[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 15]
[House]
[Pages 20433-20445]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                        IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass 
the bill (H.R. 6198) to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for 
its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in 
Iran, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                               H.R. 6198

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Freedom Support Act''.

     SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.

            TITLE I--CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

Sec. 101. Codification of sanctions.

 TITLE II--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND 
             OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN

Sec. 201. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 203. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 204. Sunset.
Sec. 205. Technical and conforming amendments.

               TITLE III--PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN

Sec. 301. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 302. Assistance to support democracy for Iran.

    TITLE IV--POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE THE NUCLEAR 
                        NONPROLIFERATION OF IRAN

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress.

TITLE V--PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Sec. 501. Prevention of money laundering for weapons of mass 
              destruction.

[[Page 20434]]



            TITLE I--CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

     SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) Codification of Sanctions.--Except as otherwise 
     provided in this section, United States sanctions with 
     respect to Iran imposed pursuant to sections 1 and 3 of 
     Executive Order No. 12957, sections 1(e), (1)(g), and (3) of 
     Executive Order No. 12959, and sections 2, 3, and 5 of 
     Executive Order No. 13059 (relating to exports and certain 
     other transactions with Iran) as in effect on January 1, 
     2006, shall remain in effect. The President may terminate 
     such sanctions, in whole or in part, if the President 
     notifies Congress at least 15 days in advance of such 
     termination. In the event of exigent circumstances, the 
     President may exercise the authority set forth in the 
     preceding sentence without regard to the notification 
     requirement stated therein, except that such notification 
     shall be provided as early as practicable, but in no event 
     later than three working days after such exercise of 
     authority.
       (b) No Effect on Other Sanctions Relating to Support for 
     Acts of International Terrorism.--Nothing in this Act shall 
     affect any United States sanction, control, or regulation as 
     in effect on January 1, 2006, relating to a determination 
     under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or 
     section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780(d)) that the Government of Iran has repeatedly provided 
     support for acts of international terrorism.

 TITLE II--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND 
             OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN

     SEC. 201. MULTILATERAL REGIME.

       (a) Waiver.--Section 4(c) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
     Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(c) Waiver.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President may, on a case by case 
     basis, waive for a period of not more than six months the 
     application of section 5(a) with respect to a national of a 
     country, if the President certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees at least 30 days before such waiver 
     is to take effect that such waiver is vital to the national 
     security interests of the United States.
       ``(2) Subsequent renewal of waiver.--If the President 
     determines that, in accordance with paragraph (1), such a 
     waiver is appropriate, the President may, at the conclusion 
     of the period of a waiver under paragraph (1), renew such 
     waiver for subsequent periods of not more than six months 
     each.''.
       (b) Investigations.--Section 4 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(f) Investigations.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President should initiate an 
     investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions under 
     section 5(a) against a person upon receipt by the United 
     States of credible information indicating that such person is 
     engaged in investment activity in Iran as described in such 
     section.
       ``(2) Determination and notification.--Not later than 180 
     days after an investigation is initiated in accordance with 
     paragraph (1), the President should determine, pursuant to 
     section 5(a), if a person has engaged in investment activity 
     in Iran as described in such section and shall notify the 
     appropriate congressional committees of the basis for any 
     such determination.''.

     SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Petroleum 
     Resources.--Section 5(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
     of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended in the heading, by 
     striking ``to Iran'' and inserting ``to the Development of 
     Petroleum Resources of Iran''.
       (b) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Weapons of 
     Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--Section 
     5(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Development of 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--
     The President shall impose two or more of the sanctions 
     described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the 
     President determines that a person has, on or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, exported, transferred, or 
     otherwise provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, 
     or other items knowing that the provision of such goods, 
     services, technology, or other items would contribute 
     materially to the ability of Iran to--
       ``(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 
     weapons or related technologies; or
       ``(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of 
     advanced conventional weapons.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply with respect to actions taken on or after June 6, 
     2006.

     SEC. 203. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

       Section 8(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) poses no significant threat to United States national 
     security, interests, or allies.''.

     SEC. 204. SUNSET.

       Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking ``on September 29, 
     2006'' and inserting ``on December 31, 2011''.

     SEC. 205. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Findings.--Section 2 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
     Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking 
     paragraph (4).
       (b) Declaration of Policy.--Section 3 of the Iran and Libya 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) Policy With 
     Respect to Iran.--''; and
       (2) by striking subsection (b).
       (c) Termination of Sanctions.--Section 8 of the Iran and 
     Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) Iran.--''; and
       (2) by striking subsection (b).
       (d) Duration of Sanctions; Presidential Waiver.--Section 
     9(c)(2)(C) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(C) an estimate of the significance of the provision of 
     the items described in section 5(a) or section 5(b) to Iran's 
     ability to, respectively, develop its petroleum resources or 
     its weapons of mass destruction or other military 
     capabilities; and''.
       (e) Reports Required.--Section 10(b)(1) of the Iran and 
     Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended 
     by striking ``and Libya'' each place it appears.
       (f) Definitions.--Section 14 of the Iran and Libya 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (9)--
       (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by--
       (i) striking ``, or with the Government of Libya or a 
     nongovernmental entity in Libya,''; and
       (ii) by striking ``nongovenmental'' and inserting 
     ``nongovernmental''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or Libya (as the 
     case may be)'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (12); and
       (3) by redesignating paragraphs (13), (14), (15), (16), and 
     (17) as paragraphs (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16), 
     respectively.
       (g) Short Title.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
     Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking 
     ``and Libya''.
       (2) References.--Any reference in any other provision of 
     law, regulation, document, or other record of the United 
     States to the ``Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996'' shall 
     be deemed to be a reference to the ``Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996''.

               TITLE III--PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN

     SEC. 301. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

       (a) In General.--Congress declares that it should be the 
     policy of the United States--
       (1) to support efforts by the people of Iran to exercise 
     self-determination over the form of government of their 
     country; and
       (2) to support independent human rights and peaceful pro-
     democracy forces in Iran.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
     construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.

     SEC. 302. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN.

       (a) Authorization.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the President is authorized to provide financial and 
     political assistance (including the award of grants) to 
     foreign and domestic individuals, organizations, and entities 
     working for the purpose of supporting and promoting democracy 
     for Iran. Such assistance may include the award of grants to 
     eligible independent pro-democracy radio and television 
     broadcasting organizations that broadcast into Iran.
       (2) Limitation on assistance.--In accordance with the rule 
     of construction described in subsection (b) of section 301, 
     none of the funds authorized under this section shall be used 
     to support the use of force against Iran.
       (b) Eligibility for Assistance.--Financial and political 
     assistance under this section should be provided only to an 
     individual, organization, or entity that--
       (1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism 
     and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist 
     organization under section 219 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the 
     preceding four years;
       (2) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation 
     regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and 
     materiel;
       (3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the 
     adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;
       (4) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the 
     fundamental equality of women;
       (5) works to establish equality of opportunity for people; 
     and
       (6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, 
     freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
       (c) Funding.--The President may provide assistance under 
     this section using--

[[Page 20435]]

       (1) funds available to the Middle East Partnership 
     Initiative (MEPI), the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
     Initiative, and the Human Rights and Democracy Fund; and
       (2) amounts made available pursuant to the authorization of 
     appropriations under subsection (g).
       (d) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before each 
     obligation of assistance under this section, and in 
     accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-l), the 
     President shall notify the Committee on International 
     Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
       (e) Sense of Congress Regarding Diplomatic Assistance.--It 
     is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) support for a transition to democracy in Iran should be 
     expressed by United States representatives and officials in 
     all appropriate international fora;
       (2) officials and representatives of the United States 
     should--
       (A) strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts 
     in Iran calling for free, transparent, and democratic 
     elections; and
       (B) draw international attention to violations by the 
     Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion, 
     freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.
       (f) Duration.--The authority to provide assistance under 
     this section shall expire on December 31, 2011.
       (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may 
     be necessary to carry out this section.

    TITLE IV--POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE THE NUCLEAR 
                        NONPROLIFERATION OF IRAN

     SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It should be the policy of the 
     United States not to bring into force an agreement for 
     cooperation with the government of any country that is 
     assisting the nuclear program of Iran or transferring 
     advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran unless the 
     President has determined that--
       (1) Iran has suspended all enrichment-related and 
     reprocessing-related activity (including uranium conversion 
     and research and development, manufacturing, testing, and 
     assembly relating to enrichment and reprocessing), has 
     committed to verifiably refrain permanently from such 
     activity in the future (except potentially the conversion of 
     uranium exclusively for export to foreign nuclear fuel 
     production facilities pursuant to internationally agreed 
     arrangements and subject to strict international safeguards), 
     and is abiding by that commitment; or
       (2) the government of that country--
       (A) has, either on its own initiative or pursuant to a 
     binding decision of the United Nations Security Council, 
     suspended all nuclear assistance to Iran and all transfers of 
     advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran, pending a 
     decision by Iran to implement measures that would permit the 
     President to make the determination described in paragraph 
     (1); and
       (B) is committed to maintaining that suspension until Iran 
     has implemented measures that would permit the President to 
     make such determination.
       (b) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agreement for cooperation.--The term ``agreement for 
     cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 
     b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(b)).
       (2) Assisting the nuclear program of iran.--The term 
     ``assisting the nuclear program of Iran'' means the 
     intentional transfer to Iran by a government, or by a person 
     subject to the jurisdiction of a government, with the 
     knowledge and acquiescence of that government, of goods, 
     services, or technology listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and 
     Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and 
     subsequent revisions) or Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-
     Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology 
     (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as 
     Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2 and subsequent 
     revisions).
       (3) Transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles 
     to iran.--The term ``transferring advanced conventional 
     weapons or missiles to Iran'' means the intentional transfer 
     to Iran by a government, or by a person subject to the 
     jurisdiction of a government, with the knowledge and 
     acquiescence of that government, of--
       (A) advanced conventional weapons; or
       (B) goods, services, or technology listed on the Missile 
     Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of 
     June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions.

TITLE V--PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

     SEC. 501. PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION.

