[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 22125-22154]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




       UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT

  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I ask that the bill S. 3709, the United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, be called up and 
be the pending business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to the consideration of S. 3709, which the clerk will report.
  The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislation clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 3709) to exempt from certain requirements of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear 
     materials, equipment, and technology to India, and to 
     implement the United States Additional Protocol.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, today the Senate begins consideration of 
legislation on the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. This 
agreement is the most important strategic diplomatic initiative 
undertaken by President Bush. By concluding this pact and the far-
reaching set of cooperative agreements that accompany it, the President 
has embraced a long-term outlook that seeks to enhance the core 
strength of our foreign policy in a way that will give us new 
diplomatic options and improve global stability.
  The Committee on Foreign Relations undertook an extensive review of 
this agreement. We held four public hearings with testimony from 17 
witnesses, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. We received a 
classified briefing from Undersecretaries of State Nick Burns and Bob 
Joseph. Numerous briefings were held for staff with experts from the 
Congressional Research Service, the State Department, and the National 
Security Council. I submitted 174 written questions for the record to 
the Department of State on details of the agreement and posted the 
answers on the committee web site.
  The agreement allows India to receive nuclear fuel, technology, and 
reactors from the United States--benefits that were previously denied 
to India because of its status outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty--NPT. This pact is a lasting incentive for India to abstain from 
further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the United 
States in stopping proliferation.
  The bill before us is an important step toward implementing the 
nuclear agreement with India, but we should understand that it is not 
the final step in the process. This legislation sets the rules for 
subsequent congressional consideration of a so-called 123 Agreement 
between the U.S. and India. A 123 Agreement is the term for a peaceful 
nuclear cooperation pact with a foreign country under the conditions 
outlined in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
  Our legislation does not restrict nor does it predetermine 
congressional action on the forthcoming 123 Agreement. Unlike the 
adminisiration's original legislative proposal, this bill preserves 
congressional prerogatives with regard to consideration of a future 123 
Agreement. Under the administration's original proposal, the 123 
Agreement would have entered into force 90 days after submission unless 
both houses of congress voted against it, and with majorities that 
could overcome a likely Presidential veto. I am pleased the 
administration changed course on this matter and agreed to submit the 
123 Agreement with India to Congress under normal procedures. This 
means that both the House and the Senate must cast a positive vote of 
support before the 123 Agreement can enter into force.
  In our view, this better protects Congress's role in the process and 
ensures congressional views will be taken into consideration.
  I thank Senator Biden for his close cooperation on developing this 
important bill. It reflects our shared views and concerns. He and his 
staff were valuable partners in the drafting of this legislation, and 
the final product is much improved because of their efforts. Together, 
we have constructed a bill that allows the U.S. to seize an important 
strategic opportunity, while ensuring a strong congressional oversight 
role, reinforcing U.S. nonproliferation efforts, and maintaining our 
responsibilities under the NPT. I also want to thank all members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee for their support, and the work of their 
staffs, in crafting a bill that received the overwhelming support of 
the committee last June.
  For the benefit of Senators, I offer the following section by section 
analysis.
  Section 101 identifies the bill as the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic 
Energy and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act. Sections 102 
and 103 of the Lugar-Biden bill include sense of the Congress 
provisions on U.S.-India relations and policy declarations. These 
provisions give voice to a set of important policy issues involving 
bilateral relations, democratic values, nuclear non-proliferation 
regimes, fissile material production in South Asia, and support for 
IAEA safeguards and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. All of these concerns 
are reinforced by the bill's comprehensive reporting requirements.
  Section 104 provides waiver authority from provisions in the Atomic 
Energy Act and removes the prohibition on cooperating with India due to 
its 1998 weapons tests and its existing weapons program. At the same 
time, section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which is preserved under 
the Lugar-Biden bill, terminates nuclear cooperation if India conducts 
a nuclear test, proliferates nuclear weapons or materials, or breaks 
its agreements with the IAEA or the United States.
  Section 105 of our proposal adopts all of the administration's 
requirements to ensure that India is meeting its nonproliferation 
commitments. In addition, we require that decisions in the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group enabling nuclear trade with India are made by consensus 
and consistent with its rules. Our aim is to ensure that this 
multilateral organization will continue to play a vital role in global 
nonproliferation efforts.
  Section 106 prohibits exports of equipment, materials or technology 
related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear 
fuel, or the production of heavy water. The provision allows narrow 
exceptions for the export of these items from the United States to 
India if they are for proliferation-resistant activities that involve 
the United States or have the sponsorship of a recognized international 
body such as the IAEA. This provision is consistent with the 
administration's policy regarding such transfers. It would allow 
cooperation in sensitive nuclear areas only if such cooperation could 
be implemented with no risk of proliferation.
  Section 107 requires the creation of a system to ensure that no items 
exported to India are diverted to any uses that are not peaceful. This 
section seeks to ensure U.S. compliance with our NPT obligations.
  Section 108 requires annual Presidential certifications that India is 
meeting its commitments under the July 2005 Joint Statement, its 
Separation Plan, New Delhi's Safeguards

[[Page 22126]]

Agreement and additional protocol with the IAEA, the 123 Agreement, and 
applicable U.S. laws regarding U.S. exports to India. The President 
must also certify on an annual basis that U.S. trade with India in 
these areas remains in the national security interests of the United 
States.
  Section 109 requires that no action be undertaken under this act that 
could violate any U.S. obligation under the NPT. Section 110 explicitly 
stipulates that if India conducts a nuclear test, U.S.-India civilian 
nuclear cooperation is terminated. Finally, sections 111 and 112 
clarify India's Missile Technology Control Regime status under U.S. law 
and various terms used in the bill.
  The U.S.-Indian agreement resulted from a delicately balanced 
negotiation. Neither side got everything it wanted. Nevertheless, the 
Bush administration and the Indian government came to the conclusion 
that the agreement was in the national security interest of both 
countries. I urge Senators to vote in favor of this legislation without 
conditions that would kill the agreement.
  I would also note that Senator Biden and I included an important 
piece of nonproliferation legislation in the bill as title II. In 2004, 
the Senate ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, but Congress did not 
pass implementing legislation that is required for the treaty to go 
into effect. President Bush has called on the Senate to act on this 
important matter, and the committee voted unanimously in favor of this 
bill in March.
  The Committee approved this legislation with a bipartisan vote of 16 
to 2. Furthermore 15 members of the committee asked to be named as 
original cosponsors. Since that time, additional Senators have 
requested to be added as cosponsors.
  Due to the fact that the legislation was an original bill, the 
Parliamentarian ruled that cosponsors were not permitted. This is 
unfortunate because the amount of support our legislation has received 
is impressive. I appreciate the strong support of Senators Biden, 
Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, 
Martinez, Dodd, Kerry, Nelson, Obama, Cornyn, Bayh, Hutchison, DeWine, 
and Lott.
  During our markup, the committee rejected an amendment offered by 
Senator Feingold. Under the amendment, the President would have had to 
determine with absolute certainty that no U.S. nuclear fuel exports to 
India could increase its production of fissile materials for weapons. 
New Delhi would rightly see this as moving the goalposts--an 
unacceptable unilateral alteration of the pact. If the Feingold 
amendment or others like it are included in the final legislation, they 
would effectively kill the U.S.-India Agreement.
  I would have preferred that the U.S.-India Agreement had included a 
commitment by New Delhi to stop making nuclear bomb materials, but 
negotiations did not yield that result. Instead, the Bush 
administration won an important commitment to negotiate a Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty. Such a multilateral approach is the best way to 
reduce nuclear tensions and threats associated with an arms race in 
South Asia.
  The Lugar-Biden bill declares it the policy of the United States to 
achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production of fissile 
materials for nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. Our bill also 
includes an annual reporting requirement detailing:

       United States efforts to promote national or regional 
     progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, 
     capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, 
     pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off 
     regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-
     off Treaty.

  I will oppose amendments that delay or impose additional conditions 
on the agreement before it can enter into force. The Senate will not 
advance U.S. national security in this case by making the perfect the 
enemy of the good. We should not hold up the significant 
nonproliferation gains afforded by this initiative in order to seek a 
fissile material cap that India has indicated it will not consider 
absent similar commitments by Pakistan and China.
  The United States and India have engaged in initial discussions on a 
multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, FMCT, to be negotiated in 
the conference on disarmament. We should press for rapid progress in 
that context. 
  The Indian government has expressed concern about section 106 of our 
bill. This section prohibits the export of any equipment, materials or 
technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of 
spent fuel, or the production of heavy water. These technologies are 
not purely civilian in nature. They are considered critical elements to 
a modern nuclear weapons program.
  This provision in our bill is entirely consistent with President 
Bush's policy announcement on this matter at the National Defense 
University on February 11, 2004. In his speech, the President said:

       The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse 
     to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and 
     technologies to any state that does not already possess full-
     scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. This 
     step will prevent new states from developing the means to 
     produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators 
     must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to 
     acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for 
     manufacturing illegal weapons.

  President Bush also said that ``enrichment and reprocessing are not 
necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes.''
  In response to questions for the record that I submitted, Under 
Secretaries of State Bob Joseph and Nick Burns amplified this 
administration policy as it applies to the nuclear agreement with 
India. They said:

       For the United States, ``full civil nuclear cooperation'' 
     with India means trade in most civil nuclear technologies, 
     including fuel and reactors. But we do not intend to provide 
     enrichment or reprocessing technology to India. As the 
     President said in February 2004, ``enrichment and 
     reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness 
     nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' We do not currently 
     provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to any country. 
     We will also need to ensure that any cooperation is fully 
     consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT not to in any 
     way assist India's nuclear weapons program, and with 
     provisions of U.S. law.

  Under Secretaries Burns and Joseph also answered that:

       We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to 
     any state. Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with 
     India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology.

  This answer is especially significant, since the phrase ``full civil 
nuclear energy cooperation'' is the phrase taken directly from the July 
2005 joint statement.
  In response to a question for the record that I submitted to 
Secretary Rice, she responded:

       The U.S. does not foresee transferring heavy water 
     production equipment or technology to India, and the draft 
     bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement accordingly 
     makes no provisions for such transfers.

  Our committee bill, S. 3709, does not break any new ground in this 
area. This is not a new subject. The answers to these questions have 
been on the committee's Web site for months. Nothing in this bill 
deviates from the President's policy, and we even go one step further 
by allowing the flexibility to export those items from the United 
States for proliferation-resistant activities with the U.S. or under 
international cooperation. I support section 106, and I think it is 
important that we take the strong and definitive statements made by 
President Bush, Secretary Rice, Under Secretary of State Nick Burns, 
and Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph and put them into law.
  The Indian government has also expressed concern about section 107, 
which requires an end-use monitoring program to be carried out with 
respect to U.S. exports and re-exports of nuclear materials, equipment, 
and technology sold or leased to India. Some have argued that this 
provision is not needed because IAEA safeguards would verify the use of 
any U.S. exports to India. IAEA safeguards only apply, however, to 
nuclear materials, not to nuclear technology. Sensitive technology of 
the kind the United States might export to India that can be used

[[Page 22127]]

in India's civilian nuclear program could also advance India's nuclear 
weapons program.
  This type of end-use system is not without precedent, as Congress 
required similar recordkeeping for nuclear cooperation with China.
  An end-use monitoring program can provide increased confidence in 
India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. It 
also would further ensure United States compliance with article I of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  The provision is not intended to cast doubt on the sincerity of 
India's July 18 Joint Statement commitments or its March and May 2006 
separation documents. Rather, the committee believes that by building 
and establishing a special program with India, the resulting 
coordination between India and U.S. regulatory agencies can provide a 
basis for even greater cooperation and commerce between the two 
nations.
  Section 107 would confirm that only authorized recipients are 
receiving nuclear technology; that the nuclear technology identified 
for transfer will be used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear 
activities; that the nuclear technology identified for transfer will 
not be retransferred without the prior consent of the United States; 
and that facilities, equipment, or materials derived through the use of 
transferred technology will not be transferred without the prior 
consent of the United States.
  This section also requires that, in the absence of IAEA safeguards, 
the U.S. and India must arrange a bilateral system to ensure that 
safeguards in India remain on U.S. exports and re-exports in 
perpetuity.
  Section 107 requirements could be met by applying to India those 
measures already governing atomic energy cooperation under the 123 
Agreement with China. Under Secretary Joseph testified before the 
committee that, while the 123 Agreement with India will not provide for 
full-scope safeguards, it ``will allow for appropriate controls to help 
ensure that material or goods provided for civilian purposes remain 
within the civilian sector.'' So nothing in section 107 would be 
inconsistent with what may be concluded in the 123 Agreement with India 
itself.
  Title II of the bill includes the committee's IAEA Additional 
Protocol Implementing Legislation. This title permits the Additional 
Protocol the U.S. has concluded with the IAEA to go into effect.
  In President Bush's 2004 speech at the National Defense University, 
he called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol with the 
IAEA. He said:

       We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to 
     fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations 
     support what is called the Additional Protocol, which 
     requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear 
     activities and facilities, and allow the IAEA to inspect 
     those facilities . . . Nations that are serious about 
     fighting proliferation will approve and implement the 
     Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol 
     to the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to 
     its ratification.

  The Committee on Foreign Relations voted unanimously to approve a 
resolution of ratification on the U.S. Additional Protocol on March 4, 
2004, and the full Senate approved it on March 31 by unanimous consent 
in 2004.
  Unfortunately the Additional Protocol is not self-executing. Congress 
must adopt implementing legislation for the United States to submit its 
instruments of ratification. In other words, implementing legislation 
must be passed before the Additional Protocol can go into effect. The 
Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously approved the implementing 
legislation on March 4, 2006, but efforts to pass the legislation in 
the full Senate have been unsuccessful due to holds placed by several 
Senators.
  At a time when the administration and the Congress are demanding that 
India conclude such an Additional Protocol as part of its overall 
nuclear arrangements, Congress must muster the political will to act on 
the implementing legislation. Our credibility as the leader of global 
nonproliferation efforts is at stake. Along with many other nations, we 
are asking the IAEA to perform critical functions aimed at preventing 
nuclear proliferation. An effective IAEA is very much in the national 
security interest of the United States.
  Some Senators expressed concern that the Additional Protocol and the 
implementing legislation will make it possible, even likely, that 
international inspectors will learn secrets about our nuclear weapons 
program. Let me state clearly, nothing could be further from the truth. 
The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or 
disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are 
increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in 
the United States, although there are increased rights granted to the 
IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the 
administration has assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the 
likelihood of an inspection occurring in our country is very low. 
Moreover, even if an inspection under the Additional Protocol is 
requested, the United States has the full right, through the National 
Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection if we determine that it 
could be potentially harmful to U.S. national security interests.
  On July 26, 2006, the National Security Adviser, Steve Hadley, 
expressed the administration's support for the language in title II. He 
wrote:

       The Administration urges both Houses of Congress to act to 
     complete expeditious action on implementing legislation to 
     enable the United States to meet its obligations under the 
     Additional Protocol.

  More recently, President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Security and Nonproliferation, John Rood, testified at 
his confirmation hearing that the administration strongly supports the 
Additional Protocol and that it is important that the United States 
pass implementing legislation.
  I am pleased to report that a compromise was reached between the 
administration, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and those Senators 
who expressed concerns about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing 
legislation. This is an important step for U.S. nonproliferation 
policy, and I thank all of the parties involved in the discussions for 
their support of those efforts.
  In conclusion, Madam President, I urge my colleagues to approve the 
U.S.-India agreement. This legislation will allow the United States to 
engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation while safeguarding U.S. national 
security and nonproliferation efforts, as well as congressional 
prerogatives. It is an opportunity to build a vital strategic 
partnership with a nation that shares our democratic values and will 
exert increasing influence on the world stage. We should move forward 
now.
  I thank the Chair, yield the floor, and suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           amendment no. 5168

                (Purpose: In the nature of a substitute)

  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I send a managers' amendment to the desk 
that has been cleared on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 5168.

  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I urge the amendment's adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is agreed to as original text.
  The amendment (No. 5168) was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 5169

  Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk that has 
been cleared on both sides of the aisle.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

[[Page 22128]]

  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for Mr. Obama, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 5169.

  The amendment is as follows:

  (Purpose: To clarify United States policy in order to deter nuclear 
                    testing by foreign governments)

       At the appropriate place in title I, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PROVISION OF 
                   NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FUEL RESERVE TO INDIA.

       It is the policy of the United States that any nuclear 
     power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of 
     India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities 
     should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 
     requirements.

  Mr. LUGAR. I urge the amendment's adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 5169) was agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, today the Senate is engaged in a truly 
historic process. When we pass this bill--and I expect we will do 
that--America will take a giant step closer to approving a major shift 
in United States-India relations. If we are right, this shift will 
increase the prospects for stability and progress in South Asia and, I 
would argue, the world at large. The Committee on Foreign Relations has 
worked to move this project forward, while safeguarding the role of 
Congress and minimizing any harm to nuclear nonproliferation policies 
and institutions. There is no one who has been stronger in dealing with 
the issue of nonproliferation than my colleague, the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. I have supported him in those efforts for 
years.
  I urge my colleagues to take a real close look at the argument that 
is being made by some that this is going to promote the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. The fact is, I believe it will not.
  I am going to urge my colleagues at the appropriate time to support 
this bill. It has been a cliche to speak of the United States-India 
relationship as a bond between the world's two oldest democracies and 
the world's two largest democracies, but this cliche is also a fact. 
Shared political values are the foundation of our relationship and, I 
would argue, the raison d'etre for taking a chance for those who are 
doubtful on this treaty. Both the United States and India believe in 
the dignity of man and the consent of the governed. Both countries are 
multiethnic and multireligious. Both countries seek economic and social 
betterment for their people and believe that it is best achieved 
through peaceful change, both domestically and externally. If that were 
the whole story, however, it would not have taken us six decades to get 
to the moment we are now.
  For much of the last 60 years, the political structures were trumped 
by geopolitical ones. Democracy in democratic India was often closer to 
the Soviet Union, while the United States often favored India's rival 
Pakistan, particularly during the most undemocratic phase of Pakistan's 
national history. That alignment was an anomaly of the cold war. Today 
the United States and Pakistan are important allies in the war on 
terror and, at the same time, today the national interests of the 
United States and India are in concert, perhaps more than any time in 
the past. India and the United States are both status quo powers, at 
least regarding territory. Neither of us has any claim on any 
neighboring piece of real estate. We face similar challenges from 
extremists and terrorists; in some cases, from the same terrorist 
groups and same individuals. We share a common desire for stability and 
the spread of liberal democracy throughout Asia and, indeed, throughout 
the world. And we share a concern about the world's need for energy, 
especially energy that does not increase the speed and risk of global 
warming.
  The need for new energy supplies is an important underpinning of the 
issues before us today, legislation opening the way for civil nuclear 
cooperation between the United States and India. In time, I hope 
India's burgeoning energy needs will prove a spur to a wide variety of 
alternatives to fossil fuels, including solar, wind, and biofuel. On 
many of these, India has already begun to move, but at present, nuclear 
power is a vital part of India's energy equation. It is likely to grow 
in significance in the years to come. Experts note correctly that 
nuclear power will still provide only a small portion of India's energy 
consumption even when this passes. But at the margin, the contribution 
of nuclear power will be greater, and India's leaders across the 
political spectrum see nuclear power as an important and necessary 
contributor to their country's economic progress.
  The Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation negotiated by President Bush and 
Prime Minister Singh in July of 2005 cannot be implemented unless 
Congress approves changes in U.S. law. So we in the Senate must now 
address both the opportunities and the nonproliferation issues raised 
by that agreement. The administration proposed that we treat the United 
States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as if it met all the 
requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. In fact, it does 
not. There is no way, of course, that India, with a nuclear weapons 
program that is outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, could 
meet these requirements. I compliment my chairman for making it clear 
to the administration that was a nonstarter.
  Were Congress to accept the administration's proposal, it would lose 
any real ability to influence a nuclear agreement with India. The 
agreement would be sent to Congress, but we would have to enact a 
motion to disapprove over a likely Presidential veto within 90 days in 
order to stop any agreement from entering into effect. That would be a 
gigantic usurpation of our responsibility. The Foreign Relations 
Committee, under the leadership of the chairman, rejected this 
approach, as did the House of Representatives.
  The bill before us today would require, instead, an affirmative vote 
of Congress before a United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
can enter into effect. Section 3709 provides expedited procedures for 
the resolution to approve such a United States-India agreement. That 
resolution would not contain any conditions, and it could not be 
amended. But if Congress found the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
wanting in some respect, it could either reject the expedited 
resolution or approval or pass a different resolution that did contain 
conditions. That is what Congress did with the United States-China 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1985. So this bill protects 
congressional powers not for the sake of protecting congressional 
powers, as if we were interested in turf; it protects the balance of 
power, the separation of power, which is essential in the formulation 
of a policy, including foreign policy. At the same time, it offers 
procedures that will expedite approval of a good agreement.
  Section 3907 also allows the President to waive section 128 of the 
Atomic Energy Act, which provides for annual submission of one export 
license to Congress. That provision has never been used and would be of 
little benefit to Congress, as a sale could be blocked only if a 
resolution of disapproval were enacted, again, over the likelihood of a 
Presidential veto.
  The administration argued that section 128, while giving Congress 
little real power, would harm U.S. industry by creating an annual event 
that would frighten both the customer and the investor from proceeding. 
We agreed, and

