[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 16]
[House]
[Pages 21355-21359]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                NORTH KOREA NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2006

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the 
Speaker's table the Senate bill (S. 3728) to promote nuclear 
nonproliferation in North Korea, and ask for its immediate 
consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  Mr. KUCINICH. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, this bill 
will not bring relief to the millions of North Koreans who are 
suffering every day. It is estimated that 2 million people have died of 
starvation in North Korea. More than 13 million North Koreans suffer 
from malnutrition, including 60 percent of all children, the worst rate 
among 110 developing nations surveyed by the World Health Organization 
and UNICEF. North Korea had an infant mortality rate of 2 percent in 
2000. South Korea's infant mortality rate for the same year by contrast 
was 0.5 percent. There are chronic shortages of food and fuel already. 
Heavy military spending, estimated at between one-quarter and one-third 
of gross domestic product, has constrained and skewed economic 
development. North Korea has a per capita GDP of $1,000. South Korea's 
per capita GDP by contrast is $18,000.
  Despite significant inflows of international assistance over the past 
decade, harsh economic and political conditions have caused tens of 
thousands of persons to flee the country.
  The better approach the U.S. should be supporting is the approach 
adhered to by the South Koreans. They have taken the approach of 
unification as a way to pull North Korea into the modern world. It 
worked for East Germany, and it can work for North Korea again. The 
downside of this approach is that missile defense advocates will have 
to create another false reason to spend in excess of $9 billion a year 
on the failed system. I am confident they can conjure up some new enemy 
and protect defense industry profits.
  Now, it is true, Mr. Speaker, that North Korea has declared that it 
possesses nuclear weapons, this according to a report by Dr. Hans Blix 
that was presented and remarked on in a congressional subcommittee the 
other day. He said this report says it has not provided evidence of 
this claim. It has violated the NPT and twice declared its withdrawal 
from the treaty.
  It operates a nuclear fuel cycle consisting of a 5-megawatt research 
reactor, which uses natural uranium; a reprocessing facility which 
produces plutonium; and various uranium processing and fuel fabrication 
facilities. The United States has claimed that the country also has an 
enrichment capability.
  In 2005 Pakistan's President Musharaff stated that the A.Q. Khan 
network had provided centrifuge machines and designs to North Korea, 
although the scale of its enrichment capability remains unknown. North 
Korea has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
  Now, under a section called ``What Must be Done'' in the report that 
Dr. Blix delivered, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission makes 
many specific and detailed recommendations. The most important of them 
are summarized as, number one, to agree on general principles of 
action; number two, to reduce the danger of present arsenals, no use by 
states, no access by terrorists; number three, to prevent 
proliferation, no new weapons systems, no new possessors; number four, 
work towards outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for 
all, including preventing an arms race in space by prohibiting any 
stationing or use of weapons in outer space. I would recommend this to 
the reading by Members of this Congress who are concerned about nuclear 
proliferation.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I think that it is time that this Congress 
calls for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. That, in effect, is 
what the Nonproliferation Treaty is all about. It is true that the use 
of nuclear weapons threatens the future of mass public, cities, 
nations, civilization itself, and, indeed, all of life on Earth. 
Nuclear weapons in the arsenal of any country undermine the security of 
all countries, including the United States. Under the Treaty of 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, all nuclear weapon states 
are committed to good-faith negotiations to achieve nuclear 
disarmament.
  On June 6, 2006, the Chair and Vice Chair of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 
Commission, cited as their number one concern for the security of the 
United States the availability of nuclear weapons materials for attack 
upon the American people. The 2006 report of the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Commission concludes: ``So long as any state has nuclear 
weapons, others will want to use them. So long as any weapons remain, 
there is a risk that they will one day be used by design or accident. 
Any such use will be catastrophic. The model nuclear weapons convention 
circulated by the United Nations demonstrates the feasibility of 
achieving the global elimination of nuclear weapons.''