       Section 5318A(c)(2) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``or both,'' and 
     inserting ``or entities involved in the proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction or missiles''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by inserting ``, including any 
     money laundering activity by organized criminal groups, 
     international terrorists, or entities involved in the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles'' 
     before the semicolon at the end.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. 
Blumenauer) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill now under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  For decades, the Iranian regime, one of the world's most dangerous 
political entities, has been pursuing a covert nuclear program. 
According to multiple reports of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the IAEA, Iran has been deceiving the world for two decades 
about its nuclear ambitions and has breached its international 
obligations dealing with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear 
cycle.
  Iran's violation of the IAEA safeguards, the safe reporting to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the denial of the agency's request 
for access to individuals and locations, the involvement of its 
military in parts of it nuclear program, as well as the Iranian 
regime's continued support of terrorist activities around the globe 
contradict any assertion of the peaceful intent of the program.
  It would be a critical mistake to allow a regime with a track record 
as bloody and as dangerous as Iran's to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran 
drives Hezbollah extremist ideology and provides it with weapons and 
funding, estimated by some at more than $80 million per year. In turn, 
Hezbollah has helped advance Iranian interests through continued 
terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies in the 
region.
  This bill before us, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 6198, as amended, will help 
prevent Iran from acquiring the technical assistance, the financial 
resources, and the political legitimacy to develop nuclear weapons and 
to support terrorism. This bill requires the imposition of sanctions on 
any entity that has exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to 
Iran any goods, services, technology, or other items that would 
materially contribute to Iran's ability to acquire or develop 
unconventional weapons. This bill codifies U.S. sanctions imposed on 
Iran by Executive Order.
  The bill also amends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act by extending the 
authorities in the bill until December 31, 2011. It also requires the 
President to certify to Congress that waiving the imposition of 
sanctions is vital to the national security interests of the United 
States.
  Furthermore, the bill authorizes the provision of democracy 
assistance to eligible human rights and pro-democracy groups and 
broadcasting entities. Moreover, this legislation will allow the United 
States to use the necessary tools against financial institutions which 
are involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or 
missiles.
  This bill provides a comprehensive approach, providing U.S. officials 
with strong leverage to secure cooperation from our allies in order to 
counter the Iranian threat. The sanctions under title II of this bill 
seek to target the Iranian regime where it is most vulnerable: Its 
energy sector. Knowledgable experts agree that for Iran, a fuel 
importer, sanctions could be crippling.
  Thus, Mr. Speaker, this bill is not an alternative to diplomacy, but 
rather complementary to our multilateral efforts. We cannot afford to 
wait any

[[Page 20436]]

longer as the potential consequences of further inaction could be 
catastrophic. I urge my colleagues to lend their support to this 
legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I am attaching an exchange of letters between Chairman 
Hyde and Chairmen Thomas and Oxley concerning the bill H.R. 6198 ``The 
Iran Freedom Support Act'' for printing in the Record.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                               Washington, DC, September 27, 2006.
     Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
     Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Chairman Hyde: I am writing regarding H.R. 6198, the 
     ``Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which is scheduled for floor 
     action on September 28.
       As per the agreement between our Committees, the bill would 
     not codify the import sanctions contained in Executive Order 
     13059. However, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the bill would 
     give the President the statutory authority to ban imports 
     against Iran and would terminate that authority with respect 
     to Libya.
       Because each of these provisions, as well as provisions 
     related to the waiver, termination, and sunset, have the 
     effect of modifying and altering the application of an import 
     ban, they fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
     Ways and Means. However, in order to expedite this 
     legislation for floor consideration, the Committee will forgo 
     action on this bill. This is being done with the 
     understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the 
     Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its 
     jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 6198, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the record.
           Best regards,
                                                      Bill Thomas,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on International 
           Relations,
                               Washington, DC, September 27, 2006.
     Hon. William M. Thomas,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     6198, the ``Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which is scheduled 
     for floor action this week.
       In recognition of the importance of this legislation and 
     based on our two Committees' agreement, the final text of the 
     bill would not codify the import sanctions contained in 
     Executive Order 13059. However, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of 
     the bill would give the President the statutory authority to 
     ban imports against Iran and would terminate that authority 
     with respect to Libya.
       I concur in your assessment that these provisions, as well 
     as provisions related to the waiver, tennination, and sunset, 
     have the effect of modifying and altering the application of 
     an import ban and fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Ways and Means. I appreciate your willingness to 
     forgo action on this bill. I also agree that your forgoing 
     formal committee action does not in any way prejudice the 
     Ways and Means Committee with respect to the appointment of 
     conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or 
     similar legislation.
       1As you have requested, I will insert a copy of our 
     exchange of letters on this bill into the Congressional 
     Record.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Henry J. Hyde,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on International 
           Relations,
                               Washington, DC, September 28, 2006.
     Hon. Michael G. Oxley,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning 
     H.R. 6198, the Iran Freedom Support Act. As indicated by the 
     referral of the bill to both of our committees, I concur that 
     the bill contains language which falls within the Rule X 
     jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, This 
     language is contained in portions of title II and in title V 
     of the bill.
       I agree that ordinarily the Committee on Financial Services 
     would be entitled to act on the bill. However, I thank you 
     for your support in moving this important legislation forward 
     by agreeing that it is not necessary for your Committee to 
     act further on the bill. Given the importance and timeliness 
     of the Iran Freedom Support Act, I appreciate your 
     willingness to work with us regarding these issues and to 
     permit the legislation to proceed. I understand that by doing 
     so, it should not be construed to prejudice the 
     jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Financial 
     Services on these provisions or any other similar legislation 
     and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of 
     matters of jurisdictional interest to your Committee in the 
     future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be 
     considered in a conference with the Senate, I will request 
     the Speaker to name members of the Committee on Financial 
     Services to the conference committee.
       As you requested, I will be pleased to include a copy of 
     this exchange of letters in the Congressional Record during 
     the consideration of this bill if you have any questions 
     regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I 
     thank you for your consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Henry J. Hyde,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                               Washington, DC, September 28, 2006.
     Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
     Committee on International Relations, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to confirm our mutual 
     understanding with respect to the consideration of H.R. 6198, 
     the Iran Freedom Support Act. This bill was introduced on 
     September 27, 2006, and was referred to the Committee on 
     International Relations as well as the Committee on Financial 
     Services. I understand that the bill will be considered by 
     the House in the near future.
       Ordinarily, the Committee on Financial Services would be 
     entitled to act on those matters within its jurisdiction, 
     Title V and portions of title II. However, given the 
     importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, 
     and your willingness to work with us regarding the issues 
     within this Committee's jurisdiction, further action in this 
     Committee will not be necessary. I do so only with the 
     understanding that this procedural route should not be 
     construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the 
     Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any 
     other similar legislation and will not be considered as 
     precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional 
     interest to my committee in the future. Furthermore, should 
     these or similar provisions be considered in a conference 
     with the Senate, I would expect members of the Committee on 
     Financial Services be appointed to the conference committee 
     on these provisions.
       Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our 
     exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 6198 and 
     in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this 
     bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please 
     do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your 
     consideration.
           Yours truly,
                                                 Michael G. Oxley,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in the years since we enacted our attack against Iraq, 
the threat from Iran has only grown more difficult, and our capacity to 
meet that threat actually has diminished. It is one of the reasons many 
of us opposed that action against Iraq.
  There is no question Iran's President is a thug, an anti-Semite, and 
a dangerous man. He exploits Iranian national grievances to consolidate 
power and has openly expressed his desire to wipe Israel off the map. 
Well, our troops are bogged down in Iraq, placing them at risk should 
Iran launch a wave of terrorism. We have done nothing to break our 
global dependency on oil, the control of which gives Iran its greatest 
ability to blackmail other countries.
  Now, I appreciate the good will and passion of the sponsors of this 
bill, bringing a critical issue before us. I rise in opposition, 
however. We have been at this point before. We passed an earlier 
version of this bill. The Senate rejected it as an amendment to the 
defense authorization. I appreciate that there have been some positive 
changes that have been made to this legislation. One is a sunset. The 
earlier bill would have made it permanent.
  And I appreciate that it contains a provision that I authored that 
would prohibit assistance to groups who had appeared on the State 
Department's list of terrorist groups in the last 4 years. However, the 
problem is nothing in this legislation points us in the direction of a 
solution. It is, if you will, a cruise missile aimed at a difficult 
diplomatic effort just as they are reaching their most sensitive point. 
The timing for this legislation could not be worse.
  While the United States has largely been missing in action from the 
diplomatic game, the European Union and Iran have been making progress 
at developing a formula that would lead to the suspension of Iran's 
nuclear enrichment program and the start of serious

[[Page 20437]]

negotiations. This bill specifically targets Russia, which may have 
some influence with Iran and which is critical to a unified diplomatic 
front.
  This bill has another fundamental flaw besides sanctioning people 
whose help we need to reach a diplomatic solution. It gives equal 
weight to overthrowing the Iranian government as it does to 
nonproliferation. These two goals work against each other.
  Yes, the regime's human rights record is atrocious, but preventing 
them from developing nuclear weapons should be our first priority. By 
not prioritizing behavior change over regime change, we pull the rug 
out from anyone in the Iranian leadership who values survival over the 
nuclear program and eliminates incentives for diplomatic solutions.
  Now, in my opinion, Iran holds, if not the key, a key to many of the 
issues that confound us in the Middle East. Their cooperation 
ultimately is going to be critical if we are going to be able to deal 
with the mess that our policies have created in Iraq, the problems that 
we are facing in Afghanistan with a resurgence of the Taliban, and it 
is going to play a key role on issues that deal with Israel, Hezbollah, 
and Hamas. They are like a puzzle. And, sadly, Iran is one of the 
missing pieces.
  After September 11, when the United States took action to overthrow 
the Taliban, our interests and Iran's aligned, and we were able to 
coordinate quietly but effectively. They were partners with us at some 
tough sessions in Bonn when we were having the negotiations that set up 
the Afghanistan government. And in the midst of this tentative effort 
at cooperation, President Bush decided to declare Iran part of the axis 
of evil and most hope for progress disappeared.
  Mr. Speaker, the irony is that Iran is one of the few nations in the 
world where the majority of the people still have a positive view of 
the United States.
  This is difficult. It is not easy. But to simply sanction potential 
partners and confuse what our priorities are, I am sad to say, is going 
to be a step backward. We ought to make clear to Iran that they need to 
stop their support for terrorism, end development of nuclear capacity, 
and begin the process of free, fair, and open elections. But I am sorry 
to say that this legislation in front of us ignores the opportunities 
that we have incorporating the lessons we learned in our success with 
Libya.
  I respectfully suggest that this is legislation that we ought to 
reject, and that we ought to instead prioritize what our goals are with 
Iran, and we are going to. By all means, have our sanctions but not be 
reckless in terms of the pressure we try to exert against the very 
people who are going to be necessary to help us with a diplomatic 
solution to prevent nuclear proliferation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 10 
minutes of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and 
that he may be permitted to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), our distinguished majority whip, 
without whom we would not be here today considering a bill with strong 
bipartisan support as well as administration support. Thank you, Mr. 
Blunt.

