[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 17307-17308]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007--Continued

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator 
from Alaska. It is late, and I understand that. I rise to address 
something which is very important to me, and that is the Defense 
appropriations bill that may appear to many to be insignificant 
boilerplate language, when, in fact, is not that at all. Unfortunately, 
the provision has an enlarged significance in this Congress as a result 
of the inexplicable and unpardonable failure of the Senate to do 
something that it has never done before, and that is to fail to pass 
intelligence authorizations for either fiscal year 2006 or fiscal year 
2007.
  Section 8086 of the Defense appropriations bill waives section 504 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 until the enactment of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007. What does that 
mean? Section 504 provides, with limited exceptions, that no 
appropriated funds available may be obligated or expended for an 
intelligence activity unless those funds were specifically authorized 
by Congress; therefore, by the two Intelligence Committees.
  This waiver is a standard part of the Defense appropriations bill. 
Until this Congress, it has served the acceptable function of allowing 
intelligence communities to begin spending money if the authorization 
bill is not completed before the beginning of the fiscal year. Under 
this waiver, as soon as the intelligence authorizations for any given 
year are enacted, that authorization language would control.
  In this Congress, however, the boilerplate language has become the 
substitute for legislative authorization of intelligence activities 
because the majority leader, to be honest, has refused to bring the 
intelligence authorization bill to the floor for the past 2 years--for 
the past 2 years.
  The Senate's failure to pass this critical national security 
legislation is unprecedented. Last year was the first time since the 
establishment of the congressional Intelligence Committees that the 
Senate failed to pass an annual authorization bill. From 1978 through 
2004, the Senate had an unbroken, 27-year record of completing its work 
on this critical legislation. The intelligence authorization bill has 
been rightly considered, always, must-pass legislation. Regardless of 
who controlled the Senate, regardless of who controlled the White 
House, there was an understanding that the programs authorized by this 
bill were too important to not have the input of the Congress through 
the Intelligence Committees.
  Unfortunately, because of an anonymous objection by a Republican 
Senator, the majority leader decided to let this important national 
security legislation die on the vine last year, for the first time, and 
he appears intent on doing so this year again. The result of this 
decision by the majority leader will be diminished authority for 
intelligence agencies to do their jobs of protecting Americans. It also 
will result in less effective oversight, which was essentially the 9/11 
Commission's No. 1 call, and all of this at a time when the 
intelligence community is undergoing the biggest restructuring in its 
50-year history.
  The annual intelligence authorization is the primary mechanism which 
the Congress, through the Intelligence Committees, uses to provide 
guidance and support to America's intelligence agencies, the heart of 
our effort to protect America's national security.
  At a time when our security depends so heavily on good intelligence, 
when our national security has been endangered by not depending 
sufficiently on good intelligence--or maybe the intelligence wasn't 
good when it should have been--and we are in the midst of reforming and 
modernizing our intelligence community, the Senate's failure to act on 
this legislation is absolutely inexplicable to this Senator and to 
virtually all the Members of the Intelligence Committees.
  In reporting the resolution to establish the Intelligence Committee 
in May 1976, since the first chairman on our side was the Senator from 
Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, the Committee on Government Operations back then 
wrote the following:

       An essential part of the new committee's jurisdiction will 
     be authorization authority over the intelligence activities 
     of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence 
     Agency. Without this authority, the new committee would not 
     be assured the practical ability to monitor the activities of 
     these agencies.

  They wrote that back then--and that is:

        . . . to obtain full access to information which the 
     committees must have to exercise control over the budgets of 
     agencies in order to reduce waste and inefficiency, and to 
     impose changes in agency practices.

  That is what they said.
  The failure of the Senate to pass intelligence authorization for 2 
years threatens to erode the ability of the Intelligence Committee to 
carry out the mission assigned to it by the Senate. This failure has 
consequences both immediate and long term. Our intelligence agencies 
can continue executing the funding made available through the various 
appropriations bills but without any guidance as to what they should do 
from the Intelligence Committees.
  I do not understand this.
  The Appropriations Committee does an excellent job at providing 
resources for the intelligence agencies, what they need to operate on. 
But the roadmap for how the Congress expects those sources to be 
executed comes from the authorization bill--which seems to no longer 
exist. The sensitivity and importance of our Nation's intelligence 
programs makes congressional direction essential every single year. But 
the creation of an Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 
2004, and the ongoing development of that office, makes the guidance 
even more important now.
  The fiscal year 2006 authorization bill contains 17 separate 
provisions enhancing or clarifying the authority of the DNI. Those 
provisions included additional authority to promote information 
sharing, clarifying the DNI's role in managing human intelligence--all 
of these, easy to say and difficult to do--providing flexibility in the 
financing of national intelligence centers, how those centers were to 
be set up, and elevating the DNI Inspector General to a statutory 
position.
  Those important provisions are now included in this fiscal year 2007 
bill, and we should act on them as soon as possible. I do not think we 
are going to, but we should.
  In the longer term, the Senate's inability to debate and act on this 
critical legislation will have a more lasting effect on congressional 
oversight. Both the 9/11 and the Robb-Silberman commission on weapons 
of mass destruction highlighted the importance of improving oversight 
as a necessary component of reforming our intelligence capabilities. 
Oversight.
  The 9/11 Commission wrote:

       Of all our recommendations, strengthening Congressional 
     oversight may be among the most difficult and most important.