[[Page 22129]]

this bill includes a section 128 waiver provision that the 
administration requested. Chairman Lugar and I yield to nobody in our 
commitment to nonproliferation, and no one has a stronger record on 
this than Senator Lugar. We believe we have presented to this body a 
bill that allows civil nuclear cooperation with India to proceed and 
ends India's nuclear isolation, but it does so without seriously 
jeopardizing the hard-won nonproliferation gains of nearly the last 
four decades.
  Specifically, our aims have been as follows:
  To preserve the right of Congress to conduct a meaningful review of 
the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement that India and the United 
States are negotiating; secondly, to ensure that such nuclear 
cooperation is used exclusively in India's civil nuclear program and 
that India continues to be a ``good citizen'' when it comes to 
nonproliferation, as it has been; to preserve the role and procedures 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency; and to do all this without requiring any renegotiation of the 
United States-India treaty deal.
  Look, every time we have a treaty presented to us in the Senate, 
there are those of us, including my friend from North Dakota who is on 
the Senate floor, who believe we can probably do it better. We believe 
we could have gotten a better deal. We believe we could have gotten a 
treaty that was even better than the one that exists. But the old 
expression is that we cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
  It wasn't really very easy to do what we set out to do, but I truly 
believe we have succeeded in the points I have just made. There is a 
reason this bill was reported out of committee with a 16-to-2 margin; 
we did really try to address the major nonproliferation concerns 
legitimately raised by colleagues in the committee.
  The Foreign Relations Committee did not endorse, for example, the 
administration's request for broad waiver authority regarding section 
129 of the Atomic Energy Act. That section terminates nuclear exports 
to a country under certain circumstances. The administration did not 
want that in place.
  The committee agreed that the President needs the right to waive 
those portions of section 129 which would end exports because India has 
a nuclear weapons program or because it has tested nuclear devices in 
the past. But section 3709 doesn't grant a waiver authority regarding 
those portions of section 129 which would end nuclear exports if India 
were to, 1, test a nuclear device in the future; 2, terminate or 
materially violate the IAEA safeguard; 3, materially violate its 
agreement with the United States, or engage in nuclear proliferation.
  Look, if India does any of those things, then the premise upon which 
we have dealt with a good friend and neighbor was falsely relied upon. 
I believe India understands the consequence of this bilateral 
relationship as profoundly as we do. If I am wrong about that and India 
were to do any or all of the four things I just named, it would clearly 
violate the spirit of this agreement, part of which, as all agreements 
ultimately are, is based on some sense of comity and trust.
  This bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol as well. It requires the 
President to certify, moreover, that the safeguards agreement is ``in 
accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices.'' The 
President must certify to that effect.
  We understand that India, having nuclear weapons, will not accept 
full-scope safeguards. But the language in this bill makes clear our 
expectation that the safeguards agreement India works out with the IAEA 
will guard effectively against diversion of foreign nuclear material 
and technology to India's military program.
  Section 3709 also requires the President to certify that the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group has decided to permit civil nuclear commerce with India 
and that the NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group, decision was made by 
consensus. We do not want to damage the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which 
has been a vital institution in our fight against nuclear 
proliferation. So this bill protects the Nuclear Suppliers Group's role 
in governing peaceful nuclear commerce.
  The administration has said repeatedly that this is an India nuclear 
deal, not intended to permit nuclear commerce with Pakistan or Israel--
the only other states that never signed the NPT. The committee's bill 
incorporates that distinction by requiring the President to certify 
that the NSG--Nuclear Suppliers Group--decision does not permit nuclear 
commerce with any other state that does not accept full-scope 
safeguards.
  The NSG is not likely to single out India as an exception to its 
guidelines. Rather, it will create tests that a non-NPT state must meet 
before nuclear commerce with the country may take place. The committee 
believes that such a test should be substantial, so that the countries 
outside the NPT are not all given the same benefits as the nonnuclear 
weapon states inside the treaty. Thus, the bill before us today is 
designed to maintain important nonproliferation policies that have 
served our country well.
  With regard to sections 106 and 107, two sections of this bill, they 
have been cited by some Indian officials as causing concern. I will 
address these sections, as I do not believe such concern is merited.
  Section 106 in the agreement bars the executive branch from exporting 
to India ``any equipment, materials, or technology related to the 
enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the 
production of heavy water.'' That is because these technologies are all 
used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In fact, the 
administration already has a worldwide policy of not exporting these 
technologies. Section 106 merely makes that a legal requirement in this 
case.
  Because section 106 makes this a legal requirement, we also added two 
exemptions. One would be for a program such as the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership, which is to develop a new generation of 
proliferation-resistant nuclear facilities. In other words, the second 
exemption would be for a facility in an IAEA-approved program to 
provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capability. For example, 
there might some day be a South Asian regional uranium enrichment 
facility under IAEA auspices.
  Some Indian officials are reportedly upset because section 106 
singles out India. But they have long known that it is U.S. policy not 
to sell them these technologies, so this is a matter more of pride than 
of substance, which I hope they deal with. I would not object to making 
section 106 apply worldwide, but we believed this was too large a step 
to take in this bill. I would think it should apply worldwide.
  Section 107 requires a program to maintain accountability with 
respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that we sell, 
lease, export, or reexport to India. This program would include end-use 
monitoring conditions, as appropriate. A similar program exists for 
U.S. nuclear exports to China. Such a monitoring program would enhance 
confidence in India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear 
programs. It would also further ensure U.S. compliance with article I 
of the nonproliferation treaty.
  Indian officials are reportedly upset that American personnel might 
need to visit India's nuclear sites. It should come as no surprise, 
however, that we need to ensure that U.S. nuclear materials, equipment, 
and technology are not diverted to military uses.
  The purpose of section 107 is not to impose new conditions upon India 
but, rather, to make sure the executive branch doesn't forget its 
obligation to guard against diversion. That obligation is already U.S. 
policy. It also flows from article I of the nonproliferation treaty, 
which requires nuclear weapon states not to assist nonnuclear weapon 
states ``in any way'' to manufacture nuclear weapons. And India remains 
a nonnuclear weapons state under both the NPT and U.S. law, despite the 
fact that now it does have nuclear weapons.
  I hope that in conference we can adjust the wording of section 107 to 
correct any potential misunderstanding of

[[Page 22130]]

its effect, which is not intended to be onerous. I also hope that 
Indian officials will understand the U.S. need to embark upon nuclear 
commerce with India in a manner that maintains our nonproliferation 
policies and fulfills our international obligation. I believe the bill 
reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee does that in a most 
reasonable manner and that it will provide a strong foundation for a 
new beginning in United States-Indian relations.
  The United States-Indian agreement is much more than just a nuclear 
deal, though, Mr. President. I believe historians will see this as a 
historic step, part of the dramatic and positive departure in United 
States-Indian relationship that was begun by President Clinton.
  President Bush is to be commended for continuing and accelerating the 
journey President Clinton started in our relations with India.
  If I were asked to name the pillars for security in the 21st century, 
India and the United States would be two of them. India and the United 
States, working in cooperation toward the same goal, can provide the 
beginning of a strong foundation for a stable world. And for the United 
States, no relationship, in my view, is more important than the United 
States-India relationship maturing along the lines that have begun.
  The ultimate success of this agreement will rest on India's 
willingness and ability to reduce tensions with its nuclear neighbors 
and achieve nuclear stability. We all hope to see the day when India 
and Pakistan voluntarily reduce or end their fissile material 
production, as the recognized NPT nuclear weapons states already have 
done.
  I hope especially that India will not use its peaceful nuclear 
commerce to free up domestic uranium for increased production of 
nuclear weapons. The United States-India deal doesn't bar India from 
doing that. But such a nuclear buildup--unless carried out in response 
to a direct threat from its nuclear-armed neighbors--would be a gross 
abuse of the world's trust, in my view. It would sour relations between 
India and the United States, just at a time when both countries hope to 
build upon a new foundation that has been laid in the past decade and 
which I respectfully suggest is in the overwhelming self-interest of 
both countries.
  India and the world will also benefit if India embraces these 
critical nonproliferation standards. These include the Proliferation 
Security Initiative; the guidelines and policies of the Australia 
Group, which, I add, controls exports that could help countries build 
chemical or biological weapons; and the guidelines and policies of the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, which combats the spread of advanced 
conventional weapons.
  India is a major world power. India needs to--and will, I believe--
step up to this awesome responsibility. As an important world power, it 
is important that support for the complete nonproliferation regime 
would make a gigantic difference in the world. Currently, however, 
India doesn't stop its companies from exporting dual-use chemicals and 
equipment to countries such as Iran because those exports are not 
banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Other leading countries have concluded that unrestrained exports of 
items that could be used to produce chemical or biological weapons and 
advanced conventional weapons are a real danger to world stability. It 
is my fervent hope and prayer that India reaches that conclusion as 
well. It is time for them to adopt, in my opinion, the same approach to 
the dangers posed by such proliferation.
  India will not attain the respect and status it seeks and deserves in 
the world unless it takes a willing and active role in preventing 
proliferation of all kinds. The nuclear deal we are considering today 
is a sign, however, of the world's desire to bring India into the fold. 
I hope India will use this deal as a departure point from which it will 
branch out to embrace all international nonproliferation activities. It 
will surely be welcomed if it does.
  In my view, the bill before us is a victory for United States-India 
relationships. It is a victory for the quest to move beyond fossil 
fuels. And it is a victory we have achieved while doing our best to 
maintain the global effort to end proliferation.
  I believe, not guaranteed by this agreement, it will be also a point 
of departure for India to rethink its role in the world with regard to 
proliferation of all kinds. I sincerely hope it does.
  I end where I began. I think United States-India relations is two of 
the pillars upon which we have a chance--we have a chance, a real 
chance--to build a 21st century that is much more stable than the 20th 
century and to avoid the carnage of the 20th century. It cannot be done 
without India's cooperation, and it can be done with India's 
leadership.
  I thank my colleagues for listening. I understand my friend from 
North Dakota may have an amendment or may wish to seek the floor.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I wish I were on the Senate floor today 
able to be supportive of the chairman and ranking member of the 
committee. They have both given persuasive and eloquent statements 
about the matter.
  I come to the floor of the Senate with a different view. I come here 
very disappointed because I think we are beginning down a very 
troublesome road for this country. I want to talk a little about what 
all this means.
  I know the issue is not an issue that rates at the top of the 
attention of the American people at the moment, this Government, or the 
press corps. This is an issue about whether there will be more nuclear 
weapons built in a world in which there are already too many nuclear 
weapons. This is an issue in which we are going to discuss the issue of 
nonproliferation, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons at a time when 
we have terrorism in this world that we worry could result in a 
terrorist organization acquiring a nuclear weapon and detonating a 
nuclear weapon in a major American city.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to show a couple of items on 
the floor of the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, my colleague, Senator Lugar, is someone 
who has been a real leader with Senator Nunn on the Nunn-Lugar program, 
which I have been proud to support. It has been a program that has 
actually reduced the number of nuclear weapons and reduced the delivery 
systems for nuclear weapons. It is what we aspire to do. It is what our 
country should lead the world in doing, and that is to step away from 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the building of new nuclear 
weapons.
  This is a piece of a wing strut from a Backfire bomber. This used to 
be flying in the air, part of a wing strut from a Soviet Backfire 
bomber that likely carried nuclear weapons that threatened our country. 
We didn't shoot this plane down. This wing strut was sawed off. The 
wing was destroyed. The plane was destroyed. It was dismantled.
  How did that happen? We actually paid for it. My colleagues, Senator 
Nunn and Senator Lugar, proposed legislation that allowed us to, with 
the Russians, actually begin to destroy and reduce delivery systems and 
nuclear weapons. So this bomber that carried a nuclear weapon, 
presumably to threaten this country, doesn't exist anymore. A piece of 
its wing is in my desk drawer in the United States Senate.
  This is a vile of ground-up copper. This used to be part of a Soviet 
submarine, that prowled under the water with missiles and warheads 
presumably aimed at U.S. cities. Yes, this used to be a Soviet 
submarine carrying weapons of mass destruction threatening our country.
  This was a hinge on a missile silo in the Ukraine, and that missile 
silo contained a missile. That missile contained nuclear warheads, 
presumably aimed at a U.S. military target or a U.S. city. This hinge, 
of course, is in my desk today, not in a field in the Ukraine. Where 
that missile used to sit, there is no missile. There is no missile 
silo. There are now sunflowers planted in that field in the Ukraine.

[[Page 22131]]

  The Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus--all three countries--had several 
thousand nuclear weapons and are now free of all nuclear weapons.
  How did all that happen? Was it by accident? No, no, it wasn't. This 
country embarked on a set of policies and proposals that resulted in 
the reduction of delivery systems and nuclear weapons.
  Have we been enormously successful? I have described some successes, 
but we have, oh, probably 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons remaining on 
this Earth. Far too many--25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons. We have 
much to do to step away from the abyss of having a terrorist 
organization or rogue nation acquire nuclear weapons and threaten our 
country or threaten the world.
  We have all experienced 9/11/2001 where several thousand innocent 
Americans were murdered. That was an unbelievable terrorist attack on 
our country. It could happen again with a nuclear weapon. We are going 
to spend $9 billion or $10 billion this year building an antiballistic 
missile defense system to create some sort of an electronic catcher's 
mitt to catch an intercontinental ballistic missile someone might aim 
at our country armed with a nuclear warhead.
  That is one of the least likely threats our country faces. We are 
going to spend close to $10 billion for a threat that is one of the 
least likely threats we face.
  The most likely threat, perhaps, instead of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile coming in at 18,000 miles an hour aimed at an 
American city, is a container ship pulling up to a dock in a major 
American city at 3 miles an hour with a container that contains a 
weapon of mass destruction onboard, to be detonated in the middle of an 
American city.
  Let me read for the Record, as I start--and I want to then talk about 
this specific agreement--I want to read an excerpt from Graham 
Allison's book. He is at Harvard. He wrote a book called ``Nuclear 
Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.''
  I talk about 9/11/2001, several thousand Americans murdered by 
terrorists. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city by a 
terrorist group will not mean several thousand Americans being 
murdered; it could likely mean several hundred thousand Americans being 
murdered, or more.
  Let me read to you from Graham Allison's book. I am quoting:

       On October 11, 2001, a month to the day after the terrorist 
     assault on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President 
     George W. Bush faced an even more terrifying prospect. At 
     that morning's Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefing, 
     George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, informed 
     the president that a CIA agent code-named Dragonfire had 
     reported that Al Qaeda terrorists possessed a ten-kiloton 
     nuclear bomb, evidently stolen from the Russian arsenal. 
     According to Dragonfire, this nuclear weapon was now on 
     American soil, in New York City.
       The CIA had no independent confirmation of this report, but 
     neither did it have any basis on which to dismiss it. Did 
     Russia's arsenal include a large number of ten-kiloton 
     weapons? Yes. Could the Russian government account for all 
     the nuclear weapons the Soviet Union had built during the 
     Cold War? No. Could Al Qaeda have acquired one or more of 
     these weapons? Yes. Could it have smuggled a nuclear weapon 
     through American border controls in New York City without 
     anyone's knowledge? Yes. . . .
       In the hours that followed, national security adviser 
     Condoleezza Rice analyzed what strategists call the ``problem 
     from hell.'' Unlike the Cold War, when the United States and 
     the Soviet Union knew that an attack against the other would 
     illicit a retaliatory strike of greater measure, Al Qaeda--
     with no return address--had no such fear of reprisal. Even if 
     the president were prepared to negotiate, Al Qaeda had no 
     phone number to call.
       Clearly, no decision could be taken without much more 
     information about the threat and those behind it. But how 
     could Rice engage a wider circle of experts and analysts 
     without the White House's suspicions leaking to the press? A 
     CNN flash that the White House had information about an Al 
     Qaeda nuclear weapon in Manhattan would create chaos. New 
     Yorkers would flee the city in terror, and residents of other 
     metropolitan areas would panic.

  I continue to quote:

       Concerned that Al Qaeda could have smuggled a nuclear 
     weapon into Washington as well, the president ordered Vice 
     President Dick Cheney to leave the capital for an 
     ``undisclosed location,'' where he would remain for many 
     weeks to follow. That was standard procedure to ensure 
     ``continuity of government''. . . . Several hundred federal 
     employees from more than a dozen government agencies joined 
     the vice president at this secret site. . . . The president 
     also immediately dispatched NEST specialists (Nuclear 
     Emergency Support Teams of scientists and engineers) to New 
     York City to search for the weapon. But no one in the city 
     was informed of the threat, not even Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.
       As the CIA's analysts examined Dragonfire's report and 
     compared it with other bits of information, they noted that 
     the attack on the World Trade Center in September had set the 
     bar higher for future terrorist spectaculars.

  I won't read to the end. I ask unanimous consent that this document 
be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. DORGAN. At the end of this process, they finally determined after 
about a month that this was not a credible threat. Dragonfire's report 
turned out not to be credible.
  But at the time they took the report very seriously. They analyzed it 
this way: Was it possible that a Russian 10-kiloton nuclear weapon 
could have been stolen? Yes, it was possible. Is it possible a 
terrorist group could have acquired it? Yes. Is it possible it could 
have been smuggled into New York City? The answer was yes. And, if so, 
was it possible a terrorist group could detonate a nuclear weapon in a 
major American city? The answer was yes.
  This is not fiction. I am reading an excerpt of a book of something 
that happened in October of 2001.
  My greatest fear is that we do not yet understand the difference 
between what was and what is. What was, was a standoff called the cold 
war in which two major nuclear superpowers aimed massive numbers of 
nuclear warheads at each other, but understanding, under the concept of 
mutually assured destruction, called MAD, that if either attacked the 
other, the other would be literally vaporized by an avalanche of 
nuclear weapons. The result was that there was a standoff, a mutually 
assured destruction standoff, and although both sides in that Cold 
War--the United States and the Soviet Union--possessed the most 
unbelievably powerful killing machines known to humankind, they were 
not used. Neither side ever used them.
  Fast-forward to today. The Cold War is over. President Bush, in fact, 
visited with the President Putin yesterday, in Russia. Times have 
changed, but this world still has somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 
nuclear weapons, the loss of one of which could be cataclysmic for this 
world. The detonation of one nuclear weapon in a major city will change 
everything--everything--and be a catastrophe unlike any we have 
previously known.
  If we have 25,000 or 30,000 nuclear weapons on this Earth, what is 
the responsibility of this great country? What is our responsibility? 
What burden falls on our shoulders? I submit it is the burden to 
provide world leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to 
reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and to reduce the stockpile of 
nuclear weapons. That is our responsibility. That responsibility falls 
on us.
  How do we do that? Listen, our country has provided leadership in a 
nonproliferation treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the test 
ban treaty. Our country has been moving always, telling the rest of the 
world we aspire to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Now we live in 
this age of terrorism where we see people who are perfectly content to 
kill themselves. They don't care. As long as they can take a weapon 
with them and kill themselves and many others with them, it doesn't 
matter to them. They are reaching for some higher glory, apparently.
  In this age of terrorism, everything about nuclear weapons has 
changed. The loss of one nuclear weapon, the loss of one anywhere on 
this globe to a terrorist organization is going to be devastating.
  So if that is the case, what does it have to do with what we are 
talking about today? We are now talking today about a country called 
India. India is

[[Page 22132]]

quite a remarkable place--a wonderful country with wonderful people. It 
is a big country. It is trying to build an economy. You can read some 
books about what is going on in India and the discussions about 
progress--it is quite a remarkable place. Our country aspires to have a 
better relationship with India. I support that. I believe we ought to 
reach out to India and improve our relationship, cement our 
relationship.
  I know there are some who see all of the geopolitical relationships 
on this Earth as aligning one way or the other. We align with this 
country to be a counterweight against this set of interests, and it is 
kind of akin to teams. So I confess to you, I come here today not 
perhaps understanding all of the sophisticated elements of 
counterweights and the nuances of why someone believes it is essential, 
at this point, to allow India to produce additional nuclear weapons in 
order to create some sort of counterweight to China, but I want to talk 
about this issue. I was unbelievably surprised to read in the newspaper 
of the travels of Ambassador Burns, someone for whom I have high 
regard, and of the interest of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 
going to India and reaching a deal without consulting Congress that I 
think begins to unravel, and undermine several decades of efforts in 
our country to tell the world: It is our responsibility and our major 
goal to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and try to reduce the number 
of nuclear weapons and reduce the nuclear threat.
  We would not be in this position today with this bill with India if 
India had followed the example, for example, of South Africa. They 
secretly had nuclear weapons by the 1980s. But South Africa dismantled 
them prior to the transfer of power to the postapartheid government. 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus had more than 4,000 nuclear weapons in 
those three countries when the Soviet Union was dissolved which they 
gave up in the years following. And I must say that my colleague 
Senator Lugar and others had significant successes in working with 
those three countries to accomplish that. So Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 
Belarus are all now free of nuclear weapons.
  Any nuclear deal--any relationship we have with another country that 
deals with nuclear power and nuclear issues should be judged, in my 
opinion, on whether it reduces the number of nuclear weapons. Does it 
reduce the nuclear weapons that exist or increase them? It is quite 
clear that what we are debating will result in an increase in nuclear 
weapons in India. I don't think there is much doubt about that. This 
bill fails that test, in my judgment.
  Experts have warned that there is enough weapons-usable fissile 
material in the world to make about 130,000 nuclear weapons. A working 
nuclear bomb, we are told, can be made with as little as 35 pounds of 
uranium-235 or 9 pounds of plutonium-239. And the acquisition of a 
nuclear weapon by a terrorist is, in my judgment, the greatest threat 
that exists in our country.
  Retired GEN Eugene Habiger, who commanded America's nuclear forces, 
said that nuclear terrorism ``is not a matter of if, it is a matter of 
when.''
  Henry Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post recently:

       The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that 
     nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national 
     armament and wind up in terrorists' hands.

