[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 11]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 14886-14888]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




    ADDRESS BY FORMER SENATOR SAM NUNN AT NUCLEAR DANGERS SYMPOSIUM

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

                           of american samoa

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 18, 2006

  Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, in reference to H. Res. 905, I submit 
an address by former Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman and CEO of the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, presented on December 16, 2003 at a 
symposium entitled Kazakhstan: Reducing Nuclear Dangers, Increasing 
Global Security.

                       Symposium Keynote Address

                             (By Sam Nunn)

       I want to thank our guests for joining us today in the 
     United States Senate, where so much deliberation has taken 
     place on how to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and where 
     the example of Kazakhstan has been welcomed and celebrated as 
     a model of what we must see in the 21st century.
       President Nazarbayev is one of the greatest champions of 
     nuclear nonproliferation in the world--not merely by his 
     words, but--most importantly--by his actions and his nation's 
     example.
       President Nazarbayev tells a very striking personal story 
     in the prologue of his book Epicenter of Peace. As a child, 
     he remembered having in his home an army rifle that had been 
     taken by one of his relatives--a Kazakh militiaman--in a 
     rebellion against a regular Russian army unit in 1916. One 
     day his grandmother said that the rifle had brought 
     suffering--that it should be cast out of the house. So 
     President Nazarbayev's father took the rifle to the 
     authorities, but not before removing the bayonet, which the 
     grandmother ordered be made into a sickle. She supplied the 
     handle that she made herself from her old spindle. As a young 
     boy, the President used that sickle to cut hay. This 
     childhood event--dismantling a weapon and building from it a 
     tool of peace and commerce--foreshadowed the work of his 
     adult life. It is the heart of the Biblical passage ``they 
     shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears 
     into pruning hooks.''

[[Page 14887]]