                              {time}  1315

  Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, for yielding. I am 
pleased to join you and join our friend Mr. Lantos in support of this 
bill.
  I think that Iran has more potential than any other country to 
destabilize the world today. President Bush should be given the tools 
necessary to work toward a diplomatic solution in the crisis that we 
now face with Iran and that Iran, frankly, presents to the world.
  I believe the solution to this problem is in this legislation. I 
think this does point us in a direction that can work. The mandatory 
sanctions for any entity that is assisting Iran to have the potential 
for weapons of mass destruction are important. They don't have to be 
targeted at a country, but those countries who are helping make that 
happen need to get the attention of this Congress and this government.
  This declares that we also intend as a Congress to avoid implementing 
agreements with countries that cooperate in this area with Iran. This 
provides new tools to the President to prevent money laundering that 
can be used to provide Iran and other dangerous countries with weapons 
that endanger our people.
  Passage of this bill today sends a powerful message to Iran and to 
those who would support that country's weapons development, a program 
that we need to be sure that we punish that behavior.
  I hope the President fully utilizes the new authority provided to him 
in this bill. I also urge not only that we approve this bill, but that 
our allies and our partners around the world work along with us to 
implement similar measures and convince Iran to peacefully abandon its 
efforts to destabilize the world. We encourage the President in this 
bill to work with those groups that have been mentioned that do support 
openness and democracy in Iran.
  I thank Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her great leadership in this effort 
and Tom Lantos for his leadership in this effort.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I first 
want to thank my good friends Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Gary Ackerman for 
their tireless work on this critical legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, the Iran Freedom Support Act will dramatically increase 
the economic pressure on the regime in Tehran to abandon its headlong 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. If we fail to use the economic and 
diplomatic tools available to us, the world will face a nightmare that 
knows no end, a despotic fundamentalist regime, wedded both to 
terrorism and to the most terrifying weapons known to man.
  Iran's desire, Iran's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, is 
beyond dispute. For years it lied to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, and even today it continues to deny access for IAEA inspectors 
to sensitive nuclear sites.
  Mr. Speaker, a short while ago I had an extensive visit to IAEA 
headquarters in Vienna where I had discussions with some of the leaders 
of countries that are interested in this issue. They have no doubt that 
Iran is determined to pursue a military nuclear program.
  Tehran has also defied the U.N. Security Council, which has demanded 
that it cease its enrichment of uranium. And now that Iran has been 
offered an incredibly generous package of benefits by the United States 
and our European allies in exchange for suspending uranium enrichment, 
the regime in Tehran is playing its usual cynical game, stalling for 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I meet with some frequency with Middle Eastern leaders, 
and there is not one who isn't deeply worried by the prospect of Iran's 
going nuclear. A nuclear Iran will touch off a bone-chilling arms race 
in the Middle East. But long before that happens, before Iran threatens 
to fire a shot, as it were, virtually every nation within reach of 
Iranian missiles will recalibrate its foreign policies to make certain 
that it doesn't offend the region's new nuclear power, Iran, and that, 
Mr. Speaker, would be a disaster for U.S. foreign policy interests, for 
the Middle East and for the entire civilized world.
  Some argue that our legislation will undermine our relations with 
European allies who invest in Iran. But that argument, Mr. Speaker, is 
simply wrong-headed. Our legislation is intended to reinforce diplomacy 
with economics. We ask our allies to do what the United States did over 
a decade ago, divest from Iran's energy sector, the cash cow of the 
ayatollah's nuclear aspirations.
  Nor is this legislation, Mr. Speaker, all stick and no carrot. By 
removing Libya from the list of the sanctioned, this legislation is an 
implicit invitation to Iran: mend your ways and your support of 
terrorism and your quest for weapons of mass destruction, and you

[[Page 20438]]

will be welcomed back into the family of nations. Refuse to do so, and 
you will suffer accordingly.
  The legislation before us will extend the Iran Sanctions Act for 5 
years. It will boost congressional oversight over its implementation. 
The clear message of this legislation is that the administration now 
has to enforce the law fully.
  Mr. Speaker, I would be delighted if our legislation were rendered 
redundant by serious Security Council action to impose international 
sanctions on Iran, but the attitudes shown by Russia and China thus far 
strongly suggest that meaningful U.N.-imposed sanctions are a most 
unlikely development.
  In the meantime, we cannot shirk our responsibility to employ every 
peaceful means possible to defeat Iran's reckless nuclear military 
ambitions. That, in essence, is the reason for the urgency of passing 
H.R. 6198 today.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this bill, and for the sake of 
foiling a looming, long-term nuclear terrorist threat, I urge my 
colleagues to do so as well.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Gilchrest).
  Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
thank the gentlewoman from Florida for allowing us to have this debate 
today.
  The human condition on the planet requires that there be strong 
military power under certain circumstances, strong intelligence under 
certain circumstances, strong sanctions under certain circumstances, 
and strong dialogue.
  The President recently spoke to the Iranian people through The 
Washington Post. Here is what he said: ``I would like to say to the 
Iranian people, we respect your history. We respect your culture. I 
recognize the importance of your sovereignty, that you are a proud 
nation. I understand that you believe it is in your interest, your 
sovereign interest, to have nuclear power for energy. I would work for 
a solution to meeting your rightful desires to have civilian nuclear 
power. I will tell the Iranian people that we have no desire for 
conflict.''
  If we hope to convince our allies and the international community 
that we are serious about resolving this matter diplomatically, the 
U.S. must open direct diplomatic channels with Tehran.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, it is important to go back a little bit in history here. 
The Iraq Accountability Act of 1998 was about funding a media 
propaganda machine which was, unfortunately, used to lay the groundwork 
for a war against Iraq. That act was about encouraging and funding 
opposition inside Iraq, unfortunately, to destabilize Iraq prior to a 
war.
  You could call this bill the ``Iran Accountability Act.'' This act 
funds media propaganda machines to lay the groundwork for a war against 
Iran. It encourages and funds opposition inside Iran for that same 
purpose.
  Notwithstanding what the words are in this bill, we have been here 
before. This administration is trying to create an international crisis 
by inflating Iran's nuclear development into an Iraq-type WMD hoax. 
``Iran is not an imminent threat,'' this from Dr. Hans Blitz, former 
Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector, speaking to our congressional oversight 
subcommittee the other day.
  The International Atomic Energy Agency points out that Iran has an 
enrichment level of about 3.6 percent. You have to go to 90 percent to 
have weapons quality enrichment. Iran is not an imminent threat. Iran 
does not have nuclear weapons.
  This is a time for us to engage Iran with direct talks, our President 
to their President. This is the time to give assurance to Iran that we 
are not going to attack them.
  Unfortunately, this administration has chosen to conduct covert ops 
in Iran. This administration has chosen to select 1,500 bombing targets 
with the Strategic Air Command. This administration has chosen plans 
for a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. This administration 
looked the other way when a congressional staff report basically 
claimed that Iran was trying to engage in nuclear escalation.
  We don't need war, we need to talk, and that is what we ought to 
stand for here. No more Iraqs.

The End of the ``Summer of Diplomacy'': Assessing U.S. Military Options 
                                on Iran


                      A CENTURY FOUNDATION REpORT

                (By Sam Gardiner, Colonel, USAF (Ret.))

       This report is part of a series commissioned by The Century 
     Foundation to inform the policy debate about Iran-related 
     issues.
       The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. 
     Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily 
     reflecting the views of The Century Foundation or as an 
     attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before 
     Congress.
       ``The doctrine of preemption remains sound and must remain 
     an integral part of our national security strategy. We do not 
     rule out the use of force before the enemy strikes.''--
     Stephen Hadley, March 16, 2006.

                              Introduction

       The summer of diplomacy began with a dramatic announcement: 
     on May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared 
     that if the Ahmadinejad government agreed to halt Iran's 
     nuclear enrichment program, the United States would talk 
     directly with Tehran. Secretary Rice crafted the statement 
     working alone at home. She called President Bush and received 
     his approval. The Bush administration announced it as a 
     significant initiative; it appeared to reflect a major change 
     in policy.
       This shift was not uncontroversial within the 
     administration; Vice President Dick Cheney had opposed the 
     announcement. But the rationale that prevailed seems to have 
     been that if the United States were going to confront Iran, 
     the diplomacy box had to be checked. The secretary of state 
     was given the summer to try it.
       Well, the summer is over. Diplomacy was given a chance, and 
     it now seems that the diplomatic activity of the past several 
     months was just a pretext for the military option.
       Unfortunately, the military option does not make sense. 
     When I discuss the possibility of an American military strike 
     on Iran with my European friends, they invariably point out 
     that an armed confrontation does not make sense--that it 
     would be unlikely to yield any of the results that American 
     policymakers do want, and that it would be highly likely to 
     yield results that they do not. I tell them they cannot 
     understand U.S. policy if they insist on passing options 
     through that filter. The ``making sense'' filter was not 
     applied over the past four years for Iraq, and it is unlikely 
     to be applied in evaluating whether to attack Iran.
       In order to understand the position of those within the 
     U.S. government who will make the final decision to execute a 
     military option against Iran, you must first consider the 
     seven key truths that they believe: Iran is developing 
     weapons of mass destruction--that is most likely true. Iran 
     is ignoring the international community--true. Iran supports 
     Hezbollah and terrorism--true. Iran is increasingly inserting 
     itself in Iraq and beginning to be involved in Afghanistan--
     true. The people of Iran want a regime change--most likely an 
     exaggeration. Sanctions are not going to work--most likely 
     true. You cannot negotiate with these people--not proven.
       If you understand these seven points as truth, you can see 
     why the administration is very close to being left with only 
     the military option. Administration officials say that they 
     want to give diplomacy a chance. But when they say that, we 
     need to remind ourselves that they do not mean a negotiated 
     settlement. They mean that Iran must do what we want as a 
     result of our nonmilitary leverage: suspend enrichment, and 
     we will talk. But enrichment appears to continue, and there 
     are no direct discussions between the two main parties. 
     Satisfied that nonmilitary leverage is not going to work, 
     those who believe the seven ``truths'' argue that the only 
     viable option remaining is a military one. The story, 
     however, is more complicated.
       This report draws on my long experience of running military 
     war games to examine some of the complications of the current 
     situation: the various pressures and rationales for an attack 
     on Iran; the probable direct and indirect consequences of air 
     strikes; the significant gap between what proponents of the 
     military option want to achieve and what in fact such attacks 
     will achieve; and the likelihood that policymakers will 
     ignore those gaps and proceed to war despite them.