  Former Senator Sam Nunn wrote in the Wall Street Journal:

       We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear materials--
     enriched uranium or plutonium--to build nuclear weapons. We 
     know that if they get that nuclear material, they can build a 
     nuclear weapon. We believe that if they build such a weapon, 
     they will use it. We know terrorists are not likely to be 
     deterred, and that the more this nuclear material is 
     available, the higher the risks.

  Osama bin Laden has been seeking nuclear components since the 1990s. 
In 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a statement entitled ``The Nuclear Bomb 
of Islam,'' declaring:

       It is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as 
     possible to terrorize the enemies of God.

  And Osama bin Laden's spokesman announced that the group aspires ``to 
kill 4 million Americans, including 1 million children,'' in response 
to casualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and 
Israel.
  The more countries there are with nuclear weapons and weapons-grade 
nuclear material and the more weapons each of them has, the greater the 
threat that one will be used by a rogue nation or will fall into the 
hands of terrorist groups.
  Now, frankly, we have not been very aggressive as a country in recent 
years in stopping proliferation. Instead of talking about how we would 
reduce the number of nuclear weapons, we were on the floor of the 
Senate, during previous debates, talking about the fact that we need 
new nuclear weapons. Our country has said we need designer nuclear 
weapons; we need bunker-buster nuclear weapons. We have people openly 
speaking about the desire in this country to build additional nuclear 
weapons.
  We attacked Iraq because we believed it possessed and was seeking 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. We are spending $10 
billion a year, as I said, on missile defense for fear that North Korea 
already has nuclear weapons. And we are talking about serious issues 
with Iran in order to try to stop its nuclear program. And the No. 1 
nightmare is that a terrorist group may acquire a nuclear weapon. No 
one in my judgment can credibly say that a world that has more nuclear 
weapons is a safer world. It is just not.
  Nowhere in the world is the threat of nuclear terrorism more imminent 
than in South Asia. It is the home to al-Qaida which seeks nuclear 
weapons. It is an area where relations among regional nuclear powers 
are always tense: China, India, and Pakistan. India and China fought a 
border war in 1962. India and Pakistan fought three major wars, had 
numerous smaller scale conflicts since the partition of British India 
in 1947. Both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear weapons in 1998 and 
declared themselves as nuclear powers. And after that, all of us in the 
world held our breath as they began fighting a limited war in Kashmir.
  Now, it has traditionally been the case that the United States has 
led the international community in efforts to deny India, Pakistan, and 
other nonnuclear States access to nuclear technology. That has been our 
traditional role. We have always been the one who said: No, no, no. We 
can't do that. We need to limit the capability of nations that will not 
sign up to nonproliferation.
  We pushed for the nonproliferation treaty, which prohibits nuclear 
assistance to these so-called nonnuclear States, unless they agree to 
put all of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards and 
to give up the option of developing a nuclear weapon. That has been our 
position. It has always been our position.
  Article I of the nonproliferation treaty obligates the recognized 
nuclear weapons States, including the United States, to:

       Not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear 
     weapons State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
     weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

  That is Article I of the nonproliferation treaty. We signed it. We 
helped write it. We supported it. It is what we believe in.
  The United States helped form the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975 to 
help prevent the misuse of peaceful nuclear technology. In 1978, we 
passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which restricts nuclear 
commerce with States that don't agree to the full scope of the 
safeguards. We pushed for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172 which 
condemned India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests and called upon 
them to cease their nuclear weapons programs and join the 
nonproliferation treaty as nonnuclear weapons states. We did that.
  In 1998, President Clinton imposed sanctions on both India and 
Pakistan, under section 102 of the Arms Control Act, which requires 
sanctions on any non-nuclear weapons state that has detonated nuclear 
devices.
  Now, these policies did not stop India's and Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons programs, but they did restrain them and they hindered them. In 
fact, that is precisely why we are here with respect to India.

[[Page 22133]]

  The Bush Administration has taken a different tact now. Their 
proposal is to provide ``full'' assistance to India's civilian nuclear 
program, while India keeps its nuclear weapons, which represents a 
complete abandonment of our traditional approach to nonproliferation.
  I don't think you can come to the floor and argue that this is part 
of an approach we have always taken. This is a U-turn. This is a 180-
degree change from the approach we have always had. The Bush 
Administration formed an agreement that allows New Delhi to 
dramatically expand its stockpile of nuclear weapons and could ignite a 
regional arms race. That is what we have here. They can have reactors 
behind the curtain that will not be subject to inspection by anybody. 
That is part of the deal. It will undermine 30 years of 
nonproliferation efforts at the very time when we are engaged in these 
issues with North Korea and Iran.
  It is a major, it seems to me, exception to the prohibition of 
nuclear assistance to any country that doesn't accept international 
monitoring of all of its nuclear facilities. This is a major exception 
to that. And it also is one that gives legitimacy to a nuclear arsenal 
that India secretly developed, and it is not going to help us in any 
way. It will hinder us in convincing others to give up their nuclear 
weapons.
  Now, India never signed the nonproliferation treaty. Because of that, 
Pakistan never signed the treaty. In the 1960s, India used both 
American technology and also Canadian technology and the nuclear fuel 
provided under what was called the Atoms For Peace Program to secretly 
build nuclear weapons. By doing so, New Delhi broke an explicit pledge 
to both the United States and to Canada about the use of technology and 
nuclear fuel only for peaceful purposes. In 1974, India conducted its 
first nuclear weapons test. It denied that it had done so. It said it 
was a peaceful nuclear test.
  In May, 1998, they conducted a series of nuclear tests and declared 
themselves as a nuclear weapons state. In response, Pakistan did 
exactly the same thing and declared themselves as a nuclear state.
  Because India has a shortage of domestic uranium, the application of 
the U.S. and international laws that prevent the sale of nuclear fuel 
and other nuclear assistance to them has seriously constrained its 
nuclear power industry and nuclear weapons program. All of us 
understand that India has energy issues. It has an expanding population 
and it wishes to build additional powerplants, nuclear powerplants, but 
it also wishes to build additional nuclear weapons. India's power 
reactors, we are now told, are operating at less than capacity due to 
fuel shortages and their utilization rates are expected to decrease 
even further. Very little uranium is leftover from its domestic 
supplies for India to turn to nuclear weapons. So in the past year--
couple of years--New Delhi has stepped up efforts to get our assistance 
in obtaining nuclear fuel and reactor components so it can increase its 
nuclear power. But the fact is, it will also increase its nuclear 
weapons programs.
  Here is what the deal that is now brought to the floor of the Senate 
does: My understanding is that it obligates the United States to 
persuade the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to change their 
rules which bar sales to India. It allows India to buy sensitive 
nuclear technologies, now forbidden under the nonproliferation treaty. 
It includes nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, and advanced technology. 
This agreement would open the door to India's cooperation with France, 
Japan, and others who want to do business with India and who now have 
not been doing business with India because of the NPT. In return, in 
this agreement, India has agreed to allow the IAEA inspections and 
safeguards at 14 of their 22 planned nuclear power reactors. But eight 
of their nuclear power reactors will be placed behind a curtain. No one 
will be able to inspect them. That is where they will be able to 
continue increasing the production of nuclear weapons, and it is not--
you wonder, do they want to produce additional nuclear weapons? Let me 
quote directly from a senior adviser to India's nuclear program, 
December 2005, an article in The Times of India. Dr. Subrahmanyam says:

       Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up 
     our minimum credible nuclear arsenal as fast as possible, it 
     is to India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors 
     as possible as civilian ones to be refueled by imported 
     uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons-
     grade plutonium production.

  This is clear:

       Given India's . . . crunch and the need to build up our 
     minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal. . . .

  That is what this is about in India.
  We have those who support this, who say it is not perfect, but it is 
not bad. I don't know whether the contention on the Senate floor is 
going to be that this will not result in additional warheads. But I am 
clear, and I think everybody should be clear, it will. India will 
produce additional nuclear weapons. We believe, if that makes the world 
safer, I guess that is what one can argue. I do not believe that at 
all. I think the addition of nuclear weapons to the stockpile that 
exists in this world is a serious danger to the world.
  Pakistan has already said: If you are going to give this deal to 
India, how about giving this deal to us? We might want to look at what 
we are doing. The administration just proposed, by the way, a big arms 
package for Pakistan: 36 Lockheed F-16C/D fighter planes, 500 JDAM 
satellite-guided bomb kits, 700 bunker buster bombs, 1,600 laser-guided 
bombs, 800 conventional bombs, 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, 200 
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 130 Harpoon antiship missiles, 115 
self-propelled howitzers.
  That is an arms package to Pakistan. But Pakistan would say: We have 
nuclear weapons. We exploded them. We showed you we have nuclear 
weapons. You are going to give this deal to build more nuclear weapons 
to India. We want that deal for Pakistan. We want to build more nuclear 
weapons.
  What will China say? What will China say when they see this agreement 
and decide that India is increasing its stockpile? China will say: We 
want to increase the stockpile of nuclear weapons.
  India is in the process of becoming a full-fledged nuclear power with 
a triad, an emerging triad. Aircraft? They have a number of types of 
aircraft used to deliver a nuclear weapon, or that could be so used, 
and land-based missiles and naval weapons.
  I do not allege that India is a country that is an aggressor. That is 
not my point. I think our relationship with India is important. I 
believe we ought to connect with India. We ought to reach out to India. 
We ought to have an improved relationship with India. I don't know, 
maybe it is advantageous to have India as a counterweight in the region 
to China.
  But, look, do any of us really believe that an agreement that pulls 
the rug out from under decades of positions we have held in this 
country on nonproliferation that results in the building of additional 
nuclear weapons advances our interests? Advances the world's interests? 
Of course not.
  It falls on our shoulders as the nuclear power in the world. It is 
our responsibility to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Will our 
children or our grandchildren someday see a nuclear weapon detonated in 
a major American city? Will we see that? We didn't see it during the 
Cold War because we had mutually agreed destruction; that is, both 
countries, us and the Soviet Union, understood if one launched a 
missile or airplane containing a nuclear weapon to be detonated in our 
country, we would launch sufficient nuclear weapons to completely 
destroy their country and their society. Both sides understood that. 
Both sides understood we have arsenals that would destroy each other 
and neither side did. Neither side was an aggressor.
  In an age of terrorism, all of that has changed. In an age of 
terrorism, if we do not embrace policies that stop the production of 
additional nuclear weapons, we have missed an enormous opportunity to 
prevent the detonation of a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. This 
agreement simply does not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It

[[Page 22134]]

doesn't prevent the production of additional nuclear weapons. This 
undermines that which we have described as our goal in the United 
Nations. It undermines that which we have for decades described as 
being our goal as a leader in nonproliferation. It provides the green 
light for India to produce additional nuclear weapons.
  With all the sophisticated arguments in favor of this agreement, I 
fail to see how undermining decades of effort at nonproliferation and 
now providing a green light to India to produce new nuclear weapons, 
additional nuclear weapons, makes this a safer world. Quite the 
contrary. I think it is dangerous. I think this agreement is a horrible 
mistake. I think all of the sophisticated calculations mean very little 
when we have decided to send signals to the world that we do not oppose 
producing additional nuclear weapons; that we support that.
  We are willing to decide to undermine the nonproliferation treaty. We 
are willing to ignore United Nations resolutions all because Ambassador 
Burns and Secretary Rice and the Bush Administration said: You know 
what, we have all these calculations about weights and counterweights 
and geopolitical strategies and here is our new one. It is a new 
strategy that undermines decades of what ought to be the best virtue of 
this country, and that is providing world leadership, real world 
leadership, aggressive world leadership to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons and prevent the building of more nuclear weapons and begin 
reducing the number of nuclear weapons that exist in this world.
  As I said when I started, I regret very much I am on the other side 
of this issue from Senator Lugar. Senator Lugar has great credibility 
on these issues because he has done a very substantial amount of good 
work. I am not quite sure how I should describe this. I was 
extraordinarily surprised when I read the first account in the 
newspaper that it was likely that this agreement was going to be 
supported by my colleague and friend. I would say the same with respect 
to Senator Biden. I have great respect for them. So I am someone who 
comes to the floor of the Senate in disagreement. That doesn't mean I 
in any way disparage their abilities or their intellectual honesty in 
pursuing strategies they believe are best for this country.
  I have very strong opposition to those who believe, however, that 
this in any way represents our best interests. I wish I could come to 
the Senate floor with a better message, but I do not. I believe one day 
we will look back on this with great regret. We have seen that in this 
decade already with some other decisions, information provided us with 
respect to Iraq and other decisions we have made. We have already, in 
my judgment, had opportunities to understand regret about policies 
undertaken that turned out to be not in this country's best interests.
  I believe if we open the floodgates with this agreement, we will 
seriously undermine this country's best interests.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From Blueprint Magazine, October 7, 2004]

                    Nuclear Terrorism--Book Excerpt

                          (By Graham Allison)

       On October 11, 2001, a month to the day after the terrorist 
     assault on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President 
     George W. Bush faced an even more terrifying prospect. At 
     that morning's Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefing, 
     George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, informed 
     the president that a CIA agent code-named Dragonfire had 
     reported that Al Qaeda terrorists possessed a ten-kiloton 
     nuclear bomb, evidently stolen from the Russian arsenal. 
     According to Dragonfire, this nuclear weapon was now on 
     American soil, in New York City.
       The CIA had no independent confirmation of this report, but 
     neither did it have any basis on which to dismiss it. Did 
     Russia's arsenal include a large number of ten-kiloton 
     weapons? Yes. Could the Russian government account for all 
     the nuclear weapon the Soviet Union had built during the Cold 
     War? No. Could Al Qaeda have acquired one or more of these 
     weapons? Yes. Could it have smuggled a nuclear weapon through 
     American border controls into New York City without anyone's 
     knowledge? Yes. In a moment of gallows humor, someone quipped 
     that the terrorists could have wrapped the bomb in one of the 
     bales of marijuana that are routinely smuggled into cities 
     like New York.
       In the hours that followed, national security adviser 
     Condoleezza Rice analyzed what strategists call the ``problem 
     from hell'' Unlike the Cold War, when the United States and 
     the Soviet Union knew that an attack against the other would 
     elicit a retaliatory strike for greater measure, Al Qaeda--
     with no return address--had no such fear of reprisal. Ever if 
     the president were prepared to negotiate, Al Qaeda had no 
     phone number to call.
       Clearly no decision could be taken without much more 
     information about the threat and those behind it. But how 
     could Rice engage a wider circle of experts and analysts 
     without the White House's suspicions leaking to the press? A 
     CNN flash that the White House had information about an Al 
     Qaeda nuclear weapon in Manhattan would create chaos. New 
     Yorkers would flee the city in terror, and residents of other 
     metropolitan areas would panic. The stock market, which was 
     just then stabilizing from the shock of 9/11, could collapse.
       American Hiroshima. Concerned that Al Qaeda could have 
     smuggled a nuclear weapon into Washington as well, the 
     president ordered Vice President Dick Cheney to leave the 
     capital for an ``undisclosed location,'' where he would 
     remain for many weeks to follow. This was standard procedure 
     to ensure ``continuity of government'' in case of a 
     decapitation strike against the U.S. political leadership. 
     Several hundred federal employees from more tan a dozen 
     government agencies joined the vice president at this secret 
     site, the core of an alternative government that would seek 
     to cope in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion that 
     destroyed Washington. The president also immediately 
     dispatched NEST specialists (Nuclear Emergency Support Teams 
     of scientists and engineers) to New York to search for the 
     weapon. But no one in the city was informed of the threat, 
     not even Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.
       Six months earlier the CIA's Counterterrorism Center had 
     picked up chatter in Al Qaeda channels about an ``American 
     Hiroshima,'' The CIA knew that Osama bin Laden's fascination 
     with nuclear weapons went back at least to 1992, when he 
     attempted to buy highly enriched uranium from South Africa. 
     Al Qaeda operatives were alleged to have negotiated with 
     Chechen separatists in Russia to buy a nuclear warhead, which 
     the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev claimed to have acquired 
     from Russian arsenals. The CIA's special task force on Al 
     Qaeda had noted the terrorist group's emphasis on thorough 
     planning, intensive training, and repetition of successful 
     tactics. The task force also highlighted Al Qaeda's strong 
     preference for symbolic targets and spectacular attacks.
       Staggering the imagination. As the CIA's analysts examined 
     Dragonfire's report and compared it with other bits of 
     information, they noted that the attack on the World Trade 
     Center in September had set the bar higher for future 
     terrorist spectaculars. Psychologically, a nuclear attack 
     would stagger the world's imagination as dramatically as 
     9/11 did. Considering where Al Qaeda might detonate such a 
     bomb, they noted that New York was, in the jargon of national 
     security experts, ``target rich.'' Among hundreds of 
     potential targets, what could be more compelling than Times 
     Square, the most famous address in the self-proclaimed 
     capital of the world?
       Amid this sea of unknowns, analysts could definitively 
     answer at least one question. They knew what kind of 
     devastation a nuclear explosion would cause. If Al Qaeda was 
     to rent a van to carry the ten-kiloton Russian weapon into 
     the heart of Times Square and detonate it adjacent to the 
     Morgan Stanley headquarters at 1585 Broadway, Times Square 
     would vanish in the twinkling of an eye. The blast would 
     generate temperatures reaching into the tens of millions of 
     degrees Fahrenheit. The resulting fireball and blast wave 
     would destroy instantaneously the theater district, the New 
     York Times building, Grand Central Terminal, and every other 
     structure within a third of a mile of the point of 
     detonation. The ensuing firestorm would engulf Rockefeller 
     Center, Carnegie Hall, the Empire State Building, and Madison 
     Square Garden, leaving a landscape resembling the World Trade 
     Center site. From the United Nations headquarters on the East 
     River and the Lincoln Tunnel under the Hudson River, to the 
     Metropolitan Museum in the eighties and the Flatiron Building 
     in the twenties, structures would remind one of the Alfred P. 
     Murrah Federal Office Building following the Oklahoma City 
     bombing.
       On a normal workday, more than half a million people crowd 
     the area within a half-mile radius of Times Square. A noon 
     detonation in midtown Manhattan could kill them all. Hundreds 
     of thousands of others would die from collapsing buildings, 
     fire, and fallout in the ensuing hours. The electromagnetic 
     pulse generated by the blast would fry cell phones, radios, 
     and other electronic communications. Hospitals, doctors, and 
     emergency services would be overwhelmed by the wounded. 
     Firefighters would be battling an uncontrolled ring of fires 
     for many days thereafter.
       The threat of nuclear terrorism, moreover, is not limited 
     to New York City. While New

[[Page 22135]]

