[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 13718-13720]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                 MORTGAGING THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 4, 2005, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) is 
recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. SKELTON. I thank the Speaker for recognizing me this evening.
  I wish to speak tonight about the United States military. I have the 
privilege of serving as the ranking member on the Armed Services 
Committee here in the House of Representatives. I wish to speak about 
mortgaging the future of our military.
  In particular, I want to talk about the Army, the United States Army. 
That wonderful institution that has contributed so much to American 
freedom, has meant so much to us historically, and yet I feel that I 
must discuss and tell my colleagues this evening about the future of 
our military and how it is being strained in so many respects.
  I want to talk about two of the elements of military. In particular, 
I want to talk about the Army. This is true also of the Marine Corps, 
but I will discuss mostly the Army.
  The continuous deployment in Iraq hurts our military personnel and 
their families by straining the recruiting and retention; it damages 
our readiness for our mission skills outside those required for Iraq. 
As we all know, we have lost some 2,529 servicemembers killed in Iraq. 
We have over 18,000 wounded, with near 8,500 of those unable to return 
to duty.
  Regarding the active duty of the United States Army, over 14 percent 
of the Army active duty force is currently deployed in Iraq. The 
quality of recruits has fallen in the United States Army, as greater 
numbers of high school dropouts and other category IV recruits, the 
lowest level of recruit, have been increasing. Additionally, the number 
of soldiers who score below the 50th percentile in the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test has been increasing.
  For the past several years, the Army has reduced the minimum time-in-
grade requirements for promotion to captain from 24 months to 18 
months. It takes 38 months for a lieutenant to become a captain 
compared to 42 months just 2 years ago.
  One hundred percent of the Army's available active duty combat 
brigades have served at least a 12-month tour in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
At least 50 percent of those combat brigades have completed their 
second tour in Iraq or Afghanistan.
  Regarding the Selected Reserves, more than 20 percent of those 
currently deployed in Iraq are members of the Selected Reserves. That 
is the Guard and the Reserves. Over 39 percent of the Selected Reserves 
have been mobilized since September 11. Nearly 20 percent of those 
mobilized have been deployed two or more times. In fact, 13,800 members 
of the Selected Reserves have had three deployments, and 10,400 have 
been deployed more than three times.
  Currently, 45 percent of the Selected Reserves mobilized are 
deployed. Ninety-seven percent of the National Guard's combat and 
special operation battalions have been mobilized since September 11. 
The average tour of duty for National Guard members is 342 days.
  Regarding recruiting and retention, by 2007, the Army projects that 
it will be short 3,500 active duty officers, primarily captains and 
majors. The percentage of officers leaving the Army has been increasing 
since 2004. Approximately 3,500 airmen are currently performing Army 
missions, and the Navy is also being asked to assume greater 
responsibilities in the Iraq theatre.

[[Page 13719]]

  While the majority of the service components are currently meeting 
their recruitment goals, last year five components failed to meet their 
enlistment accession goals. The Army began the fiscal year 2006 with a 
delayed entry program of 12 percent, which is a 5 percent reduction 
from fiscal year 2005, and it is significantly below the 46 percent 
that was at the beginning of fiscal year 2003.
  The cost of recruiting has increased tremendously in fiscal year 
2005. Active and Reserve components spent $3 billion on recruiting 
programs. The cost of retention has increased as well in fiscal year 
2005. Active and Reserve components spent $1.5 billion on retention 
bonuses, this compared to $885 million spent in fiscal year 2004.
  Next, let us discuss the equipment issues. Equipment readiness is 
falling, and Iraq seems to be a black hole for all available equipment. 
Forty percent of the Army and Marine Corps ground equipment is deployed 
to Iraq. Equipment in Iraq is wearing out two to nine times the 
peacetime rate. Some equipment has added as much as 27 years' worth of 
wear and tear in the last 3 years.
  A Humvee designed for 14 years of operation needs overhaul or 
replacement in just 3 years. Additional armor added to protect troops 
is causing accelerated aging and has increased the number of rollover 
accidents. The Army has lost over 100 helicopters since 9/11. Many of 
those lost helicopters have not been replaced. It took 4 years to 
replace the first helicopter that was lost in 2001. The Army has lost 
over 100 tanks and armored vehicles and over 1,000 vehicles since the 
start of the war.
  Readiness trends for active units are falling, and nondeployed units 
are severely degraded.