                         Timing and Uncertainty

       Waiting makes it harder. The history of warfare is 
     dominated by attackers who concluded that it was better to 
     attack early than to wait. One source of the momentum in 
     Washington for a strike on Iran's nuclear program is the 
     strategic observation that if such an attack is in fact 
     inevitable, then it is better done sooner than later.

[[Page 20439]]

       I conducted a war game for the Atlantic Monthly magazine 
     two years ago. On a chart prepared for a mock meeting of the 
     National Security Council, I identified thirteen nuclear-
     related targets in Iran. I still do this kind of gaming. My 
     most recent chart reflects twenty-four potential nuclear-
     related facilities. In the past few years we have seen Iran's 
     Natanz uranium enrichment facility buried under more than 
     fifteen meters of reinforced concrete and soil. There is 
     evidence that similar hardening is taking place at other 
     facilities, and there is some evidence of facilities being 
     placed inside populated areas. The longer the United States 
     waits, the harder the targets--and the harder the targeting.
       Another major issue that affects timing is the conspicuous 
     absence of reliable intelligence about Iran. A report by the 
     House Intelligence Committee found that we have serious gaps 
     in our knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program. 
     Paradoxically, those gaps in intelligence produce not 
     caution, but further pressure to attack. U.S. intelligence 
     agencies do not know the locations of all of Iran's 
     facilities; they are not certain how far Iran has gone with 
     enrichment. They know that Iran's nuclear program bears a 
     striking resemblance to the Pakistani program, but they do 
     not know whether Iran has acquired technology that might put 
     it ahead of current estimates.
       Some U.S. officials say that Iran is ten years from a 
     weapon. The Pentagon, we are told, is operating under the 
     assumption that Iran could have a weapon in five years. Some 
     Israeli estimates say that Iran could have a weapon in three 
     years. John Negroponte, the U.S. director of national 
     intelligence, recently said that Iran could not develop a 
     nuclear weapon until some time in the next decade. But the 
     next day, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did 
     not trust estimates of the Iranian program.
       The very ambiguity of the intelligence picture has become 
     another argument for military options, because even if U.S. 
     policymakers could agree on a firm policy red line, there 
     would be no way of determining if and when Iran crossed that 
     line. Vice President Cheney's espoused calculation for 
     dealing with global threats is that if there is even a 1 
     percent chance of a country passing WMD to a terrorist, the 
     United States must act. Because there is a 1 percent chance 
     Iran could pass WMD to a terrorist, the Bush administration 
     finds itself obliged to reject nonmilitary options.

                           Regional Pressures

       Adding to the political momentum toward war with Iran is 
     significant pressure from the Israeli security establishment. 
     Israel says that it has a plan for attacking Iranian nuclear 
     facilities. Israel recently appointed an airman to be in 
     charge of the Iranian theater of operations. It was announced 
     that this major general would coordinate Israeli planning for 
     Iran. Israeli military planners have U.S. penetrating weapons 
     and a replica of the Natanz facility. They say that the 
     attack would resemble the kind of operation they used against 
     Egypt in 1967. They say that the plan involves more than just 
     air strikes from the ``Hammers'' of the Israeli Air Force's 
     69 Squadron. It would include Shaldag commando teams, 
     possibly some version of sea-launched missiles, and even 
     explosive-carrying dogs that would penetrate the underground 
     facilities.
       Israel probably could hit most of the known nuclear 
     targets. But such an attack would leave Iran with significant 
     retaliatory options. That is a serious problem. U.S. forces 
     and interests in the region would be likely targets of 
     Iranian retaliation, so even an independent Israeli military 
     operation would have critical consequences for the United 
     States.
       Part of the problem is that the two countries' red lines 
     for Iran are not the same. Israel's red line is enrichment. 
     The U.S. red line used to be the development of an Iranian 
     nuclear weapon. But over the past six months, America's red 
     line has drifted closer to Israel's. On March 21, the 
     president said that the United States could not allow Iran to 
     have the knowledge to make a weapon. He repeated the phrase 
     in August.
       By redrawing the red line in this manner, U.S. policymakers 
     are creating pressure to go to war with Iran. In saying that 
     Iran could not be permitted to have the knowledge to develop 
     nuclear weapons, the president used almost the exact words 
     the Israeli Foreign Minister had used a year earlier. More 
     recently, a senior State Department official said that Iran 
     was near ``the point of no return'' on its nuclear program. 
     Again, this was an exact echo of the words of Israeli 
     officials. The Israeli pressure has worked.

                     Marketing the Military Option

       I often hear from those who were strongly supportive of the 
     Iraq invasion that the targeting of the Iranian facilities 
     would be simple. If you understand the elements of the 
     nuclear process, all you have to do is go after a small 
     number of targets. The argument continues that Iran's nuclear 
     facilities could be devastated on a single night, in a single 
     strike, by a small number of U.S. B-2 bombers. The apparent 
     ease of the operation is another element of this pressure to 
     go now: If the Iranian nuclear program can be stopped in one 
     night by a simple strike, why should the United States wait?
       But the elimination of Iran's nuclear capability, while it 
     might be the stated aim for the United States, is only part 
     of the objective. While the Iranian regime's weapons program 
     is a genuine source of concern, American policymakers are 
     also troubled by Iran's interference in Iraq. Despite U.S. 
     warnings, the Revolutionary Guard continues to supply 
     weapons, money, and training to insurgents inside Iraq. Some 
     proponents of attacking Iran feel that Tehran should be 
     punished for supporting militias and extremists in Iraq.
       In addition to Iran's role as an aspiring nuclear rogue and 
     a supporter of the insurgency in Iraq, the country has been 
     repeatedly portrayed as a key adversary in the war on 
     terrorism. The United States has put Iran into a separate and 
     new terrorism category, dubbing it the ``Central Banker of 
     Terrorism.'' The new National Security Strategy says, ``Any 
     government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as 
     Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, 
     and peace. The world must hold those regimes to account.'' 
     ``Unnamed intelligence officials,'' citing evidence from 
     satellite coverage and electronic eavesdropping, have told 
     the press that Iran is hosting al Qaeda, granting senior 
     operatives freedom to communicate and plan terrorist 
     operations.
       Indeed, the case against the regime is so forceful, and so 
     multifaceted, that it becomes clear that the goal is not 
     simply to do away with the regime's enrichment program. The 
     goal is to do away with the regime itself.
       And on top of all of those pressures--pressure from Israel, 
     pressure from those worried about a nuclear Iran, Iran in 
     Iraq, and Iran in the war on terrorism--is another, decisive 
     piece of the puzzle: President George W. Bush. The argument 
     takes several forms: the president is said to see himself as 
     being like Winston Churchill, and to believe that the world 
     will only appreciate him after he leaves office; he talks 
     about the Middle East in messianic terms; he is said to have 
     told those close to him that he has got to attack Iran 
     because even if a Republican succeeds him in the White House, 
     he will not have the same freedom of action that Bush enjoys. 
     Most recently, someone high in the administration told a 
     reporter that the president believes that he is the only one 
     who can ``do the right thing'' with respect to Iran. One 
     thing is clear: a major source of the pressure for a military 
     strike emanates from the very man who will ultimately make 
     the decision over whether to authorize such a strike-the 
     president. And these various accounts of his motivations and 
     rationales have in common that the president will not allow 
     does-not-make-sense arguments to stand in the way of a good 
     idea.

                           Below the CNN Line

       Stay below the ``CNN line.'' That was the guidance given to 
     the Air Component Commander, General Mike Mosley, as the 
     secret air strikes began against Iraq in operation SOUTHERN 
     FOCUS. It was July 2002. This classified bombing campaign 
     would involve strikes on almost 400 targets. It was initiated 
     just after the president visited Europe where he announced 
     numerous times, ``I have no war plans on my desk.''
       There was no UN resolution. The congressional authorization 
     was not to come for four months. But the United States was 
     starting the war.
       All of the pressures described above are pushing for war 
     with Iran, and increasingly, a public case for such a war is 
     being made. But behind the scenes, military operations are 
     already under way. (See Figure 1.) Most likely, the same 
     guidance has been given to military commanders. The pattern 
     is repeating.
       When U.S. commandos began entering Iran--probably in the 
     summer of 2004--their mission appears to have been limited. 
     The objective was to find and characterize the Iranian 
     nuclear program. From press reports, we know that the task 
     force doing these operations was implanting sensors to detect 
     radioactivity. Intelligence for these early operations inside 
     Iran was coming from information provided by A.Q. Khan, the 
     Pakistani dealer in black market nuclear material. The 
     incursions were focused in the northeast, where the Iranian 
     nuclear facilities are concentrated. The base of these 
     incursions was most likely Camp War Horse in Iraq.
       Israel also was conducting operations inside Iran in late 
     2003 or early 2004. The Israeli commandos reportedly were 
     operating from a base in Iraq. These commandos also were 
     implanting sensors. I would expect the U.S. and Israeli 
     operations to have been coordinated. At about this time the 
     United States began operating remotely piloted vehicles 
     inside Iran over nuclear facilities. (Although this was 
     certainly an embarrassment to the Iranians, they mentioned 
     the flights numerous times in their press.)
       In 2005, the balance within the U.S. government shifted in 
     favor of those who were pushing for regime change in Iran. 
     This was to result in the eventual creation of the Iran/Syria 
     Operations Group inside the State Department, a request to 
     Congress for $75 million, and the creation of a robust 
     ``democracy promotion'' program. Meanwhile the United States 
     moved from intelligence collection inside Iran, to 
     establishing contact