     York is widely seen as the most likely target, it is clear 
     that Al Qaeda is not only capable of, but also interested in, 
     mounting attacks on other American cities, where people may 
     be less prepared. Imagine the consequences of a ten-kiloton 
     weapon exploding in San Francisco, Houston, Washington, 
     Chicago, Los Angeles, or any other city Americans call home. 
     From the epicenter of the blast to a distance of 
     approximately a third of a mile, every structure and 
     individual would vanish in a vaporous haze. A second circle 
     of destruction, extending three-quarters of a mile from 
     ground zero, would leave buildings looking like the Murrah 
     building in Oklahoma City. A third circle, reaching out one 
     and one-half miles, would be ravaged by fires and radiation.
       Uncontrollable blaze. In Washington, a bomb going off at 
     the Smithsonian Institution would destroy everything from the 
     White House to the lawn of the Capitol building; everything 
     from the Supreme Court to the FDR Memorial would be left in 
     rubble; uncontrollable fires would reach all the way out to 
     the Pentagon.
       In a cover story in the New York Times Magazine in May 
     2002, Bill Keller interviewed Eugene Habiger, the retired 
     four-star general who had overseen strategic nuclear weapons 
     until 1998 and had run nuclear antiterror programs for the 
     Department of Energy until 2001. Summarizing his decade of 
     daily experience dealing with threats, Habiger offered a 
     categorical conclusion about nuclear terrorism: ``it is not a 
     matter of if; it's a matter of when.'' ``That,'' Keller noted 
     drily, may explain why he now lives in San Antonio.''
       In the end, the Dragonfire report turned out to be a false 
     alarm.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. I want to say just one additional thing. I have two 
amendments that I intend to offer today. I do not intend to take a 
great amount of time with either of them. Both of them are very 
important. I wish to say to the chairman, I know he is working through 
this bill today. I want to be cooperative but not so cooperative that I 
do not have an opportunity to fully explain amendments that I think are 
very important relative to what I just described.
  The amendments I will offer, one has to do with requiring India to 
comply with what the U.S. is already required to comply with, the 
second relates to a United Nations resolution, that our country pushed, 
that represents American policy that appears to be completely 
contradictory to the underlying bill on the floor of the Senate.
  I say to the chairman, I will have two amendments. I am prepared in a 
reasonable period to offer the amendments. I do have, with Senator 
McCain, an obligation at 12 o'clock for a few minutes off the Senate 
floor. We are going to be speaking to a group. But following that, I 
would be happy to come over and offer my two amendments if the Senator 
is willing to have me do that.
  Mr. LUGAR. I would like to respond to my distinguished colleague. I 
appreciate the appointment that he has with our colleague from Arizona. 
My hope would be that the Senator would proceed with his amendments. It 
would be timely to do so at his earliest convenience. I encourage him 
to do so.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I missed the last point.
  Mr. LUGAR. I just indicated as soon as you could proceed with your 
amendments, this would be timely, in terms of moving the progress of 
our bill today.
  Mr. DORGAN. I will be off of the Senate floor for the other 
requirement that I have, but I will come back. My understanding is 
there is a proposal to perhaps try to modify one of my amendments?
  Mr. LUGAR. That is correct. Staffs have been working on one of the 
amendments of the Senator with the hope it might be possible to accept 
that amendment. The other amendment would have to be offered and 
debated.
  Mr. DORGAN. Yes. I intend to offer the other amendment, debate it, 
and ask for a recorded vote on it. I will take a look at the proposed 
modification to see what that modification is, but I will try to be 
back on the Senate floor as quickly as possible to accommodate the 
Senator's interests in getting it done.
  Mr. LUGAR. I appreciate that and thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of S. 3709, 
the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. This 
legislation has been thoughtfully crafted and will help cement an 
important partnership with a vitally important Nation in a part of the 
world that will become increasingly important for the future.
  I first want to thank the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Lugar, for his commitment to this agreement from the 
very beginning. Thoughtful, as he always is, I thank him for his 
knowledge, his expertise, his wisdom, trying to make sure this is 
appropriate for our country, as well as India, and making sure there 
are provisions in there that are beneficial to our country while also 
not harming the ability of our friends in India to pass it in their 
country as well.
  There is no person in the Senate more knowledgeable on anti-
proliferation issues than Senator Lugar. His leadership was 
instrumental in developing a bill with protocols that met the 
commitments made by our President while also respecting the safeguard 
agreements that have protected this country for decades. I thank our 
chairman.
  The hearings by Chairman Lugar back in the spring, along with 
informative testimony of Secretary Nicholas Burns, were a necessary 
lesson for our colleagues on the committee, and I think the entire 
United States, that explained the benefits and also helped remove 
outstanding concerns about this historic pact. Chairman Lugar, earlier 
speaking on this measure, along with the ranking member on the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Biden, addressed the specific sections of 
the bill, so I will not recite all of those provisions again for my 
colleagues. I wish to provide the principles behind it, the strategic 
goals that are achieved in this United States-India civil nuclear pact. 
I want to focus on the big picture and the long-term impact of this 
cooperation agreement.
  First and foremost, the United States-India civil nuclear cooperation 
agreement is a significant foreign policy achievement for the 
advancement of our security. It is a significant achievement for the 
advancement of jobs, and also a significant achievement in improving 
the environment--the air quality particularly, in India. This strategic 
partnership between the world's oldest democracy, the United States, 
and the world's largest democracy, India, is desirable, and it is 
possible because we share the same values. We both believe in 
representative democracy. We believe in and are girded by the rule of 
law. We respect human rights and religious tolerance. We share the same 
goals for Asia and for the world, which are freedom and peace.
  This pact, this partnership, this agreement, in my view, can be the 
beginning of a blossoming marriage between the people of the United 
States and the people of India. India is a vital ally and a key global 
partner in the war on terrorism. They understand it. They have been 
threatened in India. In fact, India has been hit by terrorism in the 
name of religious fanaticism and religious extremism. This agreement is 
a step forward also regarding concerns with nuclear proliferation. Some 
critics will argue this agreement undermines the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, but when you look at the facts, India has no 
record of proliferating nuclear material, nuclear equipment, or 
technology to any other countries. In addition, India's nuclear weapons 
are there for self-defense and India has been a consistent practitioner 
of the ``no first use'' doctrine when it comes to nuclear weapons.
  India has been an exception in this regard and, in my view, should be 
viewed differently than other countries that do not have such a record.
  The fact is as a result of this agreement India will place a majority 
of its thermal power reactors under the International Atomic Energy 
safeguards for the very first time, and there also will be permanent 
inspections.
  By contrast, Iran doesn't have the same sort of policy as India. Iran 
has

[[Page 22136]]

kicked out the IAEA inspectors. This agreement helps bring India into 
the global nuclear mainstream where it is not right now.
  It is very clear, whether it was Chairman Lugar or Senator Biden and 
others, if you examine this agreement it is going to significantly 
increase transparency and oversight of its civilian nuclear program.
  We also ought to look at the economic and energy benefits of this 
cooperation. India has tremendous energy needs that will only increase 
as their economy and country grows and increasingly prospers.
  The United States-India nuclear agreement strengthens energy security 
for the United States and India by promoting the development and stable 
use of clean nuclear power, rather than relying on the Middle East for 
oil and gas, particularly from Iran. Obviously, India benefits through 
a reliable, affordable energy supply. United States companies will 
benefit from increased jobs and economic opportunity in the India 
energy market. Cooperation from this will also ensue, I believe, in 
clean coal technology and also biofuels.
  Having been in India last November-December, the air quality there is 
awful. The coal they have in India is dirty coal. They have to import 
coal.
  There are millions of people in India prospering as a country, and 
increasing. There are millions of people who do not have electricity. 
For India to have its energy needs met, they are going to have to be 
able to import more or they are going to have to come up with creative 
approaches.
  The U.S.A. is far more dependent on foreign sources of energy. We 
need to have more exploration of oil and natural gas in our country. We 
ought to be using more clean coal technology since we are the Saudi 
Arabia of the world in coal for electricity and gasification and 
liquification of coal. We also need advanced nuclear, biofuels, solar--
a diversity of fuels for our energy independence rather than being so 
dependent on foreign sources of energy from the Middle East and hostile 
dictators around the world.
  India is in a similar situation. In fact, they are even more 
dependent than the United States. There are concerns they will have to 
have a pipeline from Iran for natural gas or for oil. We are trying to 
get Iran not to develop nuclear weapons. One of the reasons 
geopolitically why it is difficult to impose sanctions or any sort of 
efforts to get them to comply is there are other parts of the world 
that are so dependent on Iran for natural gas or for oil.
  In a sense, the energy independence and energy security concerns that 
we have in our country are also brought about for the people in India 
which are even more dependent on foreign sources of energy than we are. 
If India can have clean nuclear for electricity generation, that is 
going to obviously help the people of India. It will improve their air 
quality, clearly. As you all know, a barrel of oil, wherever it is 
produced, has the same price.
  With the increasing economies of China and India and elsewhere around 
the world, for every bit of oil that is produced, the whole global 
market is competing for that barrel of oil. To the extent that India's 
demands can be somewhat ameliorated as well as ours in coal 
liquification or biofuels or other renewable approaches, it is going to 
help our energy independence in this insofar as India is concerned.
  Beyond energy and jobs, we have grave threats facing the United 
States and also our friends and allies insofar as security. We need to 
build new alliances, and we need to strengthen existing alliances as 
well.
  With that in mind, I think we ought to be looking further into the 
21st century to determine what U.S. policy will be in Asia. What should 
it be? Where can we reasonably expect support to come from, whether in 
Asia or the Western Pacific?
  Presently, some of the key allies that share our values are South 
Korea, Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia. They are key 
leaders with us. Further positive concerted efforts need to be made 
with Pakistan and Indonesia. India has a key role in all of this. I 
think India is absolutely essential for our freedom and shared values 
but also our freedom advancement in innovation and our security.
  As I mentioned, I was in India last fall. This was a key issue on the 
minds of Prime Minister Singh and other government leaders. India is a 
country with tremendous potential, amazing values, but also a lot of 
hardship, hard breaks, and poverty in that country. They need reliable 
energy. They are working in education. In fact, we can learn a lot from 
India insofar as education is concerned as young people in middle 
school are focused on high school exams to get into the India 
institutes of technology. We need to get more Americans from all 
backgrounds interested in engineering and science as India has done.
  India is also so important to security--a country which will soon 
have well over 1.2 billion people, not only the world's largest 
democracy but the world's largest country in the next few years.
  The challenges that face India's future development are making 
progress, but they are tremendous challenges. So while India is now a 
global economic power, it is going to be increasingly an economic power 
in the future. It is going to be a much more important voice in Asia as 
well.
  So it is in the interest of the United States to engage India, to 
help it develop safe, clean, and reliable energy, and also further our 
existing ties with its leaders in government, especially the people of 
India who appreciate the United States. Of course, there is a great 
deal of trade between the United States and India. Many of the H-1B 
visa applicants are from India which are very important for Virginia's 
economy and for the economy of the United States.
  I also believe that we need to--I urge my colleagues to--examine this 
in its totality. It is imperative that we pass this legislation and 
begin finalizing this agreement that was reached by the elected leaders 
of the United States and India. It is in our security interests. It is 
in our economic interests. It strengthens the alliance which will be 
vital for years ahead.
  I believe very strongly that this United States-India pact will be a 
marriage which will benefit all of us, not just now but for generations 
to come.
  I thank my colleagues. I urge most respectfully the passage of the 
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act with no 
killer amendments and let's allow this marriage between the United 
States and India blossom for our security, for our jobs, and our best 
interests through the years to come.
  I thank Chairman Lugar again for his outstanding and remarkable 
wisdom and insight shepherding this measure through. I hope by the end 
of the day this will pass, and that this marriage will continue to bear 
fruit for generations to come.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia for his very generous comments about my leadership and the 
work of the committee. But I want to say that I appreciated very much 
the Senator's diligent and thoughtful work on the committee. He will be 
missed. He has been a great leader in our efforts and has participated 
materially in the formation of the legislation he talked about today. I 
deeply appreciate the strength of his statement and his very thoughtful 
comments.
  I understand the distinguished Senator from Kansas wishes to make a 
statement.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Isakson). The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Indiana, 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He has done an outstanding 
job. He has been a leader and a foreign policy voice on Capitol Hill. 
His leadership is measured, and he is very knowledgeable and quite 
good. I appreciate his wisdom, counsel, and leadership--and his 
leadership on this bill as well.
  I recognize my colleague from Virginia who has done an outstanding 
job for many years in many capacities on foreign relations. I know that 
he knows

[[Page 22137]]

the issues on the United States-India relationship. Many people I have 
worked with on India have worked with the Senator from Virginia. I 
deeply appreciated his work, knowledge, interest, and passion on 
pushing these issues. It takes people such as that to build 
relationships. You have to always be pushing people together. I 
appreciate his willingness to do that.
  I rise in support of this bill. I rise, as my colleague from Virginia 
has done, in support of the bill but without debilitating killer 
amendments associated with it.
  I rise as someone who has chaired the South Asia subcommittee for a 
period of time and worked in building relationships with India.
  I rise as the Senator who carried the initial bill to allow the 
administration to lift sanctions against India when it tested nuclear 
weapons during the Clinton administration. It was a big brawl of 
discussion we had at that point in time.
  Let me take my colleagues back a little bit. That was the point in 
time when India was starting to shift away from its former focus on the 
Soviet Union, then Russia, and whether it was going to join the West 
and work with us. There was a big debate going on within Indian society 
as to whether they were going to pull along alongside the United 
States. It was a very heated debate, a very important discussion. It 
became the signature moment as to whether the United States would be a 
partner with India.
  You will recall that for many years the United States and India had 
what was best described as a prickly relationship. There was not an 
easy, favorable one even though the fundamentals underneath seemed like 
they were something that would be very good. India is equal. It has the 
largest democracy and we the oldest. We are the two largest democracies 
in the world. It would seem to be that this would be a very easy and 
logical relationship. Yet they had gone into the Soviet sphere. We had 
built more of a relationship with China than with India even though the 
fundamentals under India were much better for us than they were with 
China. There has been this separation and division for some period of 
time.
  India decided they needed to have a nuclear basis. They tested. 
Pakistan tested in response to that. We had a series of sanctions that 
immediately kicked in with that testing. Then our entire relationship 
with India was viewed through the nuclear nonproliferation issue. We 
had all these other issues that we needed to discuss--economics, spread 
of terrorism, a series of issues, human rights items. Everything went 
through the nonproliferation portal. If you couldn't clear it through, 
we wouldn't be able to develop the rest.
  Finally, we were able to provide the relationship, the 
administration, and the capacity to waive this series of sanctions. It 
was a difficult discussion and decision within the Congress. We were 
able to pass it through. Then let us get into a broader range--and the 
relationship flourished. It expanded enormously.
  Now I think we are at another step. This is another one of those key 
junctures in the relationship as to whether this was going be a true 
and budding and future-oriented relationship. That is whether we can 
enter into this agreement that we are discussing here today. This is 
being watched very carefully in India as being a key view as to what 
the United States is going to do in its ongoing relationship with 
India.
  I urge passage and strong support in building the fundamentals and 
strengthening a United States-India relationship. This agreement is not 
about sacrificing the nonproliferation regime on the altar of strategic 
cooperation. I want to emphasize that point. I think as people look at 
it, the initial question they would come up with is, I am fine with the 
strategic relationship; I will not sacrifice the nonproliferation 
issue. It is not about sacrificing that. It is about recognizing the 
reality of India's 30-year nuclear program. Engaged in peaceful 
civilian--as the chairman has said many times--nuclear cooperation with 
the world's largest democracy, securing commitments from India to 
implement the IAEA standard and safeguard and affirming India's 
longstanding commitment to democracy and its constructive role in 
shaping the world in decades ahead.
  There is an environmental angle on this as we look at India as being 
a key economy in growth. That growth is consuming much more energy. 
That energy is generally in the form of fossil fuels which release a 
lot more CO2. If we are concerned about the release and the 
impact and the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, one of 
the key things we should do from an environmental perspective is to 
engage in this agreement on civilian nuclear power. That is where we 
will reduce the CO2 loading into the atmosphere.
  From another nonstrategic, nonproliferation angle, from an 
environmental angle, this is a very positive agreement, a key agreement 
we can have with one of the fastest growing economies in the world that 
will be releasing a lot more CO2 in the atmosphere unless 
they use a great deal of nuclear capacity in building that energy 
system.
  Bringing India to the nonproliferation regime and forging a strategic 
partnership with the world's largest democracy makes America safer, as 
well. We have a common enemy in the war on terrorism around the world. 
India has been a key and strategic partner in their assistance in 
curbing the nuclear pursuits of Iran, a weaponized nuclear pursuit by 
Iran. We are getting help from India on that. We continue to work with 
Pakistan.
  As a number have pointed out, either implicitly or explicitly, it is 
a balancing issue, a balance-of-power issue with China. I know everyone 
in this Senate thinks about that, even if it is not expressed often, 
but it is key that we build this balance of power in our balance with 
India in this region of the world as a democracy, as a country that is 
with us in the fight on terrorism.
  India shares strategic interests; it also shares values. They have a 
commitment to democracy, with rules of law, transparency, a 
multireligious country. America and India, as I mentioned, are the 
world's two largest democracies, and India has had a functioning 
democracy for some period of time. Civilian nuclear cooperation is an 
important step in developing new and alternative energy sources.
  Comparison with Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs are 
misleading. There are strict measures taken to ensure our cooperation 
will only be with India's civilian nuclear program. They have proven to 
be trustworthy. There is still reason to believe North Korea and Iran 
are clearly pursuing these for nuclear weapons and for purposes against 
us, very threatening to us and our interests. We need to look at the 
nature of the regimes. India is a peaceful, stable democracy versus 
authoritarian in Iran and North Korea.
  Finally, this is just one of the key relationships at one of the key 
times. It is important we take the right steps during those points in 
time. I hope we have a very positive, robust debate and pass this bill 
by a very large margin, saying to the people of India and around the 
world: We are interested in partnering with you, we want to partner 
with you, we want to expand that partnership, and we see this as a key 
partnership for our future, for your future, and for global stability.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator from Kansas for a very strong 
endorsement of this legislation.
  I note in the Senate the distinguished Senator from Georgia who would 
like to participate. I look forward to hearing from him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I rise in full support of the United 
States-Indian nuclear agreement. I wish to share the two distinct 
reasons for my support.
  First and foremost is the distinguished chairman from Indiana, 
Senator Lugar. There is not an individual in this Senate and I say 
probably not an individual in this country who has

[[Page 22138]]

committed more of their life to preventing nuclear disaster and its 
proliferation. There is perhaps no one who has worked harder to see to 
it that the U.S. agreements, as they relate to the security of nuclear 
power and the interest of our country, have always been nothing but in 
the best interest of the United States of America.
  As a Senator from Georgia, I am well aware that Senator Lugar 
partnered for many years and still partners today with our Senator, Sam 
Nunn, in seeking to ensure nuclear proliferation does not take place 
anywhere in the world and that nuclear materials from existing nuclear 
nations never fall in the hands of those who would use them in an act 
of terrorism. I place my confidence first and foremost in the 
distinguished chairman from Indiana.
  There is a second, equally compelling reason; that is, my visit to 
India in April of this year, just shortly after the President announced 
the civilian nuclear deal with India. Quite frankly, my initial 
reaction before I went to India was one of significant concern. I think 
any time any of us look into nuclear agreements and the sharing of 
nuclear technology, we should have significant concern. However, I went 
to India and learned a number of things firsthand that I did not know. 
I share them with this Senate today because I believe they are 
important in whether we grant this agreement.
  First, I learned quickly that in the 30-year history of involvement 
in the development of nuclear energy, India has never had a single 
deviation from its stated original purpose, which was civilian use, and 
in terms of military, only for minimal deterrence. They have clearly 
said from the beginning they would never be a first-strike nation, and 
they have always said that our motivation from a defensive mechanism is 
minimal deterrence. A 30-year consistent policy like that in any nation 
is good enough evidence for me in terms of the heart and the intent of 
that country.
  Second, India is a democracy of 1.3 billion people in round numbers 
in a part of the world of significant importance to the United States 
of America. They have demonstrated in their cooperation with us in the 
global war on terror their interest only in peaceful operations of all 
nations and never in nuclear energy or technology falling into the 
hands of those who would use it in a devious way.
  As the distinguished Senator from Virginia has said, India is a 
blossoming nation economically, but it suffers dramatically from the 
coal it has to burn and from the lack of efficient energy sources it 
now has. This civilian nuclear agreement allows them the opportunity to 
expand nuclear energy for the generation of electricity and to reduce 
the pollution in the atmosphere, which is not just India's atmosphere 
but is the world's atmosphere.
  The distinguished chairman from Indiana has worked long and hard on 
this agreement. I am in full support of this agreement in its draft 
form and its presented form today. I hope the Members of the Senate 
will endorse and ratify without debilitating amendments. I have 
confidence in the chairman and his work. I have confidence in my visit 
to the people of India and Prime Minister Singh that they will continue 
to be what they have been: a burgeoning democracy and a great partner 
with the United States of America.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia for visiting India, for his personal testimony on this issue, 
for strong support of the treaty, and for his very thoughtful personal 
comments.
  I note the presence of the very distinguished leader in the Senate in 
fostering and strengthening India-United States relationships, the 
distinguished Senator from Texas.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. I particularly 
express my gratitude to the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Chairman Lugar, for his outstanding work on this bipartisan 
piece of legislation that advances our strategic relationship with 
India while also bringing India into the mainstream of international 
nonproliferation efforts.
  I am delighted to be the cochair, along with Senator Hillary Clinton, 
of the United States-India caucus in the Senate, actually something we 
resurrected just a couple short years ago that had fallen by the 
wayside.
  After my own visit to India and in consultation with a number of 
Indian-American constituents who live in Texas--about 200,000 live in 
my State alone--I became absolutely convinced that a closer 
relationship with the great nation of India and its people was 
essential to our security interests and essential to our economic 
interests.
  As our colleagues know and as has been mentioned by a number of our 
Members, Prime Minister Singh visited Washington last summer and 
President Bush paid a visit to India this spring. These events mark a 
critical milestone in our improving relationship. Passage of this 
legislation will mark another significant step and I daresay cement 
what is a very important relationship to both nations.
  President Bush made a fundamental foreign policy objective to move 
the United States-India relationship to a new level. As Secretary Rice 
has said, our relationship with India is one of the most important 
partnerships the United States can have in the 21st century.
  As has been often noted, India is the world's largest democracy, 
while we are the world's oldest democracy, and our two great nations 
share so many common values and common beliefs. It is only appropriate 
that the United States and India become true strategic partners as we 
move into the 21st century. Fortunately, the days of the Cold War, when 
India was more aligned with the Soviet Union than with the United 
States, are in the long past. The United States and India share a 
common vision for our future. It is a peaceful vision where we battle 
terrorism together, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
HIV/AIDS, and a host of other challenges that face our world today.
  While it is true that the agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation is a 
significant departure from previous U.S. policy, I strongly believe 
this legislation represents a positive step as we grow our strategic 
relationship.
  For more than 30 years, the United States and India have disagreed 
over India's decision not to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
As such, the United States has not cooperated with the Nation of India 
on any civilian nuclear technology to speak of. In short, we have been 
at a stalemate which has neither served our nonproliferation goals, nor 
helped India's vast needs for energy resources. Fortunately, this 
carefully crafted legislation will allow us to move forward in a 
responsible manner. The agreement, in fact, enhances our 
nonproliferation efforts.
  It is correct to say that India is not a signatory to the 
nonproliferation treaty. They have decided for their own national 
security reasons that they will not become a party to the treaty, and 
no amount of international pressure is likely to change that 
conclusion. This is the reality we face, and the status quo for another 
30 years is simply not acceptable. Recognizing this reality, we must 
ask ourselves, What can we do to promote nonproliferation efforts with 
India and bring them into the international nonproliferation regime? 
This legislation provides that answer.
  Despite not signing the nonproliferation treaty, India, for the 
record, has an excellent nonproliferation record. They understand, 
perhaps as well as anyone, the danger of the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. This is why India has agreed to adhere to key 
international nonproliferation efforts on top of their own stringent 
export control regime. This is a significant step forward which has 
been welcomed by the International Atomic Energy Agency Director 
General Mohamed ElBaradei, who understands India will not come into the 
nonproliferation treaty by traditional means but can be accommodated 
through this route.
  I conclude by noting that the United States is fortunate, indeed, to 
have

[[Page 22139]]

many Indian Americans who have helped bring our two nations closer 
together. As I have noted, many of them live in my State, as they do 
around this great country, contributing to our brainpower, to our 
economy. Frankly, this community is one of the hardest working, most 
accomplished communities in our Nation today. There are about 200,000 
of them living in Texas, and nearly 80,000 Indian students are studying 
at our Nation's colleges and universities. Their contributions to our 
Nation and the United States-India relationship have been remarkably 
positive.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this legislation, to advance our 
strategic relationship with India while also bringing India into the 
mainstream of international nonproliferation efforts.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the distinguished Senator for his leadership. His 
action with the distinguished Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton, is 
certainly timely for these important visits to occur and these 
negotiations. I think they have restored significance in our 
relationship. I thank the Senator for coming to the Senate and offering 
strong support for the treaty.
  Mr. President, I note the presence of another distinguished member of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished Senator from 
Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for S. 
3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, 
of which I am a cosponsor. First, I congratulate Senators Lugar and 
Biden for their excellent bipartisan effort to produce a quality piece 
of legislation. We can all be very proud of this product.
  I have long believed the United States and India should expand its 
excellent friendship and embark upon a deeper, more strategic 
relationship. We now have that opportunity, and I urge my fellow 
Members of the Senate to pass S. 3709, a bill that will enable us to 
transform our relationship with India and initiate a solid partnership 
with great security, economic, and environmental returns for U.S. 
national interests.
  As President Bush said when he met with Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh in New Delhi last spring:

       India in the 21st century is a natural partner of the 
     United States because we are brothers in the cause of human 
     liberty.

