[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 17427-17433]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




             SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now 
proceed to Calendar No. 432, H.R. 4954, the port security bill.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 4954) to improve maritime and cargo security 
     through enhanced layered defenses, and for other purposes.


                           Amendment No. 4919

              (Purpose: To provide a complete substitute)

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute 
amendment at the desk be considered and agreed to and further that it 
be considered as original text for the purpose of additional amendments 
and for debate only this evening.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4919) was agreed to.
  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')

[[Page 17428]]

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to present the Port Security 
Improvement Act of 2006. This bill will help to close dangerous gaps in 
our ability to protect our shipping lanes and seaports from attack.
  A number of our colleagues have worked very hard on this bill. This 
bill reflects not only bipartisan consultation and support but 
coordination among the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the Commerce 
Committee, and the Finance Committee. I thank our leader, Senator 
Frist, for encouraging and facilitating those discussions.
  I particularly wish to thank my colleague, Senator Murray, who joined 
me in sponsoring the GreenLane cargo security bill in November of 2005, 
which has served as the basis for the legislation we debate tonight. 
Senator Murray has been steadfast in her commitment to enhancing port 
security. She has been working on it since the attacks on our country 5 
years ago. She has been a terrific partner.
  Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator Grassley, Senator Lieberman, 
Senator Baucus, Senator Coleman, and Senator Allen have also played 
critical roles on this important legislation. Their support and 
involvement have been invaluable in crafting a measure that I believe 
is going to make a real difference and that will improve our protection 
against terrorist threats without crippling the operations of our 
ports. This is very important. We need to strengthen security at our 
ports, but we need to do so in a way that does not cripple our system 
of trade, that does not place barriers in the way of moving legitimate 
goods.
  This legislation will provide the structure and the resources needed 
to better protect the American people from attack through seaports that 
are both vulnerable points of entry and vital centers of economic 
activity.
  Our legislation, our joint legislation, which is the product of so 
many weeks, months, and years of study and compromise, is a 
comprehensive approach that addresses all major aspects of maritime 
cargo security. It would require the Department of Homeland Security to 
develop a comprehensive strategic plan for all transportation modes by 
which cargo moves into, within, and out of American ports. It creates 
an Office of Cargo Security Policy to coordinate departmental 
activities and to be a central contact point for interagency, private 
sector, and international partners in cargo security. It requires the 
Department of Homeland Security to develop protocols for the resumption 
of trade at seaports after an incident. That is necessary to minimize 
economic losses. It authorizes risk-based grants, training, and 
exercises for port security. It improves and expands several security 
programs, such as the Container Security Initiative, known as CSI, and 
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, and 
establishes deadlines for DHS action on these programs. And it provides 
incentives for shippers and importers who meet the highest levels of 
cargo security standards.
  Before commenting further on these provisions, let me offer a few 
facts that illustrate the importance of strengthening the security of 
our seaports.
  America's 361 seaports are vital elements of our Nation's 
transportation network. Our seaports move more than 95 percent of 
overseas trade. In 2005 alone, U.S. ports logged 53,000 calls by 
foreign-flagged vessels, including 16,000 container ship calls that 
brought 11 million shipping containers to our shores.
  The largest 22 ports, ranging from Los Angeles to Boston, handle 98 