[[Page 20440]]

     with ethnic minorities, to being involved in--and most likely 
     conducting---direct action missions. Reports suggest that the 
     United States is supporting militant groups in the 
     Baluchistan region of Iran. There have been killings and 
     kidnappings in this region. Iran Revolutionary Guard convoys 
     have been attacked. In a New Yorker article, Seymour Hersh 
     confirmed that this region was one of the areas where U.S. 
     forces were operating. The Iranian press also has accused the 
     United States of operating there. In addition, press reports 
     suggest that the United States may be sponsoring former 
     members of the Iraq-based MEK (Mojahedin-e Khalq) in 
     Baluchistan.
       I recently attended a Middle East security conference in 
     Berlin. At dinner one night, I sat next to the Iranian 
     ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali-
     Asghar Soltanieh. I told him I had read that the Iranians 
     were accusing the United States of supporting elements in 
     Baluchistan. I asked him how they knew that. Without any 
     hesitation, Soltanieh told me that they have captured 
     militants who confessed that they were working with the 
     Americans.
       The United States is also directly involved in supporting 
     groups inside the Kurdish area of Iran. According to both 
     western and Iranian press reports, the Iranian Party of Free 
     Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) has been allowed to operate from 
     Iraq into Iran and has killed Revolutionary Guard soldiers. 
     The Iranians have also accused the United States of being 
     involved in shooting down two of their aircraft, an old C-130 
     and a Fa1con jet, carrying Revolutionary Guard leaders.

                     NEXT STEPS: Above the CNN Line

       How do we get from being below the CNN line to the next 
     step? The path is fairly clear. The United Nations Security 
     Council will fall short of imposing serious sanctions on 
     Iran. The United States, then, will look for a coalition of 
     the willing to implement smart sanctions, focused on the 
     Iranian leadership.
       But the sanctions will be designed less to ensure 
     compliance from the Iranians than to generate domestic and 
     international support for the American position. I do not 
     know an Iranian specialist I trust who believes that the 
     sanctions would cause the Iranians to abandon their nuclear 
     program, any more than did the sanctions on India and 
     Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998. The sanctions 
     will be used to raise the collective conscience that Iran is 
     a threat, and to convince the world that the United States 
     has tried diplomatic solutions.
       If the experience of 1979 and other sanctions scenarios is 
     a guide, sanctions will actually empower the conservative 
     leadership in Iran. There is an irony here. It is a pattern 
     that seems to be playing out in the selection of the military 
     option. From diplomacy to sanctions, the administration is 
     not making good-faith efforts to avert a war so much as going 
     through the motions, eliminating other possible strategies of 
     engagement, until the only option left on the table is the 
     military one.
       When imposing the sanctions fails to alter Tehran's 
     position, policymakers will revert to a strike on Iran's 
     nuclear facilities. One can imagine the words of a planner in 
     the meeting: ``If we are going to do this, let's make certain 
     we get everything they have.'' I have done some rough 
     ``targeting'' of nuclear facilities for which I can find 
     satellite photos on the Web. By my calculation, an attack of 
     relatively high certainty on nuclear targets would require 
     400 aim points. (An aim point is the specific location where 
     an individual weapon is directed. Most targets would have 
     multiple aim points.) I estimate seventy-five of these aim 
     points would require penetrating weapons. (See Table 1, page 
     12.)
       But it is unlikely that a U.S. military planner would want 
     to stop there. Iran probably has two chemical weapons 
     production plants. He would want to hit those. He would want 
     to hit Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles that have just 
     recently been moved closer to Iraq. There are fourteen 
     airfields with sheltered aircraft. Although the Iranian Air 
     Force is not much of a threat, some of these airfields are 
     less than fifteen minutes flying time from Baghdad. Military 
     planners would want to eliminate that potential threat. The 
     Pentagon would want to hit the assets that could be used to 
     threaten Gulf shipping. That would mean targeting cruise 
     missile sites, Iranian diesel submarines, and Iranian naval 
     assets.

                        TABLE 1. TARGETS IN IRAN
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Initial strikes                     Follow-on strikes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear facilities...............  Revolutionary Guard bases.
Military air bases...............  Command and governance assets:
Air defense command and control..    Intelligence
Terrorist training camps.........    Military command
Chemical facilities..............    Radio and television
Medium-range ballistic missiles..    Communications
23rd Commando Division...........  Security forces in Tehran.
Gulf-threatening assets:
Submarines.......................  Leadership: targeted killing.
Anti-ship missiles...............
Naval ships......................
Small boats......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       After going through the analysis, I believe that the United 
     States can and will conduct the operation by itself. There 
     may be low-visibility support from Israel and the U.K., and 
     France may be consulted. But it will be an American 
     operation.
       What about casualties? Although the United States would 
     suffer casualties in the Iranian retaliation, the honest 
     answer to the president if he asks about losses during the 
     strike itself is that there probably will not be any. The 
     only aircraft penetrating deep into Iranian airspace will be 
     the B-2s at night. B-52s will stand off, firing cruise 
     missiles. Other missile attacks will come from Navy ships 
     firing at a safe distance.

             Targeting the Nuclear Program? Or the Regime?

       Air-target planners orchestrate strikes on the basis of 
     desired target destruction criteria. In the case of an attack 
     on Iran, after five nights of bombing, we can be relatively 
     certain of target destruction. It is even possible to project 
     the degree to which parts of the Iranian nuclear program 
     would be set back. For example, using Web pictures of the 
     Natanz enrichment facility, it is possible to see three years 
     worth of construction. An attack on that construction might 
     appear to set the program back three years. But it is hard to 
     judge. David Kay, the former top U.S. weapons inspector, 
     observed during our discussions that there is the program we 
     see, but there is also the program we do not see. Because of 
     the gaps in U.S. intelligence on Iran, and specifically on 
     Iran's nuclear program, American military leaders are growing 
     increasingly uneasy about the reliability and 
     comprehensiveness of target selection. In other words, after 
     the five-night military attack we would not be able with any 
     degree of certainty to say how we had impacted the Iranian 
     nuclear program.
       If this uncertainty does not appear to worry the proponents 
     of air strikes in Iran it is in no small part because the 
     real U.S. policy objective is not merely to eliminate the 
     nuclear program, but to overthrow the regime. It is hard to 
     believe, after the misguided talk prior to Iraq of how 
     American troops would be greeted with flowers and welcomed as 
     liberators, but those inside and close to the administration 
     who are arguing for an air strike against Iran actually sound 
     as if they believe the regime in Tehran can be eliminated by 
     air attacks.
       In this case, the concept is not a ground force Thunder Run 
     into Tehran of the sort used in Baghdad. It is a 
     decapitation-based concept. Kill the leadership and enable 
     the people of Iran to take over their government. More 
     reasonable leadership will emerge.
       Under this concept, the air operation would take longer 
     than the five nights. The targets would be expanded. The 
     Revolutionary Guard units would be attacked since according 
     to the argument they are the primary force that keeps the 
     current regime in power. There are other regime protection 
     units in Tehran. Most important, the U.S. operation would 
     move into targeted killing, seeking to eliminate the 
     leadership of Iran.
       It sounds simple. Air planners always tell a good story. By 
     the same token, they almost always fall short of their 
     promises, even in strictly military terms. That was true in 
     World War II. It was true in Korea. It was true in Vietnam. 
     It has just proved true with the Israeli attacks on 
     Hezbollah. No serious expert on Iran believes the argument 
     about enabling a regime change. On the contrary, whereas the 
     presumed goal is to weaken or disable the leadership and then 
     replace it with others who would improve relations between 
     Iran and the United States, it is far more likely that such 
     strikes would strengthen the clerical leadership and turn the 
     United States into Iran's permanent enemy.

                            Iran's Response

       Having demonstrated that air strikes are unlikely either to 
     eliminate the nuclear program or to bring about the overthrow 
     of the Islamic regime in Iran, we must now turn to what, 
     precisely, they would achieve. It is important to remember 
     that some of Iran's threats, demonstrations of new weapons, 
     and military exercises are designed to have a deterrent 
     effect. As such we should not deduce too much about what Iran 
     would do in the event of an attack on the basis of what it

[[Page 20441]]

     might say and do in advance of an attack. A former CIA Middle 
     East Station Chief told me once that predicting the 
     consequences of a strategic event in the Middle East was as 
     difficult as predicting how an Alexander Calder mobile would 
     come to rest after you flicked one of its hanging pieces.
       It is possible, however, to identify some high probability 
     immediate consequences.
       The Iranians would likely look to target Israel as a 
     response to a U.S. strike, using Hezbollah as the primary 
     vehicle for retaliation. For Tehran, there is the added 
     benefit that blaming Israel (even for a U.S. strike) would 
     play well at home, and probably throughout the region.
       Moqtada al-Sadr has said publicly that if the United States 
     were to attack Iran, he would target U.S. forces in Iraq.
       Iran could channel more individuals and weapons into Iraq. 
     Specifically, Iran could upgrade technology among Shiite 
     militias, with weapons like the laser-guided anti-tank 
     missiles Hezbollah had in Lebanon. We might even see more 
     direct operations like missile attacks against U.S. forces.
       Moqtada al-Sadr controls the large Facilities Protection 
     Service forces in Iraq. Some estimates put this force as 
     large as 140,000. Among other missions, they guard the oil 
     pipelines. If Iran wants to cut the flow of oil, Iraq is the 
     best place to begin, and the means are in place to take on 
     the mission. The impact of severing Iraq's oil supplies would 
     be an immediate increase in its own oil revenue.
       Iran is not going to wipe Israel from the map or force the 
     United States to leave Iraq with these operations. But in 
     causing these various complications, Iran can still achieve a 
     degree of success. As we recently witnessed in the clash 
     between Hezbollah and Israel, Iran can seem stronger just by 
     virtue of making the United States and Israel seem weaker.