  By expanding civil nuclear cooperation with India, the United States 
has an opportunity to bring India into an arms control regime that will 
guarantee greater oversight and inspection rights and which will allow 
us to make India's preexisting nuclear program safer and more 
transparent. At a time when we are facing many other nuclear power 
challenges, we should welcome this as a positive step in the world of 
nonproliferation.
  It is not just the United States that supports civil nuclear 
cooperation with India. I was in Vienna in May, where I met with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. During our meetings--we were 
talking primarily about Iran and what they were doing in terms of 
Iran's violation of the nuclear nonproliferation agreement. We also 
talked about India and how they felt about the proposal that was being 
entered into between the United States and India. And I was told, at 
that time, that India has been a more active and responsible partner, 
in terms of their cooperation with the IAEA, than many of the 
signatories to the nuclear nonproliferation agreement.
  As was just pointed out by the Senator from Texas, later on Director 
General Mohamed ElBaradei called the idea that is contained in this 
agreement ``a milestone'' and ``timely for ongoing efforts to 
consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and 
strengthen nuclear safety.''
  Furthermore, this agreement will allow us to form a critical 
strategic relationship with India. And from a point of view, it is long 
overdue. The geostrategic facts are that China and India are two rising 
powers in the industrialized world. As China expands its economic power 
and military strength, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India can help to 
even the international keel.
  I am also referring to the fact that China, could pose a threat to 
U.S. national security in the future. We are working very carefully to 
make sure that does not happen, but it is something we should think 
about. But I am also thinking about the fact that India and China also 
have a good relationship. So the fact that we are entering into a new 
relationship with India, I think, also would be well received by the 
Chinese and other Asian countries and helpful to alleviating any 
tensions that exist.
  For the past 30 years, we let differences in our domestic policies 
and our international intentions keep us from working together. But 
India is a unique democracy, a new shining city upon a hill, and we 
need this more than ever before. We need models such as this, where 
people of different faiths and ethnicities live together and where the 
government is open and accountable for its actions. It is the largest 
democracy that we have in the world today.
  Following the end of the Cold War, new economic opportunities have 
created room for cooperation between the United States and India in 
agriculture, health care, commerce, defense, technology, and education. 
It is amazing to me the number of businesses I have in Ohio that have 
joint ventures in India and Indian investment in the State of Ohio.
  In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, India has been a leader 
in fighting terrorism and rooting out extremists from its society. It 
has a long record of responsible behavior on nonproliferation matters, 
and it is time we embrace India as part of that nonproliferation 
community.
  I strongly encourage the Senate to pass S. 3907 and take the next 
step in bolstering our relationship with India. A democratic, 
economically sound, internationally integrated India will serve as a 
ballast in a region experiencing rapid, sweeping change.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. May I have recognition?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I see the floor manager and the matter we 
have before us is of great importance and consequence. I know we have a 
variety of different amendments that are being considered and are being 
talked about, even as we are here now. I do not mean to interfere with 
the flow of this debate and reaching a timely conclusion of it, but I 
want to address the Senate for a few moments on what I consider to be 
sort of the important agenda for our committee, our HELP Committee, in 
this next session. I will cooperate, obviously, with the floor manager 
and ask that my remarks be printed in an appropriate place in the 
Record. And I will speak for just a few moments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. So others who want to continue the debate will have the 
opportunity to do so. And as one who has been a floor manager, I 
understand his desire to have focus and attention on the underlying 
matters. But I appreciate the courtesy and the understanding of the 
manager letting me talk briefly this afternoon.
  (The remarks of Mr. Kennedy are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')


                           Amendment No. 5173

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk that has 
been cleared on both sides of the aisle.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for Mr. Harkin, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 5173.

  The amendment is as follows:

[[Page 22140]]



(Purpose: To make the waiver authority of the President contingent upon 
   a determination that India is fully and actively participating in 
  United States and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and 
  contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United Nations 
                     Security Council resolutions)

       On page 8, beginning on line 8, strike ``Group; and'' and 
     all that follows through ``Nuclear'' on line 9 and insert the 
     following:

     Group;
       (8) India is fully and actively participating in United 
     States and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and 
     contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions; and
       (9) the Nuclear

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I thank the managers of this bill, 
Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, for accepting my amendment. I thank 
my colleagues.
  My amendment is very simple and straightforward. It requires the 
President to determine that India was fully and actively participating 
in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and contain 
Iran's nuclear program consistent with United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions.
  As my colleagues know, Iran is one of, if not the most, urgent 
nuclear nonproliferation challenges the world faces today.
  For two decades Iran secretly built up its nuclear capabilities in 
violation of the safeguards commitments it made with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. To date, Iran has completed most of the 
construction of a massive uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, opened 
a heavy-water production plant at Arak and began construction of a 40-
megawatt reactor there. It also began construction on a fuel 
manufacturing plant at Isfahan; tested centrifuges with uranium, 
hexafluoride, produced their first samples of low-enriched uranium; and 
nearly completed construction of their first nuclear power reactor at 
Bushehr, set to open in 2007.
  Iran says these programs are for peaceful purposes, but experts agree 
and the Bush Administration believes, that Iran is on its way to 
acquiring the capability to produce large quantities of bomb grade 
nuclear material. Additionally, Iran has not fully answered numerous 
questions from the IAEA about activities that may be related to a 
weapons program. These activities are very concerning.
  Earlier this year, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in 
violation of its safeguards commitments and reported Iran's file to the 
U.N. Security Council. The Security Council has demanded that Iran 
suspend its uranium enrichment program and construction of a heavy-
water production reactor. These technologies can be used to make bomb-
grade nuclear material.
  However, Iran continues to stiff-arm the IAEA's investigation of its 
program. This week Iran again thumbed its nose at the international 
community boasting that the world would have to ``live with a nuclear 
Iran.'' A new report this week from the IAEA says the agency found new 
traces of plutonium and enriched uranium at a nuclear research facility 
in Tehran.
  As we are here debating this bill, U.S. diplomats are engaged with 
our partners in the U.N. Security Council on this very important issue. 
They are working to build support for a new resolution that would 
mandate targeted sanctions on Iran to help persuade its leadership to 
change course and halt its uranium enrichment work.
  This diplomatic course of action is appropriate at this stage, and I 
fully support it. To succeed, any targeted sanctions policy must not 
only have the active support of Security Council member states, but 
also the cooperation of other member states of the international 
community. Targeted sanctions against Iran will not work unless they 
are fully and actively supported by states close to Iran and with ties 
to Iran, such as India. They will not work, I would add, without 
effective diplomatic engagement with Iran.
  This is a time when we need to have the support of every country as 
the United States works with our allies to contain and constrain Iran's 
troubling nuclear program.
  Now my colleagues may be wondering what this has to do with India.
  India has a robust relationship with Iran. India actively engages in 
military-to-military cooperation with Iran and the two countries have a 
significant trade relationship. India plans to build a gas pipeline 
from Iran through Pakistan. India's leaders see Iran as a diplomatic 
partner on many issues. In fact, Iran's Foreign Minister will be 
visiting New Delhi today.
  Given India's proximity to Iran, none of this is surprising, but it 
means that India has a particular responsibility to help contain Iran's 
nuclear and missile capabilities and support possible U.N. Security 
Council sanctions against Iran.
  Obviously, India, like most other states, does not support a nuclear 
weapons option for Iran.
  However, Indian views of the threat posed by the Iran nuclear program 
and its perspective on Iran's so-called ``right'' to peaceful nuclear 
technology differ significantly from U.S. views. Unfortunately, some of 
India's policies appear to embolden Iran's leaders to press forward 
with their ambitious nuclear plans.
  As we move forward in our effort with the international community to 
deal, contain, and if necessary sanction Iran for its defiance of 
international demands to halt its sensitive nuclear activities, we will 
need greater support from all states, including India, in this effort.
  Over a year ago, on September 24, 2005, India voted with the United 
States and 20 other states on the IAEA resolution which found Iran in 
compliance with its safeguards agreement. But the resolution did not 
refer the matter immediately to the Security Council and according to a 
recent report produced by the Congressional Research Service, India was 
one of a handful of countries seeking to avoid such a referral.
  Disturbingly, India's official explanation of its vote highlights 
India's differences with the United States on how to deal with Iran's 
nuclear transgressions. It stated that:
  In our Explanation of Vote (this is the Indian government), we have 
clearly expressed our opposition to Iran being declared as noncompliant 
with its safeguards agreements. Nor do we agree that the current 
situation could constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. Nevertheless, the resolution does not refer the matter to the 
Security Council and has agreed that outstanding issues be dealt with 
under the aegis of the IAEA itself. This is in line with our position 
and therefore, we have extended our support.
  India again voted with the United States on February 4, 2006, when 
the IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer Iran's noncompliance to the 
U.N. Security Council. This was welcomed at the time. Yet the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs responded to questions about its vote by 
noting that:
  ``While there will be a report to the Security Council, the Iran 
nuclear issue remains within the purview of the IAEA. It has been our 
consistent position that confrontation should be avoided and any 
outstanding issue ought to be resolved through dialogue. . . . Our vote 
in favour of the Resolution should not be interpreted as in any way 
detracting from the traditionally close and friendly relations we enjoy 
with Iran.''
  By keeping the issue under the purview of the IAEA Iran would not be 
subject to sanctions. The IAEA does not have that capability, the 
Security Council does.
  In April 2006, the U.N. Security Council issued a statement calling 
for an immediate suspension of all Iranian enrichment activities. Iran 
responded by announcing that it had produced a small quantity of low-
enriched uranium using a test assembly of centrifuges and noted it 
planned to expand the facility's production capacity.
  What was India's response? On May 30, India signed onto a statement 
by the Non-Aligned Movement, which said that concerns surrounding 
Iran's nuclear program should be resolved at the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Board of Governors and not the U.N. Security Council, 
again seeking to avoid sanctions, contrary to what U.S. diplomats and 
others were urging at that time.

[[Page 22141]]

  In July, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1696, which gave 
Tehran until August 31 to suspend its uranium enrichment program and 
required Tehran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's, IAEA, investigation of its nuclear programs.
  Again what was India's response? Apparently, in an attempt to patch 
up relations with Tehran over its earlier votes at the IAEA Board of 
Governors, India added its name to the September 2006 joint statement 
on Iran's nuclear program released by the Non-Aligned Movement at its 
meeting in Havana. In this statement, India called nuclear research and 
development a ``basic inalienable right'' of Iran's, and said that 
nuclear ``choices and decisions'' of different countries ``must be 
respected.''
  Newspaper headlines in Iran trumpeted the news. The Iran Times 
headline on September 18 read: ``118 Countries Back Iran's Nuclear 
Program.'' Iran's President met with India's Prime Minister in Havana 
to discuss how to deepen Indo-Iranian ties.
  Since then, talks between Iran and the EU to halt the Iranian nuclear 
program have broken down, and in October, Iran took additional steps to 
improve its enrichment capability and is now seeking IAEA nuclear 
safety assistance on its Arak heavy-water reactor. U.S. diplomats are 
working hard now to lobby fellow members of the IAEA Board of Governors 
to reject this request. We need India's active support when that 
happens.
  In a recent report, the Congressional Research Service detailed some 
concerns about India's proliferation record with respect to Iran.
  The U.S. Government, as a result of the Iran-Syria Nonproliferation 
Act, has sanctioned Indian companies for transferring WMD technologies 
and materials to Iran and other countries.
  On August 4, the Bush administration publicly announced in the 
Federal Register sanctions on two Indian entities for transferring 
chemicals that can be used to produce missile propellant to Iran. The 
sanctions determination had been made July 25, a day before the House 
passed its version of the India bill.
  For its part, India contended the sanctions were unwarranted. A 
Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson asserted on August 7th the 
transfers were ``not in violation of our regulations or our 
international obligations.''
  This is deeply disturbing. What this means is that India's current 
export control laws are inadequate and do not meet the same high 
standards of U.S. export laws.
  As we move forward in our effort with the international community to 
deal, contain, and if necessary, sanction Iran for its defiance of 
international demands to halt its sensitive nuclear activities, we will 
need greater support from a regional partner. We will need India to be 
more effective and diligent in preventing the proliferation of 
technologies, goods, and material that might be used by Iran to produce 
weapons of mass destruction or the means to deliver them.
  I think that my colleagues would agree that the ties between India 
and Iran are troubling. That is why I believe we must--through my 
amendment--require the President to provide a determination that India 
is actively supporting efforts to contain Iran's nuclear program before 
he can waive existing restrictions on civil nuclear commerce with 
India.
  I want to be clear--my amendment is not ``anti-India.'' My amendment 
is a positive and vital step in safeguarding our own national security 
interests.
  There are some in this body who have argued that this legislation, 
and the possible agreement for nuclear cooperation, will enhance our 
strategic relationship and improve India's nonproliferation record. 
Others have warned that this will damage the vital effort to reduce 
nuclear weapons dangers in South Asia and elsewhere if we don't make 
adjustments to strengthen the nonproliferation requirements in the 
package.
  Whatever our differences may be regarding other aspects of this 
proposal, one issue that I hope we can agree on is the need to ensure 
we have India's full and active cooperation and support in the effort 
to prevent Iran or other states from acquiring the capability to 
produce bomb material.
  As the Senate considers reversing 36 years of nuclear proliferation 
restrictions, it is important that we ensure that India is a true 
strategic partner in the effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons.
  Again, I appreciate the support of my colleagues in accepting my 
amendment.
  Mr. LUGAR. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 5173.
  The amendment (No. 5173) was agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on 
the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. I note the distinguished Senator from New Mexico is 
present.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.


                           Amendment No. 5174

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 5174.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       (Purpose: To limit the waiver authority of the President)

       On page 6, after line 21, add the following:

       (c) Operation of Waivers.--Notwithstanding any waiver under 
     subsection (a)--
       (1) no nuclear equipment or sensitive nuclear technology 
     may be exported to India unless the President has determined, 
     and has submitted to the appropriate congressional committees 
     a report stating, that both India and the United States are 
     taking specific steps to conclude a multilateral treaty on 
     the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use 
     in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and
       (2) no nuclear materials may be exported to India unless 
     the President has determined, and has submitted to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report stating, that 
     India has stopped producing fissile materials for weapons 
     pursuant to a unilateral moratorium or multilateral 
     agreement.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, this amendment would establish a link 
between the export of nuclear fuel and equipment to India under the 
United States-India nuclear agreement and India's halting of the 
production of nuclear weapons material. More specifically, my amendment 
provides two separate tests, one for nuclear equipment and technology, 
and another for nuclear material.
  As to the nuclear equipment and technology, my amendment would 
require the President to certify that both India and the United States 
are taking specific steps to conclude a verifiable fissile material 
cutoff treaty before the United States exports any nuclear equipment or 
technology to India. As to nuclear fuel, my amendment would require the 
President to certify that India has stopped producing fissile material 
for weapons, either unilaterally or as part of a multilateral 
agreement, again, before the United States exports nuclear material to 
India.
  The purpose of the amendment is not to kill the bill or the agreement 
with India but, as I see it, to strengthen that agreement. It would 
allow nuclear trade with India to proceed but in a way that will be 
consistent with our nuclear nonproliferation goals and our security 
interests.
  It imposes no unreasonable or unrealistic conditions on nuclear trade 
with India. It simply requires the President to determine that India 
has followed through on its stated agreement to work toward a fissile 
material cutoff treaty. Let me explain why I believe this amendment is 
necessary.
  In 1974, India tested a nuclear weapon it built using technology that 
we had provided to it for peaceful purposes. The title of the pending 
bill is United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy

[[Page 22142]]

Cooperation Act. So in 1974, India tested a nuclear weapon built using 
technology that we had given it for peaceful purposes. We responded 
then by strengthening our nuclear export laws in 1978 to ensure that 
that could not happen again. In 1980, we cut off nuclear cooperation 
with India, after India failed to meet the terms of the new law.
  The bill before us would make it possible to resume nuclear 
cooperation with India by exempting India from certain requirements 
that we added to our nuclear export laws in 1978.
  Proponents of the bill offer some strong arguments for going ahead. 
They say that we need to resume nuclear cooperation in order to 
cultivate closer ties with India. They say it is in our best interest 
to help India expand its civilian nuclear power program so that India 
might meet its growing energy needs with clean, environmentally 
friendly sources of power. They say it will help to bring India within 
the ``nonproliferation mainstream.'' I don't quarrel with any of those 
arguments or with the goal of the legislation. I agree that our past 
policies to pressure India on nuclear nonproliferation have not worked. 
Compared to several of its neighbors, India has a relatively good 
nonproliferation record, and by improving cooperation with India, we 
may be able to make India a useful ally in our efforts to halt the 
spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia.
  My quarrel is not with the goal of reopening nuclear cooperation with 
India but in the details of the bill and in the terms on which we 
propose to resume that cooperation.
  Under current law, in order for the United States to resume nuclear 
trade with India, our two nations must enter into an agreement for 
cooperation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Section 123 of 
the Atomic Energy Act requires the agreement to meet eight specific 
conditions. One of those conditions is that India must sign an 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard all 
nuclear material under its jurisdiction. India has consistently and 
steadfastly refused to agree to these so-called full-scope safeguards.
  Even if we were able to enter into an agreement for cooperation with 
India, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would then have to license the 
export of specific nuclear material and facilities to India under the 
provisions of section 126 of that same Atomic Energy Act. And in order 
to license an export under those provisions, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission would first have to find that the statutory export licensing 
criteria of section 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act are met. Among 
other things, section 128 requires the Commission to find that the 
full-scope IAEA safeguards will be maintained on all of India's nuclear 
activities.
  Once again, though, of course, India has refused to agree to those 
full-scope safeguards. Even if India were to accept full-scope 
safeguards, there is the third problem.
  Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the export of nuclear 
materials or equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to any 
nonnuclear weapons state that has detonated a nuclear explosive device, 
violated or abrogated IAEA safeguards, or engaged in activities 
directed toward making a nuclear explosive device. Even section 129--
and since India tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974 and five 
times since then in 1998, it has clearly run afoul of this provision.
  The Atomic Energy Act provides a way around all of these obstacles. 
It says that the President can waive the full-scope safeguard 
requirement and can enter into an agreement for cooperation, as he is 
here proposing to do, without full-scope safeguards if he determines 
that insistence on full-scope safeguards:

       Would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the 
     United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise 
     jeopardize the common defense and security.

  Similarly, the act allows the President to authorize exports without 
full-scope safeguards, and in spite of India's detonation of a nuclear 
explosive device, if the President:

       Determines that cessation of such exports would be 
     seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States 
     nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
     common defense and security.

  President Carter used this authority in 1980 to export nuclear fuel 
to India. But the current administration has apparently concluded that 
President Bush cannot say that withholding nuclear exports from India 
would seriously prejudice our nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize 
our security.
  So instead of relying on the existing waiver authority that is in the 
law, the administration has requested and the bill provides--the bill 
before us would provide a specific statutory waiver for India. This is 
a waiver from the full-scope safeguard requirements of sections 126, 
128, and the nuclear weapons prohibition contained in section 129. So 
instead of applying full-scope safeguards to all peaceful nuclear 
activities in India, the bill only asks that India give the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the United States a:

       Credible plan to separate its civil nuclear facilities, 
     materials, and programs from its military facilities, 
     materials, and programs, and that it only apply the IAEA 
     safeguards to those civilian activities.

