[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 14071-14072]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to 
speak out of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Speaker, lately it seems that the national debate over 
the next move in Iraq has become bogged down in a way that really 
reflects the military struggle itself. The administration has dug in, 
believing that simply staying the course, we can simply outlast the 
military insurgency.
  Conversely, there are some in my party who, angered understandably by 
war under false pretenses, are seeking a pell-mell evacuation complete 
with a publicly announced evacuation date, which I think makes the 
withdrawal of 136,000 troops more dangerous and more difficult.
  But, Mr. Speaker, drawing upon the lessons of history, I would like 
to propose a third way: creating a mechanism to more effectively 
empower the new elected Iraqi Government, which will allow for a 
gradual but permanent U.S. troop reduction.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to take a moment to talk about a process 
that we went through in my office after five visits to Iraq to try to 
find a model that would allow us to shift the governmental operations 
in Iraq away from the U.S. military and to their new government. And 
the example that we came up with, that has been used by this government 
in the past, is actually the model that was developed during the Second 
World War.
  In 1944, after driving Japanese forces from the Philippines with the 
help of the Filipino resistance, the United States military, like today 
in Iraq, found itself in complete control of the Philippines, over 
7,000 islands. It found itself in complete control of the basic 
services that government would provide in the Philippines. And because 
of the recent occupation by Japanese forces, there was no incumbent 
government in the Philippines that could take the responsibilities for 
these government operations.
  So, by default, the U.S. military took over these government 
operations; and while U.S. policy at the time strongly supported 
Filipino independence, the military had no choice but to temporarily 
exercise control under the fragile circumstances.
  Clearly, that situation could not endure indefinitely. And what 
Congress did next, in 1944, under the tutelage of John W. McCormack and 
the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, and later the Truman 
administration supported, was instructive and I think worth repeating.
  In 1944, this Congress passed and the President signed the Filipino 
Rehabilitation Act, which created a national commission comprised of 
three appointees each from the White House, the Senate, and the House, 
and their mission was to plan and coordinate and oversee the transition 
of government operations away from the U.S. military and over to the 
newly forming Filipino government.
  Of course, there are certain arguable differences between the 
situation in the Philippines in 1944 and Iraq in 2006. However, after 
my five visits to Iraq and dozens of meetings with General George Casey 
and top generals in his office and in the field, as well as Iraqi 
President Jalal Talabani and members

[[Page 14072]]

of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, I believe the critical 
weakness in our current strategy is this persistent inability to 
empower the new Iraqi Government.
  With this in mind, I recently introduced the Iraq Transition Act of 
2006, H.R. 5716, drawing from the Philippines model. And I give credit 
to those in 1944 who devised this. This is not original thought; this 
is borrowed from their example.
  I have proposed the establishment of a national bipartisan commission 
comprised of appointees, again from the White House, the Senate, and 
this House, whose specific and targeted purpose would be to help 
facilitate the orderly, deliberate, and expeditious transition from 
U.S. military control to Iraqi civilian control of operations of 
government in Iraq. It is important to remember that the transition to 
civilian control in Iraq is a political process, and while I have many 
times witnessed the excellence with which our military has performed in 
Iraq, I also believe it is a strategic disservice to the military for 
us to add political reconciliation to the massive burdens of security 
and reconstruction that they are now shouldering.
  Simply put, the newly created Commission on Iraqi Transition would be 
held directly responsible for working with the military leadership and 
the Department of State to accomplish the transition to Iraqi civilian 
control of government operations in Iraq and to regularly report its 
progress to the Congress, the President, and the American people.
  While this approach may not satisfy the ``stay the course'' advocates 
or those who would prefer to announce a specific date for withdrawal, I 
believe it offers a responsible and workable plan for two important 
reasons.
  In closing, firstly, this bill introduces a level of direct 
accountability to the political transition process that does not now 
exist and has made measuring progress extremely difficult. And secondly 
and lastly, it has precedent and success to support it and offers the 
best opportunity for the earliest withdrawal of U.S. forces, while 
leaving the Iraqi people with the greatest chance for preserving their 
newly found democracy.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues.

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