                               Round Two

       Once the nature of the Iranian retaliation becomes 
     apparent, the United States will not likely declare success 
     and walk away from the problem. Clearly, the pressure will be 
     to expand the targets and punish Iran even more. The 
     government of Iran is fragile, the thinking goes; it could 
     even be on the verge of falling; it is time to ``enable'' the 
     Iranian people. The Iranians will react with their own 
     horizontal escalation. (See Table 2, page 16.)
       Iran has been sending mixed signals about whether or not it 
     would cut its own oil production or attempt to restrict the 
     flow of oil from the Gulf. A strike of five nights might not 
     push them to cut the flow of oil. But continued operations 
     probably would. Iran does have some flexibility to do without 
     oil revenues for a period because of surpluses from currently 
     high oil prices. In addition, it has plans for rationing 
     refined petroleum products that it must import.
       Executing the oil option might not be limited to operations 
     against tankers moving in and out of the Gulf. Iran has the 
     capability, and we have seen some indications of the intent, 
     to attack facilities of other oil providers in the region.
       It would be tougher for Iran and Hezbollah to attack UN 
     forces in Lebanon. If the UN forces were to become too 
     aggressive in response to Hezbollah attacks against Israel, 
     they would most likely become targets. In addition, at some 
     point in the expanding conflict, Iran might see a value to 
     making the war about attempts at Western domination of the 
     region and not just about the United States and Israel. In 
     that case, a focused attack on something like the Italian 
     headquarters would resonate in the region.
       It took a while for the nations of the region to react to 
     the Israeli attack into Lebanon. That most likely would be 
     the case in the event of a U.S. strike against Iran. As 
     attacks continued and as the television coverage intensified, 
     however, we could see something similar to the reactions to 
     the Danish cartoons. We could see the ``Arab Street'' 
     asserting itself.
       Syria and Iran signed a defense agreement on June 15. Under 
     this agreement Syrian forces would be brought into a fight if 
     Iran were attacked. Syrian President Bashar Assad might be a 
     reluctant participant, but as the conflict expands, he might 
     not have a choice.
       The Iranians could conduct targeted killing outside the 
     region. They have used this tactic in the past: in 1991, 
     Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, was 
     decapitated in his apartment in Paris.
       Continued air strikes and demonstrations could have a 
     compounding effect. Weak governments in the Muslim world 
     could be threatened. The governments of Pakistan, Jordan, 
     Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable.

                   TABLE 2. CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Type of Operation
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                     Short strike        Regime change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hezbollah attacks on Israel.....  High probability..  High probability.
Attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq..  High probability..  High probability.
Sabotage pipelines in Iraq......  High probability..  High probability.
Street demonstrations on a wide   Possible..........  High probability.
 scale.
Hezbollah attacks outside the     Possible..........  High probability.
 region.
Iran stopping its own oil         Possible..........  High probability.
 exports.
Iran blocking Gulf oil flow.....  High probability..  High probability.
Iran attacking other regional     Possible..........  Possible.
 oil facilities.
Iran suicide attacks............  Not likely........  Possible.
Syria involved..................  Not likely........  Possible.
Threats to regional governments.  Not likely........  Possible.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       As an obvious consequence of the instability resulting from 
     a U.S. strike, the price of oil almost certainly will spike. 
     The impact will depend on how high and how long. The longer 
     the conflict goes, the higher the price. A former Kuwaiti oil 
     minister privately suggested a plateau of $125 per barrel. 
     Confidential analysis by a major European bank suggests it 
     would level off at $130, and a very conservative estimate 
     would be over $200.
       With prices surging to this level, third order consequences 
     become apparent. The most obvious would be a global, 
     synchronized recession, intensified by the existing U.S. 
     trade and fiscal imbalances. Another political consequence 
     would be that oil exporting countries outside the region 
     would enjoy significant surges in revenue from higher prices. 
     As a result, countries such as Venezuela and Russia would 
     enjoy expanded influence while the West would be reeling from 
     recession.
       I should note that in the preceding discussion of the cycle 
     of action and reaction, I have not mentioned large U.S. 
     ground unit formations. That is because I do not believe we 
     will come to a point where that option will make sense to 
     policymakers. This is the one lesson the administration seems 
     to have learned from Iraq--occupation does not work. And that 
     realization brings us back to why the air strike option has 
     been so attractive to the administration from the beginning.

                          When Is the Strike?

       When does it all come together? When could the United 
     States pull the trigger on the military option? The most 
     important point in understanding the window for an attack is 
     that the military preparations will not be the determining 
     factor. This operation will not resemble the six months of 
     preparations for Operation Desert Shield in 1990. The 
     preparations will be much less visible than the movements to 
     the region in early 2003. We will not read about discussions 
     with Turkey for basing permission. It will not be a major CNN 
     event.
       Instead, preparations will involve the quiet deployment of 
     Air Force tankers to staging bases. We will see additional 
     Navy assets moved to the region. The more significant 
     indications will come from strategic influence efforts to 
     establish domestic political support. The round of 
     presidential speeches on terrorism is a beginning, but I 
     expect more. An emerging theme for the final marketing push 
     seems to be that Iran threatens Israel's existence. We can 
     expect the number of administration references to Iran to 
     significantly increase, and will see three themes--the 
     nuclear program, terrorism, and the threat to Israel's 
     existence.
       The issue of congressional approval plays into the timing 
     question. Administration officials have been asked numerous 
     times if the president would require authorization by 
     Congress for a strike on Iran. Secretary Rice responded to 
     that question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
     in October 2005 by saying, ``I will not say anything that 
     constrains his authority as Command in Chief.'' Congressmen 
     Peter DeFazio and Maurice Hinchey offered an amendment to the 
     Defense Appropriations Bill in June that would have required 
     the president to get authorization from Congress before 
     taking military action against Iran. The amendment failed.
       Over the past few months, we have seen numerous leaks and 
     administration documents that raise an Iran-al Qaeda 
     connection. In addition, the House Permanent Select Committee 
     report on the threat of Iran implied an al Qaeda connection. 
     This linkage of Iran and al Qaeda fits neatly into the 
     broader effort to sell a strike to the American people. But 
     more importantly, it opens the way for an argument that a 
     strike on Iran was part of the global war on terrorism 
     already authorized by Congress.
       In other words, approval by Congress does not necessarily 
     have to be part of the calculation of when an attack could 
     take place. If the determining factor of timing is neither 
     the preparation of military forces nor congressional 
     approval, one question remains: How much public support do 
     decisionmakers believe they need before pulling the trigger? 
     And that question brings us back to the beginning of the 
     summer of diplomacy. Vice President Cheney had to be 
     convinced that it was necessary to give some lip service to 
     diplomacy, checking that box in order to secure public 
     support. President Bush seems to be convinced of the 
     rightness of his cause and vision. He repeats often that he 
     does not care about public opinion.
       The window for a strike on Iran stands open.

                                Finally

       Policymakers who begin with the seven ``truths'' of the 
     situation can easily proceed down a path that leaves the 
     military option as the only one on the table. There is a 
     certain inevitability to this path, a certain inexorability 
     to the momentum toward war. The policymakers will say that 
     the Iranians have forced us to go in this direction. But the 
     painful irony is that these policymakers are forcing the 
     direction on themselves.
       At the end of the path that the administration seems to 
     have chosen, will the issues

[[Page 20442]]

     with Iran be resolved? No. Will the region be better off? No. 
     Is it clear Iran will abandon its nuclear program? No. On the 
     other hand, can Iran defeat the United States militarily? No.
       Will the United States force a regime change in Iran? In 
     all probability it will not. Will the economy of the United 
     States suffer? In all probability it will.
       Will the United States have weakened its position in the 
     Middle East? Yes. Will the United States have reduced its 
     influence in the world? Yes.
       When I finished the 2004 Iran war game exercise, I 
     summarized what I had learned in the process. After all the 
     effort, I am left with two simple sentences for policymakers. 
     ``You have no military solution for the issues of Iran. You 
     have to make diplomacy work.'' I have not changed my mind. 
     That conclusion made sense then. It still makes sense today.

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 1-1/3 minutes to my 
dear friend and distinguished colleague on the International Relations 
Committee, the Congresswoman from Nevada (Ms. Berkley).
  Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend Mr. Lantos for 
yielding to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. Each day 
brings something new from Iran, a new boast, a new rant, a new threat. 
Yet we have made little progress in convincing our allies that the 
Iranian regime means business, and that business is funding and 
supplying terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, wiping Israel off the 
face of the map and denying the Holocaust.
  We must not allow them to acquire the means to carry out their 
ambitions. It would be difficult to overstate the danger Iran 
represents. Unchecked Iranian nuclear proliferation, combined with 
increasing support for international terrorism, poses a grave threat to 
United States forces in the Middle East, moderate Islamic Arab 
countries in the region, the State of Israel. And a nuclear Iran poses 
just as much of a threat to Europe as it does to the countries in the 
Middle East.
  Incomprehensibly, many of our allies seem oblivious to these dangers. 
Their strategy of negotiations, incentives, and concessions are not 
working. Stronger measures are necessary. This bill will ramp up the 
pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions and cooperate with 
the international community.
  Iran is a radical fundamentalist country headed by a President who I 
believe is as dangerous to the world community in the 21st century as 
Hitler was in the 20th century. Every time this man opens his mouth, he 
proves it. We must deny Iran the technology and financial resources 
that will enable this regime to carry out its threats.
  I urge support of this bill.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Paul).