  Let me just put up a chart up here to make the point as to what I 
think the bill contains. This is an important distinction for all of us 
to understand.
  India has been called upon in this agreement to separate what they 
are going to open to safeguards from the portion of their nuclear 
program they are going to keep separate from any kind of a full-scope 
safeguard. So there are 14 power reactors and one fuel reprocessing 
plant they have identified as being subject to safeguards under this 
agreement. That is the so-called civilian side of what they are doing.
  Then there is the nonsafeguarded area, and that, according to the 
Indians--and, of course, they are the ones who make this judgment and 
have under this agreement we are now considering, they have determined 
that there are eight power reactors for which they are not going to 
provide safeguards: their Fast Breeder program, which they are not 
going to provide safeguards for, and of course their entire military 
program, which is made up of two plutonium reprocessing plants, two 
uranium enrichment plants, and two heavy water plutonium production 
reactors. So it is clear that there is a substantial amount of their 
nuclear program that they have determined they will not open to 
inspection by the IAEA and will not open to these requirements which 
are contained in our own law.
  There are major problems with this approach. First is that the 
partial safeguards are not full-scope safeguards. India produced its 
separation plan in March. It offers to place some of its civilian power 
reactors, some of its fuel cycle facilities, some of its research 
facilities under safeguards, but it leaves still others of its civilian 
power reactors, its fuel cycle facilities, its research reactors, and 
its military plants unsafeguarded. Many of the facilities that raise 
the greatest proliferation concerns, including the Fast Breeder Reactor 
program and its uranium enrichment plants and its spent fuel processing 
facilities, are placed beyond the reach of any international 
safeguards. India will be free to use these facilities to produce 
fissile material for nuclear weapons without any international 
inspection or control.
  To make matters worse, by allowing India to buy civilian nuclear fuel 
on the international market, India will no longer have to choose 
between using its own limited uranium resources to supply its civilian 
power program or its weapons program. It will be able to buy nuclear 
fuel for its civilian power program and devote all its own uranium 
resources to its weapons program.
  The other major problem with this approach is that it abandons the 
fundamental tenet of our nuclear nonproliferation policy; namely, that 
nations are required to renounce nuclear weapons in order to get our 
assistance. This simple bargain has been the cornerstone of our 
nonproliferation policy since President Eisenhower announced the Atoms 
For Peace program over a

[[Page 22143]]

half a century ago. The bill before us abandons that policy. It offers 
U.S. assistance to India without any restraint or limitation on its 
existing weapons program. Making such an exception for India will, in 
my view, permanently weaken our nonproliferation policy and our 
credibility on this issue. Already there are other nations, including 
Pakistan, that have asked for similar treatment. We are signaling that 
there are no general rules that apply when it comes to 
nonproliferation; whether we will ship nuclear technology or nuclear 
fuel or materials to a country depends upon the circumstances of each 
case. That is what this agreement signals to the rest of the world. It 
is difficult to see how we can insist that China and Russia strictly 
enforce full-scope safeguards in their dealings with Iran and North 
Korea if we are not going to enforce full-scope safeguards in our 
dealings with other countries--India, in this case. That is not to say 
we should bar the door to further nuclear cooperation with India or 
vote down the bill. I think we should open up nuclear trade with India, 
but we should do it in a way that is in keeping with our broad nuclear 
nonproliferation policy.
  I believe the bill before us, while seriously flawed as it now 
stands, can be fixed, can be salvaged, and that is the purpose of my 
amendment. The central issue, as I see it, is how to allow nuclear 
trade with India to proceed without aiding and abetting India's nuclear 
weapons program. India has dozens of nuclear weapons today. China has 
hundreds of nuclear weapons today. We do not want to see a race begin 
in Asia to see who can achieve the greatest capability in nuclear 
weapons. I believe the answer is to establish a link between our 
cooperation with India's civilian nuclear program and India stopping 
its production of nuclear materials for its weapons program.
  What I am recommending is nothing more than what our former 
colleague, Senator Sam Nunn, suggested in the article which is on each 
Member's desk entitled ``A Nuclear Pig In A Poke.'' It was an article 
in the Wall Street Journal on May 24, and I commend it to all of my 
colleagues for their consideration. Specifically, Senator Nunn in that 
article recommended that:

       Congress require a two-stage process. First, before any 
     export of nuclear reactors, components, or related technology 
     are provided to India, the President should have to certify 
     that both India and the United States are taking specific 
     steps to lead a serious and expedited international effort to 
     conclude a verifiable fissile material cutoff treatment.

  Continuing with his statement:

       Second, before any exports of nuclear reactor fuel or its 
     components are provided to India, thereby freeing India to 
     use its limited stocks to expand its nuclear weapons program, 
     the President would be required to certify that India has 
     stopped producing fissile materials for weapons, either as 
     part of a voluntary moratorium or multilateral agreement.

  That is precisely what the amendment does.
  I have attached a letter to the opinion piece Senator Nunn wrote, a 
letter from Senator Nunn to me where he states that clearly the 
amendment I am offering today is trying to implement the 
recommendations he made in his earlier opinion piece. So this amendment 
is based squarely on Senator Nunn's proposal. It simply requires first 
that before nuclear equipment and technology can be exported, the 
President first should determine that both India and the United States 
are taking specific steps to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty; 
second, that before any nuclear materials may be exported to India, the 
President must determine that India has stopped producing fissile 
materials for weapons.
  Both the United States and India have already agreed to work toward a 
fissile materials cutoff treaty. The bill before us, in section 1055, 
already requires the President to determine that India is working with 
us toward such a treaty before he can use the waivers. All my amendment 
does is to require the President to determine and to report to Congress 
that specific steps are being taken before we export nuclear equipment 
and technology, and that India has, in fact, stopped producing weapons 
material before we export nuclear material to India. The amendment 
would simply implement Senator Nunn's recommendations.
  As I indicated, there is a letter pointing out that this amendment 
would, in fact, accomplish that objective that is attached to the 
opinion piece.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Nunn's May 24 op-
ed in the Wall Street Journal and his letter to me dated September 28 
of this year be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Vitter). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1).
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the amendment I am proposing here is not 
a killer amendment. I know the traditional approach in the Senate is 
that any time an amendment is offered, it is characterized by its 
opponents as a killer amendment, so you could make the argument that 
anything we might change in the pending legislation would absolutely 
kill our prospects of getting anything done. But this amendment is not 
a killer amendment. As Senator Nunn has stated in his op-ed piece, it 
is not a killer amendment:

       Unless you believe that India will continue its weapons-
     usable nuclear material production, and that U.S. and Indian 
     pledges to work for a fissile material cutoff treaty are 
     insincere, meaningless gestures.

  If those pledges are sincere and meaningful, as I trust they are, 
then this amendment simply says they should be fulfilled before exports 
begin.
  Adoption of my amendment will significantly strengthen the agreement 
with India. As Senator Nunn has said:

       This two-stage approach would significantly strengthen the 
     deal in a way that improves the protection of our core 
     security interests, while ultimately allowing trade to 
     proceed. By establishing a linkage between exports of nuclear 
     material and the cessation of Indian production of nuclear 
     weapons material, this amendment will maintain the integrity 
     of an important U.S. security objective; that is, preventing 
     the growth and spread of nuclear weapons-usable material 
     around the globe.

  Without this amendment I am offering, I fear the enactment of the 
bill pending before us would result in making the world a more 
dangerous place rather than a less dangerous place. This amendment will 
give us the advantages of the agreement but without the increased 
danger which all of us would like to see avoided.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the Senator from New Mexico. This is a killer condition 
because it requires the President to make two determinations prior to 
the U.S.-India agreement being implemented that are at odds with the 
purpose of the pact.
  First, under the Bingaman amendment a determination must be made that 
both India and the United States have taken specific steps to conclude 
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, or FMCT, before the U.S. can export 
nuclear equipment and technology.
  The amendment requires that a second determination be made that India 
has stopped the production of fissile material for weapons before the 
U.S. can export nuclear materials.
  While I agree that an Indian commitment to abandon its nuclear 
weapons program would have been optimal, even in its absence this 
agreement serves U.S. national security interests. Members must 
consider whether this amendment and others like it advance U.S. 
national security. I believe that U.S. interests are served by greater 
IAEA oversight of India's nuclear program and I reject amendments that 
make the perfect the enemy of the good. I support this agreement and 
oppose amendments, like this one, that would derail its implementation.
  By linking American exports of nuclear equipment and technology to 
U.S. and Indian progress on a multilateral FMCT holds New Delhi to a 
different and higher standard than any other country we have nuclear 
trade with, higher standards for example than we require of Beijing. A 
successful FMCT will only be concluded and implemented when every 
nation with fissile material production capabilities agrees and abides 
by its commitment. I worry that this amendment may provide countries 
who oppose this bilateral agreement with a backdoor veto. In

[[Page 22144]]

other words, if another nation stymies progress on a FMCT, will India 
and the U.S. be penalized?
  I share the strong support of the Senator from New Mexico for an 
FMCT. But a successful FMCT negotiation will require the assent of all 
nations, in particular China. Unlike the U.S., the United Kingdom, 
France, and Russia, China is assumed to have ceased fissile material 
production but has not made a public statement confirming this as the 
others have.
  The report that accompanies the Lugar-Biden legislation, S. 3709, 
highlights the potential trouble with these kind of linkages. The 
Conference on Disarmament, the host of talks on a FMCT, has been unable 
to agree on a work program, in part because some countries--notably 
China--have refused to approve the beginning of FMCT negotiations 
unless the Conference on Disarmament also approves discussions of other 
issues, such as nuclear disarmament and banning weapons in outer space. 
For its part India has long supported conclusion of an effectively 
verifiable FMCT. This position reflects India's concern regarding 
fissile material production by its nuclear-armed neighbors, and it 
would be unrealistic to expect a precipitous change in India's 
position. It would be difficult to determine that the U.S. and India 
have taken specific steps to conclude an FMCT if Chinese interference 
didn't permit the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament to 
start.
  In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry addressed the danger of conditioning 
passage of the U.S.-India agreement on FMCT-related issues. In fact, 
Bill Perry stated that there were many things by which we could 
condition nuclear trade with India on, including ``India tak[ing] a 
leadership position in promoting an international cutoff in the 
production of fissile material.'' But Dr. Perry concluded:

       I do not recommend that the Senate try to modify the 
     agreement to include them. Instead, I recommend that the 
     Senate task the Administration to vigorously pursue 
     continuing diplomacy to facilitate these actions, and that 
     should be as a follow-on to the agreement.

  Secretary Perry's advice was good counsel and we adopted it in the 
Lugar-Biden bill. In our opinion, S. 3709 strikes the right balance in 
conditioning nuclear trade with India in areas consistent with the July 
18, 2005, Joint Statement. India reiterated its support for an FMCT in 
that statement and our bill applies pressure and requires continue 
monitoring of future Indian and U.S. administrations to ensure full 
implementation of the decision by India to support such a treaty.
  Section 105(5) of the Lugar-Biden bill requires an annual 
determination that India continues its support for an FMCT and is not 
preventing adoption of a negotiating mandate that leaves the issue of 
verification to be decided in the negotiations. If India is working 
with the United States to conclude an FMCT or a similar treaty, that 
would justify a presidential determination under this provision.
  We reinforce these requirements with report language that reads that:

     the United States must now use the influence it has gained 
     through efforts in both India and Pakistan, and with India in 
     particular through its nuclear trade with that nation, to 
     help them transition from nuclear build-ups to stability and 
     arms reductions. This is nowhere more relevant than in the 
     area of fissile material production.

  In addition, this amendment requires the President to determine that 
India has ceased the production of fissile materials for nuclear 
weapons before the agreement can be implemented. India has long 
rejected calls for the cessation of fissile material production, 
pointing to rival nuclear weapons programs as justification.
  India maintains that it cannot agree to a unilateral cap on fissile 
material production at this time. Pakistan continues to produce fissile 
material for weapons-related purposes, and China has not yet committed 
to a moratorium on such production. It is not in U.S. national security 
interests to threaten the significant nonproliferation gains afforded 
by this Initiative with India in order to seek a fissile material cap 
that India indicates it cannot agree to, absent a similar commitment by 
Pakistan and China.
  As Secretary Rice testified on April 6, 2006, before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations:

       India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its 
     nuclear arsenal. We raised this with the Indians, but the 
     Indians said that its plans and policies must take into 
     account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that 
     India would accept what would amount to an arms control 
     agreement that did not include other key countries, like 
     China and Pakistan.

  In addition, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security Policy, Bob Joseph, and Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, stated on March 29, 2006:

       The curtailment of the production of fissile material for 
     weapons was discussed as part of the Civil Nuclear 
     Cooperation Initiative, but India maintained that it could 
     not agree to a unilateral cap at this time. The U.S. has 
     achieved an important objective by obtaining India's 
     commitment to work toward the conclusion of a multilateral 
     Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Moreover, we remain 
     willing to explore other intermediate options that might also 
     serve such an objective. We also continue to call on all 
     states that produce fissile material for weapons purposes to 
     observe a voluntary production moratorium, as the United 
     States has done for many years.

  Senator Biden and I took a number of steps to address concerns about 
continued Indian fissile material production but we sought to do so in 
a manner that did not threaten the efficacy of the U.S.-India 
Agreement. In section 103(1) of our bill we make it the policy of the 
United States ``to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the 
production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.''
  Section 108(a)(1)(A) requires an annual reporting requirement on 
Indian implementation and compliance with ``the nonproliferation 
commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between 
the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India.''
  Other subsections within section 108 of our legislation require: (1) 
annual reports on ``significant changes in the production by India of 
nuclear weapons or in the types of amounts of fissile materials 
produced''; (2) whether India ``is in full compliance with the 
commitments and obligations contained in the [U.S.-India] agreements 
and other documents''; and (3) a requirement to identify and assess all 
compliance issues arising on India's commitments and obligations. These 
reporting requirements will ensure that Congress remains fully informed 
on developments related to the implementation of this agreement. As we 
all know, it is the prerogative of Congress to review these treaties 
and take action should we ever determine that Indian activities put the 
benefits of the agreement on U.S. national security interests in doubt.
  In addition, the committee adopted an amendment offered by Senator 
Chafee during markup of S. 3709 making it the policy of the United 
States that peaceful atomic cooperation and ``exports of nuclear fuel 
to India should not contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases 
in the production by India of fissile material for non-civilian 
purposes.''
  The administration is in the midst of negotiations with India on a 
123 Agreement, and New Delhi is also negotiating a new safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has yet to make a 
decision to embrace the U.S.-India Agreement and approve its 45 member 
states to engage in nuclear trade with India. If we accede to 
conditions such as the one contained in the Bingaman amendment, 
conditions that India has already rejected, we will severely limit our 
ability to influence India's nuclear program.
  Moreover, the IAEA's ability to monitor India's activities will be 
further circumscribed and we will return to a time when India was a 
hindrance rather than a partner in international, multilateral 
nonproliferation and arms control efforts.
  Senator Biden and I believe we have addressed this matter in a manner 
that does not threaten the viability of the

[[Page 22145]]

agreement. The determinations I described above were carefully drafted 
to balance, and not upset, the ongoing negotiations in Vienna or those 
in the U.S. and India. We must not forget that Congress will have a 
chance to vote on the 123 Agreement. S. 3709 provides Congress with an 
up or down vote on this important agreement and fully protects 
Congress' role in the process and ensures congressional views will be 
taken into consideration.
  In conclusion, the Bingaman amendment imposes an unacceptable 
precondition on civil nuclear cooperation with India. India will regard 
this as ``moving the goalposts,'' an unacceptable renegotiation of the 
deal, and a bad-faith effort on our part.
  As a consequence, this is a deal-killer that wrecks the balance that 
we sought between executive and legislative power, nonproliferation 
responsibilities, and the U.S.-India relationship. Killer conditions 
such as these forfeit the U.S. ability to influence Indian behavior. 
While I understand that this was not the intent of the Senator from New 
Mexico, in my view it is the practical effect.
  In sum, the Lugar-Biden bill addresses the issues raised by this 
amendment without undercutting the agreement. Unfortunately, the 
Bingaman amendment is a killer amendment and I urge Senators to oppose 
it.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. I have two amendments to offer. I will be happy to offer 
and debate them in order and to work with the chairman on whatever 
arrangements he might wish for a vote on these amendments.
  Mr. LUGAR. Let me respond to the Senator. I appreciate his 
willingness to offer the amendments in a timely fashion. We are in the 
process of debating one amendment, but I will ask unanimous consent it 
be temporarily laid aside so the Senator can offer his amendments to 
expedite this consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is set aside.
  The Senator is recognized to present his first amendment.


                           Amendment No. 5178

  Mr. DORGAN. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 5178.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

  (Purpose: To declare that it is the policy of the United States to 
 continue to support implementation of United Nations Security Council 
                        Resolution 1172 (1998))

         On page 5, beginning on line 15, strike ``Treaty; and'' 
     and all that follows through ``that exports'' on line 16 and 
     insert the following: ``Treaty;
         (9) to continue to support implementation of United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998); and
         (10) that exports

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this amendment is very simple and very 
short. Its brevity is contained in line 4 to line 6.
  It is an amendment that says we will:

       On page 5, beginning on line 15, strike ``Treaty; and'' and 
     all that follows through ``that exports'' . . . and insert 
     the following:
       (9) to continue to support implementation of United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 1172.

  Let me describe what this means and why I am offering it. In May of 
1998, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Security 
Council Resolution No. 1172 after India and then Pakistan, detonated 
nuclear weapons. The Security Council unanimously passed a resolution.
  The resolution I have in my hand, in part, says that the Security 
Council is gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests 
conducted by India and then Pakistan constitute to international 
efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons and also gravely concerned at the danger to peace and 
stability in the region.
  Continuing, it says that the resolution condemns the nuclear tests 
conducted by India on 11 and 13 May, 1998, and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 
May, 1998, demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear 
tests, calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear 
weapon development programs, to refrain from weaponization or from the 
deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic 
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; it says the 
Security Council recognizes that the tests conducted by India and 
Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts toward nuclear 
nonproliferation and disarmament, urges India and Pakistan and all 
other states that have not yet done so to become parties to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty without delay and without conditions.
  That was the reaction of our country and of the United Nations in May 
of 1998, following the detonation of nuclear weapons by both India and 
Pakistan, a point in time in which the world was very concerned about 
those actions.
  Our country then led a multinational effort to pass a resolution in 
the United Nations, Resolution 1172. That resolution, which passed 
unanimously and which has become a resolution that represents our 
policy and our support for these basic tenets, is at odds with the 
underlying legislation being considered by the Senate.
  I offer a piece of legislation, an amendment, that says it is still 
U.S. policy to support the implementations of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1172.
  How does this square with what is before the Senate?
  Resolution 1172 demonstrated that our country, the United States, and 
the rest of the international community, agree there should be no 
further nuclear weapons testing in South Asia and there should be an 
end to dangerous nuclear arms competition and no additional nuclear 
weapons produced. That resolution is as relevant today as it was in 
1998.
  Both India and Pakistan have violated Resolution 1172. They continue 
to build nuclear weapons, they produce fissile material for weapons in 
both of those countries, they continue to develop new nuclear-capable 
missiles.
  No one in this Chamber would like to see, in my judgment, India or 
Pakistan resume nuclear testing.
  Now, the Bush administration wants to lift international restrictions 
on nuclear trade with India. It is as if the United Nations Security 
Council resolution doesn't exist, never happened, doesn't apply to our 
country, doesn't apply to India. What does that say to North Korea? 
What does that tell the country of Iran?
  This past July, the United States convinced the Security Council of 
the United Nations to call upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA 
and suspend its uranium enrichment program, stop work on a heavy water 
production. Iran has not complied and the U.S. working with other 
nation states on the Security Council to pass another resolution.
  In October, the Security Council passed Resolution 1718, which 
condemns North Korea's nuclear test and demands that North Korea not 
conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile. It 
also calls on North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons in existing 
nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner; 
also, to give up its ballistic missile program.
  But these resolutions on Iran and North Korea will, in my judgment, 
mean far less if the United States does not reaffirm its commitment to 
Resolution 1172 with respect to India and Pakistan.

[[Page 22146]]

  As the world watches our actions--and we have Ambassador Burns and 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice rushing to India to negotiate these 
kinds of agreements that begin to untie and unravel decades of 
leadership by our country against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
As the world watches our actions, what will they learn from this 
discussion, from these actions by the Senate? Will they learn today 
that we remain committed to Resolution 1172 of the United Nations?
  It would be, it seems to me, a huge step backward for the Senate to 
say that Resolution 1172, which was our policy, which passed 
unanimously in the United Nations, which called for the cessation of 
the production of additional nuclear weapons by both India and 
Pakistan, if we were to tell the world that somehow that is no longer 
our policy, that is no longer operative--at least it is not operative 
with respect to India and Pakistan.
  As I said earlier, the burden falls to us to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons. It is our responsibility. We are the major nuclear 
superpower in the world. We inherit the requirement to stop the spread 
of nuclear weapons, keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of 
terrorists, try to prevent a cataclysmic terror attack anywhere in the 
world and especially against the cities of our country by a terrorist 
group who has a nuclear weapon. It is our responsibility to do that.
  What then embraces that responsibility? What kind of things should we 
be doing in the Senate? Should we be deciding in the Senate that one 
way to do that is to allow the production of additional nuclear weapons 
on this Earth? Of course not, that is absurd. Will the underlying bill 
that is before the Senate allow the production of additional nuclear 
weapons? Of course, it will. Everyone agrees with that. We all 
understand that. If that weren't the case, there would not be a 
requirement to keep eight of the nuclear reactors behind a curtain that 
will never be inspected. We understand what is going on.
  I read this morning the statement from one of the top advisers in 
India that said they have a responsibility to move quickly and 
aggressively to continue to build their nuclear deterrent. That is 
exactly what is at work here. Has our country now decided it is not our 
responsibility to stop this? Have we decided to be the green light to 
allow others to build additional nuclear weapons? Is that the junction 
we have reached? Not with my vote.
  I understand all the arguments about the geopolitics and about India 
and China and counterweights and all of these issues. None of it, in my 
judgment, justifies a decision by the United States of America to send 
a signal to the world that we believe it is all right for anybody to 
begin producing additional nuclear weapons.
  Our role, our responsibility, is to find ways today, on Thursday, 
November 16, 2006 to shut down the production of additional nuclear 
weapons, put pressure on those who want to build more nuclear weapons, 
to say to them it is not acceptable to us to have you building 
additional nuclear weapons.
  Yes, that goes for India. It goes for Pakistan. It goes for China. It 
goes for all of those countries.
  That ought to be our message. It ought to be unified. It ought not to 
be convoluted. It ought to be clear. Yet the underlying message with 
what is on the floor of the Senate--again, negotiated by Ambassador 
Burns and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, largely in secret; I 
read about it, by the way, in the Washington Post--the underlying 
message is we have decided to develop a relationship with India that is 
a counterweight to China in that region. One way to do that is to allow 
India to be able to purchase the things they need with which to produce 
additional nuclear power.
  They have been prevented from doing that because they refused to sign 
the nonproliferation treaty. They refused to sign that treaty; 
therefore, they have had sanctions against them and resolutions at the 
United Nations enacted that have condemned the actions. And now, in one 
fell swoop, they are told: Never mind. It does not matter. We are 
friends, and that friendship transcends the sanctions that exist for 
those of you who have not signed the nonproliferation treaty.
  I think this is a horrible mistake. Again, I do not question the 
motives of those who disagree with me. But we have made some very 
serious mistakes recently because some big thinkers made some big 
mistakes. This is a very big mistake. It is likely that the Senate will 
pass the underlying legislation today. I will regret that. But if it 
passes that legislation without reaffirming the basic support for 
Resolution 1172, this message today will have been a very destructive 
message to the rest of the world with respect to our country's 
leadership away from nuclear proliferation.
  So, Mr. President, I would hope that we could have a vote on this 
resolution. I have a second resolution that I shall offer. But with 
that discussion of my resolution, I will yield the floor so my 
colleagues can respond to it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.


