
not believe it can, or should, be achieved by sidestepping nearly half 
a century of international nonproliferation agreements. In the long 
run, doing so will make America and the world more vulnerable to the 
perils of nuclear weapons.
  One of the defining goals of my years in the Senate has been to 
support the important advances made by our country and the 
international community in limiting the perils of nuclear weapons 
across the globe.
  President Kennedy considered the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which 
represented an early and historic advance in nuclear nonproliferation, 
as one of his greatest accomplishments. On signing the documents of 
ratification on October 7, 1963, President Kennedy said, ``This small 
step toward safety can be followed by others longer and less limited, 
if also harder in the taking. With our courage and understanding 
enlarged by this achievement, let us press onward in quest of man's 
essential desire for peace.''
  Since that agreement, further progress was made with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, NPT, the SALT and START agreements, as well as 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These agreements although far from 
perfect are essential to limiting the spread and use of nuclear 
weapons. They are the bedrock of our effort to ensure that the world 
will never, ever again know the horrors of the use of nuclear weapons. 
They took years to negotiate and implement, and we must be exceedingly 
careful about dismantling or carving out exceptions to them for any 
country.
  Supporters of this agreement argue that the international 
nonproliferation regime has not proved successful in every case--just 
look at Iran and North Korea. And I accept the premise of the 
administration's argument that the international arms control regime 
may need to be modified or adapted to fit current times, and that we 
need to find a way to address India.
  However, we need to recognize that commitments under the NPT made by 
virtually every nonnuclear state play an essential role in assisting 
the international community in keeping a check on their nuclear 
programs. And, before we make significant changes to the 
nonproliferation regime, we must be absolutely confident that we are 
doing more good than harm and that we will be more likely not less 
likely to limit the spread of nuclear weapons across the globe. I do 
not believe that running roughshod over these agreements by carving out 
an exception for India is the way to achieve these goals.
  General Brent Scowcroft cautioned that, ``I am concerned about a 
trend that we see reflected in the United States-India nuclear deal 
where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character 
of regimes and governments. Such an approach also opens up divisions 
among the world's nuclear powers, with each making a list of 
``friends'' who can be trusted with nuclear technology and `foes' who 
are dangerous risks.''
  Further, Robert Gallucci, the Dean of Georgetown University's School 
of Foreign Service, pointed out that, if we do approve this arrangement 
with India, ``we will put at risk a world of very few nuclear weapon 
states, and open the door to the true proliferation of nuclear weapons 
in the years ahead.''
  Certainly, there are some advantages to the nonproliferation regime 
under the proposed agreement. India would place a majority of its 
current and future civilian reactors under international safeguards. 
India has agreed to abide by the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, and to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime. India has 
agreed not to test another nuclear device and has indicated that it 
will work with the United States on concluding an international regime 
to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. These 
are definitely positive steps.
  However, India will not sign the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and 
subject its military facilities to international inspection, and this 
remains a major concern. Until now, as part of an effort to limit the 
spread of nuclear

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weapons across the globe, international arms control agreements and 
U.S. law have required full international safeguards on civilian and 
military reactors before civilian nuclear energy could be provided. 
These requirements exist to ensure that by assisting a country's 
civilian program, we are not freeing up supplies for an unsafeguarded 
nuclear weapons program. Under this agreement, however, none of India's 
military reactors would be put under international safeguards, but it 
would receive civilian nuclear energy anyway. In other words, India 
will obtain the benefits of the NPT, without the obligations required 
by it.
  Additionally, despite India's stated commitment to conclude an 
international agreement to cut off the production of fissile material--
the essential component for making nuclear weapons--there is no 
timeframe for concluding such an agreement, nor is there any binding 
commitment for India to do so. United States, Russia, Great Britain, 
and France have agreed to a fissile material production cut-off for 
nuclear weapons, and India should as well. So we will knowingly permit 
a country to benefit from civilian nuclear energy cooperation and 
maintain an active, unsafeguarded program to construct, develop, and 
build nuclear weapons.
  If we provide India with the benefits of nuclear nonproliferation 
agreements without requiring them to sign the NPT nuclear agreement or, 
at least, cease the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, 
there would be significant and harmful consequences for our global 
nonproliferation efforts.
  It will embolden Iran to flout the will of the international 
community. There could not be a worse moment to give India the green 
light to build weapons with the blessing of the United States and the 
international community. The Iranians see a clear double standard. As 
Iran's national security adviser said in March, ``The United States is 
imposing a contradictory theory of dual standards: though our NPT 
membership entitles us to access to nuclear science and technology, it 
claims that we will never have that right, whereas it cooperates with 
India, which does have the bomb but is not an NPT member.'' The 
Iranians will undoubtedly use the double standard of India in Iran's 
efforts to break the will of the international community to achieve its 
nuclear aims.
  Former Senator Sam Nunn stated that ``the U.S. India deal will likely 
make it more difficult to get other nations to join us in stopping 
threatening nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.'' Similarly, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, points out that this deal ``will complicate the 
quest for a constructive resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem.''
  Furthermore, this agreement will put the United States in the 
position of indirectly supporting an arms race in South Asia. If the 
Indians or the administration could assure us that India had agreed, 
like the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France, to a fissile 
material production cut-off for nuclear weapons, the concern would 
diminish. We know that India currently has very limited uranium 
resources, which it now must dedicate to generating electric power. It 
is so short of uranium that it can only run its reactors at about two-
thirds capacity. But that will change once India gains access to 
foreign uranium supplies for its civilian uses. The agreement would 
provide India with sufficient uranium to supply its civilian reactors, 
freeing up domestic supplies for military purposes. Former Senator Sam 
Nunn warns that ``India will no longer be forced to choose whether its 
own limited uranium stocks should be used to support its civilian 
nuclear program or its nuclear weapons program.''
  Some experts estimate that India could increase production from a 
handful of weapons a year to 50 or more, if it could use its domestic 
production for its weapons program. How will China and Pakistan react 
to India's increasing nuclear stockpile, as well as to the enhanced 
potential to produce fissile material as a result of this new 
cooperation? India states it only wants to build up its nuclear arsenal 
to the ``minimum credible deterrence'' level before it stops building 
nuclear weapons, but we don't really know what India is likely to do. 
How many more weapons will it need to reach that minimum credible 
deterrence? 50? 100? 500? Will Pakistan and China respond by building 
more weapons, too? Will the mad race for nuclear arms take on a life of 
its own, continuing to escalate with reckless abandon?
  And what will happen with our other allies who are members of the 
nonproliferation regime? There is no doubt that the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty has played an essential role in the decisions 
of countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and South Korea 
all allies of the United States--to stop pursuing their own nuclear 
weapons programs. But if we allow India to build nuclear weapons and 
enjoy civilian nuclear cooperation, will other U.S. friends and other 
countries in the future follow India's lead and demand the same? If we 
argue that the decision about India was based on trust, how on Earth 
will we be able to argue otherwise with these allies? They will accuse 
us rightly of having a double standard. I think we can all agree that 
the fewer the countries with nuclear weapons the better for U.S. 
national security, even if those aspiring countries are friendly toward 
the United States.
  President Jimmy Carter said in March that ``there is no doubt that 
condoning avoidance of the NPT encourages the spread of nuclear 
weaponry. Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Argentina and many 
other technologically advanced nations have chosen to abide by the NPT 
to gain access to foreign nuclear technology. Why should they adhere to 
self-restraint if India rejects the same terms.''
  And what will happen to the international supply of material to India 
if it does test another weapon? While I am reasonably confident that 
the United States would terminate supplying nuclear materials and 
technology to India, there is a question whether the international 
regime particularly the Nuclear Suppliers Group would cease 
cooperation. Once the door to cooperation is opened to India, it may be 
difficult to get other countries to agree to shut it again. The Indian 
press has suggested that if India tests again it would likely lose the 
United States as a supplier but would retain access to uranium from 
other sources. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Singh told his Parliament 
in August that if there were a disruption of uranium supplies to India, 
such as in result of India testing another device, that ``the United 
States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier 
countries, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, aimed at restoring 
fuel supplies to India.'' This certainly should raise alarm bells. I 
know Senator Obama has tried to address that problem with his amendment 
to the Senate bill, but all should be asking whether we should open the 
international spigot if we are uncertain about whether we can shut it 
off.
  Much has been made of the foreign policy benefit to America of this 
agreement, but I reject fully--the notion that America's relationship 
with India or the Indian American community--can or should be defined 
by this vote.
  The United States and India have a multitude of ties, which are 
growing ever closer, ever stronger. In the last decade we have seen a 
dramatic improvement in bilateral relations.
  India and America are the two largest democracies in the world. We 
share deeply held, common values, including respect for human rights, 
the rule of law, promoting peace, and prosperity in the world.
  My family and I have long had an interest in India. My brothers--John 
and Bobby visited in 1951, and I am a friend of India. I work closely 
with the Indian-American community to address hate crimes, immigration, 
and other issues that affect their daily lives.
  President Kennedy was right when he characterized India as a ``great 
and vital hope of democracy in Asia.'' He rightfully exclaimed that 
``no thoughtful citizen'' could fail to recognize that India was a 
great and vital hope of democracy in Asia.
  Today, India is the world's largest democracy and soon will be the 
world's

