[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 15]
[House]
[Pages 19910-19911]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            GLOBAL TERRORISM

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, President George Bush, in creating fear 
about terrorists in the American people rather than understanding, 
often says, ``If we don't fight terrorists over there, we will have to 
fight them right here.'' He never bothers to explain in detail who the 
terrorists are or what motivates them or how his policies are creating 
more of them. The President's explanations are too simplistic, and they 
are wrong.
  The President tried to convince us if we got Saddam Hussein and 
brought him to justice the battle for peace in the Middle East would 
take a favorable turn. Indeed, the opposite has happened as Iraq 
descends into chaos. Indeed, despite the military firmness and bravery 
of our soldiers, the Iraq war has actually failed politically by 
failing to win the hearts and minds of the people.
  Equally bad, the Iraq war has strengthened Iran and those loyal to 
it. By removing Saddam Hussein as a counterweight to Iran, President 
Bush has left a vacuum now being filled by increasingly radicalized 
Shia populations and disillusioned Sunnis. The Shia and Kurd factions 
inside Iraq and the outnumbered Sunnis are now at one another's 
throats. Great instability is being created in a region where rising 
religious fundamentalism, unleashed by Saddam's ouster, is the glue 
that is binding a rising revolution of expectations by formerly 
suppressed populations.
  The President's own White House was forced this week to declassify an 
intelligence report that I am going to put in the Record. This is a 
summary, called ``Trends in Global Terrorism, a National Intelligence 
Estimate,'' and this report says the Iraq war is shaping a new 
generation of terrorists.
  Anyone who knows anything about what is causing rising levels of 
hatred against the United States in the Middle East would have 
anticipated this eventuality. The key question the President and we 
must address and face is, why do his policies yield more and more 
terrorists who want to harm us, and harm us in many places beyond the 
boundaries of Iraq and Afghanistan?
  The complete story will show terrorists will continue to plot ways to 
harm America because more than wanting to come here, although some of 
them are capable of doing that, they want America and American 
influence out of their countries and regions. They want us out of there 
more than they want to come here.
  Rather than striking fear in the American people, the President ought 
to do more to explain the forces creating this anti-American and anti-
Western sentiment across those troubled regions. Which American 
interests have caused this antagonism to our Nation? An important 
question to answer. In what countries has this hatred been fomented? 
Another important question to answer. And what is the face there of 
America that is hated more and more?
  Let me suggest part of that face involves U.S. oil alliances in 
cahoots with some of the most repressive and brutal regimes and leaders 
who hold down the potential of their own people. There is not a 
democracy over there, and we are totally reliant on all of those oil 
kingdoms.
  Let me suggest that the presence of U.S. military bases that ensure 
the status quo of those repressive regimes doesn't help.
  Let me suggest America is hated more because we are not viewed as 
being evenhanded at arriving at fair and just peace settlements between 
Israel and the Palestinians and their neighbors. We need to do a better 
job of cultivating evenhanded diplomacy in the region.
  Let me suggest our U.S. popular culture and many of its excesses are 
regarded as abhorrent to the fundamentalist legions that have gained 
even greater ascendancy after the disgusting and outrageous behavior by 
Americans at Abu Ghraib.
  Let me suggest the U.S. now is being viewed by the multitudes of 
Muslims as fighting a religious war against Islam. President Bush made 
a huge blunder at the start of the Iraqi war by calling it a Crusade 
hearkening back to the Christian wars. His battle cry gaffe echoed 
across the Muslim world and became a rallying point for the opposition. 
How tragic and inappropriate.
  Let me quote from a wise American voice who tries to enlighten about 
the roots of terrorism, rather than strike fear in our people:
  Robert Baer, author of best selling book See No Evil, is a decorated 
CIA agent who put his life on the line for our Nation for three 
decades. He tries to build understanding about the conditions giving 
rise to terrorism. He defines our problem as larger than just a few 
men--like Bin Laden and Hussein--and their followers. He argues the 
reason animosity is growing against the U.S. is the result of much 
larger forces spanning several decades. To name but one element of the 
challenge we face--he discusses the Muslim Brotherhood.

       The Muslim Brotherhood was an amorphous, dangerous, 
     unpredictable movement that shook every government in the 
     Middle East to its bones. Founded by an Egyptian, Hasan Al-
     Banna, in 1929 it was dedicated to bringing the Kingdom of 
     God to earth. The Egyptian Muslim Brothers had unsuccessfully 
     tried to kill Egyptian President Abdul Nasser. The Syrian 
     branch had tried to kill Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad a 
     couple of times. In 1982, its followers seized Hama, a 
     historic city in central Syria, provoking Asad into shelling 
     them and Hama into the next life.
       The Muslim Brothers are also distant cousins of the Wahabis 
     of Saudia Arabia, the most puritanical sect in Islam. 
     Underwritten by the Saudi royal family, the Wahabis spawned 
     Osama bin Laden. They also served as the inspiration for the 
     Taliban in Afghanistan and other radical Sunni movements. 
     Many Muslims consider the Wahabis dangerous because they 
     adopted the beliefs of Ibn Taymiyah, a 14th century Islamic 
     scholar who condoned political assassination. Al-Jihad, the 
     Egyptian fundamentalist who murdered Egyptian President Anwar 
     Sadat relied on Ibn Taymiyah as justification for what they 
     did.