                     Amendments Nos. 5179 and 5180

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk that have 
been cleared on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for Mr. Bingaman, 
     proposes amendments numbered 5179 and 5180, en bloc.

  The amendments are as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 5179

   (Purpose: To require as part of the implementation and compliance 
  report an estimate of uranium use and an analysis of the production 
                   rate of nuclear explosive devices)

       On page 18, beginning on line 7, strike ``existing'' and 
     all that follows through ``description'' on line 9 and insert 
     the following:

     existing agreements;
       (6) an estimate of--
       (A) the amount of uranium mined in India during the 
     previous year;
       (B) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or 
     allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; 
     and
       (C) the rate of production in India of--
       (i) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
       (ii) nuclear explosive devices;
       (7) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected 
     the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices; 
     and
       (8) a detailed description


                           AMENDMENT NO. 5180

  (Purpose: To establish a United States-India scientific cooperative 
                       threat reduction program)

       At the end of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 114. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE THREAT 
                   REDUCTION PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through 
     the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration, shall establish a cooperative threat 
     reduction program to pursue jointly with scientists from the 
     United States and India a program to further common 
     nonproliferation goals, including scientific research and 
     development efforts related to nuclear nonproliferation, with 
     an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred 
     to as the ``program'').
       (b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
     Defense.
       (c) National Academies Recommendations.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into 
     an agreement with the National Academies to develop 
     recommendations for the implementation of the program.
       (2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under 
     paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified 
     individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the 
     communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year 
     of--
       (A) recommendations for research and related programs 
     designed to overcome existing technological barriers to 
     nuclear nonproliferation; and
       (B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded 
     under this section are achieving the goals of the activities 
     and programs.
       (3) Public availability.--The recommendations and 
     assessments prepared under this subsection shall be made 
     publicly available.
       (d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All 
     United States activities related to the program shall be 
     consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

  Mr. LUGAR. I urge adoption of the amendments.

[[Page 22147]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are adopted 
en bloc.
  The amendments (Nos. 5179 and 5180) were agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. I would mention, Mr. President, the author of the 
amendments is Senator Bingaman, and one of the amendments is also in 
conjunction with Senator Domenici.


                           Amendment No. 5178

  Mr. President, I want to respond to the distinguished Senator from 
North Dakota briefly. I oppose his amendment. While the amendment would 
merely state that it is U.S. policy to continue to support 
implementation of the Security Council resolution that was passed in 
June 1998 in response to the nuclear weapons tests in South Asia--a 
resolution we voted for--I believe the amendment casts us back to a 
very different time, well before the miraculous changes in India's 
relations with the United States and with the world that occurred as a 
result of the July 2005 Joint Statement and India's decision to turn 
the corner on nonproliferation policy generally.
  I do not believe this bill is the right place to address ourselves to 
the past. This bill is about the future. We have taken adequate account 
in the bill of the concerns the Senator's amendment would address. 
Section 1033 of the Lugar-Biden bill makes it the policy of the United 
States that:

       India remains in full compliance with its non-
     proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements, 
     obligations, and commitments.

  Section 108(b) of our legislation requires annual reporting, 
including a detailed description of ``United States efforts to promote 
national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, 
securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, 
pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime, 
including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty; the 
reactions of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and assistance that 
the United States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India 
and Pakistan'' to promote such objectives.
  In the context of this bill, I do not believe it is appropriate to 
return to the past in a way the Senator's amendment would, and I urge 
defeat of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak to the Dorgan amendment. I 
appreciate, respect, and share the sentiment and concern of the Senator 
from North Dakota who has been doggedly supportive of pushing 
nonproliferation and a nonproliferation regime. And if this were 1998 
or 1999, I would support the Senator's amendment. But this is 2006, and 
a great deal has changed since India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear 
devices in 1998.
  The Security Council resolution passed after those tests called for 
several things: one including for India and Pakistan to immediately 
stop their nuclear weapons programs and their ballistic missile 
programs. We wish they would have ceased their nuclear programs. They 
did not. We wish they had ceased their programs with regard to 
missiles. Well, they did not.
  So the fact is, it is not realistic. We wish they would join the 
nuclear test ban treaty. But do we really think that is possible under 
this administration that is not supportive of a comprehensive nuclear 
test ban treaty?
  In this legislation, and in the United States-India nuclear 
agreement, we are making clear that continued cooperation under this 
nuclear agreement and nuclear exports to India will cease if India, 
one, tests a nuclear device, terminates or materially violates its IAEA 
safeguards, materially violates its agreement with the United States, 
or engages in nuclear proliferation.
  Further, the bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol. It also requires 
the President to certify that the safeguards agreement is in accordance 
with the IAEA standards, principles, and practices.
  In sum, that is U.S. policy toward India and its nuclear program, and 
I do not see the purpose of revisiting the old history of 1998. We need 
to look forward, and that is what we are doing in this legislation. We 
are using this legislation and the agreement to build a new 
relationship with India on this issue, and also using it as a means to 
strengthen the bilateral relationship across the board. And in doing 
so, we have enshrined important nonproliferation principles into this 
legislation because we cannot turn back the history of 1998.
  So at the appropriate time--and I think we are working now on a 
consent agreement--I would urge the defeat of the Dorgan amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, just a couple of----
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield just for a 
moment?
  Mr. DORGAN. Yes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask the Senator, how long do you think 
it will take for you to discuss and dispose of your amendment?
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, it is my intention to respond briefly to a 
couple of comments that have been made in objection to my amendment, 
and then to offer my second amendment, per agreement with the chairman. 
That would probably take me about 10 minutes, and to speak in support 
of my second amendment.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the Senator, and I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I listened intently to my two colleagues 
who apparently cannot find the ability to support this amendment. I do 
want to make a couple of observations. One of my colleagues said that 
India is in full compliance with its commitments. Well, yes, that is 
true. And the reason they are in full compliance with their commitments 
is they do not have the commitments we have. They have not signed the 
nonproliferation treaty. They do not have the commitments that we would 
expect of them. So are they in full compliance with the commitments 
that do not exist? I do not know. I mean, I guess. It is not much of an 
excuse for India, in my judgment. I don't understand that objection.
  The discussion of ``this agreement would cease if the following'' 
omitted one key issue: ``This agreement will cease if India continues 
to produce additional nuclear weapons.'' No, that was not included in 
this bill. Why? Because this agreement allows India to continue to 
produce additional nuclear weapons. That is at the root of this 
agreement; otherwise why would you have nuclear facilities put off 
limits behind a curtain, behind which India can produce additional 
nuclear bombs?
  So this issue of that we have safeguards, and this agreement will 
cease if the following exists, does not include that this agreement 
will cease if India continues to produce additional nuclear weapons. 
Why doesn't it include that provision? Because all of us here know what 
is going to happen. What is going to happen is this agreement is going 
to pass, and our ally, a wonderful country, India, is going to be told 
by this country: It is all right if behind a curtain uninspected 
facilities continue to produce additional nuclear bombs. That is all 
right with us. It works fine with us. It is not all right with me. It 
does not work fine with me.
  The past versus the future? I am glad we are not debating the 
Constitution. That is the past. Man, that is a couple hundred years 
past. What are the virtues of the Constitution? How about the virtues 
of the past, the efforts in the past at nonproliferation, the efforts 
in the past when we were serious about these issues? Really serious. 
And this country took it upon themselves to say: We are going to lead 
the way. We, by God, are going to lead the way because it is our 
burden. It is our responsibility.
  We inherit that requirement. Yes, that is the past, and I am proud of 
that past. In fact, this morning I described part of that past, 
credited, I might say, to my colleague from Indiana and my

[[Page 22148]]

former colleague from Georgia, and my colleague from Delaware. I hold 
in my hand a wing strut from a Soviet bomber that likely carried a 
nuclear weapon, which could have been dropped on an American city.
  That wing strut came from an airplane that was not shot down. That 
airplane was sawed up by an agreement. That sawing of that Backfire 
bomber, whose wing strut I now hold, was paid for by American 
taxpayers. We destroyed nuclear weapons, no, not by battle, not through 
firing our nuclear weapons. We destroyed them by saws and other methods 
of destruction, paid for by the American taxpayer.
  We destroyed nuclear weapons. Four countries that possessed them are 
now free of nuclear weapons. We destroyed delivery systems, Backfire 
bombers, missiles. Yes, that is the past, a past I am enormously proud 
of, a past we need more of, a past we need to learn from.
  The future? The future is a process here by which we say: Do you know 
what. India, you are a good country--and let me join in that 
description of the county of India. But we also say: We don't care so 
much anymore you didn't sign the nonproliferation treaty. We don't care 
that you violated Resolution 1172 of the United Nations. That is all 
OK. And, in fact, we are going to tell the suppliers of the world that 
can supply you with things you need to produce nuclear power go ahead 
and do that. The sanctions are off. We have decided that our position 
has changed. It used to be that we and the rest of the world would not 
allow you to purchase that because you would not sign the 
nonproliferation treaty. We have changed our minds. In fact, we are 
going to tell the suppliers to furnish that to you, and you can use it 
behind the curtain with some of your facilities to produce additional 
nuclear weapons. You can do it because there will be no inspections.
  That, frankly, is the circumstance of this legislation. So we have 
disagreement. I regret that. But I feel very strongly. I know my 
colleagues feel strongly about their position on this issue. I would 
just say, I hope we will not decide today as a Senate to say that 
Security Council Resolution 1172 does not matter because it is old. It 
is timeless. It is not old. It is timeless in its position of what we 
should stand for as a country.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief.
  As I said, I really admire, respect, and observe the passion of my 
friend from North Dakota on this issue. But I think the comparisons are 
not particularly apt. The wing strut the Senator has was able to be 
held in his hand because two countries--the United States and the 
Soviet Union--concluded that it was in their mutual interest to cease 
and desist and/or significantly reduce the threat each posed to the 
other. And they were the only threats that existed. The only threat to 
the United States from a nuclear capability of an ICBM or a Backfire 
bomber resided in the Soviet Union.
  Now, we tried. I was the author of--and, as a matter of fact, there 
was a South Dakota Senator named Pressler, along with John Glenn, who 
early on put in legislation relating to sanctions for India.
  India obviously violated those sanctions and did not comply with the 
U.N. resolution. But there is a reason for that--not a justification, a 
reason. They looked across their borders north and west and saw two 
nuclear powers--one emerging nuclear power, one existing nuclear 
power--and they concluded, rightly or wrongly, from their perspective 
that they had to be a nuclear power.
  It is clear nonproliferation does not work in a vacuum. 
Nonproliferation entreatments, requests, proddings to a nation that 
finds itself in a situation where it believes it is threatened by a 
nuclear neighbor have not worked particularly well, offering those two 
examples, for example.
  It seems to me what we are attempting to do is the only route to get 
to the point where both India and Pakistan are part of a 
nonproliferation treaty; that is, we are trying to change the regional 
situation on the ground. It is not going to happen through a 
nonproliferation treaty. It is going to happen through a rapprochement 
between India and Pakistan. The idea that we would be able to, through 
any legislation, prevent India from moving forward to add additional 
nuclear weapons, if they so choose to do that--there is no legislation 
we can pass to do that.
  What this legislation does is recognize the reality of the 
geopolitical situation in the region, set up safeguards to deal with 
the ability for India to use anything we are doing with them to be able 
to further advance their nuclear capability, give them a new buy-in to 
an international regime that will have the effect of putting pressure 
on them to move in the direction we and the Soviets moved on back when 
that Backfire bomber strut was sawed off a wing, and that is the route 
we choose. It is not pretty. It is not clear. It is no guarantee. It is 
not certain to succeed. But I do know one thing: Absent this agreement, 
there is a likelihood things get worse instead of better, beyond what 
may already occur.
  I appreciate the Senator's comparisons, but I think they are not as 
apt as they might appear to be because, again, India's motivation, in 
terms of its viewing its need for a nuclear arsenal, is not unlike the 
motivation that existed with regard to the United States and the Soviet 
Union. It is going to take a geopolitical settlement of that, not a 
nuclear arms control agreement imposing a settlement on India and 
Pakistan at this moment, now that the genie is out of the bottle.
  I appreciate my friend's point and respect his point of view, but I 
disagree that it is the best way to move forward.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Let me respond briefly. There is a very big difference 
between this and the agreement we had with the Soviet Union. In the 
Soviet Union agreement, both sides, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, decided they wished to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and 
the delivery systems of those weapons. As a result of that decision, 
both sides wishing to reduce both weapons and delivery systems, we 
embarked on a process that was very helpful to both countries and to 
the world and to world peace. This is very different. This is mutual 
interest.
  But now, we are told it is in our mutual interest, us and India, to 
have India be allowed to produce additional nuclear weapons, not reduce 
nuclear weapons. Under this agreement, everyone will agree, India will 
be allowed to increase nuclear weapons. If India is allowed to increase 
nuclear weapons under this agreement, that is very different from the 
agreement we had with the Soviets by which we decided to reduce.
  The point is, this agreement says it is in our mutual interest to 
allow India to increase its production of nuclear weapons. That is 
clearly not in our mutual interest, but that is what the resolution 
says.
  Second, my colleague is right, none of this operates in a vacuum. 
This will not be in a vacuum, either. Pakistan will insist on producing 
more nuclear weapons. So will China. Pakistan has already told our 
country: If you are going to do this with India, we want you to do it 
with us. So this decision will not be made in a vacuum vis-a-vis India; 
this decision will have an impact regionally and around the world.
  My colleague is very skillful in presenting his position. I admire 
both of my colleagues and their skill and determination as well. We 
just have a difference of opinion. I think this is a very significant 
mistake.
  I have a second amendment which I will send to the desk and offer for 
its consideration and try to truncate the description of that very 
briefly, if that is appropriate to the chairman.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, may I respond briefly to my colleague?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. It would be my hope--and let me discuss this quickly--that 
the debate on the first amendment of Senator Dorgan is completed. 
Secondly, I want a short time for Senator

[[Page 22149]]

Domenici of New Mexico to make a statement. And then thirdly, we will 
proceed to the introduction of Senator Dorgan's second amendment. My 
hope would be that a unanimous consent will be formulated--I know staff 
from both sides are working on that--that will provide for rollcall 
votes on both Dorgan amendments and then, at the conclusion of the 
debate of the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, on the Bingaman 
amendment, perhaps a stack of three votes for the convenience of 
Senators. I am broaching that, not asking for everybody to agree, but I 
am hopeful that would be a general agreement of those who are around at 
this point.
  It is my hope that the distinguished Senator from New Mexico might be 
recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman, 
Senator Lugar, for arranging for my few remarks before he proceeds.
  After committing to a framework 16 months ago, President Bush and 
India's Prime Minister announced an agreement earlier this year on 
civil nuclear cooperation between our two countries. I believe they 
recognize this historic moment in our history, one that requires vision 
and foresight to anticipate the world as it will be rather than stuck 
in the past wishing things somehow would be different. Some will argue 
that we must pursue a better deal approaching perfection, but the deal 
that has been negotiated is a good one that we must pursue now and 
begin taking steps to strengthen the nonproliferation regime with India 
by our side.
  Senators Lugar and Biden and the Foreign Relations Committee have 
done an admirable job of striking a balance that anticipates this 
future. This strong, bipartisan bill represents a critical step toward 
strengthening an eroding nonproliferation framework. We only need look 
at North Korea and Iran for evidence that this erosion is taking place 
and as a wake-up call that fundamental change is needed. The global 
community must work together to assure the peaceful pursuit of civilian 
nuclear waste.
  This historic agreement is a critical step that moves the United 
States and India toward a strategic relationship between our great 
democracies. Through this relationship, built on strength, we can 
jointly work toward a vision of a proliferation-free world. I 
understand that is a vision. It is not real even now. And while things 
might even look a little worse, the truth is, the relationship we are 
building with what we are agreeing to here on the floor, when that 
completes its course and becomes a reality, then that means we are 
building toward a proliferation-free world.
  India is a worthy partner. That was one of the basic questions: 
Should you enter into this agreement with a partner that has not been 
part of the ordinary, agreed-upon, acceptable accords and agreements 
between countries heretofore? I would remind everyone that India is the 
largest democracy--a population currently over 1 billion and expected 
to surpass China in the next 50 years. It has a rapidly expanding 
economy with a growth rate of over 7 percent a year in 2005, a rapidly 
expanding economy that is the envy of almost all countries that have 
free and open democracies. This agreement with India brings global 
transparency to India's entire civilian nuclear program. We forget that 
India's civilian and military program still remains closed to global 
scrutiny. Under this agreement, the entire civilian program, 65 percent 
of all nuclear activity and eventually 90 percent of all nuclear 
activity, will open to monitoring by the IAEA. Obviously, we ought to 
start, if that is where we are going to end up, because that is as good 
as we are going to do. And certainly we ought to be grateful that 
through the leadership of the President and now the leadership of the 
Congress, we can get there.
  The people are similar to the American people. They desire a better 
life for themselves and their children. Rapid economic growth that has 
led to improving their standard of living is projected to result in a 
doubling of the energy needs of their country in the next 25 years. 
India must make choices today that drive their energy mix in the 
future.
  Like many countries, they have chosen nuclear power to improve their 
energy security while reducing reliance on imports. India currently has 
nine reactors under construction and plans to grow the nuclear share to 
25 percent by 2050. That is 100 times the 2002 capacity. Cooperation 
with India will lead to significant opportunities for U.S. industry to 
help assure India's energy mix, including nuclear power, is clean, 
diversified, and proliferation-resistant.
  I strongly support an evolving strategic U.S. relationship with India 
that this agreement promotes. We ought to be proud of it and move with 
dispatch. It is the world's largest democracy and a worthy partner that 
we can work with in our pursuit of global security. I have worked with 
Senator Lugar in the past on nonproliferation measures that required 
vision and foresight. With India also, we must look to our future. I 
urge my colleagues to support this bill and urge dispatch in 
consideration of the balance of the subject matter.
  I thank Senator Lugar for obtaining time for me on the floor, and I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New 
Mexico, Mr. Domenici, for his very strong statement, and I simply want 
to mention again how much I appreciate working with him over the years. 
The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation was extremely important throughout 
a good part of the last decade, and on the nonproliferation efforts he 
has been a champion in the Senate. We appreciate his contribution to 
this debate today.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, I note the presence of the distinguished Senator from 
North Dakota. We indicated that he would continue by offering his 
second amendment, and I would advise him to do so, if he is prepared.