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largest country. It has one of the fastest growing economies and plays 
a leading role in global affairs.
  The United States and India are seeking to improve trade and 
investment ties. We are cooperating in key areas such as agriculture, 
technology, energy, and the environment. India's green revolution came 
from America and proved essential to ending massive starvation in 
India. Today, our countries are cooperating on the next green 
revolution, to increase agricultural productivity and to help the 
environment.
  Defense cooperation is increasing. Our militaries are conducting more 
joint exercises, India is purchasing more U.S. counterterrorism and 
defense equipment, and in June 2005, the United States and India signed 
a 10-year defense pact.
  India, in recent years, has been the leader in sending students to 
study in the United States. Cultural links--whether food, movies, music 
or literature--are growing, too.
  After September 11, the United States cooperated with India in 
dealing with international terrorism threats.
  We are also working closely with India on public health threats, 
including HIV/AIDS and avian influenza.
  Our relationship is strong today and will continue to grow. These 
ties can and should continue to grow regardless of this agreement 
because it is in the interests of both of our countries.
  But we need to be realistic about the foreign policy benefits of this 
agreement.
  Naturally, we want the Indian Government to work with the United 
States to advance our foreign policy objectives. But we need to be 
realistic enough to know that India will follow a foreign policy that 
suits its interest. We should not and cannot expect India to pursue a 
policy that diverges from its national interests or not to pursue a 
policy that is in its national interests.
  Fortunately, India's national interests converge with ours on the 
vital national security issues. Neither country wants to see Iran 
acquire nuclear weapons and both are profoundly concerned by the 
terrorist threats. The tragic bombing in Mumbai in July where more than 
200 people were killed by terrorists underscored to Indians that 
terrorism is a real and present danger.
  But we would be fooling ourselves if we thought that concluding a 
nuclear cooperative agreement with India will make it adopt policies 
regarding China, Iran, or others in the region or the world that are 
contrary to its national interest.
  Conversely, not concluding an agreement will not mean that India will 
forsake its national interests to spite the United States. India will 
not confront China or Iran or any other country merely because the 
United States asks it to do so. India will do so only if it is in 
India's national interests. This is independent of whether or not there 
is nuclear cooperation in place.
  Further, many have suggested that the U.S. nuclear industry will 
benefit from this agreement with increased reactor sales to India. 
However, this is not the case. Neither the United States nor India has 
ratified an international agreement to limit the civil liability for 
nuclear reactors.
  Until both nations agree to limit the liability, the U.S. nuclear 
industry will be hesitant to sell reactors to India. However, France 
and Russia have no such hesitations. Both have state-owned nuclear 
industries, so it is much less likely that victims of a nuclear reactor 
failure would be able to successfully sue for damages.
  As we have seen at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Bhopal, the 
liability exposure for such accidents can be overwhelming, resulting in 
thousands of deaths and radiation exposure for millions of people. 
Understandably, the U.S. nuclear industry is reluctant to sell reactors 
to another country until their liability for such an accident is 
limited.
  If we support this agreement without accompanying limitations on 
liability, we open the door for the French and the Russians to sell 
nuclear reactors to India but not for our own industry.
  I also do not believe this is an issue the Congress should be voting 
on now.
  President Bush is asking us to trust him that the risks of this 
agreement will not materialize and that additional benefits will 
follow--especially that India will cease fissile material production as 
a result of a new treaty.
  But with so many details unresolved and much up in the air, I see a 
vote for this legislation, which will permanently change U.S. law, as 
giving the administration a blank check in concluding the negotiations 
with India on a nuclear cooperation agreement and with the terms of 
safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
revisions to the Nuclear Suppliers Group's guidelines.
  Nuclear nonproliferation is too important to our national security to 
take unnecessary risks. We should wait until the whole package has been 
negotiated and until we have better answers to the questions I have 
raised about the implications of this agreement before we take this 
step; for once we take the step of carving up the international 
nonproliferation regime, it is no easy matter to return if we find out 
we have erred. This genie cannot be put back in the bottle.
  I am particularly concerned that unpleasant answers will come out 
after we have voted on the legislation. In an action that was eerily 
reminiscent of the White House's decision to withhold until after the 
vote on the Iraq war North Korea's admission about its nuclear weapons 
program, the State Department delayed a report on proliferation with 
Iran until after the House had already approved this agreement. It 
turned out that there were two Indian companies on that report. 
Further, the administration kept quiet on Pakistan's constructing a 
nuclear reactor that could be used in a regional arms race, making 
India more likely to ramp up its production of fissile material, using 
the domestic production freed up by this agreement. And, as we learned 
this week, Ambassador Negroponte has not yet provided answers to the 
Foreign Relations Committee's questions on India's nonproliferation 
activities.
  We have the time and we have the responsibility to get this right. 
Let's be sure of what we are getting ourselves into.
  If it can be shown with enough confidence that India will take steps 
to become a full-fledged member of the nonproliferation community and 
has agreed to cut off production of fissile material, then I would 
certainly vote in favor of the cooperation agreement. Until then, I 
will be reserving my vote, looking for answers, and waiting to see the 
final agreement.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, today the Senate is undertaking an important 
debate on the India Agreement for Civil Nuclear Cooperation.
  On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh signed an agreement to resume full civilian nuclear cooperation 
for the first time since India conducted its initial nuclear test in 
1974. Such an agreement will require changes to U.S. law and 
accommodations with the international community.
  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 assures the proper management of 
source, special nuclear, and byproduct material. Several sections of 
the AEA are at issue in this agreement, so I would like to take a 
moment to explain the pertinent provisions.
  Section 123 of the AEA limits the ability of the United States to 
enter into agreements with nonweapons states unless the agreement meets 
a minimum of nine criteria, including a requirement that the recipient 
country has in place an agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA, to safeguard in perpetuity nuclear material, equipment, 
and technology so that it will not be diverted for weapons use. This 
type of agreement is known as a ``full-scope safeguards'' agreement. A 
123 Agreement is the precursor to any export license for the nuclear 
materials, equipment and technology.
  Section 128 requires that any export license for nuclear materials, 
technology or equipment contain a requirement that the recipient 
nonnuclear weapons state maintain IAEA safeguards.

[[Page 22169]]

  Section 129 of the AEA requires that any 123 Agreement or export 
license be terminated if the nonnuclear weapons state recipient 
detonates a nuclear explosive device, terminates, abrogates, or 
violates IAEA safeguards, or engages in activities that support 
development of a nuclear explosive device. Section 129 would also 
prohibit entrance into a section 123 Agreement with any nonnuclear 
weapons state that detonated a nuclear explosive device after 1978.
  S. 3709, the bill we are considering today, establishes a mechanism 
whereby the President may submit a 123 Agreement for civil nuclear 
cooperation with India, a nonweapons state under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, to Congress for approval. However, this bill 
would allow the President to waive certain requirements of section 123, 
section 128, and portions of section 129, as long as the President 
makes certain determinations that are set out in the bill.
  India is the largest democracy in the world. Its economy is growing 
by 8 percent annually. Since the beginning of this century, United 
States-India relations on issues from trade to defense have been 
growing stronger each year. The United States also benefits from a 
large Indian-American population. Rhode Island is home to a vibrant 
Indian community who contribute greatly to the State. I believe that 
the United States should do all that it can to assist India and further 
strengthen the partnership between the two countries.
  However, this agreement does raise significant concerns. I believe 
that proliferation of nuclear material is the greatest threat facing 
our country today. North Korea recently conducted its first nuclear 
test. Iran seems intent on pursuing a nuclear program. Even efforts to 
reduce the overall size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons 
stockpiles have stalled. While there has been some small progress in 
reducing the number of deployed nuclear warheads there has been no 
progress in reducing the overall size of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile. There is great concern, therefore, that this agreement 
strikes a blow to what remains of the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.
  I, too, would share that concern, if the Senate had adopted the bill 
the administration proposed. However, I believe that the Foreign 
Relations Committee, under the leadership of Senators Lugar and Biden, 
who are certainly experts on these matters, have crafted a bill which, 
I believe, has sufficient safeguards. I think that they are trying to 
adapt the nonproliferation regime, not destroy it.
  First, section 105 of this bill sets out a series of determinations 
the President must make in writing when he submits the 123 Agreement. I 
believe these determinations will both provide a reasonable equivalent 
of full-scope safeguards and address several other concerns with 
respect to the Indian nuclear program, including concerns that the 
agreement not facilitate or assist the Indian nuclear weapons program. 
For the most part, the determinations reflect what India has committed 
to do in the July 2005 joint statement.
  Probably the most important of the determinations in section 105 is 
the fifth, which states, ``India is working with the United States to 
conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of 
fissile materials.'' This determination breathes new life into efforts 
to achieve a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, even driving the United 
States back to the negotiating table. Determination number 5 is the one 
single element in this bill that could prevent further growth in 
India's nuclear weapons stockpile and could lead to real reductions. In 
addition, this certification may also work to eliminate the impasse 
between India and Pakistan whereby neither wants to be the first to 
adopt a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
  Section 106 of S. 3709 would prohibit the export of equipment, 
materials and technologies related to uranium enrichment, spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing, and the production of heavy water, unless the user 
is a multinational facility participating in IAEA approved reactor fuel 
program or the President ``determines that the export or reexport will 
not improve India's ability to produce nuclear weapons or fissile 
material for military uses.'' On several occasions administration 
witnesses clearly stated to the Foreign Relations Committee that the 
U.S. would not provide such technologies to India. As a result, it is 
not anticipated that the presidential exemption will be used.
  Section 107 of the bill requires a program, which would include end-
use monitoring conditions as appropriate, to maintain accountability 
with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold, 
leased and exported, or re-exported to India. This provision would 
enhance confidence in India's efforts to ensure separation of its 
civilian and military nuclear programs, facilities, materials and 
personnel and also further ensure U.S. compliance with Article I of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  S. 3709 also requires the President to provide the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee 
with updated information regarding India's compliance with 
nonproliferation commitments. Specifically, it would require the 
President to keep these committees informed of any material violation 
of India's nuclear nonproliferation commitments, the construction of 
any nuclear facilities in India, any significant changes in India's 
production of nuclear weapons or fissile materials, or changes in the 
purpose or status of India's non-declared facilities. The bill also 
requires the President to submit an annual report on the implementation 
of civil nuclear commerce, India's compliance with its nonproliferation 
commitments, and U.S. efforts and progress toward achieving India's 
full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and 
adherence to the guidelines and policies of the Australia Group and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement.
  It is important that this bill would waive section 129 applicability 
for any actions taken before July 18, 2005. If India detonated a 
nuclear device after the date of enactment the waiver authority would 
cease to be effective and the exports would be prohibited.
  Another vitally important provision of S. 3709 is that it follows 
current law and requires Congress to have a vote to approve any final 
123 Agreement. The House bill also has an approval process, but it is 
not clear if that process requires a vote. The administration had 
proposed that a 123 Agreement with India would only require 
congressional notification and a waiting period.
  Because of the provisions I have just discussed, I believe I can 
support this bill. I would also note that passage of this bill is 
simply the first step on a long road. If this bill passes the Senate, 
it must be conferenced with the House bill, which has different 
provisions. If the conference report comes back with the Senate 
provisions weakened, or absent, I may be obligated to vote against that 
report.
  Much more important is the substance of the 123 statement the 
President ultimately submits. I understand that this is an attempt to 
adapt the nonproliferation regime to a changing world. I will carefully 
examine any 123 Agreement to ensure that it adequately addresses vital 
proliferation concerns.
  But at this first step, I have hope that this agreement will lead to 
greater cooperation on nonproliferation rather than less. With that 
hope, I will support S. 3709.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I am here to support the Lugar-Biden 
legislation that would implement changes in law necessary to secure our 
Nation's civil-nuclear agreement with India.
  This is very important to our future for two reasons: No. 1, India is 
one of the great powers of the 21st century, and this agreement 
represents an important step toward a new strategic partnership between 
our two countries; and No. 2, nuclear power is a source of clean energy 
that is good for us, and it is good for India.
  As we look at the beginning of this new century, we have witnessed 
the emergence of three great powers or influences in the world--three 
major

