[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 14]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 19105-19106]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. FRANK R. WOLF

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 21, 2006

  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Congressional 
Record a statement by former special representative on Sudan, Roger P. 
Winter. This statement was delivered at a hearing on the current 
situation in Sudan--the House International Relations Committee 
Subcommittee on Africa.
  Roger's testimony is compelling and I encourage all members to read 
it. The warning signs are written on the wall; if the international 
community fails to act, the genocide in Darfur can and will get worse.
  The statement of Roger P. Winter, October 20, 2006, follows:

Statement of Roger P. Winter, Former Special Representative on Sudan of 
                     the Deputy Secretary of State

       Sudan's National Congress Party is controlled by an 
     intellectually-capable, radically-committed, conspiratorial 
     and compassionless nucleus of individuals, long referred to 
     as the National Islamic Front (NIF). In the 17 years since 
     they came to power by coup to abort an incipient peace 
     process, they have consistently defied the international 
     community and won. As individuals, the NIF has never paid a 
     price for their crimes. Almost all of them are still in 
     important positions.
       The NIF core is a competent cadre of men who have an 
     agenda, the pursuit of which has killed millions of Sudanese 
     and uprooted and destroyed the lives of millions more. While 
     their agenda is radically ideological, it is equally about 
     personal power and enrichment. They are not at all suicidal, 
     but they respond only to credible threats against their power 
     and prosperity. The international community with its 
     limitless posturing and (too often) empty words has, to date, 
     never constituted a credible threat. During its 17-year 
     reign, the NIF engaged seriously with critics only once, that 
     being when confronted by a strong Sudanese Peoples Liberation 
     Movement and Army (SPLM/A) and an energetic international 
     coalition led by the United States. The result was the 
     Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), an incredible, detailed 
     document that ended a twenty-two year war between the NIF 
     government and the people of southern Sudan, the Nuba 
     Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei. Despite Khartoum's 
     deliberately slow and selective implementation, in my view, 
     the CPA is now at very serious risk of survival.
       Power and wealth in Sudan have historically been 
     concentrated in ``the center'', in fact in just a few tribes. 
     All the peripheral populations--North, South, East and West--
     have, as a result, been marginalized, largely destitute, 
     powerless and lacking development, regardless of their 
     religious, cultural or ethnic background. The U.S. initiative 
     beginning in 2001 made rather incredible progress in ending 
     hostilities between the SPLM and the NIF government and 
     opening up humanitarian access to war-affected people, 
     raising the hopes and expectations of a better life for 
     almost all Sudanese. That the peace process took four years 
     is not surprising, given the egregious history to be overcome 
     and the quality of the final text. The CPA was signed in 
     January 2005. In April an SPLM delegation went to Khartoum to 
     begin implementation arrangements. On landing at Khartoum's 
     airport they were engulfed by joyous throngs of Sudanese of 
     all backgrounds--Muslims, Christians, Africans, Arabs and 
     others--hoisting the delegation onto their shoulders and 
     dancing in the streets. They understood the implications of 
     the CPA to be for all Sudanese. On July 8 when Dr. John de 
     Mabior, chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the 
     SPLA arrived in Khartoum to sign the Interim Constitution 
     that was to implement the CPA, huge crowds of Northerners and 
     Southerners estimated by some at 6-8 million came out to meet 
     him. His popularity was such that, in a free election, it is 
     likely that he could be elected President of Sudan by all the 
     people. A New Sudan was being born.
       But Darfur was in flames.
       In February 2003, perhaps seeing the progress of CPA 
     negotiations and concerned about being left out of the 
     benefits of the CPA, ``rebels'' from Darfur's marginalized 
     populations who were considered ``African'' as distinct from 
     ``Arab'' initiated hostilities against the NIF government, 
     The NIF responded precisely as it had in the war against the 
     SPLA. This involved destruction of civilian populations, 
     denial of humanitarian assistance to war-affected civilians, 
     utilization of surrogate Arab militias in coordination with 
     formal government military forces and pretence of themselves 
     being the aggrieved party, being the ``sovereign'' 
     government. The violence exhibited a character far beyond 
     that which could fairly be described as ``military''. Ethnic 
     cleansing was clear. Genocide was its truer name.
       The CPA includes a provision that the South and potentially 
     Abyei can legally secede from the Sudan state if a referendum 
     in those areas, scheduled for 2011, so decides. (The people 
     of Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains, to their great 
     dismay, have no similar option and fear being overwhelmed by 
     Khartoum eventually). The NIF committed itself to make unity 
     attractive but the war in Darfur has demonstrated to the SPLM 
     that unity in a state dominated by the NIF would be anything 
     but attractive. Many core NIF adherents were appalled by this 
     provision, not just at the potential dismemberment of the 
     Sudanese state but also because a large percentage of Sudan's 
     known oil reserves, now increasingly coming on line, are 
     located in the South. If the South legally seceded, that oil 
     would then belong to it as a new separate country. Those NIF 
     personnel also saw other CPA interim provisions as 
     contemptible: that Dr. Garang would become Sudan's First Vice 
     President, that the South would have its own government, that 
     the SPLA would continue to exist as a component of ``the 
     national army'', but separate from the Government's army, and 
     that national elections would be held.
       So, why did the NIF government sign the CPA? With its very 
     limited allegiance from the Sudanese public and increasing 
     military threats from Sudan's other disaffected marginalized 
     populations, with the international war on terror potentially 
     having implications for Sudan itself, being on the U.S. list 
     of state sponsors of terrorism and also being the political 
     birthing place for Osama bin Laden, not to mention the NIF's 
     own brand of radical politics, the NIF needed to buy time. It 
     also hadn't, despite a twenty two year war, been able to 
     defeat the SPLA. It was in their interests, at least ``for 
     now'', to sign. At least signing guaranteed it six and one-
     half years of protected existence. Who could know what 
     opportunities for a