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill, and 
let me give you a few reasons why.
  In the introduction to the bill, it says that its purpose is to hold 
the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and 
to support a transition of its government; and I would just ask one 
question: Could it be possible that others around the world and those 
in Iran see us as participating in ``threatening behavior?'' We should 
make an attempt to see things from other people's view as well.
  I want to give you three quick reasons why I think we should not be 
going at it this way:
  First, this is a confrontational manner of dealing with a problem. A 
country that is powerful and self-confident should never need to resort 
to confrontation. If one is confident, one should be willing to use 
diplomacy whether dealing with our friends or our enemies; I think the 
lack of confidence motivates resolutions of this type.
  The second reason that I will give you for opposing this is that this 
is clearly seeking regime change in Iran. We are taking it upon 
ourselves that we do not like the current regime. I don't like 
Almadinyad, but do we have the responsibility and the authority to 
orchestrate regime change? We approach this by doing two things: 
Sanctions to penalize, at the same time giving aid to those groups that 
we expect to undermine the government. Do you know if somebody came 
into this country and paid groups to undermine our government, that is 
illegal? Yet here we are casually paying money, millions of dollars, 
unlimited sums of money to undermine that government. This is illegal.
  The third point. This bill rejects the notion of the nonproliferation 
treaty. The Iranians have never been proven to be in violation of the 
nonproliferation treaty; and this explicitly says that they cannot 
enrich, uranium even for private and commercial purposes.
  For these three reasons we obviously should reconsider and not use 
this confrontational approach. Why not try diplomacy? Oppose this 
resolution.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/3\ minutes to Mr. 
Sherman.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant support of this bill 
and in strong support of its authors--who got what they could from a 
President who has a veto pen, and is determined to continue our 
ineffectual policy toward Iran.
  America has been blinded by the flash of this President's overly 
aggressive response to Iraq's tiny ``weapons of mass destruction'' 
program. So, as a result, we have settled for a loud but pitifully 
ineffectual effort, both toward North Korea's nuclear program and 
toward Iran's.
  In this bill, I had an amendment that would have prohibited U.S. 
corporations from doing business with Iran through their foreign 
subsidiaries. That amendment was stripped in conference. So Halliburton 
is protected; the American people are not.
  This bill extends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was so 
effective, along with other measures, in getting Khadaffi to change his 
policies. However, as toward Iran, the last administration and this 
administration has a policy of ignoring widely reported investments in 
the Iran oil sector. The bill says we are supposed to sanction oil 
companies that invest even $40 million in Iran's oil sector. When tens 
of billions of dollars of investments are announced in the Wall Street 
Journal, the President's response is, he didn't get that copy.
  We have got to pass this bill, but we have got to do a lot more. And 
we have got to make sure that, in our policy toward Russia and China 
about Moldova, Abkhazia, and currency controls, that we make it clear 
that support on Iran will lead to our change on those issues that are 
so important to Russia and China. We need linkage, and we need an 
effective policy.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington 
(Mr. McDermott).
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the American people need to know the 
Republican majority today has created the House Failed Diplomacy 
Caucus.
  The Republicans need another press release before they go home, so we 
have 20 minutes to offer our thoughts on a bad bill sent to the floor 
by Republicans to show how tough they are.
  Showing how smart we are would be a far better idea for dealing with 
nations like Iran and Iraq. But global diplomacy isn't the stuff of 
press releases; rhetoric is. So the Republicans have shut down debate 
by bringing legislation to the floor under a closed rule. They don't 
want ideas or improvements for making the world a safer place. They 
want leaflets to drop during the campaign, and they are being printed 
en mass right now. It is the Republican Iraq strategy all over again. 
Different nation, same flawed approach.
  Republicans have given us H.R. 6198, the We Run the World Act. There 
is no need for other nations to actually have governments, actually. We 
will send our press releases. Just follow along, Russia, Iraq, Iran, 
Pakistan, Lebanon, and anywhere else where we think we run them.
  Republicans want Americans to point the finger and send along 
instructions. They are staging a campaign event right here on the 
floor. You watch how quick it makes it into the ads of television.
  This is not, not, going to help America chart a path to deal with 
what is

[[Page 20443]]

wrong with the Iranian government. No one disagrees with the fact that 
it is not a government we want in control of that country. It will only 
entrench and bolster those who are wrong.
  The press release won't protect anybody. But, in fact, the Iranian 
dissidents don't want the money. Do you know why? Just like many 
Republicans today don't want Bush to come into their district and put 
his arm around them in the midst of this campaign, the Iranian 
dissidents know that, if it becomes American money, they are done. They 
will not be able to do what they need to. We need to vote ``no'' on 
this initiative.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield time to my 
colleague from Florida on this bipartisan bill, the essence of which 
has been extensively debated on the floor several times and in 
committees, as well.
  I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Shaw).
  Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding this time 
to me and congratulate the committee on both sides of the aisle.
  I think, however, when we look around and see some of the rhetoric 
that is going on, let's take a look at what is happening.
  We have probably one of the most dangerous countries in the world run 
by fanatics that is in the process of producing a nuclear weapon. We 
have the Iranians financing the terrorists in Iraq killing American 
soldiers. We have the Iranians in Iraq killing innocent Iraqis. We have 
the Iranians in Iraq killing innocent Lebanese with the Hezbollah. And 
we are standing here today listening to people talk about press 
releases.
  Come on, guys. Isn't there something that can draw this Congress 
together? It already has brought together responsible Democrats and 
Republicans. But to come forward and talk of this nature is absolutely 
counterproductive. It does not help us in our country, and we should 
stop it now. We need to put up a unified force in this country.
  We are aiding and abetting the enemy when we stress our division. Of 
course we are going to disagree. That is healthy. That is what 
democracy is all about. But on some of these items, such as what we are 
talking about here today, when American soldiers are spilling their 
blood and that blood is being spilt with Iranian money, can't we start 
talking about America and quit talking about politics?
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Oregon for yielding 
me this time and providing it to us in the context of this debate.
  This proposed legislation is contrary to the best interest of Iran 
and the United States. It is, unfortunately, reminiscent of the State 
of the Union address which declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as part 
of the Axis of Evil; and we are now very familiar with the consequences 
of that statement. We have seen a disastrous situation develop in Iraq, 
and we have also seen the revival of nuclear interest both in North 
Korea and in Iran.
  The attitude of our country toward Iran now for more than 50 years 
has been overly aggressive and overbearing, and the consequences of it 
have been very dangerous. We should be acting in a much more mature and 
responsible way, particularly toward this country. This is a very 
significant country, not only in the Middle East but in the world 
generally. The people of this country are good, sound, solid, 
reasonable people, and we need to be appealing to them on that basis, 
not on the basis of the language of this resolution, which continues to 
create this atmosphere of hostility which is, as I have indicated, has 
been going on now for more than 50 years.
  That needs to change. We need to change our attitude, change our 
approach to this nation. We need to engage them more objectively, more 
seriously, and in a much more filial way, a much more friendlier way. 
And if we were to do that, we would find that this country would react 
and respond to us in a similar fashion.
  Unfortunately, this proposed legislation does exactly the opposite. 
It places us, continues to place us in a difficult and dangerous, 
antagonistic circumstance between ourselves and this country, and 
unnecessarily so. So this legislation is contrary to our interests, 
just as it is contrary to the interests of Iran, and so it should be 
rejected by this body.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of our 
time to the distinguished member of the International Relations 
Committee, Mr. Engel, from New York.
  Mr. ENGEL. I thank my distinguished friend from California for 
yielding to me, and I rise in strong support of this bill.
  My colleagues, we have to deal with things as they are, not as what 
we wish them to be. I wish there was reasonableness among the 
government of Iran today. I wish there were people that we could talk 
to on a friendly basis and reason with them and come to some kind of a 
compromise.
  But that is not what we have here. We have a belligerent regime that 
is pursuing nuclear weapons, that is hostile towards the United States, 
that is hostile towards the West, that is hostile towards Israel. You 
have a president of that country who has said every foul thing 
imaginable, denies the Holocaust, says he wants to wipe Israel off the 
face of the map, and says that Americans are his sworn enemy.
  This bill makes sense. This bill extends the current law and 
sanctions and provides important additional authorities to fight that 
threat. It is the carrot and the stick. We are having democracy 
building in this bill. We are being able to try to reach the Iranian 
people, who are good friends of the American people, but they are 
trapped by a repressive government and a government that doesn't have 
their best interests at heart, let alone anybody else's best interest.
  So this is sort of a carrot-and-stick approach. We slap sanctions 
when sanctions are needed. We amend, also we expand it. It is expiring 
if we don't amend it, and it does what we know needs to be done.
  Iran needs to be challenged. It cannot be allowed to have nuclear 
weapons. This is the same policy, it is a centrist policy, it makes a 
lot of sense, and I urge strong bipartisan support for this bill.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa.
  Mr. LEACH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  First, let me stress, this bill has strong bipartisan support. It 
also has significant bipartisan opposition. And so it should be 
considered in the category of individual judgment, not politics.
  On the plus side of the bill, let me note that it does stress 
sanctions, not military action, and it quite properly gives the 
executive discretion to lift these sanctions.
  On the minus side, and this is the compelling point, it represents an 
escalation of tension, policy, and attitudinal friction with Iran.

                              {time}  1345

  It is an escalation that is guaranteed to fail. You might ask, Why is 
it guaranteed to fail? It is because unilateral sanctions don't work, 
and there is no evidence that the other principal parties that are 
dealing with Iran will follow this example.
  We can pound our chest all we want to suggest that a Russia or a 
China should follow our lead, but these kinds of suggestions from 
Congress simply carry no weight.
  Secondly, no one should doubt that this complicates problems for our 
troops in Iraq today. That is an absolute utter circumstance that has 
to be dealt with, and we have to think it through.
  Thirdly, this step implicitly underscores and advances a diplomacy-
less strategy. That is, the United States of America has advanced a no-
talk-with-Iran strategy for more than this administration, for quite a 
number of years, and the question is does it work, is it as hapless as 
our strategy towards certain other countries in the world, including 
Cuba.
  In the backdrop is the issue of force, and also the issue of 
dominoes, dominoes in the sense of decisionmaking.