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shifts that will help define the many years to come.
  One is the rise of China. One is the emergence of a new political 
Islam. And the third is the arrival of India as a great power.
  I asked Secretary Rice about these three new forces shaping the 
coming century at the Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the United 
States-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, and she agreed with my 
assessment.
  And if you look at those three emerging forces, one presents the 
greatest opportunity for us to be a partner, and that one is India: 
India, the largest democracy in the world; India, where English is an 
official language; India, where the legal system, like ours, is 
descended from that of the British; and India, where a diverse ethnic 
and religious population has joined together to form one nation with a 
democratic government. India.
  I was fortunate to travel to India earlier this year with a group of 
Senators led by Senator Enzi. We went to look at what India is doing to 
improve its economic standing by improving its brainpower through 
better education and research and an emphasis on science and 
technology. And we saw a country that is rapidly advancing.
  Both our President and this Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, are 
showing real vision by recognizing that in this new century there may 
be no more important two-country relationship than the one between the 
United States and India.
  And we share an important strategic interest: we are facing the same 
sort of energy and environmental issues. India's needs are even more 
acute.
  When I was there a few months ago, I was told that India hopes to 
bring online 50,000 MW over the next 10 years in order to meet demand.
  That is an incredible figure. If each power plant has a capacity of 
500 MW, that is 100 new power plants. And they are going to build them 
with us or without us.
  The question for us is: What kind of power plants will they build? 
From an environmental perspective, the only technology that is ready to 
go, today, to provide large amounts of reliable power without emitting 
noxious gases into the air is nuclear power.
  As new studies are emerging that India's air pollution and China's 
air pollution is also our air pollution because air pollution both 
deposits locally and moves around the globe and that their greenhouse 
gases cause just as much global warming as our greenhouse gases, then 
it is in our interest for India to build nuclear power plants rather 
than more dirty coal power plants that emit sulfur and nitrogen and 
mercury and carbon.
  Seventy-two percent of India's electricity needs are currently 
provided by coal-burning plants. Gas provides 12 percent; oil, 2 
percent; nuclear, 3 percent; hydro, 10 percent, and renewables, 1 
percent.
  This agreement won't radically shift those numbers overnight, but 
each new nuclear powerplant is a powerplant that is not emitting 
noxious gases into the air. It is one more powerplant that is not 
putting out sulfur or nitrogen or mercury or even carbon.
  So, Mr. President, before us is legislation to implement the United 
States-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. This is not an agreement about 
nuclear weapons--it is about cooperation for nuclear power. This is an 
agreement that puts us on the path to a new strategic partnership with 
India--one of the three great rising forces in this new century. And 
this is an agreement that meets energy needs while being good for the 
environment.
  I am glad that we have taken this matter up in a bipartisan manner 
and look forward to its passage today.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, today, the Senate has begun debate on S. 
3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, 
which will help pave the way for our Nation to assist India in 
fulfilling its energy needs. I intend to vote in support of this 
legislation.
  The United States and India are bound together by deep mutual respect 
and our common efforts to work towards a democratic, free, and secure 
world. As cochair of the Senate India Caucus, I have sought to 
strengthen the ties that bind our two nations.
  The legislation that emerged from the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee is a significant improvement over the implementing 
legislation put forward by the administration in March. The 
administration's initial proposal sought to undercut Congressional 
authority by asking us to effectively approve an agreement before it 
had even been negotiated with India and before India had reached its 
nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA.
   I carefully followed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's 
consideration of this agreement. Senator Richard Lugar, the Foreign 
Relations Committee chairman, and Senator Joseph Biden, the Foreign 
Relations Committee ranking member, are to be commended for the 
seriousness with which they exercised their jurisdiction over this 
legislation. Because of the efforts of Chairman Lugar and Ranking 
Member Biden, the bill before us today is much improved. This 
legislation not only retains congressional prerogatives, but it also 
ensures that Congress will not have to vote to approve a final 
agreement until every single nation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
NSG, the global regime given the charge for ensuring the responsible 
trade of nuclear technology, has agreed to permit the transfer of 
peaceful nuclear technology to India. By working through the NSG, we 
will help strengthen both that group, as well as the greater 
international nonproliferation regime that is center stage as we 
address the threats posed by the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and 
North Korea.
  As India continues to grow stronger and to shoulder more of the 
responsibilities that come with being a leading nation in the world, we 
must continue to work towards greater cooperation with our Indian 
friends to deal with our common challenges in security, energy, 
economics, and health. I hope that this agreement is just one step on 
that journey that our countries, and our people, are taking together.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today in full support of S. 3709. The 
passage of this bill and the ultimate conclusion of the U.S.-India 
nuclear agreement will be instrumental in bringing our countries closer 
together after decades of estrangement. This outcome is not just 
desirable but essential for U.S. national interests.
  It is hard to overemphasize the importance of India's role in the 
world today. Not only is India one of the most populous countries and 
fastest growing economies in the world, it is also the world's largest 
democracy that has long demonstrated a commitment to pluralism and rule 
of law and a rich intellectual and civilization heritage.
  I applaud the efforts of both the Clinton and Bush administration in 
strengthening our ties with India. Their efforts reflect the bipartisan 
spirit with which America extends its hand of friendship to India and 
the importance that it places in getting this relationship right.
  The U.S.-India nuclear deal significantly benefits both our 
countries. It will help India meet its growing energy needs, fueling 
its economic growth and reducing the global demand and cost of fossil 
fuels. It will enhance U.S.-Indian technological and commercial 
cooperation with significant dividends for U.S. companies. And it will 
bolster our strategic partnership with India in Asia and beyond.
  It also opens the window for greater oversight over India's civil 
nuclear program, drawing an important non-signatory to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty into the broader nonproliferation system. This 
is a positive step for the U.S. in controlling the spread of nuclear 
materials and weapons and gaining an important ally in that fight.
  But the flip side of this coin is that we are doing business with a 
non-nuclear weapon state as defined by the NPT that does not have full-
scope safeguards.
  In doing so, the U.S. has overstepped domestic and international non-
proliferation laws and norms. It has sent a signal that countries can 
pursue and