                              {time}  2210

  Nearly all of the nondeployed Army units are suffering degraded 
readiness, with unprecedented numbers of units reporting at the lowest 
levels of mission capability. Units preparing to deploy for Iraq are 
being issued equipment. In many cases this equipment arrives right 
before deployment. This limits the training opportunities for units 
returning to combat.
  Regarding their pre-positioned equipment, let us speak about that. 
Much of it is no longer pre-positioned. Pre-positioned equipment stocks 
have been seriously depleted to support the war in Iraq.
  Nearly 40 percent of the Marine Corps positioned to afloat ships have 
been downloaded. The Army plans to download one of the two afloat 
brigades to supply more equipment to Iraq. These afloat brigades are 
used to rapidly provide heavy combat equipment to contingency missions. 
Afloat brigades reduce deployment time from months to days. This plan 
is accepting significant strategic risk that will affect force 
protection capability.
  Let us speak about the National Guard equipment. The National Guard 
only has about 34 percent of its equipment on hand, down from 75 
percent of its requirement in 2001. The missing equipment that has been 
left in Iraq is transferred to units deploying to Iraq. According to 
the National Guard, reserve equipment for fiscal year 2007, the Army 
National Guard has been directed to transfer more than 75,000 pieces of 
equipment valued at $1.7 billion to the Army to support Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.
  There is no plan to replace these items. This lack of equipment at 
home hinders the Guard's ability to train and adversely affects their 
ability to be comparable with active component units. Examples of 
shortages, the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from 
Iraq in 2005. The unit had left 229 HUMVEES or 73 percent of its 
predeployment inventory of those vehicles in Iraq.
  Regarding repairing all of this damage, it is costly. The Army has at 
least a $36 billion bill to repair and replace equipment. In fiscal 
year 2006, the Army will spend $13.5 billion this year to repair and 
replace battle damage and losses from Iraq.
  This isn't a full accounting of all losses, because some items such 
as helicopters, cannot be replaced because they are no longer in 
production.
  The Army estimates that $17 billion will be required for 2007. If the 
war in Iraq ended today, the Army would require 2 years of supplemental 
appropriations for somewhere between $24 and $36 billion. 
Unfortunately, it will take much more than 2 years to repair or replace 
that equipment. The Army will not be made whole again for many years.
  General Hagee of the Marine Corps reported that it has taken 2 years 
to produce replacement light armored vehicles from placement of the 
order until delivery. Army modernization and transformation has slowed 
due to funding pressures of the war in Iraq. Depots are not operating 
at full capacity. They are capable of producing 57 million hours of 
direct labor but are currently estimated at providing about 19 million 
hours of labor.
  According to the Army's Tank and Automotive Command, the Army cannot 
afford to do full overhauls on its ground equipment and has made a 
decision to perform reduced scope repairs.
  By the way, the Marine Corps has incurred a bill of some $12 billion 
to date to reset its equipment.
  In 2006, 19 brigade combat teams will return from Iraq. Their 
equipment is some 600 combat vehicles, 30,000 wheeled vehicles and 615 
aircraft, and they will require 24 million hours of direct labor or 
repair. This will be quite a challenge for the Army, considering that 
the Army has still not repaired all of the vehicles deployed to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, which returned home in 2004.
  By the way, the Marine Corps has determined that equipment deployed 
to air has suffered such significant damage and wear and tear and that 
80 percent of it will need to be replaced.
  Regarding the budget pressures affecting everything in the Department 
of Defense, it goes to make up for budget shortfalls.
  The Army reduced its base operation support budget. Some of the cuts, 
such as cuts to childcare facilities, directly affect military quality 
of life and make it more difficult for already stressed military 
families to get by.
  The Navy only partially funded its deployed steaming days in the 
President's budget. The budget included a request for only 36 of the 51 
required steaming days for Navy ships, a shortfall of $120 billion.
  The Navy ship program was underfunded. The shipping program was 
underfunded by the President's budget request by $119 million this 
year, bringing the total deferred maintenance bill for Navy ships to 
$240 million.
  Army modernization is being slowed. The Air Force's fleet of aircraft 
is aging, and we are not replacing them fast enough. The average age 
for Air Force aircraft is over 23 years. Some aircraft are over 50 
years old. Would one feel safe to be in a 50-year-old commercial 
airplane? Do we feel we want to have a 50-year-old plane defending our 
Nation?
  Regarding readiness ratings, they continued to fall. Very few 
nondeployed units here in the continental United States are rated fully 
mission capable. Readiness in Iraq remains high, but it is coming on 
the back of the reset of the Army and Marine Corps. Units in the 
continental United States are short of equipment having to get 
additional parts and are sending additional equipment into the fight.
  Units are training for Iraq without all of their required equipment. 
They are getting well only upon arrival in Iraq.
  Readiness within the force services is poor across the board, and it 
continues to trend down. Mostly, this is due to the equipment as well 
as personnel issues.
  When asked if he was comfortable with the readiness of the Army 
outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, General Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, replied no.
  Why do I make these comments? Because, under the Constitution of the 
United States, it is up to us to raise and maintain the military, the 
wonderful military of the United States. I spoke mostly, of course, 
this evening about the Army, the United States Army, that magnificent 
institution whose history is that of protecting

[[Page 13720]]

freedom; and so much glory is due to those that wore the uniform from 
the days of our Revolution down to today, and I am so proud of them.
  But we in Congress need to take heed of the personnel challenges. We 
need to take heed of the equipment challenges. We need to do so, and I 
bring this to the attention of this body, because it is the right thing 
to do for our country and for the wonderful military and those who wear 
the uniform of our country.

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