[[Page 19106]]

     course-correction might materialize within that timespan?
       On July 30, 2005 Dr. John de Mabior, the embodiment of the 
     possibility of a united New Sudan, was killed in a helicopter 
     crash. The opportunity had arrived. That very day, I believe, 
     the NIF recalculated its future course of action.
       To seize the opportunity, the NIF needed to eliminate the 
     Darfur opposition (civilian and military), destabilize the 
     SPLM, corrupt or abort any potential for a viable referendum. 
     maintain possession of the oil fields of Abyei, and ensure 
     the degradation of the SPLA. The NIF has seen progress on all 
     of these in the last fourteen months.
       We are currently witnessing the NIF's attempt to achieve 
     the elimination of its Darfur opposition. Khartoum is 
     attempting to change the realities on the ground in Darfur 
     before the international community gets serious, if that is 
     possible. They believe they have ``read'' us, the 
     international community, all accurately, the U.S. included. 
     They believe there will be a continued slow response on our 
     part to Darfur's genocide and acceptable limits to whatever 
     actions are ultimately taken. After all, that's been pretty 
     much the case throughout their tenure. Thus, the liquidation 
     of the Darfur opposition is now in motion.
       The NIF has successfully marginalized the SPLM within the 
     ``Government of National Unity'' created by the CPA. The SPLM 
     is largely powerless to affect significant national policy. 
     The NIF has ``bought'' several SPLM officials and also 
     inserted into the SPLM apparatus other key individuals whose 
     loyalty is to Khartoum. Several veteran SPLM leaders, 
     brilliant, capable men who were critical in achieving the 
     CPA, have now left the country in despair.
       The process for undermining the referendum is now underway. 
     The first elections, preliminary to any referendum, are 
     scheduled for 2008. To prepare for them, basic elements, laws 
     and structures must be put in place, especially in a context 
     where there is no history of elections. For example, there 
     has been no proper census in Sudan since 1983. Thus, the 
     architecture for elections is being put in place in a context 
     largely controlled by Khartoum loyalists. And, too, the 
     international community is being of only limited assistance 
     to the SPLM in its conversion from a rebel movement into a 
     nationally competitive political party, a serious 
     shortcoming.
       The future of Abyei, a place little understood by 
     outsiders, is a critical issue as it is the repository of a 
     significant amount of Sudan's oil; most of Abyei is an oil 
     field. Currently that oil is being extracted under Government 
     contracts with oil companies from China, with its UN Security 
     Council veto power, Malaysia, India and Sudan itself. Its 
     products are fueling the NIF's war in Darfur. The CPA 
     provided for an Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to 
     determine Abyei's actual borders, so that oil revenues can be 
     properly allocated. The ABC determined the boundaries but 
     President Beshir has rejected it and also the appointment of 
     an interim local government as provided in the CPA. To buy 
     time as the clock ticks, he refuses to proceed. The highly 
     volatile Abyei area, thus, remains largely in the hands of 
     the Sudanese Army.
       The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army is, in many ways, the 
     reason the CPA exists. This rebel army, with very limited 
     resources, could not be defeated by the Sudan army. But that 
     was then; this in now. The balance may be changing. The 
     riches of Khartoum are being used to modernize and equip the 