[[Page 22171]]

test nuclear weapons, as India did in 1998, and wear out U.S. 
opposition. And it may trigger a low-level arms race between India and 
Pakistan as India's uranium reserves are freed up for diversion to its 
weapons program.
  Moreover, at a time when we are trying to roll back North Korea and 
Iran's nuclear program, cutting a deal with India suggests that if you 
are on America's side, you can keep your nuclear weapons. Such double 
standards are detrimental to America's interests and image.
  What we ultimately need is not a country-specific approach to civil 
nuclear cooperation but a criteria-specific one. India has agreed to 
meet some of these criteria but not all. Its nonproliferation record is 
infinitely better than that of its neighbors, but far from perfect.
  For now, the bill that is before the Senate carves out an exception 
for India. As I said earlier, I will vote for this bill because I think 
our relationship with India is critical.
  It is also important to highlight what should be one vital outgrowth 
of this relationship: halting the global production of fissile material 
that can be used in a nuclear device.
  S. 3709 calls for U.S.-Indian cooperation in pursuit of a 
multilateral fissile material cutoff treaty. However, the reality is 
that negotiations on such a treaty at the Geneva Conference on 
Disarmament have long been at a standstill due to many factors. These 
include linkages that countries have imposed with issues such as the 
militarization of space.
  The proliferation dangers of increased fissile material stockpiles 
are well understood. Yet the current approach has failed to stop 
production.
  That is why the United States needs to sit down with India and the 
other key handful of countries that have produced and are producing 
fissile material, and make a hard push for an interim non-
discriminatory moratorium on fissile material production that is 
applicable to this grouping of states. This moratorium would remain in 
effect pending the entry into force of a multilateral treaty.
  The advantage of this new format is that it allows for a smaller, 
more relevant grouping with a singular agenda where the U.S. can 
immediately introduce proposals it has already drafted for discussion.
  If we are to seriously address the nuclear challenges we face today, 
we need to break the deadlock in Geneva, think outside the box and 
focus on this issue like a laser beam. We simply cannot have countries 
churning out fissile material because it increases the chances of it 
falling into the hands of terrorists and the buildup of nuclear 
arsenals.
  In this bill, the Senate calls for the President to make several 
determinations on whether India has taken certain steps before we can 
proceed with an agreement. The Senate must also set certain benchmarks 
for our own government and ensure that it is upholding its 
responsibilities as a global leader and a nuclear weapon state.
  I can think of no better way of doing this than calling for fresh and 
meaningful negotiations on halting fissile material production. Moving 
in this direction will strengthen the U.S.-India nuclear deal and make 
it a catalyst for positive change in the nonproliferation system.
  In the end, the goal should be a strong U.S. India relationship and a 
nuclear deal that provides momentum toward strengthening the nuclear 
nonproliferation system.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, last year President Bush and Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh ushered in a new era of cooperation between the 
United States and India on civilian nuclear energy. President Bush 
promised to seek the necessary changes in U.S. laws and policies to 
allow full cooperation and commerce in this area. In return, Prime 
Minister Singh has committed India to specific steps strengthening its 
adherence to various elements of the global nonproliferation regime. 
This agreement marks a historic milestone for U.S. relations with 
India, one of our most important friends, a natural ally, and a country 
that can be a close partner on a number of key issues including nuclear 
nonproliferation.
  The legislation pending before us today is critically important 
because it sets the framework for Congress to consider a formal 
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India under section 123 of 
the Atomic Energy Act. The Foreign Relations Committee passed this bill 
with strong bipartisan support shortly before the July 4th recess, and 
I hope the full Senate will follow suit. By passing this legislation, 
we will not only move the United States and India one step closer to 
energy cooperation but also send a clear message that a strong United 
States-India relationship is vital to both of our nations.
  More and more, this bond is built on the bedrock of natural 
affinities--on shared interests and shared values. And it is no 
wonder--our two countries are natural partners. We should be partners 
in the war on terror, in the spread of democracy, in religious 
tolerance, in advancing technology, and in bringing stability and 
balance to Asia. In the post-9/11 world, we share interests and we 
share threats. India after all sees more terror attacks every year than 
any other country.
  For a long time, South Asians and Americans have been extremely 
close--thanks to so many families spilt between the two countries and 
such a vibrant Indian-American community here at home. But now at last 
our Governments are finally catching up to our people and bringing our 
countries together.
  I have long believed that it is in the interest of the United States 
and India to expand our strategic relationship. In 1994 I took a trade 
delegation from my home State of Massachusetts to India. It was clear 
to me that Cold War tensions had created a gulf between our nations 
that didn't serve either country. I believed then that India could and 
should be a critical American partner in South Asia. My subsequent 
trips in 1999 and again earlier this year have only reinforced that 
view.
  With its strategic location in South Asia and its experience in 
maintaining a stable and religiously diverse democracy--India has 
nearly 150 Muslim citizens--India can be an important partner on a 
range of issues, from combating the threat of terrorism and 
proliferation to promoting democracy and regional security. Cooperating 
on the civilian nuclear front can help move this essential partnership 
forward.
  I know from my discussions in India this past January with Prime 
Minister Singh and his National Security Adviser that they want our 
help in meeting India's energy needs. This is crucial if India is to 
continue to expand its economy and increase its stature as a major 
regional and global power. And they see this nuclear initiative, as we 
do, as an important foundation for our bilateral relationship.
  And everywhere I went, I kept hearing from political leaders and 
businessmen just how important they consider American investment in 
India's economic future--and not just in technology. India wants our 
help. They see this nuclear initiative as a cornerstone of economic 
development and sensible energy policy, and I see it as a great chance 
for our countries to work together.
  Civil nuclear cooperation is in India's interest, but it is also in 
ours. That is why during my trip to India in January I was one of the 
first Senators to express my support for the civil nuclear initiative 
in principle. Since then, I have been committed to working with my 
colleagues to find a way to make this deal work for all our interests. 
I am pleased that we have accomplished that with the legislation 
approved by the committee.
  Obviously, there are ramifications for our nonproliferation efforts 
because for the first time we are agreeing to engage in nuclear 
cooperation with a country that has a nuclear weapons program but is 
not a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or bound by its 
obligations. We cannot gloss over the fact that this is an 
unprecedented step. But it is not one taken lightly. I am convinced 
that this exception for India makes sense, despite its real costs, 
given India's record as a trustworthy steward of nuclear materials and 
technologies.

[[Page 22172]]

  India can be an important ally in our global nonproliferation 
efforts, as demonstrated by their voting with us in the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to try to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. And, of 
course, India is critical to any regional effort to cap fissile 
material production. India has made a number of positive commitments 
with respect to its nuclear program, such as separating its civil and 
military facilities, putting more of its civilian facilities under IAEA 
safeguards, and working with the United States to achieve a 
multilateral fissile material cutoff treaty.
  I believe this bill we are considering today will encourage India to 
fulfill these commitments while still allowing for timely consideration 
by Congress of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement--the so-
called section 123 agreement--when it is concluded by Indian and 
American negotiators. As I said when Secretary Rice testified before 
the committee on this deal in early April, it is critical for us to see 
the safeguards agreement that India reaches with the IAEA before taking 
action on the section 123 agreement between us and India. This bill 
ensures that we will. I am pleased that it includes my language 
clarifying that India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA must provide 
for safeguards ``in perpetuity,'' as India has said it would.
  Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican Senator from Michigan, used to say 
that partisan politics ought to stop at the water's edge. Crafting this 
legislation was not easy, but I am pleased to say that we have thus far 
met Vandenberg's challenge. And we must continue to do so.
  To reach agreement, we had to balance a number of critically 
important interests: building a strong and comprehensive relationship 
with India, furthering our global nonproliferation efforts, and 
protecting congressional prerogatives to act on nuclear cooperation 
agreements between the United States and other countries. I recognize 
that there are aspects of this legislation that some on both sides of 
the debate wish had come out differently, but on the whole, I believe 
the legislation the committee has sent to the Senate is a good-faith--
and ultimately successful--effort to meet those needs.
  One of the most important aspects of the balance in the bill before 
us is the requirement that Congress review the formal peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreement with India, which must be submitted under section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The bill passed by the House includes 
procedures which would deny Congress a full right of review. Such an 
approach would undermine the balance we have struck in this bill. I 
believe it is essential that the Senate conferees insist upon the 
procedures in the Senate bill for the consideration of the 123 
agreement. The Senate bill is a good bill, and our goal should be to 
enact as much of it as possible.
  We have taken an important step forward for one of our most promising 
and important relationships in the years to come.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support 
for this bill.
  The proposed agreement will mark a momentous change in U.S. and 
global nuclear policy, in my view for the better. It will give India 
due recognition as a global power, and it will deepen the bilateral 
commercial and strategic relationship that the United States enjoys 
with the world's largest democracy.
  Beyond these commercial and strategic benefits, this deal will bring 
India into the mainstream of the global nonproliferation system for the 
first time in its nuclear history. This bill includes a number of 
nonproliferation-related provisions, including a requirement that the 
U.S.-India agreement will not enter into force unless and until India 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency negotiate and conclude an 
inspection agreement. It also includes a requirement that the U.S.-
India agreement will not enter into force unless and until India and 
the IAEA negotiate and conclude a safeguards agreement. Further, it 
requires that the U.S.-India agreement will not enter into force unless 
and until the Nuclear Suppliers Group reaches consensus on nuclear 
trade with India and bans U.S. export of uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies under any U.S.-India agreement.
  This agreement will benefit the economic, strategic, and security 
interests of the United States, and I offer my strong support for it 
and congratulate my colleagues, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, for 
completing this important legislation.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 3709, the 
United States-India, Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, 
legislation which will permit the United States to export nuclear 
material to India for peaceful purposes.
  I applaud President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice for taking this bold, new and welcome approach to America's 
bilateral relations with India. For too long our relations with India 
and Pakistan have resembled a zero-sum game--by helping one nation, we 
have been perceived as hurting the other.
  This agreement helps to liberate U.S. policy from this false choice; 
the United States can and should enjoy positive relations with both 
nations. This bill will broaden and deepen America's emerging strategic 
partnership with India.
  This legislation is also part of a broader framework for the United 
States and India to work together on many issues, including energy, 
defense cooperation, anti-terrorism efforts and the promotion of 
democracy. S. 3709 will strengthen the world's security by expanding 
the reach of international non-proliferation efforts, and will increase 
transparency about India's civilian nuclear program.
  In addition, this bill will boost America's energy security by 
helping India meet its growing energy needs with nuclear power. With a 
population over one billion, India has greatly increased the demand for 
energy, helping to raise energy prices on the world market. The more 
power India can get from other sources, the less Americans will have to 
pay for energy here at home.
  This bill will also foster economic growth in America by opening up 
new opportunities for American companies to do business in India's 
civilian nuclear sector. By passing this legislation, my colleagues 
will help create new jobs for Americans and new markets for American 
firms.
  I want to commend my good friend from the neighboring State of 
Indiana, Senator Lugar, for his sponsorship of this bill and his 
successful shepherding of it through the Senate.
  Mr. President, improving U.S.-Indian ties is long overdue. After all, 
America and India are the worlds two largest democracies. As President 
Bush continues to champion the spread of democracy abroad, it is 
entirely fitting that our two countries should continue to strengthen 
our strategic partnership, as a model for the world of what democracies 
can accomplish when they work together in peace.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the unanimous consent order provides for 1 
minute on each side. I will forego my minute, but I would like to yield 
to the distinguished leader, who is here. He wants to make a comment.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, just for the information of my colleagues, 
this will be the last rollcall vote tonight. The plans will be on 
Monday, December 4, to be back in session, and in all likelihood we 
will not be voting until the late afternoon of December 5. Everybody 
stay posted. We will keep you apprised of the future plans.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we relinquish all time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to the consideration of H.R. 5682, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