percent of the container traffic. Nearly half of all container ship 
calls are made in just three States--California, New York, and 
Virginia--but traffic arrives at many ports, from Maine to Hawaii, 
including a port in my State, Portland, the largest port by tonnage in 
new England. Coming from a State with three international cargo ports, 
I am keenly aware of the importance of seaports to our national economy 
and to the communities in which they are located.
  In addition to our ports' economic significance, the link between 
maritime security and our national security is obvious and the 
vulnerabilities of our ports worrisome. Shipping containers are a 
special source of concern. When we look at shipping containers, we 
know, in most cases, they contain useful consumer goods. But shipping 
containers could also be used to convey a squad of terrorists or a 
dirty bomb. In some sense, containers could be the 21st century 
``Trojan horse.''
  The vulnerabilities of containers are evident when one considers a 
recent incident that occurred in Seattle. In May, several Chinese 
nationalists illegally smuggled themselves within a shipping container 
that made its way to Seattle. Now, they were discovered, fortunately, 
but think if that container had, instead of including illegal Chinese 
immigrants seeking a better way of life, included individuals, 
terrorists, who were dedicated to destroying our way of life.
  The container has also been called ``the poor man's missile'' because 
a low-budget terrorist could ship one across the Atlantic or the 
Pacific to a U.S. port for just a few thousands dollars. And the 
contents of a container do not have to be as complex as a nuclear or 
chemical or biological weapon. As former Customs and Border Protection 
Commissioner Robert Bonner told the New York Times last year, a single 
container packed with readily available ammonium sulfate fertilizer and 
a detonation system could produce 10 times the blast that destroyed the 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
  Whatever the type of weapon, an attack on an American port could 
cause great loss of life, damage our energy supplies and 
infrastructure, cripple retailers and manufacturers dependent on just-
in-time inventory, prevent farmers from exporting their crops, and 
hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces.
  Earlier this year, I visited the ports in L.A. and Long Beach and 
Seattle. At the invitation of Senator Murray, I examined the Seattle 
port. When one looks at the busy harbor in Seattle, one sees ferries 
bringing thousands of passengers--a large urban population--in sight of 
the port and two stadiums nearby. You realize immediately the depth and 
destruction that a ship carrying a container with a weapon of mass 
destruction could inflict at a single port.
  Moreover, a successful port attack would likely trigger a security 
lockdown of all of our ports, just as the attacks 5 years ago grounded 
all commercial aircraft. So the economic damage would swiftly spread 
across the entire country. The Pacific Coast has already given us a 
glimpse of the economic damage that an attack on a port would cause. 
The west coast dock strike of 2002 was peaceful and anticipated, unlike 
any terror attack would be, but it cost an estimated $1 billion a day 
in economic losses for each of the 10 days it lasted.
  Of course, a port could also be a conduit for an attack as well as 
being a target itself. A container with dangerous cargo could be loaded 
on a truck or a railcar or have its contents unpacked at a port and 
distributed to support an attack elsewhere--perhaps in the heartland of 
this country.
  For these reasons, and many others, including the risks of container 
tampering or false documentation, the 9/11 Commission concluded that 
``Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and 
surface transportation'' as in commercial aviation.
  Some actions have been taken to improve security at our seaports. The 
9/11 terror attacks prompted some useful moves toward better security 
for vessel shipping lanes and the ports themselves. But, unfortunately, 
many of these initiatives have not proceeded under a comprehensive, 
strategic security plan. Some of them have lagged, and some of them 
have not been effectively implemented.
  The Senate Homeland Security Committee has conducted five hearings on 
port security and the failures of DHS's cargo security programs. The 
first hearing we held back in March of 2003 when the committee heard 
testimony

