[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 21889-21890]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Leiberman, Mr. 
        Leahy, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. Coleman, Mr. Coburn, Mr. Kerry, Mr. 
        Salazar, Mr. Sununu, Mr. Kennedy, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. 
        Lautenberg, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Biden, Mr. Levin, Mr. 
        Byrd, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Warner, Ms. Snowe, and Mr. Bennett):
  S. 4046. A bill to extend oversight and accountability related to 
United States reconstruction funds and efforts in Iraq by extending the 
termination date of the Office of the Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction; to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, today Senator Feingold and I are 
introducing the Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act of 2006. This 
bipartisan legislation, is co-sponsored by Senators Lieberman, Leahy, 
Coleman, Cantwell, Salazar, Kerry and Coburn, has a single purpose: to 
ensure continuing, vigorous oversight of American tax dollars in Iraq 
by repealing the premature termination date for the Office of the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).
  This legislation would restore SIGIR's termination date to its 
previous schedule of 10 months after 80 percent of Iraq reconstruction 
funds have been expended. It would repeal conference language in the 
2007 Defense Authorization Bill that would close SIGIR on October 1, 
2007, and transfer oversight to the Inspectors General of the 
Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development.
  Departmental and agency Inspectors General perform an important 
service with dedication and expertise. However, those offices are 
configured to provide audits, inspections, and investigations of 
continuing government operations. The traditional approach of IG 
oversight--extensive inquiries, lengthy preparation and delivery of 
reports, recommendations for corrective action--is thorough. But it 
also is time-consuming and can allow wasteful or fraudulent practices 
to continue for some time.
  Iraq reconstruction is a unique situation, with enormous amounts of 
money being spent in a relatively short period of time on a specific 
range of programs and operations. A number of agencies across the 
federal government are active in Iraq reconstruction, including the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, the Department of Justice and others. 
Reconstruction managers, and ultimately the taxpayers, do not have the 
luxury of waiting months to receive recommendations to correct wasteful 
or fraudulent practices. Oversight of Iraq reconstruction requires that 
the Inspector General be able to cross departmental boundaries and 
deliver the results of his work quickly and efficiently.
  Effective oversight of Iraq reconstruction requires the unique 
approach provided by the SIGIR. Special Inspector General Stuart Bowen 
described this approach in testimony before the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee in a hearing on August 2. SIGIR's 
auditors and inspectors provide on-the-spot guidance to managers as 
soon as problems are discovered, so corrective action can begin 
immediately. This ``real time'' method allows most of his reports to 
document not only how problems were detected, but also how they were 
corrected.

[[Page 21890]]

  This method works. It should continue as long as American funds are 
being used for Iraq reconstruction, not terminate on some arbitrary and 
premature date. As of October 30, 2006, SIGIR estimates that the 
financial impact of its audit operations is $441 billion, its 
investigative operations is $20 million and its inspection operations 
is $1.44 billion. It has achieved these results while costing the 
taxpayer $72 million. This means that for every dollar SIGIR has spent 
there has been a financial impact of $25 dollars, a very impressive 
ratio. SIGIR has also opened 256 cases thus far, and has either 
referred for prosecution or cleared 164. SIGIR has an impressive 
record. The Office has 92 open cases, with 25 of them at the Department 
of Justice. SIGIR has issued 73 audit reports and 65 project 
assessments. Its work has led to the arrests of five people, and the 
convictions of four, with more than $17 million in assets seized. 
During the current quarter, SIGIR investigators opened 20 new cases and 
closed 10.
  There is no question that SIGIR has proven itself to be a much-needed 
watchdog, auditing reconstruction contracts in Iraq and spotlighting 
numerous cases of waste, fraud and abuse. We must keep this watchdog on 
the job.
  In addition, SIGIR has taken on a mission that will benefit our 
nation long after the Iraq reconstruction efforts conclude. Through its 
Lessons Learned Initiative, the experience gained in Iraq--and the 
methods developed to track, evaluate, and correct programs--will 
provide critical guidance to managers and policymakers in the future. 
The efficient and speedy SIGIR approach would have helped the initial 
urgent stages of Katrina recovery immeasurably, and it will be 
invaluable in the aftermath of new disasters to come.
  SIGIR has performed admirably in the most difficult of circumstances. 
Mr. Bowen and his exemplary staff have put themselves in harm's way 
numerous times. This incredible dedication is reflected in their work, 
which provides a high degree of oversight and accountability that is 
essential for Iraq reconstruction to succeed, and it is creating a 
template for success in the challenges that lie ahead. I urge my 
colleagues to support the Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act. I ask 
unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 4046

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Reconstruction 
     Accountability Act of 2006''.

     SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF THE TERMINATION DATE FOR THE OFFICE 
                   OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ 
                   RECONSTRUCTION.

       Section 3001(o) of the Emergency Supplemental 
     Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 
     Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106; 117 Stat. 
     1238; 5 U.S.C. App., note to section 8G of Public Law 95-
     452), as amended by section 1054(b) of the John Warner 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
     (Public Law 109-364), is amended to read as follows:
       ``(o) Termination.--(1)(A) The Office of the Inspector 
     General shall terminate 10 months after 80 percent of the 
     funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq 
     Relief and Reconstruction Fund have been expended.
       ``(B) For purposes of calculating the termination of the 
     Office of the Inspector General under this subsection, any 
     United States funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
     for fiscal year 2006 for the reconstruction of Iraq, 
     irrespective of the designation of such funds, shall be 
     deemed to be amounts appropriated or otherwise made available 
     to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.
       ``(2) The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
     shall, prior to the termination of the Office of the Special 
     Inspector General under paragraph (1), prepare a final 
     forensic audit report on all funds deemed to be amounts 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief 
     and Reconstruction Fund.''.

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