[[Page 22173]]

       A bill (H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of 
     the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement 
     for cooperation with India.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, all after the 
enacting clause is stricken, and the text of S. 3709, as amended, is 
inserted in lieu thereof.
  The question is on third reading of the bill.
  The bill (H.R. 5682), as amended, was ordered to a third reading and 
was read the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the 
question is, Shall it pass?
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. 
Thomas).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 85, nays 12, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 270 Leg.]

                                YEAS--85

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--12

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Conrad
     Dayton
     Dorgan
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Leahy

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Thomas
  The bill (H.R. 5682), as amended, was passed, as follows:

                               H.R. 5682

       Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives 
     (H.R. 5682) entitled ``An Act to exempt from certain 
     requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed 
     nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.'', do pass with 
     the following amendment:
       Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

    TITLE I--UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION

     SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``United States-India 
     Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act''.

     SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) strong bilateral relations with India are in the 
     national interest of the United States;
       (2) the United States and India share common democratic 
     values and the potential for increasing and sustained 
     economic engagement;
       (3) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
     United States and other countries has the potential to 
     benefit the people of all countries;
       (4) such commerce also represents a significant change in 
     United States policy regarding commerce with countries not 
     parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
     remains the foundation of the international non-proliferation 
     regime;
       (5) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
     United States and other countries must be achieved in a 
     manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or 
     regional arms races and maximizes India's adherence to 
     international non-proliferation regimes, including, in 
     particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     (NSG); and
       (6) the United States should not seek to facilitate or 
     encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any 
     other party if such exports are terminated under United 
     States law.

     SEC. 103. DECLARATION OF POLICY CONCERNING UNITED STATES-
                   INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION.

       It shall be the policy of the United States with respect to 
     any peaceful atomic energy cooperation between the United 
     States and India--
       (1) to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the 
     production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for 
     nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;
       (2) to achieve as quickly as possible the Government of 
     India's adherence to, and cooperation in, the full range of 
     international non-proliferation regimes and activities, 
     including India's--
       (A) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative;
       (B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
     Principles;
       (C) public announcement of its decision to conform its 
     export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
     Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
     Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
       (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
     implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C);
       (3) to ensure that India remains in full compliance with 
     its non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament 
     agreements, obligations, and commitments;
       (4) to ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional 
     Protocol thereto to which India is a party with the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can reliably 
     safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear 
     materials and equipment;
       (5) to meet the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) 
     and a.(3)-a.(9) of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153);
       (6) to act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines 
     for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of 
     Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and 
     Related Technology developed by the multilateral Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group and the rules and practices regarding NSG 
     decision-making;
       (7) given the special sensitivity of equipment and 
     technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
     reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of 
     heavy water, to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group, individually and collectively, to further restrict the 
     transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to 
     India;
       (8) to maintain the fullest possible international support 
     for, adherence to, and compliance with the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty; and
       (9) that exports of nuclear fuel to India should not 
     contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases in the 
     production by India of fissile material for non-civilian 
     purposes.

     SEC. 104. WAIVERS FOR COOPERATION WITH INDIA.

       (a) Waiver Authority.--If the President submits a 
     determination under section 105 to the appropriate 
     congressional committees and makes available to such 
     committees the text of the agreement described in paragraph 
     (3) of such section, the President may--
       (1) subject to subsection (b), exempt a proposed agreement 
     for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 
     of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the 
     requirement of subsection a.(2) of such section;
       (2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports 
     to India; and
       (3) waive the application of any sanction with respect to 
     India under--
       (A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
     (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
       (B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding any 
     actions that occurred before July 18, 2005.
       (b) Joint Resolution of Approval Requirement.--An agreement 
     for cooperation exempted by the President pursuant to 
     subsection (a)(1) shall be subject to the second proviso in 
     subsection d. of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
     (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) applicable to agreements exempted by the 
     President pursuant to subsection (a) of such section.

     SEC. 105. DETERMINATION REGARDING UNITED STATES-INDIA 
                   PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION.

       The determination referred to in section 104 is a written 
     determination by the President, which shall be accompanied by 
     a report to the appropriate congressional committees, that--
       (1) India has provided to the IAEA and the United States a 
     credible plan to separate its civil nuclear facilities, 
     materials, and programs from its military facilities, 
     materials, and programs;
       (2) India has filed a complete declaration regarding its 
     civil nuclear facilities and materials with the IAEA;
       (3) an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring the 
     application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with 
     IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear 
     facilities, programs, and materials described in paragraph 
     (2) has entered into force;
       (4) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
     toward implementing an Additional Protocol;
       (5) India is working with the United States to conclude a 
     multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of 
     fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
     explosive devices;
       (6) India is supporting international efforts to prevent 
     the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any 
     state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning 
     enrichment or reprocessing plants;
       (7) India has secured nuclear and other sensitive materials 
     and technology through the application of comprehensive 
     export control legislation and regulations, including through 
     effective enforcement actions, and through harmonization of 
     its control lists with, and adherence

[[Page 22174]]

     to, the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     and the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
       (8) India is fully and actively participating in United 
     States and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and 
     contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions; and
       (9) the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided to permit civil 
     nuclear commerce with India pursuant to a decision taken by 
     the Nuclear Suppliers Group that--
       (A) was made by consensus; and
       (B) does not permit nuclear commerce with any non-nuclear 
     weapon state other than India that does not have IAEA 
     safeguards on all nuclear materials and all peaceful nuclear 
     activities within the territory of such state, under its 
     jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

     SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EXPORTS AND REEXPORTS.

       (a) Prohibition.--
       (1) Nuclear regulatory commission.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (b), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may not 
     authorize pursuant to part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, licenses for the export or reexport to India of 
     any equipment, materials, or technology related to the 
     enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear 
     fuel, or the production of heavy water.
       (2) Secretary of energy.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (b), the Secretary of Energy may not authorize pursuant to 
     part 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, licenses 
     for the export or reexport to India of any equipment, 
     materials, or technology to be used for the enrichment of 
     uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the 
     production of heavy water.
       (b) Exceptions.--Exports or reexports otherwise prohibited 
     under subsection (a) may be approved if--
       (1) the end user--
       (A) is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-
     approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel 
     cycle capabilities; or
       (B) is a facility participating in, and the export or 
     reexport is associated with, a bilateral or multinational 
     program to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle; and
       (2) the President determines that the export or reexport 
     will not improve India's ability to produce nuclear weapons 
     or fissile material for military uses.