[[Page 17429]]

from several experts that cargo containers could well be the next 
target of terrorists. Three of these hearings have been conducted by 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator 
Coleman, and I thank him and Senator Levin for their efforts in this 
area. Indeed, several provisions in our bill address concerns that were 
identified through that joint investigative work.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maine 
yield for just a brief comment or question or two?
  Ms. COLLINS. I am happy to.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, let me just take a moment to thank Senator 
Collins for her leadership and the work of her committee in this area. 
I say to the Senator, I have been listening to her remarks. I think it 
is very important we outline the risks that are involved here and the 
importance of our ports to the economy of America.
  Like the Senator from Maine, I myself recently went around looking at 
large and small ports, from the gulf all the way to Seattle and Tacoma. 
I must say, I was somewhat pleased with the amount of effort that has 
been put in place in those ports.
  But it also dramatizes how much more we need to do. We do need the 
macro legislation to deal with this. One of the great concerns is, as 
the Senator outlined, what would happen if we did have an event in one 
of those West Coast ports? It would lock them all down. What would be 
the process to restart them? I am also very much impressed with the 
appearance of those ports and the volume of the training activities. It 
is a critical area.
  While a lot of work has been done and money has gone to our ports, 
big and small, we need this legislation. There is a lot more to it than 
just the restart protocols. It hasn't been easy because we have three 
committees with interest and jurisdiction, including Commerce and 
Finance. The Senator worked with the leadership of our Commerce 
Committee and of the Finance Committee, and I thank the Senator for 
that.
  I urge my colleagues in the Senate that we move expeditiously on this 
legislation and that we not play games with it in any way because this 
is serious business. I feel for the person who would oppose this kind 
of legislation, or delay it, if some incident occurs. We need to move 
on it. This is the time to do it. It has been a real yeoman's task to 
bring it to this point. I wanted to be on record early commending the 
Senator from Maine, and I hope I will have an opportunity to talk later 
about some of the substantive parts of this legislation, which is 
critical for our country. I thank the Senator for yielding.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the junior Senator from 
Mississippi for his kind comments. He has been so helpful as a member 
of the Commerce Committee and the Finance Committee in helping us weave 
our way through a very difficult maze. Without his advice and support, 
I doubt that we would be here tonight. I express my personal 
appreciation to Senator Lott for his guidance and his assistance and 
for keeping us all focused on the goal. We could never let turf battles 
or jurisdictional disputes block us from accomplishing such a needed 
and important task. He helped us keep our eye on the ball. I thank the 
Senator very much for his comments.
  Mr. President, I was talking about the hearings we were having. Our 
most recent hearing was in April on the GreenLane Maritime Cargo 
Security Act, which I mentioned Senator Murray and I had introduced. We 
heard also from the House leaders on port security, including 
Representative Dan Lungren and Representative Jane Harman, as well as 
other experts on our Nation's ports. The following month, that bill was 
reported out of the Homeland Security Committee.
  The Port Security Improvement Act will clarify the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of Government agencies at all levels 
and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear and 
measurable goals for better security of commercial operations from the 
point of origin to the destination. It will also establish mandatory 
baseline security standards and provide incentives for additional 
voluntary measures.
  Perhaps most importantly, the Secretary of Homeland Security would be 
required to develop protocols for the resumption of trade in the wake 
of an attack. Five years after the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Government 
still has not established adequate protocols for resuming port 
operations and setting cargo release priorities after an attack. I will 
tell you, when I talk to port authority directors, every single one of 
them brings this up as a major issue. If we don't have a plan for 
restarting our ports and for releasing cargo, then our ports will be 
closed far longer than they would need to be and economic losses would 
multiply.
  This legislation would also establish priorities for critical DHS 
programs necessary to improve maritime cargo security and would set 
clear timelines to ensure steady progress on their development and 
expansion. Let me give another example of where DHS has languished in 
some areas. They have made progress in others but languished in some.
  For example, the Department has been working on a minimum standard 
for mechanical seals on containers for more than 2 years but has yet to 
issue it. Under our bill, the Department would have 6 months to 
establish minimum standards for securing containers in transit to the 
United States. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry would have 
to meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are 
established.
  The bill also provides guidance and deadlines for essential 
improvements in the Automated Targeting System, the Radiation Portal 
Monitor Program, the CSI and C-TPAT.
  The Automated Targeting System, ATS, is a screening mechanism that 
the Federal Government uses to help it determine which of the 11 
million containers entering this country should receive further 
scrutiny. The GAO has criticized ATS for utilizing inadequate 
information to accurately assess the risk of cargo, and our legislation 
will ensure that the DHS improves that program.
  Another notable provision of the bill is the requirement that 
radiation scanning be applied to 100 percent of the containers entering 
the 22 largest U.S. ports by December 31, 2007. Now, the result of that 
is that 98 percent of all cargo containers coming into U.S. ports will 
be screened for radiation. That is in addition to the radiation 
scanning that is done at foreign ports through the CSI and the 
Megaports Programs.
  The legislation also expands and enhances the C-TPAT program to ensue 
the security of cargo from point of origin to destination. It creates a 
GreenLane, a third tier of C-TPAT, offering additional benefits to 
participants that voluntarily meet the highest level of security 
standards. The cooperation of private industry is vital to securing 
supply chains, and C-TPAT is a necessary tool for securing their active 
cooperation in supply chain security efforts.
  Another security measure that has languished for years is the vital 
Transportation Workers Identification Card, or the TWIC Program. Again, 
we would require DHS to publish a final rule on the implementation of 
this program by the end of this year.
  Finally, this comprehensive legislation would authorize the 
competitive, risk-based Port Security Grants Program. It would have 
stable, consistent funding set at $400 million each year for the next 5 
years. This is a significant commitment of resources, and it will allow 
our ports to plan and to undertake multiyear projects that require a 
sustained investment.
  The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 will help us construct an 
effective, layered, coordinated system that extends from the point of 
origin to the point of destination. It will cover the people, the 
vessels, the cargo, and the facilities involved in our maritime 
commerce. And it addresses a major vulnerability identified time and 
again by terrorism experts.