[[Page 21356]]

  So, Mr. Speaker, I am once again asking this House to call for the 
abolition of all nuclear weapons and to ask that the House call upon 
the President to initiate multilateral negotiations for the abolition 
of nuclear weapons. We can start by opening up direct negotiations with 
North Korea for the purpose of getting their participation, and I think 
that is a much better approach than the legislation that we are about 
to send over to the President.
  And for that purpose, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I would like to 
inquire of the chairman what his reasoning is in moving this bill when 
he was so supportive of selling fissile materials to India, which, like 
North Korea, is not a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty and, unlike North Korea, has a demonstrated nuclear capability.
  Now, I was only a kid then, but I remember when we sold F-15s to Iran 
so that Iran could offset Soviet power in South Asia. And because we 
sold F-15s and other things to Iran, we wound up selling chemical 
weapon precursor materials to Iraq to offset Iran in the Middle East. 
Now we are told that we should sell fissile materials to India, which 
would free up Indian nuclear reactors to produce many more nuclear 
weapons for the Indian nuclear weapons program as an offset to Chinese 
power in Asia.
  Mr. Chairman, if we do this with India, what it would do is encourage 
the Chinese to increase their nuclear arsenal, and I submit to you that 
we are one of the potential targets of that enhanced Chinese nuclear 
arsenal.

                              {time}  0045

  Even more worrisome is that this Indian nuclear build-up would 
accelerate further the Pakistani nuclear build-up, which my friend from 
Ohio referred to a moment ago.
  And while I have strong confidence in the stability of the Indian 
government, and in the stability of Indian democracy, I have much less 
faith in the stability of the Pakistani government, and of Pakistani 
democracy, and of the Pakistani government's ability to keep under 
control those nuclear weapons which it already has, and more of which 
it would be encouraged to build because of the sale of fissile material 
to India.
  And in a military coup, if there is a military coup in Pakistan, 
which there has been multiple times in the last 20 years, we should be 
very, very concerned about the stability of not only south Asia, but of 
the world.
  I think the chairman, as one of the subcommittee chairs of the 
International Relations Committee would surely agree with me that 
rather than sanctioning nonsignatory States, approving of nonsignatory 
States to those nonproliferation treaties, the better course of action 
is to respect these international agreements and to immediately bring 
to the Senate a total ban on nuclear testing, and comprehensive 
treaties concerning nuclear proliferation.
  I would be happy to yield to the chairman for his response.
  Mr. ROYCE. Yes. Let me explain to the gentleman that, first, our 
efforts with respect to India is to bring India into the 
nonproliferation regime.
  Mr. WU. Reclaiming my time. Is not ultimately the big picture effect 
of permitting India to go forward with this basically blowing out of 
the water the entire treaty system with which we have tried to restrain 
nuclear nonproliferation in this world? I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Aliberti supports, and the United Nations Security 
Council resolution supports actions by member States in response to 
North Korea pulling out of the nonproliferation agreement, to go 
forward and put these types of prohibitions on the transfer of 
technologies to North Korea that would allow it to develop these types 
of weapon systems.
  North Korea is a proliferator, India is not.
  Mr. WU. Reclaiming my time. Is the gentleman citing something from 
the United Nations? I yield to the the gentleman.
  Mr. ROYCE. I am citing the United Nations Security Council resolution 