     SEC. 107. END-USE MONITORING PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--The President shall ensure that all 
     appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability 
     with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology 
     sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India and to ensure 
     United States compliance with Article I of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty.
       (b) Measures.--The measures taken pursuant to subsection 
     (a) shall include the following:
       (1) Obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions 
     pursuant to the export licensing authorities of the Nuclear 
     Regulatory Commission and the Department of Commerce and the 
     authorizing authorities of the Department of Energy, 
     including, as appropriate, conditions regarding end-use 
     monitoring.
       (2) A detailed system of reporting and accounting for 
     technology transfers, including any retransfers in India, 
     authorized by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 57 
     b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such 
     system shall be capable of providing assurances that--
       (A) the identified recipients of the nuclear technology are 
     authorized to receive the nuclear technology;
       (B) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be 
     used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities and 
     will not be used for any military or nuclear explosive 
     purpose; and
       (C) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not 
     be retransferred without the prior consent of the United 
     States, and facilities, equipment, or materials derived 
     through the use of transferred technology will not be 
     transferred without the prior consent of the United States.
       (3) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards 
     as required by an agreement between the United States and 
     India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), arrangements that conform with 
     IAEA safeguards standards, principles, and practices that 
     provide assurances equivalent to that intended to be secured 
     by the system they replace, including--
       (A) review in a timely fashion of the design of any 
     equipment transferred pursuant to the agreement for 
     cooperation, or of any facility that is to use, fabricate, 
     process, or store any material so transferred or any special 
     nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such 
     material and equipment;
       (B) maintenance and disclosure of records and of relevant 
     reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring 
     accountability for material transferred pursuant to the 
     agreement and any source or special nuclear material used in 
     or produced through the use of any material and equipment so 
     transferred; and
       (C) access to places and data necessary to account for the 
     material referred to in subparagraph (B) and to inspect any 
     equipment or facility referred to in subparagraph (A).
       (c) Implementation.--The measures described in subsection 
     (b) shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances 
     that the recipient is complying with the relevant 
     requirements, terms, and conditions of any licenses issued by 
     the United States regarding such exports, including those 
     relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure 
     transit, and storage of such exports.

     SEC. 108. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE.

       (a) Information on Nuclear Activities of India.--The 
     President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees 
     fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of 
     any significant nuclear activities of India, including--
       (1) any material non-compliance on the part of the 
     Government of India with--
       (A) the non-proliferation commitments undertaken in the 
     Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of 
     the United States and the Prime Minister of India;
       (B) the separation plan presented in the national 
     parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail 
     on May 11, 2006;
       (C) a safeguards agreement between the Government of India 
     and the IAEA;
       (D) an Additional Protocol between the Government of India 
     and the IAEA;
       (E) a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the 
     Government of India and the United States Government pursuant 
     to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2153) or any subsequent arrangement under section 131 of such 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);
       (F) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses; and
       (G) United States laws and regulations regarding the export 
     or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use material, 
     equipment, or technology;
       (2) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act;
       (3) significant changes in the production by India of 
     nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile 
     material produced; and
       (4) changes in the purpose or operational status of any 
     unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
       (b) Implementation and Compliance Report.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date on which an agreement between the 
     Government of India and the United States Government pursuant 
     to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2153) enters into force, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report including--
       (1) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and 
     nuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or 
     intends to place under IAEA safeguards;
       (2) a comprehensive listing of--
       (A) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear 
     Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy for exports 
     and reexports to India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, 
     Code of Federal Regulations;
       (B) any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce for 
     the export or reexport to India of commodities, related 
     technology, and software which are controlled for nuclear 
     non-proliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the 
     Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of title 15, 
     Code of Federal Regulations;
       (C) any other United States authorizations for the export 
     or reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and
       (D) with respect to each such license or other form of 
     authorization described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C)--
       (i) the number or other identifying information of each 
     license or authorization;
       (ii) the name or names of the authorized end user or end 
     users;
       (iii) the name of the site, facility, or location in India 
     to which the export or reexport was made;
       (iv) the terms and conditions included on such licenses and 
     authorizations;
       (v) any post-shipment verification procedures that will be 
     applied to such exports or reexports; and
       (vi) the term of validity of each such license or 
     authorization;
       (3) any significant nuclear commerce between India and 
     other countries, including any such trade that--
       (A) does not comply with applicable guidelines or decisions 
     of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; or
       (B) would not meet the standards applied to exports or 
     reexports of such material, equipment, or technology of 
     United States origin;
       (4) either--
       (A) a certification that India is in full compliance with 
     the commitments and obligations contained in the agreements 
     and other documents referenced in subparagraphs (A) through 
     (F) of subsection (a)(1); or
       (B) if the President cannot make such certification, an 
     identification and assessment of all compliance issues 
     arising with regard to the adherence by India to its 
     commitments and obligations, including--
       (i) the steps the United States Government has taken to 
     remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues;
       (ii) the responses of the Government of India to such 
     steps; and
       (iii) an assessment of the implications of any continued 
     noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India, 
     if not already terminated under section 129 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158), remains in the national 
     security interest of the United States;
       (5) a detailed description of--
       (A) United States efforts to promote national or regional 
     progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, 
     capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, 
     pending creation

[[Page 22175]]

     of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime, including 
     the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
       (B) the reactions of India and Pakistan to such efforts; 
     and
       (C) assistance that the United States is providing, or 
     would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote 
     the objectives in subparagraph (A), consistent with its 
     obligations under international law and existing agreements;
       (6) an estimate of--
       (A) the amount of uranium mined in India during the 
     previous year;
       (B) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or 
     allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; 
     and
       (C) the rate of production in India of--
       (i) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
       (ii) nuclear explosive devices;
       (7) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected 
     the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices; 
     and
       (8) a detailed description of efforts and progress made 
     toward the achievement of India's--
       (A) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative;
       (B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
     Principles;
       (C) public announcement of its decision to conform its 
     export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
     Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
     Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
       (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
     implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C).
       (c) Submittal With Other Annual Reports.--
       (1) Report on proliferation prevention.--Each annual report 
     submitted under subsection (b) after the initial report may 
     be submitted together with the annual report on proliferation 
     prevention required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
       (2) Report on progress toward regional non-proliferation.--
     The information required to be submitted under subsection 
     (b)(5) after the initial report may be submitted together 
     with the annual report on progress toward regional non-
     proliferation required under section 620F(c) of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).
       (d) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 109. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR NON-
                   PROLIFERATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

       This title shall not be deemed to constitute authority for 
     any action in violation of any obligation of the United 
     States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

     SEC. 110. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS.

       A determination under section 105 and any waiver under 
     section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President 
     determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive 
     device after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 111. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.

       Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the 
     purposes of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2797b).

     SEC. 112. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

       Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
     Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg 
     Donovan Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as 
     enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 
     and contained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-
     486)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon at the end;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(C) so much of the reports required under section 108 of 
     the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation 
     Act as relates to verification or compliance matters; and''.

     SEC. 113. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) The term ``Additional Protocol'' means a protocol 
     additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as 
     negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a Model 
     Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular 
     (INFCIRC) 540.
       (2) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (3) The term ``atomic energy'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 11 c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2014(c)).
       (4) The term ``dual-use material, equipment, or 
     technology'' means those items controlled by the Department 
     of Commerce pursuant to section 309(c) of the Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
       (5) The term ``IAEA safeguards'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).
       (6) The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' has the 
     meaning given the term in section 4(5) of the Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3203(3)).
       (7) The term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
     Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into 
     force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
       (8) The terms ``nuclear weapon'' and ``nuclear explosive 
     device'' have the meaning given the term ``nuclear explosive 
     device'' in section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(4)).
       (9) The terms ``reprocessing'' and ``reprocess'' refer to 
     the separation of nuclear materials from fission products in 
     spent nuclear fuel.
       (10) The term ``source material'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2014(z)).
       (11) The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning 
     given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
       (12) The term ``unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity'' 
     means research on, or development, design, manufacture, 
     construction, operation, or maintenance of--
       (A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility, 
     conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, 
     plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special 
     fissionable material, or separate storage installation with 
     respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
     safeguards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant, or 
     installation that contains source or special fissionable 
     material; or
       (B) any existing or future heavy water production plant 
     with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
     safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in 
     connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.

     SEC. 114. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PROVISION OF 
                   NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FUEL RESERVE TO INDIA.

       It is the policy of the United States that any nuclear 
     power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of 
     India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities 
     should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 
     requirements.

     SEC. 115. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE THREAT 
                   REDUCTION PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through 
     the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration, shall establish a cooperative threat 
     reduction program to pursue jointly with scientists from the 
     United States and India a program to further common 
     nonproliferation goals, including scientific research and 
     development efforts related to nuclear nonproliferation, with 
     an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred 
     to as the ``program'').
       (b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
     Defense.
       (c) National Academies Recommendations.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into 
     an agreement with the National Academies to develop 
     recommendations for the implementation of the program.
       (2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under 
     paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified 
     individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the 
     communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year 
     of--
       (A) recommendations for research and related programs 
     designed to overcome existing technological barriers to 
     nuclear nonproliferation; and
       (B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded 
     under this section are achieving the goals of the activities 
     and programs.
       (3) Public availability.--The recommendations and 
     assessments prepared under this subsection shall be made 
     publicly available.
       (d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All 
     United States activities related to the program shall be 
     consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

       TITLE II--UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``United States Additional 
     Protocol Implementation Act''.

     SEC. 202. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings--
       (1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
     explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national 
     security of the United States and its vital national 
     interests.
       (2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven 
     critical to limiting such proliferation.
       (3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be 
     effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must 
     conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, 
     and such agreements must be honored and enforced.
       (4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening 
     the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the 
     safeguards system. This can best be accomplished by providing 
     IAEA inspectors with more information about, and broader 
     access to, nuclear activities within the territory of non-
     nuclear-weapon State Parties.
       (5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and 
     access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA 
     in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing 
     safeguards agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional 
     Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states is essential to 
     enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty.