[[Page 17430]]

  Mr. President, I do hope that we can proceed with all due haste to 
enact this important legislation.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Hawaii is 
recognized.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the Port 
Security Improvement Act of 2006. It reflects a bipartisan compromise 
between the three committees that have jurisdiction over the security 
of our Nation's ports, international intermodal supply chain and the 
administration of the Department of Homeland Security.
  This bill strikes the right balance between security and facilitating 
the trade that is so important to our economy.
  Our national economy depends on port security, yet amazingly, the 
administration has not made it the priority that it needs to be. It has 
consistently submitted inadequate funding requests and has routinely 
missed critical security deadlines that were required by law. It was 
not until the Dubai Ports World controversy hit the front pages of 
local newspapers that many members of the Congress began to take port 
security seriously.
  I hope that Members of this body will give this important piece of 
legislation the consideration it deserves. Lastly, we all know that you 
cannot have a successful security policy without adequate funding. 
Today is a good first step, but the administration and this Congress 
must take the next step after we pass this legislation and fund these 
initiatives as proposed here.
  There are more than 360 ports in our Nation that serve as a 
gatekeeper for our Nation's trade and commerce, bringing into the 
country most of the merchandise and raw materials our businesses rely 
upon. If an incident forced the shutdown of ports across the Nation, 
the impact on our national economy would be devastating and have long-
term consequences.
  The Coast Guard, through the National Maritime Transportation Act, 
has taken important steps to create a plan to guarantee trade resumes 
quickly after an attack. However, more needs to be done to enhance the 
Coast Guard's plan and ensure effective implementation. Our economic 
health depends on it.
  Given the role our ports play in the economy, we cannot underestimate 
the importance of ensuring that the containerized cargo that comes into 
our country is safe and that the ships entering our borders do not 
carry enemies of our Nation. Yet less than 6 percent of the cargo 
coming into this country is inspected, a level that is unacceptable if 
we are to take security seriously.
  Making the current situation worse is the fact that current State 
inspection and radiation scanning technologies are woefully inadequate.
  The measure before us today addresses the shortfalls of the past 5 
years. First, it enhances the examination of cargo domestically and 
before it reaches our shores. Second, the bill improves interagency 
cooperation. Third, it improves the sharing of intelligence information 
with the creation of interagency port security command centers. Fourth, 
it provides an additional director within to improve communication and 
cooperation between the public and private sectors to quickly resume 
trade should an incident occur. And fifth, the bill offers assistance 
and technical training to our partners in the war on terror. These are 
all simple fixes but fixes that have significant consequence in our 
efforts to protect our ports.
  As we consider this piece of legislation, we must not forget the 
security needs of our other transportation systems. Amendments will be 
offered to this bill that relate to securing other modes of 
transportation and it is my intent to support those amendments as well 
so that we have a comprehensive approach to securing our 
infrastructure.
  I am hopeful that the Senate will pass this bill as soon as possible. 
Our approach has broad bipartisan support. The Senate Commerce, Science 
and Transportation Committee has focused on the issues of 
transportation security long before the events of September 11, 2001.
  We have dedicated substantial time and resources to oversee and 
investigate the security and safety of our Nation's systems of 
transportation and this bill will mark the fourth landmark 
transportation security related bill that has been brought before the 
Senate. The time is right to pass these needed security improvements, 
and I am hopeful that we can make it happen.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Washington.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, it has been 5 years since September 11, 
and our country is still dangerously vulnerable. We have huge loopholes 
at our ports and in our cargo container system, and none of us should 
sleep well at night until we close those security holes and protect our 
country.
  That is why I am on the Senate floor once again pushing for us to 
pass the bipartisan GreenLane bill. I am excited that after working for 
a number of years, we are now on the verge of making our country more 
secure.
  The full House of Representatives passed our bill. The Senate 
Homeland Security Committee passed our bill. We have worked with the 
Commerce and Finance Committees to address the issues in the bill they 
have raised. Now it is up to us, the full Senate, to finally pass this 
bill.
  Today I wish to explain why our ports are so vulnerable, how an 
attack would affect our people and our economy, and finally, how this 
bill will make us more secure and keep trade flowing.
  To understand why our ports are so vulnerable, one just has to look 
at something that happened in my home State of Washington 3 weeks ago.
  On August 16, there was a big scare at the Port of Seattle. Two 
containers that originated in Pakistan were offloaded at terminal 18. 
They were targeted for inspection. They were first scanned by a gamma-
imaging machine, which is essentially a giant x-ray machine for cargo 
containers. The initial images suggested what was supposed to be in the 
container was different than what that x-ray scan showed. Next, the 
port officials brought in two security dogs, and both dogs detected 
what they thought were explosives in that cargo container at terminal 
18.
  To understand why that is such a scary incident in Seattle, one just 
has to look at the Port of Seattle and what surrounds it.
  This photograph shows the Port of Seattle. We can see the port very 
clearly in the foreground. That is Seattle in the background. My 
colleague, Senator Collins, was out there and remarked, tonight and 
while she was out there, about the incredible closeness to where our 
containers are brought into the Port of Seattle, to where our downtown 
area is, where there are two sports stadiums that can have thousands 
and thousands of people at one time sitting in them, and I-5 is over 
here. That is the main highway that goes through the State of 
Washington, right through downtown Seattle. As one can see, these cargo 
containers sitting on these docks are within feet and yards of mass 
people, infrastructure, our community, our railroads, our 
transportation system, sports stadiums, and where people live and work.
  During the scare I just mentioned, officials had to close the 
terminal and establish a 500-yard safety zone surrounding the terminal, 
and they had to create a 300-yard safety zone around the entire Seattle 
waterfront. Fortunately, that day, after having the port closed down 
for some time, further testing showed that what was in that container 
was just a false alarm.
  I wish to take a second to commend everyone on the ground for doing 
an excellent job of immediately responding to a possibly very dangerous 
incident.
  Here is the problem: We did not know what was in that container. We 
did not know. It could have posed a problem, and it was sitting right 
on the dock, right within our sports stadiums, within all of downtown 
Seattle, within our transportation systems, and where people live and 
work.
  That is why we are presenting this bill tonight. The main idea of 
this bill is to push our country's borders out, to do the screening and 
testing for these