[[Page 20444]]

Often policies that don't work implicitly are followed by other 
policies that we hope will work. If this particular policy doesn't 
work, do we then have to go to the force option?
  There is a neocon desire, as has been written about extensively, to 
consider the idea of a preemptive strike. All I would say is there is a 
``3-3-100'' set of principles that we have to think through.
  The first ``three'' is there are three ways of obtaining nuclear 
weapons: one is to develop them; another is to steal them; and another 
is to buy them.
  If we bomb Iran, there is no doubt whatsoever we will put back their 
capacity to develop. But it might also accelerate the capacity to steal 
or purchase.
  The second ``three'' principle is that there are three weapons of 
mass destruction. We not only have nuclear; we have chemical and 
biological. And knocking back their nuclear certainly will accelerate 
the other two.
  The third issue is the issue of a ``hundred.'' We have the idea that 
we can do a preemptive strike quickly and it will be over. But the fact 
is that the other side will respond. They might respond for 100 years.
  I think it is time we talk about from the people's House the issue of 
developing mutual self-interest, not antagonism, and we ought to move 
in the direction of realism instead of taking ideological steps that 
don't fit the times.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to 
close.
  Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentlewoman's work because the bill 
that we have before us, as I mentioned earlier, is, a substantial 
improvement over the one that was approved by the House earlier this 
year. I had hoped it would come back to our committee because I think 
these issues are worthy of further discussion, and there is more fine-
tuning we could do.
  For instance, dealing with the provisions for terms of the promotion 
of democracy, reading the language that is in this bill, the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, in exile in France, would have qualified for U.S. assistance. 
We could have had a debacle like we had with Chalabi. I don't think it 
is as tight and precise as we would like.
  But most important, it fails to deal with the fundamental choice we 
need to make between whether we want regime change or whether we want 
to stop nuclear proliferation.
  I deeply appreciate the points raised by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. 
Leach). We could end up actually making the situation worse.
  I am deeply troubled that we are going to ratchet up the pressure on 
the very people who we most need for a diplomatic solution, the people 
like China and Russia who are going to be key to ultimately resolving 
it.
  Mr. Speaker, part of the problem that we have great difficulty with 
is that some of the most disagreeable people, some of the most 
dangerous people, are people that we ignore at our peril. We should not 
do that. We should engage them directly, diplomatically and not under 
the auspices of this bill, which I hope that the House will reject.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, as recently as last month, Iran 
blatantly refused to respond to the August 31 deadline as set forth by 
the United Nations Security Council to stop enriching its uranium in 
exchange for a very generous incentives package.
  We have tried to coax. We have tried to induce. We have tried to talk 
the Iranians into cooperating. Enough with the carrots; it is time for 
the stick.
  We hope that all freedom-loving nations are allies in this struggle 
for nonproliferation efforts and would, out of their own volition, take 
the necessary steps to hold Iran accountable for its own behavior. 
However, sometimes even friends need a little prodding.
  Writer Charles Krauthammer points out the chilling reality of the 
opportunity costs of not dealing effectively with Iran at this time. He 
says, ``If we fail to prevent an Iranian regime run by apocalyptic 
fanatics from going nuclear, we will have reached the point of no 
return. It is not just Iran that might be the source of great concern, 
but that we will have demonstrated to the world that for those 
similarly inclined, there is no serious impediment.''
  This bill will help contain the Iranian threat and will send a clear 
message that we will not tolerate flagrant violations of international 
nonproliferation obligations.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6198, 
legislation to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its 
threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran. 
As an original cosponsor of the legislation I am pleased that the House 
is considering it today.
  The threat from Iran is plain. The Iranian mullahs have lied to the 
international community about their nuclear program for years. They 
have, again and again and again, defied the clear will of the 
international community that has demanded that they freeze their 
efforts to enrich uranium. Iran has been, and remains today, the most 
active state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Iran provides hundreds 
of millions of dollars, shiploads of weapons, advanced military 
training and substantial political cover to Hizballah, Hamas and other 
radical, violent Islamist groups in the Middle East. Their most senior 
officials continue to make pronouncements that call into question their 
attachment to reality. Supreme Leader Khamenei has confirmed that Iran 
would share its nuclear technology with other states. President 
Ahmadinejad has made a hobby out of Holocaust denial and at every 
opportunity violates the most fundamental tenet of international law by 
calling for the annihilation of Israel, a sovereign member of the 
international community.
  In Iran, we have exactly what we thought we had in Iraq: a state with 
enormous wealth in natural resources; significant WMD capabilities and 
the means to deliver them; and the use of terrorist organizations as an 
instrument of state policy. But what will amaze the historians who look 
back on this period will be the stunning lack of urgency with which the 
Bush Administration and this Congress has approached this problem.
  I will be the first to admit that our policy options toward Iran are 
unappetizing at best. We have little diplomatic leverage, since we 
don't talk with Iran directly, except in very limited circumstances. 
Any military operation beyond pinpoint air strikes is quite simply 
beyond our capacity at the moment, given our situation in Iraq. And we 
should honestly acknowledge that even a robust campaign of air strikes 
targeted at Iran's nuclear facilities might have only a marginal effect 
on Iran's nuclear program. We don't know where all of it is hidden and 
many of the sites that we do know of can't be effectively attacked from 
the air. Further, since our intelligence is so incomplete, we would 
have a very limited ability to assess how much damage our strikes had 
actually done to the Iranian program. In addition to questions about 
the direct affects, a decision to strike Iran, would have enormous 
diplomatic consequences for the United States, and would likely lead to 
Iranian retaliation against our already overextended troops in Iraq, 
and probably against our ally, Israel.
  So without a viable military option, we are left with maklng multi-
lateral diplomacy effective. This is the right course, but it is one 
that the Bush administration has been extremely loathe to pursue, and 
one at which they have shown little proficiency.
  If a nuclear-armed Iran is ``very de-stabilizing,'' as the President 
has said it is--and I do believe it is--then we need to make that view, 
and the implications of that view, clear to Russia and China and even 
to our partners in Europe. Fortunately, this legislation provides the 
administration with new and useful tools that can be applied to help 
make that case. Our message must be that this urgent problem can be 
addressed if the will is there to do so.
  In short, Iran needs to become urgent for the administration before 
it will become urgent for anyone else. Only concerted, sustained 
multilateral pressure has any chance of convincing Iran to change 
course. And if Iran chooses not to change course, then the 
international community must be prepared to pursue effective 
multilateral sanctions against the regime. Unfortunately, while the EU-
3 shares our view that an Iran with nuclear weapons is not an 
acceptable outcome, it seems that Russia and China do not. If the 
administration can't convince those nations that it is in their 
interest for Iran not to have nuclear weapons, then we need to start 
considering what options remain to us unilaterally, what the cost of 
the options would be and how we could go about containing a nuclear-
armed Iran.
  One last point Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the bill we are 
considering today does not contain the language regarding pension plans 
and mutual funds that would require the managers of such funds to 
notify investors if any of the assets of a particular fund are invested 
in an entity which has invested in

[[Page 20445]]

Iran and may be subject to sanctions under ILSA. I think such 
notifications are consistent with the fiduciary responsibilities of 
fund managers and would have prevented Americans from unwittingly 
fueling Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons, simply by contributing 
to their 401(k)'s. Nevertheless, I strongly urge my colleagues to 
support the bill.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the march to war with Iran. 
I am as concerned as the authors and supporters of this bill about 
Iran's nuclear weapons program. But I do not believe that levying 
additional sanctions and encouraging regime change is the correct 
course. Instead, we should work with our allies to negotiate a 
diplomatic solution.
  The ``Iran Freedom Support Act'', H.R. 6198, will antagonize Iran's 
government. Provisions calling for democracy promotion and ``the 
exercise of self-determination'' will be interpreted as a direct 
assault on Iran's sovereignty and may prompt Iran to discontinue 
ongoing negotiations. Unilateral sanctions may also discourage France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain from working to broker an international 
agreement. Our allies do not appreciate it when we ``go it alone.''
  Dissidents will also be hurt by our offer of financial and political 
assistance. As in Iraq, individuals and groups that ally with America 
will see their integrity questioned and their reputations for 
independence undermined.
  Iranian families will be hurt by sanctions that prohibit foreign 
investment in the country's petroleum industries. Sanctions already in 
place have not impacted Iran's behavior. Why would new prohibitions on 
investment succeed where old sanctions have failed?
  Finally, the American people will be less secure. Antagonizing Iran 
will not stop or even slow nuclear weapons development. Instead, 
sanctions will prompt Iran to redouble its efforts as a means of saving 
domestic and international face.
  The Bush administration and Republicans in Congress have already made 
a mess of Iraq and allowed warlords to gain control of much of 
Afghanistan's countryside. This legislation takes us a step closer to 
similar results in Iran. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no''.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6198, 
introduced by my colleagues on the House International Relations 
Committee.
  The international community continues to look the other way as Iran 
claims they will move forward in the process of enriching uranium.
  The leaders of Iran decided the IAEA deadline did not apply to them 
and I strongly believe have no interest in negotiating with the West.
  The President of Iran was clear about his intentions to enrich 
uranium at the United Nations General Assembly a few weeks ago.
  His performance in New York and at the Council of Foreign Relations 
was a display of insanity.
  He continues to proudly defend his comments about the Holocaust being 
a myth and how Iran is not trying to acquire nuclear weapons even as 
more and more information comes out about their covert nuclear program 
that was helped along by AQ Khan's black market nuclear network
  This is a man who was basically appointed by the Mullahs in Tehran.
  I say this because any reform minded candidate was removed from the 
ballots. Iran is not a democracy; the government of Iran is run by 
zealots using terrorism to meet their goals.
  We need to support the people of Iran as they continue to be 
repressed by the Mullahs.
  The people of Iran deserve freedom and democracy.
  I strongly support this bill and I urge all of my colleagues to 
support this important piece of legislation.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6198, the Iran 
Freedom Support Act, because this bill could very well derail the 
diplomatic efforts currently underway that are our best hope for ending 
the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
  Let me be clear that I agree with the great majority of which this 
bill would do. I believe that we should extend the Iran Libya Sanctions 
Act. I believe that we should support human rights in Iran.
  But as with so many things in life, Mr. Speaker, timing is 
everything. And this is the wrong time to pass this bill.
  Crucial negotiations between Iran and the European Union in Berlin 
are reportedly closing in on a deal that would suspend Iran's uranium 
enrichment program while multilateral talks commence. The Bush 
administration has so botched the issue of containing Iran's nuclear 
ambitions that we have few choices left. These negotiations were just 
suspended for a week, and it would surprise no one if Iran did not 
return to the table. But make no mistake: as bad as the negotiation 
option may turn out to be, it remains our best chance of stopping Iran 
from ever building a nuclear weapon.
  We need to support these negotiations, not undermine them. For the 
Congress to pass language which essentially makes regime change in Iran 
the official policy of the United States would be counterproductive 
while these negotiations in Berlin remain promising.
  I could support this bill at another time, but not now, not when its 
passage could kill the ongoing negotiations.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6198, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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