[[Page 22176]]

       (6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-
     weapon State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is 
     based on the Model Additional Protocol, but which also 
     contains measures, consistent with its existing safeguards 
     agreements with its members, that protect the right of the 
     United States to exclude the application of IAEA safeguards 
     to locations and activities with direct national security 
     significance or to locations or information associated with 
     such activities.
       (7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United 
     States in a manner consistent with United States obligations 
     under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage 
     other parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
     especially non-nuclear-weapon State Parties, to conclude 
     Additional Protocols and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help reduce the 
     threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of direct and 
     substantial benefit to the United States.
       (8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United 
     States is not required and is completely voluntary given its 
     status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States 
     has acceded to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its 
     commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to 
     make United States civil nuclear activities available to the 
     same IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-
     nuclear-weapon State Parties.
       (9) In accordance with the national security exclusion 
     contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the 
     United States will not allow any inspection activities, nor 
     make any declaration of any information with respect to, 
     locations, information, and activities of direct national 
     security significance to the United States.
       (10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform 
     to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, 
     from the United States Permanent Representative to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of 
     the United Nations to the Director General of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.

     SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'', 
     when used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional 
     to the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
     Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, 
     signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on International 
     Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (3) Complementary access.--The term ``complementary 
     access'' means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as 
     set forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.
       (4) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (5) Facility.--The term ``facility'' has the meaning set 
     forth in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.
       (6) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency.
       (7) Judge of the united states.--The term ``judge of the 
     United States'' means a United States district judge, or a 
     United States magistrate judge appointed under the authority 
     of chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code.
       (8) Location.--The term ``location'' means any geographic 
     point or area declared or identified by the United States or 
     specified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 
     (21 UST 483).
       (10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon 
     state party.--The terms ``nuclear-weapon State Party'' and 
     ``non-nuclear-weapon State Party'' have the meanings given 
     such terms in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       (11) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise 
     provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, 
     firm, association, trust, estate, public or private 
     institution, any State or any political subdivision thereof, 
     or any political entity within a State, any foreign 
     government or nation or any agency, instrumentality or 
     political subdivision of any such government or nation, or 
     other entity located in the United States.
       (12) Site.--The term ``site'' has the meaning set forth in 
     Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
       (13) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used 
     as a geographic reference, means the several States of the 
     United States, the District of Columbia, and the 
     commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United 
     States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or 
     control of the United States, including--
       (A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;
       (B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public 
     aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and 
     (41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United 
     States Code; and
       (C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
     defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
     Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
       (14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term ``wide-
     area environmental sampling'' has the meaning set forth in 
     Article 18g. of the Additional Protocol.

     SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this title, or the application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
     remainder of this title, or the application of such provision 
     to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it 
     is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

                     Subtitle A--General Provisions

     SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement 
     and carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional 
     Protocol and shall designate through Executive order which 
     executive agency or agencies of the United States, which may 
     include but are not limited to the Department of State, the 
     Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the 
     Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and 
     enforce regulations in order to implement this title and the 
     provisions of the Additional Protocol.
       (b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency 
     designated under subsection (a) that does not currently 
     possess the authority to conduct site vulnerability 
     assessments and related activities, the authority provided in 
     subsection (a) includes such authority.
       (c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) 
     does not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority 
     of any Federal department or agency already having such 
     authority.

                    Subtitle B--Complementary Access

     SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY 
                   ACCESS.

       (a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location 
     in the United States shall take place pursuant to the 
     Additional Protocol without the authorization of the United 
     States Government in accordance with the requirements of this 
     title.
       (b) Authority.--
       (1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in 
     the United States subject to access under the Additional 
     Protocol is authorized in accordance with this title.
       (2) United states representatives.--
       (A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary access to 
     a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the 
     Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and 
     Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health 
     Administration of the Department of Labor may participate in 
     the access.
       (B) Number.--The number of designated United States 
     representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be kept to 
     the minimum necessary.

     SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

       (a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a 
     location in the United States under the Additional Protocol 
     shall be conducted in accordance with this subtitle.
       (b) Notice.--
       (1) In general.--Complementary access referred to in 
     subsection (a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual 
     written notice by the United States Government to the owner, 
     operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the location to be 
     subject to complementary access.
       (2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or 
     agent as soon as possible after the United States Government 
     has received notification that the IAEA seeks complementary 
     access. Notices may be posted prominently at the location if 
     the United States Government is unable to provide actual 
     written notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
       (3) Content of notice.--
       (A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph (1) shall 
     specify--
       (i) the purpose for the complementary access;
       (ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or 
     other location for the complementary access sought;
       (iii) the activities that will be carried out during the 
     complementary access;
       (iv) the time and date that the complementary access is 
     expected to begin, and the anticipated period covered by the 
     complementary access; and
       (v) the names and titles of the inspectors.
       (4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be 
     provided each time that complementary access is sought by the 
     IAEA.
       (c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA 
     and representatives or designees of the United States 
     Government shall display appropriate identifying credentials 
     to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the 
     location before gaining entry in connection with 
     complementary access.
       (d) Scope.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued 
     under section 223, and subject to the United States 
     Government's rights under the Additional Protocol to limit 
     complementary access, complementary access to a location 
     pursuant to this title may extend to all activities 
     specifically permitted for such locations under Article 6 of 
     the Additional Protocol.
       (2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol, 
     no inspection under this title shall extend to--

[[Page 22177]]

       (A) financial data (other than production data);
       (B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
       (C) pricing data;
       (D) personnel data;
       (E) patent data;
       (F) data maintained for compliance with environmental or 
     occupational health and safety regulations; or
       (G) research data.
       (e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying 
     out their activities, members of the IAEA complementary 
     access team and representatives or designees of the United 
     States Government shall observe applicable environmental, 
     health, safety, and security regulations established at the 
     location subject to complementary access, including those for 
     protection of controlled environments within a facility and 
     for personal safety.

     SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Procedure.--
       (A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an 
     appropriate official of the United States Government shall 
     seek or have the consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or 
     agent in charge of a location prior to entering that location 
     in connection with complementary access pursuant to sections 
     221 and 222. The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in 
     charge of the location may withhold consent for any reason or 
     no reason.
       (B) Administrative search warrant.--In the absence of 
     consent, the United States Government may seek an 
     administrative search warrant from a judge of the United 
     States under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the 
     issuance of an administrative search warrant shall be 
     conducted ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the United 
     States Government.
       (2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining access to 
     a location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional 
     Protocol in order to satisfy United States obligations under 
     the Additional Protocol when notice of two hours or less is 
     required, the United States Government may gain entry to such 
     location in connection with complementary access, to the 
     extent such access is consistent with the Fourth Amendment to 
     the United States Constitution, without obtaining either a 
     warrant or consent.
       (b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary 
     Access.--
       (1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For 
     complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant 
     to the Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of 
     a warrant is required, the United States Government shall 
     first obtain an administrative search warrant from a judge of 
     the United States. The United States Government shall provide 
     to such judge all appropriate information regarding the basis 
     for the selection of the facility, site, or other location to 
     which complementary access is sought.
       (2) Content of affidavits for administrative search 
     warrants.--A judge of the United States shall promptly issue 
     an administrative search warrant authorizing the requested 
     complementary access upon an affidavit submitted by the 
     United States Government--
       (A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;
       (B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other 
     location is subject to complementary access under the 
     Additional Protocol;
       (C) stating that the purpose of the complementary access is 
     consistent with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
       (D) stating that the requested complementary access is in 
     accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
       (E) containing assurances that the scope of the IAEA's 
     complementary access, as well as what it may collect, shall 
     be limited to the access provided for in Article 6 of the 
     Additional Protocol;
       (F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be searched 
     and seized;
       (G) stating the earliest commencement and the anticipated 
     duration of the complementary access period, as well as the 
     expected times of day during which such complementary access 
     will take place; and
       (H) stating that the location to which entry in connection 
     with complementary access is sought was selected either--
       (i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of 
     specific evidence, to believe that information required to be 
     reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations 
     promulgated under this title is incorrect or incomplete, and 
     that the location to be accessed contains evidence regarding 
     that violation; or
       (ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative plan 
     based upon specific neutral criteria.
       (3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph 
     (2) shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit 
     under that paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain 
     the identities of the representatives of the IAEA on the 
     complementary access team and the identities of the 
     representatives or designees of the United States Government 
     required to display identifying credentials under section 
     222(c).

     SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
     refuse to permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, 
     a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or an 
     entry in connection with such access.

               Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

     SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.

       Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the 
     United States Government under this title or under the 
     Additional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under 
     sections 552 of title 5, United States Code.

                        Subtitle D--Enforcement

     SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
     refuse--
       (1) to establish or maintain any record required by any 
     regulation prescribed under this title;
       (2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to 
     the United States Government in accordance with any 
     regulation prescribed under this title; or
       (3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the 
     United States Government in accordance with any regulation 
     prescribed under this title.

     SEC. 242. PENALTIES.