[[Page 17431]]

cargo containers overseas so that the container never gets close to our 
shores if we think it is dangerous. But today, too often we wait until 
that container is sitting on American soil, dangerously close to our 
cities, before we find out whether it could pose a danger.
  Fortunately, that Seattle incident ended well, but that very same 
week, we got a very stark warning about how it could have ended 
differently.
  In August around the same time, the RAND Center for Terrorism and 
Risk Management Policy issued a very troubling report that showed what 
could happen if there is a nuclear device in a cargo container.
  The RAND Corporation looked at the following scenario: terrorists put 
a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb inside a cargo container and detonated it at 
the port of Long Beach, CA. The researchers chose that scenario 
because, as they put it, ``analysts consider it feasible, it is highly 
likely to have a catastrophic effect, and the target is both a key part 
of the U.S. economic structure and a critical global shipping center.''
  Here is what they said would have happened: Up to 60,000 people would 
be killed instantly from the blast or from radiation poisoning; 150,000 
people would be injured by radiation exposure; up to 6 million people 
would flee Los Angeles; 2 to 3 million people would need to be 
relocated because their land would be contaminated by radiation. And 
finally, the economic loss simply would be about $1 trillion. That is 
10 times worse than September 11. Those costs would include medical 
care, insurance claims, workers' compensation, evacuation, 
construction. Imagine that--the economic damage would be 10 times worse 
than what happened on September 11.
  How many more reports such as that is it going to take? How many port 
evacuations and scares is it going to take before we get serious about 
port security? Time is not on our side. Each year, 6 million cargo 
containers enter our U.S. seaports, and that number is expected to 
quadruple in the next 20 years. These cargo containers carry the 
building blocks of our economy, but without adequate security, they can 
also provide an opportunity for terrorists to deliver a deadly one-two 
punch to our country. The first punch would create untold number of 
American casualties. The second punch would bring our economy to a 
halt. Today we are not doing enough to keep America safe.
  Standing in this Chamber, it can feel as if the dangers at our ports 
are a distant concern, but given that our ports are connected to our 
Nation's transportation system and are close to our major population 
centers, the threat is never far away.
  I want to share a very disturbing photo that shows us what a 
terrorist attack could look like. On March 21, a container ship called 
the Hyundai Fortune was traveling off the coast of Yemen when an 
explosion occurred in the rear of the ship. This is a photo of what 
happened. This is a container ship close to Yemen with an explosion at 
the rear of the ship. Remember the picture I just showed of the port of 
Seattle and where we are and imagine this happening in the Port of 
Seattle.
  What happened when this ship exploded was that 90 containers were 
blown off the side of this ship and it created a debris field 5 miles 
long. Thankfully, amazingly, there were no fatalities and the crew was 
rescued.
  This incident, by the way, did not appear to be terrorist related, 
but it gives us an idea of what it would look like if a terrorist 
incident occurred on a container ship in one of our seaports.
  I want my colleagues to imagine the same burning ship sitting just a 
few feet off our shores in New York Harbor or Puget Sound, off the 
coast of Los Angeles or Charleston, Miami, Portland, Hampton Roads, the 
Delaware Bay, or the Gulf of Mexico. Now imagine we are not dealing 
with just a conventional explosion; we are dealing with a dirty bomb. I 
want to walk through what would happen next.
  Of course, there would be the immediate horrible loss of life. Many 
of our ports, as I said, are located near major cities. If this were a 
chemical weapon exploding in Seattle, the chemical plume could 