adopted on July 15, 2006.
  Mr. WU. Reclaiming my time. Is this the Congress of the United States 
or are we abdicating responsibility to the United Nations?
  Mr. ROYCE. I am pointing out that all member States, in response to 
the actions by North Korea to develop and to proliferate weapons of 
mass destruction such as long-range ballistic missiles and atomic 
weapons, have attempted to curtail the transfer of technologies to this 
State, since it has adopted a very aggressive posture and thus has 
become a direct threat to the United States and to our allies in 
northeast Asia.
  Mr. WU. Reclaiming my time. It is a very short question, amenable to 
a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer. Is this not the United States Congress? Are 
we not abdicating responsibility under your comment to the United 
Nations rather than taking responsibility ourselves?
  Mr. ROYCE. We are taking responsibility because North Korea is a 
direct threat to the United States.
  Mr. WU. I mean taking responsibility for Indian nuclear weapons, 
which will be produced as a result of our sale of fissile materials to 
India.
  Mr. ROYCE. Our attempt with respect to India is to bring India into 
the MPT regime and lead it to peaceful purposes of nuclear energy and 
away from producing weapons outside of an MPT regime.
  Mr. WU. I thank the gentleman and yield to the question from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I want to say that the gentleman from Oregon's point is 
well taken. As someone who engaged in the debate over India, I am 
familiar with the concerns that he has raised. And there are concerns 
about the ability of the United States Congress, which is being asked 
to on one hand ascent to the proliferation of one group, and deny the 
proliferation of another, for this Congress to be in a position of 
trying to help this country have a consistent program of nuclear 
nonproliferation, which I know is exactly the point that the gentleman 
relates to.
  In addition to that, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has 
said that North Korea ought to be given the same kinds of guarantees 
that is in the agreed framework of 1994 that they are not going to be 
attacked. This is the same thing that has been recommended that is done 
with Iran as well. So we do not need to get into these nuclear crises 
and say that people are threats if we engage them in talks that work 
towards nonproliferation.
  This group made recommendations, Mr. Wu, that I am sure you are 
familiar with. They said that a negotiation with North Korea should aim 
at a verifiable agreement, including as a principle element, North 
Korea's manifestation of its adherence to the MPT and accepting the 
1997 additional protocol, as well as the revival and a legal 
confirmation of the commitments made in the 1992 joint declaration on 
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
  And notably saying that neither North nor South Korea shall have 
nuclear weapons nor nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
facilities, and fuel cycle services should be assured through 
international agreements. The agreements should also cover biological 
and chemical weapons as well as the comprehensive nuclear test ban 
treaty, thus making the Korean Peninsula a zone free of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  So what Mr. Wu is asking about, and which I certainly support, is 
some consistency in policy. And it beings with Congress since we are 
being called upon, as Mr. Wu stated, to either agree or disagree with 
these policies.
  I want to thank the gentleman for raising that, because this is the 
appropriate time to raise that.
  Mr. WU. Reclaiming my time. I thank the gentleman. I want to make 
clear that I am certainly not defending the North Korea regime. But, I 
am calling into question the actions of this Congress and the strong 
advocacy of the chairman in favor of a proposed