     Sudan Army. The SPLA is largely as it was several years ago, 
     perhaps even less so. In significant part, this is due to us. 
     Endless debating regarding what the U.S. is authorized to do 
     to the help in the transformation of the SPLA into a modern 
     military force is very dangerous. It could cost South Sudan 
     and potentially all of Sudan tragically in the future. 
     Transformation of the SPLA is the surest guarantee that the 
     CPA will survive.
       It is my view the war in Darfur and the survival of the CPA 
     are inextricably entwined, and the NIF sees it. If, through 
     weak international responses to genocide, the NIF succeeds in 
     eliminating its Darfur opposition, and that reality is 
     combined with the reality of the loss of Dr. Garang, the only 
     southern leader who had the stature to compete successfully 
     with Khartoum, the stage is set for the NIF to entirely 
     undermine the CPA. The SPLM can again compete, and its 
     current leadership is trying to so position it, but its 
     recovery from the loss of Dr. Garang and from the 
     destabilization efforts of the NIF will take time. And the 
     clock is ticking.
       Based on this analysis, I encourage the following urgent 
     steps:
       1. Deploy non-consentually the now-stymied UN protection 
     force. In fact, some of the UN force already in the South, in 
     such places as Wau virtually next door to Darfur, could be 
     moved there quickly. In the meantime, declare and enforce a 
     no-fly zone for Sudan military aircraft throughout Darfur. 
     U.S. resources exist in Djibouti that could be used for 
     enforcement purposes.
       2. Provide substantial assistance to the SPLM to empower 
     its participation in governance at all levels. to be 
     seriously competitive as a national political party and to 
     effectively govern the South. The Government of South Sudan 
     also needs assistance in anticorruption efforts. such as 
     setting up an office of Inspector General of Government. Some 
     of these issues were discussed by Salva Kiir, President of 
     South Sudan, when he met with President Bush in July.
       3. Focus now urgently on the upcoming interim elections and 
     ultimately the referendum. Time is flying by, given what 
     needs to be accomplished. Monitor preparations in detail and 
     equip the SPLM to be able to fully participate in 
     preparations.
       4. Take Abyei seriously. If war breaks out again between 
     the NIF and the SPLM, it will in my estimation likely begin 
     in Abyei. Expose President Beshir's perfidy in delaying. 
     Raise the issue at the UN Security Council and other 
     appropriate forums.
       5. Seriously assist the SPLA in its conversion from a rebel 
     force to a modern military, The delays already caused by U.S. 
     persistent bureaucratics have the potential for actually 
     encouraging war and the ultimate loss of life and of the CPA.
       6. Finally, given the ``no negative consequences'' pattern 
     experienced by the NIF for crimes committed, accountability 
     for past, current and future crimes is a critical issue. 
     Unfortunately for Sudanese, the International Criminal Court 
     seems to have disappeared. An internationally agreed-on 
     system of accountability is desperately needed for Sudan's 
     atrocities. The U.S. should actively take leadership in 
     addressing this crying need.
       Believe me, we are in really dangerous times regarding 
     Sudan. It could happen that the CPA is stamped ``CANCELLED'', 
     along with an incredible additional number of Sudanese lives. 
     And if that happened, it would blot out one of the finest 
     U.S. initiatives of the last decade.

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