contaminate the rail system, Interstate 5, SeaTac Airport, not to 
mention, as I showed my colleagues, the downtown business and 
residential areas. At the port, there would immediately be tremendous 
confusion. People would try to contain the fire, but it is unclear 
today who would be in charge. Then when word spread and chaos ensued, 
panic would set in and there would be chaos as our first responders 
tried to react and people who lived nearby would try to flee.
  Next, what would happen is our Government would shut down every 
single port in America to make sure there were no other bombs on any 
other containers in any other city. That shutdown would be the 
equivalent of driving our economy into a brick wall and, in fact, it 
could spark a global recession. Day by day, we would feel the painful 
economic impact of the attack. American factories in the middle of our 
country would not be able to get the supplies they need. They would 
have to shut their doors and lay off workers. Stores around our country 
would not be able to get the products they need to put on their 
shelves. Prices would spike, demand would outweigh supply, and 
consumers would not be able to afford the simple items they rely on 
every single day.
  In 2002, we saw what the closure of just a few ports on the west 
coast could do. It cost our economy $1 billion a day. Imagine if we 
shut down all of our ports. One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S. 
ports were shut down for just 9 days, it would cost our economy $58 
billion.
  The RAND report I mentioned earlier found the economic damage could 
easily top more than $1 trillion. Of course, we would soon realize we 
have no plan for resuming trade after an attack. We have no plan today 
for how we would resume trade, no protocol for what would be searched. 
We wouldn't know what would be allowed in or even who was in charge, 
and there would be a mass scramble to create a new system in a crisis 
atmosphere. Eventually, we would begin the slow process of manually 
inspecting all the cargo waiting to enter the United States. One report 
found it could take as long as 4 months to get all the cargo inspected 
and moving again.
  Finally, we would have to set up a new regime for port security. You 
can bet that any kind of rushed plan we put together in this kind of 
scenario would not balance strong security with efficient trade.
  This is a realistic portrayal of events that could happen tomorrow. 
Five years after September 11, we have not closed a major loophole that 
threatens our lives and our economy. Time is not on our side. We have 
to act, and we need to act now.
  I approach this as someone who really understands the importance of 
both improving our security and maintaining the flow of commerce. My 
home State of Washington is the most trade-dependent State in the 
entire country. We know what is at stake if there is an incident at one 
of our ports. That is why I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce to 
help us find where we are vulnerable and to evaluate the best security 
practices. It is why I worked hard to boost funding for the Coast 
Guard, and I fought to keep the Port Security Grant Program from being 
eliminated year after year.
  Right after September 11, 5 years ago, I started talking with 
security and trade experts to find out what we needed to be doing to 
both improve security and keep our commerce going. Last year, I sought 
out Senator Collins as a partner in this effort. I approached Senator 
Collins because I knew she cared about this issue. I knew she had done 
a lot of work on it already, and I knew she was someone who could get 
things done. Since that day, she and I have worked hand in hand to 
develop this bill and to move it forward.
  The reason we worked so hard on this bill is because we know how 
vulnerable we are. Terrorists have a lot of opportunities to introduce 
deadly cargo into a container. It can be tampered with at any time from 
when it leaves a foreign factory overseas to when it arrives at a 
consolidation warehouse and moves to a foreign port. It could even be 
tampered with while it is en route to the