       President Nazarbayev dismantled his nation's nuclear 
     weapons and out of that action built a friendship with the 
     United States, an example for the world, and an opportunity 
     for his people to move toward a more promising future. Iran 
     and other nations could learn from Kazakhstan that a nation 
     can grow, modernize, make progress, and gain stature not in 
     spite of renouncing nuclear weapons, but because of it.
       Increasing global security also has a critical economic 
     dimension. In making the decision to disarm, President 
     Nazarbayev also chose to use his nation's resources to build 
     an economic base that would benefit all the citizens of 
     Kazakhstan. The world's economy and stability depends on 
     diversifying our energy base--so the Kazakhstan role in 
     energy development is very important. The pressure is 
     appropriately increasing on both governments and industry to 
     embed ``transparent'' processes and good governance practices 
     into their management systems. The government of Kazakhstan 
     clearly understands this issue, given the heightened 
     attention to increased oil production in the Caspian region. 
     The transparency demonstrated by the government of Kazakhstan 
     recently in announcing at a press conference the royalties 
     received for a recent large petroleum project is a very 
     positive step, and one that should be recognized, showcased, 
     and supported widely. Revenue transparency is an issue on 
     which industry and governments will likely continue to face 
     pressure. I applaud the inclusive and constructive approach 
     that has been taken to date, and I encourage all parties 
     involved to continue the dialogue and working together to 
     advance this important topic. Without economic stability--
     every step in the security arena becomes more difficult.
       Let me acknowledge and thank Minister Vladimir Shkolnik for 
     his role both in Kazakhstan's economic development and in its 
     nuclear disarmament example. President Nazarbayev had the 
     personal vision to renounce nuclear weapons, but he also had 
     something just as important. He had in Minister Shkolnik, a 
     man with the determination and the skill to get it done. The 
     world owes you a great debt, Mr. Minister.
       I also want to thank Ambassador Saudabayev, who this past 
     August in Athens, Georgia, so graciously presented to me 
     Kazakhstan's highest award to non-citizens. The Ambassador is 
     a vigorous and talented advocate for Kazakhstan's interests 
     in the United States. He has a keen understanding of where 
     our nations' interests intersect, and how we can advance them 
     together. Kazakhstan is fortunate to have a man of his talent 
     in Washington.
       It is fitting that we meet here in the halls of the United 
     States Senate, because it was here that the first legislative 
     debate took place on the question of reducing the nuclear 
     threat in the post-Cold War world.
       Let us recall what was at stake back in 1991. In December 
     of that year, Vice President Dick Cheney was then Defense 
     Secretary, and he offered this analysis:
       ``If the Soviets do an excellent job retaining control over 
     their stockpile of nuclear weapons--let's assume they've got 
     25,000-30,000; that's a ballpark figure--and they are 99 
     percent successful, that would mean you could still have as 
     many as 250 that they were not able to control.''
       So far--strong, visionary actions by many people have kept 
     that dire but plausible scenario from becoming reality. Dick 
     Lugar was an indispensible partner in creating the Nunn-Lugar 
     Program and a central crucial force in the Senate for 
     spending U.S. dollars to help secure nuclear weapons and 
     materials in the former Soviet Union. Graham Allison was a 
     brilliant voice from the outside urging action. At the start, 
     many members of Congress criticized this effort as aid to the 
     Soviet military. Six weeks or so later, the Senate voted 86-8 
     to spend $400 million to help secure the Soviet nuclear 
     stockpile and limit the spread of nuclear weapons as one 
     country split into fifteen countries, and one nuclear power 
     was replaced by four.
       This first vote was not a blank check; it was a challenge. 
     We had to prove to the Congress that Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction made a clear contribution to our national security. 
     The courageous actions of President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan 
     and Ukraine made a world of difference in proving the 
     effectiveness of our efforts.
       I understand the term ``Kazakh'' is a version of a Turkic 
     word meaning ``free or independent''. The moment Kazakhstan 
     became free, it set an independent course among the nations 
     of the world. Its President declared the nation would 
     renounce nuclear weapons. Its parliament voted in 1993 to 
     confirm that--and set in motion the plans to destroy more 
     than one hundred SS-18 ICBMs, each with 10 high-yield 
     warheads, along with other smaller nuclear weapons--a larger 
     nuclear arsenal than held by China, France or the United 
     Kingdom.
       President Nazarbayev's view was like his grandmother's: 
     these weapons have caused only suffering; they should be cast 
     out of the country.
       The world should understand, more than it does, the 
     Kazakhstani suffering that led to that decision. As everyone 
     here knows, the Soviet Union's premier nuclear test site was 
     located in Kazakhstan at Semipalatinsk, where it was the site 