  Understanding the forces that generate terrorism is fundamental for 
solving it. The National Intelligence Report summarizes some of the 
essential steps our Nation must take to broaden our understanding of 
what it will take to break our dependence on oil regimes, resolve peace 
settlements that have been let languish, and form alliances that are 
broadly representative and democratic in their focus. The world needs 
more understanding, not fear, to counter terrorism.
  Mr. Speaker, I am very sorry that my time is out. I will continue 
tomorrow with an additional statement including complementary remarks 
about the book ``See No Evil'' by Robert Baer that gets the picture 
right.
  The NIE report I referred to earlier is as follows:

      National Intelligence Estimate--Trends in Global Terrorism: 
                   Implications for the United States


   Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate 
  ``Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States'' 
                            dated April 2006

       Key Judgments: United States-led counterterrorism efforts 
     have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa'ida and 
     disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa'ida 
     will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and 
     U.S. interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We 
     also assess that the global jihadist movement--which includes 
     al-Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and 
     emerging networks and cells--is spreading and adapting to 
     counterterrorism efforts.
       Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with 
     precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates 
     that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although 
     a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number 
     and geographic dispersion.
       If this trend continues, threats to U.S. interests at home 
     and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing 
     attacks worldwide.
       Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in 
     Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the 
     grievances

[[Page 19911]]

     jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with 
     sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the 
     vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued 
     pressure on al-Qa'ida, could erode support for the jihadists.
       We assess that the global jihadist movement is 
     decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is 
     becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with 
     anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The 
     confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make 
     it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.
       We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized 
     cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism 
     efforts, particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.
       The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for 
     attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the 
     extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment 
     and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 
     Madrid and 2005 London bombings.
       We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation 
     of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist 
     success there would inspire more fighters to continue the 
     struggle elsewhere.
       The Iraq conflict has become the ``cause celebre'' for 
     jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in 
     the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global 
     jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive 
     themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer 
     fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.
       We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of 
     the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to 
     do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.
       Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the 
     jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as 
     corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, 
     leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; 
     (2) the Iraq ``jihad;'' (3) the slow pace of real and 
     sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many 
     Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-U.S. 
     sentiment among most Muslims--all of which jihadists exploit.
       Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have 
     emerged that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to 
     slow the spread of the movement. They include dependence on 
     the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited 
     appeal of the jihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of 
     respected voices of moderation, and criticism of the violent 
     tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
       The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their 
     ultimate political solution--an ultra-conservative 
     interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the 
     Muslim world--is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. 
     Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is 
     implied by the jihadists' propaganda would help to divide 
     them from the audiences they seek to persuade.
       Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious 
     interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a 
     trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive 
     alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political 
     activism. This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic 
     participation of broader Muslim communities in rejecting 
     violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on 
     passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream 
     emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.
       Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require 
     coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond 
     operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.
       If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations 
     progress over the next five years, political participation 
     probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists 
     and groups willing to use the political process to achieve 
     their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and 
     potentially destabilizing transitions will create new 
     opportunities for jihadists to exploit.
       Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, 
     is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits 
     and donors and to maintain its leadership role.
       The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama bin Ladin, 
     Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, 
     probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller 
     groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to 
     carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would 
     exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that the 
     resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a 
     less serious threat to U.S. interests than does al-Qa'ida.
       Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back 
     attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his 
     popular appeal and present a global threat.
       The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of 
     al-Qa'ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to 
     focus their efforts on external operations.
       Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as 
     Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah, and several North African 
     groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach 
     and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty 
     attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
       We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the 
     Homeland than does al-Qa'ida but will pose varying degrees of 
     threat to our allies and to U.S. interests abroad. The focus 
     of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local 
     regime targets and regional or global ones.
       We judge that most jihadist groups--both well-known and 
     newly formed--will use improvised explosive devices and 
     suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to 
     implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they 
     will attempt to conduct sustained terrorist attacks in urban 
     environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a 
     potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these 
     tactics.
       CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist 
     groups.
       While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most 
     active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be 
     unable to prevent territory or resources from being exploited 
     by terrorists.
       Anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise 
     and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some 
     leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist 
     methods to attack U.S. interests. The radicalization process 
     is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously 
     in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise 
     attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be 
     difficult to pinpoint.
       We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use 
     the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, 
     and obtain logistical and financial support.

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