       (a) Civil.--
       (1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in 
     accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224 
     or section 241 shall be required by order to pay a civil 
     penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each 
     violation. For the purposes of this paragraph, each day 
     during which a violation of section 224 continues shall 
     constitute a separate violation of that section.
       (2) Notice and hearing.--
       (A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a person 
     under paragraph (1), the head of an executive agency 
     designated under section 211(a) shall provide the person with 
     notice of the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the 
     notice, the person requests a hearing, the head of the 
     designated executive agency shall initiate a hearing on the 
     violation.
       (B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall be 
     conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall 
     be conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 
     554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so 
     requested, the order imposed by the head of the designated 
     agency shall constitute a final agency action.
       (C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge 
     determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received, 
     that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224 
     or section 241, the administrative judge shall state his 
     findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve 
     on such person an order described in paragraph (1).
       (D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--In 
     determining the amount of any civil penalty, the 
     administrative judge or the head of the designated agency 
     shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, 
     and gravity of the violation or violations and, with respect 
     to the violator, the ability to pay, effect on ability to 
     continue to do business, any history of such violations, the 
     degree of culpability, the existence of an internal 
     compliance program, and such other matters as justice may 
     require.
       (E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this paragraph, 
     notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably served 
     upon the person or persons subject to an order described in 
     paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall--
       (i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of the 
     alleged violation or violations; and
       (ii) specify the administrative and judicial remedies 
     available to the person or persons subject to the order, 
     including the availability of a hearing and subsequent 
     appeal.
       (3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and 
     order of an administrative judge shall be the recommended 
     decision and order and shall be referred to the head of the 
     designated executive agency for final decision and order. If, 
     within 60 days, the head of the designated executive agency 
     does not modify or vacate the decision and order, it shall 
     become a final agency action under this subsection.
       (4) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected by a 
     final order may, within 30 days after the date the final 
     order is issued, file a petition in the Court of Appeals for 
     the District of Columbia Circuit or in the Court of Appeals 
     for the district in which the violation occurred.
       (5) Enforcement of final orders.--
       (A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a final 
     order issued against such person under this subsection and--
       (i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial review 
     of the order in accordance with paragraph (4), or
       (ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph (4) has 
     entered a final judgment in favor of the designated executive 
     agency,
     the head of the designated executive agency shall commence a 
     civil action to seek compliance with the final order in any 
     appropriate district court of the United States.
       (B) No review.--In any such civil action, the validity and 
     appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject to 
     review.
       (C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a final 
     order under this section shall include interest at currently 
     prevailing rates calculated from the date of expiration of 
     the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (3) or the date of 
     such final order, as the case may be.
       (b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or 
     section 241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil 
     penalty which may be imposed under subsection (a) for such 
     violation, be fined under title 18, United States Code, 
     imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

     SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States 
     shall have jurisdiction over civil

[[Page 22178]]

     actions brought by the head of an executive agency designated 
     under section 211(a)--
       (1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or 
     section 241; or
       (2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under 
     this title or the Additional Protocol.
       (b) Civil Actions.--
       (1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) 
     may be brought--
       (A) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph 
     (1) of such subsection, in the United States district court 
     for the judicial district in which any act, omission, or 
     transaction constituting a violation of section 224 or 
     section 241 occurred or in which the defendant is found or 
     transacts business; or
       (B) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph 
     (2) of such subsection, in the United States district court 
     for the judicial district in which the defendant is found or 
     transacts business.
       (2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, process 
     shall be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may 
     reside or may be found.

                   Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

     SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD APPROVAL OF 
                   WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on 
     which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area 
     environmental sampling for use as a safeguards verification 
     tool, the President shall notify the appropriate 
     congressional committees.
       (b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall 
     contain--
       (1) a description of the specific methods and sampling 
     techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be 
     employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
       (2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be 
     conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; 
     and
       (3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods 
     and sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine 
     the conduct, type, and nature of nuclear activities.

     SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO WIDE-
                   AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

       In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, 
     the United States shall not permit any wide-area 
     environmental sampling proposed by the IAEA to be conducted 
     at a specified location in the United States under Article 9 
     of the Additional Protocol unless the President has 
     determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 
     committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental 
     sampling that--
       (1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is 
     necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect 
     undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-
     nuclear-weapon State Party;
       (2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling 
     will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, 
     activities, or information of direct national security 
     significance; and
       (3) the United States--
       (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
     consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
     complementary access involving wide-area environmental 
     sampling; or
       (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
     Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 
     United States that involves the use of wide-area 
     environmental sampling.

     SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO 
                   LOCATION-SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

       In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, 
     the United States shall not permit any location-specific 
     environmental sampling in the United States under Article 5 
     of the Additional Protocol unless the President has 
     determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 
     committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental 
     sampling that--
       (1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
     sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA 
     to detect undeclared nuclear activities in a non-nuclear 
     weapons state;
       (2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
     sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, 
     activities, or information of direct national security 
     significance; and
       (3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental 
     sampling, the United States--
       (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
     consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
     complementary access involving location-specific 
     environmental sampling; or
       (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
     Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 
     United States that involves the use of location-specific 
     environmental sampling.

     SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       As used in this subtitle, the term ``necessary to increase 
     the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear 
     activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State 
     Party'' shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses of 
     environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in 
     detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a 
     non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--
       (1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of 
     such sampling; or
       (2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or 
     political support for such sampling in the territory of a 
     non-nuclear-weapon State Party.

 Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities

     SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

       (a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security 
     Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or 
     Department of Energy location, site, or facility of direct 
     national security significance shall be declared or be 
     subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.
       (b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--
     No information of direct national security significance 
     regarding any location, site, or facility associated with 
     activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of 
     Energy shall be provided under the Additional Protocol.
       (c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be 
     construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the 
     IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by the 
     provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 
     et seq.), including in particular ``Restricted Data'' as 
     defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42 
     U.S.C. 2014(y)).
       (d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
     construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the 
     IAEA or IAEA employees of national security information and 
     other classified information.

     SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

       (a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--
     No national of a country designated by the Secretary of State 
     under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2371) as a government supporting acts of international 
     terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to 
     carry out an inspection activity under the Additional 
     Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.
       (b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA 
     inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States 
     Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, 
     facilities, or activities in the United States under the 
     Additional Protocol.
       (c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President 
     shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related 
     assessments not less than every 5 years to ensure that 
     information of direct national security significance remains 
     protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities 
     in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection 
     under the Additional Protocol.

                          Subtitle G--Reports

     SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARATION.

       Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United 
     States declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, 
     the President shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, 
     locations, facilities, and activities in the United States 
     that the President intends to declare to the IAEA.

     SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED STATES 
                   DECLARATION.

       Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any 
     revisions to the United States declaration submitted under 
     the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to 
     Congress a list of any sites, locations, facilities, or 
     activities in the United States that the President intends to 
     add to or remove from the declaration.

     SEC. 273. CERTIFICATION REGARDING VULNERABILITY AND RELATED 
                   ASSESSMENTS.

       Concurrently with the submission to Congress of the initial 
     declaration list under section 271 and each list update under 
     section 272, the President shall submit to Congress a report 
     certifying that--
       (1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in 
     the list has been examined by each agency with national 
     security equities with respect to such site, location, 
     facility, or activity; and
       (2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that 
     information of direct national security significance will not 
     be compromised at any such site, location, facility, or 
     activity in connection with an IAEA inspection.

     SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
                   ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS.

       Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the 
     Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on--
       (1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve 
     the adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards 
     agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and
       (2) assistance provided by the United States to the IAEA in 
     order to promote the effective implementation of additional 
     protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-
     nuclear-weapon State Parties and the verification of the 
     compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations.

     SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.

       The President shall notify Congress of any notifications 
     issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of 
     the Additional Protocol.

              Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

     SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out this title.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

[[Page 22179]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate insists 
on its amendment and requests a conference with the House, and the 
Chair is authorized to appoint conferees. S. 3709 is returned to the 
calendar.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate has taken a historic step in 
approving the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation 
Act. This is critically important. Passage of the bill takes one more 
important step toward a vibrant and exciting relationship between our 
two great democracies. I thank all Senators for their cooperation in 
completing the Senate's consideration in such a short period of time. I 
thank especially Senator Biden for his strong support and cooperation. 
This has been truly a bipartisan effort from the beginning until final 
passage. We are committed to continuing this effort through the 
conference process.
  Before yielding the floor, let me publicly thank Tom Moore of the 
majority staff and Ed Levine of the minority staff. They have become 
experts on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy and 
Cooperation Act. They have assisted the committee professionally and 
skillfully in helping craft the bill.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to make some 
brief comments congratulating the chairman and ranking member.
  I think this is a big deal. I think it will be seen as a big deal. I 
think it is an enormously positive step forward on our relationships.
  I commend the chairman and ranking member and the leader for bringing 
up this topic. I believe this is going to help us cement the 
relationship back and forth with us and India. It is important that we 
do this. It will help environmentally and help energy-wise but, more 
importantly, I believe it will be a very important strategic 
relationship. This is a key movement forward. I hope we can move it 
forward through the conference committee. I hope we can get it to the 
President in short order and show India and the rest of the world this 
budding, growing, strengthening relationship back and forth.
  I commend Chairman Lugar for such insightful and supportive 
leadership on such an important topic.
  I suggest the absence of quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if 
in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________