     of the first Soviet nuclear explosion, and nearly 500 more 
     over the next forty years, more than one hundred of them 
     above ground. Because of the environmental devastation caused 
     by the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, President 
     Nazarbayev ordered the test site closed on August 29, 1991--
     four months before the collapse of the Soviet Union and 42 
     years to the day after the first nuclear test there.
       The release of radiation at the test site was far more 
     severe than Chernobyl--yet the world hears much of Chernobyl 
     and little of Semipalatinsk. Seventy percent of all Soviet 
     nuclear testing took place there. More than a million people 
     suffered dangerous doses of radiation from exposure to 
     fallout from the test site. Those exposed have suffered high 
     rates of cancer, infant mortality, birth defects, immune 
     deficiencies and nervous system disorders. Many of these 
     health defects don't end with the first generation; they are 
     passed on to children.
       It was in large part an understanding of their suffering 
     and a respect for their sacrifice that caused Kazakhstan to 
     become a world leader in renouncing nuclear weapons. 
     Kazakhstan was not only willing to dismantle its nuclear 
     arsenal, but also eager to destroy the test sites.
       Kazakhstan and the United States became strong security 
     partners from that decision forward, and money appropriated 
     here in the Congress helped pay for the dismantling of the 
     nuclear weapons, the destruction of the silos and the sealing 
     of the nuclear test tunnels.
       That is an impressive record of security cooperation. Yet 
     there is another accomplishment of U.S.-Kazakhstan relations 
     that is a model for nuclear nonproliferation, and that is 
     Project Sapphire. In 1993, Kazakhstani officials approached 
     the U.S. Ambassador in secret, alerting him to the existence, 
     at the lightly-secured Ulba Metallurgical Plant, of 1,300 
     pounds of weapons-grade uranium--enough to make dozens of 
     nuclear weapons. Both Iraq and Iran were known to be seeking 
     this kind of high-grade material. It was dangerous, plentiful 
     and vulnerable.
       After a year of planning, a 31-person team from the United 
     States flew to the region and worked with Kazakhstani experts 
     for six weeks to take the material out of its containers, 
     take precautions to make it safe during transport, repackage 
     it, and then ship it back to the United States on two Air 
     Force transporters. Once securely stored in Tennessee, this 
     uranium was blended down and used to generate civilian power, 
     in a continuation of the ``swords to plowshares'' tradition.
       This example shows how indispensable cooperation is in 
     keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of 
     dangerous people. The U.S. team arrived back in the United 
     States in late November. Elections three weeks before had 
     turned leadership of several legislative committees in 
     Congress over to new chairmen, some of whom were opposed to 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction. Project Sapphire offered 
     dramatic and visible proof of the security value of this 
     program and helped strengthen the arguments of those of us 
     who fought to continue funding.
       Project Sapphire also provided a model for future 
     operations of this kind--such as an operation four years 
     later in the Republic of Georgia; a recent operation in 
     Serbia called Project Vinca, where NTI working with the U.S., 
     Russian and Serbian officials, removed 100 pounds of highly 
     enriched uranium from the nuclear research reactor near 
     Belgrade; an another successful operation in Romania a few 
     months ago.
       The United States and Kazakhstan must intensify our ties 
     across the board--economic, educational, cultural, and 
     especially on matters of security.
       We have to continue to work together to shut down 
     Kazakhstan's fast breeder reactor that generated weapons-
     usable plutonium. We have to make sure the weapons scientists 
     who used to work at the Stepnogorsk anthrax factory can find 
     peaceful work. NTI is working with Kazakhstan now on how to 
     convert an active research reactor from using 90% enriched 
     uranium to low-enriched uranium, and on blending down tons of 
     fresh HEU power reactor fuel for sale as LEU.
       Kazakhstan has an important role in global security. Much 
     remains to be done and each crucial step is important to 
     Kazakhstan security, U.S. security and world security.
       We must recognize and our priorities and resources must 
     reflect that:
       1. The gravest danger in the world today is the threat from 
     nuclear, biological, an chemical weapons.
       2. The likeliest use of these weapons are in terrorist 
     hands.
       3. Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, biological and 
     chemical weapons should be the central organizing security 
     principle for the 21st century.
       Terrorists are racing to get weapons of mass destruction, 
     and we are not yet racing to stop them. The citizens of all 
     nations need to understand that no one--no matter where in 
     the world they live--is safe from the consequences of a 
     terrorist nuclear attack. The economic impact of the 
     September 11 attacks was felt in all parts of the globe. 
     Tourism dollars plunged. Airlines went bankrupt. Corporations 
     announced layoffs.
       But a nuclear 9/11 would make World Trade Center attacks 
     look like a warning shot. It