[[Page 17432]]

United States. There are several dangers. I outlined what would happen 
if terrorists exploded a container, but they could just as easily use 
cargo containers to transport weapons or personnel into the United 
States to launch an attack anywhere on American soil. In fact, in 
April, 22 Chinese stowaways were found at the Port of Seattle. They 
reached the United States inside a cargo container. In that case, they 
were stowaways, but they could easily have been terrorists sneaking 
into this country.
  The programs we have in place today are totally inadequate. Last 
year, thanks to the insistence of Senator Collins and Senator Coleman, 
the Government Accountability Office found its C-TPAT was not even 
checking to see if companies were doing what they promised they would 
in their security plans. Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find 
something suspicious today at a foreign port, they can't force a 
container to be inspected. So we have a clear and deadly threat, and we 
know that current programs are inadequate. So what are we going to do 
about it? We could manually inspect every container coming into our 
ports, but that would cripple our economy.
  The real challenge we face is how to make our trade more secure 
without slowing it to a crawl. That is why the Homeland Security, 
Commerce, and Finance Committees, through the leadership of Senators 
Collins and Lieberman, Senators Stevens and Inouye, and Senators 
Grassley and Baucus and I, have worked with stakeholders and experts to 
strike the right balance. The result is the bill that we are now 
considering. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for how we improve 
security while keeping our trade efficient. At its heart, this 
challenge is about keeping the good things about trade--speed and 
efficiency--without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade, 
which is the potential for terrorists to use our engines of commerce.
  The GreenLane bill does five things. First of all, it creates tough 
new standards for all cargo. Today, we don't have any standards for 
cargo security.
  Second, it creates a GreenLane option which provides for an even 
higher level of security. Companies have the option to follow the 
higher standards of the GreenLane. Their cargo will be tracked and 
monitored from the moment it leaves the factory floor overseas until it 
reaches the United States. We will know everywhere their cargo has 
been. We will know every person who has touched it, and we will know 
whether it has been tampered with. The GreenLane pushes our borders out 
by conducting inspections overseas before cargo is even loaded into a 
ship bound for the United States, and we will provide incentives for 
the companies that use this highest standard of GreenLane.
  Third, our bill sets up a plan to resume trade quickly and safely, to 
minimize the impact of a terrorist attack on our economy.
  Fourth, our bill will secure our ports here at home by authorizing 
and funding port security grants. This funding will help our ports and 
port operators to develop and implement security plans. They could use 
this funding to strengthen their perimeter security, which would help 
prevent a number of security lapses that were highlighted in a recent 
Seattle Times article in which a reporter was able to enter a port and 
walk around the containers without anybody stopping him.
  Finally, our bill will hold DHS accountable for improving cargo 
security. DHS is long overdue in establishing cargo security standards 
and transportation worker credentials. We need to hold DHS accountable, 
and our bill provides the infrastructure to ensure accountability and 
coordination.
  Let me take a few minutes to share a few ways that our bill does make 
America safer. First of all, we close the loopholes that leave us 
vulnerable today. Senator Collins and I have studied the 9/11 
Commission Report and the various GAO reports and we worked very hard 
to put their recommendations into this bill. The 9/11 Commission 
examined what went wrong 5 years ago and how we can prevent another 
terrorist attack. We listened to the 9/11 Commission and we worked very 
hard to incorporate their recommendations and to close the loopholes 
that the Commission identified. The 9/11 Commission said we needed a 
layered security system. Our bill adopts that layered approach.
  Here is what we envision as the Secretary of Homeland Security 
implements this bill. Each step in the GreenLane system will have 
multiple and redundant security layers. Cargo would be monitored and 
secured starting at a foreign factory overseas. In addition, containers 
will be sealed with high-tech container security devices, such as e-
seals, to protect against their being tampered with or compromised. 
Then, before that container is ever loaded onto a ship, its manifest is 
reviewed and the container is inspected for radiation, seal tampering, 
and x-rayed. Finally, the cargo will be secured with access controls, 
ensuring anyone with access to GreenLane cargo has undergone a 
background check and possesses verifiable identification. Those 
multiple layers provide the type of layered security that the 9/11 
Commission called for.
  Now, the 9/11 Commission also said we have to centralize authority 
and responsibility so that there is finally someone accountable in our 
Government. Our bill does that. It centralizes authority by 
establishing the Office of Cargo Security Policy within the Department 
of Homeland Security to coordinate Federal cargo security programs and 
to advance security research and development.
  The 9/11 Commission also said we need to do a better job sharing 
information throughout our Government. Our bill promotes coordination 
by establishing regional interagency operational centers to enhance 
cooperation between our Federal agencies. So our bill is responsive to 
the problems and the loopholes that the 9/11 Commission identified.
  Our bill gives us new tools so we can approach cargo security in new 
ways. It gives U.S. officials in foreign ports the authority to inspect 
suspicious containers before they are loaded for departure into the 
United States. Our bill makes the haystack of containers smaller. It 
allows the Government to focus on suspicious cargo that enters our 
ports, and it ensures that we are inspecting and stopping cargo that 
poses a threat. And it cuts down on the smuggling of weapons, people, 
drugs, and other illegal cargo.
  This bill will also protect America's economy in the event of a 
terror attack, and that is because it provides a secure, organized way 
to quickly resume cargo operations after any emergency shutdown because 
any shutdown of our ports has the potential to cost the U.S. economy 
billions of dollars a day. Our bill would minimize the economic impact 
of a terrorist attack.
  So I am very proud of this bill, and I thank all of our partners and 
all of our supporters. I especially thank Senator Collins for her 
tremendous leadership and work on this very complex issue, and I 
commend her for the job she has done. I thank Senator Coleman for his 
work as chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. I 
thank Senator Lieberman and all of our cosponsors, and I thank the 
Commerce and Finance Committees, especially Senator Stevens and Senator 
Inouye, Senator Grassley and Senator Baucus.
  We have also seen tremendous progress on the House side with the Safe 
Port Act, and I want to thank Representatives Dan Lundgren and Jane 
Harman for their leadership. Finally, I especially tonight thank the 
numerous Federal, State and local officials and all of the industry 
representatives for their tremendous assistance in helping us craft 
this legislation. They truly are at the front lines of securing our 
Nation's ports, and I have been very proud to work with all of them and 
to get to know them and see their dedication and commitment to making 
our country more secure.
  Today, we have a choice in how we deal with the cargo security 
challenges that face us, but if we wait for a disaster, our choices are 
going to be pretty stark. So I think we have to make the changes now, 
on our terms, before there is a deadly incident. Let's protect

