[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 10]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 13754-13755]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              KAZAKHSTAN'S CANDIDACY FOR OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 29, 2006

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, next week, Kassymzhomart 
Tokaev, the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, will be visiting 
Washington. Given Kazakhstan's growing strategic and economic 
significance, his agenda with U.S. Government officials and Congress is 
likely to be broad-ranging. But a key focus of Minister Tokaev's 
discussions will certainly be Kazakhstan's bid to serve in 2009 as 
Chair-in-Office of the 56-nation Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Kazakhstan has been avidly pursuing this 
prestigious leadership post since 2003. The consensus decision must be 
made by this fall, in time for the December OSCE Ministerial Meeting.
  While I support the idea of Central Asian leadership of the OSCE, my 
purpose today is to point out the very serious problems with 
Kazakhstan's candidacy. As many of my colleagues on the Helsinki 
Commission have concluded, awarding Kazakhstan the political leadership 
of OSCE in 2009 would be unwarranted and potentially dangerous for the 
Organization. President Nursultan Nazarbaev, in

[[Page 13755]]

his opening statement at a recent OSCE meeting in Almaty, even 
admitted: ``We do not . . . have established democratic principles.'' 
Therefore, allowing Kazakhstan to assume the chairmanship by default is 
not acceptable. Kazakhstan's chairmanship bid must be deferred until 
the country substantially implements its OSCE commitments, especially 
those on human rights and democratization.
  Defenders of Kazakhstan's candidacy have pointed to the country's 
economic reforms and relative freedom, compared to the rest of Central 
Asia. I concur that Kazakhstan is far ahead of the police states of 
Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. But that is no great achievement. 
Surpassing the worst of the worst does not confer an automatic right to 
hold the chairmanship of the OSCE which is dedicated to upholding human 
rights and promoting democracy.
  It has long been the State Department's position ``that any Chair of 
the OSCE must be in substantial compliance with all OSCE commitments.'' 
Over several years now, high-level U.S. Government officials have 
provided Nazarbaev and other Kazakh officials clear, concrete 
indicators of the progress necessary before serious consideration could 
be given to U.S. support for Kazakhstan's Chair-in-Office bid.
  Yet long-promised political reforms in Kazakhstan have not 
materialized and the human rights climate remains poor, as documented 
in the State Department's annual reports. Kazakhstan's oil riches, 
strategic location and cooperation with the United States in 
antiterrorism programs cannot conceal the fact that the country remains 
an authoritarian state. President Nazarbaev has manipulated 
constitutional referendums and falsified elections to stay in power, 
while his relatives and friends have gained monopoly positions in the 
most profitable sectors of the economy. Independent and opposition 
media have been consistently harassed and pressured, and opposition 
politicians have been excluded from elections, or worse.
  Such was the state of affairs before last December's presidential 
election, which was widely seen as a ``make-or-break'' moment for 
Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, the government failed to uphold its 
international commitments before, during and following the election. 
Despite repeated pledges from Nazarbaev to hold a free and fair 
contest, the OSCE observation mission stated the election ``did not 
meet a number of OSCE commitments'' due to ``restrictions on 
campaigning, harassment of campaign staff and persistent and numerous 
cases of intimidation by the authorities'' which ``limited the 
possibility for a meaningful competition.''
  The election was a serious blow to Kazakhstan's chances to chair the 
OSCE. The recent establishment of the State Commission on the 
Development and Realization of the Programme of Political Reforms comes 
after the major elections, too late to have any definitive liberalizing 
effects. In addition, a string of events has accentuated the disturbing 
gap between OSCE commitments and Kazakhstan's implementation.
  Last November, opposition politician and former Mayor of Almaty 
Zamanbek Nurkadilov was found dead in his home. According to Kazakh 
authorities, he shot himself three times--twice in the chest and once 
in the head. The official version of his death is, kindly put, 
implausible in the extreme.
  In February, opposition politician Altynbek Sarsenbaev, along with 
his driver and unarmed bodyguard, was shot in an apple orchard outside 
Almaty. The official investigation has placed the blame for this brazen 
crime on Erzhan Utembaev, head of the administration of the Senate, who 
allegedly engaged the services of some security officers.
  It is fair to say that this explanation for Sarsenbaev's death has 
failed to satisfy many observers. What is indisputable, however, is 
that anyone involved in opposition politics in Kazakhstan risks, in the 
worst case scenario, not merely electoral defeat but murder.
  Furthermore, Kazakh officials have backed Russian plans to eviscerate 
the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which, 
among other important democracy promoting activities, undertakes the 
OSCE's election observation missions. This would pose a grave threat to 
the OSCE as an institution and as the most credible election monitoring 
organization in the world.
  Recent statements and actions by local Kazakh authorities against a 
Hare Krishna community outside of Almaty and actions to penalize 
minority religious communities for unregistered religious practice run 
counter to OSCE norms and Kazakhstan's stated commitment to inter-
religious tolerance.
  On March 20, President Nazarbaev praised Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov's handling of unrest in Andijon in May 2005. Praise for the 
Andijon massacre that left hundreds dead in Uzbekistan--and which moved 
the OSCE, the U.S. Government and international organizations to call 
for an independent, impartial investigation--are hardly the ``reforms'' 
one expects of a country that hopes to chair the OSCE. The forced 
repatriation of Uzbek refugees to Uzbekistan was equally alarming.
  Just today, Kazakhstan's upper house passed a highly restrictive 
media law that has been criticized by the OSCE's Representative on the 
Media and the U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan. It is hoped that President 
Nazarbaev will not sign this problematic bill into law.
  Mr. Speaker, in light of these circumstances, Kazakhstan's bid to 
chair the OSCE in 2009 cannot be supported. I strongly believe that 
backing Kazakhstan's candidacy would cause more difficulties than will 
result from Astana's disappointment over not winning this prize.
  None of this means that we should not strive to develop the best 
possible relations with Kazakhstan, on a mutually beneficial basis. 
There are many areas of current and potential cooperation between our 
countries, including Kazakhstan's entry into the WTO, energy, military 
security and anti-terrorism. Nor does my inability to support 
Kazakhstan's candidacy for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 mean that I do 
not hope to be able to back a future bid. Nothing would please me more 
than to report to this Chamber that Kazakhstan has met its commitments 
on democratization and human rights and richly deserves to lead the 
OSCE. A Kazakh chairmanship would also move the Organization eastward 
in the symbolic sense, bridging what has become an uncomfortable gap 
between the former Soviet republics and Europe.
  But that moment has not yet come, Mr. Speaker. I would encourage the 
Kazakh leaders to avail themselves of the opportunity of additional 
time to constructively engage the OSCE. Working to ensure that the 
Organization succeeds would aid Kazakhstan's bid for a future 
chairmanship, while expressing sour grapes over a denial can only add 
to the impression that Kazakhstan is not ready for a leadership role.
  The OSCE Chairmanship represents acknowledgement of progress already 
made, not a stimulus to future, unproven progress. Urging the Kazakhs 
to defer their bid would leave the door open for Astana, should 
demonstrable reforms on human rights and democratization be 
forthcoming. That progress was promised by President Nazarbaev, when he 
signed the Helsinki Accords as his country joined the OSCE in 1992.

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