[[Page 14888]]

     would be impossible to calculate the economic costs, because 
     there is no way to calculate how long it would take for 
     citizens to recover the confidence they need to spend and 
     invest. The public would assume that if the terrorists had 
     one nuclear weapon, they could get another. If they would use 
     it in one city, they would use it in another. If even one 
     goes off, it's hard to see how we could fully recover. We 
     have to prevent it from happening--ever.
       How difficult is it for terrorists to attack us with a 
     nuclear weapon? That depends on how difficult we make it. No 
     terrorist can launch an attack without weapons-grade 
     material--plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Most 
     terrorists lack the sophisticated infrastructure necessary to 
     produce these materials; they would have to steal or buy 
     them.
       So the most effective, least expensive way to prevent 
     nuclear terrorism is to lock down and secure weapons and 
     fissile materials in every country and every facility that 
     has them. The world is in a race between cooperation an 
     catastrophe. To win this race, we have to achieve cooperation 
     on a scale we've never seen or attempted before--not because 
     cooperation will give us a warm feeling of community, but 
     because every. other method will fail.
       Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the 
     Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a charitable organization 
     working to reduce the global threats from nuclear, biological 
     and chemical weapons. He is also a senior partner in the law 
     firm of King & Spalding, where he focuses his practice on 
     international and corporate matters. He served as a United 
     States Senator from Georgia for 24 years (1972-1996).
       Raised in the small town of Perry in middle Georgia, he 
     attended Georgia Tech, Emory University and Emory Law School, 
     where he graduated with honors in 1962. After active duty 
     service in the U.S. Coast Guard, he served six years in the 
     U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. He first entere politics as a 
     member of the Georgia House of Representatives in 1968.
       During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Senator Nunn served 
     as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
     Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. He also served on 
     the Intelligence and Small Business Committees. His 
     legislative achievements include the landmark Department of 
     Defense Reorganization Act, drafted with the late Senator 
     Barry Goldwater, and the ``Nunn-Lugar'' Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction Program, which provides assistance to Russia and 
     the former Soviet republics for securing and destroying their 
     excess nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
       In addition to his work with NTI, Senator Nunn has 
     continued his service in the public policy arena as a 
     distinguished professor in the Sam Nunn School of 
     International Affairs at Georgia Tech and as chairman of the 
     board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
     in Washington, D.C.
       He is a board member of the following publicly held 
     corporations: ChevronTexaco Corporation, The Coca-Cola 
     Company, Dell Computer Corporation, General Electric Company, 
     Internet Security Systems Inc., and Scientific-Atlanta Inc.
       He is married to the former Colleen O'Brien and has two 
     children, Michelle and Brian, and one grandchild.
       On the nuclear front: the mission is difficult--but it is 
     not complicated. We know where the dangerous and vulnerable 
     materials are; we know what how to be done; we know how to do 
     it; we have made some progress--but not enough.
       There remains a dangerous gap between the pace of our 
     progress and the scope and urgency of the threat. The threat 
     extends well beyond the former Soviet Union. There are 100 
     nuclear research reactors and other facilities in 40 
     countries using highly enriched uranium--the raw material of 
     nuclear terrorism. Some of it is secured by nothing more than 
     an underpaid guard sitting inside a chain-link fence. In 
     August 2002, when nuclear weapons material was removed from 
     the research reactor near Belgrade, the U.S. and Russia said 
     they were going to move quickly on 24 similar sites. But it's 
     now been over a year and only one additional site has been 
     addressed. Two out of 25 shows the lack of urgency of this 
     work. We can argue as to who is to blame--Russia or the 
     United States or other countries--but the bottom line is that 
     our security is at stake no matter who is to blame.
       Most governments and most leaders have still not 
     acknowledged by their actions, by their resource priorities, 
     and by their cooperation that the threat of catastrophic 
     terrorism is the most immediate, most likely, most 
     potentially devastating threat we face; that it threatens all 
     of us equally; that it demands urgent action; that it 
     requires a new level of cooperation. This is the kind of 
     danger that ought to focus our attention--because if we don't 
     prevent this threat, nothing else will matter.
       What must we do? NTI has funded a project that brings 
     together a consortium of 21 research institutions across 
     Europe, Russia, the U.S. and Asia to work together on threat 
     reduction. Let me summarize their conclusion:
       1. Nuclear weapons and materials--wherever they are in the 
     world--represent a grave danger. We must secure all of it, 
     everywhere, quickly to reduce the terrorist threat.
       2. Tactical nuclear weapons must be accounted for and 
     secured.
       3. All excess weapons-grade nuclear materials should be 
     secured and then destroyed.
       4. Chemical weapons--every one of them--should be secured 
     and destroyed.
       5. Biological weapons facilities of the former Soviet Union 
     must be open and transparent. We must help convert these 
     facilities and the labors of the scientists who used to work 
     in them, to peaceful commercial purposes.
       The most positive recent development in Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction came in the summer of last year when the G8 nations 
     pledged $20 billion over ten years to launch the Global 
     Partnership and to secure and prevent the read of weapons and 
     mass destruction. Since this announcement many other nations 
     have joined the partnership. Kazakhstan has a great deal to 
     contribute to the partnership, and I hope that you will join. 
     The partnership should include everyone who has something to 
     safeguard and who has something to contribute to safeguarding 
     it. Kazakhstan is unique as an example of leadership.
       A great opportunity to accelerate the work of the global 
     partnership comes next summer in Sea Island, Georgia, where 
     the leaders of the G8 will meet again. Either the G8 will 
     dramatically expand its threat reduction efforts, or the 
     Global Partnership will remain a second-tier response to a 
     first-tier threat--and leave grave dangers to our children.
       In the race between cooperation and catastrophe, we have 
     taken steps in the right direction, but we're long past the 
     time when we can take satisfaction with step in the right 
     direction. A gazelle running from a cheetah is taking steps 
     in the right direction. It's not just a question of 
     direction; it's a matter of speed.
       If a terrorist nuclear device exploded tonight in 
     Washington, New York, Astana, Moscow or London, what would we 
     wish we had done to stop it? Why aren't we doing that now?

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