[[Page 17433]]

America before an image like this appears on our television screens. 
Let's not wait until a terrorist incident strikes again to protect our 
people and to protect our economy.
  Earlier this year, the American people woke up, and they spoke out 
when they heard that a foreign government-owned company could be 
running our ports. That sparked a very critical debate. Now we need to 
set up a security regime that will actually make us safer. Until we do 
so, none of us should sleep well at night. A terrible image like this 
of a burning container ship with a dirty bomb in one of America's 
harbors could be on our TV screens tomorrow. So this Congress needs to 
act today. We only have a few days to get this right, and I hope that 
all of our colleagues will work with all of us to move this bill 
quickly and expeditiously and pass a GreenLane bill before it is too 
late.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I again thank the Senator for her 
excellent statement, for her leadership, and for getting us to where we 
are today. It has been a long journey, but with her leadership we were 
able to craft this bill, work out the many compromises, and come to the 
floor. I hope we can do this bill relatively quickly. It has been the 
subject of an awful lot of discussion and review, and it would be 
terrific if we can show the American people that we can act in a 
bipartisan way on an issue that really matters to their security.
  It is appropriate that the Presiding Officer tonight is the Senator 
from Virginia, Senator Allen. I know that port security has been a 
major priority of his. Earlier in my statement, I mentioned that 
California, New York, and Virginia are the three States that receive 
the greatest number of containers, although actually I would think that 
Washington State has to be in there, too, given the size of Seattle and 
Tacoma's ports as well. So I know they should be in there as well. But 
Virginia is a major player in port security, and I want to commend the 
Senator from Virginia for his leadership on this issue. I know that 
this has been of great concern to him. He has talked to me as this bill 
has been making its way through the process, and I publicly thank him 
for caring about this issue and making it a priority as well.
  Mr. President, I am not aware of further Members who are seeking to 
speak on my side, and I see no indication of further Members on the 
other side. I am going to, very briefly, put in a quorum call so that 
we can check, but I believe we are very close to concluding our 
business for tonight.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________