[[Page 21357]]

treaty with India which would have the result of starting a nuclear 
arms race or accelerating a nuclear arms race in south Asia and, just 
as importantly, which in the big picture blows out the whole treaty 
system for restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. ROYCE. With respect to the strategy to bring India into the MPT, 
in our considered judgment, and the judgment of the majority of the 
Members of this House, it is a wiser policy to bring them into the 
tent, to get their cooperation and to focus on using nuclear energy to 
produce energy for peaceful purposes in India.
  Now, with respect to North Korea, it remains a very real threat with 
over a million troops, possibly several nuclear weapons, and most 
importantly, the propensity to export these types of weapons. This is 
not something we have seen from India in the past.
  But North Korea is an exporter of its missiles and of its technology. 
And for that very reason, the goal of this legislation is to put a 
prohibition on the transfer to North Korea of the types of technologies 
that could be used by North Korea in order to further develop its 
weapons systems. It is that simple.
  It is the same with respect to Iran. It is the same with respect to 
Syria. Now, we are putting in place a provision stating that North 
Korea shall not have the ability to receive from the United States or 
any companies in the United States this type of technology. U.S. 
companies will not be able to be licensed to export this kind of 
technology. They will be sanctioned if they attempt it.
  Mr. WU. I share with the gentleman the concerns about the export of 
nuclear weapons from North Korea. The point of my earlier comments is 
not about export from India, but because of our actions with respect to 
India, that we would be encouraging and accelerating the Pakistani 
nuclear program from which there is a real risk of exportation. I yield 
to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. This is a discussion that should have been happening a 
long time ago in this Congress. Because no one really talked that 
deeply about the implication of our decision granting India the ability 
to gain access to fissile materials, in terms of the potential 
dialectic of conflict which develops between the proliferator, 
Pakistan, and India gaining the fissile materials.
  Mr. Wu has raised the point that is really central to the discussion 
about how do we protect world peace. How do we stop some kind of a 
conflagration from breaking out on the subcontinent if we do not have a 
consistent policy?
  I mean, we know as was pointed out in the WMDC report here, that in 
February of 1999, India and Pakistan signed a memorandum of 
understanding on a variety of nuclear confidence building measures.
  Both countries, however, this report says: ``Are continuing their 
efforts to develop and produce nuclear weapons and their delivery 
vehicles.'' So, Mr. Wu is right on in raising this. And this is the 
exact time this has to be raised, even though it is almost one in the 
morning on Saturday. I yield.
  Mr. WU. Reclaiming my time. I would be happy to yield to the 
chairman.
  Mr. ROYCE. Yes. In response, I do not think the opposition is to this 
bill. But I understand the concept, and the argument relating to the 
nonproliferation regime as you have laid it out.
  But I think we have an honest disagreement about the approach to 
India and whether or not that will strengthen the regime. And that is 
what is playing itself out in debate here.
  From my standpoint, the proliferation issues have been between 
Pakistan and North Korea, whereas India has shown itself resistant to 
proliferation, and has shown a willingness to look at a way to be 
brought into the fold of the MPT. So I saw that earlier initiative to 
bring India within the framework agreement and with the MPT as a 
positive step forward.
  And with respect to this legislation, basically what it does is to 
apply exactly the same system of forced compliance on companies that 
now exist with respect to Iran and Syria.
  That is to say, that in terms of getting a licensing agreement or 
having the ability to ship technologies into North Korea that could be 
used for the purpose of eventually developing those weapon systems, 
that will be prohibited. That is the intent of the legislation. And I 
thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. WU. Reclaiming my time. Unlike the gentleman from Ohio, the 
dialectic of proliferation is way beyond me.

                              {time}  0100

  I do recognize a bad idea when I see one, and encouraging India by 
selling it nuclear fissile materials, which would ultimately result in 
the increase of Chinese nuclear weapons and Pakistani nuclear weapons, 
is surely that bad idea.
  There are times when we are all in the minority at one time or 
another. There was 68 of us who voted against approving the treaty to 
sell nuclear fissile materials to India. On that vote, I would have 
been happy to have been a minority of one because I do believe that it 
would add fuel to the fire of nuclear proliferation in south Asia in 
that it basically does blow out of the water any hope we have of treaty 
constraints on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  I want to make it clear in this Record and for history that the 
actions of this administration in nuclear proliferation or trying to 
contain nuclear proliferation have been patently irresponsible. This 
administration has underfunded the Nunn-Lugar legislation which seeks 
to purchase fissile materials, which would be otherwise available to 
terrorists on the open market.
  This administration has proposed a treaty with India that would sell 
India nuclear fissile materials that would result in a nuclear arms 
race between India and China and India and Pakistan, and Pakistan is 
not a stable country. There is great danger of the leakage of nuclear 
weapons from Pakistan. You heard earlier from another speaker about 
Pakistani aid to nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world.
  Let the record show that if or when a mushroom cloud ever erupts over 
an American city, it will be traced back to this unwise vote in the 
United States Congress and to a bone-headed policy of this 
administration with respect to treaty rights, to Nunn-Lugar and this 
sale of nuclear materials to India.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, if I could make just one last comment in 
support of what the gentleman is saying, I am sure many are familiar 
that in the Hindu religion Brahma, the Creator; and Vishnu, the 
Preserver; and Shiva, the Destroyer exist simultaneously and represent 
the multiplicity of God.
  We here are called upon to determine which of the principles, 
Creator, Preserver or Destroyer, shall work through each of us. As the 
gentleman from Oregon says, if we continue to pursue nuclear 
proliferation as embodied in the nuclear agreement with India, we will 
be open to the principles of destruction. At this moment when world 
tensions are rising and violence is cycling higher, we need to take the 
direction of preserving the peace and creating a new opening through 
the abolition of all nuclear weapons.
  Again, I want to thank my friend from Oregon for raising this point 
at this propitious moment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would like to inquire as to 
whether or not the gentleman from Oregon is planning on withdrawing his 
reservation or not.
  Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I simply wanted to yield to the chairman for any 
further comments he might have.
  Mr. ROYCE. I am going to yield back, and I appreciate the gentleman 
yielding.
  Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the chairman's forbearance and the 
Speaker's forbearance.
  Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of S. 3728, 
the North Korea Non-Proliferation Act of 2006. This legislation would 
amend the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act to extend the provisions 
of the Act to North Korea. Enactment of this legislation