                           Amendment No. 5182

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 5182 and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 5182.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 5182

(Purpose: To require as a precondition to United States-India peaceful 
 atomic energy cooperation a determination by the President that India 
has committed to certain basic provisions consistent with United States 
 nonproliferation goals and the obligations and political commitments 
  undertaken by State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)

       On page 8, beginning on line 8, strike ``Group; and'' and 
     all that follows through ``the Nuclear'' on line 9 and insert 
     the following:

     Group;
       (8) India has committed to--
       (A) the development of a credible separation plan between 
     civilian and military facilities by ensuring all reactors 
     that supply electricity to the civilian sector are declared 
     and are subject to permanent IAEA standards and practices;
       (B) a binding obligation to the same extent as nuclear-
     weapon State Parties under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty--
       (i) not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
     weapons or nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
     devices directly or indirectly; and
       (ii) not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any 
     non-nuclear-weapon State Party to manufacture or otherwise 
     acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
     acquire control over such weapons or explosive devices; and
       (C) consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--
       (i) pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective 
     measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
     early date and to nuclear disarmament, including ending 
     fissile material production for nuclear weapons;
       (ii) joining a legally-binding nuclear test moratorium;

[[Page 22150]]

       (iii) verifiably reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile; 
     and
       (iv) eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons; and
       (9) the Nuclear


                    Amendment No. 5178, as Modified

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to offer a 
modification to the first amendment I offered today. The amendment had 
two line numbers in it that were made to the original copy of the 
legislation. That legislation was subsequently changed. So let me ask 
unanimous consent that on the initial amendment I offered today, on 
line 1, the reference to line 15 be struck, and it is line 8; on line 
2, the reference to line 15 be struck, and it is line 9.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 5178), as modified, is as follows:

       On page 5, beginning on line 8, strike ``Treaty; and'' and 
     all that follows through ``that exports'' on line 9 and 
     insert the following:

     Treaty;
       (9) to continue to support implementation of United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998); and
       (10) that exports

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the second amendment I have sent to the 
desk says that before this United States-India agreement can go into 
effect, the President must submit to the Congress a written 
determination that India has committed to certain basic provisions 
consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals and with the NPT, the 
nonproliferation treaty. It requires the President to determine that 
India has committed to, for example, putting all of its reactors that 
supply electricity to the civilian sector under the IAEA inspection 
regime. This would close a loophole that exists in the proposed 
agreement, and that loophole allows India to keep electricity-producing 
reactors out of the IAEA inspection regime. Eight of them will be out 
of the regime, and those eight are going to be behind a curtain, unable 
to be inspected, and able to produce the materials to produce 
additional nuclear weapons. Fourteen of the existing and planned 
nuclear reactors would be inspected, and eight of them would not.
  If those other eight reactors produce civilian electricity, my 
amendment would require that India allow inspection of them.
  The bill as now written would allow India to produce energy with 
nuclear reactors that are closed to IAEA safeguards. My amendment says 
that is a loophole which should not be allowed. If India can keep 
energy-producing reactors outside of these safeguards, why shouldn't 
other countries be allowed to do so? How will our country say to 
others: Well, we have special deals. We have loopholes here for one, 
but we are not consistent. There is no consistency with respect to our 
position on these issues.
  The amendment also requires India to undertake a binding obligation 
not to assist, encourage, or induce nonnuclear weapons states to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. That is what our 
country has obligated itself to do under the nonproliferation treaty. 
It is what other nuclear weapons states have done as well, including 
Russia, China, Britain, and France. They have all agreed to and signed 
the nonproliferation treaty and agreed to that basic provision, a 
binding obligation not to assist, encourage, or induce nonnuclear 
weapons states to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.
  Lastly, my amendment requires the President to determine that India 
has committed itself to pursuing negotiations on measures directed at 
reducing nuclear stockpiles and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. 
These are the same commitments, the very same commitments our country 
has made, the same commitments other nation states which have signed 
the nonproliferation treaty have made. So I believe it is appropriate 
that if we have this agreement with India dealing with the issue of 
nuclear weapons, they should be under the same obligations we are 
under. Even though they have not signed the nonproliferation treaty, we 
have. We have obligations under that treaty. They should accept the 
obligations under that treaty, in my judgment, even though they have 
not yet signed it.
  This debate today has been interesting and, in many ways, very 
frustrating as well. I intend to support very aggressively the 
amendment offered by my colleague from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman. I 
believe that amendment is very important and at the root of much of 
what I have talked about today as well.
  It seems to me this is a case for our children and our grandchildren 
about what kind of a world they are going to live in. It is 
interesting. If you just fast forward from 1960 to 1980 to 2000 and 
fast forward from 2001 to today, we went through a Cold War with the 
Soviet Union where we had heavy nuclear weapons, huge nuclear weapons 
with big bombers and powerful missiles aimed at each other, so we had a 
Cold War. Massive numbers of nuclear weapons were built. We had a 
standoff between our country and the Soviet Union. There was great 
concern and worry that somehow, something would happen in which someone 
would launch a missile or a submarine or an airplane would launch a 
missile with a nuclear weapon and we would start a nuclear war and our 
two countries would be obliterated. It didn't happen. Instead, we chose 
a much more constructive direction.
  We and the Soviet Union began what is called arms control talks, and 
we reached arms control agreements. Those agreements began the 
destruction of weapons systems, delivery systems, nuclear weapons. I 
admit that a very small amount of those delivery systems and nuclear 
weapons were actually destroyed, but some of them were. It was actually 
moving in the right direction rather than the wrong direction. We 
developed a test ban treaty. We led the way. We said: We are going to 
no longer test nuclear weapons. We said that to the world. A 
nonproliferation treaty. We said this is important to do, and we were 
the leaders in saying this is the right course for the world. Now we 
are told: You know what, that is old-fashioned; that is the past; this 
is the future. I say that what we did then is timeless. These values 
don't change, the value of deciding that our future ought to be a 
future with fewer nuclear weapons rather than more nuclear weapons.
  If anyone has listened closely, they will know there has been no 
refutation of the assertion that some of my colleagues and I have made 
that this agreement will mean we have more nuclear weapons produced. No 
one has disputed that. This agreement means we are signing up to have 
more nuclear weapons produced on this Earth. One--just one--nuclear 
weapon in the hands of a terrorist group pulling up to a dock in a 
major American city on a container ship at 2\1/2\ or 3 miles an hour 
can potentially kill hundreds of thousands of American citizens--just 
one--and there are 30,000 out there. Can anyone here tell me that every 
one of those 30,000 is safeguarded and that no terrorist organization 
will acquire one? Can anybody tell me that is going to be the case?
  I started this morning talking about a CIA agent called Dragon Fire 
who reported 1 month after 9/11 that a Russian 10-kiloton nuclear 
weapon had been stolen by a terrorist group and taken into New York 
City and was about to be detonated. That episode has been written about 
in a book. Most of us have heard of it. It was a time when for a month 
we didn't know if it was true or not. It wasn't disclosed publicly 
because there would have been mass hysteria if it was thought that a 
10-kiloton nuclear weapon had been stolen from Russia and was now in 
New York City about to be detonated. It eventually was discovered that 
had not happened. But when they did the postmortem on that situation, 
it was understood that it was clearly possible. Russia had those 
weapons. They were not safeguarded well. They are not, and they were 
not. They could have been stolen. It could have been smuggled into a 
major American city by a terrorist group and it could have been 
detonated, killing hundreds of thousands of people. That is the 
consequence of one nuclear weapon. Just one. We have 30,000 or so on 
this Earth. What are we doing today? We are saying it is all right if 
they build more--in this case, India. It is OK if they build more.

[[Page 22151]]

  This is not going to be done in a vacuum. What we do here today will 
have consequences for Pakistan, it will have consequences for China. 
You think they won't decide if India is going to be allowed to build 
more nuclear weapons that they won't build more nuclear weapons? Of 
course they will. That is what this is about.
  I understand it is argued that this is geopolitics; you don't 
understand it; you can't see over the horizon. Maybe not. What I do 
understand is that this world will be a safer place with fewer nuclear 
weapons, this world will be a safer place if we care about 
nonproliferation, if we reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and this 
world will not be safer if at the end of today we have decided that we 
have given a green light to a world with more nuclear weapons.
  I hope my colleagues will agree with me and support my amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I intend to offer a short statement 
opposing the amendment. I would ask Members to be alert to the 
possibility that following my statement, Senator Biden has indicated he 
would put his statement in the Record if this plan can then be 
accepted, and we would then proceed to three rollcall votes: an 
amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, Mr. 
Bingaman, and two amendments offered by the distinguished Senator from 
North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan. For the convenience of our colleagues, those 
three votes would come without pause, thus minimizing the dislocation 
of Members' schedules and accelerating our consideration of this 
debate.
  I am certain the Chair has heard that Senator Biden and I, for many 
of our colleagues who were hopeful that we could proceed in a 
responsible way but conclude the debate today, on Thursday, are 
attempting to do that, and we appreciate the cooperation of our 
colleagues.
  Having said that, Mr. President, let me state my opposition to the 
second amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from North 
Dakota. His amendment would, in fact, undo the entire effort we have 
achieved with India over the past year. Not only would he revise 
India's civilian military separation plan with his amendment, but he 
would require India to assume the obligations of a nuclear weapons 
state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. This is, in 
effect, a perfect killer amendment. It should be strongly opposed by 
every Member of this body who supports an improved relationship with 
India.
  The Senator's amendment adds two new determination requirements to 
our bill: first, that India's separation plan result in a situation 
wherein all reactors that supply civilian power are declared to the 
IAEA and under safeguards; and second, that India assume certain NPT 
obligations. This is unnecessary and would do us great harm. It adds a 
new element in the separation plan that the President did not negotiate 
and would undo the deal we have reached.
  India's separation plan is credible and sound, according to criteria 
developed by the administration in its negotiations with India. As 
Secretary Rice stated last April:

       For the plan to be transparent, it had to be articulated 
     publicly.

  It has been.

       For it to be credible and defensible from a 
     nonproliferation standpoint, it had to capture more than just 
     a token number of Indian nuclear facilities--

  Which it did----

       by encompassing nearly two-thirds of India's current and 
     planned thermal power reactors, as well as all future civil, 
     thermal, and breeder reactors. Importantly, for the 
     safeguards to be meaningful, India had to commit to apply 
     IAEA safeguards in perpetuity.

  It did so.
       Once a reactor is under IAEA safeguards, those safeguards 
     will remain there permanently and on an unconditional basis. 
     Further, in our view, the plan also needed to include 
     upstream and downstream facilities associated with the 
     safeguarded reactors to provide a true separation of civil 
     and military programs. India committed to these steps, and we 
     have concluded that its separation plan meets the criteria 
     established: it is credible, transparent, and defensible from 
     a nonproliferation standpoint.

  The amendment changes the metrics for a credible and defensible 
separation plan by including that such a plan must mean that any 
reactor supplying power must be declared. As Secretary Rice stated 
before the committee:

       Regardless of whether they might be used to generate 
     electric power or not, reactors that are not declared civil, 
     and thus are not under IAEA safeguards, cannot legitimately 
     receive nuclear fuel or other nuclear cooperation from any 
     State party to the NPT.

  The second element in the Senator's amendment would require India to 
assume the obligations of a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.
  The administration was careful not to term India a ``nuclear weapon 
state'' with similar rights and obligations as those five nations in 
the NPT with status as lawful weapon states--France, Russia, China, the 
U.K., and the U.S.--and instead termed India in the July 2005 joint 
statement a ``responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.'' 
This was necessary to do no harm to U.S. and other weapons states' 
status under the treaty.
  The Senator's amendment would create obligations similar to those of 
weapon states for India through creating a determination requirement 
that the President must make wherein India has assumed the obligations 
of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. I would argue that this is not 
necessary, since it could well provoke India to walk away from the 
obligations they would assume under our 123 Agreement with them and 
leave the restraint we might get through that deal on their weapons 
program on the negotiating table.
  India has stated they have no intention to sign or become a party to 
the NPT, as a weapon state or otherwise. India's July 2005 joint 
statement commitments are significant, but they do not include NPT 
membership.
  I urge defeat of the amendment; it is a killer.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks 
made by the Senator from Indiana.
  The amendment requires India to declare as civil reactors all 
reactors that supply electricity to the civil sector.
  There is no way that India will accept this.
  I might wish they would, but they will not.
  That's because for decades, they have built reactors that can be 
either civil or military.
  So India has reserved as military enough reactors to produce more 
plutonium for nuclear weapons--in case they decide they need to do 
that.
  But India will also use those reactors for electric power.
  If this amendment is enacted, India will have to choose to either 
make all its power reactors civil, and build new ones to produce 
plutonium; or waste the electric power capability of its current 
military reactors.
  India will not do that.
  So this is a killer amendment.
  It's also a killer amendment because it requires India to commit to 
verifiably reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile.
  I wish India would do that--but it will not.
  India fears both Pakistan and China, which also have nuclear weapons.
  The Dorgan amendment does not require Pakistan and China to reduce 
their stockpiles, only India.
  This is a non-starter for India.
  Finally, the amendment requires India to commit to ``joining a 
legally-binding, nuclear test moratorium.'' I wish India would do that. 
I hope the administration will push for that.
  But for now, there is only one ``legally-binding, nuclear test 
moratorium.'' It is called the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.
  And I do not think this administration will press India to join that 
treaty.
  So, I sympathize with all of the concerns raised by this amendment. 
But I know that it would kill the nuclear deal.
  That is the bottom line: if we support the deal, we have to reject 
this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate

[[Page 22152]]

proceed to a series of stacked votes in relation to the following 
amendments: the Bingaman amendment No. 5174, the Dorgan amendment No. 
5178, as modified and the Dorgan amendment No. 5182; further, that 
there be no second degrees in order to any of the amendments prior to 
the votes, that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided before the 
second and third votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I think 
there is a need for a mild correction.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my second 
amendment be considered, notwithstanding the Harkin amendment that was 
previously offered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the primary request?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, could I ask the floor manager? I would 
prefer if we had 2 minutes equally divided prior to the first vote as 
well since there has been some time since we debated it. I want the 
chance to explain it for 1 minute before we have a vote.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I amend the request to include 2 minutes of 
debate on the Bingaman amendment No. 5174 prior to the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request, as amended?
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me ask the chairman. I wish to respond 
for 2 minutes to the comments which the chairman just made in 
opposition to my amendment prior to proceeding to the vote.
  Mr. LUGAR. I have no objection to that. I amend the request to 
include 2 minutes of debate by Senator Dorgan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection, as amended? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 5182

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I will try not to take the 2 minutes, but 
it is important to point out the chairman, in responding--and I suspect 
the ranking member in his response--is saying this is a killer 
amendment. It is not offered as a killer amendment, but it is the case 
that my amendment would impose upon India exactly the same burdens that 
exist upon our country. My colleague, the chairman, said the President 
``did not negotiate''--he started the sentence. That is what brings me 
to the floor--that the President ``did not negotiate.'' What he did not 
negotiate was a requirement and a burden on India which clearly is a 
nuclear weapons state. He did not negotiate a requirement and a burden 
on them that we ourselves assume under the nonproliferation treaty. My 
amendment would simply provide that requirement and that burden to the 
country of India.
  I come from a town of 300 people. I have to relearn always the 
lessons of the Senate--and not just the Senate but the way the 
Government works. In my hometown you always call things just the way 
they are. You saw it, you spoke it, and described it. In this body, 
however, now we know that India has a nuclear weapon--has many of them. 
We know they have detonated them, and we know they are a nuclear 
weapons state. So we have decided as a country officially to describe 
India as a responsible state with nuclear technology as opposed to a 
nuclear weapons state. I don't know; maybe it works here. It doesn't 
work in my hometown. We have to call things as we see them.
  We have responsibilities--all of us do. Our responsibility is, I 
think, toward nonproliferation, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, 
to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. I regret that the underlying 
piece of legislation is going to result in more nuclear weapons being 
built.
  The second amendment I have offered is an amendment that simply says 
let us impose on those with whom we negotiate the same burdens we 
inherit ourselves. In fact, the United States negotiated with India in 
the way that exempts them from those burdens. I think that is 
fundamentally wrong.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 2 minutes equally divided on the 
Bingaman amendment.


                           Amendment No. 5174

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will briefly describe the Bingaman 
amendment. It is an amendment that puts into effect the recommendations 
Senator Nunn made in his op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in May 
of this year. It says that as to nuclear equipment and technology, 
before we can export or reexport to India nuclear equipment or 
technology, the President must first determine that both India and the 
United States are taking specific steps to conclude a fissile material 
cutoff treaty.
  Second, the amendment says that before any nuclear materials fuel can 
be exported to India, the President must determine that India has 
stopped producing fissile materials for weapons.
  This is a reasonable amendment. This does not kill the deal, as I 
would see it. This is something which India has stated a willingness to 
generally abide by. I think this is the least we can insist upon. I 
hope very much my colleagues will support this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I will oppose this amendment as it goes 
significantly beyond the commitments India made in the joint statement. 
India will regard this particular requirement that India stop producing 
fissile materials for weapons as moving the goalposts and an 
unacceptable renegotiation of the deal--a bad-faith effort on our part.
  India maintains that they cannot agree to a unilateral cap at this 
time. We should not hold up the significant nonproliferation gains 
afforded by the initiative in order to seek a fissile material cap that 
India indicates it cannot agree to absent a similar commitment by 
Pakistan and China. Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for 
weapons-related purposes and China has not committed to a moratorium on 
such production. Unfortunately, in my judgment, this is truly a killer 
amendment. I strongly encourage that amendment be defeated.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the next two 
amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time on the next amendment?
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, my impression was that the call was for the 
vote and then a 2-minute debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is correct.
  The question is on agreeing to the Bingaman amendment. The yeas and 
nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Thomas).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 26, nays 73, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 265 Leg.]

                                YEAS--26

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Conrad
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Salazar

                                NAYS--73

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum

[[Page 22153]]


     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Thomas
       
  The amendment (No. 5174) was rejected.
  Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next 
rollcall votes be 10 minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                    Amendment No. 5178, as Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are now 2 minutes equally divided prior 
to a vote on the Dorgan amendment No. 5178, as modified.
  The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, my amendment, in light of the underlying 
bill brought to the floor of the Senate, would express that we would 
continue to support the implementation of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1172.
  The reason that is important is it had been the policy of this 
country to not only author but to support that resolution after India 
and Pakistan exploded their nuclear weapons.
  It calls on them to immediately stop their nuclear weapons 
development programs, refrain from weaponization or deployment of 
nuclear weapons, cease the development of ballistic missiles, and so 
on.
  That has been a very important tenet of this country in supporting 
that United Nations Resolution 1172. Despite what we are doing in the 
underlying bill, I would hope this country and this Senate would 
express our support for that which we drafted and that which we 
encouraged the rest of the world to support some while ago.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask that Members oppose the Dorgan 
amendment on the basis that the resolution he talks about is an 
important one, but it talks about a time in which our relationship with 
India was very different. It talks about the past. We have been very 
fortunate in this country to move into a better relationship with 
India, to a point where we are now going to be in India. The IAEA is 
going to be in India. We are going to be able to observe a bulk of the 
nuclear reactors and programs there and to work with India in peaceful 
development.
  There was a time when we did not have that relationship. By ``we,'' I 
mean the United States and the international community. The situation 
in India is constructive. This is a time to celebrate and to move on 
that momentum.
  I ask that the Dorgan amendment be defeated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as modified. The yeas and nays were previously ordered. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. 
Thomas).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 27, nays 71, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 266 Leg.]

                                YEAS--27

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Nelson (FL)
     Obama
     Reid
     Salazar
     Schumer
     Stabenow

                                NAYS--71

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     McCain
     Thomas
      
  The amendment (No. 5178), as modified, was rejected.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 5182

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the second amendment I had offered says 
that before the United States-India agreement can go into effect, the 
President must submit to the Congress a written determination that 
India has committed to certain basic provisions that are consistent 
with the U.S. nonproliferation goals and with the nonproliferation 
treaty. In other words, I would suggest that we should impose the same 
burdens on India as we have on ourselves. There is great reluctance to 
do that by this Chamber, but that was my amendment. I must say there is 
very little education in a third vote if I believe it weakens our 
efforts in nonproliferation nuclear weapons. So rather than have a 
third recorded vote, I will ask that we vitiate the recorded vote and 
vote on this amendment by voice.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, the yeas and nays are vitiated.
  Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the 
amendment, as modified.
  The amendment, as modified, was not agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to indicate that the 
distinguished Senator from Nevada will offer an amendment. We will then 
proceed to the Old Senate Chamber for a debate on that amendment. I 
think we have an agreement that the extent of the debate will be no 
more than 60 minutes. We would return to this Chamber for the actual 
vote on the Ensign amendment, following the debate in the Old Senate 
Chamber. Therefore, the Senator from Nevada should be recognized so 
that he can start that process.


                           Amendment No. 5181

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 5181 and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Ensign] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 5181.

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 5181

  (Purpose: To ensure that IAEA inspection equipment is not used for 
                          espionage purposes)

       Strike section 262 and insert the following:

     SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

       (a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--
     No national of a country designated by the Secretary of State 
     under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2371) as a government supporting acts of international 
     terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to 
     carry out an inspection activity under the Additional 
     Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.
       (b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA 
     inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States

[[Page 22154]]

     Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, 
     facilities, or activities in the United States under the 
     Additional Protocol.
       (c) Use of United States Equipment, Materials, and 
     Resources.--Any inspections conducted by personnel of the 
     IAEA in the United States pursuant to the Additional Protocol 
     shall by carried out using equipment, materials, and 
     resources that are purchased, owned, inspected, and 
     controlled by the United States.
       (d) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President 
     shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related 
     assessments not less than every 5 years to ensure that 
     information of direct national security significance remains 
     protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities 
     in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection 
     under the Additional Protocol.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from 
Delaware, as the ranking member, will offer the official motion sending 
us over to the Chamber.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I understand the parliamentary situation 
properly, and I am not sure I do, I ask unanimous consent that 
following the offering of the Ensign amendment, the Senate stand in 
recess subject to the call of the Chair so that it may reconvene 
pursuant to the previous order.
  I further ask that the following Senate staff be permitted to attend 
the closed session, and I send the list to the desk.
  The list is as follows:

       Mike Disilvestro; Joel Breitner; Mary Jane McCarthy; Paul 
     Nelson; Richard Verma; Stephen Rademaker; Marcel Lettre; 
     Nancy Erickson; Lynne Halbrooks; Scott O'Malia; Pam Thiessen; 
     Thomas Moore; Lynn Rusten; Ed Corrigan; Rexon Ryu; Ken Myers 
     III; Ken Myers, Jr; Brian McKeon; Ed Levine; Madelyn Creedon; 
     Nancy Stetson; Diane Ohlbaum; Anthony Blinken; Janice 
     O'Connell.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, before the Chair rules, I will remind 
Senators that those who attend the closed session are not permitted to 
bring any electronic devices into the Old Senate Chamber. Mr. 
President, I send to the desk the list of the names of the staff 
members that could be present.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________