  In December 2004, the Senate took steps to strengthen the Senate 
Intelligence Committee by eliminating member term limits. That had been 
a long time coming. People were limited to 8 years. They just began to 
get up to speed and then they were off. Now that has changed. It is at 
the discretion of the majority leader and the minority leader.
  We increased our staff and strengthened other procedures. But these 
improvements were in a sense a hollow victory. Since enactment of the 
reforms, the majority leader has emasculated the Intelligence Committee 
by denying it the central tool to carry out oversight, and that is the 
annual authorization bill which is called for under the law.
  The majority leader's unwillingness to consider these bills is even 
more puzzling because of the bipartisan effort that has gone into their 
development on both sides of this House. Both the fiscal 2006 and 2007 
bills passed the Intelligence Committee unanimously. Both were referred 
to the Armed Services Committee where they were again

[[Page 17308]]

approved unanimously. Last year, the bill was also referred to the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, which suggested 
changes that would have been included had we been discussing the bill 
along with suggestions from the administration in a managers' 
amendment.
  Last year's bill and this year's bill contain legislation focused on 
four important areas about which I am going to talk briefly. I have 
already mentioned the numerous provisions relating to the authority and 
the operation of the Office of the DNI, the Director of National 
Intelligence. The bill also contains additional provisions to foster 
and improve information sharing and information access. Easy words, 
hard to do.
  Section 310 establishes a pilot program giving the Intelligence 
Committee access to databases of other nonintelligence agencies for the 
purpose of collecting intelligence on counterterrorism or weapons of 
mass destruction. While this bill sits on the calendar, that 
information is now outside the reach of the intelligence community.
  Many of my colleagues have decried the seemingly endless stream of 
leaks of classified information. I join them in denouncing the leaks of 
sensitive material. The authorization bill includes provisions 
strengthening the authority of the DNI and the Director of the CIA to 
protect intelligence sources and methods. It also includes a provision, 
authored by Senator Wyden and adopted by the committee unanimously, to 
increase the penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of a covert 
agent.
  Finally, the authorization bill contains numerous provisions intended 
to improve oversight of the intelligence community, both from within 
and from the Congress itself.
  Section 408 is interesting. Section 408 of the bill proposes the 
establishment of a statutory inspector general for the intelligence 
community. I have said that. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 took a 
first step toward that end by authorizing the Director of National 
Intelligence to appoint an inspector general within the Office of the 
Director. The DNI has done that, and I applaud him for doing so. But 
the bill will strengthen that position and make it more accountable to 
the Congress.
  Section 434 of the bill strengthens accountability further and 
oversight of the technical agencies by providing that the heads of the 
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are to be appointed by the 
President with the Senate's advice and consent.
  This is in the authorization bill, and if we were to pass it, this 
would become effective. I think it actually comes as a surprise to many 
of my colleagues that the head of an agency with as central a role in 
the intelligence community as the National Security Agency is not 
appointed with Senate confirmation. In fact, heads of the National 
Security Agency have customarily only gone through confirmation in 
connection with their military rank but not for their appointment to 
the position of the Director of NSA. That is not considered.
  Section 107 of the bill, sponsored in committee by Senators Levin and 
Hagel, seeks to improve the timely flow of information to the 
congressional Intelligence Committees. Similar language was included in 
the intelligence reform legislation that passed in the Senate in 2004 
but did not survive the conference. I applaud Senators Levin and Hagel 
for their efforts with respect to this issue.
  There are other provisions requiring specific information, including 
a report on the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act and a 
separate report on the possibility of existence of clandestine 
detention facilities. I am at a loss to understand what the objection 
to this legislation is. Maybe somebody does not like the enhancement of 
oversight. That is our job. That is why the committees were formed. 
Maybe somebody doesn't want the DNI to have more authority or maybe 
somebody thinks the Congress should not be getting timely access to 
information about intelligence programs that are so important. But let 
me remind all my colleagues that the authorization bill passed the 
Intelligence Committee unanimously. If somebody has a problem with a 
provision, bring up the bill, offer an amendment, debate, and vote. 
That is the way the Senate works.


                           Amendment No. 4906

  Because of the importance of getting the authorization bill enacted 
and because I and all the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
have been totally unable to make any headway on this at all now for 2 
years, and because I have concluded that it will once again be ignored 
by the majority leader, I send an amendment to the desk to strike 
section 8086 of the pending legislation, the fiscal year 2007 
Department of Defense appropriations bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Rockefeller] proposes a 
     amendment numbered 4906.

  The amendment follows:

 (Purpose: To strike the section specifically authorizing intelligence 
                  and intelligence-related activities)

       On page 206, strike lines 10 through 16.

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, striking section 8086 would mean the 
following: that none of the funds in this bill could be spent for 
intelligence activities without an authorization bill. I do not know 
how else to do it. I am reluctant to take this step because I do not 
want our intelligence agencies to be caught without funding. But I see 
no other way to force the Senate to bring into the consciousness, the 
cerebral cortexes of the various Senators, that it is important to take 
up and pass authorization bills.
  This legislation is too important to be allowed to languish in 
legislative limbo. I am at a loss to understand why the Senate cannot 
complete action. It would be in no one's interest to not complete this, 
not the Senate, not the Congress, not the intelligence community, nor 
would it be in the national security interest of the United States.
  Democrats are more than willing to quickly debate and pass much 
needed national security legislation. Democrats know that it is 
essential that we permit the men and women of the intelligence agencies 
to continue their critical work on the front lines of the war in Iraq 
and the war on terror.
  In the meantime, to the men and women of the intelligence agencies, I 
say that we stand with you. We are proud of your bravery and your 
patriotism, and we thank you for your sacrifice, working in silence, 
and in the shadows, against the threat that America faces.
  (At the request of Mr. Rockefeller, the following statement was 
ordered to be printed in the Record.)

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