[[Page 21358]]

would impose sanctions on persons who transfer such weapons and related 
goods and technology to and from North Korea. This legislation would 
authorize sanctions that are equivalent to those required under current 
law for persons who are found to transfer such items to and from Iran 
and Syria. S. 3728 also calls on the international community to act in 
accordance with the provisions of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1695 (UNSCR 1695), which prevents member states from 
conducting missile and related transfers to or from North Korea in 
reaction to the tests. This bill is timely and important. It deserves 
steadfast support from this body.
  North Korea's nuclear ambitions are destabilizing. Its recent missile 
tests on July 5, 2006, were conducted against the urging of the 
international community. Ultimately, this recent missile test was a 
failure. But that act, taken together with its previous tests and North 
Korea's intransigent behavior during international talks on this 
matter, is indicative of the recalcitrant nature of the North Korean 
regime. North Korea is in fact continuing to pursue its nuclear and 
ballistic missiles programs in spite of diplomatic efforts by the 
international community and in contradiction with North Korea's 
previous commitments. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles technology and capabilities is an emerging danger to 
the national security of the United States.
  North Korea's recent missile test also disappointed the international 
community. On July 16, 2006, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted UNSCR 1695 in order to prevent United Nations member states 
from conducting missile and related technology transfers to North Korea 
in reaction to the tests. UNSCR 1695 also requires North Korea to 
suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and 
return to the negotiating table. Enactment of S. 3728 would strengthen 
U.S. laws, authorizing the U.S. government to investigate, sanction, 
and prevent proliferation efforts made by or on behalf of the North 
Korean regime by government or private entities.
  But sanctions alone will not ultimately solve this problem. Robust 
and constant diplomatic pressure on the North Korean regime must 
continue to be applied by the United States in coordination with the 
United Nations and other countries. North Korea and its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles is not only the United States' 
problem. I am encouraged by the fact that China, Japan, South Korea, 
and Russia remain desirous of a peaceful resolution to this problem. 
The Six Party Talks involving these countries and North Korea should 
continue.
  More progress should be made toward constraining North Korea's 
ability to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology and 
capabilities while we continue diplomatic efforts to encourage that 
government to abandon its nuclear ambitions. S. 3728, the North Korea 
Non-Proliferation Act of 2006, will help to achieve those goals.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of S. 3728, the 
North Korea Non-Proliferation Act of 2006.
  Mr. Speaker, Americans around the nation celebrated the Fourth of 
July this year by watching fireworks, hosting backyard barbecues, and 
spending time with their families. The North Koreans chose to observe 
America's birthday in a far more threatening fashion: they test 
launched a series of missiles, one of which was potentially capable of 
hitting American soil with a nuclear payload.
  Pyongyang's destabilizing actions not only angered Washington, but 
set off alarm bells in Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow, our partners 
in the Six Party Talks. The UN Security Council quickly adopted a 
resolution requiring all Member States to prevent overseas sales of 
North Korea missiles, and to stop transfers of any financial resources 
to North Korea related to its missile or WMD programs.
  The legislation before the House today implements this groundbreaking 
Security Council Resolution. By adding North Korea to the Iran and 
Syria Nonproliferation Act, the United States will take concrete 
actions against foreign firms that engage in missile- and WMD-related 
trade with North Korea.
  The Executive Branch will now be forced to review every six months 
all credible intelligence regarding commercial transfers to North Korea 
of items applicable for the development of weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missiles.
  On the basis of these reviews, the President must sanction foreign 
firms that engaged in such trade, or explain to Congress why he has not 
done so.
  This is Congressional direction at its best. We must remember that 
the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, which this amends, forced the 
Executive Branch to take actions against firms engaging in illicit 
trade with both Iran and Syria, actions that the President would 
otherwise not have taken. Dozens of firms have been sanctioned for such 
Iran- and Syria-related trade in the years since, focusing global 
attention on their activities and on their governments.
  The regime of Kim Jong-Il poses as much of a threat to international 
security as Iran and Syria. Common sense requires us to undertake the 
same review and sanctions for Pyongyang's activities and their 
commercial co-conspirators as we do for Iran and Syria.
  Mr. Speaker, the North Korean leadership was hoping to gain the 
world's attention with its July missile launches. Pyongyang succeeded. 
But rather than forcing the world to bring a new tray of goodies to 
North Korea, the tests unified the world in opposition to North Korea's 
destabilizing actions, and brought about a new round of UN-approved 
sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, with the right package of carrots and sticks, I remain 
optimistic that the U.S. and its Six Party allies can negotiate a 
comprehensive and verifiable deal with North Korea. I hope that by July 
4th next year, we will have such an agreement in hand. Until then, we 
must bring our laws in line with the recent UN Security Council 
resolution, and act decisively to undermine North Korea's missile and 
WMD programs.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation, and am gratified 
that it has passed this House.
  Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:

                                S. 3728

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Nonproliferation 
     Act of 2006''.

     SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       (a) In view of --
       (1) North Korea's manifest determination to produce 
     missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass 
     destruction and to proliferate missiles, in violation of 
     international norms and expectations; and
       (2) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695, 
     adopted on July 15, 2006, which requires all Member States, 
     in accordance with their national legal authorities and 
     consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and 
     prevent--
       (A) missile and missile-related items, materials, goods, 
     and technology from being transferred to North Korea's 
     missile or weapons of mass destruction programs; and
       (B) the procurement of missiles or missile-related items, 
     materials, goods, and technology from North Korea, and the 
     transfer of any financial resources in relation to North 
     Korea's missile or weapons of mass destruction programs,

     it should be the policy of the United States to impose 
     sanctions on persons who transfer such weapons, and goods and 
     technology related to such weapons, to and from North Korea 
     in the same manner as persons who transfer such items to and 
     from Iran and Syria currently are sanctioned under United 
     States law.

     SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION ACT.

       (a) Reporting Requirements.--Section 2 of the Iran and 
     Syria Nonproliferation Act (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by inserting ``, NORTH KOREA,'' after 
     ``IRAN''; and
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``Iran, or'' and inserting ``Iran,''; and
       (ii) by inserting after ``Syria'' the following: ``, or on 
     or after January 1, 2006, transferred to or acquired from 
     North Korea'' after ``Iran''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, North Korea,'' after 
     ``Iran''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such Act is further amended--
       (1) in section 1, by inserting ``, North Korea,'' after 
     ``Iran'';
       (2) in section 5(a), by inserting ``, North Korea,'' after 
     ``Iran'' both places it appears; and
       (3) in section 6(b)--
       (A) in the heading, by inserting ``, North Korea,'' after 
     ``Iran''; and
       (B) by inserting ``, North Korea,'' after ``Iran'' each 
     place it appears.

     SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

       Congress urges all governments to comply promptly with 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 and to impose 
     measures on persons involved in such proliferation that are 
     similar to those imposed by the United States Government 
     pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
     Act (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended by 
     this Act.

  The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the 
third

[[Page 21359]]

time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________